elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Fatigue; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a personal pleasure flight; flying low (500-1000 AGL) over extremely remote terrain (well more than 500 ft from an person; vessel; vehicle or structure) and careful not to operate in a careless or reckless manner; I descended low towards an open area; simulating an approach to landing. I misjudged my height and the wind conditions and unintentionally hit the surface. The wheels grabbed and I began to decelerate. In spite of adding power slowly the plane continued to decelerate. Finally in spite of being at full power; the plane continued to decelerate. It was unable to regain flight; so I committed to landing; by now at a very slow speed. The rollout was flat and smooth; but upon hitting a muddy area; the plane nosed over out of control. Damage was limited to the propeller and spinner; which struck the ground; [and] the engine cowling. Other than the plane; no object was damaged. No person was injured. I was able to push the Light-Sport plane to a nearby road where it was towed away.Contributing Factors:Airplane: A Light-Sport plane is more vulnerable to gusts and has less power.Attitude: In retrospect; had I added full power immediately; I may have been able to regain flight. Probably the overconfident macho attitude 'I can handle it' contributed the incident.Conditions: Trees; hills; and the open area probably produced gusts and directional changes in the wind.Different planes: I had just recently flown my Cessna T210 16 hours during the week; and I may have instinctively treated the Light Sport as if I were still in the T210 regarding the slow adding of power so as to not over-boost the turbo.Corrective Actions: Emphasis on transition both from light to heavier aircraft and the reverse from heavier to lighter.Human Performance Considerations:Macho attitudeGreater familiarity and comfort - training the body to respond in another airplane than the one being flown.Fatigue: The non-reportable incident occurred after a long week of travelling.




Synopsis: Avid Mk IV pilot reported inadvertently touching down in a muddy area during a simulated landing which resulted in a slow speed nose-over.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Dash 8-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On climbout we were given two left turns and we were now heading towards ALB. Departure then gave us direct to HANAA and a frequency change to BOS Center. The aircraft turned 180 degrees because we had HANNA programmed into the FMS instead of HANAA. When we realized the mistake; BOS Center asked where we were going; we replied that we had put the wrong HANAA in; Center jokingly replied 'go direct ALB; there is only one of those.' We then turned direct to ALB and continued the flight.When verifying the flight plan; be sure to check the total mileage in the FMS; check the spelling letter by letter of each fix. HANAA and HANNA are so similar; we both missed the Data Entry error.


Second narrative: No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.


Synopsis: When cleared direct to HANAA waypoint the flight crew of a Dash 8 entered HANNA from their legs page; not realizing it had been misspelled in their filed route. The start of a 180 degree turn alerted them to the error and they were recleared direct to a local VOR.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I was monitoring the North sector and waiting for the training team in North to give a briefing to me and my trainee. At the same time Final was being split off from North and they would be briefed at the same time. The trainer and trainee were obviously very busy and engaged with the traffic complexities while working North and Final combined. This caused an unnecessary situation when Final should have been already opened.  The trainee working North cleared [Aircraft X] for an ILS approach to RWY28L (maintain 025 until established) even though a VFR callup was going to cross [Aircraft X`s] path in the next 5 miles at 025. The trainer who was busy watching many other situations in the North sector took over and turned Aircraft X to a 250 heading; cancelling his approach clearance; and tried turning the VFR aircraft; who didn`t respond; but it was not looking good. The two aircraft passed within a mile of each other. There has been a big push at P80 to combine sectors because of staffing; meetings; lack of awareness of traffic; and it is making for an unsafe environment for the flying public.  #1 ATM [Air Traffic Manager] is new and on the fast track to bigger things. ATM has spent very little time understanding the TRACON environment and this disconnect roles down hill. The FLM's [Front Line Managers] are frustrated and not staying engaged with the traffic flows. Safety has to be our first priority and I don`t feel it is. FLM's are criticized for calling overtime or keeping sectors opened. It was only by the grace of God and 'the big sky' theory that someone didn't die today.




