elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: DC Battery
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: MD-82 aircraft flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1 diverted into ZZZ2 for maintenance.  The discrepancy was: After takeoff the Battery Charger light came on. Flight Attendant in the back of aircraft reported a large amount of water that came from the overhead area of aircraft. After further investigation found Circuit Breakers (CB) # L5; X25; Z24 and the entire Ground Service Bus inoperative. All other electrical indications were normal.  Sign-off was;  Removed and Replaced (R/R) Battery Charger IAW Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 24-30-02. Reset circuit breakers. Operational Check (Ops) [was] normal.  Windshield Anti-Ice Ops checks normal IAW AMM 34-41-00. Ok for service.  I omitted stating that we had checked overhead panels; floors and the Electrical Equipment (E/E) compartment and had found no evidence of water.  Also; while talking with the crew; they stated that ZZZ had lots of rain the night before; and lots of condensation that morning in the aircraft. I believe that any water that came from the overhead area of the aircraft was the result of condensation in the aircraft Air Ventilation System.    Due to the discussions we had that day; I believed that the statement about water coming from the overhead areas was more of information into the discrepancy that needed to be investigated and not a discrepancy itself that needed to be addressed; in the action taken block in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML).  Don't assume any information in the [Logbook] Discrepancy block doesn't need to be addressed in the [Logbook's] Action Taken block.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) explains why he did not state in a Logbook sign-off that he had also checked the cabin overhead panels; floors and the E/E compartment for evidence of water intrusion after he had Removed and Replaced (R/R) a Battery Charger. The MD-82 aircraft had diverted due to a Battery Charger light illuminating in flight.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff there was a strong odor in the cabin; stronger in back galley. I was still buckled in my jump seat. I saw the A and B flight attendants get out of their jump seats and move into the cabin. The odor was strong and I could feel a burning in my chest that went away in half hour or so. The crew decided that everyone was capable of going on to [destination]. During flight the C flight attendant had to take oxygen and several others had headaches.


Second narrative: While sitting in jump seat Flight Attendant B smelled nauseous fumes immediately during takeoff and landing [at our destination]. Once airborne; the pilots performed an air cleaning procedure; which eliminated the fumes until landing. Also; once airborne; passengers commented about the nauseous fumes. Fortunately; no passengers reported any physical or medical reactions from the fumes to me. Flight Attendant C needed oxygen for 20 minutes or so. She continued to perform her duties afterwards.


Synopsis: The flight attendants on an Airbus A330 reported that there was a very strong odor in the cabin after takeoff.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Agusta Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tail Rotor Drive System
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Inspection Authority
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Ground Run Operation
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The tail rotor control tube was installed and the RII was performed by myself. The aircraft had been in the maintenance hangar since [the beginning for the week] for multiple inspections. After the tube was installed I was asked to complete the RII (Required Inspection Item) and verify the aft side of the tube that connects to the lower lever had proper thread count and bolt was cotter pinned. Then crawled into the tail boom compartment to verify the forward end was connected to the servo verified bolt and cotter pin by hand because visibility cannot accessible without multiple mirrors. Then we performed ops check by actuating tail rotor pedals moving the tube back and forth operation seemed normal. I was not present for when the aircraft was doing ground runs when the aircraft shifted on the ground. I was later notified by my maintenance manager [in the evening] that there was an incident and I would need to write a statement what was my part of the maintenance performed. To avoid this ever happening again a bore scope should be used to see into the compartment that way you can see the side view and be able to tell that it was just not jammed in the bell-crank. Even performing the static check on the ground wasn't enough because the operation felt normal and actuated the tail rotor. After reviewing the maintenance procedures again a step was missed by performing a rigging check there is special tools needed for this step and I was not aware of this step because of the training we had in the hanger it was always taught to match thread count that was so the rigging would not be thrown off. The maintenance procedures need to be followed step by step and reviewed again to make sure a step was not missed.




