elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: On an A321 aircraft; the passenger tray tables appear to pose a possible evacuation hazard. Specifically; rows 11 and 25. The mechanism designed to keep the tray table in the upright position appears to be backward. In the event of an emergency and possible evacuation; anyone could inadvertently move the mechanism out of place causing the tray table to drop; ultimately slowing an evacuation or blocking the exit. The small round tab designed to keep the mechanism from rotating fully left or right is on the opposite side of the L2/R2 and L3/R3 doors. I believe this round tab should be aircraft left (if you're seated left) and aircraft right. Please advise.

Callback: Reporter stated there is an additional small tab that locks the common latching arm that stows seatback tray tables at emergency exits. When facing forward in the aircraft; the seatbacks at Rows 11 and 25 are exposed to potential passenger emergency egress at emergency exit doors L2/R2; forward of the wing; and L3/L4 doors just aft of the wing. Passengers exiting left emergency doors could easily brush up against the seatbacks and basically unlock the small tab that locks the tray table common latch because the lock turns left to unlock; which would be the direction of passenger flow during a left egress. The tray tables could then be easily unlatched by contact with the tray table's common latch and interfere with emergency egress. Reporter has twenty-two years flight attendant experience.



Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reports that a special tab installed at seatbacks to lock the tray table latches at emergency exit doors L2/R2 and L3/R3 on an A321 aircraft; can be unlocked by contact. Anyone could inadvertently move the lock tab mechanism out of place causing the tray table to drop; ultimately slowing an evacuation or blocking the exit.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Lost MCP (Mode Control Panel) and all related functions. All windows blanked except for FO's (First Officer) course selector; which could not be changed. No auto pilot; flight directors; auto throttle; course selector; altitude selector etc. Spoke with Dispatch and Maintenance. FMC and RNAV were still available; [advised ATC]; and hand flew visual approach into ZZZZ. Landed without incident; situational awareness and CRM were key!




Synopsis: B-737 Captain reported failure of the Mode Control Panel; causing loss of most flight direction functions; resulting in an uneventful landing.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Fume event while taxiing out returned to the gate. Cause: unknown aircraft system was causing fumes inside cabin and cockpit. Returned to the gate deplaned all passengers and crew. Called company medical assistance and followed recommendation to go to hospital and get medical assessment. CA and FO and FAs 2 and 3 went to hospital; FA 1 reported no ill effects in First Class cabin area and continued flying duty. All crew members released from hospital within 1 1/2 hours.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported a ground gate return due to a fume event during taxi. Several crew members went to the hospital for check-ups.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final approach we put the landing gear down for landing and got a nose gear indication; a left main gear indication; but no right main gear indication. We cycled the gear and same issue. Since we were now on a short final; we asked Tower if we could do a low approach and have them confirm our right main gear was down and locked. We did; and they confirmed it appeared to be down. We entered the traffic pattern; ran the checklist and confirmed the gear was down and locked with the standby gear down and locked lights. The Tower declared an emergency for us and had the rescue vehicles come meet us; even though we did not declare an emergency. We landed with no incident. My copilot exited the aircraft and pinned the right main gear and talked to emergency personnel. After shutdown and talking with airport police officer we called management and notified them of the situation. We decided to trouble shoot the lights in the gear indicator. We changed the light bulbs and they then worked. Afterwards; we realized that we should not have done this and should have included Maintenance.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: BAE-125-850XP flight crew reported they had no green light for right main gear on short final. A flyby indicated the gear was down and a safe landing was made with equipment standing by. After a bulb change; all was back to normal.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground PHL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had pushed back from gate at PHL to mid-alley; started the Number 1 Engine and disconnected from the tug; after receiving a wands up signal we received clearance from ramp control to taxi to Spot 8. As the first officer called PHL Ground Control; we received clearance to taxi via November to Runway 27L and to cross 27R. I restated our clearance; looked left and noticed a tanker fuel truck stopped on the ground equipment roadway aft of the planes parked on the gates; the tanker truck was in our 9 o'clock position; I called out clear left and stated crossing Runway 27R on November as my scan shifted to ensuring Runway 27R was clear of traffic prior to our crossing. The First Officer called clear right; confirmed our runway crossing clearance and then stated the fuel tanker truck started to move and suggested I stop the aircraft; which I did and set the parking brake. We then observed the fuel tanker truck proceed to make a shallow right turn toward our aircraft such that our plane was probably not visible from the driver's seat as the geometry of the shallow arcing turn (cutting the corner of the perpendicular ground traffic roadway guide line) kept our aircraft in the tanker truck's 4 o'clock position. I sounded the ground crew call horn several times as the tanker truck passed within 15 FT of the nose of our aircraft without stopping! There was no collision due to the First Officer's situational awareness and Crew Resource Management type communication of a possible threat. The driver of the fuel tanker truck did not remain on the designated ground equipment roadway by cutting the corner and was therefore not able to properly 'clear' to his right and yield to airplane traffic. Ground traffic should remain on designated roadways and would in so doing make a perpendicular turn in such cases which would provide a safe margin separation from aircraft and of visibility of aircraft traffic. A driver should never drive a vehicle where he cannot see.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reports failure of a fuel truck driver to yield at Spot 8 during initial taxi for takeoff.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had a STAB TRIM total failure on climbout. FO was flying and noticed Stabilizer Trim switch was not working. I then tried mine and the autopilot; none worked. Preformed the Stabilizer Trim Failure Checklist. Since it was going to lead to a flaps 15 landing and manual trim I would be the Pilot landing. We called Operations; Dispatch; notified Flight Attendants and Passengers. After we amended our Release to return to the departure airport we asked for vectors for ILS XXL. We landed overweight flap 15 and taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported he discovered the Stabilizer Trim not functioning during climb after takeoff. The QRH checklist was completed and flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DNL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF DNL
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other ATP
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was in pattern just turning a close in base when an airplane reported on final. I thought they reported 6 miles out giving me plenty of time to land first. When on final their ADS-B target was very close behind me and 100 feet below so I elected to make a low approach.  That alleviated any conflict. I believe I misheard other airplanes distance out. They were much closer as it turned out.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC.  Reporter thought the aircraft was further away from their aircraft but misunderstood.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Solo flight in PA18 with wheel skis configured in a wheels down position. Locked brake during landing resulting in propeller contacting the ground. Landing surface snow covered gravel with areas of exposed gravel. Push rod connecting front seat brake pedal to master cylinder was discovered pinned under wheel/ski pump after stopping on the runway. Aircraft was stopped on the runway following the propeller contacting the ground. Front brake pedals were not used during the landing. No additional damage to the aircraft or property. Tower was notified of the aircraft being shutdown on the landing surface and a tow was requested. Aircraft was towed from the landing surface. Locked brake perception was insidious due to slippery surface initially and the drag increased rapidly just prior to prop contact. Mid roll out there were sounds similar to the back of the skis dragging if the pressure drops a little in the wheel ski pump or the skis are not installed properly but I did not process as possible brake lock during the landing. Sound was most likely gravel kicking up and hitting the ski from the locked brake. There was also a light quartering headwind with an approximate 5kt crosswind on the same side as the locked brake to add to the poor perception. The mechanical situation is preventable with adjustment of the ski pump installation to avoid interference with the brake push rod. I also intend to add a visual check of brake rods/cables to my before landing checklist and be more vigilant for unusual sensory perceptions that do not match my expected environment.




