elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201603
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When we landed [the] Captain came over the PA to let all of the crew and passengers that we were 10-15 minutes early. He told the passengers that if they wanted to get up and move about the cabin; stretch their legs; use the lavatories; do what they needed to do they could get up. A lot of passengers in the cabin got up out of their seats. Took their luggage out of the overhead bins and used the lavatories. The bins were open the aisle was blocked by bags. I made an announcement to let everyone know they should stay seated if they didn't need to use the lavatories and keep all luggage stowed so when it is time to taxi to the gate [we'll be] ready.Then I called the cockpit and spoke with [the] Captain and told him maybe that wasn't such a good idea. We will need a few minutes to get all passengers seated and make sure the cabin is secure. He said okay. Then 7 minutes later he made an announcement that our gate was open and for everyone to take their seats. We made an announcement for everyone to take their seats. Make sure bags were stowed and setbacks and tray tables were in their upright position. When we were doing our checks the phone chimed.I went to go answer it and when I got to the phone we were already moving. My flying partner told the cockpit we were getting checks done and were almost ready. The Captain's decision and lack of effective CRM resulted in luggage and passengers blocking exits and aisles which would have delayed or prevented an effective evacuation in an emergency.The Captain's decision and lack of CRM also impeded; delayed; and prevented our ability to monitor and ensure a safe cabin during active taxi; a critical phase of flight. The Captain's decision; although fully his; allowed customers to create an environment in direct conflict with FARs; company policy; and established safety practices. The Captain's communication with the crew was condescending; unprofessional; and created a work environment that was unsafe for crew and passengers.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported being concerned about the safety implications of the Captain's decision to allow passengers in the aisle while they were waiting for a gate.
Date: 202008
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Fuel Door verification procedures were not accomplished. On the day prior to this trip; we had flown Flight ABCB ZZZ to ZZZZ in which we had accomplished the Fuel Door verification procedure. Upon departure at ZZZZ we were taking the exact aircraft we'd flown in. We'd ferried fuel in the day before and assumed that we would not require the verification procedure because we figured the fuel door would not have been opened. We misunderstood that the requirement was for all flights; regardless of any extenuating circumstances. Closer attention to detail in reviewing recent policy and procedure changes; especially after a long layoff.


Second narrative: Did not submit Fuel Door verification pre-departure in ZZZZ due to no fuel added.  Operated Flight ABCB day prior ZZZ-ZZZZ; complied with MEL requirement departing ZZZ.  Due to no fuel added and dispatching with fuel as onboard did not believe it was necessary to submit Fuel Door verification.I directed the fueler not to open the fuel panel so as to not have to submit fuel form and meet the MEL requirement.  Believed this to be unnecessary.Nearly all operations with this type aircraft require fuel to be added.  Would be helpful to describe this procedure to highlight these circumstances where fuel is not added.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported not filling out Fuel Door verification paperwork because they thought it wasn't necessary.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Flight conditions: Mixed
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flying at FL410; I encountered a loss of GPS signal as a result of jamming. On the ATC frequency there were numerous aircraft that were similarly affected. All aircraft had to resort to flying by heading; or an alternative means of navigation. In some cases aircraft had to descend since their AHRS require GPS signals. In my case the disruption to navigation lasted nearly an hour. This extremely frequent jamming of critical GPS navigation is a significant threat to aviation safety. This affects all aircraft and could result in critical altitude changes for aircraft that are required to descend to lower altitude when losing a GPS signal. If can aircraft has to descend to a lower altitude it can have a significant impact on its range and could result in a diversion. Most modern aircraft rely solely on GPS not only for navigation signals in cruise; but also to determine range; fuel remaining; and other critical aspects of flight. In addition this disruption also impact instrument approach procedures. Since the FAA is deprecating VORs; NDBs; and associated approaches; we are becoming dependent upon an unreliable navigation system. Imagine an aircraft on an RNAV approach in IMC and it loses the GPS signal. Not only could it not continue to descend on the approach - the pilot would have no method to execute a missed approach.  This jamming has to end.




