elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C JAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON JAX
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was southbound at 3;000 feet. There was a VFR aircraft northbound at 3;000 feet. I called traffic and issued a right turn to avoid. A moment later; I was on the landline. While on the line; Aircraft X calls that he is taking evasive action due to a VFR aircraft. I did not issue a traffic alert since the pilot was already maneuvering. I initially thought that the VFR traffic was the previously called traffic. Upon later review; I saw that it was actually a different aircraft. The VFR was southwest of Aircraft X; southbound at 4;700 feet. The VFR aircraft made a fast; right descending turn towards Aircraft X. I never saw the VFR aircraft make the turn; and I don't remember [a] conflict alert going off prior to me be being on the landline. I have no specific recommendations. However; if the adjacent TRACON STARS had a feed with our STARS system; inbound information could be handled via automation rather than landline coordination. This may have given me enough time to see the event develop.




Synopsis: JAX TRACON Controller reported an aircraft had a NMAC with another unidentified VFR target that the Controller confused for other VFR traffic.
Date: 201507
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had brought this aircraft in and had written it up for the same messages. We stayed at the hotel and on the second day were told it was fixed and ready to be repositioned. When we arrived at the aircraft I asked the mechanics what they did to fix the issue. They said they did a lot of trouble shooting; replaced some wiring; did a gear swing; replaced some valves; and did a service check. I verified the logbook had closed the write up; service check and airworthiness were valid.Once they left we took off after a short storm delay. About half way to destination the RH and LH BRK FAULT messages appeared. We ran the QRH and planned for a flaps FULL landing. We prepared for asymmetrical braking and the possible use of the Emergency Parking Brake. Because both the RH and LH BRK FAULT messages were present we concluded that there would be a 50 percent loss of braking. I decided that I should do the landing in the event that the Emergency Parking Brake needed to be used. We contacted dispatch and let me know of the messages and status. We decided to continue and that the runway there was of adequate length. Upon touchdown I notice the brakes did not have their normal braking power. We exited the runway with no problem. We stopped to assess the brakes. The inboard brakes were at ambient temperatures while the outboards were slowly rising. By the time we got to the gate; one outboard was just above the line in the yellow while the other was just below the line in the green. Once the aircraft was shutdown I contacted maintenance and wrote up the messages.I think a maintenance flight needs to be done with this aircraft. I don't think it should be in revenue service with this problem reoccurring and the fact that it is a new aircraft. After writing this up a second time and the 8th or 9th time overall; I don't think we should be landing with 50 percent brakes with passengers onboard until the issue can be permanently resolved.




Synopsis: An EMB175 Captain experiences a RH and LH BRK FAULT message on a reposition flight after Maintenance had attempted to correct the same fault from the previous flight. The reporter states that this is the eighth or ninth time this aircraft has been written up for the same fault and the aircraft is almost new.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am not sure a violation occurred in this incident and I do not believe it a reportable incident.  However; I am filing this report to help avoid an FAA violation; but also because if this agency uses this information for analysis and data collection; then this report is of some value.  On take off; after pre-flighting my aircraft; I noticed a large increase in the cylinder head temps on my aircraft engine.  I estimate my altitude to have been approx. 200 feet agl.  I reduced power to idle; did an aborted take off and landed the airplane.  I taxied to the nearest taxiway and shut down the engine. Because I was concerned about the potential for an engine fire I immediately shut down the aircraft engine.  I was about 5 feet from the nearest tie down area and so I pulled the aircraft to that area and pulled the top cowling.  I had forgotten to take the engine intake plugs from the cowling and that is what caused the engine to overheat.  The engine coolant reservoir cap had come off the recover causing the coolant to be sprayed into the engine compartment.  An airport ground person drove me to my hangar where I had some coolant stored.  I then filled the coolant reservoir; started the engine and the cylinder head temps were still to high for safe flight.  I called ground control for an expedited taxi back to my hangar; was given that clearance; and returned to my hangar. I then drove my car to my destination. Final conclusion:  During my preflight I completely forgot the cowling plugs because my mind was concentrating on the 7 hour flight; and I failed to use a proper check list while pre-flighting the aircraft.  THAT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN!!!




