elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BUR
Aircraft component: Pitot/Static Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Pitot 2 MEL stated no flight into known icing or moisture conditions. Preflight planning and enroute updates showed route and destination conditions to be clear skies. We obtained ATIS info D prior to beginning descent in the JANNY5 arrival; and received info D which stated 10 SM visibility and sky clear. On the ILS Z Runway 8 approach; we saw a haze layer looking directly into the sun but could make out the ground and the field. After switching to BUR tower inside the FAF; Tower relayed that traffic immediately ahead of us; just reported breaking out near the ILS minimums. We continued the approach and went IMC at approximately 1;000 feet and broke out at 450 feet AGL. Uneventful normal landing. Reported to Tower and they proceeded to issue a special METAR and update ATIS. Delayed on ground for next flight until field was VMC.No way to forecast this situation and plan for it. Had we had this info available to us prior to the FAF we would have diverted in accordance with the MEL limitations.




Synopsis: EMB-135 Captain reported inadvertently entering IMC on approach; resulting in a violation of the MEL.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SLC
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Upon taxi out to assigned Runway 16L at the airport; we were assigned a taxi route of H F G to the runway. Due to the close proximity for taxiway F with E; we turned onto E. We were able to taxi onto G with no disruption to the taxi out or ATC and other aircraft. This event was caused due to lack of effective signage/markings in conjunction to a confusing taxiway layout. [Caused by a] poor airport layout; lack of effective signage; and an intersection that seems to be complex; although is not marked a hotspot. [Recommend] better taxi briefing; being more attentive on taxi out; if found confused; request progressive taxi.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported they were cleared by SLC Ground to Runway 16L via Taxiways H; F; G. Because of their location on the air carrier apron; they mistook Taxiway E for F; but made the correct turn onto Taxiway G. Poor signage and complex taxiways were reported factors.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Other Person
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y; the heavy; was the lead aircraft on the north downwind for runway 26L. Aircraft X; the large; was the following aircraft on the same downwind but en-route to runway 27. Aircraft Y was descending to 2000 feet and Aircraft X was descending to 3000 feet initially. I turned the heavy out of 5000 feet for the right base. More than minimum separation existed when I turned the heavy southbound. TARP [Traffic Analysis Review Program] claims I flew through the wake remnant of the heavy with the large on the downwind even though I had more than 5 miles behind the heavy when the heavy started the base. I pointed the heavy on the base leg out to Aircraft X while he was still on the downwind. Aircraft X reported the heavy in sight and was instructed to maintain visual separation. I did so because I knew I'd be turning behind the heavy for the base leg to runway 27 and I wanted to ensure I was protected. TARP claims closest proximity was 400 feet vertical and 4.13 miles lateral. Those distances are approximate from my recollection of looking at the replay. I'm at a loss for words about how this was an operational error. I had more than minimum separation laterally when the heavy turned southbound on the base leg. I don't mess with wake turbulence and probably had a *T line drawn to ensure spacing. I used the tools available to me to maintain separation. If TARP can see wake remnant and call a deal on me; why doesn't TARP provide me with a tool to avoid said remnant. As I said above; I used the tools available to me.