Synopsis: P80 Controller reports of an airborne conflict that was saved by the instructor. The reporter also states that the positions were combined and caused an unnecessary situation when the final position should have been open.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ACK.Airport, MA
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ACK
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Right engine did not make N1 takeoff power. It needed to make 98.5 but only provided 97.9 and the N1 number started to roll back during takeoff roll. An abort takeoff was executed; all procedures and checklists were followed. ATC was notified and we taxied back to [parking]; Called maintenance and reported issue.




Synopsis: A BE-400XP First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff when the right engine failed to produce calculated takeoff thrust.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Apprentice
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was placed in short term storage on [date]. The step in Job Card XX to disconnect the main batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but not documented in the AML as required. The same day; 2hrs later; Job Card XY was issued to take Aircraft X out of short term storage. The step to reconnect the aircraft batteries was accomplished/stamped off; but once again it wasn't documented in the AML as required. Both groups of technicians failed to show compliance to document in the AML these steps. Paperwork audit found the discrepancy and it has been rectified on AML XX; to show it had been accomplished. A message has also been sent to records to show correct date work was complied with.  Miscommunication between technicians assigned both job cards.  Technicians need to verify work accomplished on job cards before submitting finalized package. Better communication between technicians assigned to the tasks.




Synopsis: Technician reported problems with job cards not being signed off correctly.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Fighting Falcon F16
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: Fighting Falcon F16
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: A formation flight requested breakup. I issued a beacon code to the second aircraft; issued holding instructions as requested 4000 feet and approved Aircraft X go to initial as requested. I instructed Aircraft X 'when able descend to 2500 feet'. I was informed I had an operational error because I didn't tell Aircraft Y to instruct Aircraft X to descend to 2500 feet when able. FAA 7110.65W paragraph 2-1-13 Note 1 states' Separation responsibility between aircraft within the formation during transition to individual control rests with the pilots concerned until approved separation has been approved.'A memorandum interprets this to mean we can only issue control instructions through the lead aircraft. How can this interpretation be construed from this note? It clearly states that separation responsibility rests with the pilots does it not? To add this extra requirement when it's obviously not the intent of this note is ridiculous. It's apparent that [the memorandum] is intending to complicate and infer a simple interpretation. This facility has had numerous operational errors attributed to this incorrect memorandum. Redact this memorandum and apply this note as it's obviously intended. Military flights know they are responsible for their separation until another form of separation is attained.




Synopsis: A TRACON Controller reported providing instructions for a military formation flight break up in accordance with FAA H 7110.65 but did not relay instructions through the flight lead.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We departed and climbed to approx. 3000 ft. and orbited the runway for 3-4 patterns at that time we began to climb to 5000 ft.; after several orbits we began a downwind to base turn and I observed the Manifold pressure indicator decreasing. I made an immediate turn to the runway and adjusted the throttle. The manifold pressure gauge did not react to throttle inputs. At that time I setup for best glide and changed from the right fuel tank to the left fuel tank. At some time in the guide it appeared to me that we would be high; so I extended the gear. Prior to the approach end of [the runway] is a set of train tracks and a set telephone wires. As we got closer to the airport I was not sure I was going make the runway. I had a field to my left so I choose to put the aircraft down in the field. I made a turn to align with the borrows in the field and extended flaps. After touchdown the engine was observed to still be running; I again adjusted the throttle with no observed change in engine operation. The cowl panel was removed and the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose. The linkage was reinstalled and an engine run-up was performed. All parameters appeared to be normal. I performed a test taxi and then parked the aircraft in the corner of the field for Inspection.




Synopsis: A Beechcraft M35 pilot lost manifold pressure while descending and turning downwind to base leg. He immediately turned toward the runway while noticing that the manifold pressure gauge did not respond to throttle inputs and landed in a field near the airport. Upon inspection; the throttle cable linkage was observed to be loose.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was my first OJTI session on the arrival sector. The developmental issued Aircraft X a heading toward the final; but did not instruct the aircraft to join (vector angle too large). The aircraft began slowing as Aircraft Y was coming up behind. The developmental recognized the blow through of the final and issued a LA (low altitude) alert and a turn back west. We were focusing on Aircraft X and getting him out of the MVA that we didn't notice right away Aircraft Y overtaking; but still with vertical separation. I eventually had Aircraft Y maintain Visual Separation with Aircraft X; but I don't know exactly at what point that occurred. There were other IFR conflicts that we were focusing on and traffic was getting busier. I failed to listen actively and assumed Aircraft X was going to join the final. I should have stopped Aircraft Y at 4;000; but was too concerned about Aircraft X and the MVA. I realize that in this sector; control from the OJTI must be maintained constantly or things get out of hand quickly - not like other sectors where there's room to correct actions.




