elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flying in night VMC; I failed to fully familiarize myself with the surrounding terrain; and common procedures. The weather was reporting VFR with the winds favoring Runway XX. I briefed the approach as a visual; backed up with the FMS. The briefed highest threat was situational awareness due to the fact that it was night time. We were cleared direct to the airport. Approximately 20 NM away from the airport; we called the airport in sight and upon being cleared for the visual approach; I started proceeding directly to the 5 NM fix. I was looking out the window at the airport as terrain started to come in as patchy green on the GPWS. The First Officer mentioned that there was terrain in the area; but I did not grasp the severity of his comment as I was looking at the airport and trying to lose altitude due the fact that I now believed we were high. Approximately 10 seconds after the First Officer's comment; we received an aural 'Caution; terrain. Caution; terrain.' I immediately advance the thrust levers; retracted the spoilers; and turned left towards the airport. As the surrounding terrain layout became more apparent; the First Officer mentioned that most other Captains he had flown with always landed on Runway Y at night. As I could now see why this would be prudent; I agreed with the idea and changed our approach to a left pattern for Runway Y.  In my approach briefing; I had said that situational awareness would be the biggest threat. When I said this; my thinking was about situational awareness in regards to the airport and the runways. The First Officer; who was more familiar with the airport; understood the situational awareness briefing as being more towards that of the surrounding terrain. As the First Officer now believed that I was more familiar with the surrounding terrain than I actually was; it did not occur to him to immediately question my briefed approach. Thus we continued as briefed until the GPWS warning caused us to change plans.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew experienced a GPWS warning on a visual approach to an airport with rising terrain to the north. On advice of the First Officer who was familiar with the airport; the Captain altered the approach to the north runway.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: A330
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: A CRJ2 departed Chicago O'Hare. He was climbed to 10;000 and vectored to the north departure area. O'Hare was landing Runways 10; 14R; and 22R. Aircraft inbound from the northeast (Kubbs Sector of the Chicago Center) are on an arrival route for Runway 22R and descending to 9;000 per ZAU/C90 Letter of Agreement. An A330 was an arrival from Kubbs and came inbound at 10;000 FT and fast. The A330 evidently requested Runway 14R and Arrival approved his request including a 10;000 FT altitude and faster speed. The inbound route for the A330; and all northbound departures; merge around 20 miles north/northeast. Just prior to this point; I received an Intra-facility Land line call that said they were slowing and descending the A330. I immediately turned the CRJ2 and climbed him to 11;000 as well as telling him about the traffic. When aircraft are 'Turned In' to different runways it is imperative that the aircraft be pointed out to all who may be affected. This is a critical point out that must be made especially when the altitude and speeds are different from the LOA. No point out or information was passed between arrival and myself. Secondly; we have been on Fusion RADAR for 8 days. It has been mentioned to management; and again I will state it here that the fused target and the associated ARTS symbol are such that if you turn the intensity of the RADAR target up; you cannot tell what ARTS symbol is co located with that aircraft and thus you do not know where that aircraft may be going. Conversely; turn the intensity of the target way down and you can now see what controller and which runway the aircraft will land on. The RADAR room is getting sloppy. Good technique which includes point outs as in this instance insured that we ran a safe operation. When we deviate from the LOA's we live by; and don't advise our fellow controllers; disaster is imminent.




Synopsis: C90 Controller described a loss of separation event noting the recent change to FUSION RADAR as one contributing factor.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SAV.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C SAV
ATC / advisory: Tower SAV
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While on the GPS approach to Runway 19; there was virga between the FAF and the runway. While entering the precipitation; the plane entered a downdraft of -500 feet per minute. I added power and attempted to maintain a constant rate of descent; and a few seconds later air traffic control called a low altitude alert. The altimeter indicated 400 feet; about 3/4 from the airport. By this point visual contact with the airport was made; I acknowledged the report from air traffic control; and landed without further incident.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported receiving low altitude alert from ATC while in downdraft; below approach altitude.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At 75 KTS on takeoff an ECAM amber warning and audio chimes indicated a reverser fault of some sort. A rejected takeoff was accomplished and the aircraft cleared the runway. By the time the aircraft was brought to a complete stop on the runway; the ECAM fault was no longer displayed. All appropriate checklists were completed and aircraft returned to the gate for maintenance action. An appropriate entry was made in the aircraft maintenance log.




