elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201308
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the initial phase of cruise; approximately 1 hour into flight the 'standby power off' light illuminated. In addition the cabin crew notified us that the cabin was operating on emergency power with no PA or standard lighting. The QRH was consulted and followed; by placing the standby power switch to 'Batt;' completing the checklist but not extinguishing the light. We then noticed a popped circuit breaker on the p-5 standby power unit panel behind the First Officer; above the cabinet in the back wall. We advised company via ACARS. After consulting with Maintenance and Dispatch we diverted to an enroute airport for maintenance. Upon completion of maintenance we were re dispatched to our destination and continued without issue.




Synopsis: The flight crew of a B737-700 diverted to an enroute airport for maintenance attention following the loss of standby electrical power.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MDW
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While #1 and holding short of MDW Rwy 22L; we heard a takeoff clearance what we thought was our call sign and flight number. We accepted the clearance and read it back. As I turned on lights and began rolling onto the runway; I saw another aircraft on the other side of the runway taking the runway as well. In the darkness of night and the many lights effectively camouflaged the other aircraft. Neither my First Officer or I had seen the other airplane and were not even aware of its presence until that moment. I immediately stopped the aircraft and asked tower who the take off clearance was for. Tower advised that it was for the Lear Jet which had similar sounding call sign and number and instructed us to hold short. We advised tower that we had crossed the Hold Short line. Tower instructed us to cross the runway; do a 180 turn and again hold short. We departed normally after the next arrival.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported a runway incursion when they misunderstood an ATC clearance for an aircraft with a similar call sign.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VBT.Airport, AR
Weather elements / visibility: clear; 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: TRACON XNA
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: VBT had issued displaced threshold and usable runway NOTAMs.  No mention of runway obstruction or Taxiway A2 inaccessible.  I landed on [Runway] 18 and rolled out to the end for a departure on A2 Taxiway.  50 [feet] prior to the taxiway; the runway is blocked with several rows of sandbags.  You can't see them until you are within 200 feet or so due to the slope of the runway.  No NOTAM on the Closure of Taxiway A2. No NOTAM on runway obstruction.  No NOTAM to support the change in runway lighting. No runway end lights for the displaced threshold.  Runway lights are still in the original 4;426 feet configuration. The only way you can get to the FBO or off the runway is back taxi; no warning to that effect. Management at this airport consistently puts aviators and passengers at risk. This is not the first time safety of flight issue have happened and no NOTAM to support the issue.




Synopsis: General aviation pilot reported a confusing NOTAM about a runway displaced threshold at BVT airport which failed to mention several rows of sandbags obstructing the runway and an adjoining taxiway.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Out of FL200; [we] heard loud noise and moderate vibration. We assumed that the air driven generator (ADG) had deployed. Upon arrival at the gate; Maintenance informed us that the nose gear doors were open. We never received any alerts or indications of gear doors open or gear extended. Maintenance later provided this assessment of the damage: found the following items broken: on right aft door the aft bracket assembly that attaches to the strut is broken allowing the aft door to hang loose on the hinges (ref IPC 32-36-01-01). On the left forward door the rod end for the forward door link broken (IPC 32-36-01-01). Also on left forward door; the aft support rod; as well as the aft three hinges are broken (52-81-05-01). Suggest engineer investigation of failed parts to determine adequacy of inspection procedures and interval on nose gear doors.

Callback: The Reporter suspects that the forward door actuator rod which attaches to the door with an eyelet failed first then allowed turbulent air to tear the aft door hinges; opening that door also. The indication from the cockpit was simply a vibration which the Captain associated with a ram air turbine; and as the aircraft was slowed the vibration ceased. There as no visible external door damage. The reporter did not know what the inspection cycle on these doors is or if this is an aging aircraft related issue.



