elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The EMB190 was climbing out of BOS cleared via the SSOXS 3 departure. While on a land line doing a point out; I noticed the flight take a hard right turn into Sector 47. At the same time; Boston Approach called to inform me of the same thing. I immediately turned the pilot southeast on a 160 heading (which I noticed later he didn't even do). I queried the pilot as to their cleared route of flight and the fix to which they were navigating. They said they were cleared via the SSOXS 3 departure and were navigating to 'Weymouth' or 'Plymouth'. I honestly couldn't make it out. Weymouth doesn't make sense because that airport closed about a decade ago. But I can't imagine how any one of the Plymouth navaids (airport; NDB) could have possibly found their way into that departure.This is literally the third EMB190 SSOXS 3 departure issue I've had within less than two years; all from the same company. Each time; they take these crazy right-hand turns on about a 270 heading. Is there some systemic issue we're missing with regard to this particular airline; aircraft; or FMS system/software? It may be time to investigate.

Callback: The reporter states that the EMB190 was passed to him heading roughly south and proceeding direct to SSOXS when the sudden turn to the west occurred. When queried the pilot seemed to know that an error had been made and replied that he was turning back to SSOXS. This event occurred 6 to 8 NM north of SSOXS and their route of flight after SSOXS was over BUZRD and SEY. Unfortunately; no request for a phone call was made by the reporter and no clear explanation for the turn is available.



Synopsis: ZBW Controller reports an EMB190 making a sudden right turn at 14;000 FT on departure from BOS. The reporter has seen this turn happen twice before; each time by the same aircraft type and same company; and wonders if there is some FMS or software issue.
Date: 201604
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Air Starter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was approached by a Ramp Service Employee today who had a safety concern regarding air start procedures. The employee stated on a few occasions he and his crew had connected an air start to an E170 aircraft. They positioned the air start on the aircraft right (engine #2). The pilot then proceeded to start engine number 2. This scenario would cause the agent to walk very close to the running engine to disconnect the hose. They asked the captain to turn the engine off which he did.I looked through the Operations Manual and could not find anything indicating a specific side of the aircraft to position the Pneumatic air start. I also did not find which engine is recommended to be started first. The only thing I could find stated the Pneumatic air start should be positioned in a way that it is visible to the flight crew. If this is the case then it is possible the flight crew did not look to see where the pneumatic air start was poisoned or ramp crew failed to communicate with flight crew.




Synopsis: The procedure(s) as to where to position a ground air start unit on an Embraer 170 are not defined clearly. The procedures which engine to start first is also not defined.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: A11.TRACON, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E A11
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Handoff / Assist; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: It was a busy training session. I was training on south radar and south hand off combined. We had an unusual flight schedule due to fly-bys to Runway 7R. I was instructed to vector all of our traffic to Runway 7L; except for the Runway 7R aircraft. After the fly-by was completed; tower still didn't want any aircraft to go to Runway 7R. Aircraft X entered our airspace direct to ANC VOR at 050. I told Aircraft X to expect Runway 7L. When he reached an appropriate place to turn upwind; I gave Aircraft X a 070 heading to parallel Aircraft Y that was on downwind. I started getting busy; intending to turn Aircraft X to a 340 heading to the downwind about 5 miles in trail of Aircraft Y I had Aircraft Z that was on the NEELL5 arrival that was in conflict with Aircraft Y so I was watching that and listening to final radar to see if he had turned Aircraft Y to base. I then shipped Aircraft Z to final and continued my scan. I saw Aircraft X about 1 mile from the 6;000 feet MVA. I immediately turned Aircraft X left to a 350 heading and pulled up my EOVM [emergency obstruction video map]. Aircraft X was over the water and not near any terrain. I saw Aircraft X continue straight after acknowledging the heading so I verified that the aircraft had the terrain in sight. He answered affirmatively and was instructed to maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance. He was in the 6;000 feet MVA for a total of about 4 flying miles and remained over the water the entire time. During my debrief; my On the Job Training Instructor said that I had caught the aircraft in time and corrected it before it was a factor. I was notified by a supervisor; that the region was made aware of it and called the front office. The front office watched and listened to the entire thing and made a determination that separation from terrain was lost.I recommend that the MVA's change around the ANC area. There are MVA's over the water (sea level) that are 060-080 feet which is ridiculous. I know the terrain makes it difficult to establish consistent MVA's but our airspace is cramped and too small as it is; now we are not utilizing it in a way to help move airplanes.