Synopsis: SCT Controller reported a loss of separation and a MVA violation.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCI.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MCI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We landed on 1L in MCI. Weather was 1;000 FT ceiling and one mile with snow. I took aircraft after landing rollout and taxied clear of runway. Ground first gave taxi instructions; 'B; M' to gate and asked about braking conditions on taxiway and runway. We thought runway and taxiways were good. As we approached Taxiway M; Ground said we could use Taxiway M1. I turned onto M1 since it was a shorter distance to our gate and wouldn't require as many sharp turns on the snowy taxiways. The taxiways had some snow on them; but the yellow center lines were visible and the blue taxiway lights were highly visible as it was starting to get dark.While approaching the gate the aircraft pulled [yawed] right four or five feet. We were still on the taxiway and we were trying to figure out what happened and whether we should proceed. We then noticed that the Number 2 engine had shutdown. We notified Ground that we would need a tow and contacted Company Ops. We shut down the other engine and let the passengers know it was going to be a few minutes to get to the gate. After Ops and Company Maintenance arrived; we saw that the right main gear and engine were in a snow drift and arranged for air stairs and busses to take the passengers to the terminal.Airport Ops needs to ensure that the taxiways are better cleared. The snow had been cleared from the centerline of M1 but had been pushed into a three to four foot drift on the taxiway; not off the taxiway. With the light snow covering and the darkening conditions; the snow drift was not visible from the cockpit.




Synopsis: While taxiing to the gate on darkening; snow covered and slippery MCI taxiways the flight crew of a B737NG failed to note that plowed snow was built up three or four feet on the taxiway itself. The right main gear and engine impacted the snow drift and they shut down the jet and removed the passengers by bus.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Brake System
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Myself and Technician Y were working on a Cessna CE560E aircraft inspection. We performed the task which checks the Emergency Braking System.  One of the final steps is to disconnect the [Emergency Brake] line and blow it out with alcohol to make sure that if there's any fluid (Skydrol); that it's cleaned out.  When removing the Right-Hand (R/H) side; the 'B' nut was partially seized and the line broke while being removed.  I capped the line on the aircraft side and took the broken line and placed it on the table by my Lead Mechanic.  I told him  that the line broke and that it needed [to be] written-up and a new line ordered.  It has been three weeks since all of this happened; so I don't know what his exact reaction was as far as a thumbs ups; an O.K.; or even just a nod; but I do know that I was under the impression that he heard me and understood.  I then turned around and went back to cleaning up after the [Inspection] Checks we had accomplished.  Apparently the Lead Mechanic didn't hear me; or misunderstood because the line was not ordered and was not written up and from my understanding it was found on the Post Maintenance Checklist this past weekend.  The broken line was the one that connects directly to the Brake Assembly and going from their Removal and Replacement here is the Part Number (P/N) 6527365-16 and it's found in the Cessna CE-560 Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 32-41-00; Figure 04a; Item # 2. Not sure what could be done differently other than double checking all of the write-ups and parts when your Lead finishes for the day...but not sure that's 100 % possible.  This is the first time I have had to fill out one of these reports.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician was informed that a broken Emergency Brake System line he had removed and capped off was not replaced on their Cessna CE-560E aircraft. The brake line was discovered missing during a Post Maintenance Check.
Date: 202108
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter function: Observer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Ramp
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A [ramp employee] driving a cargo loader cut in front of a 787 marshaling in at gate XX at XA20 on Date; the right wing walker did have his stop signal but the aircraft could not stopped.  The [ramp employee] barely made it to the right side of aircraft with out any incidents.




Synopsis: Ramp Agent reported observing a cargo loader cut in front of a taxiing Dreamliner as it was being marshalled into the gate. The Observer further stated that it was impossible to stop the Dreamliner and the cargo loader was able to get out of the way.