Synopsis: I90 Controller describes a loss of separation he finds out by the tool TARP advising the wake turbulence remnant. Controller wonders if this tool (TARP) can tell them that there was a loss of separation why can't it provide the controller information to prevent the loss.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 5
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain; Flight Engineer / Second Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At night in MIA; after [a] rainstorm; taxiing in from landing on Runway 9. Clearance after crossing Runway 30 on Taxiway V; was 'V P HH hold short Y1.' As I approached [the Taxiway] P and Y intersection I observed an aircraft taxiing south on [Taxiway] HH approaching the Y2 intersection. At this moment I mistakenly thought the approaching aircraft was on [Taxiway] JJ; and I turned northbound on Taxiway Y thinking it was HH. As soon as I turned; I realized my mistake and stopped the aircraft short of [Taxiway] Y2. The approaching aircraft had stopped on HH; also short of Y2. I informed ground of my mistake and was given clearance to continue north on [Taxiway] Y and to transition to HH on Y2. The southbound aircraft continued clearance to transition to Y at Y2.In hindsight; that particular intersection area is an unlit wide open concrete pad that has many taxiways merging in a small area with many taxiway signs. I do believe in these particular intersections; it would be helpful to have the taxiway identifier painted on the tarmac with the lead in lines; much like the spot markings approaching airport gates. However; I could have prevented this situation; and will avoid repeating this in the future by simply stopping the aircraft when any doubt arises.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported improvements in MIA ramp markings would reduce taxi confusion.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: ATR 42
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Two pieces of undeclared or no DG [Dangerous Goods] paperwork attached to the items were discovered by myself as I was monitoring the cargo loading.  I had notified the DG Agent who then added the one piece at 1.37KG and then must have misread the second piece of 6KG to add incorrectly .6KG to the total added dry ice weight of 1.97KG and then he proceeded to round up it up to 2KG.  At the time; I quickly glanced at the packages and misread the 6 KG as .6KG as well. (I did take pictures of the boxes however and realized this mistake as I was preparing an Irregular Operations Report.)  He then added the dry ice to the paperwork.  All pictures; first paperwork copy showing no dry ice; new paperwork showing dry ice; and entire DG paperwork included with my irregular ops report that I am submitting as well.Some type of miscommunication between ZZZ1 DG and ZZZ DG; a common complaint I have heard from MSP DG agents.  As to the 'Misreading' error; my own fault for not spending more time verifying the ice count rather than taking his word for it. He said it was .6 and my expectation bias then read it as .6 instead of the correct 6.




Synopsis: ATR 42 Captain reported a communications breakdown between flight crew and ground personnel regarding undeclared and erroneousness DG documentation.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After takeoff from ZZZ; we were being vectored for our climb and were kept on a speed restriction. Climbing through about 17;000 feet; the speed restriction was removed and we heard a noise coming from the cabin. Soon; we realized [the] cabin door key had been left in the door. Noise lasted only a few minutes followed by an engine whine in the left engine. There were no other secondary indications. [We] chose to land in ZZZ1 which was only 15min away. Landed without incident.


