elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Please ensure that passenger agents are well versed on fulfilling the FARs requiring confirmation with Lead Flight Attendant prior to door closure. On this flight they attempted to close the door without confirming to me that all FARs had been met. I managed to catch them half way through door closing and twice stated that they had not verified nor confirmed with me. Bins were still open and I had not gotten confirmation from crew as to whether exit row verifications had been done. It was prior to scheduled departure time and they were in a rush to close. There is so much pressure from the company to meet on time departures that I feel FARs are being compromised. Also; our crew found a lot of leftover items in the flight attendant bunk room cubby holes and cabinets from previous flights...a bottle of water in a First Class overhead bin; reading glasses in one flight attendant bunk; etc. A proper security sweep had not been done. Again; the company is in a rush and wants a quick turn around and is compromising safety and security [to do so].




Synopsis: A Lead Flight Attendant reported passenger agents are failing to comply with regulations requiring them to assure all FAR requirements for cabin preparation are completed before closing passenger boarding doors. The reporter cited pressure from the company for on-time departures as a contributing factor.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An adjacent Center sector gives point outs to my sector on a regular basis on aircraft that head southbound. There is military airspace that was active from 18000 to 23000 feet. It's my understanding that they are aware of this airspace; helped design the airspace; and know when it is going active and inactive. So; when I received a point out on Aircraft X; I accepted the automated point out and continued on with my own traffic. A few moments later; I noticed Aircraft X had entered the southwestern corner of military restricted airspace at 18000 feet. This is a violation of military airspace and an unsafe situation; since there was a drone currently operating in the military airspace.




Synopsis: A Center Controller observed an aircraft entering military restricted airspace which was active wih a drone flight.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On vectors to intercept final on visual approach to Runway 10C ORD. Approach gave descent to 4;000 FT and assigned heading 360. Called field in sight; were assigned heading 070 and given clearance to 3;000 FT and cleared for visual approach Runway 10C. Heading had us intercept final inside of RAYYY. Upon contacting Tower; [we were] given clearance to land behind E170. Inside RAYYY; showing 1 to 1/2 dot high on glideslope; Tower called issuing low altitude alert. Confirmed we were above glideslope (1 to .5 dot high); within intercept criteria. Continued approach to uneventful landing.


Second narrative: On arrival into Chicago received a low altitude alert from ATC (ORD Tower) on arrival to Runway 10C. We were given a heading to join final approach course and cleared for the visual approach. We were above glideslope profile slightly and descending while intercepting the final approach course. We received a low altitude warning from ATC. Our cross check verified we were on profile and we continued to normal landing.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reports receiving a low altitude alert from the Tower while on a visual approach to Runway 10C at ORD. The crew was above the glideslope intercepting final inside RAYYY when the alert was issued and continued to a normal landing.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During approach into DEN we were assigned the RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 34R. Upon reaching HIMOM (IF) we were unable to continue the RNAV approach because we dropped LNAV and so we requested the visual approach to Runway 34R. The controller cleared us for the visual approach to 34R then offered a runway change to 35L even though the controller stated that it might be 'a little late in the game to switch'. We accepted the runway change and decided to switch. I had already disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles in anticipation for landing on Runway 34R. We were assigned a 080 heading for the visual to Runway 35L. We were then given a subsequent turn to 020 to intercept final for Runway 35L. Attempting to hand fly the aircraft and make sure the new approach was loaded by the Captain; and acquire an electronic centerline to the new runway; my workload increased to a level I didn't anticipate. This caused me to inadvertently shallow my turn to final. While trying to work through this issue I lost situational awareness and was focused more on making sure the ILS was loaded for RWY 35L instead of visually clearing my turn and getting established on final. During the turn to/through final we got an RA from TCAS that stated to level off. I leveled the aircraft and the Captain notified ATC of the RA and they stated for us to fly the LOC for Runway 35L. The controller then asked if we could continue the approach or if we needed to go missed approach. We were high and too close to continue the approach due to leveling off for the RA so we executed a missed approach and were given vectors for the missed. We were vectored for and flew the ILS to 35R and landed. After landing the Ground Controller gave us a number to contact Denver TRACON. The Captain [did so; and] discussed the events leading up to the approach.




