Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Holding short of Runway 36R on taxi in; I directed my First Officer to shut down no. 2 engine. After gate arrival; my First Officer correctly displayed to me the after landing checklist which stated after crossing active runways an engine shutdown is allowed. I had forgotten the requirement to cross active runways before shutting down an engine and I stand corrected! Thank you. I think reviewing parts of the checklist that Captains do not normally refer to would have prevented the event.


Second narrative: Holding short 36R Dallas Captain asked to shutdown engine 2 down. I asked are you sure you want to do that. He said yes. I said we still have to cross 36R an active runway. I again asked are you sure you want to do that. He said yes it isn't written anywhere that you can't shut down the engine before crossing a runway. We shut the engine down. I have approximately 4500 hours on this airplane. About three times a year; a Captain will ask to taxi single engine. I am reluctant because we do it so infrequently that I have to think about the bleed panel which requires my attention not to be looking outside usually in a critical area. It has been my experience they ask entering the ramp area. This Captain the whole flight from prior to engine start to landing was reluctant to any input I had. He also was in a constant rush over the two days. For example; he would brief approaches without me being on the page. He was going at his pace not as a team. We needed to be de-iced. He didn't want to de-ice until I pointed out ice outboard on the top of the wing. He wanted to taxi out single engine to deice. I managed to convince him let's keep it simple and start both. When I suggested we use more power for takeoff in mountainous terrain which most Captains do he said no. When I suggested we go slower than the .79 planned because of the numerous reports of turbulence he said no. Not until the airplane was going to overspeed did we slow down. Then as soon as we had 5 minutes of smooth air he sped it back up to slow down again. It was moderate turbulence going into DFW I cooled the passengers off. He turned the temperature back up. I was pilot flying but he wasn't following the defined roles. For example on takeoff roll I barely touched the power before his hand was on top of mine. Another example; he jumped in and started talking to the de-ice truck. Holding short in DFW he asks tower when are we going to cross. He was always confident in his decisions and not open to acknowledging a different opinion. To complicate matters; we had a Fed on the jump seat. When he asked to shut the engine down; I knew it didn't seem correct but I had no idea where it was written or if it was written. I challenged him twice. Once again I do this about 3 times a year. Short of getting into an argument holding short of a runway with numerous planes waiting to takeoff and numerous planes waiting to cross I did it. He hadn't been receptive to any input and I fell flat. When I later looked down at the checklist; I saw the note when clear of all active runways with proper cool down time an engine can be shutdown. Being correct in this case felt defeating. Once the passengers were off I pointed this out to him. He said it must be a new change. Still not acknowledging our error; I said no the checklist has been out since July. I told him when your co-pilot gives you a conservative suggestion take it. They are trying not to get you in trouble. He told me I should have told him it was written. I said I didn't know myself where it was written. When I later said I was going to ASAP it; he didn't think it was necessary. He still didn't get it. First I called professional standards. I like this Captain as a person but as a professional I have issues with his lack of crew coordination. I discussed ways to deal with Captains that don't take input. I usually fly with the same group of Captains and don't have this issue. I have 29 years of flying experience. I am a senior co-pilot who could be a Captain; retired military pilot and I also flew for the commuters. I have been there and done that. My attitude is one day we all can be Chuck Yeager and the next no better than a student pilot. When you get the pilot who thinks he Chuck but is performing like a student pilot it is stressful. We had lots of weather coming into DFW with a complicated approach that had a strong tailwind that switched to a headwind at a low altitude. The energy it took to keep us in the green the whole flight was exhausting because of the Captains reluctance to take any suggestions especially with the pressure of having a fed onboard. It's a team effort. This Captain loves the attention of the passengers and stands in the doorway before and after each flight. Yes this is great customer service but even better customer service is to work as a team to get the plane ready and work as a team to fly the airplane to ensure the highest quality of safety. Passengers really like a pilot being safe. I have been trying to keep up with the multitude of changes in our books but I am struggling. I have always been a look it up person. It defeats a lot of difference of opinions. I will keep suggesting to Captains the correct policy and procedure and hopefully I will be able to better recall where information is written. I would ask the review board to let me know if the single engine taxi is prohibitive by our checklist or is it a FAR?


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported shutting down Number 2 engine before crossing runway; which was against company policy.