Synopsis: Technician reported an Agusta-A119 helicopter shifted because the tail rotor was not connected correctly while doing ground runs after maintenance was performed.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CIU.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E CZYZ
ATC / advisory: Center CZYZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After breaking out under the clouds on the RNAV GPS RWY 34 at CIU during high winds and blowing snow partially obscuring the runway we both visually saw the runway pavement. Runway markings were poor and unfortunately we were unable to see the yellow chevrons depicting the relocated threshold. Both flight crew members thought that the runway began at the beginning of the paved surface. This being the case we touchdown short of the landing threshold by about 50 feet.Root cause was in my opinion a poor job of depicting this runway/relocated threshold on the Jeppesen 10-9 Chart; we looked up the government chart for the same airport and it clearly depicts the large portion of the runway that is no longer used for landing from this direction. Blowing snow and low visibility; and poorly painted markings all added to the lack up perceptibility of this layout. Improvement of the Jeppesen 10-9 Chart and a writeup in company charts explaining the situation should another crew execute this approach in similar meteorological conditions.


Second narrative: After breaking out of the clouds on final to runway 34 at CIU on a RNAV GPS approach; we had high winds and blowing snow conditions across the runway. We both visually saw the runway pavement; but due to the poor runway markings we were unable to see the yellow relocated threshold chevrons. My First Officer and I both thought the runway started at the beginning of the paved surface. Therefore our landing occurred outside of the actual marked runway. We landed approximately 50 ft inside of the displaced threshold.Poor Visibility and Poor Displaced runway markings. Also the 10-9 chart does not show the displacement accurately. Improve the 10-9 chart to better depict actual conditions and paint the chevrons so they are visible to the pilot.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reports landing prior to the displaced threshold for Runway 34 at CIU; due to poor runway markings; blowing snow and a poor depiction on the Jeppesen airport diagram.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DVT.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DVT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I accidently took the active runway without authorization. At Deer Valley (DVT) the northwest run-up area for 7L is a large area with several lanes for run-up. On initial contact with Ground pilots are given instructions to taxi to the Northwest run-up area via Alpha and advise when run-up is complete. I taxied to the run-up area and did my run-up. Upon completing my run-up I contacted ground and advised run-up complete. Ground said to taxi to Runway 7L via Alpha. Noticing very little traffic at the usually very busy DVT; when I was told to taxi to Runway 7L I thought wow; that's nice; cleared to take the runway and I proceeded to taxi onto the runway. This was obviously wrong since I never even talked to Tower. By the time I realized what I did I was on the runway and immediately contacted Tower and advised I took the active runway. They cleared me for departure and eventually gave me a phone number to call when I landed. There were no airplanes on final and my mistake did not cause any traffic to be diverted. I got lucky!I find it possibly confusing to taxi to a large run-up area; do the run-up; and then having to contact Ground to say run-up complete and get instructions to taxi to the runway which was is literally right there. In my situation I was thinking that I was at a 'normal' run-up area and I was talking to Tower after the run-up.If the old wording of 'Position and hold' was too confusing and had to be placed with 'Lineup and wait' then maybe it would be useful when getting instructions from Ground to taxi to Runway 7L; to be changed to something like 'taxi to Runway 7L via Alpha and hold short' or 'taxi to runway 7L via Alpha and contact Tower when ready to depart'.




Synopsis: A general aviation pilot became confused by the pre-departure procedures at Deer Valley Airport and taxied onto the runway without a clearance.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PDX.Tower, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was working Advisory next to LC1 (Local Controller) when Aircraft Y reported inbound for rwy 8 at [nearby] VUO. I told the LC1 controller that Aircraft Y was inbound to VUO. I noticed Aircraft X on final for 10L [at PDX] and advised Aircraft Y; who was on a left downwind (SW bound); about the traffic. Aircraft Y reported that they had Aircraft X in sight. LC1 issued the traffic to Aircraft X and advised that Aircraft X also had Aircraft Y in sight. I looked out the window and Aircraft X appeared to be climbing; so I advised LC1. LC1 acknowledged my information about the same time that Aircraft X was probably transmitting to LC1 that they were going around due to a TCAS RA. I recommend that a tower be built at VUO so we can control the pattern traffic there and reduce the number of RA's that occur due to PDX landing to the east and VUO traffic being right under them. Both aircraft had each other in sight; but Aircraft X had to go around due to the TCAS RA. This is preventable!


