Date: 201412
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Thrust Reverser Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: MEL; Weather; Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: When my crew showed for the flight; we learned that the right 'Reverser Accumulator Low' annunciator had been written up by the previous crew and that the right reverser had been deferred. Neither the Captain nor I were particularly fond of the situation but there were no limitations so we accepted the aircraft.The weather for the destination was reported as winds out of 350 degrees; 11 knots; 8 miles visibility with light rain; ceiling broken at 600 feet. The forecast for our arrival time [was] winds out of 360 degrees; 11 knots; 1 mile visibility with light snow and mist; ceiling overcast at 800 feet. Both the Captain and I felt that this was an acceptable situation; but that we would check the weather enroute; and we also had an alternate which had better weather.Departure and enroute were as planned with a weather check with dispatch enroute. The weather report that we received enroute was pretty much as forecast with the addition of braking action of Mu's +40. At the appropriate time before descent we obtained the ATIS weather which was winds 340 degrees 14 gusting 24; visibility 1 mile light snow and mist; ceiling about 500 feet and braking action Mu's +40 (I don't have the exact report at this time so this is the best of my memory - it wasn't much different from forecast). A snow depth was reported; which I don't remember exactly; but it was within limitations. Both the Captain and I felt that landing would be acceptable because reversers are not required for stopping distance and we had a runway that was long enough. We briefed the approach and agreed that auto-brakes of Medium would be acceptable.The ILS approach to the runway was as expected; breaking out of the ceiling at approximately 500 feet. The landing was normal and well within the touchdown zone. After touchdown; nothing was normal and we almost slid off the end of the runway.I have landed the aircraft with one reverser deferred and knew what to expect. I have also landed in light snow with snow on the runway with no problems. The differences that occurred on this night and that I will pay attention to in the future were threefold; the temperature which indicates snow condition; the runway coverage; and the time of the last Mu readings.At touchdown I lowered the nose before opening the reversers. The right reverser was deferred but the handle was not locked down. As I was trying to modulate the reverser thrust; I could not feel any braking action. The combination of the wind; basically 90 degrees crosswind from the right; and the left reverser; produced a tendency for the airplane to weather vane to the right but at the same time drift to the left side of the runway. Directional control was maintained but the use of reverse thrust was seriously limited.The worst part was the lack of braking action. I wasn't feeling any braking action and thought possibly that the reverser deferral had somehow limited the auto-brakes. At some point I applied brakes myself which kicked off the auto-brakes. The Captain also started braking. The airplane was decelerating but not at the rate that it needed to avoid going off the end of the runway. As we decelerated the Captain said he had the controls and below 60 knots he applied a lot more reverse. I think that he was also on the tiller because he was able to keep the airplane straight and we stopped with just 100 - 200 feet to spare. To exit the runway; we made a forward left turn onto taxiway A at the end of the runway.  I reported the braking action as 'Poor' to the tower. For a contrast I would like to discuss briefly the departure.  The Captain and I discussed the departure and decided that it would be safe because the airport was plowing and sanding the runway as we sat at the gate. The weather was -1 degrees and 1 mile visibility which put us into the 'Heavy' snow category for anti -ice purposes. The truck was spraying Clariant Safewing MP IV for the anti-ice fluid.  The Captain discussed thiswith the station personnel and it was decided to load the passengers so we could push if the weather changed slightly. After 'awhile' the weather did change to -2 degrees and visibility increased to (I think) 1 1/4 mile.  We pushed and commenced de-icing and anti-icing. The de-ice took 'awhile' because there was accumulation on the aircraft. At that point; the 'iceman' called and said that the electronics had failed and that they couldn't spray the type IV fluid. We concluded that it had to be done and so we waited 'awhile' for them to go and get the 'manual' truck.  As you can guess; the 'awhile's' added up and just as the next truck arrived; the station called and said that we were exceeding 2 hours and had to return to the gate so that passengers could get off. The Captain and I were frustrated and he called Dispatch but there was no way around returning. Dispatch agreed that regulations specified a 3 hour rule but that the company had established a 2 hour limit to prevent the $10;000.00 charge per person.  We went back to the gate and all the passengers were given the opportunity to get up and stretch their legs or get off. Every passenger declined and we pushed again; completed a de-ice and anti-ice cycle and departed without incident.The company has established a 1 hour buffer time to prevent a situation where we get charged $10;000.00 fine per passenger. After the fact; the Captain and I both agreed that this was a good rule; but ...  The company needs to create operational buffer zones to keep our flights safe. An airplane with a deferred thrust reverser should never be dispatched to a situation where the runway braking action could possibly be compromised. Sure it is legal; but as in our case; having both reversers would have been helpful in stopping the airplane. Having only one reverser severely hampered our braking action and compromised our directional stability. First: I will never again accept a deferred thrust reverser going to an airport that will possibly have snow or ice on the runway. In addition; I will not accept it when going to an airport with rain if the runway is short.Second: I will always query the timeliness of braking action reports.Third: I will pay attention to the temperature when it is snowing. Wet snow is slippery.Fourth: If the runway is covered in snow; I will call for auto-brakes to be at 'Maximum'. I can always apply manual braking if 'Maximum' is too much.




Synopsis: Aircrew attempted landing with one deferred inoperative reverser on a runway surface with limited braking action and in a crosswind condition. Aircraft stopped just short of runway end.