elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 4B6.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Ticonderoga Municipal Airport (4B6) is a small rural airport in Upstate NY. We have had problems with townspeople gaining access to the field by entering the gate code and walking on the ramp. When someone is there and confronts these individuals they are obnoxious and refuse to leave. When the local police are called they do nothing. A trespasser with an unleashed dog entered onto the ramp while an aircraft was taxiing to the fuel pad. I informed him that he could not be on the ramp and I was told in no uncertain terms he could do whatever he liked. The police were called and did nothing. The individual told the officer that he had permission to walk inside the fence. I pursued this and indeed confirmed that he permission to walk inside the secure area without explanation as to why he would do so. The simple solution it would seem is to change the gate code. Since this airport is unattended it would make gaining entry difficult for pilots. Currently the code is displayed on the inside of the gate on the back of the door. It is almost a certainty that whatever code is used would be discovered by the trespassers so a constant changing of the gate code is not practical. What is practical is to enforce the signage at the airport which clearly states no pedestrians are allowed beyond the fence/gate. As a pilot I have seen some of these individuals on the taxiway while I was doing touch and goes.




Synopsis: General aviation pilot reported trespassing issues at a rural airport 4B6; which pose a safety hazard for pilots.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out; received a RUD FULL PRESS caution light. We both looked at the hydraulic quantity. It looked to be around 2-3 quarts and falling on the #2 hydraulics. As we continued the climb; the RUD FULL PRESS extinguished and we only had a #2 ISO VALVE caution light with a little less than a quart left. Captain ran the Emergency Checklist for that light and we got vectors back. Captain informed Dispatch; the Flight Attendant; and the passengers. We transferred controls; called Operations; did the manual gear extension and landed ... fairly uneventfully.


Second narrative: Just after rotation upon selection of landing gear up; the RUD FULL PRESS caution light illuminated. I checked the quantity and noticed the #2 system at 2 quarts and falling rapidly. The First Officer was pilot flying and I made sure he was aware of the situation. When the quantity reached approximately 1 quart the RUD FULL PRESS light extinguished and the #2 ISO VALVE light illuminated. Ran the Non-Normal Checklist; then I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance. Notified the Flight Attendant and made a passenger announcement that we would be returning. I assumed role of pilot flying so the First Officer could complete the alternate gear extension procedure. [We] returned for ILS using alternate gear extension. Just like the simulator.


Synopsis: DHC8-300 flight crew experiences a loss of hydraulic fluid from the number two system as the gear is retracted after takeoff. Flight returns to the departure airport using the alternate gear extension method.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During Flight Crew inspection of DG (Dangerous Goods); the Ramp Agent briefed the items onboard. I (F/O) noticed one box had both a class 8 and class 9 sticker visible; but there was no class 9 listed on the DG inspection paperwork; or the ULD (Unit Load Device) manifest. The CA called [Administration]; who in turn referred him to a DG Specialist. The only information the DG Specialist could provide was that particular box only had class 8 listed. In the end; the crew jointly decided to have that box removed from the aircraft; since we couldn't be sure of its contents; and; at the very least; the paperwork did not match the box's label(s).




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported refusing Dangerous Goods cargo that was missing on flight crew documents but had been loaded on aircraft.
Date: 201711
Location: MMGL.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: volcanic ash
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center MMFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While enroute [to] MMTO approximately 15-20 min before top of descent; received following SIGMET for volcanic ash from Volcano. SIGMET area depicted on Flight Explorer was within 20 NM of MMTO airport. It was still dark down in MMTO; so no way to visually assess actual presence of ash. Flight not tankered due to payload; so out of abundance of caution; coordinated with crew and service recovery to divert flight to filed alternate of MMGL. Shortly after making the turn to MMGL; MMGL forecast amended to ¼ SM for our time of arrival so subsequently amended to add further alternate of MMMY. At time of [reporting]; MMGL weather holding and Aircraft X in descent for landing at MMGL. Shift note written and duty officer as well as manager on duty notified.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported assisting a flight in avoiding an area of volcanic ash. Flight diverted to an alternate airport.
Date: 201904
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Ramp must secure dangerous goods with at least 15 bags. Due to new rule; if live animals are also manifested for the same flight; then [the dangerous goods are] held off [the flight].




