elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was leg #3 of 3; the last flight of the 2 day trip.  We had a little over 2 hour sit in ZZZ.  It was the FO's leg.  Our trip was going smoothly; and our CRM was going well for our trip.  The FO programmed the FMC and I checked it.  The FO programmed an NAPD2; 'L3' climb he put clean maneuvering speed/ 3;000 AGL in the L3 speed restriction; but left the L2 restriction at the ECON speeds. (forgot to put '250' to restrict the speed after 3;000 feet in the L2 position).  During my pre-flight; I checked the climb page; but didn't notice the omission.  Taxi and takeoff were uneventful.  Sometime passing around 6;000 feet; I noticed our airspeed to be approximately 280 kts.  I called out 'airspeed.' The FO corrected the deviation by climbing faster. We debriefed the error once we got to cruise. He made the programming error; and I missed it on my review.  On climbout; he followed the VNAV guidance and sped up; and I didn't notice the increase until later.  With these very light weights we are operating at; the airplane handles differently. There is a normal nose-down cue when we accelerate to climb speed passing 10;000 feet.  I didn't feel any such pronounced nose down event...and I was surprised to see the speed that high.


Second narrative: The flight was our third flight of the day flying on the second and last day of our pairing together.  I was the pilot flying the departure out of ZZZ.  Due to incorrectly programming the VNAV 'Climb' page in the FMC; after reaching acceleration altitude the VNAV commanded acceleration to climb speed appropriate above 10;000 feet.  I failed to catch the error and proceeded to accelerate towards this speed while we were still below 10;000 feet.  The Captain recognized the error as we were accelerating around 270 KIAS; which occurred around 6;000 MSL.  He verbally informed me of the deviation and I immediately corrected the error.  ATC was not involved in the incident and never contacted us on the radio or any other manner.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing a speed deviation during departure.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HNZ.Airport, NC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: TRACON RDU
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Around XA00 I was flying to HNZ with my IFR student. We filed a flight plan to HNZ then back to ZZZ for a 2 hour flight. We were with Raleigh Approach receiving vectors for the RNAV GPS for Runway 24 at HNZ. The controller advised me to proceed direct to a point which I could not locate. I responded to her that I cannot go direct because I cannot find this fix. She just kept telling me to go direct to this imaginary fix; so I just went direct to the IAF for the approach. She said nothing of it so I assumed the point I went to was correct. After the RNAV 24 approach we wanted vectors to shoot the RNAV 6 back in. Instead of going to the IAF and doing a course reversal the controller advised us to go outbound to TUCOV. TUCOV does not exist. We just went outbound until we crossed Virginia and I took controls and turned around inbound; I heard nothing from the controller and he cleared me in for the approach. Why would a controller have me fly outbound when I am on the course to do a course reversal is what I was wondering about. After the approach we headed back to ZZZ. I spoke to my boss and we called the Raleigh approach on the telephone. Turns out that the controllers had expired charts; hence the reason we had this confusion.




Synopsis: Pilot is told to fly to a fix that is not on his route and flies towards the IAF. On a second approach the controller tells the pilot to go to another fix which according to the pilot does not exist. After landing the pilot's boss calls approach control and finds out they are still using expired charts.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other All
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was reassigned from a deadhead to ZZZ to flying a turn to ZZZ1 because the copilot called in sick with suspected symptoms of COVID-19. Reportedly he had lost his sense of smell and had a severe headache. He had already flown with Captain X that morning potentially exposing Captain to the virus.  Now I am assigned to fly with Captain X potentially exposing me to the virus. I called the flight operations management; explained my concerns; he explained CDC guidelines; I told him I was uncomfortable with the situation; he told he would call me back. I got no such call. We are flooded with cautious bulletins; emails and other communications from our company about COVID-19 yet when faced with getting a flight out it would seem that's all thrown out the window.  Regardless of CDC guidelines; it would seem prudent to remove anyone who is knowingly exposed to the virus from duty until verified negative or positive.Please note; I was not trying to get out of the trip; I was trying to get out of being needlessly exposed to COVID-19. I'm exceptionally disappointed with how this was handled.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported being assigned to fly with a Captain whose previous First Officer co-pilot called in sick with COVID-19 symptoms.  Reporter described concerns with management's handling of the situation stating it goes against all the guidelines delineated by the company.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During two flights; Dispatchers sent two SELCAL ACARS messages to the crew on behalf of crew scheduling to ensure at least one member of the crew needed to call scheduling ASAP to verify a new assignment. The first message was received on Taxiway SC during taxi in and the SELCAL chime overpowered the Ground Controllers instruction to hold short of 9R at Taxiway SC. We heard our call sign and verified the hold short and all was normal. The second SELCAL message came approximately over the an approach intersection about 4;000 AGL; again; with a SELCAL message with the message stating something to the effect of 'Scheduling asked me to relay a message to the Flight Attendant to contact them upon landing.' Due to the professionalism of the crew; a [crewmember] was not reached. The schedulers are taking advantages of Dispatcher's ability to reach the flight crew and forcing crews to break sterile cockpit FAR to deal with a non-essential message to the operation of the aircraft. Any and all communication between dispatchers and pilots should be about flight related activities. Scheduling is abusing the dispatch link to the crew. This MUST be stopped ASAP.




