elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Thunderstorm; Rain; Windshear
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to 16L we had received numerous reports of strong gusting wind at SEA from ATC; ATIS; and dispatch. Approach also informed us of windshear advisories of gains and losses of 20 knots on final. This matched the gust factor of the reported wind. As we set up for the ILS approach we also reviewed the windshear escape procedure in the event it was needed.As we descended on the glideslope we experienced moderate turbulence. The First Officer was flying with the autopilot on; and his hands on the yoke and thrust levers to keep the speed as close to assigned and approach speeds as possible and prevent stall warning or flap overspeed. He was ready to disconnect the autopilot at any time if needed. While he guarded the controls I adjusted the altitude and speed bugs as instructed so he did not need to remove his hands from the controls.On short final we received a windshear warning message. I called out 'Windshear; max thrust.' The First Officer hesitated momentarily but started initiating the escape maneuver before I had finished calling out max thrust. We followed the escape maneuver and exited the windshear without further difficulty. No altitude was lost. I informed ATC of our go around and our windshear encounter. We were vectored around and were able to land successfully without any further windshear messages. In the post flight debrief the First Officer said that the windshear warning caught him by surprise.Ensure that when briefing escape maneuvers and flying into potential windshear or other abnormal conditions that you are mentally prepared to react; not just briefing the procedure to cover your bases; but to truly prepare for the condition if encountered.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported executing a missed approach after encountering windshear on short final at SEA.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TKI.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D10
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Event happened shortly after DFW Approach had issued instruction direct TKI from a position of approximately 5 miles NW of HQZ (visual); 20 miles S of TKI (GPS). At 3300 MSL; a red/silver drone was spotted just as it passed under right wing. Separation is estimated to have been 100 feet. We spotted it too late to take evasive action. Reported to ATC approximately 30 seconds after event when frequency congestion would allow.




Synopsis: PA-32 pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV at 3300 MSL 20 miles south of TKI.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Lubrication Oil
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise roughly 1 hour out; while doing a system check; noticed oil quantity low and decreasing. A message was sent to Maintenance (MX) describing the condition and the possibility of an erroneous reading. Oil continued to decrease and at zero; the oil pressure started falling. This verified our quantity issue. We reduced the #2 engine to idle and assessed our diversion options. Considerations included: mountainous terrain ahead; heavy weight landing; weather; and the upcoming single engine situation. We received clearance from Center for a pilot's discretion descent to FL240. Our best choice at the moment was to divert to ZZZ at our left 7:30 position and a distance of over 120 miles; with a nice [long] runway. We received this clearance and relayed our plan to dispatch via ACARS. At about the same time the Oil Pressure ECAM came on dictating the engine shutdown. Stable inbound to ZZZ we declared an emergency with ATC and followed it up with dispatch. During this entire process [the First Officer] flew the airplane and I handled the ECAM first and then the QRH engine shutdown checklist. By now we are level at FL240; unable to maintain any higher altitude comfortably. Dispatch forwarded the landing data for our heavy weight condition; weather was checked; and the visual backed up by the ILS 21 was input and briefed. Flight Attendants were notified of our situation and to clean up the cabin. A short time later the seat belt sign was turned on and an announcement made to the passengers. Heavy Weight landing checklist was the next one reviewed and with that and normal checklists done; we were ready for the landing. With favorable conditions; and his leg; [the First Officer] flew the excellent approach and landing. With our declared emergency. Taxiing in; hydraulics and steering remained normal and the fire crew followed us to the gate.


Second narrative: The autopilot was on and we set up for an overweight landing.


