elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PSP.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D PSP
ATC / advisory: Tower PSP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Found an error on the Jeppesen Chart for PSP [Tailored Company Page XX-0-2]. We were landing on RWY 31L as the sun was just slipping below the mountains to the west of the airport; it was VMC. With the shadows and the last bit of sunlight hitting us in the face; it was hard to see the edges for the runways. When landing RWY 31L at PSP; there is no ILS and no straight in approach because of the mountains to the east; so the RNAV Visual brings you in at an angle. The First Officer was flying and it was very easy to see the airport and the PAPIs to both runways. With the shadows from the setting sun; Taxiway C looked a lot like a runway; not a taxiway (in the past it was; in fact; used as a runway while work was being done to 31L). He started to line up on the taxiway; and [I] was easily able to direct him to the left to line up on 31L. He mentioned; however that he lined up on the taxiway because during the brief as he went through the Jeppesen chart; it said that there would be VASIs on the left; and he initially lined up to put the VASIs on his left; thus lining up on the taxiway. The PAPI's; actually; are on the right of 31L; not the left. It does say that correctly on page YY-21; page 10-9A; and page XX-04. The reason for the report is that we were easily able to correct at a safe altitude; but the First Officer did have a moment of confusion and the one page that he had up to help him; had the wrong information on it! Before someone actually does land on the taxiway; please have Jeppesen page XX-0-2 fixed to show that RWY 31L actually has a PAPI on the right; not a VASI on the left.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that one of the Company Tailored Jeppesen charts for Runway 31L at PSP erroneously indicates that there are VASI lights to the left of the runway which may lead to Taxiway C being mistaken as a runway.
Date: 201308
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: SA 365 Dauphin 2
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I vectored a PC12 for an ILS Approach to Runway 29R. I turned the aircraft on to final approximately 4 miles outside the final approach fix at 2;000 FT and cleared him for the approach. I gave him a frequency change to Tower; and immediately after; I noticed that the aircraft was making a left turn off the final approach into higher terrain and descending to 1;700 FT. I called Tower to find out if they were talking to the aircraft; they said he hadn't called. I alerted the Supervisor to the problem; and continued to try and contact the PC12; without any success. I called Tower again to see if he had called yet; he had not. I then made a broadcast in the blind 'PC12 is dangerously low; approaching higher terrain; and should climb immediately'. The PC12 came back on frequency advising that he was climbing. At the same time I had an AS65 at 3;000 FT in the same vicinity; and another aircraft behind the AS65 at 4;000 FT. The PC12 kept climbing through 3;000 FT; and soon as I was able I turned the aircraft away from the AS65. I was not able to maintain standard separation; due to the incident; and the pilot's actions. I had the pilot of the PC12 call us after he landed; he was very thankful for my actions; and said that he had a malfunction of the auto-pilot and was banking and descending without realizing it. Have the pilot not try to fix the auto pilot while on final approach.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when traffic on final for an ILS approach suddenly turned off the final in a descent and failed to respond to repeated radio calls.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NTD.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While flying with a student on an IFR flight plan; we departed Camarillo on an assigned heading of 270 and told to expect vectors to the VNY VOR.Whle climbing; Camarillo Tower handed us off to Mugu Approach. I looked and changed the frequency. Before being able to transmit; I saw a very close aircraft on the G-530 traffic awareness warning; which I announced and told my student to turn right. I could not see traffic and told the student to continue his turn.After nearly 180 degrees of turn; the traffic (a Bonanza) descended past us on the right. I instructed my student to maintain his heading and contacted Point Mugu. The controller asked us if we were on an IFR flight plan; which we confirmed. He told us to fly a (Heading) 070 vector for VNY without further discussion; and we completed our flight.




