elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FWA.Airport, IN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C FWA
ATC / advisory: Tower FWA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The flight was assigned the RNAV 23 approach to Runway 23 into FWA. The Commercial Plate has an ambiguous note. The black circle 2 note on the 12-3 plate states 1;520 FT applies to LNAV only approaches but it is not possible to ascertain exactly how it applies to the LNAV only approaches. The NOS charts show that there is a level off at 1;520 FT between AKEWS and BABAC and that level off is not depicted clearly on the Commercial Chart. One could assume from the Commercial Chart that 1;520 FT is required but is not clear which point to which point that altitude would apply. The Commercial Plate should be revised to clearly denote 1;520 FT is a level off altitude between AKEWS and BABAC for LNAV only approaches as well as the MDA of 1;300 FT after BABAC.

Callback: The reporter believes that the descent constraint at BABAC with Auburn's altimeter setting is 1;500 FT and then a descent to 1;360 FT is permitted as the VNAV minimum. There is a great deal of confusion about this approach and it should be clarified and republished.



Synopsis: An air carrier Captain on the FWA RNAV 23 was confused by the Commercial Chart Note 2 which constrains a descent at BABAC to 1;500 FT when using the Auburn altimeter setting but does not clearly indicate what the descent minimum is after BABAC.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Airport Personnel; Ramp; Vehicle Driver; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I drove a tug out onto the ramp to pull and refuel carts. I saw a heat cart on fire next to the left side of the aircraft and drove towards it. I called on the radio for somebody to call the fire department that there is a heat cart on fire. When I got to the scene I saw a work truck with a fuel cart attached to the vehicle next to the burning heat cart. I saw [an employee] using a fire extinguisher to put out the fire. Our shift manager was on the radio saying get away from the fire. I was going to drive away with the work truck that had the fuel cart attached to it but the fuel nozzle was still attached to the heat cart that was on fire. I was afraid the fuel nozzle was still pumping fuel. I saw [someone] walk to us with a fire extinguisher and began to put out the fire. Then I saw [the first employee] hit the fuel nozzle with the fire extinguisher and the fuel nozzle detached from the aircraft and when I saw the fuel nozzle was not pumping fuel; I then got into the work truck and drove away with the fuel cart attached to a safe distance. I saw the fire department arrive and extinguish the fire.[We need] better maintenance of heat carts and better fueling procedures.




Synopsis: Mechanic witnessed a heat cart catch on fire while still next to an aircraft. Nearby ground personnel and firefighters were able to respond quickly to extinguish the fire.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was the flying pilot departing EWR momentarily level at 15;000 before resuming our ATC climb past Colts Neck (COL) VOR when I saw a bright flash at my 2 o'clock position that caught my attention. I looked over towards the bright and highly reflective object. I tracked the path/trajectory and it appeared to be relatively level traveling opposite direction and below our flight path. It passed below and outside of the right engine nacelle about midway out from the length of the right wing. It was highly reflective and shimmering so I could not get a clear image of it relative size and shape. However; it appeared to be the size of a football with a fairly stable trajectory. I looked back towards the Captain and the jumpseater and said 'did you see that?' The jumpseater said that he did and the Captain indicated that he did not. The jumpseater and I said it looked like or could be a drone. Our assumption. The best I could compare it to visually was a flare with its highly reflective appearance but a smooth (not random or wobbly) level flight path whizzing by us at a consistent speed. I could not see any identify features; such as rotors; paint color; or markings.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a shiny object passed very close to the right engine while level at 15000 ft during an EWR departure.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student was working on a tailwheel endorsement. The initial touchdown was smooth in the three point attitude. The student relaxed the elevator pressure; the instructor failed to catch it and the aircraft started side loading. The aircraft then went off the runway hit a berm and caused a prop strike.




Synopsis: An instructor pilot reported the student lost control of the aircraft during landing resulting in a prop strike and the aircraft running off the runway.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Two aircraft requested IFR practice approaches to the airport. Both wanted the RNAV 4L approach with missed approach clearances. There was little sequencing that needed to be done. However according to the flips today the approach plates changed dramatically. I cleared both aircraft to the east side T fix ABCDE and issued an approach clearance. I even referenced the SAIDS approach plate to ensure accuracy. According to the new flips that T fix no longer exists. Later in the day I became aware of this and notified management who had no idea there was changes. In fact no one at the facility had any idea that there was a change. There was also nothing in any briefing items notifying any change. Notify controllers when there are significant changes to instrument approaches.