Synopsis: An A319 flight crew rejected their takeoff below 80 KTS due to an ECAM reverser fault warning. After exiting the runway the fault extinguished.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had a valid takeoff weight before takeoff. 19 minutes after takeoff we received a new weight manifest which put our weight 2000# less than our takeoff weight. This would have been a huge safety issue if the weight error had been 2000# heavier!


Second narrative: Aircraft X departed ZZZ. [13 minutes later;] dispatch received a message regarding a weight change of 2018lbs after closeout. Apparently; the ramp personnel in ZZZ discovered a load of mail that had been listed as loaded on board the aircraft. This resulted in a decrease to the Zero Fuel Weight and Takeoff Gross Weight of 2018lbs. It is unknown if that also changed the Percent MAC or Trim Settings. The crew was informed of the weight change and advised to file a [report].


Synopsis: A Boeing 737 Captain and a Dispatcher reported that it was discovered after takeoff that the weight manifest included 2000 pounds of cargo that was not loaded.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During pre-flight; while testing the rudder trim; it binds when you turn it to the left. Also seems to be binding up against the aileron trim wheel.  Found autopilot control wire bundle tangled in rudder aileron trim asymmetry shafts.  Removed aileron rudder trim asymmetry from pedestal and untangled wire bundle.  Installed rudder aileron trim assembly In Accordance With (IWA) Cessna 560XL MM.  Rudder and aileron trim operate normal.

Callback: Reporter stated the Rudder/Aileron Trim vertical shafts inside the aft end of the center pedestal were wrapped with the Autopilot control wire bundle. The Task Card he was referring to involved inspecting and repairing the routing and security of wire bundles in that area. The nylon Tie-Wraps (Cable-ties) (Zip-ties) that secure some of the wire bundles do break; allowing wires to become entangled with the Rudder-Aileron Trim Assembly. He's not sure when that Task Card was last issued or accomplished on the CE-560XL aircraft. He has over forty years maintenance experience as a Technician and Inspector.



Synopsis: While troubleshooting a flight crew report of Rudder-Aileron Trim wheel binding on a CE-560XL; an Aircraft Maintenance Inspector finds the Autopilot Control wire bundle tangled in the Rudder-Aileron Trim Assembly vertical shafts; inside the aft end of the cockpit Center pedestal. Inspector questions if a Task Card for inspecting the routing and security of wire bundles and tie-wraps had been accomplished.
Date: 201208
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We were] descending on arrival; at 12;000 FT and 300 KTS; windshield heat normal-on. First Officer's windscreen started arcing sparks and glowing yellow which caused the windscreen to crack the entire width of the window. As pilot flying; I handed over the aircraft to the Captain and at his suggestion; donned my full face mask oxygen mask and ran the emergency procedure checklist for cracked windscreen. We declared an emergency and received expeditious handling to landing.




Synopsis: An MD11 windshield heat arced then the windshield cracked during descent at 12;000 FT. An emergency was declared and flight landed at destination.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Toilet Furnishing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had an Aft Lav inop due to a waste can flapper valve and the APU bleed inop. At the time I contacted maintenance control and was told the Aircraft would be full on [both legs]. I was to keep the Aircraft; all the way; and was concerned about the reduction in lavs. Maintenance said they were unable to repair; so I refused the aircraft for safety related issues of people gathering in both lavs to utilize the reduced facilities.




