elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I am an Aircraft owner. My plane's annual inspection was due at the end of [month]. There was significant weather on my intended route; southbound; to perform the annual inspection on my aircraft. On Day 0; I submitted a request for a special flight permit ('ferry permit') to ZZZ FSDO using the FAA's AWC system. I used instructions found on the FAA website to create the account; fill out the special flight permit form; and submit it for review. In the past; I have done this via FAX or Email. I am attempting to join the FAA in modernizing systems. My request was quite simple. I was asking for a 10 day extension to my Annual's due date (thus; Day 4 through Day 13). There was widespread icing and turbulence PIREPs and forecasts for the next three days. I stated in my application that I wished to avoid 'get-there-itis' as a pilot. The pressure of getting the aircraft to maintenance in a timely fashion may have compromised my judgment. As luck would have it; there was a 4 hour forecast window between two passing cold fronts which had created miserable flying conditions. I used this window. I am very concerned that the FAA's transition to new systems may be causing requests like mine to fall through the cracks. I feel that if the weather window did not appear as it did; that I would have been placed under undue pressure to complete a flight which may have had hazardous consequences; or been generally marginal with fewer 'outs' than my normal preference. A pilot with less weather experience; or a less capable aircraft may have made the wrong decision in my situation. If the FAA is to present a tool such as the AWC Portal; then it needs to use it. As I write this; the request has sat ignored for two weeks. If the FAA has no intent to use these tools (i.e.; a local FSDO preference perhaps) then it should not make them available for the affected region. Normally; when I encounter FSDO service gaps such as these; I am able to solicit at more favorable FSDO offices. In this case; the Special Flight Permit specifically requires that the office responsible is at the departure airport; limiting me to the ZZZ FSDO. 'Gotchas' like these are detrimental to flight safety in my opinion.




Synopsis: Aircraft owner reported submitting a request for a special flight permit using the FAA AWC tool (Airworthiness Certification Process) and receiving no response for two weeks.
Date: 201302
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Passing through FL300; received a Level 1 alert 'Fire Det 1 Fail'; which was followed by a very brief Level 3 'Eng 1 Fire'. We executed the Eng. Fire Severe Damage checklist; shut down Number 1 engine; declared an emergency. Executed an ILS with an autoland. On the deck; the fire crew did a visual inspection on the engine and airframe; said all looked good. Taxied to parking.


Second narrative: Passing FL250 during descent the crew got a Level 1 'Fire DET 1 Fail' followed about 30 seconds later by a Level 3 'Eng 1 Fire'. First Officer was flying the plane. After reviewing what they had the crew decided that since they had a Dual Fire detect fail and momentary (2-3 Sec) Fire Light they ran the Engine Fire checklist which secured the Number 1 engine. They declared an emergency and the Captain flew an ILS approach with an autoland. The landing; rollout; and taxi clear of the runway were normal. Once clear the Fire Department looked over the airplane for about 15 minutes and noted nothing abnormal about the engine. After receiving clearance from a ground control a normal taxi to the blocks was accomplished. The Fire Department followed as a precaution. They noted nothing abnormal during the taxi in and shutdown. Crew did an outstanding job with a difficult situation.


Synopsis: MD11 flight crew experiences a Level 1 'Fire DET 1 Fail' followed about 30 seconds later by a Level 3 'Eng 1 Fire' during descent for landing. The engine is shut down and an uneventful landing ensues.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MHT.Tower, NH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C MHT
ATC / advisory: Tower MHT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Runway 35 in use. Plowing in progress on both runway 35 and 6. Visibility approx. 1 mile. This occurred after opening local control for the first time of the day after the midnight operation; which was consolidated at ground control (This is normal procedure). I opened Local and was briefed that A4 was the contact for runway 6 plow vehicles and A6 was the contact for runway 35 plow vehicles. Shortly after I took the position I asked A6 to report all vehicles clear of runway 35 for a departure. A6 complied and advised all vehicles holding short of runway 35. I advised A4 to report all vehicles holding short of runway 35 on runway 6. A4 reported A4 off the field at maintenance. I did not see any vehicles on either runway during my scan before issuing a takeoff clearance to the departing aircraft. The aircraft departed without incident. A minute or two after the departure; I noticed several vehicles on runway 6. I was not expecting any vehicles on runway 6 because A4 (whom I thought was the runway 6 contact) reported clear of the field. Between the ground controller and I; we were able to gather that not A4; but B4 was the contact for runway 6. I am not sure where the breakdown in communication occurred. I believe that although; there is a communication problem here; it stems from a bigger problem. The bigger issue; I believe is the contributing factor that we can no longer have one vehicle be the contact for both runways. If we had one vehicle be the 'snow boss' for both runways; like we used to; there would only be one vehicle that Local control has to communicate with to ensure all runways are vacated.I highly recommend removing the restriction that prohibits plow vehicles from being granted clearance onto both runways at the same time. It creates a lengthened process for insuring runways are clear of vehicles; and adds unnecessary complexity to the scenario at the most critical moments; when the visibility is at or near zero; and there are already additional tasks required of the Local controller.




