elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DPA.Tower, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D DPA
ATC / advisory: Tower DPA
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was inbound from the southeast on a Visual Approach. Soon after Aircraft Y checked in from the north on a Visual Approach. The two aircraft were both IFR; on Visual Approaches to the airport but nothing was coordinated from TRACON reference the two aircraft. No adequate separation was provided from TRACON. Had coordination been accomplished; I could have informed TRACON I could provide visual separation for the two IFR inbounds. I did select the TRACON line and indicate that I was providing visual separation with the two arrivals. They never answered the line.This is not the first time TRACON has failed to coordinate if Tower can provide visual separation for two IFR arrivals on visual approaches to the airport with less than adequate separation or spacing. This is an unsafe practice and needs to STOP.TRACON needs to coordinate if Tower can provide visual separation for two or more IFR inbounds on visual approaches with less than adequate separation or spacing or utilize the scratch pad; indicating Number 2 has Number 1 in sight.




Synopsis: DPA Tower reporter TRACON transfers simultaneous Visual Approach arrivals to Tower without ensuring a sequence or separation of the aircraft.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator ControlSystem
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out the Captain noted an abnormal pitch control feedback from control yoke that was not present on the ground flight control checks. He passed controls to me and asked for verification. I noted a significant abnormal dead band in the yoke response in the pitch axis raising concern about the potential flight control problems. In the discussion that followed; we agreed that the safest course of action was to turn back and get the aircraft checked. ATC was informed followed by a routine visual approach.


Second narrative: At rotation the pitch control felt sluggish and sloppy. We got the aircraft cleaned up. I transferred control of the aircraft to my First Officer seeking his evaluation as to the feel of the pitch control. He agreed there was sloppiness in the feel of the pitch control. We decided that a return was the prudent thing to do and informed ATC of our decision to return. An emergency was declared and we were cleared for a visual approach. The approach and landing were uneventful.


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew experiences sloppy elevator pitch control during and immediately after takeoff. After discussion the crew elects to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On downwind; the A-system engine driven light flickered. There was about 25 percent quantity remaining. We lowered the gear immediately before losing the entire A-system. Shortly thereafter the A-system quantity was zero and both lights were illuminated. We accomplished the checklist on the turn to final and prepared to land. I [advised ATC of the situation] in order to reduce the radio calls for base to final turns and was sent to Tower. We landed uneventfully and were able to taxi to the gate.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported loss of A hydraulic system on approach.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SUS.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D SUS
ATC / advisory: Tower SUS
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Upon arriving SUS on a visual approach to Runway 26L via CSX VOR at night; both pilots were distracted by the brightness and intensity of the lighting system at the new [golf center] location; which is located on roughly a two-mile final to Runway 26L.  The angle of the lighting system at the new facility is directly aimed at any pilot lined up for 26L at night.  The lights are extremely bright; distracting; and disrupt night vision acuity.




Synopsis: Corporate pilot reported being distracted by the bright lights from a new golf center near Spirit of St Louis Airport.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SMF.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C SMF
ATC / advisory: Tower SMF
Second aircraft: Twin Beech 18
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was taking the position from a fellow tower controller; that had sequenced a BE18 in front of a [Large Transport] with a fast overtake. When I officially had the position; the BE18 was on landing roll; and [Large Transport] was on about a 1.5 mile final. The BE18 rolled by exit after exit; and looked like he would be able to take the midfield exit at A8. I instructed the pilot to 'turn right at A8 and contact ground .7 off the runway'. He turned the aircraft eastbound and both myself and my ground controller determined that he was clear of the runway. Apparently; however; he had made the turn and stopped on the runway; and [Large Transport] on very short final (who had a better vantage point from that angle) determined that he was not entirely clear and initiated a go around. It seemed very odd that this aircraft would have stopped on the runway; as there should have been ample time for him to clear before the [Large Transport] reached the threshold. A couple of minutes later we figured out why the BE18 stopped on the runway: a half hour earlier; when the previous tower controller had turned on the lights at sunset; she had neglected to turn on any taxiway lights on the field. The BE18 must have been having a hard time seeing the unlit taxiway.In hindsight; I should not have taken the position with the squeeze play the previous controller had been attempting to make work. If I would have known some of the decisions that were made prior to myself entering the tower cab; I would have waited until the [Large Transport] was on the ground. Second; I should have double checked all of the lights prior to taking the position from this controller. I saw the beacon and runway lights and assumed everything was on. I should have double checked; though. I didn't have time to check them once I had taken the position; as my focus was too great on making sure not to have a runway incursion.




