Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Enroute; Supervisor / CIC
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The WIANG A/B/C military airspace went active on the radar scopes in the Northeast Area 15 minutes earlier than scheduled.  I had the Squib radar controller ask me if the airspace was active because his GI (general information) said that it wasn't to go active until XX00Z.  I quickly checked the SAMS website and it said that it began at XX00Z.I then attempted to contact the military position in the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) to find out what was going on.  They did not answer the phone due to being overwhelmed with multiple positions combined in TMU due to lack of staffing in the TMU.  As I was about to walk up to TMU to ask them about the status of the airspace; the airspace turned off the radar scopes.  Then TMU called me (the Northeast Area FLM) and the North Area Front Line Manager (FLM) on the VSCS.  They explained that the WIANGs were turned on by accident; that the WIANGs were not going to go active until XX00Z; and that the VOK airspace was active early at XX00 minus 15 minutes Z (which was already coordinated with the North Area and does not impact the Northeast Area).A few minutes later; TMU called and said that the WIANGs airspace actually did go active at XX00 minus 15 minutes Z and to protect for it.I believe that the coordination between Chicago ARTCC's TMU and Minneapolis ARTCC's TMU is breaking down.  I also believe that the lack of staffing and fatigue in Chicago ARTCC's TMU is playing a major role in this and yesterday's situation.  I do not know what training was transpiring in TMU over the past two days.This is the second day in a row where the WIANG airspace was not executed/coordinated correctly.  Get more staffing in Chicago ARTCC's TMU (TMCs and STMCs)!  Hire more FLM staffing in Chicago ARTCC!Have Chicago ARTCC's TMU; Minneapolis ARTCC's TMU; and the military re-evaluate the process for activating the WIANGs airspace.  However it might not be a problem with the procedure; but proper staffing and training.


Second narrative: I (the Front Line Manager (FLM) of the Northeast Area) received a call about 3 or 4 minutes prior to the WIANG A/B/C military airspace going active from FL180 through FL240 (normal stratum) from ZAU's Traffic Management's military line.  They were asking if we could extend the WIANGs airspace up to FL290.  I told them that I would have to check with the controllers that it affected and to see if there was any aircraft in or about to overfly the WIANGs (240B290).  TMU told me to notify the North Area once I had an answer and that they would follow through with the coordination. When I asked all the controllers; they were fine with it and there was no traffic (at that time).I walked down to the North Area (which is the next aisle down) and told the FLM that we were good with it. This FLM was not a FLM from another area; had little to no familiarity with the North Area; and was placed in the North Area to have FLM coverageMinutes later I had the trainer from the Pullman sector (#25) walk up to me at the Northeast Area desk asking about what was going on with the WIANGs.  I asked him what he meant.  He told me that there was two Aircraft X types about to fly through at FL250.  I walked over to the Pullman (#25) and Fremont (#24) sectors and told them that the airspace was released FL180 through FL290.  The trainee at the Fremont sector told me that they were just told from the North Area controller that the planes could go through at FL250.  They said that a tanker only wanted FL270 through FL290 and that planes could go through at FL250 and FL260.However; we released 180B290 and that is what Minneapolis Center and the military coordinator believes was active.  I ran down to the North Area and barked at them that they needed to turn the aircraft out and re-explained the situation.  I then got into an argument with the controller (radar and radar associate position combined) and two other controllers.  He kept saying that it was okay that the tanker was 270B290 and the remainder of the WIANGs were 180B240.  I asked him how the fighters were going to get to the tanker (because VOLK Air Force Base and ZMP were the only ones controlling the airspace and talking to the fighters and tanker).The North Area FLM then re-instructed them to get those planes away from there and he said that he needed a D-side immediately.  The training team at the adjacent sector ceased training on their D-Side and the trainer slid over and jumped on the D-side to help.The Aircraft X aircraft flew into the WIANG A/B/C airspace at FL250 before being issued turns to exit the airspace.Additionally; the SAMS website was not updated and the ERAM/EDST only displayed 180B240 which added to the confusion. First; the controllers need to understand that they can't arbitrarily alter airspace once it has been given away without going through proper channels.  The North Area controllers by-passed management and the traffic management units of both ZMP and ZAU.  I think that the North Area needs to receive a briefing; eLMS course; and/or given a presentation explaining the proper procedure for coordinating airspace.  It should explain all of the parties involved and possibly a flow chart of how the request and activation process works.A mandate should be issued and followed that a FLM who has never certified on any positions in a specific area should not be put in charge of that area.  I believe that the FLM-IC was not familiar with the process for activating the military airspace; the airspace of the area (in general); and the people of that area.  The FLM had no respect and received much doubt and second guessing due to him not being from that area.  A FLM from that area would have known all of that and would know how to speak to certain people due to their familiarity.  The FLM staffing is way below guidelines and has been this way for over a year; which has led to many areas not having enough FLMs to cover their areas throughout the week(i.e. 3 FLMs in multiple areas can't cover all the shifts).  Many FLMs are being moved around the facility as 'mystery guests' to different areas and areas that they have no knowledge of. I believe that the entire facility should receive a briefing; an eLMS; and/or a briefing tracker (BT) presentation about ways to recover when an aircraft is about or has already entered military airspace. Methods such as using UHF guard to call in the blind to the military fighters and tanker to warn them about the traffic; using VHF guard to issue headings to the plane to keep them away; having the scheduling office give back airspace temporarily; etc.


Synopsis: A Chicago Center (ZAU) Front line Manager (FLM) reports of confusion concerning a reference to a Special Use Airspace (SUA) and whether it is hot or not and tries to figure it out. Aircraft are in the area and then they are notified that it is hot and has been for about 15 minutes.