elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While flying at night on February 2015 to CLT; the CLT Approach Controller advised us that the CLT Runway 5 Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights were inoperative.  The Approach Controller also advised us that there were some red lights on the ground to the left of Runway 5; past Taxiway Foxtrot; that had the appearance of PAPI lights.  He advised us to ignore these lights.  We were glad that the Controller briefed us in advance of this issue.  As we flew our visual approach; backed up by the Runway 5 ILS; we noticed four distinct red lights situated in a horizontal line to the left of the touchdown zone.  The lights appeared to be PAPI lights (from left to right) in the red; red; red; red configuration ('RED on WHITE you're all right; RED on RED Pilot is dead.').  We confirmed that we were on the glidepath all the way to touchdown using the ILS.  However; the optical illusion of the four red lights (looked exactly like four red PAPI lights) caught our attention as we flew the approach.  Ignoring these four red lights was good advice from the Approach Controller.  However; doing so was like someone saying; 'Trust me; ignore the red traffic lights ahead; proceed through the intersection without regard for those red traffic lights.'  Flying an approach at night with what appears to be four red PAPI lights goes against everything a Pilot is trained 'not to do.'  After landing; we began our taxi to the gate and noticed a grouping of what appeared to be many temporary red lights in a construction zone in an area between Runway 5; Taxiway Foxtrot; Taxiway Mike; and Taxiway Mike 2.  On the ground the red lights took on a whole different appearance.  They did not look at all like PAPI lights; just a random grouping of red lights.  Somehow; when viewing the lights during an approach to Runway 5; these lights look exactly like four red PAPI lights.  I recommend that these lights be shielded or blocked in some way so that Pilots making the approach to CLT Runway 5 do not mistake the red construction lights for PAPI lights.




Synopsis: CLT TRACON alerted a flight crew that red airport lights to the left of Runway 5 appeared as false PAPI lights which at the time was inoperative.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was scheduled for a 12+ hour duty day on day 2. We taxied out for takeoff the second time after receiving additional fuel for the reroute. I thought I was fit to continue. I realize now that I never should have gone. To even make that decision after a long duty day is totally against any NASA sleep study regarding safety. My physical and mental states were compromised. Duty days should never be scheduled so long without rest if safety is important. No violations were made but it was only adrenaline keeping me going. My original Captain called fatigued after the first leg because they had an early go two days prior. The new captain was thrown in last second after a deadhead from ZZZ1 with pressure from ramp and the company to go quickly. It was a 14+ hour duty day in the end. Then there were issues with getting a room. The next morning I woke for the deadhead and could not see clearly for hours; was losing things and could not focus. I would never accept a duty this long again. It was a poor decision made when tired but not recognizing how tired I was.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer described compromised physical and mental state resulting from fatigue due to long duty days.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During Visual APP XXL at 4NM from ZZZ1 and passing 1200 ft.; while manually flying; crew saw at 1 O'clock; a medium size helium balloon holding a parcel by a string with an approximate total size (length) of 15ft. PF (Pilot Flying) (Captain) gently pulled AFT and banked left to avoid collision. PM (Pilot Monitoring) (FO (First Officer)) Immediately reported to ATC; which in turn acknowledged and passed the information to aircraft landing behind. The balloon with string and box crossed approximately 65 ft. from the cockpit and 20 ft. under the right wing. After arrival at the ramp; there was no evidence of collision observed.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported taking evasive action to miss a medium sized helium balloon while on visual approach.
Date: 201602
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post-Flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was supposed to renew my TSA Alien; because I am starting the instrument course in a 141 school. I asked my instructor should I renew it. Instructor said no your old one is still valid (Private TSA Alien). Instructor said let me ask one of the chiefs just to make sure. The head chief of the airport said no you do not need to; your old one is still valid; so I took their word for it; and did one flight. After a few days another chief said to me you were not allowed to fly; and I will report this to the TSA. I should not have relied on someone else; even if he is the head chief of the airport or my instructor.