Synopsis: A11 TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDPP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower MDPP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After operating into Puerto Plata; Dominican Republic for the first time; I am left wondering why this is not a Special Qualifications airport. Specifically; my major concern is not the large ridgeline southwest of the airport; but rather the small isolated mountain located to the immediate north side of the final approach into runway 08 (about 7 miles west of the field). This terrain rises approximately 700 feet above the aircraft altitude when passing abeam on the RNAV-08 approach. Page MDPP 12-1 has a black arrow pointing at a terrain symbol there; and the airport 10-7 page states only 'Terrain' under Special Comments. I feel this is wholly inadequate to describe the threat to a pilot unfamiliar with the airport. Should a late running flight ever arrive at MDPP after dark ever make the mistake of not flying the complete RNAV approach; this terrain lies almost exactly between the STAR terminating fix EMIVO and a normal five mile visual approach entry point. Additionally; very poor ATC services tend to increase the workload of a crew approaching MDPP. For example; the approach control radios are the worst I have ever heard in my career. They are not strong enough to break through the normal squelch settings at times; even when close to the airport. Also; tower apparently will not clear an aircraft to land until it reports a two mile final (or runway in sight); a practice which does not work well with a 710 ft DDA. We were also later cleared to back taxi on a runway with a 737 heading toward us on takeoff roll. Again; to be clear; my point here is that we need to provide more information regarding the terrain north of the runway 8 final approach course.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain unfamiliar with MDPP noted that because of high terrain west of the airport; a pilot could fly the Runway 8 RNAV/GPS Arrival then fly from EMIVO direct to Runway 8 and pass 0.72 miles from the highest point.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a fairly typical tight visual approach to ZZZ; we noticed that flaps were indicating 25 instead of the selected 40 during the landing checklist at about 1;300 feet AGL. We initiated a go-around; which was mostly normal other than flaps staying at 25 even when put to 15. We had an exceptional jump seater who was previously in the training department who was an invaluable member of the crew.As we handled the aviating and communicating; he handed me a QRH turned to the Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree checklist; which we confirmed and began; I handed aircraft control to my First Officer along with the radios. We had about 7.5 on the fuel; so we decided quickly that we were going to our alternate of ZZZ1. I ran the checklist and programmed up runway and communicated with dispatch through ACARS notifying them of our decision and need for landing data.We [identified as priority handling] out of an abundance of caution. The rest of the crew and finally the passengers were notified of our new destination; which we reached shortly thereafter. The first officer did an exceptional job of staying between flaps 25 over speed and the gear warning horn and also landed the plane. Maintenance worked on the plane for some time before hauling it away to a remote pad to continue troubleshooting the issue; which had happened previously.Always having an alternate is helpful as a baseline of required fuel is available when an issue like this arises. Our bingo fuel was for a clean configuration and we were flaps 25 but it was valuable information.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight crew and jump seating instructor reported a 'Trailing Edge Flap Disagree' on approach resulting in a go-around and diversion.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SGU.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G SGU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: SGU is notorious for near mid-air collisions and RA events.  I was monitoring the CTAF while we were between ETIYR and PIETZ prior to being cleared for the GPS (Runway) 19.  While monitoring I heard an aircraft state that they were having difficulty getting the runway lights to turn on via the CTAF.  I heard multiple series of clicks on the frequency.  After a minute the other plane said he saw the lights and all was normal.  That plane made position reports and was doing a circle to land to a MAP (Missed Approach) for the HIVKA SID.  Everything was uneventful until an aircraft at Mesquite Municipal began trying to cycle the lights at Mesquite.  Hey; what do you know SGU and Mesquite share the same frequency along with Kanab or maybe 2 more fields.  So; inside the FAF our Runway 19 lights cycle through all 3 settings of low; medium; high and turn off 3 times before we land.  We landed with the lights on low with no incident. Too many airports on the same CTAF.  Get a new CTAF for SGU that is it's own




