elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At [departure airport]; a ramp agent delivered the Cargo Load Report to me; which included '6 @ 165 lbs' of additional cargo. The ramp agent; as he handed this to me; said there were six items in freight with a total weight of 165. He did not make any other statements to me and did not advise me about any other items.[The flight] proceeded normally.At [the destination]; I assured ground power was available; shut down the APU; and began the post-flight walk around.As I turned to inspect the left side of the airplane; I observed that the cargo door was closed; and a belt loader was still parked next to the airplane; unattended; with six parcels still on the belt. One parcel was long with a [retail sales company] logo. The five other parcels were larger cardboard boxes; all of the same size. Four were identical; but the fifth had a large 'CAUTION!' sticker on every side of the box. On closer inspection; I discovered this one parcel was labeled 'LITHIUM ION BATTERY; DO NOT LOAD OR TRANSPORT PACKAGE IF DAMAGED.' Its appearance was highly unusual to me.I immediately consulted the company Hazardous Materials Operations Manual. The policy provides for carry-on items and wheelchairs only to contain lithium ion batteries. Cargo items may not contain lithium ion batteries; and the Flight crew must be informed of any hazardous materials in cargo.I then phoned the dispatch desk. [The hazmat specialist] requested copies of [the dangerous goods]. He later returned my call and instructed me to have the parcel quarantined for investigation and to file a report. I relayed the request to Operations; and then met with [the] ramp supervisor. He understood the request to quarantine the package; which had been removed in the meantime; and asked me to email a photo of the waybill to him.As the flight crew does not routinely inspect cargo prior to flight; I rely on the Cargo Load Report from ramp personnel unless there appears to be any doubt or confusion as to the nature of the cargo. In this case; I could have asked specifically if there was any hazmat; but that alone might not prevent such an event.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported unknowingly carrying hazmat (lithium ion batteries) without being properly advised of their presence on the aircraft.
Date: 201707
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I regularly observe the following issues when requesting to leave the flight deck for physiological needs.1) Galley lights are off when I look through the peephole. It is impossible to see anything; so I have to sit down and call the FA again telling them to turn on the lights. Especially when flying with new hire FOs they are often not fully aware of the necessity to clearly see what goes on in the galley before unlocking the cockpit door; so although the galley lights were off they still opened the door. 2) The cart is placed in the aisle (as per my request) but one flight attendant is standing in the galley unable to see the aisle and the other FA is facing the peephole cabin-side. This way they would not be able to see if a passenger came running to the FD door as we open it. When I asked the FAs about that problem afterwards they said that nobody really ever trained the procedure with them to that level of detail. 3) When FAs have the cart in place they often knock on the FD door instead of using the interphone. This is an issue because in a duress situation they are supposed to call with 3 chimes and say [a specific phrase]. If they always knock in normal non-duress situations anybody observing our procedures for a while would know that as soon as they reach for the interphone and don't knock they are doing so to warn us.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain relayed his opinion of current in-flight security procedures pertaining to flight deck access.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; Turbulence; Windshear; .5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Inadvertent controlled flight towards terrain. During vectors to the final approach course; this light GA aircraft (C182) was experiencing moderate to heavy turbulence and the pilot was working very hard to keep the aircraft on course and on altitude. The turbulence continued past the Final Approach Fix and upon breaking out of the clouds at 1000 ft MSL; the PIC noticed that he was below the visual glideslope indications from the field but was still showing on glideslope on the aircraft navigation system. It was at this point that the pilot recognized that the vertical glideslope indicator inop flag was now displayed; but the PIC had not noticed a flag previously on the approach. It is likely that the vertical glideslope had stopped functioning at some point during the approach and the pilot's scan had broken down due to the additional difficulty posed by the challenging wind conditions and had thus allowed the pilot to unknowingly descend below glideslope. Fortunately the cloud cover was high enough that visual cues allowed the pilot to recognize and correct for the deviation once below the clouds. No low altitude alert was given by the Tower during the approach.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported descending below glideslope on an RNAV approach and noted that the glideslope indicator was inoperative only after seeing the visual glideslope indicators showing that the aircraft was below the glideslope.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: FFZ.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D FFZ
ATC / advisory: Tower FFZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was cleared into the Class D by Falcon Tower when 11 miles southwest of the airport and told to make right hand entry for Runway 4L. Runway 4R is closed for construction. I was at 3;000 FT MSL and descending to pattern altitude of 2;400 when the Tower advised me of traffic to my right and behind me. I did not spot the traffic and reported [that] to the Tower. I was asked to IDENT two or three times. I was in contact with the Tower several times and given a clearance to land while about three miles from the airport. The Tower was in contact with two helicopters on the west side of the field at the same time and was having trouble determining which one was where. The next thing I see is a [low-wing light aircraft] below me and at my 10 o'clock. He had passed below me about 100 FT and was turning to base leg at that time. I was told to turn down wind and make it a long down wind. I was then told to make a 360 on down wind as I was about to exit the Falcon Class D airspace. I was then told to turn base. The rest of the landing sequence was without incident.