Synopsis: A DC-10's right aft and left forward nose gear doors had brackets and hinges fail in flight which allowed those two doors to open with no indication except for an unusual vibration.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Cleared to descend on the SERFR 1 STAR and given a 'West' transition. Thought we heard previous aircraft get the 'Wesla' transition and asked if we could expect the same - ATC answer was affirmative. We plugged in the 'Wesla' transition expecting a wraparound to Rwy28 or maybe something else. As we started down that fork; ATC asked our intentions and [we] told them we were on our way to 'Wesla.' What they really wanted was the 'West' transition to Rwy28. Turned back on course to Menlo for the 28L ILS uneventfully.




Synopsis: B-737 flight crew and ATC confusion regarding 'West' and 'WESLA' transition terminology on the SFO SERFR1 STAR results in a heading deviation.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OKBK.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During the landing roll right after touchdown; a cart came loose in the upper deck galley. It rolled all the way forward. Striking and dislodging the stowed barrier; and then hit the cockpit door. Luckily; nobody was struck by the cart as it proceeded forward between the upper deck seats. I have heard from another pilot; two accounts of this exact occurrence in the past. Also; flight attendants on my flight shared with me several occurrences they were familiar with as well. This has happened at my company on many occasions in the past. Clearly there is a problem with cart stowage and lock system in the upper deck galley. Perhaps it is time to install a cargo net across the upper deck galley entrance. In our case; the cart struck the door at a high rate of speed. This could have caused serious or fatal injuries to a passenger or flight attendant.




Synopsis: B747 Captain describes a galley cart getting loose on the upper deck during landing and striking the cockpit door.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Logbook Entry; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A/C X arrived in ZZZ on DATE at [late evening]. Aircraft had a Transit Check accomplished on the overnight. Aircraft sat on the ground for 36 hours; and was assigned another Transit Check on DATE1. On the workcard for the Transit Check for Oil Servicing; (1) Has OSP entry been made in AML since last flight?(a) If 'YES'; proceed to Step 2.C.(1). and enter the OSP Authorization Code.(b) If 'NO'; proceed to Step 2.B. Our answer is 'YES' because it was accomplished the night before. Step 2.C. Record oil Information below:NoteWhen recording oil added; record the partial pint; in 1/8 increments; in decimal equivalent only; i.e. 1/8 = 0.125;1/ 4 = 0.250; 3/8 = 0.375; 1/2 = 0.500; 5/8 = 0.625; 3/4 = 0.750; 7/8 = 0.875. For example; if 1-1/8 pints areadded; record as 1.125.(1) OSP and AML entries.Record OSP Authorization Code: __________________Make sure that the OSP Authorization Code is entered in the AML. Quality Control is briefing management and supervisors that AMT's are required to transcribe the OSP information from previous check to logbook page with current Airworthiness Release for the current check. This results in multiple Airworthiness Releases with the same OSP information until the aircraft flies next.AMT's interpret the statement 'Make sure that the OSP Authorization Code is entered in the AML' as verifying that this information has previously been entered in the AML; NOT continuously transcribing this information multiple times for each assigned check that has been accomplished until the engines have been serviced after the aircrafts next flight.Asking for compliance to clarify to AMT's; QC and management on the proper way this documentation should be accomplished. Or change the statement to read 'If OSP has been previously entered in AML; no further OSP entries are required to be entered in the AML.'




Synopsis: Technician reported lack of clarity regarding aircraft records and longer than normal service intervals.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Aircraft X] was an arrival into the CMH airport and descending to 11;000 feet. The aircraft was switched to CMH aproach and a bit later the data block vanished. The R controller looked at me and I looked at him simultaneously and we realized neither of us had touched the keyboard and asked each other; 'What just happened?'  We then contacted the supervisor to look at the situation and at this time the correlated target had changed to an (I) intruder.  [Aircraft X] was still level at 11;000 feet (our airspace) when the R controller called CMH to make sure they had the data block and verified all was okay. They said; 'They still had a data block; didn't do anything stange; but got a Remove Strip message.'