Synopsis: B737NG First Officer reported executing a go-around after a last minute runway change led to an airborne conflict and an unstabilized approach.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Squat Switch
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After completing all checklists prior to landing and performing all of the standard operations; the Captain; who was the flying pilot; proceeded to land. The approach to landing was normal and within the touchdown zone. Once the Captain made ground contact with the nose wheel; he proceeded to deploy the thrust reversers. Although the thrust reversers were armed; they did not deploy. After trying both sides of the brakes; neither worked. By the time Captain realized no braking could be used; there was not enough runway to perform a go-around so he then opted to deploy the parking brake. After coming to a stop we contacted Tower and they sent out the crash and rescue vehicles. There was no smoke or fire so we did not perform an expedited deplaning. We contacted the FA (Flight Attendant) and told him to remain seated and that we would notify him when the bus for the passengers arrived. We also notified ops who coordinated the bus and we also notified Dispatch. We executed a normal deplaning and the bus took the passengers to the terminal. No one was injured. After completing the rest of the normal tasks and shutdown procedures and the walk around; we then proceeded to the terminal.The tires blew because we had to deploy the parking brake. The thrust reversers would not deploy and the brakes were not working; and performing a go around was not a possibility due to there not being adequate runway for it.I don't think it was avoidable. The system seemed to have failed on us. Everything we had set up was under normal operating parameters.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported thrust reverser and brake failure upon landing; necessitating the use of parking brake to stop the plane; which blew the tires.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In Foreign Airspace at FL340 diverting in clear air on the upwind side of some build ups we encountered moderate turbulence. The seat belt sign was on but two flight attendants were in the very back of the aircraft working in the aisle with the cart. It looked as though we would clear the tops of the buildups but at the last minute we just went through the tops. There was one moderate bump of turbulence. I called back to the flight attendants and they informed me that they had both hit the ceiling and the cart had turned over. I asked if they were hurt and they said yes. Further discovery revealed they both required medical help. I turned the flying duties over to my First Officer and asked him to declare an emergency and we diverted to a nearby foreign airport. I got a phone patch through Commercial Radio with Dispatch and told them we were diverting with a Medical Emergency with two flight attendants injured and requested medical help upon arrival. We landed uneventfully. My First Officer and the number 1 and 3 Flight Attendants performed their duties perfectly. The station personnel did a superb job of making arrangements for our passengers. In retrospect I should have given more clearance to this build up even though we appeared to be well above it and on the back side of it. I was trained that you should use the HUD to determine your Flight Path Vector above or around build ups. This training has worked perfectly until now. It clearly did not work in this case. I will never use the HUD guidance for avoiding build ups again.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B737 passed in the top of a thunderstorm where moderate turbulence injured two flight attendants and turned over the beverage cart so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby foreign airport for medical attention.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight from [international airport]. Several passengers non-compliant; sitting in areas of the aircraft where they had not paid for that seat; such as economy passengers taking first class seats; when they had paid for and were assigned economy seats. We had passenger in 25B take seat 9C; which is $179 more; but she would not take her assigned seat until our purser; Mr. X; instructed her to do so. Upon landing and still on an active taxiway; this passenger moved again from seat 25B to 9C; as 50 people stood up to retrieve their bags from the overhead bins and place them in the aisles. Our aircraft had stopped on the taxiway to allow other aircraft right of way. We made several announcements and yet no one would heed the announcement to replace their bags in the overhead bins; and take a seat and buckle up.Passenger in 9E pretended to be asleep and we could not wake her to take her economy seat; I am not sure where that was; but our purser had tried several times to have her move. She woke up after we walked away and then went back to sleep whenever we approached her.Mr. X declared a Level 1 threat as it was almost chaotic; no one would listen to us. The general feeling was that passengers felt they could do whatever they wanted.The cockpit called for security; but when we arrived at the gate; we were greeted by one customer service agent; and no one else. Mr. X was approached by passengers in the Customs Hall as they wanted his name and they had their cell phones out; including the passenger who was seated in 25B and took 9C without paying the up-charge.Passenger in 14D; kept changing seats as well; although he stayed within his 'area'; he drank 2 vodkas and had asked for more; but decided not to have any more vodka. This took our time throughout the flight; rarely did we have time to take care of those customers who simply wanted service and to sleep. We had such disruptive passengers in 25B/9C; 9E; and row 14; most notably 14D. I was told upon boarding; passengers decided to take first class seats and they sat down in them; even though they had economy seats. All were American; all spoke perfect English. There were no language problems.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported unruly passengers on an international flight who refused to take their assigned seats.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A340
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Dangerous Goods checklist failure. No indication on Air Way Bill (AWB). Shipment consists of 60 pieces but 59 pieces Dangerous Goods on AWB. Dangerous Goods Declaration indicates only 58 pieces and point 28 on Dangerous Goods checklist indicates N/A - meaning that all 60 pieces are Dangerous Goods.




