elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We departed after a 737 with adequate spacing. Once airborne around 500 FT AFE we encountered some wake turbulence. It got progressively worse and required flight control inputs similar to that of low level moderate turbulence. At about 1;000 FT AFE; just as I was about to call for Continuous Ignition we got the shaker. I immediately pushed the thrust levers to the maximum and checked the flight spoilers while lowering the nose slightly. We notified ATC and were asked; 'What would you like me to do sir?' I told them that we needed an additional vector or spacing from the preceding aircraft. The turbulence went away and we informed them of that as well before they gave us a turn. Then we were told to contact Departure. As NextGen airspace transforms to a category-aircraft based approach for wake turbulence separation; I feel that the best way to reduce these events is to have multiple departure paths for jet aircraft. This is especially important with stage 2; 3; and 4 aircraft that don't have as much of an impact on surrounding communities that the turbojet aircraft of the past did. Many times; CLT specifically; doesn't keep aircraft on the prescribed departure path for the JACAL departure; which negates the RNAV departure theory entirely (all aircraft; same path; minimal noise impact on minimum number of homes; especially at low altitudes and high power settings).




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported wake vortex encounter from a preceeding B737.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: When we arrived at the aircraft; we discovered it was covered in frost. There was freezing fog at the airport. We conducted our pre-flight and de-iced in the gate. We discovered a maintenance issue on taxi out that required a return to the gate. While waiting for the maintenance work to be completed; I asked the First Officer (FO) to check out the plane to see if we might need more de-icing. There was no precipitation so I did not think we needed further de-icing. The FO made a thorough inspection and then I did as well. What we saw was surprising. The top of the wings; top of the tail and fuselage were all clear of frost. The underside of the wing; though; had a great deal of frost. The frost on the lower wing was thick and extended out beyond the fuel tanks. There was frost on the lower area of the winglet. There was also frost covering the underside of the tail. Neither the FO; the mechanic; nor I had ever seen that much frost on the underside of a wing to tail. The mechanic then told us that the plan had sat there for three and a half days in temperatures well below freezing and in freezing fog. We had the underside of the wing and tail de-iced with type 1 fluid. Takeoff and flight was normal.The plane was sitting idle for more than three days in below freezing temperatures and freezing fog. Frost was covering the whole plane including the landing gear. It obviously needed de-icing and we followed our procedures. But our procedures do not have a step for the pilots to exit the plane and check the de-icing results. Had we not returned to the gate; we would have never noticed the excessive frost on the underside of the wing.I think mechanics and de-icing crews should be trained to de-ice the whole plane when the plane has been cold soaked. In the future; I will specifically instruct the crew to de-ice the lower surfaces if the plane has been sitting and is covered with frost. I called [dispatch] and expressed my concerns.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported finding a considerable amount of frost on the undersides of the wing and tail surfaces after the aircraft had sat on the ground for several days in freezing fog conditions. Reporter was concerned that normal de-ice procedures do not address this issue.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight from ZZZ to SJC. Nighttime VMC conditions. ATIS reported GS for the ILS 30L was OTS. We requested the RNP 30L from HEPAP since it was the last fix on our route. We were not on a STAR. We were cleared to descend to 4;700 feet until established; then cleared for the approach. We were high on our VSD and configured early to get on profile and on PATH. We were on PATH and met our requirements to set field elevation in then MCP. Just after passing HEPAP; ATC told us cancel approach clearance; climb and maintain 6;000 feet. Told us they got a low altitude alert. I told them we had the terrain and airport in sight. We started the climb as instructed; but had to ask for a heading as we were still on LNAV; the lateral track of the approach. ATC vectored us out for a downwind. They then asked us if we wanted vectors to YADUT for another approach. I told them negative; we still have the airport in sight for the visual. We were told to look for traffic and follow them for the visual 30L. We did and approach and landing was without incident.  We were not told to cross HEPAP at 4;700 feet. We were told to descend to 4;700 feet until established. This caused the confusion.We were not on a STAR. As I look back at it now; HEPAP is not the IAF; YADUT is. YADUT to HEPAP is 4;000 feet. Then after HEPAP; 3;600 feet. We need to have a better chart from coming in from ZZZ.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported they were advised ATC received a low altitude alert during their approach to SJC and were instructed to climb.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Due to COVID customer service agents should not be touching the airplane phones to make announcements. Both arrival and departure announcements are not necessary. Passenger and Airline have the technology to get current gate and baggage claim information. All the agent is; is in the way when making any announcements in the aircraft doorway.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported that during COVID-19 customer service agents should not use the airplane phones to make announcements.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: When I got in on the MID; the sectors were already combined at ZZZ and there were several things to do. I stayed busy for almost an hour and a half and was just managing to keep my head above water. These sectors should not have been combined. Period. We have a 4-12 shift to keep someone at work during this time to keep the highs split out from the lows and I was told the Supervisor let them go home on leave. While working the traffic I was told by area 2 that 'ZZZ1 was open'. Unlike our area; they still had highs open; super highs open and split. So in other words; during the same busy period; they had four controllers in working the sectors adjacent mine; where I was working alone and I would argue that I had more traffic at the time.ZZZ1 was yelling over at me because I had just violated them with Aircraft X. This was truly an unsafe situation and violating ZZZ1 sector was minor compared to what could have happened. The Supervisor simply left in the middle of this after taking one handoff and telling ZZZ2 to keep the next one coming. After a recent fatality; it was discovered that the area stays busy during these hours and the 4-12 person is there to mitigate it. Why he was allowed to take leave and why the sectors were combined I do not know; but it put me in a very bad situation.The Supervisor needs to understand that just because it [is close to end of shift] we don't just combine everything up so he can leave and needs to understand the purpose of the 4-12 shift. If the area right next to us recognized the need to have 4 controllers in the sectors around me; clearly someone else recognized that this was a busy time with a high traffic load.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported a problem with staffing that may have led to an airspace violation and increased workload.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Was doing simulated emergency descent over ZZZ and began to experience smoke in cockpit which was electrical in nature.  After turning all systems off; we attempted to make emergency landing at ZZZ but could not due to excessive speed on first attempt.  After reviewing the situation; we determined that turning all electrical off had removed the smoke in cabin.  With it becoming dusk and having no knowledge of A&P on the field; we decided to proceed back to ZZZ1 and landed uneventfully.  However; with electrical systems off we did not have ADSB-out or transponder working at the time.




