Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System Indicating & Warning
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushback for our delayed flight while starting engines we got 'L ENG PROBE HEAT' EICAS message. We returned to the gate where Maintenance attempted to fix the problem; including an engine run at gate with no luck. The necessary part was not in stock so Maintenance placarded the item per an MEL which allows for flight avoiding 'any known or forecast icing condition.' While checking satellite weather pictures; we had a discussion with an inbound Captain who described layers of clouds with icing east of ZZZ. We also noticed a large area of North-South oriented weather that would require flight through and/or above it. Talked with WSI Meteorologist about such weather; regarding temp; icing etc. We also learned of additional areas of cloud cover in the vicinity of our climb out and descent and were advised they were either below us or would consist solely of ice crystals.We asked if temperatures would be below -40C (AFM definition of icing) and he said no. Apparently; their view of icing; and when I'm required to turn on engine heat are different if they want the plane to go. The briefer also did not know about the inbound icing I had just discussed with landing Captain. As a result I lost most faith in their forecast ability to keep me clear of ice at this point. As a side note; I have had continual doubts about contract weather providers since we went to them years ago. I am continually surprised with their forecasts; especially turbulence; and rapid weather changes. I did not feel that I could safely guarantee that we would not encounter icing no matter the route chosen and; mindful of the fact that any descent required by subsequent system failure; would drive me into icing conditions; I rejected the aircraft as unsuitable for this in-the-dark; transcontinental; 2;200 NM flight. Nighttime inability to see weather was also a major factor; plus a secondary concern was drift down altitudes if the right engine failed. Other considerations included the fact I have exactly ZERO guidance from Boeing and the company on what an engine does when/if that P2/T2 probe ices up in-flight; I cannot believe that this is only a status message that says 'Stay out of icing' only AFTER you pull the MEL. Ought to be higher priority; or have more info to crews. The jet also had a history of weather radar gripes for avoidance issues and a recent uncontrollable temporary discrepancy in main cabin. [I] had to consider that in mix when rejecting the aircraft. As it turned out; when the jet departed the following day (with L ENG Probe HEAT still on placard) it did not make it to its destination and; instead; diverted enroute due to an uncontrollably cold cabin. I got pressured from station personnel (who are understaffed for any abnormality) and Dispatch was so-so; but did get a call from the Chief Pilot on duty to ask me why I rejected the aircraft. The Chief Pilot seemed understanding of my rationale once explained; but the call itself could have been construed as 'pilot-pushing' by someone less resolute. If you are only going to fly one 757 into a station a day; you either need to have parts for it; or accept that nighttime; trans-continental safety requirements may be more stringent than for a short daytime hop [and delays may result]. Pressure to get the one 757 out each night; on an all-nighter that is always full; will be intense and result in plane/pilot pushing. With the way our 757's are being maintained (more MEL's and breakdowns than I can ever remember in 24 years); it's not going to be pretty.


Second narrative: I echo all of [the Captain's] concerns; and add additional important considerations given my educational background. The level of operational safety at our airline is in decline and has been for some time; yet I see no efforts to arrest this progression. This flight is simply another indicator that aging aircraft plus operational 'push' to take marginal aircraft into inappropriate conditions; added to years of 'short-cuts;' all result in increased risk for our passengers and crews. This trend needs to stop now.


Synopsis: A B757-200 flight crew refused their assigned aircraft due to icing conditions enroute and an MEL'd engine probe heater. They further generally addressed the state of aircraft maintenance at their carrier and what they believe to be attempts to coerce flight crews to accept aircraft; technically legal for release; but for which the crews feel existing conditions make it unsafe to do so.