elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RBG.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E RGB
ATC / advisory: CTAF RGB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I fly to RBG often. RBG is surrounded by hilly terrain on all sides. The VASI; which has been in place for around 60 years; enhances safety significantly by allowing pilots to be sure that they are safely above the hills near the runway under the final approaches in both directions. The VASI has been out of service for over 7 months. The FBO operator explained that the FAA instructed the city to remove it from service because terrain protruded too close to the VASI glide slope outside of 5 degrees laterally from centerline. The city installed baffling; to limit the viewing to 5 degrees either side of centerline; and various exchanges have gone back and forth between the city and the FAA since then. Apparently now they are awaiting the FAA test flight; but there is no schedule for that. The VASI has been in service for around 60 years; and there has never been a VASI-related accident at RBG. Safety is degraded significantly by not having a VASI at an airport with hills at both ends of the runway. Either it should be turned back on prior to the test flight (the vertical angles haven't changed); or the FAA should get their test flight done ASAP.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported that the VASI lights have been deactivated at RBG by FAA directive; because terrain protruded too close to the VASI glideslope outside of 5 degrees laterally from centerline. The VASI had been in place for around 60 years and enhanced safety significantly.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was vectoring for increased in-trail at a reduced speed and the sector the aircraft was previously in had held the aircraft for some time and then vectored out of the hold to meet our requirements. Speeds were not working so I had started to fan aircraft on the arrival out to the north. C90 called and informed us we were back in the hold so I started to head aircraft back east and amended altitudes as necessary. My lead aircraft needed to divert to FWA and wanted to climb to a higher altitude so I used headings to allow a climb sooner. A CRJ7's interim altitude of 120 was related to this circumstance and as the aircraft approached an eastbound aircraft at 110 he descended through 120. The pilot's explanation of why it happened did not make sense to me. I am not a pilot and have no first-hand knowledge of what a flight deck/FMS looks like. Traffic volume and complexity were relativity low; the weather wasn't causing any deviations in my airspace; and pilots were reading back all of my clearances and not clogging up the frequency with questions. However; I was vectoring for increased in-trail at a reduced speed and the sector the aircraft was previously in had held the aircraft for some time and then vectored out of the hold to meet our requirements. It was only 2 or 3 minutes prior to the deviation that C90 put us back into the hold while we were vectoring and 2 aircraft requested to divert as soon as they had the opportunity. The whole scenario seemed like the perfect opportunity for a pilot deviation and I couldn't dismiss the possibility that I had cleared him lower until I heard it. Maybe I'm fooling myself about the complexity level on my end; but I could certainly see this situation being complex on the pilot's end. I have no recommendations beyond constant vigilance during weather shifts on the controller's and pilot's end. If a pilot has doubts as to their clearance they should never hesitate to ask and controllers should be grateful for their professionalism.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller experienced a loss of separation event apparently due to a pilot's unauthorized descent.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Preflight Briefing
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Line Check Airman (LCA) doing IOE. Planned 15 hour duty day with 10:30 flight time. Due to maintenance issues at the trip's start a rest plan was not briefed. 1:30 into first flight; I called cockpit to ask LCA rest plans. He advised I would be sitting in back all day. I advised him IOE trips were crewed as such to give LCA and student a break and flying the whole mission did not meet intent of FAR. He agreed to rest; but only did so for 1 hour. Subsequently; at an intermediate stop after the student being in cockpit seat for about 8 hours; four legs and on duty 13 hours; the IRO suggested to the Captain that he occupy right seat and student be relieved. The LCA insisted he would be flying and the student would occupy seat as pilot not flying. I then asked to speak to LCA privately and raised my concerns of not only the student's position of such a long day and pressing him to keep flying; especially since he had two well rested qualified first officers ready to fly last leg; but also the fact that instruction was mentally fatiguing and in the interest of safety he should fly last leg in non LCA mode. At first; LCA was not receptive; but through strong CRM and using uncomfortable [language]; he changed his mind but told me I had to write a letter to the Chief Pilot through him explaining why I made this stand. In the interest of schedule with safety; I believe having a student occupy a control seat in excess of 8 hours is not only unsafe but breaks the spirit of the FAR requirements to augment over 8 hours and then not utilize them.




