elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201605
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This morning [I] asked for a 'bug wash' to clean bugs off the windscreen from the day before. (This should be done automatically this time of year) didn't happen. Took plane to [another airport] asked twice for a 'bug wash' didn't happen. Collected more bugs on the way there. Continued to [another airport]. Collected even more bugs; asked [them] 3 times for a window wash. They said ok; didn't happen. Asked again [them]; flat out refused to do one and pushed us out! I did not want to fly the airplane at that point with 2 full days of bugs all over the windows! This is a SAFETY OF FLIGHT issue. We cannot 'see and avoid' as required by FARs with so many obstructions on the window. I cannot believe the company is okay with this! Expect one of these reports each leg this happens until it is rectified. Summertime brings many bugs out and they cover the airplane. The front windscreen should be cleared every leg automatically. I don't even care if they keep the supplies IN the aircraft; I will wash it myself every leg!  This is SAFETY OF FLIGHT and impedes required FARs to see and avoid traffic; etc. I cannot stress enough the importance of this! Refusal of a window wash possibly due to time pressure on the station.




Synopsis: Q400 First Officer reported he had difficulty getting the windshield washed clear of bugs because station personnel were reluctant to take the time to do so.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: June 2013; [during the] aircraft's Servce Visit; the left aft (L2) cabin door slide was changed. In October 2013; the aircraft was in a Base Maintenance for scheduled maintenance. It was during this visit on Task Card sequence XXX; that Maintenance personnel found the wrong slide was previously installed at the L2 position. The slide was removed and replaced without incident. It was after this change that I was made aware of the error that resulted in the wrong slide being installed. The correct Part Number (P/N) per the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) is XXX88-YYY; for the aft [door] position.  The Part Number that was installed was XXX86-YYY; which corresponds to a forward [door] position. This was an unintentional error that occured from what I believe to be a key stroke error when ordering the part.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed about an incorrect slide he had installed on a B737-700 aircraft approximately four months earlier. He had replaced the aft Cabin (L2) door slide with a forward door slide.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Ground LAX
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight while briefing the HOLZ9 RNAV departure we saw a discrepancy between the flight plan points and the MCU (Mode Control Unit) NAV display; which displayed a right 360 degree magenta turn just after takeoff. We reloaded the SID for both 25 left and right but the turn would reinsert itself after about a 15 second delay. Called maintenance and wrote an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) discrepancy; we also informed the dispatcher and the duty officer of the problem. Maintenance reset the circuit breakers but the turn remained on the NAV display. After more consulting between LAX maintenance they said they had seen this before and the turn would clear itself when we lined up on the runway. We assessed the operational risk and decided we would taxi out and see if the turn would remove itself from the display when we lined up for takeoff; if it did not clear itself we would cancel our clearance and taxi off the runway and then ask clearance for the LAXX 7. The anomaly did not clear; we cancelled our takeoff clearance and taxied clear. No traffic separation issues occurred. Once stopped on taxiway Alpha we executed our game plan refilling and receiving clearance for the LAXX7 SID. No anomaly appeared with that SID; flight continued with no further issues. Navigation error on MCU displayed that did not match the waypoints on MCDU.




Synopsis: Wide body First Officer reported requesting a different departure from LAX when their FMC showed a wrong turn programmed on the original HOLZ9 departure.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DAL
Second aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I was working Local Control West and North combined when a BE36/R; taxied out for departure to Runway 13R. A GLEX/Q was on a visual approach from the north inbound to Runway 13R.The VFR/RSA hold short line for Runway 13R is non-standard and back further than any other hold short line of the same type. Several pilots miss it and then get told to taxi back; but I decided to file this report. If there was a study done on the runway incursions at DAL; over 60% will be found to have happened at this hold short line. I saw the BE36 taxi out and do a run-up short of the VFR hold short line. I thought I saw the plane start moving while the GLEX was on a 2 NM mile final. I grabbed the binoculars and then was able to verify the BE36 taxi across the hold short line. I tried calling the BE36 on the radio with no response. The Ground Controller also attempted with no response. The BE36 pilot finally check on ready to go well passed the hold line; but short of where a normal hold short line would be. I told him to make an immediate 180 and taxi across the hold short line. The GLEX was on about 1 NM final when the BE36 was on the taxiway side of the hold short line. I advised the pilot that the flashing lights were where the hold short line was located. I believe this to be a continuing problem at this airfield due to poor design and the FAA's misunderstanding of the Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) manual and Policy Memo which added an appendix to the TERPS manual clarifying the design of hold short lines with displaced thresholds. I believe that when Runway 13L opens up; there will be an increase of runway incursions as well due to this poor and incorrect design.