Synopsis: When the right engine oil quantity fell to zero and the oil pressure dropped as they approached a mountain range; the flight crew of an A320 shut down the engine; requested a lower altitude and diverted to an airport behind them.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were flying at 36;000 feet and we got a Cabin Altitude Warning horn and light.  We accomplished cabin altitude warning - abnormal pressurization memory items. I called Center and told them we had a pressurization problem and needed to start descending. We finished the Cabin Altitude Abnormal Pressurization Checklist and could not control the rising cabin pressure. We accomplished the Emergency Descent Checklist and descended to 10;000 feet. We had plenty of fuel and good weather. We contacted Dispatch and told them our situation.  They agreed continuing to [destination] was the best decision. We had normal indications on the air conditioning panel; both bleeds were on with normal press; both packs were operating normally; and the outflow valve was closed the whole time. We had cabin altitude rise up to almost 14;000 feet. The situation was made more challenging when the First Officer put on his oxygen mask and turned on his mask switch.  He could not communicate so we used hand signals and he yelled. We found that his Microphone wire had a short so he pushed it into a working position and could communicate.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: A B737 flight crew reported a pressurization problem that forced an early descent. The issue was complicated by the First Officer's Oxygen Mask Microphone exhibiting a shorting cable.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PVC.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: CTAF PVC
Second aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was doing touch and go landings on Runway 7 with a student. I was downwind making standard calls when Aircraft Y was reporting on the GPS approach to Runway 7. I reported my base turn when turning final when Aircraft Y said I cut him off. I told him I was in the traffic pattern and he replied that he was IFR. I told him that this was an uncontrolled airport under visual conditions and he was to merge with the local traffic. He said he was IFR so he didn't have to. I referred him to the AIM and part 91.Being IFR into an uncontrolled airport under visual conditions does not mean one can fly with impunity into a busy traffic pattern. I feel that Aircraft Y pilot felt that his IFR clearance gave him priority. That is a dangerous assumption. At [Company]; our rule was to fly the traffic pattern. We understand that we had to mix with local traffic.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor Pilot reported that another aircraft operating under IFR failed to look for traffic in the pattern; resulting in a NMAC.
Date: 201909
Location: HNL.Airport, HI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B HNL
ATC / advisory: Tower HNL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After completion of the Before Taxi Checklist; I called Ground for taxi clearance. We were cleared to 'Taxi to Runway 8R via Alpha.' Nearing the approach end of Runway 8L; and now monitoring Tower; I made a verbal comment to the Captain; such as 'we are going to hold short of Runway 8L; correct?' He responded with 'No; we are cleared to taxi to Runway 8R; so we can cross all runways along our path to the assigned Runway.' I responded by saying 'don't think that's correct; can we just hold short here (meaning Runway 8L)?' The CRM was good and the Captain was very willing to stop short of Runway 8L so we could query the Tower Controller on the somewhat congested Tower frequency. As I was about to query; Tower contacted us with a takeoff clearance for Runway 8L. After running the Departure Plan and Before Takeoff Checklists; we departed on Runway 8L uneventfully.I think; in hindsight; the Ground Controller meant to give us a taxi clearance to Runway 8L; not Runway 8R; like we copied and read back. We were late to notice that Alpha does continue across the south side of Runway 8L; but from there; continuing via Romeo-Bravo is the only option to continue taxiing to Runway 8R.More importantly; in the next few days of the pairing; the Captain and I both brought up the circumstances with other pilots; and there were mixed responses as to the legality of crossing other runways on a clearance to the assigned Departure Runway. My understanding is that this used to be valid; but the FAR changed several years ago; now requiring ATC to instruct you to either hold short of; or cross any and all runways along the assigned route to the Departure Runway. The reference I found is AIM 4-3-18. Since there was disagreement; not just between the Captain and I; but among other Company pilots with whom we spoke; perhaps this topic is worthy of review among the pilot group.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported taxi clearance confusion to a departure runway; allowing the crossing of runway along the taxi route.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SAV.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Orion (P3)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C SAV
ATC / advisory: Tower SAV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: While working the South RADAR sector; I was vectoring a P-3 on a downwind for the GPS/RNAV Runway 28 approach at SVN at 2;500 FT MSL. On this particular approach; a discreet code appeared in the flight path of my P-3; opposite direction at 2;200 FT MSL. My aircraft had to be vectored wide around the unknown and steadily tracking westbound aircraft on the discreet code. The SAV RADAR was questionable at the time; IBI Mode was in effect due to continued problems with the SAV Mode-S system. With no primary targets to verify the legitimacy of this target; evasive actions were required. Post event research reveals that the discreet code was in fact an aircraft that was 20 miles northeast of SAV; having just departed from Ridgeland; SC (3J1) and climbing westbound. It had in fact been another 'GHOST' target generated by the aged SAV ARTS system. These events where we have to react to ghost or 'duplicate' targets continue to increase and no longer visibly impact SAV management or Tech Ops; as the FLM watched this event occurred; yet no log entry was made; nor was any follow up with Tech Ops management; even though evasive vectors were required. This complacent culture is as dangerous as the false targets the SAV ARTS creates. Recommend the SAV ARTS system be replaced; recommend the SAV Mode-S system be stabilized until that replacement system is in place. Recommend that SAV AT and Tech Ops both AVOID using the IBI mode. Recommend that all Tech Ops Maintenance on the Mode-S or IBI (RADAR) and ARTS systems involve senior technicians. Recent 'events' and 'outages' have been on the rise when less experienced techs are doing 'routine' maintenance. Recommend the SAV ARTS system be replaced! The SAV ASR-8 is aged; but stable; it has a digitizer on both the primary and the secondary systems; additionally; two DOD facilities have ASR-11 Digital RADARs within 30 miles of SAV; all of which makes SAV perfect for a STARS like replacement as quickly as possible. SAV is in a modern base building and rack space is available to immediate installation.




