elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground JAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxi clearance was from Gate to Runway 26 via ramp; H; B and C. I taxied via the taxi lane behind Gate X (west of it) northbound. Looking at the Jeppesen airport chart 10-9; just south of the ARP (Airport Reference Point); between Papa and Juliet; the taxi line suddenly stopped. Looking ahead about 20 yards; I saw the continuation of the taxi line; so taxiing was no issue as it was clear and daylight. Where this might become as issue is when the visibility is restricted or at night. Please contact the JAX Airport and have someone paint a continuous taxi line on the ramp.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a confusing depiction on the JAX airport diagram. The west ramp taxi line ends at the normal left edge marking for Taxiway J.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Push-back
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Gate Pushback
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We pushed back 10 minutes prior to receiving the Final Dangerous Goods.  I saw the planned DG; but failed to note that we had not received our Final DG prior to pushback.  I was under the mistaken impression that we did not need the final DG prior to push when leaving the U.S. for a foreign destination.  I thought this was true only when returning to the U.S.  My sharp F/O's corrected me for my future reference.


Second narrative: IRO Notified both pilot that we had Dangerous Goods on board after tearing the message off printer. During final closing and securing aircraft to perform push back procedures. All three of us missed not receiving Final Dangerous Goods Summary; until taxi out to Runway XXL. We received message at XB:21 about 6 min after push back which was at XA:15.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported gate pushback without the required Final Dangerous Goods Summary. Final DG Summary was received  shortly thereafter.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Although no SOPs were violated; there appears to be a systematic threat for all pilots.During the preflight setup I gathered the plan data for a 1R departure in SFO. I circled the max thrust data and set the V2 speed. During the preflight briefing the Captain asked why I had chosen max thrust and told him it was to comply with the OPS Alert for 737s requiring max thrust takeoffs and flaps 5 or greater. He commented that he had just reviewed the Ops Alerts in the Mobile App for this leg and that Alert was not listed. I looked at my app and saw that the alert was not listed in mine either. I showed him the Ops Alert at which point we agreed to continue with the briefing and flight using max thrust. SOPs were followed. The threat to this flight was since the Captain had not flown much recently; he used the Mobile app to refresh his memory about current OPS Alerts but this one was missing and so he was not prepared to comply with it.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported his Captain was unaware of a special procedure that was not being displayed on their iPads.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When climbing out in thunderstorms and heavy rain I heard a noise hitting the fuselage on the Captain's side. Initially I thought it was the heavy rain. I asked the First Officer if he heard it or knew what it was. He then informed me it could be the standby pitot cover which he may have forgotten. We then check all the instruments normal; and determined the flight could safely continue. On landing the post flight revealed the standby pitot cover was still on. The other pitot tube covers where left at the gate. This incident could have been avoided with actual verification during the acceptance checklist instead of rote responses. With the weather closing in on the airport we were in a rush to get going.




Synopsis: CRJ flight crew reported they forgot to remove one of the pitot tube covers before takeoff but were able to continue to their destination.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CID.Airport, IA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C CID
ATC / advisory: Tower CID
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [I was flying a] Taylorcraft on seven mile final to runway 27; 1000 FT AGL.  Six miles behind an A319. No wind; clear evening. Severe wake turbulence. Taylorcraft pitched up then down. (Saw only sky; then only ground) Taylorcraft engine quit. The Taylorcraft has no electrical system. I was looking for a place to land as I pushed the throttle to full. The propeller flailed for a couple of seconds before it restarted. I landed safely a few minutes later at CID.  I will be more careful in the future when there is no wind or a direct headwind. I will also listen more closely for the aircraft type when following a big jet. In the past; five miles behind Regional Jets caused no concerns. Will request a 90 degree turn if following something that large in the future. Glad I had my seat belt on and landed safely. Might be more easily understood if the tower said very large jet or massive jet; I thought they said MD-20 (I know it doesn't sound like A320) which I didn't recognize. Very clear when they say RJ. I should have realized how big the plane was when I could see it that clearly at six miles. I found the flight information the next day through research.




Synopsis: Taylorcraft pilot reported severe wake turbulence and loss of aircraft control in 6-mile trail of an A319 at CID.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: TCAS Climb Alert complied with during approach to 16L at SEA. Conflict was VFR traffic at BFI. I called SEATAC tower after landing and he said this has happened several times in the past. He said there is a small area of overlap in the airspace used by SEA and BFI traffic.




Synopsis: An air carrier on approach to SEA had a near miss with an aircraft in the BFI pattern while both aircraft were transiting a small area of airport airspace overlap.
Date: 202102
Aircraft: Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked; Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Pusback from gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Not realizing we were planning dangerous goods I requested pushback and in fact began the pushback without the final manifest.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported gate departure without required Hazmat documents.
Date: 202111
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Towing aircraft into gate XX bus company cut me off 2-3 feet from hitting my partner and myself; possibly killing us alone with a lot of damage to the aircraft. At some point something needs to be done we have reported issues to the bus company time and time again; they continue not care about us moving planes they even cut off airplanes under its own power. So we could have been killed tonight but I guess nothing will get done with this company until they kill someone.




Synopsis: Air carrier tow crew reported a critical ground conflict while towing an aircraft when an employee bus cut off their tug.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Tower, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZBW
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Takeoff on Runway 33L in BOS. Winds were approximately 28 kts. gusting to 38 kts. Moderate turbulence during climb out. It was difficult during climbout trying to maintain pitch and following the flight director. I became disoriented following the flight director to where my pitch became 25 deg nose up. The First Officer quickly alerted me of my high pitch attitude where I was able to correct to a normal pitch attitude. Flight continued and landed without incident. High winds; mod turbulence during climbout. I am on reserve; not having flown consistently in 2 1/2 weeks.