Synopsis: Air carrier ground personnel reported revised dangerous goods transport procedures as related to configuration and live animal limitations.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a maintenance issue at the gate and being delayed; we taxied to runway finally. During taxi; ATC advised us of a full reroute clearance. We pulled over and stopped as we worked on that. During that time; we were given a runway change. It was very busy and a high workload for both of us.After takeoff and at cruise; FO (First Officer) turns to me and says; 'I am not sure I had the right takeoff data in the box.' We looked at our paperwork; and that is when we both realized we failed to accomplish the Supplemental Checklist for runway change. We had no performance issues with the takeoff and climb out; but we took off with flaps 5 and possibly used flaps 1 data.


Second narrative: When the new takeoff numbers arrived; I printed them off and accepted the data in the FMC. Shortly after we completed the checklist we were cleared for takeoff. The takeoff itself was uneventful. Upon climbout I noticed that the takeoff data had us taking off at a flaps setting of 1. I notified the Captain and we discussed what happened. Neither of us could confirm that the uploaded flap setting in the FMC was for flaps 1 or flaps 5 (only that the Takeoff Data message called for flaps 1). We definitely took off at Flaps 5.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported that they took off with performance data based on a different runway.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Following a 1 hour 40 minute tarmac delay due to thunderstorms in the departure corridor; flight gate returned and deplaned at the request of operations. After the weather cleared the area the flight was boarded and departed without much further delay.The departure was uneventful with occasional light chop in the climb behind the weather system along with being in and out of IMC. Just prior to reaching 36;000 feet the cabin altitude warning horn sounded along with the red warning light. The immediate action items were run promptly. At this point in the flight the seat belt sign was still on. I was the pilot monitoring and the Captain was the pilot flying. After crew communication was established we immediately coordinated a decent to 10;000 feet with air traffic control. The Captain executed this while I continued monitoring duties.The QRH was continued beyond the immediate action items and it was determined the pressurization was not controllable even in manual mode. The QRH was finished during the emergency descent at which point flight attendants were contacted and a stable situation was reported from the back with oxygen generators deployed. This led to a decision to divert. Airport ZZZ was ahead and had favorable weather. The destination was changed and a diversion message was sent to Dispatch with a brief description of the situation. Dispatch coordinated with ZZZ operations and a gate; medical personnel; and fire crews were waiting for us upon arrival. Once at a safe altitude a briefing was completed along with the appropriate checklists for the arrival.The landing was under max structural landing weight and the flight landed without incident or injuries to anyone onboard. Mechanics met us at the gate and began to diagnose the problem.




Synopsis: Just prior to cruise level-off; B737 First Officer reported an aural cabin altitude warning horn along with the red warning light. Crew diverted to a nearby airport.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ATC vectors to ILS 19L. On base leg vector at 5000' we were given clearance to descend to 3100' on a heading of 160 degrees to intercept 19L localizer and once established cleared to descend to 2800' until SHAKE. We were a couple miles southwest of BERKS (15 DME ISIA) when given turn to intercept. At about 3100' just prior to LOC intercept we received a GPWS warning for terrain. I disconnected the autopilot and executed the GPWS escape maneuver. We climbed to about 5000' and continued to intercept the localizer and reloaded the approach. We notified ATC and once clear of the terrain warning and acquiring the runway; we continued the approach for a normal landing. We made visual contact with the airport just outside of SHAKE.


Second narrative: 3100 feet near BERKS is approximately 1000 feet above the terrain but well below the 5000 foot altitude on the approach plate. We were surprised to get the warning but complied as we were night IMC. The whole event lasted just a few seconds.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported they received a GPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to SFO Runway 19L.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon climbout from a normal takeoff; at approximately 4;000 MSL; with me (First Officer) as PF (Pilot Flying); an 'ELEVATOR SPLIT' caution message appeared on ED-1 (EICAS Display). Upon recognizing the condition; Captain assigned me flying duties while he ran the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) procedure for this message and handled radios. ATC was notified of the situation as we continued the climb towards assigned altitude.The QRH procedure ultimately directed us to limit airspeed to 200 KIAS; turn autopilot disengaged; limit elevator control input (use elevator trim instead to control pitch); and land at the nearest suitable field with no more than flaps 20.[ATC was advised]; an [assessment] was run; and we were vectored to [the origin airport] for a normal ILS approach and landing. Upon landing; fire and rescue followed us to the gate without further incident.Cause determined to be a faulty elevator control mechanism. Recommend to inspect elevator controls more frequently.


