elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201812
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Other Pushback
Second aircraft: B747-800 Advanced
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Push Back
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a normal and uneventful preflight; ground ops; and preflight briefings; aircraft was secured for flight. ZZZ Ops informed us that the aircraft would be deiced/anti-iced on ramp after pushback from ZZZ parking spot. During aircraft pushback with engines shutdown and in a 45 degree angle; we felt the airplane shudder; slide; and stop.  I commented to the mechanic; 'It sure seems slick out there.' The tug pulled us forward and then stopped again. Finally the mechanic informed us that he thought we 'kissed' another airplane's wingtip. After being pulled back to parking and shutting down; we were informed by ground personnel that our airplane collided with a B747-8F parked on [another] spot; right wingtip to right wingtip.  At no point during aircraft movement did the crew ever have control of the airplane. The flight was immediately canceled.


Second narrative: Aircraft parked in ZZZ preparing for departure. Our aircraft was struck by another [aircraft] under tow.


Synopsis: B747 Captain reported pushback crew pushed aircraft into parked aircraft.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While working the Monitor 2 Controller position I was told that the FR2 Controller was going to be using 'shuffle procedures' on the final. The plan was to shuffle a single 35R arrival aircraft to an ILS approach between two 35L aircraft both on ILS approaches to 35L. I observed a B737 joining the localizer for the approach with the appropriate 'shuffle procedures' separation between the 35L and 35R final. As the B737 was at or inside the FAF for 35R the FLM walked up and ordered me to 'pull out' the B737. I immediately canceled the B737's approach and coordinated turning to the east for re sequencing. I also climbed the B737 to 7;000 FT. I kept the B737 on the Local frequency; turned the B737 to a southbound heading and climbed to 9;000 FT. After I observed the B737 turning southbound below the downwind traffic; I changed the B737's to the FR2 frequency. Staying within the 'normal' SIMOS operation procedures would have fixed this problem. The workload and weather made the situation more stressful. The aggressiveness of the Final Controller to save time; fuel; and to be expeditious with the traffic load also were contributing factors to the go around.




Synopsis: D01 Controller described a go around event during simultaneous approach procedures when one controller elected to alter the simultaneous procedures leading to the go around.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: F/A (Flight Attendant) reported inoperative reading light en route to ZZZ. ACARS message sent en route for MX assistance upon arrival. Company Mechanic evaluated and determined problem was not light but light switch and communicated need for deferral. Mechanic departed with logbook and subsequently returned with logbook indicating deferral and placed white sticker in appropriate place. Dispatch sent ACARS message to have Captain call for obligatory conference call with MX Control regarding deferral of this inconsequential writeup. During this effort; ZZZ Supervisor verbally asked if we were aware HAZMAT in the form or radioactive pharmaceuticals were being loaded. With F/O (First Officer) attentive to this conversation; I (Captain) confirmed with Supervisor that a HAZMAT declaration would be brought for my signature.As both the F/O and I were busy preparing the flight deck for the next leg; and simultaneously attempting to eat our dinners; I called Dispatch for the required conference call. While the Dispatcher was aware of the MEL number (25-XX-XX); his system did not reflect the nature of the deferral. This MEL covers a myriad of non-essential cabin items. As a result; I had to read the actual discrepancy to the Dispatcher for him to be informed about the issue. The conference call (as usual) was neither informative nor helpful. It was purely a requirement that fulfilled (in this case) no need.After the conference call; the Dispatcher; upon my request; patched in a Chief Pilot on Call to discuss the need for relief of this requirement and how it only creates an additive condition with no benefit to the Flight Crew (only an additional administrative requirement). Upon completion of this discussion; the takeoff data came through ACARS; and we proceeded to complete checklists and review performance data. Takeoff and climb out were uneventful; and en route Dispatch sent an ACARS indicating I had failed to sign the required HAZMAT declaration.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported departing the gate without signing the Hazmat declaration due to a maintenance distraction in addition to other time critical departure issues.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On departure out of ATL; we encountered moderate wake from an A321. Autopilot remained engaged during the encounter. We had requested additional time for increased separation between us and the preceding aircraft prior to departure; which was granted. Departing behind an A321; despite leaving increased room for separation for anticipated wake turbulence. ATL Tower has increased the rate at which they launch aircraft; regardless of the size. While it would slightly slow the rate at which aircraft are able to depart ATL; giving more room between departing aircraft of such disparate size (CRJ behind an A321 for example) will decrease these types of adverse wake encounters. Had we not asked for the additional time; it was likely that Tower would've cleared us to depart prior to the A321 rotating off the runway. That type of lack of separation significantly increases the chances of a severe wake encounter extremely close to the ground.

