Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MKE.Airport, WI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C MKE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we prepared to push back from the gate; I noted the 'Souls On Board' from the [Weight and Balance] report as 144; which broke out as 138 passengers + 1 infant + 5 crew. As we were ready to close the cockpit door; the A F/A (Flight Attendant) stated that we had 139 + 1 infant. I conferred with the [Gate] Agent; and confirmed with our F/A's that the infant was in fact in a lap and not in a seat. After a discussion on the radio; the [Gate] Agent confirmed that we did in fact have 139 + 1; as one boarding pass had not been scanned; even though that passenger had boarded. She sent us Version 2 of the Takeoff Data with the updated count; we re-accomplished the Before Push Checklist; and the flight proceeded normally.GENERAL SAFETY CONCERN: This isn't the first time I've had this situation occur. It's easiest to catch on full or nearly full flights with a senior 'C' F/A who still counts the number of empty seats before pushback. Various things can set up the situation where this error can occur; a boarding pass that isn't scanned will do it; or an [Gate] Agent who assumes that the thru count is correct without verifying can cause it as well. I've seen that too; the deplaning F/A's got a thru-count; but the [Gate] Agent never asked for it; and the oncoming F/A's were never asked or told what it was. The [Gate] Agent blindly assumed that the count was right; and she was wrong. (That error got caught because it occurred before the final passenger count was abolished.) With current procedures; if the thru-count is off and the subsequent flight isn't full; NOTHING will catch this sort of error after it gets made. 'What's the thru-count supposed to be? 28. Yeah; we have 28.' (No; you have 29; because the 4th Rider; in a seat; is staying on even though the operational information system thinks she's getting off here; but you didn't catch it because another passenger was using the lav when you counted and you weren't aware of it. Or because you got distracted during the count; and it was like 27 or 28 or something; and it's easier to say 'yeah; we have 28' than to go back and count again.) These errors happen ALL THE TIME; but now we are generally oblivious to them; whereas before the procedure change; 'count's off; have to count again' was common. Sometimes the F/A's count before push was simply off and the recount straightened everything out; but other times there was a real discrepancy between the number of people that the computer had on the aircraft; and the true number. The ramifications of errors like this are two-fold. First; the aircraft is operated with an inaccurate ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) and Takeoff Gross Weight. This means that the aircraft is operated in a non-compliant manner with certainty; even though the actual impact of a 200 or even 400 pound error is essentially nil. Second; however; in the event of an aircraft accident; having an accurate count of Souls On Board can be absolutely vital; and an inaccurate count may be the difference between leaving someone on the aircraft who could be rescued; or sending a firefighter into an aircraft in search of an individual who was never there in the first place. In other words; an accurate count makes no difference whatsoever; until that one day when it is of life and death importance. It frankly astounds me that; at the same time that we obsess over 97 bags versus 98 bags (at 50 pounds each); with elaborate checks and verification between the ramp agents and the [Gate] Agent; we willingly forgo the best and only verification of what the computer says about our number of passengers (at 200 pounds each). How the FAA can require no counting of people actually onboard the aircraft at the same time they require exact accountability of bags; is beyond me. An extra passenger; as we had today; is four times as consequential in terms of aircraft weight as an extra bag; and infinitely more important as a soul to be rescued and accounted for in the event of an accident.The FAA should require Company to return to the previous practice of counting the actual number of people who are physically onboard the aircraft prior to pushing back from the gate. Yes; those counts take time; and when a Flight Attendant miscounts; it takes time to resolve the error. But; isn't an accurate count of the number of lives in our care worth it?




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported an inaccurate passenger count prior to departure.