Synopsis: A CRJ200 Dispatcher twice used the SELCAL system to contact a flight crew during a critical; sterile flight environment period to relay non-essential crew scheduling information.
Date: 201408
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On this flight; the Captain wanted an irregular break schedule. His break schedule lacks a valid justification. One relief co-pilot was willing to accommodate. We had half of the crew doing a standard break (flying co-pilot and me: 6 hours each) while the Captain and other Relief Pilot did a 4-6-2 break. I was awakened by the crew call from the lower bunk trying to wake my flying partner at the end of the 4 hour break. I was unable to fall back to sleep. The other Relief Pilot slept very little on the two short breaks. I learned that this was the third trip in a row with two days off in between. Relief Pilot fell asleep in the seat during the 6 hours on. The 4-6-2 break schedule is very unsafe for the operation. The Relief Pilot is not allowed a decent time to rest. When I tried politely to speak to the Captain about my concerns; he stated; 'It's fine if you relief pilots are hanging from your shoulder straps because; you are just relief pilots.' This Captain is unwilling to consider the fatigue or consequences of his irregular break scheme. His ego is getting in the way of a safe operation. There is a cost however...half of your crew is asleep in the seat.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer laments the Captain's decision to use a nonstandard break schedule on a 12 hour flight resulting in insufficient rest for the two relief pilots.
Date: 201206
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: As per the B767 flight manual; when lined up on the departure runway; both pilots will visually confirm the airplane symbol on the ND/MAP display is on the assigned runway and the airplane and runway headings agree (using the lowest scale). If inconsistency is found; do not takeoff. I; and I would assume almost every other B757/B767 flight; cannot meet this requirement in the flight manual; due to the fact that our position update to the takeoff position of the inserted runway in the FMC does not occur until after the takeoff is started and the EPR button is pressed. ON almost every flight in the non-GPS aircraft; which is most; the aircraft symbol is not on the assigned runway; in fact it often is very far off. So how is one to comply with the flight manual and ever make a takeoff with the B757 or non-GPS B767 aircraft? This flight manual requirement has no room for interpretation the way it is written. I would estimate that probably 90% of all B757/B767 flights do not meet this requirement but still execute the takeoff. When we get GPS upgrades; this will probably correct itself; but until then the flight manual needs to be changed.




Synopsis: B757 Captain believes that the flight manual requirement to verify aircraft position on the NAV display prior to takeoff is not germane due to the position not being updated in the FMC until the EPR button is pressed for takeoff.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Learjet 60
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I conducted a preflight inspection prior to departure and noticed that two small screws were missing from the left wing root leading edge fairing (wing to fuselage). Upon further inspection I observed that one of the left engine fan blades (N1) had a dent or ding toward the end (closest to inlet; away from root). I also noticed that one of the screws that had come lose from the L wing leading edge was logged into the inlet foam or honeycomb just forward of the fan (N1). I immediately notified Maintenance about what I had discovered and sent him quality images from my smartphone. After speaking with Maintenance and his review of the images I sent; Maintenance cleared us for flight back. Myself and the First Officer started the engines; taxied; and ran up the engines to take off power prior to departure to ensure there were no vibrations or abnormalities in the engine gauges. The engines ran in parallel with no vibrations or abnormalities indicated on the instruments (gauges). We then departed ZZZZ and flew the airplane back with no issues. There were also no abnormalities with engine operation on our previous arrival into ZZZZ two days prior.I did conduct a post-flight inspection after our arrival into ZZZZ. However; it wasn't thorough enough or I would have noticed the screws missing and fan blade ding then; which is when it should've been addressed. I realize that the only way to maintain professional standards and continuously be growing into a safer aviator is to always be learning from my experiences and mistakes. I learned a valuable lesson on this trip; to always conduct thorough and complete post-flight inspections. There is no excuse for complacency.