Synopsis: ZID Controller reports that everything is normal reference a specific tracked aircraft on his display. The aircraft is shipped to Approach Control and then the data block disappears. The advised the Front Line Manager (FLM) to investigate and called the Approach Control to ask them what happened. Approach said they still had a data tag; they did not do anything strange but they did get a remove strip message.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were given a 90 degree vector direct to [the FAF] about 10 miles from the fix and given a descent to 2;000 feet. We were then cleared for a visual. Turning final the aircraft was well below glide slope and we received a GPWS glide slope warning. Corrections were made to get back on glide slope and the landing was uneventful.Poor vectoring by ATC for a heavy aircraft. The crew's familiarity with the approach. We did comment this would be a very close in approach; but visibility was excellent which led the Pilot Flying (PF) to continue.Do not accept poor vector. ATC should not give a heavy aircraft a close in vector for this approach and we; as a crew should not have accepted it.




Synopsis: A330 First Officer reported receiving a very tight vector for an approach; resulting in the aircraft becoming low on the glideslope and generating a GPWS warning. A timely correction was made to the glideslope and a successful landing was accomplished.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-83
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An Aircraft arrived with a [Pilot Report] for Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Loud Thump on Taxi (Item had history). After replacing numerous parts and Rig check problem still exist. Lead that was working the issue came to me and said after replacing the Control valve and checking the Rigging that he believes the issue is within the strut of the gear. He suggested that the only way to really determine it was the strut was to ride within the Nose wheel well of the left side of the Aircraft (AC) while taxiing the AC. I asked him who was going to perform the task; and he told me he had no issue riding within the opening of the wheel well. I approved this action feeling there was No safety issue due to the space within the area. The only safety precaution from myself was to pin the gear and assure he would not be subject to any moving parts within the area. Also that radio communication was used. The task was performed with a positive determination that the noise was in the gear itself. After scrutiny from other shifts as to what a stupid decision it was; I felt a need to file this report. I myself take full responsibility for allowing the lead to perform this task. I do not feel his safety was compromised at any time. We are short staffed; personnel not badged; short equipment and stores support. Always being pressured to have AC ready and on time. This is not an excuse for my poor decision. Should not have said yes.




Synopsis: While troubleshooting an MD83 Nose Landing Gear (NLG) issue; a Lead Mechanic rode on the NLG Wheel well while the aircraft was taxing.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a Flight Attendant crew change and passenger boarding; our Flight Attendant B advised Flight Attendant A and myself; Captain; that she received a call from her personal Physician that she had a positive result for COVID-19 test resulting from a pre-surgery screening. A Flight Attendant immediately advised B Flight Attendant to contact Crew Scheduling and request to be removed and replaced for the flight. The Captain immediately advised Operations Agent to discontinue boarding and have passengers in jet-bridge return to boarding area in terminal building; while B Flight Attendant gathered her belongings and removed herself from the aircraft.I then requested the Operations Agent to call Flight Attendant crew lounge to see if a Reserve Flight Attendant was available to assume vacant position. The Flight was originally advised of a 30 minute delay for inbound Flight Attendant from another flight. After approximately 10 minutes; we were advised that a Reserve Flight Attendant was enroute from the crew lounge to cover flight. The Flight took a 17 minute delay due to the Flight Attendant exchange.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported during passenger boarding one of the flight attendants received a call from a physician reporting a positive COVID-19 test result.
Date: 201403
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During the boarding process there were a total of 6 customers that had more than the one carry-on and one personal item. I asked each customer for them to consolidate their bags or they were going to have to check one of them. All of them complied with the exception of one who stated he was a high profile frequent flyer and I will do it after I get to my seat as he walked passed me. At this point I was afraid to say anymore to him since he identified himself as one of our company's frequent flyers and knowing that all he had to do was write a letter to the company. I was in fear of receiving discipline from the company if he was to write a letter. In recurrent this year we are now being told that we are only to inform and not enforce when it comes to a violation. When I talked to the Gate Agent about the situation it was brought to my attention that they also are fear of loosing there jobs for enforcing the FAR and company policy if the customer writes a letter for being dissatisfied for checking their bag.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reported that a company frequent flyer boarded with an extra carry on and was asked to consolidate to reduce the number but the passenger did not comply. The reporter and gate agent were fearful of disciplinary action if they enforced the FAR.