Second narrative: On climbout of [the departure airport] we received an ELEVATOR SPLIT caution; AP (Auto Pilot) TRIM is ND and CAS MISCOMP messages. The FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying); I stated to continue. Once we were above 10;000 feet; I pulled up the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). It stated disengage autopilot; speed less than 200 KIAS and land at nearest suitable airport. We complied with the QRH and informed ATC of the restriction and that we would be returning to field. I called the flight attendants and gave an [assessment]. I briefed the passengers and stated 'we have a minor maintenance issue and we will be returning to [the origin airport]; follow your flight attendants instructions.' I alerted Dispatch. I then [requested priority handling] with Approach. The QRH also called for a flaps 20 landing. We landed without incident and below max landing weight. I recall our landing weight was 66;200 lbs. The fire trucks responded and followed us to the gate. At the gate we deplaned and I wrote up the issue; Maintenance met us at the gate.


Synopsis: CRJ-700 flight crew reported receiving an Elevator Split message on climbout. Aircraft returned to departure airport.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SFO.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Had uneventful flight to SFO; and was cleared BIG SUR2 arrival. SFO weather: CAVU night; visibility 20+ miles. Cleared to cross BOLDR at 250/10000 per arrival; then received vectors to the NW; then back to east on a downwind for Runway 28L. Vectored onto a visual final for Runway 28L at about HEMAN; following Aircraft X. We flew the ILS inbound. The preceding Aircraft X appeared to take an inordinate amount to time to clear Runway 28L; exiting I think at taxiway T or K. By now we were within 1.0 nm of threshold. At about 0.75 NM; perhaps even closer; SFO tower cleared another aircraft; Aircraft Y; to 'cross RW 28L'. I believe this aircraft was on E. The aircraft began moving towards; and then onto; RW28L. We were now within 0.5 nm. It was obvious to us that this was not going to work; and we were discussing a go-around. At about 100 feet AGL; Tower directed us to go-around.  The go-around and subsequent approach were uneventful.The SFO tower controller may have lost situational awareness when clearing the other aircraft to cross 28L. At no time were either we; or the other aircraft in any danger. We would have initiated our own go-around within a couple of seconds had the controller not told us to go-around.  Considering that it was a CAVU night; one must wonder what might have happened on a night with reduced visibility if we; and/or SFO Tower; had not been able to see the other aircraft; considering our closeness to the landing threshold. Had we actually landed; this might have been either an accident; or a serious runway incursion.Also; the amount of radio communication occurring was not particularly great; so it was not a matter of any party not being able to get a word in at a critical time.Possible tower controller loss of situational awareness regarding our closeness to runway threshold when clearing another aircraft to cross the runway.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported he was within one mile of touchdown on SFO Runway 28L when Tower cleared an aircraft to cross the runway. Tower then directed a go-around to resolve the conflict.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a cruise check we noticed the green hydraulic system quantity was low but the indication was green. Shortly after the indication was even lower and amber. I made an AML entry to ensure the quantity was serviced and sent a message to dispatch (could not find an appropriate arms code). We were starting to descend now and began getting an ECAM caution for low green system quantity. This caution appeared for approximately one second then disappeared 12-15 times. The caution then stayed on long enough to complete the ECAM procedure; which turns off all pumps to the green system. Green system pressure remained normal (3000 psi). The green system pressure dropped to zero and returned to normal 3-4 times before landing. As we were configuring to land green system pressure was normal. We decided to continue with the original ECAM procedure which calls for gravity landing gear extension and no nose-wheel steering because the pressure might drop to zero at any moment. I landed the airplane and had enough control to clear the runway and stop. We were towed to the gate. During descent and approach we [requested priority handling]; coordinated with ZZZ Operations and Maintenance for a tow; briefed the flight attendants for a precautionary landing and completed multiple landing assessments; checklists; ECAM procedures; etc. We were told the next day; by a mechanic; that the aircraft had a hydraulic fluid leak.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported a loss of green hydraulic system quantity; as well as erratic readings through approach and landing sequences.