Synopsis: DAL Controller described a runway incursion event by a departing general aviation aircraft that failed to stop at the Runway 13R hold line. The reporter indicated that the location of the hold line was problematic.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the Pilot Flying on this leg. After departing ZZZ1 while climbing through Flight Level 280 on our way up to FL340 Autopilot #1 disconnected and would not reengage. A/P (Autopilot) #2 would engage but after about 30 seconds it also disengaged along with the auto thrust going into THRUST LOCK mode. Then several ECAMs (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) appeared including RUD TRIM1 FAULT; YAW DAMPER 1; RUD TRV LIM 1. The First Officer ran the Quick Reference Handbook procedures for each of those problems which included resetting the FACs (Flight Augmentation Computer).We leveled at FL340 and the aircraft was exhibiting a slight Dutch Roll tendency so we descended to FL280 and no more Dutch Roll was observed. Autopilots could be intermittently engaged; flight directors would come and go; autothrust would disengage in THRUST LOCK mode. We consulted with Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] via phone patch. Without further attempting to engage autopilots or autothrust events seemed to stabilize and with consult with Dispatch we planned to continue to destination. We began evaluating along route alternates and asked Dispatch to do the same. Shortly thereafter the flight directors started to come and go repeatedly along with the previously described ECAMS. When each rudder ECAM came and went there was a discernible yaw felt. Other messages would appear momentarily then clear such as 2FD2; and BOTH PFDs (Primary Flight Display) on SINGLE SOURCE (not sure of the wording as it would momentarily flash then disappear).At this time we made the decision to divert and after evaluating the weather decided with dispatch concurrence to divert to ZZZ2. An [urgent situation] was declared with ATC and a clearance to ZZZ2 was obtained and a safe landing was made. ECAMS intermittently continued while enroute.The aircraft was always fully under control. After gate arrival I debriefed with the [Flight Manager] and maintenance log entries were submitted. Briefed local ZZZ2 maintenance personnel.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain flying A319 aircraft diverted due to aircraft mechanical malfunction.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We took off and just after liftoff I felt like the plane was not performing well. We were in a turn and I wasn't sure if it was just the turbulence or if it was actually something wrong. As we leveled the wings I realized that there really was a problem with the plane. It was requiring substantial right aileron to maintain level flight. We leveled off at 15;000 to trouble shoot the problem. After discussing it with maintenance we elected to return to the departure airport. After a smooth overweight landing we were told by maintenance that we had a flap broken and hanging off the back of the wing.




Synopsis: After takeoff; a B737-900 First Officer noted significant right aileron trim was required to maintain level flight after takeoff. The flight returned to the departure airport where a trailing edge flap was found partially detached and hanging off the wing.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autoflight Yaw Damper
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff and about 50 ft high; I heard the Yaw damper switch snapped into the off position; with a master caution flight control light on. With time permitting I ran the QRH yaw damper off checklist. When I reset the yaw damper switch back on the aircraft did a abrupt yaw to the left and the yaw damper switch snapped off again. We asked ATC for radar vectors to stay within the Airport area to work out the yaw damper problem. After talking to maintenance and dispatch about the yaw damper failure; Flight planned cruise altitude FL400; thunderstorms and rain at the destination we decided to return back to ZZZ. ATC gave us a visual approach [Runway] XX; on base leg turn 1;300 ft Tower gave us a low altitude alert. We landed safely and wrote up the Yaw Damper.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported Yaw Damper failure caused an air turnback and precautionary landing.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: W29.Airport, MD
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Other Flying on base in pattern
Airspace: Class G W29
Second aircraft: Beechcraft Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When I was flying base to land on Runway 29; a Baron that had been flying behind me for the last leg of the pattern; flew diagonal and cut infront of me on base. In reaction I circled for a minute or two while he landed and cleared the runway. Afterwards; I rejoined the pattern and landed normally.