Synopsis: Pilot reported smoke in the cockpit during a training flight. Flight Crew turned off all electrical power and the smoke dissipated. The Flight Crew elected to return to the departure airport and make a precautionary landing.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The aircraft had several maintenance scheduled items that needed to be addressed before we could fly the aircraft. It was supposed to be the first revenue flight after long term storage. There was one maintenance schedule item X which needed to be accomplished before the aircraft can be used for revenue flight with passengers. The item was signed off on the completed items sheet and the aircraft was released for flight. When we were taxing; Dispatch notified us to hold. We called them and they said there was a maintenance schedule write off not signed off properly. So; we returned to the gate to have to addressed. The reason for this report is that you cannot leave the gate with passengers unless maintenance schedule item X had been signed off. Our paperwork showed it was signed of yet the electronic AML [Aircraft Maintenance Logbook] said it was not.  We returned to gate. We found out later that it was a clerical data entry error made by someone in maintenance and the maintenance schedule item sign off was entered incorrectly.The cause is easy to figure out. The only way to fix it is to have a computerized completed items sheet that only shows items cleared and then the computer copy and paper completed items sheet would always match!After items are cleared in computer; print out new completed items sheet for AML so paper and computer always match.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a return to gate after Dispatch told them they had an improperly signed maintenance item.  The aircraft had several maintenance items that needed to be addressed before the flight due to it just coming out of long term storage.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GEG.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Descent
Airspace: Class C GEG
ATC / advisory: TRACON GEG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were in visual conditions on approach to GEG; when we were cleared by GEG Approach control to descend to an altitude of 3;900 feet; while also being cleared for the visual approach Runway 21. As we began to descend; I as the pilot monitoring; looked outside and noticed some tall radio towers.  I brought the towers to the Captain's attention and he immediately stopped the descent in order to prevent us from coming any closer to the towers. If I remember correctly we stopped the descent at approximately 5;300 feet. We then flew over the towers and after clearing them we continued our descent to 3;900 ft and commenced the visual approach to a successful and safe landing. We were never given any warning about the towers and did not notice the towers on the approach plate until after landing and getting to the hotel. Since this was my first time flying into GEG; and the Captain had not flown to GEG in years; we were both unfamiliar with the area and after this incident would recommend that a better warning be given on the 10-7 pages as well as on the approach plates.These warnings would not only help those who are unfamiliar with the area and specifically the radio towers; but would help remind those that are familiar with the area to possible encounters with the towers.


Second narrative: After being cleared for a visual approach to Runway 21 in GEG; I started a descent to the SIGYOFAF altitude using FLCH with the autopilot on.  During the descent the FO verbalized that he saw towers at approximately our 12:00 o'clock position.  I promptly leveled off until we passed the towers and then continued the visual approach backed up with the ILS for an uneventful landing. It should be noted that there are towers on a bluff a few miles SE of the Runway 21 FAF that are higher than the FAF altitude.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported a hazardous situation exist with tall radio towers in the vicinity of GEG airport. Reporters recommends more prominent warnings on approach and airport charts to flight crews .
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were seven miles behind a 747 on approach to Runway 9 in Miami; flaps 5; 170 knots on glidepath; when the aircraft abruptly went into 30 degrees left bank. We commanded full right aileron and there was no response for an unknown amount of time (possibly three seconds). We regained wings level flight only to encounter another abrupt 30 degree roll to the left with lack of aircraft control. After much discussion; my First Officer and I were worried that after such a 'minor incident' (seven miles behind a 747) that the event should cause such a severe loss of aircraft control. We both agree that the incident should be investigated.


Second narrative: We were 15 miles out on the localizer to Runway 9 at 5000 feet. We were seven miles in trail of a B747. We encountered wake turbulence and the aircraft yawed to the left 30+ degrees for 3-5 seconds. We inputted right aileron with no results. The aircraft returned to level flight on its own and immediately went into a 30+ degree left bank turn for 3-5 seconds.


Synopsis: B737 NG flight crew reported momentary loss of control during a wake turbulence encounter on approach to MIA in trail of a B747.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Turbo Commander 690 Series
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Fuel gauge read inaccurate; low fuel light came on and within 2 minutes both engines flame out. Got vectors to nearest airfield and landed safely on the runway. One fuel cap was missing upon landing.

Callback: The Reporter stated that he visually checked the fuel cap prior to departure but did not use a screw driver to ensure it was locked. In flight the fuel usage did not feel correct and stayed at 1;200 LBS for a long time; then dropped to 600 LBS; then quickly to 300 LBS; at which point he was for ATC assistance. Within two minutes the engines flamed out. After landing he discovered the fuel cap missing and the fuel cap chain wedged in the flapper valve so that the valve remained open allowing the fuel to siphon due to negative over wing pressure. The Reporter could not verify the Mechanic's statement that over 100 Turbo Commander fuel caps are ordered per year.



Synopsis: A Turbo Commander 690B fuel cap came off in flight while the cap chain became wedged in the fill flapper valve which allowed fuel to siphon out; draining the tanks and causing both engines to flame out at 16;000 FT. A successful on airport landing was completed.