Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On right downwind for [Runway] XR in ZZZ; and after being cleared for the visual approach; we received a GEN 2 OFF Caution message. Once on base; the Tower Controller asked where we were parking. I told him; and he asked if we wanted [Runway] XL. The Captain and I both agreed we would stick with XR. After the Captain had the aircraft fully configured; he stated he was comfortable with the approach; and asked me to run the QRH checklist for GEN 2 OFF message. I opened the QRH and found the checklist for GEN 2 off message. The first item on the checklist says to move the GEN 2 switch to OFF/REST then AUTO. I looked up at Gen 2; looked back at the checklist; then accidentally moved the GEN 1 switch to the OFF/RESET position. This caused the ADG to automatically deploy. The Captain turned on the APU and continued the approach and landing normally. I advised the Tower Controller that we may lose radios for a few seconds once on the ground. On the rollout the Captain asked me to press the transfer override button to transfer power to the APU generator. We were already running behind and were scheduled to get in about 15 minutes later than scheduled. When we got the GEN 2 OFF message; my mind began to wander. I started thinking that the plane would be delayed severely or grounded. Then I thought about how the next crew was going to be delayed; and how it might affect their day. Once it came time to run the checklist my mind wasn't completely on the task at hand as it should have been. I will definitely confirm and re-confirm what I'm doing while running any checklist. This was a mistake that I made; and should have paid more attention to what I was doing.


Second narrative: As we approached ZZZ; it was morning and there seemed to be no other traffic in the vicinity of the airport. The First Officer inquired to the Final Controller if we were number one for the field and the Controller agreed that we were. At 6;000 FT; midfield downwind we called the visual and were cleared to land on [Runway] XR. I selected and confirmed with the First Officer a new altitude of 3;000 FT to continue the descent to land. I told the First Officer that I planned to turn base on about a 5 mile final. As we turned base; I announced and disconnected the autopilot then called for Flaps 30; Gear Down; Landing Check to the Line. The First Officer executed the checklist and we then received a GEN 2 OFF Caution Message. I called for the APU to be turned on and the First Officer did so. I then called for Flaps 45 Landing Checklist Below the Line. The First Officer had fully configured the airplane as I was turning final. We were around 1;500 FT when I told the First Officer; 'I'm comfortable with where things are at; how about taking a look at that QRH.' I felt that since I was stable; fully configured; and had the runway; he could look at the checklist. The First Officer reached up and selected GEN 1 to OFF/RESET. ED 1 & 2 and the First Officer's MFD and PFD flickered and we then heard the ADG deploy and spool up. The First Officer profusely apologized and was clearly upset. I told him not to worry and we would continue to land. At that point; he announced the 1;000 FT call 'No Flags; Gear Down; Clear to Land.' ATC offered [Runway] XL for a quicker taxi but I declined since we were configured and had other distractions. I asked the First Officer to inform the Tower that we might possibly lose our COMM's on landing as the ADG spooled down. I also asked the First Officer to select the ADG XFER OVRD switch once we land to ensure we had electrical power at all times. We landed on speed; in the touchdown zone; and taxied clear of [Runway] XR onto Foxtrot; then followed the Ground Controller's instructions into the gate. I called Maintenance Control and was informed that 'it was not a big deal at all to re-stow the ADG and Maintenance was on their way.' The next crew was at the jet bridge. We told them what had happened and that Maintenance was en-route.Upon arriving home; I had a voicemail from my Chief Pilot and returned his phone call. I gave him a quick description of what happened. He responded by saying; 'Well let me go ahead and give you the Monday morning quarterback on this...you should have broken off the approach; went and held and run the checklist.' He went on to tell me his big problem with this was that it was a CONFIRM and OFF checklist that we 'clearly didn't adhere to and questioned my Captain leadership.' [He said] it would be left up to the standards department as to what would happen and I could possibly be taken off line for re-training but not to worry - he could not see any reason for discipline. I believe my First Officer is a great pilot and made an honest mistake. He had the best intentions for a successful checklist procedure. This was my 4th trip as a new Captain. The First Officer and I got along fine and he seemed to 'go the extra mile' to ensure that everything was double checked being that I was still new to the seat. The flight departed late due to the Flight Attendant leaving her purse at the hotel and had to return to get it. We agreed that we needed to try to make up for some time. We asked for shortcuts in the routing but I never allowed the crew to get 'rushed.' The biggest threat I took away from this was that the QRH did not have a 'CONFIRM AND OFF' for this procedure. I hope this report can aid in revising this particular checklist. I firmly believe that if this was a CONFIRM and OFF item; this never would have happened and the ADG would not have deployed. One last threat was ATC offering a runway change on short final. I saw no benefit in the last minute change. I would like to see a revision to this checklist and all other checklist than involved taking a GEN offline to be a CONFIRM and OFF item. I do not feel that we did anything wrong as a crew other than the First Officer making an honest mistake. I feel that my training and systems knowledge led to a successful outcome even after a mistake was made. I am not impressed with my supervisor stating his 'Monday Morning Quarterback' (his own words) feedback based on little fact and his wrong assumption of the QRH procedure. My desire is that my supervisor be more supportive of this program and not give me immediate feedback based on little facts. I also believe the First Officer is a strong pilot and has learned a lot from this event. It reinforces the importance of taking your time when running a checklist.


Synopsis: CRJ700 flight crew experiences a number two generator off message during a visual approach and elects to continue. The First Officer is asked to review the QRH and inadvertently turns off the number one generator while attempting to comply with the reset procedure causing the ADG to deploy. The APU is started and the flight continues to a normal landing.