Synopsis: LSA pilot reports forgetting to remove cowling plugs during preflight resulting in high CHT shortly after takeoff. The anomaly is quickly detected and the aircraft is landed in the remaining runway.
Date: 201809
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Event began with phone conversation to [Maintenance] from hotel prior to walking to the airport. Subject inbound writeup at XA08 to ZZZ Low Oxygen Quantity. I was told the jet was just blocking in (XA43) our departure was at XB50. I arrived at the jet at approximately XB25; after going by Flight Operations for planning.I discovered the O2 hadn't been serviced and displayed 970 psi. I immediately called Maintenance and requested servicing as the visibility was now 1/2 mist; and our takeoff alternate was ZZZ2. Having a basic understanding of the Crew Oxygen System dispatch limits 850/550 psi and other [company] publications that quantifies the dispatch limit that states a crew has approximately 15 minutes of O2 in case of cockpit smoke; I concluded - based on takeoff weather/takeoff alternate; and enroute planning where we would be on the hose from airborne to ground rollout; the safest and most prudent and course of action would be to have the O2 serviced. I continued with preflight duties while monitoring the Maintenance frequency. A few minutes later; Maintenance told me they weren't going to service the O2; because they would have to deplane our passengers.I told them that I didn't think this was the correct procedure; and I immediately called Maintenance. He said a [report] would be initiated. At that point I sent a [Maintenance Request] at XB41 (9 mins before scheduled departure and due to Maintenance's request as mentioned earlier; I had notified ZZZ Maintenance approximately 16 minutes prior to this. In the end; ZZZ Maintenance made the decision to deplane everyone. In the end; we deplaned; serviced system; reboarded and departed 55 minutes late.47 minutes into the flight we had already lost 110 psi; noted on an info only write up.As a side note; existing ZZZ2 weather and takeoff alternate aside; actual enroute data placed us 4nm on top of ZZZ3 at FL320. Using ZZZ3 as the closest airport would require 18 minutes leaving us with a possible 3 minute deficit and all of this in a perfect world.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported issues between the aircraft advisory display; maintenance limits and dispatch limits for servicing the crew oxygen system.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CMI.TRACON, IL
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Rain; Turbulence; Windshear; 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E CMI
ATC / advisory: TRACON CMI
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Received a low altitude alert from Champaign Approach while on the RNAV 03 Approach into DNV. This event occurred while procedure turn inbound on the RNAV 03 approach. Indicated altitude read 2120 when [charted] altitude was 2;300. ATC reported a low altitude alert and immediately retracted the statement as we climbed back to 2;300.Cause of the deviation was due to light-moderate turbulence; IMC; and night conditions during a training flight. Aircraft consistently was experiencing up/down drafts +/- ~500 FMP.




Synopsis: GA instructor reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on the RNAV 03 approach to DNV airport.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AVL.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C AVL
ATC / advisory: Tower AVL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We were descending visually for our left downwind leg for Runway 34 at AVL. At about 10 miles northwest of the airport and at 5;000 FT we were issued a visual clearance for Runway 34. I started a descent to 3;600 FT which was pattern altitude. I was planning to fly what I estimated to be about a mile left downwind. As we continued our descent to pattern altitude we heard the aural terrain warning. We were in visual conditions and we both knew terrain was not an issue; but I complied with the warning anyways. After the warning subsided; I decided to continue my visual descent as we were now approaching the abeam point to Runway 34. Shortly thereafter we received a second aural terrain warning. Again; we were in visual conditions and both knew terrain was not going to be a factor. The warning subsided and we continued our visual descent. I believe the terrain to our west is what caused the aural terrain warnings to sound.Next time I fly to AVL I am going to increase the height of my visual pattern altitude by another 500 FT as I believe that will prevent the terrain warnings from sounding. As a result; I will have to plan on an increased final segment leg which should not result in any terrain issues.