Synopsis: A Line Check Airman (LCA) with a student and two relief pilots did not want to have either himself or his student relieved during a 15 hour duty day with 10:30 flight time. A Relief Pilot contended a FAR violation occurred so the LCA acquiesced.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While attempting to talk to Ground and Tower while parked on the north ramp I did not receive any responses back. Listened to ATIS again and heard that the Tower closed each day at XA00.  Checked the time and it was after XA00 Z and continued on as I would with a closed Tower. I taxied to get fuel and continued to make radio calls and then took off.  While in cruise I realized that the radio was not working correctly. After fixing the radio I continued the flight.  While coming back to land at ZZZ I listened to ATIS 8 miles out and noticed that the time now said the tower closes at XA00 local time. I then called the Tower and let them know that I had ATIS and requested to land and was cleared to land and landed with no incident. Contributing factors are a Tower closure during this pandemic times; a radio that was not working correctly; and the XA00 local time vs Zulu time and possibly not identified on ATIS as local time vs. Zulu time on the initial ATIS weather.




Synopsis: Pilot departed airport without communication with Tower. Pilot mistook LOCAL time for ZULU time; and departed the airport when Tower was open.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: FCU (Flight Control Unit)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On descent into ZZZ we received an ECAM for a FCU (Flight Control Unit) 1 failure. Completed ECAM procedure and went to QRH which advised to reset circuit breakers. I decided not to reset since we were on arrival; busy environment and in high traffic area. Plane was flying normal with FCU 2. Approximately 5 mins later we had FCU 2 failure.  Accomplished ECAM procedure for dual FCU failure and we're able to recover one FCU.  We were on descent with crossings and speeds to meet. When this happened we called controller to advise with no response because he was very busy; after three [urgent request] calls we were given a different frequency. Controller gave us a heading. We were able to recover one FCU as stated above. Uneventful landing; logbook entry made and this report filed.




Synopsis: Captain reported multiple FCU failures on descent; but were able to recover one FCU. Captain stated ATC did not respond to multiple requests for help before giving them a different frequency to continue approach and landing.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The localizer course to the new [ORD] Runway 10R is displaced to the right. We were assigned a visual to 10R; but were totally confused by the displacement to a runway we have never landed on. To further the confusion; the lights to 10L are off; so the only visible runways were 10C and 10R. The hangers between 10C and 10R even have a tower; making the entire situation unacceptable. You cannot tell if you are lining up offset to 10R; or if you are rather offset from 10C and not seeing 10R.There is nothing in the NOTAMs to prepare you for this. The ATIS simply says that the LOC Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) 10R is offset. On a visual that does not clue you in; and it doesn't say which way it is offset. All unacceptable.Tower should notify ALL crews about the offset on first contact; and the direction. Or; turn off the faulty localizer!!!Tell ORD controllers to communicate better. This is a new runway. A simple inadequate note in the ATIS is not communicating effectively.




Synopsis: MD-80 Captain reported the new ORD Runway10R offset localizer is confusing and the existing NOTAMs and ATIS do not do enough to help.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: An hour and a half into the flight at FL430 we noticed the cabin was ascending and the pressure differential was dropping. We tried to stop the ascent by following the QRH procedure with no success. A few minutes later the 'Cabin Press Low' message illuminated on the CAS system. At this point we donned our oxygen masks; declared an emergency; dropped the masks in the cabin and initiated an emergency descent procedure and diverted. At approximately 10;000 feet MSL we cancelled the emergency and made an uneventful landing. Upon further investigation there was no indication of bleed air pressure from the L Engine and L Bleed air CB and 28V cabin press CB's had popped.




Synopsis: GLF4 Captain experiences slow loss of cabin pressurization at FL430. An emergency descent is initiated and the flight diverts to a suitable airport. On post flight it was discovered that the L Bleed air CB and 28V Cabin press CB's had tripped.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approaching ZZZZ en route to our destination at cruise and just prior to top of descent; a significant acrid smell was noted in the cockpit. Oxygen masks were donned; crew communication was established and the Smoke/Fume/Odor QRH was initiated. It was verified that the same smell was noted in the cabin with no smoke or fire. As the checklist was completed the smell quickly dissipated. An emergency was declared with ATC; we gave our condition and asked them to stand by. At this point a SATCOM call was placed to Dispatch. After conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; we gave our intention to divert to ZZZZ which was now behind us. Dispatch checked the NOTAM's and informed us that the runway was temporarily closed for maintenance. Based on our current location and with concurrence with Dispatch; we decided that our destination would be our best option. Communication with ATC was a bit spotty; but we were cleared direct to the ILS IAF at our best speed and a clearance to descend at pilot's discretion was given. The flight attendants were briefed and an announcement to the passengers was made concerning our condition and that a normal landing would be made. We landed about 33 minutes later without further incident.