Synopsis: PA-28 instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the vicinity of CMA airport.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were extended upwind after a touch and go on Runway XX; we proceeded to turn crosswind at traffic pattern altitude then we made the turn to downwind. After making our turn on the downwind Aircraft Y was wings level in crosswind within 30 ft after being instructed to fly west bound after departing Runway XX behind us. I had to make an evasive correction and descended immediately to avoid the Cessna flying toward us at the same altitude. I believe that this occurred due to either a lack of understanding of the instruction given to the pilot of the Cessna or a failure to maintain situational awareness by ignoring radio calls from tower. The pilot of the Cessna responded to tower after about 3 or 4 calls.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported a near-mid-air-collision in the pattern when another pilot did not follow tower instructions.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: All seats on board were occupied; plus a jumpseater. After sending the weight and balance via ACARS; the numbers returned stating a need for 250 LBS of ballast due to being 2.1% out of forward CG limit. I pointed this out to the captain who said 'nah; we don't need ballast. Put the number in there and resend it'. I stated my concern for that practice then reiterated with 'are you sure you don't want ballast?' to which the captain responded 'I'm sure'. I pressed him again and he says 'I'm positive'. He entered the 250 into the ballast field and resent the Weight and Balance computation. The jumpseater; a captain for another airline on a different aircraft; did not voice any concern at all.  I regretfully went along with the captain's decision; despite my protest; and we continued to [destination] without incident. Had an incident or accident happened along the way; any investigation would have discovered no extra ballast on board the aircraft and while just about every captain at my airline would say 'it's not your certificate on the line; it's mine'; I know the next question an inspector would ask is 'where was the First Officer?' I should have spoken again with this concern and been more assertive about a bad practice. My reluctance to force the action by simply telling the ramp crew we needed it was likely amplified by the fact another captain was on board; my mental submission to an idea of 250 LBS in a 46;000 LB aircraft being a potential 'rounding error'; as well as the fear many FOs have in not wanting to upset the CA and being labeled as 'difficult' or 'that guy'. I had briefed 2 legs previous that I was there to help and 'keep us out of trouble'; but with my shortness of action; I could have done almost the opposite and contributed to said trouble.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported departing; at the direction of the Captain; without required ballast to correct a CG problem.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I take what happened seriously and will see that it does not occur ever again in the future; but please bear with me as I explain what led up to the event with a backstory. I have recently started letting my hair grow out and - up until recently - had not needed the use of hair spray. On the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 I stepped into the forward lavatory and saw that it needed grooming.  For the first time ever; after never having to use hairspray while on the airplane in my 32-plus years of flying; I retrieved my hairspray and returned to the lavatory. As I began grooming my hair with the hair spray I do not know if I had failed to recall or was simply unaware that there was the potential for that type of product to set off a lavatory smoke detector. Within a couple of seconds the alarm activated and it was then that I immediately recognized my mistake. I stepped out of the lavatory and quickly called the Captain who was also calling me. He told me the smoke alarm indicator lit up and I explained the situation to his satisfaction. I then pressed the reset button and the alarm ceased. Again; this was a first and one time incident and I will be more attentive and aware of my actions and conduct in the future so as to avoid repeating this mistake. I will review the section on hazardous materials in my Inflight Manual and; if necessary; add this event to my briefings to illustrate what can happen when one is not continuously vigilant of proper conduct on the aircraft.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported inadvertently activated lavatory smoke detector during flight by utilizing a non-approved [Hazmat] hair spray
Date: 201811
Location: BNA.Airport, TN
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BNA
ATC / advisory: TRACON BNA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were descending into BNA on the RYYMN 2 Arrival. ATIS said landing north. We had thoroughly briefed the arrival and approach to the northerly runways. We were given a late change to Runway 31 as we descended into moderate icing. We broke out at about 4000 feet as we intercepted the Localizer and were cleared for the approach to BNA Runway 31. We saw a very well-lit runway much closer than we expected which looked somewhat like BNA Rwy 31. We saw no other airports anywhere. I began to align the aircraft and descend for the runway we saw. All the while; the instruments were giving us doubts. After a few seconds; I decided to go around. As we were vectored around for another try; we realized what had happened; as have you; no doubt. We assumed the well-lit airport we saw was BNA; while it was actually Smyrna; MQY. We then executed an uneventful approach to and landing at BNA.The instruments seldom lie. Trust them. Additionally; I have read reports of other pilots doing exactly what we did. Maybe approach could mention the proximity of MQY as a caution.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported momentarily mistaking MQY Runway 31 for BNA Runway 31 on an instrument approach to BNA.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Champion Citabria 7ECA
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During landing on touch and go; aircraft veered right. Correction was made (tapping left brake) to bring back aircraft to centerline causing aircraft to start veering toward left side. When right brake was tapped to bring aircraft toward center; brake locked bringing aircraft onto nose.