Synopsis: Light aircraft pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft on visual approach to FFZ.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On vectors for approach to 16R. Approach Control called converging traffic for 16L. We saw the Airbus and called the traffic in sight. First Officer (FO) Pilot Flying (PF) armed the LOC after being cleared to intercept on a 145 heading. Winds aloft were from the ESE at approx.30 knots providing us with undershooting winds and the converging traffic with overshooting winds. The aircraft captured the LOC without overshooting. I maintained visual contact with the parallel traffic the whole time (over my left shoulder) and their depiction on TCAS indicated yellow and +500. I remarked to the FO that the traffic seemed pretty close. We were cleared for the approach; FO armed Approach and intercepted glideslope. At around 2;000 feet AGL; we received a RA 'Climb; Climb'. The TCAS depiction of the parallel traffic had switched to red +500. I visually observed the traffic above and to our left. Following the RA at that time would have been an unsafe course of action because it would have had us climb into the traffic. I told the FO/PF to continue the approach and that I had the traffic in sight. There was no other traffic in the area that could possibly have caused the RA. The 'Climb; Climb' warning continued for a few seconds and then stopped. At around 1;700 feet AGL we received an additional RA; but this time it was 'Descend; Descend now'. The traffic was still in sight and in the same relative position as before. I again advised the FO to continue the approach. At that time; the FO slowed to our approach speed of 121 kts. The airbus soon passed us and all the RAs stopped. We landed uneventfully. It is my opinion that following the guidance would have put both our aircraft in an unsafe situation. TCAS should not direct a climb to avoid traffic that is above us.




Synopsis: B757 Captain on approach experienced a TCAS RA generated by an Airbus approaching 16L. The Captain was the monitoring pilot with the traffic in sight and instructed the First Officer to continue the approach. The RA was calling for a climb initially; with the traffic clearly above.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight the oil pressure went to zero. [I] turned toward nearest airport. Engine started to lose power. Loss of power continued until engine failure; causing aircraft to land short and to right side of the runway. During roll out horizontal stabilizer hit post. Damage was to tail of aircraft. No injuries to passengers. Problem possibly caused by oil filter adaptor becoming loose.




Synopsis: After loosing engine oil pressure; the pilot of a single engine high wing aircraft experienced loss of engine power and eventually engine failure; resulting in a landing short of the runway and collision with a post.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While performing the after takeoff flow I noticed the EICAS message BLD 2 VLV CLSD. I performed the associated QRH procedures but the EICAS message stayed on. We leveled off at 10;000 MSL to troubleshoot. Maintenance and Dispatch agreed that continuation to destination was not practical and we decided to return to our departure airport. Although we were well above maximum structural landing weight Dispatch advised that holding for two hours to burn off the necessary fuel was not practical. We declared an emergency with TRACON to perform an overweight landing with ARFF equipment and personal standing by. Touchdown was at -100 FPM. Brake temperatures were normal after the landing roll so we continued to the gate and deplaned.