Synopsis: Eclipse pilot reported experiencing GPS jamming during cruise that lasted for an hour.
Date: 201310
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class A ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While holding at BUDDI on our scheduled flight to BWI; we were advised through ACARS to accept the following diversion plan: FAF at BWI of 5.7 then go (divert) to IAD with a burn of 1.7. I rejected the flight plan because if executed as suggested; I would land with 4.0 at IAD; assuming everything went perfect. I rejected this plan and offered to hold so as to arrive at the FAF with 7.0 and then divert to IAD. Later on; will still holding at BUDDI; I talked to the Dispatcher via radio and once again he tried to get me to agree to 5.7 at the FAF. I objected and again stated my desire to use 7.0 at the FAF. We ended up leaving holding at BUDDI with 8.0; and arrived at IAD with 6.1. IAD is closer to BUDDI then BWI.I called Dispatch to discuss the suggestion that we would hold at the original destination down to basically VFR landing fuel and then divert (worst case) in the weather to a close in alternate with marginal weather and land with 4.0. I was told that it was done all the time and some of our pilots would accept it. Do you really think this is a good practice? The Dispatcher was busy; I know him; and he does a great job. I did not get to talk to him and this is not about him. The other Dispatcher I talked to at the time said they do this all the time; therefore; they assume that the holding aircraft will get into the original destination. I think this practice needs review. In this case; the front had already gone through IAD and was affecting BWI; but IAD did not clear up. IAD still had low ceilings and rain. We almost had to go-around on short final due to the tailwind and were among the last to land south at IAD. What if I had gotten there with 4.0; had to go-around; or received extended vectoring for a runway change? We would have been critically low on fuel. This practice appears to be a common among all our dispatchers. I realize every situation is different and dynamic and I; as the Pilot in Command; have the last vote. But in my humble opinion; this is a recipe for disaster. I recommend we review the our procedures as to how this practice came about and change the practice to allow our flights to land with approximately 5;000 LBS of fuel should they have to divert.




Synopsis: B737 Captain in a holding pattern; is requested by Dispatch to hold as long as possible and plan on arriving at the nearby alternate with 4;000 LBS of fuel. The alternate is also IMC and this plan is rejected. Holding is departed to land at the alternate with 6;000 LBS.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HEF.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1
Light: Night
Aircraft: Lancair ES
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [I] conducted an IFR flight to HEF. Precipitation was forecast for my direct route of flight; so instead; I filed a route taking me much further west and clear of precipitation. I was concerned about the possibility of icing; but the briefer reported the freezing level at FL080. I wanted to stay low and filed for FL070. As I continued northbound at FL070 I was in the clear above a layer with OAT at 40 degrees; but dropping to 34 degrees as I continued northbound. Charleston was reporting 45 degrees and scattered ceiling at 8;500 MSL; a good alternate if I needed it. As I got closer to HEF; I was cleared direct CSN. Conditions at Manassas (HEF) were forecast to be scattered at FL055 starting at XA:00 (early evening); but conditions were much worse with visibility below 1 mile and low ceiling with snow. At XB:00; however; ceilings were not rising and visibility was still reported at 1/4 mile. I was concerned about icing; and even spoke to ATC about this while I was still at FL070 in the clear and with temperatures at 32 degrees. I assumed that temperatures would increase as I descended; but once I got closer to CSN and entered IMC; temperatures actually dropped. I was cleared to FL050 and temperatures were 30...yet no icing. ATC queried traffic cleared to CHO; and they did not report any icing. I continued on. I started feeling really uncomfortable with the situation (IMC in below freezing temperatures) and couldn't understand how I found myself in the position. Why did temperatures decrease as I descended and why were conditions much worse at HEF than the XM Weather reported throughout my flight. ATC cleared me to FL030 and I shot the GPS Runway 16L approach with visibility reported at 1 mile and 800 FT ceiling. I popped out at about 900 FT and probably 2 miles visibility; with no trace of ice. Temperatures on the ground were 34 degrees. I was happy to make it safely on the ground; but I had a sick feeling in my gut. I should have not trusted the forecast as much as I did; and I should have diverted to Charleston at the first hint of dropping temps as I descended from FL070 (when I still had the ability to climb and stay in VMC). Big lesson learned!