Synopsis: MHT Local control reported of attempting to clear the runway of vehicles for a departure. Controller though he cleared the runway and departed the aircraft. Minutes later vehicles were observed on a runway. Controller found out the vehicle he thought was in charge; was not. There was another vehicle that was in charge they found out.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: DC-9 10
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff I noticed the cabin pressure indicator was at zero. After confirming with the PIC he took over the flight controls and radios as I ran the checklist. We maintained an altitude below 10;000 MSL. The checklist was ineffective at regaining pressurization. After discussion between the PIC; Operations; Chief Pilot; ATC and I we elected as a crew to divert and we landed normally. After landing we noticed nothing out of the ordinary on the exterior or interior of the aircraft. While flying we noticed that as speed increased; a 'rumble' in the floor behind us became louder. We both agreed that the air stair door was likely opened. There was no indication of any open doors or any other irregularity from the annunciator lights.




Synopsis: DC9 First Officer experiences a pressurization anomaly during initial climb and the aircraft is leveled below 10;000 FT to troubleshoot. A rumbling is felt and thought to be the result of the forward air stair door being open but no annunciator lights are illuminated and the aircraft cannot be pressurized. Flight diverts to a suitable airport.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: I was asked to assist two other Mechanics that had a heavy workload on an aircraft. Upon arriving to the aircraft I noticed two emergency evacuation slide boxes in the back of the truck that they were driving that night. I confirmed that they were for this aircraft and I offered to swap them out. I checked the paperwork for the serial numbers of the slides that required replacement and verified those serial numbers with the slides that were installed on the aircraft. After removing the FWD entry slide I walked down the jet bridge stairs to retrieve a new slide to install. When comparing part numbers between slide removed and slide installed I was so focused on the 'dash' number of the part that I neglected to notice that there was a difference between FWD and AFT. I assumed that the slides were the same and installed them in the incorrect positions. A P/A system alert was being worked in the AFT galley at the same time that I was installing the AFT entry slide and I was in a hurry to be out of the way. The problem was discovered by the Flight Attendant when the girt bar would not align properly.No matter how many times you complete a job It is imperative to read procedures very carefully. Some part numbers may appear to be identical but each number and letter must be checked at least twice; you should not assume.




Synopsis: An air carrier maintenance Technician reported on the events that led to the incorrect installation of escape slides on a B737-700.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MER.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D MER
ATC / advisory: Tower MER
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Inbound on the 45 for the right traffic 31 I was going 100 KIAS. My nose was pointed at between mid field and the end of the Runway (13). I looked right and saw an aircraft on right crosswind. Performed a left 360 for spacing. After the flight saw my ground track was towards the 13 numbers. After the flight the person threatened me physically and stated that he was going to make a report so I would lose my job. The way it could be made better at this airport would be radar installed at this airport.


Second narrative: Just after rotation on the upwind for a touch-and-go (before midfield on the upwind); MER Tower told us that traffic was on the right 45 to the downwind approaching the prison (a visual reference point that is about midfield right downwind) and I said I was looking for the traffic. I continued upwind until about .5 miles past the departure end of the runway; and still did not have traffic in sight. Considering the size of the runway (approx 12;000 feet) and with no traffic in sight; I believed them to be nearly abeam the approach end of the runway and I started my right crosswind. At this point; the traffic I was advised about called Tower about having my aircraft in sight and started a left 360 degree turn. I saw the airplane in sight still about 1 mile from the departure end of the runway and expedited my turn to the crosswind and downwind to avoid the traffic. From there I continued the pattern and made a normal touch-and-go.