Callback: Reporter stated hopefully ATL in-trail procedures will be adjusted to minimize risk.



Synopsis: CRJ First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence departing ATL in trail of an A321; and questioned current ATL spacing procedures.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at FL330; at night; an electrical malfunction occurred resulting in multiple bus failures; flickering of lights; loss of both PFD's and ND's; loss of flight guidance; loss of GFMS; erratic/pulsating CSD needles; erratic and inappropriate CAWS alerts (too low gear; for example); loss of both NAVs; loss of VHF1; multiple flickering caution lights and a fail light on the transponder. Partial use of VHF2 was available.The Captain had me declare an emergency immediately; which after several tries; I did with ATC on VHF2. We requested and received vectors to the nearest suitable airport. Emergency power was selected; to no avail; until the Captain turned the left generator off. The APU was started and we landed safely although overweight at 136;400 LBS. No known ATC deviations occurred; and a normal approach and landing were made. CFR scanned our E&E compartment and confirmed no fire or hot spots.


Second narrative: [No substantive additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]


Synopsis: An MD-80 flight crew successfully diverted to the nearest suitable airport when electrical anomalies resulted in multiple bus failures and system losses while enroute at FL330.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Second aircraft: Military Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X reported there are parachutes off his left side less than half a mile at his altitude. He reported about a dozen parachutes. He adjusted his course to the right to miss them. He said that if he had stayed on V105 he would have hit them. We were not talking to any jump aircraft at AZ04 at the time. We then noticed a 1200 code maneuvering at 175. We tracked the aircraft and another IFR aircraft into TUS had to adjust his course to miss the aircraft and he reported that it was an [Aircraft Y]. I called the ZZZ jump school who told me that [Aircraft Y] had flown in yesterday. [Jump School] briefed them for operations at ZZZ and then the pilot told them that they would be dropping at AZ04. [Jump school] told them that they needed to contact ZAB for operations at AZ04. I asked him if he had a contact number for the pilot. He said that he would try to have them contact us. We were able to have the pilot call the Operations Manager. The pilot admitted to doing a HAHO [High Altitude High Opening] drop at AZ04 without talking to ZAB. This pilot violated several FAR's and created a near mid-air with a non-participating aircraft operating IFR in the NAS. The number; frequency; several locations and type of jump operations in Sector 46 is by far more than anywhere else in the world. The FAR's were never created for these types of operations. These operations; on an everyday basis; at several locations; create a very real hazard to the NAS. Every single controller that tries to maintain some sort of safety on that sector will tell you that the FAA will not take action to address the jump operations until someone dies. There will be a fatality in that sector due to jump operations in the very near future if these types of operations are allowed to continue. The FAR's need to be changed. There needs to be regulation in place that ensures that jump operations are contained in a TFR; warning area or restricted airspace. Aircraft should not be allowed to throw objects out the back of an airplane that will collide with other non-participating aircraft.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported skydivers that were not supposed to be dropping out of the sky; close to an aircraft that reported the parachutes.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken

Narrative: Captain and I were made aware of live animal in forward cargo bin and dry ice in aft cargo bin. After long period of searching for dry ice limitations in rear cargo; we departed. After flight completed we located an [electronic reference] stating no dry ice in aft cargo. No clear or easy way to find dry ice loading configurations with animals in AOM; SOPM; FOM; or any other reference.Add animal carrying guidelines and dry ice to any reference usable in flight.




