elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202101
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other N/A
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Other Scheduling changes
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Layover Rest Period
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I awoke at XA:00 on Date and was called just a few hours later and told I was being placed back on rest; and given a XP:00 assignment. I don't understand how I'm supposed to be able to function; with less than 12 hours to adjust. I attempted to go to sleep at XJ:00 but laid awake till almost XM:00. I was awakened just after XM:00 when my phone received a text alert that my schedule had changed. I have no way to silence text alerts without also silencing all phone calls. I attempted to go back to sleep but was stressed that I would sleep through the call and could never fall back to sleep. Scheduling finally called me at XR:00; giving me absolute minimum notice to show; when I was forced to call in fatigued. I understand that this type of assignment is currently legal on paper; it shouldn't be; but I have to tell you that I flew transatlantic flights for 8 years and was never as fatigued as I have been on Reserve under this domestic FAR 117 rules. This is ridiculous. This is the second time in only 10 days that I was switched from day to night duty with less than 12 hours notice and after being awake for less than 5-6 hours. I want to make our system work so that the flights can be covered; but this current system is a system of 'gamesmanship'. No one is on the same team. Why don't we have a system where everyone wants the system to work to get the planes and passengers where they need to be? It just seems like it has become a war between the company and the union and not a great place to work anymore.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported Scheduling ongoing assignment changes during crew rest period resulting in his refusal of assignment due to fatigue
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FFZ.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Other Clearing turns
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my check ride for CFI Initial; while performing a wind drift circle; we had a Near Mid-Air Collision with a Cessna 172. While performing the wind drift circle at approximately 2;600 FT MSL my DPE (Designated Pilot Examiner) and I noticed at the same time; a shadow of an aircraft on the ground approximately 30 degrees off the nose. I looked up and saw the aircraft and stopped the wind drift circle and flew away from it. The aircraft; when I saw it; was around 100-200 feet above and 500 feet horizontal. I called on the radio after leveling off and stated my position and intentions and the pilot in the other aircraft replied 'Yeah; I just flew over you. Didn't you see me? I'm doing ground reference maneuvers over the orchards' (the orchards were where we were). I stated that I was sorry and had just seen him as he flew over and that I fly to another location to do the maneuver that I was setting up for. At no point do I recollect hearing any call from the other aircraft before the NMAC nor after; until I spoke on the radio.




Synopsis: PA-28R pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the vicinity of FFZ airport.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: WSI SIGMET products lack the SIGMET identification numbers e.g. S1 or C1 as issued by the controlling authority like Gander or Shanwick or any other. It makes it hard to coordinate SIGMET and Hazardous Weather information when crews refer to a SIGMET by a number given to them by ATC. The Dispatcher then goes looking for it; but will never find or identify the SIGMET they are referring to by its proper tag number. This is so frustrating and flat out dangerous. We must have the SIGMET tag numbers attached to the SIGMET header line as issued from the original issuer.

Callback: The reporter believes that the lack of communications is the root issue here. Dispatch and flight crews may not be talking about the same enroute weather because the commercial weather product's number system does not correlate to North Atlantic Controlling Agencies weather reporting. The consequence is when an airborne flight crew calls Dispatch for information about a SIGMET or Hazardous Weather with a report number; the dispatcher may not know what the crew is referencing because the Controlling Agency number will not be in the commercial weather product's report causing confusion and miscommunication.



Synopsis: A Dispatcher reported that a Commercial Weather product used by his Company does not reference North Atlantic Air Traffic Agencies' SIGMET and Hazardous Weather reports causing miscommunication and confusion.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared for the ILS roughly 20 miles from the airport and assigned 170 KTS. We configured flaps 20 and gear down to maintain speed and separation with lead aircraft on the approach. Just after FAF the Captain and I noticed that the altimeter were 100 feet off. This was due to an incorrect altimeter setting on my side. When I switched the navigation source to the localized I had changed the altimeter instead. I thought I had fixed it back to the proper setting but failed to cross check as we were entering the approach. As we continued on the approach we received a 'pull up; terrain' warning. It was at this point I recognized that the flaps were improperly set and we executed the go around. We were busy on the approach and had been slowed early. Improper altimeter distracted us acutely around FAF. Ensure crosscheck by crew any time improper inputs are made.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported distraction of incorrect altimeter setting resulting a terrain warning.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On takeoff; right after rotation; we heard a flapping sound on the left side of the flight deck. During the preflight back at the gate; the FO was doing the walk around and was unable to remove the standby pitot cover; so was going to wait until the jet bridge was pulled up and remove it then. After he completed his walk around; the gate agent was pulling up the jet bridge. The FO was busy getting onboard the plane and doing his preflight duties; he forgot to remove the standby pitot cover. I did not call for an acceptance checklist; we went right to the before start checklist. Nobody noticed the pitot cover on the ground crew; so we pushed back and taxied out.After takeoff; when we heard the flapping sound; the FO knew right away what it was. We circled back around to land.Suggestions for avoiding this:Don't be in a hurry. Call for all appropriate checklists. Be more aware of what's going on; it is a very busy time trying to get a flight out.From now on I'm going to try to be more involved in the FO duties; trying to stay on top of things better during busy times.


