elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Both aircraft were departing the Nashville Approach airspace. Aircraft X was handed off to me first. I climbed Aircraft X to FL230. BNA then flashes Aircraft Y climbing. Aircraft X turned from a 150 heading to a 190 heading without any instruction from me. I assumed BNA APCH had told Aircraft X that he could turn out of a certain altitude. None of this was coordinated with me. The aircraft looked to be on parallel headings when I took the hand off on Aircraft X with a slight converge to within 5 nm in about 5-6 minutes. Aircraft Y was climbing just as well as Aircraft X and was at the same altitude or within a 1000 feet the whole time Aircraft X was climbing to FL230. I did not take the hand off on Aircraft Y and BNA called me for a hand off. I asked BNA what Aircraft Y was climbing to and the controller at BNA said that he was stepping him up reference Aircraft X. He also said that if I would have taken the hand off he would have discussed it with me then. The Controller at BNA has had a few other issues with ZME Controllers. The fact that he wanted me to take the hand off and then coordinate makes me think he doesn't know how approval requests work. I didn't know what Aircraft Y was doing and as far as I was concerned BNA was handing me a deal so I was within my right to refuse the hand off. The easiest way to fix this issue was either coordinate intentions; or put the aircraft on course and wait till 5 nm was established. Aircraft X on course heading was southerly and Aircraft Y on course was southeast. Aircraft X was on the right and Aircraft Y was on the left. BNA could have turned Aircraft Y to the east to cross out with Aircraft X and then flashed Aircraft Y to me. It seems with this instance and several problems with OPDs (Optimized Profile Descent) BNA has gotten very lax on separation going to an enroute environment.




Synopsis: ZME Center Controller reported hand off issues with a BNA Approach Controller.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Other 107
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I operated a drone at only a few feet AGL near my residence. I believe that around the same time but several miles from my residence was a small brush fire that fire slurry bombers and helicopters were dropping retardant and water from a local reservoir throughout the day.




Synopsis: UAV Operator reported he operated his drone at home a few miles from a fire where other aircraft were dropping retardant.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E T75
ATC / advisory: TRACON T75
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: An E145 was cleared to descend via AARCH1 STAR. As often happens with E145's; CRJ2's and CRJ7's; the pilot was descending to the lowest available altitude on the transition; in this case the 12L/12R/11 transition. An A319 was about 10 MIT also descending via the AARCH1 and descending as the procedure was intended with a continuous descent. This put the A319 about 4;000 FT higher than the E145 at the intersections along the arrival near the T75/ZKC boundary. To try and maintain spacing; the E145 was assigned 300 KTS or more by ZKC and I advised the aircraft to delete the speed restrictions on the arrival. This is what typically occurs anytime E145's; CRJ2's; CRJ7's and similar aircraft fly the RNAV STARs and they are followed by B737's; A319's or other aircraft flying the procedures as intended. The E145's; CRJ2's; CRJ7's do not have adequate V-NAV so understandably they 'dive and drive;' creating overtakes with aircraft in trail. Because they are so much lower than aircraft behind them flying the procedure as designed; speed control is often not adequate and controllers have to take in trail aircraft off the descend via clearance on the RNAV STAR. This adds to workload; reduces efficiency and can lead to unsafe overtakes. I would recommend amending the STAR's to add new floor and ceiling altitudes at select intersections to reduce the altitude differential different aircraft are flying. Controllers and staff at ZKC and T75 are close to agreeing on what would work but the process is slowed considerably by funding concerns; lack of management backing and user concerns.