Synopsis: ERJ175 Captain reported no 'user friendly' HAZMAT information readily available in flight crew manuals.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the initial phase of flight; the aircraft showed no unusual indications; nor were there any signs of engine abnormality until approximately 1 hour into the flight. During a missed approach procedure climb out from the VOR DME; Student and instructor both noticed some slight engine roughness. Engine indications seemed normal at the time; but IP (Instructor Pilot) noticed that the CHT for cylinder 3 was not reporting on the MFD. In addition to this; the EGT for cylinder three seemed low compared to the other cylinder readings. At 2200 feet; IP decided to return to [departure airport] for a precautionary landing. After landing and taxiing to an FBO; the engine seemed to be acting normally (no longer vibrating; though cylinder 3 still showed no CHT value.) Post flight inspection revealed that the engine compartment seemed to be leaking excessive oil. Ambient temperature on the ground read 31*C; though as stated in the description narrative; [neither] CHT nor EGT temperatures seemed to be affected by this.




Synopsis: SR20 flight instructor reported returning to departure airport after noticing some engine anomalies.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HQG.Airport, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF HQG
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received a flight request and checked NOTAMs and weather and departed for HQG. I landed HQG at approximately XA15 [Local Time] on runway 20. At the time of landing there were no X's on the runway or any lighted X's designating a closed runway. I did however notice men which appeared to be at the end of runway 20; but I just assumed they were farmers with it being harvest time. I then observed an aerial applicator land on the adjacent taxiway next to runway 20; this is when I checked the NOTAMs again and realized the mistake I had made by inadvertently landing on a closed runway. At no time did I come near the men or there equipment. I misread the time for the runway closure on runway 2 and 20 which was for July starting at XB58 Zulu. When I interpreted it I was thinking of the 24hr clock and not Zulu time.




Synopsis: BE90 Captain reports not converting UTC time to local time when determining the time of a runway closure at HQG. There were no yellow X's on the runway but reexamination of the NOTAM revealed that the runway was closed.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were assigned 34R Approach which I backed up with the ILS. We were at 11;000 FT and 210 knots and about to enter the downwind from the arrival. ATC asked if we could accept 34 R RNAV Z and we accepted. We saw in the chart that it was a RNP and we wouldn't have time to set it up so we asked to go back to the ILS 34R and put it back in. We were given headings for a visual to 34R but tried to follow the ILS. Because we put it in late; the course didn't turn magenta where we were and we went through the course. Reinserting the ILS also added in a 13;000 FT altitude which made our plane start to climb and accelerate. I was getting behind the airplane; so I had First Officer activate vectors and I turned the autopilot off and hand flew from base to final without any further deviation. Crew had a thorough debrief afterwards. The cause of the incident was our late change from ILS 34R to RNAV-Z 34R and then last minute change back to ILS 34R. I shouldn't have accepted the change of approach so close to the airport and rather than trying to fix the plane; I should just fly the plane. The last minute changes definitely put me behind the plane.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported track and altitude deviations resulted following late clearance changes on arrival into DEN.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were level at 14;000 feet and told to cross VOR ZZZ at 11;000 feet. The correct altitude was entered into both the altitude selector and the FMS for the crossing restriction. Pilot flying failed to arm VNAV and pilot monitoring didn't notice the unselected mode selection. Upon crossing ZZZ; were given a descent to 6;000 feet. We were still level at 14;000 feet. I then realized we missed the crossing restriction. Both pilots should double check that the correct FMC modes are selected.




Synopsis: CE560 flight crew failed to arm the VNAV mode of the FMC and did not descend to meet ATC assigned crossing altitude.