Synopsis: Approach Controller cleared two aircraft to a 'T' fix on an RNAV procedure only to later discover that the 'T' fix was removed from the approach on a recent procedural change.
Date: 201509
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Switch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cockpit switches and MX personnel procedures for work in cockpit.[I] have received numerous aircraft over the last year that the white tip on switches are covered in gunk and grime. While a little is not uncommon; now the switches are covered in oil; grease; and hydraulic fluid to the point they are falling apart and feel greasy. Once again with maintenance working multiple issues on the aircraft [there's the] occasional problem. What I have noticed now is that maintenance personnel are starting to wear gloves to prevent them from getting their hands too dirty. That being said we don't know when the last time they changed their gloves and if they had been working a lavatory or hygiene issue; it has now been brought into the cockpit and deposited on all the switches. I don't know how often all the controls in the cockpit are cleaned but based on the appearance of the switch controls I see it is very seldom.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported a concern about the transfer of unhealthy fluids to the switches and other areas of the flight deck by Maintenance personnel.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Descending via DRMMM1 arrival we contacted ATL approach with our ATC assigned speed of 310 kts and clearance to cross DRMMM at 13000'. Approach told us after what we perceived he had said as RAIIN slow to 250 kts. The first officer read back the restriction as RAIIN after a short confirmation discussion between ourselves. After passing DRMMM ATC asked to confirm we were slowing to 250 kts. We told them we thought he had said RAIIN and ATC said slow to 250 kts now.There is no phonetic correctness to pronunciation of intersections. Center in our descent I believe pronounced DRMMM as 'Drum' while the approach controllers were pronouncing the same intersection as 'Dream'. I believe Drum would be appropriate for literal translation of this intersection since no vowel exists between R and M. So when we were told to slow at 'Dream' we mistook it for the next closest pronunciation on the STAR as RAIIN. It doesn't help matters here when all the arrivals are NOTAMed to disregard all altitudes and air speeds on the chart they will be assigned by ATC. This takes all the predictability and fore planning out of the arrival briefing and with arbitrary interpretation of the pronunciation of the intersections leaves open a myriad of possible problems. Also with the intersection depicted on the STAR as 280kts there was also no thought given to the possibility of being that slow at that point. It's almost to the point where all intersections need in small print under the intersection of how all of us are to pronounce the intersection ATC and pilots alike.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported missing a speed restriction on the DRMMM1 arrival into ATL when they misunderstood a Controller's pronunciation of DRMMM intersection.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Control
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Confusion; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on the takeoff roll on runway 16 at Airport ZZZ we experienced an engine rollback at approximately 95 KIAS. Upon discovering the engine rollback; I commanded the pilot flying to abort the takeoff. I then advised ATC that we were aborting on the runway. At this point I wasn't completely sure what had just happened because I didn't hear or see anything that would obviously indicate an engine failure (red annunciator lights; loud bangs etc.) and when tower inquired as to what had happened; I first said; I'd get back to them as to the nature of our abort. Tower then instructed us to exit the runway onto taxiway X and taxi to the FBO. After clear of the runway; I took a moment to scan the annunciator panel and discovered the number 2 engine computer indicated that it had failed. I advised tower that it was an engine computer issue and that we'd not need any further assistance. We contacted ground control and taxied to FBO uneventfully then contacted flight tracking and maintenance control to coordinate our flight cancellation and repairs.


Second narrative: During Takeoff Roll after the 80 knot call out (around 100kts) the Right engine rolled back and the rudder bias activated.