Synopsis: T75 Controller expressed concern regarding the descent profiles of the various aircraft based upon equipment; noting that those differences result in highly variable altitudes and speed differentials.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Military Transport
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When Aircraft X checked on with Center they were in the block 240B270 with Aircraft Y. A short time later Aircraft X reported they will break up soon and Aircraft Y is requesting a direct ZZZ at FL400B410 and Aircraft X requested a return at FL260. Controller acknowledged and advised Aircraft X to separate in the block and advised Aircraft Y squawk and frequency. Aircraft Y flight checked on at FL240B250. Aircraft Y requested direct ZZZ and FL340B350 and the controller cleared Aircraft Y direct climb and maintain FL340B350. The controller asked Aircraft X to say altitude. MODE C showed Aircraft X at FL270. Aircraft X responded with a request. The controller then cleared Aircraft X and maintain FL260. Aircraft Y appeared on the radar replay and altitude showed FL258. Aircraft X showed at FL270. The controller radar identified Aircraft Y flight and asked the flight to say altitude. The first reply was broken and then Aircraft Y responded passing 265 for 340 and we had a near collision with Aircraft X. Controller advised MARSA (Military Authority Responsible for Separation) was not terminated. Closest observed separation was .12 miles and 400 feet.I learned from this event that I cannot rely on MARSA. If I am in communication with military aircraft under MARSA and I have not yet terminated MARSA; I will apply all IFR separation rules to the best of my ability; instead of relying on the pilots to separate themselves. Applying that mind set to this particular situation: I would first radar identify Aircraft Y flight. I would clear Aircraft Y flight direct and assign FL240B250. I would then assign Aircraft X direct and assign FL270. Once I had Aircraft Y flight laterally separated from Aircraft X; I would terminate MARSA and climb Aircraft Y flight to the requested altitude. I would then descend Aircraft X to the requested altitude.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported a military aircraft reported a NMAC with another military aircraft as they were exiting their refueling track.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working with a radar site out of service. I got a call from Aircraft X saying he departed early and wanted to pick up his IFR clearance if possible. I looked up his flight plan and gave him a code to squawk. I believed that he said he was off ZZZ airport so I asked him what altitude he was at and he was above all my terrain so I gave him a clearance for non-radar so I changed it. Then I told him to report over ZZZ1. I was working all my other traffic and about 15 minutes later without getting a report of ZZZ1 I asked where he was and he told me that he had actually departed ZZZ2 and was 40 miles south of ZZZ. I then saw his code and tagged him up and called and pointed him out to [the adjacent] control. Then I identified him and gave a new altimeter. I looked up the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) and believe he might have flown through a 12300 foot MIA but not sure.I was having a hard time understanding him and it was a little scratchy. I was pretty busy at the time. Looking back I was totally in control of the sector but [day] morning quarterbacking it I properly should have had a D-Side.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported an aircraft below radar coverage due to an outage was issued an IFR clearance and a reporting point but the aircraft did not comply and was in another sector airspace and possible flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Normal takeoff; FO (First Officer) flying. Shortly after takeoff the FO noticed his electric trim switches were not working. I tried mine and they were also inoperative. We informed ATC; then leveled off and manually trimmed the aircraft without issue. The QRH directed us to try the autopilot. We did that and it also failed to trim the aircraft. We chose to return to ZZZ and contacted Dispatch. We notified the FA's (Flight Attendants) and passengers; and let ATC know what our requirements would be for landing.We followed the QRH checklists to a flaps 15 overweight landing on Runway XXL. Touchdown was less than 200 feet per minute. Landing distance and braking were not an issue. We taxied to the gate normally. We did not declare an emergency.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported electric trim failure after takeoff and returned to departure airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In the terminal phase of flight at approximately 2;000 FT; I experienced the following: The aircraft yawed to the left engine side with a muffled sound coming from the left engine. Looking at the left engine I noticed what appeared to be red sparks exiting the left engines inboard exhaust stack. The aircraft was set up for landing so I decided to execute a precautionary emergency shutdown of the left engine. I focused on making sure I selected the correct engine and propeller controls so as not to secure the normally functioning engine and declared an emergency. I executed a precautionary emergency engine shut down of the left engine and single engine landing without any further problems.