Second narrative: [We] declared an emergency due to the weight issue (brake blow out or fire). We knew we may fly into icing and considering we where going to have to refile at 250 for single bleed did not want to chance single bleed in icing.


Synopsis: Shortly after takeoff; an E-145 flight crew elected to return to their departure airport and land overweight when EICAS revealed an engine bleed valve was closed and the possibility of icing conditions existed en route to their destination.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the initial climb as we were climbing to 9;000 feet as directed by ATC it was noticed that the aircraft was not pressurizing. Our Delta P was at 0.2 and Cabin Pressure at 8;500 feet. We immediately agreed we shouldn't climb any higher than 9;000 feet and I then delegated tasks to ensure our safety as we ran a QRH and associated checks. ATC was more than accommodating with us at a lower altitude direct ZZZ. We ran fuel numbers and saw we would land with well above our standard divert should we remain at 9;000 feet the entire way. The cabin reported that there was no unusual activity and I briefed the FA on the situation. Company was contacted via ZZZ Radio via PRESTO Radio after attempts to contact Dispatch as outlined in our guidebooks yielded no results. Dispatch was appraised and Maintenance had me attempt manual pressurization which failed. It was learned the following day that the seal around the cargo door had failed. After discussing all available option and considering the pros and cons of the options as a crew; along with the support of Dispatch and Maintenance we then continued to our destination as the cost of a longer flight duration. There were no further abnormalities or incidents during this flight.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a pressurization problem that caused the flight to continue to destination at a low altitude.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out through FL180 while performing cockpit duties; [I] noticed fuel system synoptic was not indicating properly. No indication of fuel valves position and no flow bar to L engine. Right side had flow bar with no valve position indication. Concerned whether fuel system was in proper operating configuration. Decided to return to [departure airport].




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported returning to the departure airport after noting the fuel system synoptic was not indicating properly.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we taxied into position on the runway; two following flights reported that significant flames and smoke were coming from our APU compartment.  We verified the APU had shut down; exited the runway; and requested CFR support. The QRH provided no guidance given the lack of ECAM indications; and I elected to deploy the APU fire extinguishing system as a precaution.  Once we were able to communicate with the CFR crews on a discreet emergency frequency; we determined that the event was over. We returned to the gate and debriefed with the CFR and cabin crews.




Synopsis: The flight crew of an A320 was alerted by other aircraft of significant smoke and flames emanating from their APU while taking the departure runway.  The Captain activated the APU Fire Extinguishing system and contacted the CFR personnel; determined the event was over; and returned the aircraft to the gate followed by a crew briefing.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MSO.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After arriving at the airport a Person X told us there was frost on the aircraft that would require deicing. He was not the deice coordinator but the deice coordinator was there and confirmed the need. After we got to the aircraft the First Officer did the exterior preflight inspection and returned to the flight deck. He reported that the Person X we spoke to upon arrival said we could do the deicing at the deice pad with engines running. He told the First Officer that tests have shown there enough overspray when spraying the wings to adequately remove the frost from the props. A short time later the deice coordinator came to the flight deck and we discussed that I would be shutting the engines down to complete the process. He agreed and the flight continued with the process and departed.I have not been able to verify the engine running procedure as described. We did not find a provision in the deice section of the FOM. I consulted the fleet manager and a couple other pilots to ask if there was a procedure as described by the Person X. None had heard of this procedure. My concern is that; while well intended; the influence from Person X could result in a newer Captain accepting the procedure. My First Officer was clear that the person indicated the procedure had been tested and found to be acceptable. My recommendation is to educate the Person X that this is not an acceptable method of deicing the props; but also that trying to influence a pilot to accept a non-standard procedure could have disastrous results.My intention here is NOT to get somebody in any kind of a discipline situation but rather to insure we are all on the same page when formulating the proper course of action.




Synopsis: Captain reported station ground personnel pressured him to accept nonstandard procedures for deicing; resulting in a possible procedural deviation.