Synopsis: HS 125-800 experienced an engine rollback during takeoff resulting in a high speed rejected takeoff. This was caused by an engine computer failure.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the climb out we experienced a L BLEED DUCT warning message. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying. He remained on the controls and radios while I ran the appropriate checklists and made the necessary communications to the crew; the passengers; and the company. [We advised ATC] and we were given priority handling back to land at ZZZ. The temperature in both the cabin and the cockpit reached 40 degrees Celsius because we were unable to maintain an open engine bleed valve. The warning occurred at approximately 12;000 feet MSL. We immediately got a clearance to descend below 10;000 feet MSL as pressurization could not be maintained. We then only had ram air to cool the cockpit and cabin. We landed safely on runway and taxied directly to gate where the passengers were deplaned through the normal method.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported a loss of cabin pressure and inability to control cabin temperature; resulting in an air turn back.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA; Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: MIA landing west. From Curso 2 RNAV ARR; on initial contact; Miami Approach control assigned vectors to LOC DME RWY 26R. We were vectored north of the field on a right downwind. Right base turn was outside HINKU; then we were cleared to intercept 26R localizer at 3000 FT. We intercepted the LOC; but when inbound noticed spacing with preceding aircraft was approximately 3 nm (on TCAS). Approach then assigned a left turn heading 240 while advising us we would be brought back on downwind for the approach; which we presumed was for separation. After being established on a 240 heading (south towards active RWYs 27 and 30) we received an unexpected/conflicting clearance to turn back right to intercept the 26R LOC. By this time we were inside HINKU; still at 3000 feet; without approach clearance; and judging whether or not to continue the approach or request additional vectors. We were then cleared to 2000 feet; at which time we acquired a visual with RWY 26R; below the cloud layer; and called the runway in sight. Approach control then cleared us for a visual approach to RWY 26R; contact MIA Tower. On initial contact with tower; inside JODAX; at approximately 1300 ft.; were cleared to change runways; and cleared to land on RWY 26L. Pilot flying (PF)/Pilot Monitoring (PM) agreed and we accepted the clearance; reverted to the lowest level of automation; confirmed landing checklist complete; and landed visually and uneventfully; on RWY 26L. Three days in a row; [operating Air Carrier X flight] ZZZZ-MIA; we initially received ILS RWY 30; then a change of RWY to LOC DME 26R. Two out of three days; we were issued a last minute change to RWY 26L below 1500 FT. On the occasion of this ASAP report; the approach controller communication was less than professional. The controller appeared task saturated and situationally disconnected with spacing of arrivals. Indeed; both PF and PM; when assigned the 240 heading off the 26 R LOC; began internal cockpit questioning whether the controller actually knew which flight he was communicating that clearance to. Speed assignments; sequencing; and spacing should be better managed by Approach Control so as to mitigate the risk of miscommunication; confusion; and last minute runway changes which increase potential for errors.




Synopsis: A319 pilot reported receiving multiple late runway changes from MIA ATC on several different days that led to confusion and increased workload.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The A Flight Attendant immediately contacted us through the service interphone after hearing the single ring indicating our climb through 10;000 feet.  He stated that he was not seated during takeoff; his galley was not secure; and that coffee had spilled on himself and his iPad. He then went on to state that the reason he was not able to complete his tasks prior to pushback and departure was because he was having to deal with passengers and their improper usage of masks. The B; C; and D Flight Attendants did not mention any passenger issues to us.As the First Officer; take a more proactive role in ensuring the flight attendants acknowledge the single ring prior to takeoff.  Also; it is my understanding that the flight attendants are supposed to immediately inform the pilots of any disruption or disturbance in the cabin in which they are unable to perform or complete their required tasks.


Second narrative: After giving the chime and monitoring the bell across the PA I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist.  After completing the checklist we switched the radio to Tower and they cleared us for takeoff with an aircraft on a 3 NM final.  With this distraction; I failed to listen to the A FA make his Departure PA.  Around 10;000 feet the A FA called to say he had been in the aisle during takeoff.  He told the FO he had been talking to a couple of passengers about wearing their masks and hadn't received the attendant chime.  He told the FO he had not fully secured the galley and had coffee spilled on his EFB and personal device.  He said he had no physical injury or harm and that overall he was fine.  I clearly heard the chime; but failed to monitor his PA.A FA should not be monitoring masks before takeoff at that time because non compliant passengers are less of a safety risk than delaying preparation for takeoff.  I will be more cognizant of listening to the FA PA per the AOM in the future.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a Flight Attendant was not seated for departure due to having to deal with passengers not properly wearing face masks.