Synopsis: SAV Controller voiced concern regarding a 'ghost' target that resulted in unnecessary vectors for an IFR aircraft. The reporter recommended RADAR system replacement.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was the Relief Pilot on Aircraft X and during the briefing; I requested that masks be worn while I was in the flight deck because my wife has a condition that will require surgery and I am trying to protect her and my family. I explained that I was okay with masks being off if we were eating and drinking. The Captain's response was that 'It is too long of a flight and that I should have not come to work.'  This set the tone. He then stated I should remove myself from the trip. I attempted to contact company but was unable to reach anyone. I then called the flight operations management and requested to be removed from the trip. I was removed from the trip with a significant reduction in pay. Safety was never mentioned as a concern just the inconvenience of wearing a mask for a long period of time.




Synopsis: Air carrier Relief Pilot reported removing himself from a flight due to a disagreement with the Captain about wearing masks in the flight deck.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MKE.Airport, WI
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MKE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Landed in foggy conditions that got worse as we rolled down Runway 1 left. Tower told us to exit on Runway 31. The runway lights were not on and rolled past it. Then told to exit at Taxiway V and then take G; cross 31/13 and Bravo to the gate. There were no taxiway signs for Taxiway Golf that could be seen. Continued on Taxiway Victor and crossed Runway 31/13 at Victor instead of Golf. Tower then said just to proceed down Victor to Bravo and to the gate. No further problems. The visibility on the last half of Runway 1 Left kept getting worse and was probably less than 500 feet at times. [Caused by] fog and inadequate signage and no lights on the runway we were told to taxi off onto (13/31). Should have just asked for progressive taxi due to the worsening visibility.


Second narrative: After landing from a CAT II approach; we taxied off the runway. We were cleared to cross Runway 31 on G and we accidentally crossed on victor. When told to cross another active runway without any ground navigation aids to confirm which taxiway we were on; we believed we crossed the runway at G. We actually crossed the runway at V. The controller informed us after the crossing that we crossed on the wrong taxiway. Preceded to the gate without any incident. Visibility conditions got worse the further down the runway we taxied. The cause of the event was due to low visibility after landing from a CAT II. There weren't any signs to indicate the taxiway to which we were crossing a runway. Lights for the runway we were assigned to cross weren't on. The taxiway for which we exited the active led to a three way intersection to cross the runway for which we crossed at the wrong intersection. Ask for a progressive taxi when visibility conditions are low. Better signage on the airport. Lead off lights from the active runway to a taxiway and a marking on the ground for which taxiway we were on. Ground navigation on the iPad to show which taxiway we are on to use during times of low visibility.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Flight Crew reported runway lights and taxiway signage inoperative.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During preflight I was handed a 'Notice to Captain' advising to 2.5 KGS of Lithium Ion Batteries had been loaded in the forward cargo compartment. Knowing the possibility of thermal runaway associated with these items; I immediately referenced the hazardous goods sections of the manual which advised: Only Lithium batteries which are installed in the devices for which they are intended and which do not exceed 8 grams can be placed in checked baggage.' 30 minutes prior to push I contacted Dispatch and asked him to investigate....he returned my call a few minutes later and said he was having problems getting an answer and would continue to investigate; 5 minutes before push I contacted Dispatch again; he said he was talking to Load Control but still did not have a definitive answer to the legality of said cargo. I asked him to get Operational Control involved and I would continue to push and get back to him.We received our load closeout and started to taxi; but I was not comfortable with the discrepancy and we asked Ground Control if we could pull into the Penalty Box while we continued to sort this out.  The Purser then contacted me and informed me that on his Cargo Manifest it listed that we were carrying 97 LBS of Lithium Ion Batteries in Cargo.With Operational Control's concurrence I decided to return to a gate and have the cargo unloaded. Operations provided us with a gate and a crew to unload the entire forward cargo compartment (because the items were buried at the bottom/back section of the cargo hold). The items in question turned out to be: four body sized bags labeled 160 LBS of Lithium Ion Batteries.We then continued our flight two hours behind schedule.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: An alert B757 Captain questioned the loading of excessive amounts of Lithium Ion batteries in the cargo hold. After investigation the aircraft returned to the gate and the offending load removed.