Second narrative: B737 on final for 10L [at PDX] was issued traffic on Aircraft Y (downwind for RY08 @ VUO) that was opposite direction. B737 had Aircraft Y in sight. Once B737 was over the VUO airport they went around because of an RA.VUO traffic pattern when PDX is on a 10 flow is dangerous. There needs to be a tower at VUO or the airport needs to be shut down.


Synopsis: PDX Tower Controllers reported an arriving airliner responded to a RA and executed a go around due to VFR traffic in the pattern at nearby VUO.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: INS / IRS / IRU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; First Officer's (FO's) flight director gave erroneous commands and the heading triangle was not displayed on the FO's ND. The FO's flight director only gave normal indications when L was selected on his INSTR SOURCE SEL panel. There were no other abnormal indications in the cockpit. No EICAS messages were displayed; no amber lights came on anywhere. After some investigation we discovered there was no information available from the center and right IRU on the IRS Mode Select panel or either FMC. Concerned that we were operating on only 1 IRU; after consulting with Tech and Dispatch; we declared an emergency; went direct to ZZZ [our departure airport].  Accomplished QRH Overweight Landing checklist; made required AML entries.


Second narrative: As a crew; we don't know why 2 IRUs could apparently fail (records indicate maintenance found them both faulted and replaced them) without any cockpit failure annunciations. Each IRU has a FAULT light and they are monitored by the EICAS.


Synopsis: After takeoff; First Officer's flight director gave erroneous commands with two IRUs inoperative.  Emergency was declared and crew returned to departure airport.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi; Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Tower cleared me to land; advising me of an airbus 'in position' at the hold short bars that would be departing when I cleared the runway. With this in mind; I intended to exit the runway as soon as possible. As a result; after touchdown I immediately applied the brakes intending to slow to taxi speed before the left turn onto the first taxiway.Upon nearing the taxiway I intended to use to clear the runway; I was slightly above normal taxi speed. Realizing this; I initiated the turn with the intent to continue using the brakes through the turn. After turning approximately 45 degrees the airplane yawed suddenly to the left. I tried to counter momentarily with right rudder; but this was ineffective. The yawing rotation continued until the airplane effectively ground looped; skidding the main gear around the nose wheel; coming to rest at the intersection of the runway and taxiway. The Tower; witnessing the loss of control; asked if I required assistance. I applied a small amount of power to see if the airplane rolled and steered normally. The tires were still on the rim; holding air pressure; and the nose wheel steering was normal so I declined assistance and exited the runway promptly. Upon seeing the skid marks on the runway; I appear to have locked up the right main tire with poor application of the brake. This event occurred as a result of my poor decision to initiate a turn during the landing rollout before slowing to a safe speed. I felt pressured to exit the runway as soon as possible in order to not inconvenience the controller or airbus crew. This was a self-imposed pressure which was a result of my inexperience in operations at airports within Charlie Airspace. Another contributing factor was my low time in type and relative unfamiliarity with the aircraft; which has a reputation for being directionally unstable during the landing rollout.




Synopsis: An inexperienced Private Pilot in an unidentified tricycle gear airplane lost control and ground looped the aircraft while attempting to expedite his exit from the runway to facilitate the subsequent departure of an airliner holding short.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Prepped for a short flight to TDO; approx 55 nm. Plugged route into Foreflight on my iPad. Route came up CLEAN; I saw no TFRs. I did this as engine was warming up. After runup; departed and climbed rapidly to 2;800 feet to stay below the floor of Class B airspace. Leveled; set cruise; glanced at my iPad; and to my shock and horror found myself inside a firefighting TFR; and 200 feet into the ceiling of it!! I promptly turned away and exited it; continued on to TDO. THAT TFR WAS NOT ON MY IPAD SCREEN WHEN I BEGAN MY TAKEOFF ROLL. It either was transmitted shortly after my takeoff; OR there was some kind of snag with Foreflight in the download. I don't know.  The Foreflight TFR has always been prompt and accurate for me in the past. Upon my return; 3 hours later; the TFR was on screen the moment it came up to speed.




Synopsis: A light aircraft pilot reported a TFR incursion when ForeFlight was slow to display the TFR.