Second narrative: The omission of the acceptance checklist was the primary cause and point where the error should have been trapped to ensure that this event did not happen. It is evident now to both crew members the gravity of this error and the importance of the acceptance check. It is also important to take the extra second during the initial preflight to ensure all safety equipment is removed and deferral of removing the covers should be avoided regardless of jet bridge location/ inability to reach the cover.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported taking off with the standby pitot cover still in place; necessitating a return to the airport to get it removed.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was cleared to land. As I came over the end of the runway; I was getting some weird wind shear that was pushing me around; but my approach felt controlled and so I went through with it. Right before I touched down; I got a strong crosswind gust of wind (from the left) that pushed my super cub sideways (nose pointing to the left) as I touched down. Being a tail dragger; the plane responded accordingly; and I began to skid sideways down the runway. I was already down and too sideways for a go-around; so I pulled the throttle all the way back; stick back and left; and rudder full right. The plane continued to skid to a stop sideways on the runway; but all three wheels remained on the runway at all times; and no damage to the runway or aircraft occurred. After coming to a complete stop; I proceeded to turn the plane around to the left; leaving the asphalt for a brief time on the left side of the runway and taxing to the exit ramp on the other side where the Tower then informed me to stop; and I was later met by a foam truck and a service vehicle. I believe that the main factors in this were the wind gusts from the side; which in turn caused me to land sideways. I could have performed a go-around; though in the moment my approach felt controlled up until the last minute. I believe that I took the correct actions on the ground; and in so doing prevented any further damage to the aircraft or to airport property. My plane did not complete a full ground loop; but rather only turned about 90-120 degrees; and the rest of the 'loop' was me taxiing out of my predicament back on to the runway.




Synopsis: PA-18 pilot reported losing directional control on landing roll in a crosswind situation.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Instructed to descend from 4;000 feet to 3;000 feet while the airplane was at approximately 4;100 feet. I selected 3;000 feet and both pilot confirmed ALT SEL was still selected. At approximately 5NM from FAF on 4R on heading 090 while looking for traffic and airport I realized the airplane was descending through 2;400 feet (no automation inputs from the Pilot Flying (PF) while altitude was capturing and no altitude deviation warning sound). I immediately turned the autopilot off and started climbing back to 3;000 feet while the Pilot Monitoring (PM) reported our deviation to ATC. ATC replied saying it was no problem and to descend to 2;000 feet and asked if we had the airport in sight. We reported the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to 4R.


Second narrative: [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].


Synopsis: A DHC-8 flight crew; cleared to descend to 3000 feet got distracted and failed to note the aircraft hadn't leveled but instead descended to ~2300 feet at which point they intervened and climbed back to 3000 feet.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Forward Cargo light and bell came on at cruise. Discharged bottle. Light went out for six to seven minutes. Then the light and bell came on again. Diverted to [an airport] which was 90 miles away.


Second narrative: [This report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B737-300 FWD Cargo Fire bell and light alerted at cruise so the fire bottle was discharged which put the warning out for about six to seven minutes. After the fire system alerted again; the crew diverted to a nearby airport.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Local Control on a day that several people had called in sick and were not replaced by anyone; therefore we were forced to take shorter breaks than normal to make up for it. I had multiple aircraft taxied to Runway XXR and 3 taxied out to Runway YY. The first aircraft in line at [Runway] YY was a Falcon; who spoke less than stellar English. I cleared an aircraft for take off on Runway XXR with traffic on a 4 mile final. I tried calling the Falcon so I could roll him on [Runway] YY prior to the arrival for [Runway] XXR. The Falcon was not on my frequency at the time. After the aircraft for [Runway] XXR landed I put an Air Carrier in position (LUAW) on Runway XXR. When the aircraft that had landed cleared Runway XXR; I cleared the Air Carrier for take off. We are required to call the Departure Controller if an aircraft doesn't tag up. The previous departure didn't tag up so after clearing the Air Carrier for take off I hit the land line to tell the Departure Controller that the other aircraft was untagged. During that time I heard the Air Carrier acknowledge his take off clearance. When the Air Carrier started rolling I scanned the runways and observed the Falcon pulling on to Runway YY. As I observed this; a voice keyed up and said; 'That Falcon's rolling on Runway YY.' I then told the Falcon to hold his position. I also let him know that I never cleared him for take off or to enter the runway. He told me; in his words; he 'understood clear for take off and read it back.' In my opinion he never began take off roll and was still turning onto the runway. More staffing and change the procedure of having to call the Departure Controller within 3 miles of the airport when an aircraft doesn't tag up to 5 miles; so I'm not stuck on a land line and unable to hear aircraft calling me on frequency.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an unauthorized take off attempt by a foreign aircraft noting language barrier and procedural requirements as causal factors.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were slightly delayed due to a minor maintenance write-up (lav sink clogged). As soon as maintenance completed logbook; we closed the door. But; I had forgotten that we did not have a fuel slip yet. In fact; they were still in the process of refueling the aircraft. Cabin crew had already armed the doors so I made the decision to just pass the fuel slip through the cockpit window. However; a ground crew member had contacted a zone controller who in turn contacted the gate agent standing in the loading bridge to re-open door 1L.I called out that it wasn't necessary as our doors were armed. Gate agent insisted; so we disarmed doors and reopened door 1L. Spoke with ramp supervisor on phone who told me door had to be opened during refueling. I went to FOM to check and discovered I was wrong. I thought either door had to be open OR doors armed. But FOM reads door MUST be opened if loading bridge is available. My mistake. I now understand the correct reading of FOM.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported the doors were closed and armed during the completion of aircraft fueling at the gate.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center SKED
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Relief Pilot
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Jeppesen SKBO engine failure missed approach chart [is] missing. When getting ready to brief the approach and engine failure on missed approach procedure; we could not find the normal engine failure on missed approach chart for the basic 757. Our [charting] apps were updated at home the morning of the trip. When we could not find the previous engine failure chart that is always used for SKBO; we realized it must have been omitted from the current revision by mistake. We briefed the existing Pegasus 757 engine failure on missed approach chart and set it up. Since it was a clear night with very good visibility; we felt it safe to continue and land.[Suggest] closer review of critical Jeppesen charts when making new changes prior to revision cycle.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported they were not supplied with the SKBO engine failure missed approach chart.