elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On departure from ZZZ RWY XX the initial plan was to fly to ZZZ1 for all three approaches. ZZZ1 winds favored RWY XZ which did not allow us to complete the LOC APP (Localizer Approach) due to other aircraft in the pattern. We completed four landings at ZZZ1 with no gear issues. During cruise enroute to ZZZ our plan was to conduct the LOC APP. However; the ATIS reported ZZZ switched to RWY XY and would prevent us from conducted the APP. We were ten miles north of ZZZ3 when IP (Instructor Pilot) determined ZZZ2 could accommodate a LOC XY APP. Ceiling was BKN 200 when IP requested IFR CLR (Clearance) to ZZZ via ZZZ2 for the APP. We were given the clearance from ATC and proceeded to ZZZ2. Half mile from the FAF as appropriate PUI (Pilot Under Instruction) conducted the gear down before landing checklist and placed the gear knob in the down positions. Gear functioned normally. We continued the approach; went missed and climbed out on RWY heading toward ZZZ for a full stop landing. On climb-out at an airspeed below 109 kts and a positive rate of climb the PUI retracted the flaps and moved the gear knob into the up position. The gear lights went to the hashed 'in transition' indications but shortly after the CAS (Crew Alerting System) alerted us of a 'HYDR (Hydraulic) PUMP ON' message; three red gear indicator lights and audible tones. IP instructed the PUI to confirm the condition of the landing gear via the gear mirror on the left engine and he confirmed the gear was still down. PUI was then instructed to move the gear knob to the down position and after doing so the alerts ceased and the gear indicators showed three green lights. IP instructed the PUI to leave the gear down and with ZZZ in sight we requested the visual for RWY XY full stop and proceeded to land with no further issues. After the flight the incident was immediately reported to maintenance. Perhaps placing an additional 'gear mirror' on the right engine would allow the IP to see and confirm the condition of the gear instead of relying on the PUI or having to look over the PUI in times such as this.




Synopsis: PA-44 flight crew reported landing gear anomaly.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft was at the gate and had been terminated by the departing crew. Flight attendants arrived. We (pilots taking the aircraft out) were late arriving and would block in at push time. Operations Agent boarded the aircraft without any pilots present in violation of current procedure. A commuting mechanic started the APU to provide electric to the jet. Unknown if ground power was connected to the aircraft or not. When we arrived at the aircraft the APU was providing air; no ground power connected; emergency exit lights were not armed. There is confusion amongst Ops Agents about what constitutes shutdown or terminated. Our entire operation has confusion over 'terminated' versus 'shutdown;' etc. In general folks believe 'terminate' only applies to the final flight of the day; rather than the reality of our operation which sees aircraft terminated numerous times a day. Perhaps a set of clear definitions and common terminology would help.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported that an Operations Agent boarded the aircraft and a commuting Mechanic started the APU without any pilots aboard.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: GEG.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON GEG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On descent into GEG; short vector to final Runway 21; received a 'caution terrain' advisory. Captain minimized descent rate; advisory went away; continued the approach; uneventful. We briefed the surrounding terrain and high descent might cause a GPWS. We briefed to minimize our descent; ATC short vectors; resulting in slightly high approach angle primary cause.




Synopsis: A300 First Officer reported receiving a 'caution terrain' EGPWS advisory on approach to GEG; high closure rate to terrain the likely cause.
Date: 201203
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When flaps were selected to 35 they extended to approximately 30 and stopped. The FLAP DRIVE caution light illuminated. We were in the critical phase of flight; moderate icing conditions on approach. I considered a missed approach but was unsure if the flaps would retract. I considered what the aircraft performance might be like with the flaps stuck at 30 degrees in icing conditions and elected to continue the approach to landing as the safer alternative. Since the final was quite long I asked for the First Officer to review the landing considerations in the handbook and applied them as appropriate. Landing; rollout and taxi-in were without incident. Exercised Captain emergency authority to continue approach and review handbook in critical phase of flight for landing considerations.




