Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp IND
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight crew refused to fly to MDW due to a max braking stopping margin of 270 feet with a wet runway in a fully load single axle aircraft. Flight was a return flight to MDW after diverting due to thunderstorms. After diverting due to the field closing; we were fueled up again and given our paperwork for the flight to MDW. Again we were a completely full flight. We would be landing 500 pounds under max landing weight; with a negative stopping margin on Runway 31C (the runway in use) and a 270 foot stopping margin on 22L; which was not in use; but Dispatch had promised would probably be opened by the time we got there. During the time that we were waiting for MDW to open back up; I became increasingly uncomfortable with landing with such a slim stopping margin. After conferring again with Dispatch about our need for 22L to land; I decided to call my Chief Pilot's office to confer and get the 'warm and fuzzy.' The Assistant Chief Pilot said yes; it was an uncomfortable margin; but that's what we get paid the big bucks for; and to make the decision that I was most comfortable with. He also suggested that I call the Dispatch Chief Pilot on call; which I did. The Chief Pilot stated that he would be comfortable taking the flight because those 270 feet did not include the flare and touchdown distance of 1;500 feet. In another words; if you were to land using less than the 1;500 feet that would improve your stopping margin. I thanked him for his input; not indicating one way or the other what we would do since I was in the data collection mode. I conferred with my First Officer going over all the data and possible scenarios. My First Officer (two years of experience at Company; hardly any heavy aircraft time; and who had never flown into MDW in this model aircraft and with wet runways) told me that he was uncomfortable making the flight. At that point; I agreed with discretion being the better part of valor in this particular circumstance. We were legal to land on only one runway; which was not in use; with a stopping margin that was out of my personal comfort zone even though we were legal to do so. I called Dispatch and informed them of my decision. The Dispatcher was clearly relieved by my decision; telling me; 'We have no business flying that aircraft type into MDW with wet runways; and that we have been keeping them away from MDW all week and didn't know why we were using this airplane on this flight.' He told me it was a good decision to inform Ops to pull the passengers and luggage off the jet; the aircraft would be put on another flight; and he would find us a lighter aircraft to fly; and the extra people could be accommodated on later flights. Ops was informed and the passengers and luggage were deplaned. About 20 minutes later; Dispatch called and I was put on the phone with the Dispatch SOD who extremely upset that I was refusing the flight and told me. 'I had no right in taking that airplane off the flight to MDW;' and that he needed '175 passengers on that airplane to MDW right now' I told him my reasons for the decision and he very forcefully reminded me that I was legal to do the flight. I again reminded him of my reasons and that the Flight Dispatcher had instructed me to tell Ops to deplane the passengers and luggage and what his plan was to get us back to MDW. At this point; he became increasingly agitated and told me to stand by and that he was going to get the Chief Pilot on call on the line. The Chief Pilot (who I had talked to earlier) got on the line with the Dispatch Chief Pilot on call and he [said] that he was very surprised that I was not going to take the flight after what we had talked about earlier. I told him that it was simply out of my comfort level and that I didn't feel safe making the flight. By this time the Dispatch Chief Pilot on call is now yelling over the phone that he needs that airplane on its way to MDW ASAP. The Chief Pilot told him that he needed to take a step back and settle down. The Chief Pilot asked for my cell number and that he would call me. We hung up. A short time later the Chief Pilot called and wanted to go over my decision making process yet again; saying that he was at a Chief Pilot meeting; and that he had talked over my situation with all the other Chief Pilots; and that they would all take the flight; EVEN DOWN TO A 1-FOOT STOPPING MARGIN. I told the Chief Pilot; that although my decision was conservative; I felt it was the right one; and my First Officer and Dispatcher seemed to be also in agreement. I told him this was not a decision easily made; and that I was extremely disappointed because I was getting absolutely no support from the Company. He told me that they would pull me from the flight and we hung up. Five minutes later; the SOD called to inform me that I and the First Officer were being pulled from the flight and would deadhead ON THE SAME FLIGHT THAT WE HAD REFUSED TO FLY. I immediately called the Chief Pilot on call again and voiced my extreme displeasure over this arrangement. He informed that it would be a Check Airman who would be flying the flight. I asked to him to 'put yourself in my shoes; how would you feel if you were treated this way.' In the interest of safety; I know that I have made the right decision; and I feel like you are putting the dunce cap on me and sticking me in the back of the airplane.' He told me not to worry about it; and that there would be no repercussions. I told him that since a Check Airman would be flying the flight that I would sit in the jumpseat; talk to him; and maybe get some valuable training. I then had to talk to all the flight attendants since they were of the mind that 'if you're not going; we're not going.' I told them about who would be flying the jet and that I was comfortable doing it. They then agreed to work the flight. The passengers were re-boarded and; a short time later; the Captain and First Officer showed up and we pushed back for MDW. The ATIS/field conditions going into MDW showed wet runways; but by the time we landed the weather had moved through; and we landed on Runway 31C on a completely dry runway. We finished that evening; after a 14+30 crew day; with 8+14 block hours. This was a most unsettling breakdown in the safety discipline of Company. It was clear to me that the Company had a go-go-go attitude toward flying heavy aircraft into MDW regardless of runway conditions. I have also been trained that safety is the number 1 priority; and that the PIC and Dispatch have a shared responsibility in the safe conduct of the flight. If one of the parties does not feel that it is safe to fly; then the no-go decision is made; and the flight does not go until conditions change for the better. I felt under the pressures that Dispatch Safety Officer may be under; but what is the point if an airplane goes sliding off the end of the runway? I was also led to believe that the Chief Pilot was the pilot's advocate; especially when safety issues are in play. To have such pressure brought to bear on a Line Pilot; by both Dispatch and the Chief Pilot; is a grave breaking of that trust that we all must share if this airline is to continue its stellar safety record (which is one of the foundations of a profitable airline.)To remedy this situation; first; the Company really needs to look at its policy of flying heavy aircraft into MDW. The gas burned; time lost; and passengers inconvenienced cannot be worth the potential profit if airplanes consistently have to divert due to braking performance. Secondly; there needs to be a reset of the safety relationship that must be in place between the Line Pilot; Dispatch; and the Chief Pilot on call. If ANY party is uncomfortable with a flight segment; then the flight simply does not go; period. My safety margin is obviously more restrictive that all of the Chief Pilots. But what is the real priority here? To question a Captain's PIC authority; who is erring on the side of safety; is unconscionable. This cowboy mentality of go-go-go is going to lead to an accident and people are going to get hurt.'




Synopsis: A single axle aircraft Captain refused to fly the aircraft into MDW with a 270 foot stopping margin on the active wet runway so his company had a Management Pilot fly and upon arrival the airport was clear and dry.