Synopsis: Alien private pilot starting an instrument training course asked his instructor if a new TSA alien form was required and was told no. This proved to be incorrect.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TYR.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D TYR
ATC / advisory: Tower TYR
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While approaching TYR Airport was cleared by the Tower to enter a right downwind for runway 13. Could hear Tower talking to another aircraft inbound to the airport and giving them our position and altitude. At no time did the Tower give us a traffic report on the other aircraft inbound to TYR. As our aircraft was about to turn downwind to runway 13 the aircraft crossed in front of our aircraft at close range and landed. Our aircraft then proceeded to follow the aircraft and landed without incident. I believe had the Tower had told us of traffic inbound behind us and the location of the aircraft; I would have been more aware of the traffic and would have avoided that traffic.




Synopsis: Flight instructor reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the pattern at TYR airport. Reporter stated they were not advised of the traffic.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I supplied a non-compliant part to an AMT (Aircraft Maintenance Technician) who then installed it onto a cargo door which then was used on our aircraft.Currently [technician] is working a skin change on a 737 forward cargo door. While drilling up a pre-shaped skin it was realized that this skin was not fabricated for use on this MPN (Model Part Number) or model door. Discussions [on] this with the crew; it came up that one of these pre-formed skins had been used in the past for [the] same model; door.A review of the records shows that earlier this year [technician] produced a 737-800 cargo door by installing a skin pre-fabricated by [company] drawing 52-xxxx-xxx.The skins fabricated per the Engineering Order/Drawing are for a different MPN / model aircraft. This alone does not make these skin unusable but the fact that engineer based their approvals on a different MPN and aircraft model type when approving the material substitution; does.The original substitution approvals were for an original skin bonded from two layers of [aluminum]; substituted for one single thickness skin of for the aft cargo door of a 737-200/300.We installed this [modification] on a forward cargo door where the original skin was; the Engineering Order as stated does not cover forward cargo doors or 737-800s. To use the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) material substitution chart in an effort to allow for the substitution of a T42 skin vs a T3 skin requires additional thickness; due to the different heat treat properties.Therefore the skin installed is an out of compliance situation.




Synopsis: B737 Maintenance Technician reported that multiple cargo door repairs were made using an incorrect-thickness material.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation II/SP (C551)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While en route; approximately 440 nautical miles to the southwest of our destination; our GPS appeared to provide erroneous information. While the GPS unit itself displayed an accurate position; the information relayed to the HSI and multifunction display was ultimately erroneous in terms of what information the flight crew received. Ultimately we were queried by Center controllers that we were proceeding 30 degrees off course. At that point we checked our GPS against the on-board VOR's and confirmed that we were proceeding off course. At that point we reset the GPS after which it appeared to function properly. We continued to monitor it against the VOR receivers with no further errors being detected.




Synopsis: A C550 developed a 30 degree track error apparently caused by a faulty GPS which was reset and resulted in normal route tracking.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Once we leveled off at FL300 we received a HYD LO PRES; PUSHER FAIL; BRK FAIL CAS messages. As the flying pilot I called for the appropriate check list. As a crew we accomplished all the items and double checked our landing numbers. We determined that we met all the required performance numbers and decided to continue to destination. As we descended on the arrival; the HYD system reenergized and the CAS messages cleared. At this point we decided to extend the landing gear. The nose gear and right main extended normally but the left main showed up. At this point we received HYD LO PRES; PUSHER FAIL; BRK FAIL CAS messages; in addition we received the LDG DISG CAS message. I asked for the appropriate checklist and once we accomplished the checklist we were successful in extended all three wheels. We continued with the arrival and approach. Once we landed I used the emergency brake to bring the aircraft to a complete and successful stop.  Emergency crews met the aircraft but no services were needed. The FBO towed us in to the ramp. On postflight we did not see any evidence of a hydraulic leak. As a flight crew we worked together as a team and accomplished the appropriate actions to land and stop the aircraft successfully.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB505 flight crew reported a HYD LO PRES alert at FL300 and continued to their destination. Emergency braking was used to stop the aircraft on the runway.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While performing the preflight O2 check I got the following ECAM indication: OXY turned amber...pressure was approximately 1;650 PSI and REGUL LO PR appeared in amber under the pressure display. I HAD SEEN THIS BEFORE. Approximately last summer; had an aircraft with the same problem. In that case; Maintenance replaced the regulator and some sensors with no effect; and the jet was removed from service. On this day Maintenance felt it was an indication problem and the intent was to defer the oxy indication. As before; when the First Officer and I donned our O2 masks; after 2-3 good breaths; the masks sucked in against our face. There was DEFINITELY an airflow problem. Took quite awhile to convince Maintenance of this; we switched airplanes and I believe the aircraft was removed from service. The first time this occurred; I thought it was just a strange; fluke 'Airbus failure'. Now that I have seen this failure twice; my concern is there may be a fleet wide problem. PLEASE NOTE: This failure is ONLY noticed if you are looking at the ECAM oxygen indication while performing the O2 check!!!!!!!!!!