Synopsis: Q400 Captain experiences a flap drive failure during approach with the flaps stopping at 30 degrees in icing conditions. After considering a go around the approach is continued to an uneventful landing.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: [The flight] departed with a filed final altitude of 15;000 ft. I gave him his descend via clearance on the arrival. My MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) in that area is 14;000 ft.; and that route; at 15;000 ft.; has been safe for more than the 20 years that I have been a Controller in [this Area]. Upon investigation; the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) in Approach's airspace is 15;500 ft. on that arrival. This is not information that is posted or referenced anywhere in the area. We have not been briefed on Approach's MVA's and have no knowledge of them.The Approach Controller took the handoff and I shipped the aircraft. The aircraft was level at 15;000 ft. There was no phone call to alert me that aircraft was below Approach's MVA's in MY airspace. There was no phone call to request Control to try and fix the situation per the 7110.65. The aircraft was safe in my airspace. Although the aircraft was not at the altitude per the Letter of Agreement; it was a safe altitude. And it continued to be safe even into Approach's airspace.Additionally; the MVA for Approach should not be higher than the MIA at Center. All aircraft on the arrival should be at the lowest restriction for the fix. Significant changes such as the new LOA (Letter of Agreement); including METROPLEX; should be verbally briefed the week before it takes effect. There were shelves implemented; changes in MIA's and MVA's; configuration changes; significant phraseology changes; [and] names on the arrivals that were hard to decipher. I asked in the briefing [earlier this year] that a list of the fixes be clarified and distributed to the areas; [but] was told that wasn't necessary.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported descending an aircraft they handed off to Approach to an altitude contrary to the procedure in the Letter of Agreement and discovered that the Approach Control's altitude minimum is higher than the Center's minimum altitude in that airspace.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were [waiting to takeoff] Runway 28C at ORD. After being cleared to Line Up and Wait; Tower crossed a B-747 at either Tango or Foxtrot and cleared him to the Cargo Ramp. After the aircraft crossed the runway; he stopped and requested confirmation he was cleared into the ramp. Tower confirmed this for him and then cleared us for takeoff. As we rolled down the runway; the other aircraft must have just started to throttle up as he was still just across the hold short line and was emitting a lot of jet blast as we passed behind him at around 120 KIAS and got a yawing action off of it as it hit our tail and a slight; momentary; wing dip from it as well. I kept the aircraft under control and we were still stable for the takeoff so we continued the takeoff since we were over 80 KIAS. We rotated maybe 1;000 feet beyond the jet blast and had no further complications. We let Tower know that we got his jet blast and received only a roger in reply. This could have easily been prevented if ATC had waited a little longer to allow the heavy to adequately clear the runway before he gave us a takeoff clearance. There are wake turbulence time limits between takeoffs and landings; but the Controller didn't seem to allow the proper space for the 747 to clear the runway to insure we wouldn't hit his jet blast. After that aircraft stopped; it required extra power to start moving again and we were probably right behind him whenever he resumed his taxi. If we were a smaller aircraft or were in our rotation when we hit his jet blast; we probably would have had a much harder time keeping the aircraft under control. We could also have requested a little longer hold in position to allow the aircraft to start his movement again; but seeing as it was night; we thought he had cleared the runway a little further than he had.




Synopsis: During his takeoff roll an ERJ-175 First Officer had to cope with jet blast from a B747 which had crossed the runway and stopped prior to spooling up to continue taxi after clarifying their taxi clearance.
Date: 201510
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the ILS PRM to 10C in VMC conditions just inside final approach fix we were told to slow to approach speed as we were getting less than 2.5 miles on traffic in front. We were already at 167 knots with our REF. speed of 157 knots. Preceding traffic was told to plan on a short time on Runway traffic close behind. Preceding 737 traffic turned off at DD which is a 90 degree turn which is slower than the next high speed and surprisingly short touchdown and roll. We were anticipating a go around but at 100 feet we saw the preceding aircraft was well; clear of the runway. Tower then told us to go around at about 10 feet. I thought we were going to touch the Runway but did not. I also heard the voice in the back ground tell the controller to tell aircraft to go around so the warning was not completely done before the Tower controller already had us on the go. From my position there was no need for a go around in this situation at such a late/ near the runway time. If a go around was needed it the warning should have been much earlier. And secondly we were flaring in about the area the preceding aircraft cleared the runway.




