elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other All Operations
ATC / advisory: Tower FLL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Other Unwanted situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: FLL Runway 10R/28L; currently under construction and slated for completion in Sept 2014; is an unsafe and dangerous design.With its approximately 60 foot high MSE walls surrounding three sides of the east end of the runway and parallel taxiway; and more specifically the planned east end 600 FT EMAS bed; the design of Runway 10R/28L makes it virtually impossible for passengers to safely evacuate and egress from an aircraft stopped in the EMAS.This untenable situation is further complicated in the event of an aircraft fire. As the prevailing winds at FLL are generally out of the east/southeast; evacuating passengers would be trapped in the confined and elevated 'Safety Area.' The 60 FT high walls effectively prevent passengers and crew from distancing themselves from the disabled aircraft and responding ARFF equipment.The B777-200 configuration that my company currently utilizes is 289 passengers; 11 flight attendants; and 4 pilots. Given the extremely constrained east end EMAS area; as pilot in command; I will not takeoff from or land on Runway 10R at FLL. To do otherwise would be to jeopardize the safety and well being of my passengers and crew.




Synopsis: A B777 Captain advised he considers the elevated runway modifications to the east end of Runway 10R/28L at FLL currently under construction to be too confining should an evacuation from the included EMAS runway extension be necessary.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We] rejected takeoff at 85 KTS because the Captain's altimeter setting spontaneously changed from 30.01 inches to 29.89 inches during the takeoff roll. I saw the displayed altitude change and the yellow NEG flag also popped up because the different altimeter setting placed us below sea level. Unknown what caused the malfunction.




Synopsis: CRJ-50 Captain reported rejecting takeoff at 85 KTS when his altimeter setting spontaneously changed from 30.01 to 29.89.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Indications
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff on a Boeing 757-200 operating a ferry flight Part 91 from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We rejected the takeoff at high speed due to a left engine fire indication. We advised ATC immediately of the issue; cleared the runway; shut down the engine as a precaution; and taxied to a pad to allow for brake cooling. No further event took place from this rejected takeoff; it was only an indication problem.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported performing a high speed rejected takeoff after receiving a left engine fire indication.
Date: 202201
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation; in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported receiving a terrain caution message followed by a low altitude alert from ATC while responding to a traffic resolution advisory.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Checked iPad currency prior to early report. Referenced iPad Content Locker items on DHD flight. Second leg I stored Flight plan and papers in iPad Content Locker. Discovered enroute that iPad Content Locker had tried to update after flight planning and did not complete. Content locker was NOT available; could not reference Flight Papers; Flight Plan; FM or FOM.I see that AFTER I started my work day a Bulletin was issued. I did specifically check for Pilot Bulletins on a Flight Operations computer before I started my trip; so the bulletin was too late to help me.This is the second major failure I have experienced with the iPad and our management of it in the last two weeks. At my CQMV we discovered that my Jeppesen coverage status had not been change to reflect the change from 76T to 756 so I did not have the correct charts. Apparently this has happened to multiple crewmembers.Fortunately on this specific flight we had the required paper FPF; the First Officer's Content Locker had not failed and I just happened to copy the flight papers to another reader program in my iPad.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported his iPad was not updating properly; and this is not an uncommon occurrence.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C SNA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: PC-12
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was conducting OJT on the Pacific Sector. A B737 departed SNA and was climbing to assigned altitude of 050; on the Channel 1 departure. A PC12 was on vectors for a visual approach to SNA. The PC12 was heading 315 at 060. A BE20 was departing SNA also climbing to 050. The developmental then issued traffic information to both the B737 and the PC12; both aircraft stating they were searching. A climb clearance was issued to the BE20 to 070; and the read back was blocked on the frequency. The developmental tried to insure the clearance asking 'last call to Approach say again.' Then the PC12 reported the B737 insight; also the B737 reported the PC12 insight. What had happened was the B737 had taken the BE20's climb clearance to 070 and was climbing through 054 when they responded to a TCAS alert on the PC12. The developmental then instructed the B737 to maintain visual separation and climb to 100. This all happened in seconds and there wasn't anything I; or the developmental; could have done. The similar sounding call signs played a major part to this event [the B737 and BE20 both ended the same]; but in my opinion the real cause was due to the poor quality of radio frequencies that we are using at SCT. For the last three to four weeks the workforce has complained about the frequencies; with 5 by 5 being good in actual 1 to 2 of 5 is what were dealing with. I know management and maintenance have been aware of this problem; but something has to be done. Without TCAS this could have been a midair collision. Again something has to be done about the frequencies at SCT. Also I explained to the developmental the correct phraseology for use with similar sounding call signs.