Second narrative: We were on hot spare in ZZZ after several days of early show times. I went to the aircraft to get some cash and return to the FBO. While I was there; my partner came out and said we have a trip. I got up front to prepare the aircraft. He came out and did his walk around and we left.We were slowed under [a] Class B [airspace] and subsequently ATC gave us a speed restriction. Once we were around FL190 and north of [the] Class B [airspace]; he gave us normal speed [and] that is when we accelerated and heard a strange noise. We discussed it for several minutes; but thought it was not a real issue at the time. Several minutes later; the noise stopped and the left engine had a deeper tone. We immediately started watching the gauges and reduced power. We kept the power reduced and continued monitoring the engine gauges and there were no abnormal indications. Then; I realized it was my key.When we did the key check; I felt my pocket as usual and felt my ear plugs thinking it was my key. It was completely my fault.For starters; I am going to hang my key on my lanyard from now on. Secondly; I will be checking the door lock from now on during preflight.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew left key in door and it may have been ingested into left engine during cruise flight.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out at 4000 MSL; the lead flight attendant called the flight deck and reported a burning smell throughout the cabin. We had a very experienced cabin crew and they assured me the source of the burning smell was not the galley ovens. I made the decision to return to [departure airport] as the source of burning smell could not be confirmed. After landing the burning smell dissipated; Fire personnel found no exterior indication of burning; and there was no cabin source of fire found. The aircraft was not evacuated. An overweight landing was made; which led to a hot brakes situation. I requested airport firefighting personnel to complete an exterior inspection of the aircraft and I followed the appropriate hot brakes procedure from the QRH; and subsequent inspection of the brakes was accomplished by Fire personnel. I contacted [Maintenance] and it was deemed safe to taxi; [so] we proceeded to the gate. The appropriate electronic logbook entries were accomplished.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after a Flight Attendant reported a burning smell in the cabin.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJC.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: Tower SJC
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were departing SJC on runway 30R. Conditions were clear skies and 10 miles or greater visibility. My duties were the pilot monitoring and the F/O (First Officer) was the pilot flying. Upon reaching thrust reduction altitude; we received a TCAS RA to descend at a rate of at least 2000 fpm. The target aircraft was at our 12 o'clock less than a mile and 500 ft above us. There was no way we were able to comply with the TCAS command [because] as soon as the TCAS alert had happened; it disappeared. Further; our initial climb rate was over 4000 fpm because were very light. We never saw an aircraft and shortly after; SJC Tower instructed us to contact departure control. Tower and NorCal TRACON never reported any aircraft in our vicinity. I don't know if this was a phantom RA or not. Needless to say; this was a very disconcerting event. I truly thought we were going to have a midair collision. We both were very shaken by this event and I even failed to report it to SJC Tower or any controlling ATC authorities. This event only lasted about 3-5 seconds. We didn't even have time to comply with procedures. The FO elected to continue the climb to avoid the RA and we did so by 200 ft.It is unknown if there was or wasn't an aircraft directly in our departure path; but we never saw one. I just don't know.After reflecting on this event for several days; I have come to the reasoning; that with the surrounding airspace protections at SJC; the possibility of an aircraft intrusion in the departure corridor is possible; but not likely. My failure to recognize that it was a possible phantom RA; I didn't realize that the TCAS system on this aircraft may be failing as well. I did not write up the TCAS system on this aircraft and it probably should be.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported receiving an RA on climb out from SJC that was likely a false target generated by a malfunctioning TCAS.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Flight encountered a drone passing 2500 ft (MSL). The drone was at our 9-O'clock position. ATC notified.




Synopsis: 737-800 captain reported a UAV at 2500 ft. (MSL).
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ABQ.TRACON, NM
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ABQ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ABQ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked onto Departure and was instructed to 'Climb via SID' on the MNZNO3 Departure CME transition. Aircraft X read back the correct control instructions. While on the SID; Aircraft X passed south of the point where they should start their climb but remained level at 90. Approach caught this and asked if they were 'Climbing via the SID?' Aircraft X replies they were given 90 (previously on clearance delivery). If Aircraft X were to remain on the SID they likely would not make the climb over the eastbound turn MVA of 113. As a result departure took Aircraft X off the SID on a 190 heading; and they were then instructed to maintain FL200. If Departure was busy and did not catch Aircraft X leveling off at 90; they would have turned east into an MVA of 110. Aircraft on clearance should be instructed to 'Climb via SID' with no altitude restrictions; and if approach needs an altitude restriction this will be given upon aircraft check in. - OR - all pilots need to be on the same page that when Departure clears an aircraft to 'Climb via SID'; this deletes the clearance delivery restriction previously given.




Synopsis: ABQ TRACON Controller observed aircraft not climbing; questioned pilot; and issued Climb Via instructions again.
Date: 201705
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Tail Tip warning was called out on the radio (Not SOP) and I was on the bridge providing bridge support to [another ramp employee]. Upon Ramp Service Employee (RSE) chocking they immediately turned and gave the Customer Service Representative the Direction of movement. She began to go. She then had a RSE jump into her line of sight and motioned with the signal to stop. We stood there watching the RSE drag the tail stand from its location by the building in front of the aircraft and proceeded to drag it passed the nose of the plane to the tail were it was installed. We were then provided the direction of movement again and the agent continued.Unfortunately this an SOP that is and was never consistently adhered to. They are currently changing the process that we are to follow the Direction of movement signal from the RSE when meeting all fleet types.




Synopsis: Ramp employee reported that the company procedure for an aircraft tail tip condition is often not followed.