Synopsis: BE-200 pilot shut down his malfunctioning left engine and declared an emergency while descending for landing.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cincinnati clearance gave us a clearance of radar vectors V128 YRK RHODE then as filed. The FMS was accidentally programmed V128 YRK ROHDE which is a fix close to YRK; but not the fix filed. ATC noticed we were on a heading not coincident to the right fix. We were queried which fix we were headed to and replied ROHDE. Both fixes sound the same; which led to further confusion. FMS programming should be checked and rechecked by the crewmembers. Any questions or confusion should be addressed before takeoff.




Synopsis: CE560 Captain reports a track deviation departing CVG due to confusion over a similar sounding fix names. The clearance was V128 YRK RHODE as filed; but ROHDE was entered in the FMC instead of RHODE. ATC detects the error.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Airport; Manuals; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This report concerns acceptance of extensions to FAR 117 duty time limits. On a recent flight; as a crew we decided that we would hold to the FAR 117 limit as found in Table C. Since this flight was a window of circadian low (WOCL) flight; we believed it not in the interest of safety to extend our duty day beyond the normal limit. After we were unable to make it off the ground before our Max Off Time had expired; we returned to the gate. Dispatch was notified of our reason for returning. On my drive home; I received what can only be described as an irate call from Crew Tracking; scolding me for not calling them with my 'Fatigue Notice.' I explained to the Crew Tracker that I was NOT fatigued nor making a declaration of fatigue; but simply illegal to continue the flight duty period under FAR 117 limits without an extension. She told me that if I did not negotiate an extension that I was in fact declaring myself fatigued. I again told her that I was not fatigued; but at this point decided to take it up with my Base Chief Pilot in the morning. It appears that the cart and the horse have been reversed here by my air carrier concerning extensions to FAR 117 Duty Time limits. Instead of using the Table C limits as the default; they are claiming that the two hour extension is the default; and that any pilot who does not approve the extension is tagged with a 'fatigue event.' Clearly this is faulty logic; as disapproval of the extension by any one member of the crew can result in all members of the crew receiving a fatigue event. I believe this also to be direct 'pilot pushing;' whereby crews are made to feel that simply sticking to the true default FAR limits will result in negative consequences. This not so subtle pressure could result in a pilot yielding to the company's desire to complete the flight at all costs; instead of heeding the pilot's own objective evaluation as to whether they are fit to continue.




Synopsis: A B767 Captain returned to the gate and removed himself because the flight could not reach the destination without exceeding the FAR 117 Table C limit and since the flight was oceanic during the window of circadian low he would not exend the duty day for safety reasons.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As an LCA I was in the right seat and training a new B787 type aircraft Captain in the left seat. We had landed from on Runway  XXR in ZZZ and taxied to gate. Upon approaching the gate there was a marshaller and a wing walker on both sides. They were all giving us the all clear signal and marshalling us in to the gate. Gate X is a challenging gate because close proximity to other aircraft. We noticed tractors; baggage carts; containers; and container trailers all parked in the transgression zone on both sides of the entry path. We stopped the aircraft and attempted to contact Operations. As we waited the wing walker; especially on aircraft right; seemed to be frustrated and continued to try to get us to move forward. I witnessed a baggage tractor drive up and just push some of the baggage carts; not even taking time to hook up and pull them. Operations radioed back and told us they would call the ramp. A pickup truck showed up; presumably with a ramp supervisor. The person got out and started directing the removal of the equipment from the path of the aircraft. It was extremely hard for us to see the lines marking the transgression zone and we wanted to be able to rely on the ramp team; but it was more than obvious due to our experience with our aircraft; taxi training; and taxi experience; that we weren't safe to proceed. Finally they cleared all of the obstructions except for one container cart. Once that was cleared and could confirm that the transgression area was clear; we taxied in. What was most disturbing about this whole situation was the continued all clear signal from the wing walkers and the signal to continue the taxi from the marshaller.




Synopsis: B787 Captain reported a ground conflict with ramp vehicles during taxi in and cited concerns with the ramp marshaller instructions to continue taxi without properly clearing the transgression zone area before continuing their taxi in.