Synopsis: Corporate jet Captain reported two screws missing on a wing fairing during preflight; one which had caused a dent in an engine fan blade which he had not noticed on his post flight from the previous flight.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: APC.Airport, CA
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D APC
ATC / advisory: Tower APC
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working local. Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were both on frequency and sequenced to parallel runways; Aircraft Y on 18R and Aircraft X on 18L. Both were issued traffic just prior to them turning base leg. I knew Aircraft Y pilot was good; so I cleared them right away; Aircraft X acted hesitant; so I waited to clear him; so I could check and see if he was lined up for the right runway.Aircraft X appeared to be lined up for 18L when he turned final and; just before I was going to clear him; Aircraft Z who was unfamiliar with the area called up. I thought I had time to acknowledge Aircraft Z because the parallel runway thresholds are offset. By the time I got back to Aircraft X he had landed on 18R without clearance and Aircraft Y had to go around.When Aircraft X showed hesitation I should have said the name of the runway Aircraft Y was landing on instead of calling it 'the parallel runway.' I also should have waited until after I cleared Aircraft X to acknowledge Aircraft Z; even though I was sure Aircraft X was lined up for the right runway.




Synopsis: APC Tower Controller reported an aircraft landing on the wrong runway; causing another aircraft to go-around.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to Runway 13L; as PF; I lost VNAV guidance because I mistakenly hit the VNAV button. After multiple attempts I could not get VNAV to re-engage. Since we were on a visual approach; I elected to continue without it. Meanwhile; while trying to slow below 170 KIAS to approach speed; the throttles kept pushing themselves up. As I tried to manage the airspeed; the throttles were hampering my effort to reduce airspeed. I elected to disengage the autothrottles and continued the approach. During this time we had become high on the approach. I pitched over to get back on a visual glide path. At some point on the approach; we got a 'sink rate; sink rate' warning. I do not recall if we were below 500 feet in which case; we should have gone around. We determined we were in a safe position to land so we continued the approach and landed uneventfully.PF should coordinate with PNF to coordinate any MCP/FMC changes so as not to distract from flying.PM should be ready to be able to offer back-up visual guidance by use of V/S mode when primary means is lost. If we thought we were close to 500 feet when we hear the 'sink rate; sink rate' warning; we should have done the conservative thing and gone around.


Second narrative: Many of our pilots; myself included; have grown accustomed to flying with vertical and lateral guidance 99.9% of the time; and it's uncomfortable to say the least to fly without; or contrary to; that guidance. I believe it would be good practice to occasionally fly a takeoff approach and landing with no FD guidance in the Sim and the airplane (with PM using FD guidance).Be ready at any time to lose automation; and know your plan B ahead of time (for both PF and PM).Don't stay tied to the automation in the heat of battle. Know when to let go of it.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported their approach became unstabilized when VNAV was mistakenly de-selected.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Runway 10 cleared for takeoff. After First Officer calls 'Thrust Set' before 80 KTS. I look down the runway and mid- field a twin-engine Islander had taxied on runway and executed a takeoff. I started abort below 80 KTS. RTO Autobrakes did not engage. First Officer called Tower to alert abort and Tower questioned us as to why we aborted; informed about other aircraft and they did not know about or issue clearance to other aircraft. I taxied off runway. After abort rest of flight was normal.


Second narrative: A low-speed ABORT (Rejected Takeoff) was performed due to another aircraft accepting our take-off clearance; entering the runway mid-field; and taking off in front of us.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reports a rejected takeoff when it is noticed that a light twin has accepted the clearance and is departing from mid field. The tower was not aware of the issue and questioned the reject by the B757 crew.