Synopsis: Two instructor pilots in the MER traffic pattern report a near miss as both aircraft on base turns for Runway 13 approached each other. One aircraft turned a 360; the other continued.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator ControlSystem
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When disconnecting autopilot on final approach; First Officer (pilot flying) noticed definite binding and a definite 'bump' in the control column when moving the elevator controls thru the neutral position. Also noticed an audible 'click' accompanying the bump and a bump could be felt in the First Officer's floor board. Not noticeable from the Captain's side. [This] occurs near the neutral position in the control column as the elevator controls are moved forward and aft past neutral. Otherwise; longitudinal flight control was normal through approach and landing. [I] contacted both Maintenance and Dispatch after arrival at gate.




Synopsis: MD-82 Captain reported his First Officer noticed binding and clicking in the elevator controls an approach. Aircraft was written up after landing.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passing ENSLL while level at 12;000 feet on the HOBTT2 arrival into ATL; I observed an object appearing to be a consumer type drone pass off the right of the aircraft. I estimated that the object was approximately two (2) miles away; and approximately 1;000 feet below our altitude. The object was reflecting the sun and was hard to distinguish any identifying features. I immediately notified ATC; Approach; who advised the aircraft behind us. An aircraft behind us also spotted the object; concurred that it appeared to be a drone; and also noted that it appeared to be traveling southbound. Near collision with object appearing to be a drone; insufficient time to react.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew reported an airborne conflict with a drone on descent to landing at ATL airport.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: TCAS Equipment
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were descending through 11;200 approaching LOZIT on the golden gate arrival to SFO. We had a TCAS RA. The target was 200 FT below us. We followed the guidance to 13;000 FT when the oral and visual stopped. The target stayed with us at 200 FT below our altitude. At 13;000 FT it disappeared. We did not see an airplane visually; nor did we see a TCAS target near us prior to the RA sounding. We immediately notified NORCAL of our TCAS RA climb. They told us that they did not have an aircraft on their scope.


Second narrative: During descent into SFO on the GOLDN1 Arrival we were cleared to cross LOZIT at 11;000 FT. The Captain was flying with the autopilot on in a VNAV PATH descent. Descending through 12;000 FT we got a TRAFFIC TA and a pop up red target on the HSI. The TA was followed immediately by a CLIMB RA. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and initiated a climb per the RA. TCAS then commanded an INCREASE CLIMB RA. I called OAK Center and informed them of our RA and resultant climb. The Controller told us that he had no other traffic in the area. At 13;000 FT the target suddenly dropped off our HSI without downgrading to a yellow or white target. We then re-initiated a decent but were unable to comply with the 11;000 FT crossing restriction at LOZIT. The target on our HSI's remained with us at our exact location and altitude throughout the incident. We believe it was a phantom target and not an actual aircraft that triggered the RA. The rest of the flight was normal.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew experiences a TCAS RA descending through 12;000 FT and climbs to comply with the RA. Target is co-located and at or slightly below the reporter's aircraft and climbing with it until it disappears at 13;000 FT.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was on the missed approach. They had been instructed 3 separate times to climb to 4000 feet on the missed approach because Aircraft Y was holding at a fix at 5000 to 6000 feet. They read it back correctly each time. Two Sectors were combined and rather than have me split off one sector the Supervisor directed me to get the Controller out and another Controller would then come and split off the sector. It was fairly busy and I was not happy with the plan but did as I was told. During the course of my scan I noted that Aircraft X had climbed through their assigned altitude. I issued a descent to 4000 feet; issued traffic to Aircraft X and Aircraft Y and cancelled Aircraft Y's block altitude and had them climb to 6000 feet and initiated a turn.This was purely a pilot deviation and nothing I did here is my fault but what annoys the heck out of me is that we are constantly be put into situations where we are forced to work unassisted under conditions that historically we would have always had a D-Side (Radar Assist) for. We use strips here and those take up controller time. Had I been given a D-Side to handle my strips or if the sector had been split like it should have been in my opinion then I could have caught this much sooner; perhaps before even losing separation. Feels like we never have any extra help available when you need it. If you do ask for help the schedule can't support opening even one position without driving everyone to 2 hours time on position. The culture has shifted to never splitting sectors and never opening D-Sides because of it.




Synopsis: HCF TRACON Controller reported an aircraft climbed above their assigned altitude into conflict with traffic in a holding pattern.