Synopsis: Lancair pilot reports planning an IFR flight to HEF to avoid IMC and in flight icing conditions. The forecast does not hold up but the reporter continues to HEF in IMC and freezing temperatures and lands after an instrument approach. Minimal enroute icing is actually encountered.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I finished fueling my aircraft at the self service island off of Taxiway XX and within a short time started my taxi towards Runway XX to cross onto Taxiway XY. Upon reaching Runway XX I noticed a [tanker aircraft] turning what appeared to be a fairly tight right base to final and decided to hold short of Runway XX at Taxiway XX; I also noticed another small aircraft on right downwind. While waiting for the [tanker] to land I heard someone say 'I'll depart after the tanker lands'. The [tanker] had landed and started his left turn off Runway XX onto Taxiway XY; at this time I took note of where the light aircraft was in the pattern and looked down the runway to check for traffic; I then radioed my intention to cross Runway XX and follow the [tanker]. Within several seconds I was crossing and noticed what appeared to be a Cessna Citation flying low (Gear Up) and headed towards me; I stopped momentarily while he flew overhead. I had been listening carefully before starting my taxi across Runway XX and did not hear the CJ announce taking [the] runway for departure. I wish I had taken more time to look for departing traffic and will not make that mistake again.




Synopsis: C-172 Single Pilot reported a critical ground conflict while taxing across the runway with a aircraft executing a departure over the runway.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Twin Beech 18
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a training flight of takeoff and landings; we had made three touch and go landings. The fourth was planned for a full stop. As the main wheel touched down with no problem; as the aircraft was slowing down and the tail made contact with the runway; we started going left and right and left of the centerline of the runway about 10 degrees of runway heading. That's when I called for 'I have the controls'.The aircraft was going straight down the runway and we were about 500 feet from [the taxiway] where I plan to exit the runway. At that point the aircraft started going to the left and I applied right brake and it went to the stop. I applied right brake again and it went to the stop again. So I started applying left engine to get it straight; but the engine did not come up in RPM quick enough to stop the turn to the left. The aircraft exited the runway about 75 feet before [the taxiway] on a heading of 240 degrees. The aircraft did ground loop to the left and stopped pointing the runway at heading of about 010 degrees.I locked the tail wheel and taxied to [the taxiway] which was 50 feet away. Tower asked if the aircraft exited the runway early which I said yes and told Tower that there was a brake failure. While taxing I got the right brake back to working; but heard a metal to metal sound. I told tower that we did not need assistance; but taxi back to parking. Completed after landing check and taxied back to parking.The flap had contacted a runway light on the exiting of the runway early which had bent the trailing edge of the left flap at the second bay outboard from the inboard of the flap. The right brake a piece of metal at the brake disc and caliper. The airport was told that a runway light was possibly had been hit. Wind was out of the south at estimated 6 to 8 knots.




Synopsis: Beech 18 instructor reported they experienced a brake failure during landing rollout resulting in a runway excursion.
Date: 201304
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Dispatch [program] alerted that a radio number was required to be added to [one of] my flights to avoid a conflict with the late arriving inbound flight of the same number. I complied with this by adding a suffix X to the call sign. What I was not aware of was that my counterpart on the sector next to me had also added a radio number suffix X to his flight with the same number based on the alerting from dispatch [program]. I was not advised in any messaging alert that this radio number was already in use. We ended up having two flights with the same radio number active at the same time on [the same] ATC frequencies.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher was notified of duplicate flight numbers by his company software program. To mitigate the problem; he added a letter suffix to the associated flight number; making it a radio number. He was not aware; that the Dispatcher responsible for the other flight had also received notification and added the identical letter suffix to his flight number; thus counteracting the mitigation.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 0.25
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Set up for Cat 3 dual ILS 35R Denver. ATIS 1/4 SM; RVR 2600. Planning autoland. Vectored to final; instruction to cross DEANE at 8000; cleared for the approach. We complied with the DEANE crossing; PF calls glideslope alive. Shortly thereafter we got a TCAS descent. We had been watching the 35L traffic on the TCAS and thought maybe the 8000 at DEANE instead of the published 9000 was for separation but the traffic continued to descend; however the lateral offset seemed to remain constant. The PF initiated the descent to the green portion of the VSI and he announced 'I'm going to the green; 1200 FPM down.' I told Tower were TCAS RA descending. Tower responded by telling us our traffic was on the ILS 35; and then asked if we were able to continue the approach. I looked at the PFD and we were 2 dots below glide path descending with the altitude warning sounding. I knew we were not going to intercept GS on our current path but I didn't know our exact altitude. 7000 was in my head as a minimum. I stated we either need to follow the TCAS or go-around (PF was following the TCAS). Shortly thereafter the PF initiated a go-around. I advised tower and requested a heading and altitude. Tower directed; track the localizer and maintain 9000. Clear of conflict announced and we returned for an uneventful approach and landing.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reported executing a go-around after responding to an RA on the DEN ILS Runway 35R.