Synopsis: Aircraft landing at SMF delayed runway exit at taxiway. Following arrival noticed the aircraft still partially on the runway and initiated a go-around. The Tower Controller had failed to turn on the taxiway lights after sunset causing the first aircrafts confusion and delay exiting the runway.
Date: 201208
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 350
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On departure climb my Departure Procedure (DP) accidentally was cleared from the GPS/MFD. Having departed TEB in the past; I had always been given immediate vectors to ELVAE (which I did have still active in the GPS) so I was not immediately concerned. I was contacted by ATC to follow the DP which was no longer in my flight plan-they proceeded to give me a heading and altitude to which I immediately complied. I am still not quite sure how the DP was deleted; however; I have realized that I should also load the chart for the DP on my charts page of the MFD which would have given me immediate reference to the procedure.The event occurred in VMC; I was fully in control of the aircraft and at no time was I at risk. I fly into and out of Teterboro often and want to be certain this does not occur again. I have taken corrective procedural action to ensure it does not. On departure I will always load the DP into the flight plan; load the chart into the charts page; have the chart active on the iPad and have my heading bug and altitude indicator set on the appropriate numbers for the first phase of the DP. I have run this scenario through my head numerous times as it was disconcerting to err in such a busy flight environment.I plan on pursuing my CFI in the spring of 2013 and feel that although this was a failure on my part; much was gained and learned. I should have immediately asked ATC for vectors when I realized the flight plan was missing the DP and appreciate ATC's immediate vectors when they recognized my deviation. Obviously all of the above-mentioned back up systems will greatly improve safety and compliance.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Cessna 350 suffered a track deviation departing TEB when she either failed to load the departure procedure in the GPS/MFD or had inadvertently deleted it. ATC provided vectors to resolve the error.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EC135
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Compressor
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I completed inspection Job Card (compressor wash) on both engines of an EC-135T2+ with Arrius 2B2 Engines. The Engine Compressor Wash [was] performed in accordance with the correct procedures. While I was collecting the equipment and materials to be used I could not find the chemical I was trained to use. I then researched for the proper chemicals in the appropriate manuals. I then saw the name ARDROX on the List of Approved Chemicals and remembered that there was some in the chemical lockers on the hangar floor. The chemical in the locker was ARDROX-185L. I then mixed the chemical in the compressor wash sprayer at one liter chemical to four liters water. Duty Pilot X then ran the engines to allow myself to complete the compressor wash. The chemical was allowed to soak in the engines for approximately ten minutes. Pilot Y; the next On-Duty Pilot; ran the engines to allow me to perform the rinse in accordance with procedures. After the engines were rinsed; the aircraft was ran by Pilot Y; on the ground at idle for five minutes to dry. While speaking to my trainer; I discussed the problem that I could not find the chemical that he instructed me to use and that I used ARDROX. He then told me that the chemical was located outside of the hangar and ARDROX was not used during the compressor wash. I then researched the chemical again and found that ARDROX 185L was not on the approved chemical listing; but other ARDROX products were. The incident could have been avoided if the entire chemical were located in one centralized location. Another solution would have been for me to slow down and read the Chemical Listing and the Chemical Label more closely.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed that the ARDROX-185L chemical solution he used to accomplished a compressor wash on two Arrius 2B2 turbine engines installed on an EC-135T2 helicopter; was not on their approved Chemical List.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FAT.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E FAT
ATC / advisory: TRACON FAT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A C208 departed FAT on an IFR Flight Plan. The aircraft was handed off to NCT and switched frequencies. Approximately 30 minutes later NCT called with 'hand off unable ARTS'. The aircraft was the C208 at 5;000. We checked the FDIO and there was nothing stored. The aircraft did not have an IFR Flight Plan in the system. NCT apparently cleared the aircraft to FAT and failed to file a Flight Plan. We don't know if the aircraft stopped at his destination or just did a fly by and return. [This is] a problem that would not have occurred if this facility was part of NCT. Something the NCT Controllers can't seem to get into their heads. By no means am I advocating this facility become part of NCT. NCT needs to be made aware that just because it works 'in house' doesn't mean it works with adjacent facilities. Standard procedures should always be followed.