Synopsis: Pilot reported issues with the CTAF pilot controlled runway lights at SGU.  Reporter stated the CTAF frequency is utilized by several airports nearby which allegedly is causing the runway light problems.
Date: 201411
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: This flight was planned on a polar route over the fix DEVID with a re-dispatch fix BADRO.  The aircraft was out of communication and flew passed the BADRO without a re-dispatch release. I attempted communication with all three satcom lines and also had SFO ARINC attempting to contact. Also the position reports for the fixes DEKMO; DEVID; and BADRO didn't enter the system until the aircraft was back in communication giving the appearance; after the fact that the aircraft was in communication throughout the flight. There was no space WX during the event.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher lost contact with a long range flight on a polar route; missing real time position reports at three fixes (later received) and was unable to communicate the re-dispatch message as required.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon second lap around the pattern on ZZZ; I heard Aircraft Y calling 5 miles away with intend to join pattern behind downwind traffic in sight. That radio call came right came in between my Student Pilot call from crosswind to downwind. And there was another aircraft that was just passing the numbers. I made a second left downwind RWY XX call in case my Student Pilot's position call wasn't heard.I was passing mid-runway point and couldn't see the airplane that was joining pattern. Aircraft Y reported 45 degree entry ; left downwind [Runway] XX behind downwind traffic. After I passed the abeam point; I instructed Student Pilot to not turn base nor descend until ahead traffic passed our wing; in which we had momentarily lost sight as they were doing a very wide pattern. At that moment; Aircraft Y and I were about to collide. Aircraft Y was positioned/ entering traffic on left base instead of downwind; behind us; as they called previously. I took controls from Student Pilot executing an evasive maneuver; steep left turn from base to final; while trying to not collide with aircraft on final that had just passed us. Aircraft Y made a turn to their right. No one was hurt nor lost aircraft control.




Synopsis: Flight Instructor reported an NMAC event during traffic pattern training due to inaccurate communication and pattern entry by the conflict aircraft.
Date: 201705
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Paper weight and balance forms too prone to error. Paper weight and balance forms are used during Charter Operations and as a backup to normal procedures. Especially during Charter Operations; the Crew can be subjected to distractions. Those distractions can contribute to Flight Crews not trapping errors made by the Agent on the paper forms. Such errors can become huge Safety of flight issues.A weight and balance app in the EFB would be far safer. Arithmetic errors would be eliminated. Now that the EFB has data connectivity; the app could be designed so that it emails Dispatch a copy; which would satisfy the requirement to leave a copy of the weight and balance behind when departing.Eliminate paper weight and balance forms.  Develop an iPad EFB app for weight and balance for charter operations and backup to normal online procedures. Have app email a copy to Dispatch to satisfy need to leave behind a copy of weight and balance info.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the paper weight and balance forms used on charter operations; believing that an iPad application would be much less error prone.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing out around FL210 we got an EICAS message Presn Auto Fail. We requested to stop the climb at FL220.  I ran the associated QRH Procedure and was unable to reset the Auto Function.  A few minutes later we received the Presn Man Fail message as well. I ran the associated QRH Procedure and requested 10;000 FT from ATC. We descended quickly to 10;000 and the cabin never climbed above 8000 ft. I was able to raise Dispatch and after talking to Dispatch and Maintenance Control I elected to continue to destination at 10;000 FT with Pack 2 on and Pack 1 off.  The Cabin was fairly stable at about 5000 FT for most of our time at 10;000 but we were unable to control it and had the ability to turn off the packs if it went crazy.As we approached our destination; ATC tried to vector us out several times and I repeatedly told them we were tight on fuel.  We did not declare minimum fuel because we were still showing landing over 3000 LBS; but we wanted to know what their plan with us was so that we could continue to monitor our fuel situation.  The Packs were turned off as we descended from 10;000 FT and the approach and landing were uneventful except for the Cabin Temperature Rising.  I believe our companies Maintenance procedures of simply powering down the aircraft powering it back up and ops checking items is unwise. And this may have contributed to this failure.




Synopsis: ERJ170 Captain experiences a pressurization anomaly passing FL210 and stops at FL220 to perform QRH procedures. With Presn Auto Fail; manual is selected but also fails. The flight descends to 10;000 feet for the remainder of the flight to destination airport.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Management is not enforcing the face mask policy. Agents continue to walk around public areas exposing themselves and others.




Synopsis: Customer Service Representative reported that management is not enforcing the COVID-19 mask policy.