Synopsis: Champion 7FC pilot reported directional control difficulties during landing roll led to a nose-over event.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Just leveled off at FL 390 and the aircraft had a yoke right trim to approximately 15 degrees to the right. I tried to trim the aircraft to the right with rudder trim and it did not trim. I tried momentary to the left and it did; tried back to the right no rudder trim to right. Control wheel had a right 15 degree right input. We looked in QRH; made sure all CBs were in and they were. Called Dispatch; told them the problem and asked if they could get Maintenance on also. They did. I ask if there was something simple we could check. They repeated the things we did already. Dispatch asked if we felt comfortable to continue to [our destination]; which is over water. No was the answer. Dispatch looked to find us a diversion. Contacted ATC and diverted. Taxied to gate.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported a problem with the rudder trim which eventually resulted in the flight diverting to an enroute field.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Latitude (C680A)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute at FL410; we lost pressurization and executed an emergency descent and diverted to ZZZ. The first CAS message we had was a Pressurization FAULT CAS message. Checklist calls for select Manual then Auto. If message remains select Manual. The light went out momentarily then came right back on; so we selected Manual. During this process the GEA FAIL 3 CASS message came on and the cabin started immediately dumping cabin pressure rapidly and we executed an emergency descent. During the descent the Engine Control FAULT R and CABIN ALT red CASS messages came on. We ran the GEA FAIL 3 checklist next which says select Manual Pressurization. However; the temporary revision checklist TC-R02-03 in step 2 states that cabin pressurization will dump when selected to Manual. I read the revision in the IPad after the event occurred. In Auto or Manual the cabin was losing pressurization. I believe at some point in the descent; I selected Auto to see if that would help because Manual wasn't helping. Auto also allowed for the cabin O2 mask to automatically deploy. Also with the GEA FAIL 3; we would not have indication of our right main landing gear down along with other failed indicators which led us to blow down the landing gear. On final going into ZZZ with strong headwinds the wind shear warning was sounding but the airplane and airspeed seemed stable; so I decided to land under the circumstances.I think the Pressurization FAULT Checklist needs to have a warning that if GEA FAIL 3 is displayed the cabin will dump in Manual. The cabin was losing Pressurization in Auto initially but really started dumping at a rapid rate in Manual with the GEA FAIL 3. If you have the Pressurization FAULT CASS message along with the GEA FAIL 3 and you're losing Pressurization; I believe there needs to be better checklist guidance. Pressurization FAULT leads you to Manual Pressurization. GEA FAIL 3 leads to cabin dumping in Manual Pressurization.




Synopsis: Citation flight crew encountered loss of pressurization inflight.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X has been flying around the system with a broken counter balance on the door. In the picture; you see a yellow strap attached holding the door in place. When speaking with a mechanic; he said that was not part of the MEL and that a ramp serviceman must have added it. The yellow strap was zip tied to a pole that was supporting the netting system. The yellow strap in the picture was not inserted by the ramp crew. The aircraft was here 4 days earlier with same issue and in the same picture you will see a red strap; the company mechanic took it and wrapped around the pole securing the net system; this was after the door fell on the mechanics legs. Maintenance was required to stay and close the door on that turn. Today; I asked the Captain and the company mechanic what was the safety system set up when the counter balance was broken and the reply was to have an agent hold it open. I told the mechanic that was an unacceptable resolution. The aircraft has been here twice and a different method of securing the door was utilized for each departure. When asking for Maintenance assistance today; Supervisor was advised the door had been deferred and Maintenance would not be assisting.




Synopsis: Ramp Agent reported that a CRJ-700 was in service with a cargo door counterbalance broken.