Second narrative: [There was an] acrid smell in the cockpit. Cabin/Smoke/Fumes/Odor checklist [was completed]. Odor cleared; [but still] declared an emergency. Our destination [was the] best choice [and we] expedited to our destination.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reports an acrid odor in the cockpit just prior to top of descent. As the smoke and fumes checklist was completed the smell quickly dissipated. An emergency was declared and the flight continued to destination.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DTW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D21
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Mostly clear skies and visibility 10 SM or greater. CA Pilot Flying; FO Pilot Monitoring. DTW was doing simultaneous approaches to both 4L and 3R. Cleared Visual Approach to 4L DTW backed up with ILS Z 4L procedure. On speed and on profile. AP engaged. TA alert just inside NATIY. Traffic was a 737 at our 10 o'clock position; approximately 700 feet below and 2.5 miles. Traffic threat was rapidly closing on our position while in a left banking turn attempting to merge onto the 4L Localizer. Traffic was not on our frequency and came as a complete surprise. We were not informed by ATC of this traffic; nor were we informed that this 737 would be attempting to cut in front of us for Runway 4L. The 737's closure rate and rapidly increasing proximity prompted the CA to immediately disconnect the AP and begin a turn away from the rapidly emerging threat. 1-3 seconds after the AP was disconnected we received ATC instructions to turn right heading 070 to avoid traffic. We complied. However; this assigned heading immediately put us in a position where our flight path cut across the approach path of Runway 3R. Thankfully there was no traffic on approach to 3R at that time. We were given new vectors and altitudes back towards 4L where we resumed a normal; stabilized approach and landing. The 737 was sidestepped over to 4R and landed uneventfully.I am personally witnessing what I can only describe as increased preferential treatment towards Airlines by Approach and Tower Controllers throughout the United States. Controllers are vectoring flights so that they can jump ahead in line to approach and land. What I witnessed in DTW was; by far; the clearest evidence of this favoring. There has to be some type of motivator that is driving individual ATC controllers to behave this way. Why else would they do so? Why did this particular Detroit controller attempt to push this flight into a bad position which comprised our safety? What was his/her motivation to do so? This event occurred on a afternoon during an arrival lull into DTW. Vectoring in front of us probably saved them less than three minutes of flight time...again; why the preferential treatment?




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reported a B737 was vectored in front of their aircraft while on approach to Runway 4L at DTW which caused them to take evasive action.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While practicing an ILS approach on A/P I went missed at the FAF and reengaged A/P at 1;800 ft; at that point Aircraft started pitching in an unusual high nose up attitude; tried to disengage A/P by pressing A/P on the yoke; additionally on the A/P disconnect on autopilot panel; and finally disconnected circuit breaker; none of this disengaged it and aircraft continued pitching up and down with elevator trim running up and down on its own.Was able to land after 90 second approximately from when event started; very difficult to control but landed safely.Reported the incident to NTSB and sent them the data card of the aircraft flight; awaiting for results back.


Second narrative: While practicing an ILS approach on A/P I went missed at the FAF and reengaged A/P at 1;800 ft; at that point Aircraft started pitching in an unusual high nose up attitude; tried to disengage A/P by pressing A/P on the yoke; additionally on the A/P disconnect on A/P panel; and finally pulled A/P circuit breaker ; non of this disengaged it and aircraft continued pitching up and down with elevator trim running up and down on its on.Was able to land after 9 seconds approximately from when event started; very difficult to control but landed safely.Reported the incident to NTSB and sent them the data card of the aircraft flight; awaiting for results back.After 30 minutes on the ground and shutting off avionics 1 and 2 and master switch decided to fly back to base with A/P breaker off. The 20 mins Flight was uneventful. Problem is definitely with pitch trim and or A/P.


Synopsis: Pilot reported a pitch trim failure on missed approach.