Synopsis: SCT Controller voiced concern regarding several radio frequencies that fail to operate as required; listing a TCAS RA event resulting from the subject communications problem.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TUS.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C TUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON U90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flying on the ZONNA1 arrival descending to 10;000 ft passing the JOKIM fix; we started to get controller vectors for the airport. Unfortunately; the Control's [procedure]; or surveyor terrain in this area could be looked at some. On the chart; if you stay on the route you're ok; but the vector we got put us closer to the little peaks that were higher on the mountain. A 270 [heading] was bad enough to get this close; then the controller gave us a 265 heading the put us closer to another high little peak on the mountain. The copilot and I remarked how close to the ground coming up we were with no yellow or red terrain dots showing up on our screen. We looked for the radar altimeter to show 2500 feet; [but] that never happened. We questioned the altitude assignment of 10;000 feet; ATC said the minimum radar vector altitude was 9100 feet; we should be good; [and] then we got the GPWS terrain [warning]. I disconnected the autopilot and did a soft escape maneuver climb to 10;300 feet; told ATC we had to climb because of the GPWS warning but he did not know what we were talking about. He said [no] problem; descend to 7000 feet; we were clear of the mountain by then; [it was] very visible [since it was] a clear day with cloud cover above us. Continued vector to Runway 11L for landing.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning when vectored off the charted course approaching TUS.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Level at 15;000; autopilot(AP) on then the AP and yaw dampers (YD) disconnected. I noticed rudder trim was pegged max right. No 'tone' warning through headset to indicate runaway trim. No CAS annunciation (ie: 'YD Hold Nose Left or Right'). I grabbed the control wheel and countered the right rudder with left aileron. I was also holding left rudder; but could not put in enough input (could not push hard enough) to offset the full right rudder trim. So we were flying in a left wing down; forward slip in order to maintain heading. I slowed to reduce control pressures; and was able to maintain altitude at about 170 knots. We did not notice the right rudder trim travel until it was pegged because we were in and out of LT to MOD turbulence; which apparently masked the trim travel. My First Officer pulled out the QRH; but there was nothing listed for our particular fault (I looked later on and the closest thing I found to our situation was 'Abnormal Disconnect'). While I was flying; my First Officer attempted to center the trim with the rudder trim switch; and was successful. We completed the balance of the flight with the YD and AP off (and we did not touch the rudder trim switch again until we landed). After landing; I 'exercised' the rudder trim switch; and found that if I held right trim on the rocker switch; then released the switch at 'center' (green AC symbol); the trim continued to travel to the right until it stopped at full right. During the time that the above was happening; we were given a descent to 11;000 by ATC; which was accomplished without incident. We did not declare an emergency.




Synopsis: PC-12 Captain reported the autopilot and yaw dampener disconnected without other alerts. The rudder trim displaced full right until the First Officer centered the trim after a suspected trim switch malfunctioned.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were flying midfield downwind for Runway XXR when we noticed an airplane close behind via ADS-B. The Tower also noticed the aircraft behind us and indicated to the pilot of that aircraft that he was doing 115 kts ground speed and overtaking us. The other pilot did not react to ATC's instructions and got closer to us. As we were about to turn base; the other pilot apparently did not see us and got closer at this point. The Tower told us to continue downwind after we started turning our base. The other pilot turned base slightly above and behind us and continued to perform a normal landing. We performed a normal landing thereafter.




Synopsis: Student pilot reported an NMAC when another aircraft overtook them on final and landed in front of them.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am reporting this for another controller who seemed unwilling to do so. ZOB Center did not take a handoff on Aircraft X until the plane was less than a minute flying time to their boundary and had to call them to take the handoff. ZOB Center ROUTINELY doesn't take handoffs in a timely manner. ZOB Center controllers need remedial training on how far out beyond their boundaries to set their maps and what constitutes 'timely acceptance of a handoff.' They clearly understand neither.




Synopsis: ZAU Controller reported ZOB ARTCC routinely does not accept automated handoffs in a timely manner.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Upon Landing
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Following Troubleshooting Manual (TSM) and Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedures to determine the cause for brake overheat; I determined that possibly the Anti-Skid System was not managing the brake; which was causing the overheat and not just a temperature reporting error. Maintenance Control agreed with my explanation; allowing the deactivation MEL and subsequent procedure. After retrieving the exact AMM reference for deactivation; I entered it into the maintenance computer; which displayed several subtasks. One of these was a specific procedure for deactivating only the Green [Hydraulic System] NORMAL side. I chose this based on the previous TSM Task for complying with the NORMAL Brake System Tachometer Functional Test. The TSM was referencing only the Green-Normal System with a possible fault. I mistakenly misidentified Green from Yellow [hydraulics]; causing only the Yellow hydraulic line to be stowed for the MEL. Had I removed the correct one [hydraulic line]; the brake would not have activated; even though one side was disconnected and stowed. Since the brake was still active; the high temperature condition recurred upon landing. Since I [had been] working on the NORMAL Braking System; I [had] decided to only deactivate that side; but confused Yellow from Green hydraulic hose couplings. [After landing]; the Green hydraulic line was disconnected and stowed as part of the complete MEL procedure. Please update the MEL reference for the deactivation procedure to read the EXACT subtask [in the maintenance computer] that will link directly to deactivating the entire brake. Currently when this task is entered; several other DEACTIVATION choices appear. Flight delay.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports he mistakenly mis-identified a Yellow System hydraulic line hose coupling for a Green NORMAL Hydraulic System hose coupling; causing only the Yellow hydraulic line to be stowed for an MEL deferral of an A320 Brake Temperature Indication. High temperature condition recurred due to  brake was still active on landing.
Date: 202104
Location: ISP.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ISP
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Tower told me I was cleared to land. After landing they wanted to me to taxi off the runway onto an intersecting runway and hold short of another runway. Upon landing and clearing the runway I was on the intersecting runway and tower had someone landing on the runway.  I took evasive action and taxied off the runway. The aircraft landing went around I advised Tower they nearly had a collision on the runway and they responded with 'thanks for your help.' The Tower Controller had several other airplanes in the pattern and must of forgotten he had someone landing on the runway I was on.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported they were on a runway holding short of an intersecting runway when they observed an aircraft about to land on their runway at ISP. They taxied off and advised Tower.