Second narrative: During initial climb out in gusty weather conditions (winds were approximately 270 at 18 kts gusting to 29 kts) the climb attitude was slightly high (approximately 3 degrees above flight director command). As Pilot Monitoring; I stated 'check pitch'; and pitch attitude increased. 'Check pitch' was stated again; again met with an increase in climb angle. As I reached to push forward on control yoke; pitch began to decrease and normal climb angle achieved. Max climb angle was approximately 25 degrees. Captain stated he mistakenly swapped flight director guidance and actual pitch angle in PFD. Safety of flight was never compromised. Lack of flying proficiency from Captain on reserve.


Synopsis: ERJ-190 flight crew reported becoming disoriented following flight director resulting in over pitch attitude.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Event occurred while I (instructor) was conducting flight training at ZZZ; flying left closed traffic for Runway XX. My student was flying the aircraft and making position reports on the radio while I was monitoring performance and looking for traffic. We were established on the left downwind for Runway XX when I first saw the potential traffic conflict on ADS-B. My student made a second left downwind position report. The conflicting aircraft was Aircraft Y; who was apparently making a 45 degree entry to the left downwind; continued to directly converge with our aircraft; Aircraft X.  I attempted to make radio contact with the aircraft; who was now confirmed to not be communicating on the CTAF. At this point; I made visual contact with the other aircraft who was now on a direct collision course with our aircraft and I proceeded to take evasive action. My student and I departed the area and flew back to our home airport (ZZZ1). In the future if I spot any potential traffic conflict on ADS-B; and they are not communicating; I will maneuver for adequate spacing well before it becomes a potential conflict.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported an NMAC at a non-towered airport with an aircraft that was not on CTAF.
Date: 201701
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Before arriving in ZZZZ the captain informed me that we are going to have tail tip prevention upon arrival. I told the captain that what I read in [a company publication] that part of the procedure is that the jet bridge will not be positioned on the plane until we are ready to deplane. I told the captain that it is a bit confusing as to when I should disarmed door because normally I disarmed doors when the seat belt sign is off. And in all the tail tip procedures I have been involved the jet bridge have been positioned right away. I even told him that I have written several reports about this issue. He advised me to disarm as soon we stop at the gate. I did as I was told. As soon as we parked at the gate I went ahead and disarmed my door. The seat belt sign was on and announcement from the Captain to remain seated were made. The jet bridge came onto the plane right away. Agent knocked but I could not see because the window was fogged and the doors were opened right away even though the seat beat signed was still on. Passengers started to get up and some tried to deplane. I have to make more announcements to please remain seated. At this time I still haven't made the announcement to the rest of FAs to disarm doors and crosscheck and stand by for all call. I showed the agent the [company publication] that the jet bridge will not be positioned until we are ready to deplane.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reported confusion during tail tip procedures when passengers are not allowed to get up from their seats until the seat belt sign is turned off and the aircraft is stabilized.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: OGG.TRACON, HI
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C OGG
ATC / advisory: Tower OGG
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Local Control. Aircraft Y was on 5 mile final RWY 2 at 100kts. Aircraft X was on 10 mile final RWY 2 270kts. I assumed HCF would slow Aircraft X to follow Aircraft Y but Aircraft X kept coming at 270 knots. I reached out for Aircraft X when he was on 7 mile final and Aircraft Y was on 3 mile final but received no response from Aircraft X. [Tower Coordinator] reached out to HCF to ship Aircraft X.When Aircraft X was on frequency at 5 mile final I told him to continue traffic to follow [on a] 1 1/2 mile final. I cleared Aircraft X to land when he was on a 1 mile final and Aircraft Y was given taxi instructions to exit RWY 2. We barely achieved Runway separation. If Aircraft X kept going the speed he was going we may have had a NMAC. After talking to the pilot of Aircraft X; he said he was advised about the traffic but not slowed or given a speed restriction by HCF. This has been a recurring event where we have received inadequate spacing due to speed issues that should and could be resolved further out but are being handled at the last minute or left up to tower to resolve. I recommend HCF to use speed control when applicable and ensure that the aircraft are doing what they were told to ensure separation. Maybe I could have reached out to HCF sooner to ensure separation further out.




Synopsis: OGG Controller reports of an overtake on final that if not resolved may have resulted in a NMAC.  Controller described that this type of situation is a recurring event where HCF TRACON does not provide adequate spacing on final due to speed issues.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Descending on the ZZZZZ 3 Arrival; in FMC level automation both laterally and vertically; we received a clearance to descend and maintain 5;000 feet.  The PF set 5;000 feet in the altitude selector window; and the PM confirmed it.  However; the PF did not press Altitude Intervention; and the PM did not verify that it had been selected.  Therefore; the 9;000 feet crossing restriction at ZZZZZ1 remained in the FMC; and the aircraft leveled at 9;000 feet.  ATC trapped the error; and we continued our descent to 5;000 feet and landed at ZZZ uneventfully.The PM had not flown in almost three weeks and was admittedly a little 'rusty.'  Flying regularly maintains proficiency with skill sets.  This was the first leg of the trip and the PM and PF had never flown together before.  The PF displayed very good attention to detail which may have contributed to the PM's lack of alertness and not challenging the PF when Altitude Intervention was not utilized to erase the 9;000 feet crossing restriction at ZZZZZ1.  The PM must continually be asking his or herself 'What actions would I take to ensure the aircraft does what I want it to do?' even when the PF is demonstrating a high level of proficiency.  Another technique that would have ensured the aircraft's descent all the way to 5;000 feet would have been to utilize MCP level automation such as Level Change or Vertical Speed.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported not making the second crossing restriction on arrival.