Synopsis: While flying a left downwind visual to Runway 34 at AVL the flight crew of a Commercial Fixed Wing aircraft received two GPWS Terrain warnings. Given VMC conditions they elected to continue their approach and landing exercising extra awareness of the terrain below.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: POU.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D POU
ATC / advisory: Tower POU
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Workload; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While flying Southbound at 1;800 feet. I established radio communications via CTAF. Self-announcing to low level helicopter traffic in the vicinity of the [POU] airport in order to ensure proper separation. I was queried by a voice as to my call sign; in which I replied my call sign. I believed at the time that I was speaking with the operator of the helicopter which I was attempting to communicate with. The voice then advised me that POU Tower was currently open. I requested clearance; which was approved. The Controller did advise me that a violation may have occurred. The flight continued without incident where we landed safely at the destination. All NOTAMs for the enroute phase of flight were checked prior to with no mention of normal hours resuming at POU. It has been my experience since the COVID Pandemic that Dutchess Tower was operating on an amended schedule; 4:00 PM Tower closure. I was not aware nor did I see any notice that normal hours had resumed. I did call the POU Tower after landing. I did identify myself as the pilot. ATC collected my information and advised me [further]. I was advised that no notice or NOTAM was put out as to the change; but LACK of a NOTAM was the indication that normal hours had resumed.A NOTAM or notice needs to be circulated advising local pilots who have become programmed to the early Tower closure since the beginning of the pandemic; that normal hours have resumed. More so than just the 'lack of a NOTAM.'




Synopsis: Pilot reported the ATC Tower at POU airport closed mid-afternoon during the COVID-19 pandemic; but unbeknownst to the reporter; the Tower had returned to normal hours of operation during this flight.  Reportedly; there was no notice or NOTAM advising of the change.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During deplaning at ZZZ airport; a passenger advised the lead flight attendant that either she may have been or was exposed to COVID-19. The affected passenger advised she was transferring to an international destination. This passenger would have had to disclose at check-in if she was possibly exposed; but passengers lie because they want to get home or travel to their destination. Also; on this flight I observed at least 10 passengers walk off the plane without any mask on and about 20 passengers walk off the plane with their mask only around their mouth. I see this type of activity on EVERY flight EVERY week. This is even with numerous PA's telling the passengers they must wear the mask around their mouth and nose. Many customers just don't care. I've had passengers completely remove this mask right in front of me. I've even experienced passengers telling me; '[profanity] the mask' right in my face as they walk off the plane mask less. This is the type of activity I see on every flight.




Synopsis: Captain reported being advised that a passenger told the Flight Attendant they may have been exposed to COVID-19.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The event happened at the run-up area while we were completing operational tests following maintenance on JB2 and JB3 junction boxes. Testing procedures for thrust reverser control systems outlined in CRJ200 AMM 24-01-02 and 24-01-03 indicated the test would be performed while simulating wheel speed movement. Our interpretation of the procedure was we could either simulate wheel speed movement or use actual wheel speed; for example; while taxiing. We chose to use actual wheel speed since that was the current configuration of the aircraft. While rolling with engines at idle; the test procedure had us open 3 circuit breakers then operate the thrust reverser to verify certain messages would illuminate on EICAS. Once the breakers were pulled; nose wheel steering and brakes were inoperative. At that point; the aircraft began to veer left towards the edge of the taxiway. I was sitting right seat and immediately reset the circuit breakers so the Pilot in Command (PIC) could regain control of the aircraft. By the time I had the circuit breakers reset and systems came back online; we had already rolled off the edge of the taxiway into a shallow ditch where the left main sank in 6 inches of mud bringing the aircraft to a stop.The testing procedure did not say actual wheel speed could not be used.Instructions to perform maintenance provided by the manufacturer of any aircraft should be specific on what can and cannot be done during testing or repairs of any kind. In the event the instructions are not clear and there is any doubt on actions that should be taken; personnel performing the task should stop immediately and ask for help or contact the manufacturer to gain a better understanding of the task at hand.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: While performing a retest; mechanics pulled three different circuit breakers which affected the nose wheel steering and the brakes which caused the loss of control and caused the aircraft to run off the taxiway into the mud.