Synopsis: PA-18 pilot reported a prop strike occurred when the brakes locked during landing roll.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight was delayed for smoke in cockpit prior; this scheduled flight was good until crew reached 3;000 ft. and smoke occurred again. The crew immediately requested a return to ZZZZ with ATC and [requested priority handling]. No fuel was dumped and the aircraft was returned safely to the ramp.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a new Flight Crew reported smoke in the cockpit on initial climb. Flight crew performed an air turn back to make a precautionary landing. This was a repeat discrepancy.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON MSP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were approaching runway 12R in MSP and we were cleared to 4000 feet and 190 knots. Then we were given a base turn and subsequently cleared to a heading to join ILS 12R and 3000 feet until established. I selected vertical speed of -500 FPM to join the ILS. ATC then told us we had exited Class B airspace by 200 feet but then had reentered Class B airspace. Our speed at this point was 170 knots. Not sure if a deviation has occurred as we were following ATC clearance. We understood the clearance of '3000 feet until established; cleared for the approach' as a clearance to descend to 3000 feet. Also we relied on ATC to keep us in Class B airspace as it was IMC conditions A more thorough study of the Class B airspace would have been useful.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported exiting and reentering Class B Airspace while complying with an ATC clearance.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While taxiing off of 27L; we were instructed to exit on Runway 22R; and taxi A1-B to the the ramp. However; upon exiting the runway; I took H instead of A1; since there was no signage and no time to reference the taxi chart during a high speed runway exit/taxi. ATC seemed aware that we used H instead of A1; but did not seem to mind since we returned to the appropriate traffic flow.My primary safety concern is that it was impossible for me to identify the taxiway due to lack of signage from exiting the runway from our position. Hotspot 1 did not apply to our particular situation. Lack of taxiway signage; or inadequate signage lead to deviation from ATC clearance. Unable to brief lack of signage and unable to prepare for exiting runway from unforeseen circumstances that lead to unfamiliar taxi routes. I recommend additional signage be placed to appropriately identify taxiways from runway exits.




Synopsis: EMB145 Captain is instructed to exit Runway 27L ORD after landing on Runway 22R and taxi via A1 and B to the gate. A1 cannot be quickly located due to lack of signage and H is used instead; without comment from ATC.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight; the master warning and EICAS stated that the Hydraulic #1 failed and the Hydraulic page showed zero quantity in Hydraulic #1 System. The QRH was performed and I declared an emergency. The Company and passengers were then notified. The QRH directed that Hydraulic #1 be turned off when quantity indicated zero which was performed. I received via ACRS that Dispatch and Maintenance requested that I continue flight to [destination]. I refused to continue and requested to divert to [a nearby suitable airport]. I notified ATC of our in intentions and ATC directed us to fly direct to [that airport]. The diversion report was sent and QRH completed. The First Officer and I continued to discuss the approach and landing in detail. Since the First Officer was to do an emergency landing gear extension; we switched and I became the pilot flying. After initiating descent; I received another request to continue flight to [original destination] which I again refused. The Emergency (Abnormal) Landing Gear Extension Checklist was performed in order to lower the gear with no hydraulics. During landing; and although half the brakes were missing; we were able to stop aircraft about half way down runway. Aircraft was then towed to the gate. A large amount of time was spent on waiting on response from Dispatch/Maintenance and about where to land. In this particular emergency; I do not think that convenience to passengers or Maintenance was appropriate. During any emergency; and especially a very serious one; safety needs to be priority number one. During this emergency we were flying on Hydraulic System #2. There was no backup in case the #2 Hydraulic failed. There were numerous tasked to be performed and there just no time for long waits from the company or numerous ACRS messages about where to land the aircraft. In this case I think the aircraft needed to land at the nearest suitable airport.




Synopsis: EMB-145XR Captain reported loss of Hydraulic System #1 during cruise flight. Captain declared an emergency; and contrary to the advice of the company; decided to divert to a nearby suitable airport.