Synopsis: FAT Controller described a confused hand off event when traffic inbound was devoid of any Flight Plan information in the FAT ARTS system; the reporter claiming NCT handled the traffic incorrectly with regard to separate facilities.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was enroute from the south and was to the west of the Washington DC airspace when I was given a new route which was direct ZZZZZ; then direct ZZZZZ1; then T291 to ALB; then V489 to GFL. I was advised that my read back was correct. I was in IMC and slowly entered the new route into the navigator. As I was trying to enter V489 from ALB to GFL it became apparent that that segment of V489 no longer existed as the VOR was decommissioned several years ago and I discovered later that the ALB - GFL segment was removed last fall. I did not make an issue of it because I knew I would be asking for and getting vectors to final for the ILS 01 at GFL long before arriving at the ALB VOR. My question is whether the folks that give these routes are using outdated charts or have preferred routes that should have been updated. In any case; the routers need to be made aware of the changes to the Victor airways that used GFL in them as they all have been modified.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a route revision in which it contained an airway and VOR that no longer exist.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: ATC changed our clearance via CPDLC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) before push to the Offshore2 [SID] McKey ZZZ as filed. Loaded SID in FMC Runway 1L. Observed a [disconnect] after SEPDY. We questioned Clearance Delivery what they wanted us to fly after SEPDY. I assumed a 203 degrees heading to intercept the PYE [VOR] 151. Noticed there were several points not programmed in the FMC..This clearance is confusing and the SID is very poorly written. What is expected after SEPDY?  Will ATC give us vectors or are we to intercept the radial on our own?We questioned both Clearance Delivery and on initial contact with Departure so there was no deviation; but this needs to be better written on the SID procedures. Rewrite this SID to better explain what ATC expects the pilot to fly ie. radar vectors after SEPDY.




Synopsis: Captain reported SFO OFFSHORE2 SID required clarification.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MRY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 0
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A-1 Husky
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D MRY
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Other climb out
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the initial climb out on the MRY5 departure; we had some trouble maintaining a decent climb rate once entering IMC. Although we know the aircraft meets the departure minimums; the aircraft has been modified with a composite prop and amphibious floats. These floats in particular drastically reduce the climb performance of the aircraft.We requested the MRY departure off 28L because we knew we would not meet the opposing (active traffic) runway requirements. However; once departing; we received a low altitude alert from the air traffic controller. At this time; we were very carefully monitoring our AGL and terrain using multiple onboard GPS and navigational systems. However; we apparently went below the trigger altitude for the controller. We are not sure if we actually were below the departure minimums at that point; but were close enough to require a warning. We continued climbing over the water on the departure; and were able to break out of the marine layer shortly thereafter. One thing that I would like to see; is better performance data published for the aircraft; but we are aware that being a seaplane we are limited. In the future; perhaps we will opt to navigate using a different technique; perhaps depart Special VFR and remain in Class G airspace once departing the airport. This is our normal course of action; and the reason I stay off whore whenever ferrying seaplanes.




Synopsis: Aviat Husky pilot reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during climbout.