Synopsis: A319 Captain experiences a crew oxygen system failure during preflight testing and informs Maintenance. Maintenance attempts to defer the oxygen indication system but the crew refuses to accept the aircraft.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ASE
ATC / advisory: Tower ASE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Paragliding activity in the vicinity of the city of Aspen puts paragliders in close proximity to aircraft landing Runway 33 at ASE airport.  Runway 33 is rarely a landing runway; however; due to a tailwind to Runway 15; traffic landed Runway 33.  Due to terrain; landing 33 is only possible via right traffic.  Right traffic to 33 puts aircraft near paragliders.  Per LOA between paragliders and ASE Tower; aircraft must be advised of paraglider activity.  Paraglider activity was broadcasted on the ATIS; Aircraft X reported receipt of the current ATIS which had paraglider activity on it.  I observed a paraglider in the projected course of Aircraft X when the aircraft had just turned base.  The paraglider appeared to be slightly more than a half mile ahead of Aircraft X.  I advised Aircraft X again that there were paragliders near Aspen Mountain and to use caution.  Aircraft X acknowledged receipt of my advisory; appeared to climb slightly; then continued to the runway and landed.  When the paragliding company reported operations terminated for the day (as per LOA) they told me they felt the jet was 'too close for comfort.'  I agreed and explained everything in this statement. I recommend that paragliders not operate in the traffic pattern at Aspen. They are small and not easily identified visually by controllers.  It's too dangerous for them to be in the pattern.




Synopsis: ASE Developmental Controller reports of an incident where paragliding activities are done and a jet that departs ASE gets too close to the glider.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Immediately after lift-off; we heard EWR Tower tell the aircraft behind us to remain in position on runway 22R due to an ATC radio outage. We were then instructed to contact Departure Control on 128.55. My FO (First Officer) tried to contact departure several times with no response.I had him switch to radio #2 and attempt contact. After no success; I had him return to EWR tower on radio #1. Once again; no success. Thinking it might be his PTT switch; I had him engage the auto pilot; and I tried both radios several times; with the same outcome.We ran our After Take-off check list; and I had him contact ATC on 121.50. Lots of chatter: we received no response; but could hear several other aircraft with the same issue; so we pieced together that it was not an issue with our airborne equipment.At that time; I had him transmit 7600 on the transponder. Within a few moments; ATC (via 121.50) gave us a LGA frequency; and we immediately contacted them. They issued us a climb to 3;000 feet and a left turn to heading 090.Total elapsed time from take-off until we reestablished communication was approximately 3-4 minutes.From that point on; the flight was uneventful.Threats were our inability to contact anyone from ATC. Additional threat was flying low-level; in the wrong direction (southbound; we wanted to go northeast on course) for several minutes without further ATC clearance.




Synopsis: Medium transport Captain reported losing contact with ATC for approximately 4 minutes shortly after takeoff from EWR.