Synopsis: Pilot reported of following traffic into an airport and slowing for spacing on short final. Pilot observed the preceding traffic exit the runway and at the same time ATC told the aircraft to go around. Pilot went around but felt it was not necessary.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During post flight and re-fueling at ZZZ crew noticed a gash in the aircraft skin just forward of the single point refueling door.  Gash was about 16 inches long and ½ inch wide and was symmetrical and squared at each end. The gash was directly in line and aft of the right nose gear.  It appears that FOD was flipped up by the nose wheel on takeoff or landing leading to damage.  However; no unusual noises or vibrations were noted by crew but takeoff and landings are noisy events.  Preflight inspection was performed by Pilot in Command (PIC) with no damage noted.  Both pilots performed pilot's walk around with no damage noted. Both pilots have a habit of either opening and inspecting fuel door or physically touching the door to ensure it is securely closed.  It would be virtually impossible to physically touch the refueling door and not notice the gash.


Second narrative: Upon post-flight inspection in ZZZ; an indentation/gash of approximately one inch wide and 16 inches long was discovered on the underside of the aircraft. The cut did not appear to puncture deep enough to impact the pressure vessel. The length of the cut was in-line with the aircraft and appears to be in a prime location for an object (FOD) to have been kicked up by the nose-wheel on takeoff or landing. An independent walk around was performed by each crew member on the ground prior to flight; per SOPs. Due to the location of the strike near the single point re-fuel point; we are both certain the damage was not there prior to taxi-out. Upon discovery; a sweep of the runway in ZZZ was requested and no obvious object for the damage was found.


Synopsis: Upon post flight inspection a gash was noticed on the underside of the aircraft near the single point refueling station. The reporter attributed the damage to FOD encountered during the takeoff or landing phase.
Date: 202012
Location: TUS.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C TUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON TUS
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While executing the published missed approach for the Practice VOR approach at TUS Runway 11 left; Aircraft Y departed on Runway 11 flew under the Aircraft X and continued a climb to their departure altitude. The Aircraft X encountered wake turbulence from the departing Aircraft Y at approximately the VOR location; recovered; and continued with the missed approach procedure.Extenuating circumstances were that the Tower at TUS was closed due to staffing issues; and the TRACON was handling IFR and VFR traffic into and departing from TUS. We had no direct radio contact with the departing air carrier before; or after their departure. If the Tower had been open instructions to us or to the air carrier would have prevented this close encounter.




Synopsis: Small aircraft flight Instructor reported encountering wake turbulence from a departing air carrier that passed below them as they were executing a practice missed approach.  Reporter stated Tower was closed at the time because of staffing issues.
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: As we now have many versions of A320 family aircraft; many are not equipped with ADF or a second weather radar system. I am finding that most but not all of these aircraft do not have deactivate / inop placards on the system 2 radar selector panel or EFIS control panel ADF selector switches. Some aircraft have them while many do not. Are they required? If so; is this an AML entry item or something that Maintenance is able to get to as the aircraft cycles through scheduled maintenance? Read file; OM guidance or release SEL [Selected Equipment List] information regarding not installed cockpit equipment/placarding requirements.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported missing aircraft placards on this family of aircraft.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout the Left Wheel Well Overheat light illuminated. We followed the Emergency Procedure; declared an emergency; and diverted to the nearest suitable airport. Landed normally.




Synopsis: A Falcon 2000 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby airport due to an illuminated wheel well overheat light.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At push there was confusion between the ramp agent and me. I released the parking brake before they were hooked up to the airplane. The airplane started rolling backwards and I applied the toe brakes. The system was not pressurized so the brakes did not work. I quickly applied the parking/emergency brake and the airplane stopped abruptly. The flight attendants stated the were thrown backward but did not fall down and were not injured.[This was caused by ] miscommunication between ramp and flight deck [I suggest verifying] communications with ramp




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported miscommunication with ground crew led to the aircraft rolling backwards before control was regained.