Synopsis: Arrival Ground Personnel reported Air Way Bill HAZMAT form incorrectly completed.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CMA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D CMA
ATC / advisory: Tower CMA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I reported to Camarillo Tower 5 miles west of Saticoy Bridge. I was cleared to enter a right downwind for runway 26 and tower reported traffic on a right crosswind to a right downwind. I did not have the traffic in sight. Soon after; I was cleared to land runway 26. I continued my descent to traffic pattern altitude for a 45 degree entry for a right downwind. As I began my turn to downwind I suddenly saw the traffic to my right and at my altitude on a converging course. To avoid the conflict I dove from about 1000 to 600 ft as the traffic passed directly over me. There was no indication that the other aircraft saw me.On the ground I notified tower and called the supervisor. He said the other airplane reported that he had me in sight but apparently failed to take corrective action.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at CMA airport.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Aircraft X] was on the ATL 26R ILS approach; assigned 180 knots to the FAF. [Aircraft X] slowed well prior to the FAF. The monitor caught the speed reduction and was able to speed him back up to the assigned speed without loss of separation.  I was not working the position; but witnessed the event. The controller made a great catch on this. Separation could've been lost behind Aircraft X.  Please share this report with anyone you see fit; especially [Aircraft company X]. Advise [Aircraft X] company that any 'wink-wink deals' they made with A80 dealing with speed are now null and void and that all [Aircraft X company] aircraft must adhere to ATC clearances as every other user in ATL has do. This must cease.


Second narrative: Shooting ILS 26R at ATL; controller cleared crew for approach and ask us to maintain 180 knots to AJAAY (FAF). Aircraft slowed at approximately three NM from FAF to ensure proper configuration for ILS (not a visual approach) approach per the FOM. Just outside AJAAY; the controller asked us what our airspeed was and was upset that we had slowed below 180 prior to AJAAY. Inside the FAF; the controller gave us phone number to ATL Approach facility and asked us to call for possible deviation/violation.


Synopsis: A80 Controller and pilots of aircraft report of a speed reduction on final that could have led to a loss of separation. Final monitor caught the aircraft slowing and issued speed again for it to maintain. Pilots slowed aircraft before final approach fix as per their flight manual.
Date: 201510
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb-out from ZZZ; at approximately FL240; I noticed the Number 1 Engine Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) in the amber range.  I verbalized it to the Captain; who was the flying pilot.  He immediately disconnected the autothrottles and retarded the number one engine to bring it out of the amber range.  We were very light; so we had no problem with the reduction in thrust.  We pulled out the QRH and ran the Engine Limit Checklist.  The engine was controllable; but the checklist directed us to land at the nearest suitable airport.  I took the aircraft while the Captain coordinated our return.  We made a left turn back direct to ZZZ and began our descent.  After the Captain was finished coordinating; he took the airplane back.  During our descent into ZZZ at approximately 8;000 feet; a green laser illuminated us from approximately 2 miles south of the ZZZ airport.  We reported that to ATC.  We landed uneventfully; although we had to request 10L several times because an aircraft had earlier been disabled near the runway; but had now been moved and ATC was worried about a right turnoff; so we told them we wanted 10L for operational necessity and that we could clear to the left if necessary.  We taxied to the gate; and let passengers off.  There was a lot of uncertainty of cancel or not and it was getting late and we were pushing our Crew Critical Off (CCO) time.  Scheduling called the Captain and asked us to extend the CCO.  Maintenance was still on board; and the earliest we were looking to get into ZZZ1 was [early morning].  Neither the Captain; nor I; had prepared for a red-eye or Window of Circadian Low (WOCL) intrusion and declined the Flight Duty Period (FDP) extension and went to the hotel.




Synopsis: A B737 First Officer reported returning to departure airport when the flight crew noticed high number 1 engine EGT.