Synopsis: A319 Captain refused the assigned aircraft due to inoperative lav.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Previous crew reported that the autothrottles had kicked off on their flight. Local maintenance applied MEL to the aircraft. When we eventually got to go flying; we quickly found out that the Thrust Management Computer (TMC) was also inoperative. At a very low altitude; in IMC with winter operations; we had to scramble to look up EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) thrust settings in the Flight Manual for our climb out. MEL has a note at the end that states that the Thrust Management Computer and EICAS will work normally. It did not. We had no magenta thrust bugs on our EPR gauges. We had to look up and manually set our climb; cruise; and go around EPR Thrust settings from our manual. We contacted [Maintenance Control] via SAT COM enroute and explained our concerns. [Maintenance Control] concurred that MEL was incorrect; and local Maintenance should apply the correct MEL [at destination]. We were also told to write up the Thrust Management Computer. We wrote up the TMC in ACARS enroute.  Very long day for us. We had a return to gate caused by an engine anomaly; forcing an engine run up at the gate. Satisfied that the engine was safe; we accepted it for our flight. Winter ops then set in. Low visibility; snow; contamination checks; with the flight crew approaching their CCO time. When we finally went flying; we were blindsided with no EPR thrust bugs. I would have thought that if the correct MEL was applied to this aircraft; there then would have been some mention of the TMC being inoperative; and that we would have to look up our own EPR settings. We could have briefed this; and prepared for this threat on the ground in the flight planning area. Very frustrating; and very unsafe.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reported the wrong MEL was applied to the inoperative Autothrottles. The flight crew was not prepared for the associated loss of the Thrust Management Computer after takeoff.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: This report is being filed at the request of SoCal Approach.On arrival to SNA; we were flying the new DSNEE ONE STAR; as assigned. During the descent; we had a slight tailwind (approximately 010 degrees at 10 knots). After crossing the ROADE waypoint and attempting to descend to meet the crossing restriction at the PHIYA waypoint; we realized we were going to be a bit higher than the required altitude. We advised ATC of the situation and immediately asked for relief on the altitude restriction. ATC gave us the relief without question or issue. We ended up crossing PHIYA about 400 feet high; but were able to make the rest of the crossing restrictions without issue.The controller mentioned that multiple aircraft have had issues making that particular crossing restriction on this new arrival; and that controllers don't particularly like the required descent between ROADE and PHIYA; either. He asked us to file this report in order to help them with an upcoming meeting concerning this STAR and the other recent revisions to LAX terminal airspace. We agreed to do so; hence this report.This event occurred because the descent profile is too steep for easy compliance with the new STAR. The published restriction at ROADE is between FL190 and 17;000 feet. The published restriction at PHIYA is 13;000 feet. Depending on how the airplane calculates the VNAV descent; it is required to lose as much as 6;000 feet in 11.3 NM. That's a difficult restriction to meet; even harder when there's a tailwind on the arrival.The arrival needs to be reconfigured in order to allow all aircraft types to meet the crossing restrictions and still allow time to properly configure for a stabilized approach and landing at SNA.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reported that SoCal TRACON requested he fill out a report about a bad descent and crossing restriction that is hard to make into Orange County.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Occurred during single commercial check ride. I was the pilot in command and Mr. X was the DPE on board. While on short final during a power-off 180 a Cessna Citation (tail number unknown; Mr. X has the information) entered the runway area for runway XX. I was making all calls while in the pattern. I called downwind; downwind to base and base to final. While on short final I noticed the Citation entering the runway area and called for a go around. The Citation then proceeded to ask who was going around in the pattern and Mr. X took the calls over communications. The Citation said he was number one for takeoff and Mr. X told him it's an untowered airport and we were on short final. The Citation told us to get our training plane 'the heck out of there' and that was his last communication with us.


Second narrative: I'm not sure which crew member was making the radio transmissions; but I will refer to him as the captain. The captain's response to the go-around call was; 'what are you doing?' in an irritated tone of voice. I responded that we were in the traffic pattern doing takeoffs and landings. The captain responded with; 'you are a just training aircraft. You need to get the heck out of here.' The captain also said; 'Center told me I was number one for departure.'The citation departed Runway XX while we were still on the upwind and passed extremely close to us as we were turning left crosswind.


Synopsis: A commercial pilot applicant and DPE reported executing a go-around while on approach after a Cessna Citation took the runway without CTAF communications; unsafely departed; and communicated in a disparaging manner about a training aircraft in the pattern.