Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Our flight was delayed due to maintenance of a popped circuit breaker. We completed our preflight duties and briefing so to be ready as soon as Maintenance was finished with the aircraft. Maintenance finished and we pushed back and taxied out without incident. We had Runway 18 programmed into the FMS and we were assigned [Runway] 17 on taxi out. We updated the FMS both sides appropriately. We taxied to the hold short line for [Runway] 17 without incident. Upon receiving clearance for takeoff I noted that the autopilot was coupled to the Captain's side. We had briefed I was doing the takeoff but I adapted to the situation and set the TCAS to the Captains side and finished the Before Takeoff Checklist. Upon completion of the checklist the Captain immediately advanced the thrust levers and called out 'Set Thrust'. I verified that set thrust was properly set and called out 'Thrust Set'. I called out '80 Knots' that the Captain answered and then 'V1; Rotate' (the speeds were almost identical). After I called out rotate the Captain stated something like 'Oh; it's your leg' and at the same time the aircraft seemed to stop rotating. I saw the Captain's hand leave the thrust levers and it felt like he also let go of the yoke. (Upon debrief he claimed that he did not let go of the yoke but that was his rotation technique). At this point it was very unclear to me who was flying the aircraft and I stated 'You have it' and pointed toward the Captain while looking straight ahead to make sure we continued to takeoff safely. The aircraft then continued to rotate more and prior to indication of positive rate the Captain called 'Positive Rate; Gear Up'. This further confused who was flying the aircraft because he had combined flying and pilot not flying call outs into one call out. At 500 FT AGL we put the autopilot on and just after that the Captain changed the coupling to the First Officer side and said I had the aircraft. At this point I took control of the aircraft and called for flaps up at 800 FT AGL while I selected IAS 200.I was concerned about the safety of the flight and focused on flying the aircraft safely. We continued to climb out and at the first turn in the RNAV departure I notice the aircraft was not initiating a turn. I scanned the instruments and noted that the autopilot was in ROL - IAS mode and scanned the LNAV button. It was not illuminated so I selected it and verified LNAV on the PFD. The aircraft initiated its turn. The magenta needle stayed well within one dot deviation. Upon debrief with the Captain I discovered that even that amount of deviation could still lead to an ATC deviation. We continued the departure and climb without incident. Above 10;000 FT I changed the TCAS to the First Officer side. I tried to discuss the events after we passed through FL180 and the Captain effectively shut down any conversation about the event. We continued to our filed destination and I believe flew the ILS 36 approach. We landed; deplaning; completed post flight; and road the van to the hotel. As we were entering our rooms I tried to debrief again with the Captain and he just said to put it in my report. I pressed him if he was comfortable without discussing the matter and he stated he was. After he entered his room and closed the door I did not feel safe flying with him again without discussion and knocked on his door and stated so. He invited me in to discuss the situation. I explained that I thought what had happened was not safe and he disagreed. He stated he thought it was 'Safe to transfer controls below acceleration altitude'. I strong disagreed and explained that not having clarity of who was flying the aircraft at rotation was not safe. He refused to agree with this. I left with a slight hope that the situation would not repeat itself.The event occurred because the pilot flying (Captain) did not follow SOP's breaking sterile cockpit and put into question who was flying the aircraft at rotation. Why the Captain chose to do this I do not know.Follow SOP's; do not break sterile cockpit; make safe decisions.


Second narrative: We were running almost an hour late leaving on leg four going to the overnight and it was the First Officer's leg. We got cleared for takeoff and I advanced the thrust levers and started the takeoff roll. At V1/Rotate call I realized it was supposed to be the First Officer's leg and said; 'Oh man; I forgot it was your leg...' I rotated; called for gear up select NAV; at 500 FT I called for autopilot ON. Once the autopilot was on and the aircraft was climbing out on the RNAV Departure I said to the First Officer; 'I'm going to give you the aircraft; Your aircraft' and the First Officer responded 'I have the aircraft' when the Flight Guidance Controller was switched to the First Officer's side; the autopilot switched to the basic mode and the First Officer didn't catch it right away and we started to go slightly off the RNAV course. The First Officer recovered the course and selected NAV and we continued the flight without further incident.


Synopsis: An EMB-145 Captain inadvertently began the takeoff on what would have been the First Officer's leg. He realized the error and transfered control at about 500 FT which dropped RNAV; caused a track deviation and left the First Officer feeling aircraft command was compromised.