Synopsis: Student Pilot reported an NMAC event in landing pattern during base turn to final.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CZQX.ARTCC, NF
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center CZQX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Just prior to coast out the Purser called the flight deck to say there was a burn spot on the side panel next to 20F and it was very hot to the touch. We asked the IRO who was on break to investigate it. He confirmed what the Purser said. The IRO came up so the Captain could go back and investigate and he confirmed something was burning in the side wall. While he was in the back; I coordinated with Maintenance Control via Satcom. The Captain came back and was agreed it was unsafe to cross the water with an uncontrollable and unknown heat source in the side panel. We advised ATC and returned to departure airport.


Second narrative: Over wing hatch heater at row 20 seat F; overheated. Unable to control and isolate. Plastic molding was showing signs of heat damage (big black spot) Unable to touch due to heat. Conference call with Maintenance and Duty Manager. Returned to departure airport.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew is informed of burn marks on the right emergency exit door by the Purser. The First Officer on break investigates and determines there is a burn mark plus several other hot spots on the door. The crew elects to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after departure; during landing gear retraction; we received an aural and visual warning gear disagree message. It appeared that the nose landing gear did not retract as per normal cycle. We completed the appropriate QRH checklist which directed us to land at the nearest suitable airport. We advised Dispatch that we were returning for landing and needed performance information. We advised ATC of our situation to return and later declared an emergency prior to a precautionary and successful overweight landing. Discrepancies were recorded in the aircraft maintenance flight log.




Synopsis: A CL-65 flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport for an overweight landing following receipt of a 'GEAR DISAGREE' warning after takeoff.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were descending into DCA via the FRDMM RNAV STAR; conducting a VNAV Path descent. We monitored the FMA to ensure we stayed on the VNAV PATH and on the VDI (vertical deviation indicator) during the descent. After passing MORLL; still on the correct VNAV PATH; we reset the altimeters at FL180 from 29.92 to 30.56. The next waypoint; PLDGE; is supposed to be crossed at 280 KTS between 17;000 and 15;000. Due to the large altimeter change (which increased our QNH vice QNE indicated altitude by 640 FT) the very short distance between MORLL and PLDGE and the inability of VNAV to deal with the altimeter change in such a short period of time; we crossed PLDGE higher than 17;000. During all this; we monitored the FMA the entire time. We never left VNAV PATH once; yet we still crossed PLDGE high! Upon changing the altimeter; the VDI briefly went away; FMA stayed in VNAV PATH. The VDI came back after maybe 10 seconds and showed us on the correct vertical track. The speed began to slow towards 250 (no idea why [as we were] still in VNAV PATH). As we neared 250; it became apparent that VNAV didn't know what it was doing. We FLCH'd it down as quick as we could; including speed brake use; but there was no way to catch up at that point.




Synopsis: A B757-200 flight crew was unable to comply with the crossing altitude restriction at PLDGE on the FRDMM RNAV STAR into DCA when the switch from QNE to QNH passing FL180 increased their indicated altitude by 640 FT.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Currently in ZZZ COVID-19 is spiking. Employees in breakrooms and offices are breathing unfiltered/unclean air. Installing HEPA filters in all employee breakrooms and offices will clean up the air and mitigate exposure to our employees.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported concerns regarding the unfiltered air that employees are breathing in breakrooms and offices and recommends filters be installed to mitigate COVID-19 exposure.