Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I have flown this SID; in 8 different aircraft in the past year. This incident is the only time I have flown the SID in a Honeywell aircraft. We were cleared via the following string; YOKES4.DEHLI..ONL.J114.FSD.. Per Company Policy at a minimum; the departure runway and SID must be included in the pre-departure brief.  As practiced for my 10+ years as a captain; I have always briefed the entire route to include the anticipated landing runway at the destination. There is no doubt in my mind that the entire route was entered; verified and briefed correctly. I would even offer that the CVR be pulled to verify. Typically; where there is a runway change; the flight plan in the FMC may default to a discontinuity after the SID transition or even prior to if the transition is runway specific. As I stated above; I have flown this SID 8 times in the past year; 7 times in a Thales FMC; with no incident with and without a runway change. Whenever there is a runway change in the FMC; I would confidently state that most Airbus pilots would immediately look for; verify and clear a discontinuity. On this particular day; we planned for; briefed and took off from the same runway. There was no reason to suspect nor did we notice a discontinuity in the flight plan.During the climb; I noticed a discontinuity after DEHLI.  I recall stating DEHLI (the transition); verifying and clearing the discontinuity. This was prior to YOKES with the screen range set to either 40 or 80 nm. After passing YOKES; we received a call from ATC asking us to verify our clearance. We looked at and read back our PDC clearance. He stated there was a fix we were supposed to be going to; CHICI. We looked at the chart again and indeed verified that CHICI was no longer in the flight plan. The controller asked which model of FMC we had and we stated it was a Honeywell. He stated that ATC was aware of a continuing problem with Honeywell FMC's and this particular SID. We were cleared to a downstream fix.Based on ATC's comments; I am appalled that a crew was dispatched with a known problem that ATC and I am assuming; that company was aware of. The first officer (FO) and I were neither trained; briefed nor was there a memo issued about the deficiency. In today's day and age with reporting programs geared to PREVENTING safety concerns; punitive actions for known deficiencies by ATC; aircraft manufacturer; FMC manufacturer and company should not be born by the crew. I have over 10 years' experience as an Airbus captain; have written a guide for airbus FMC operation and am frequently asked for guidance from my peers. I have even identified and reported several deficiencies in the past and I am very aware of most of its nuances. This is the first time I was made aware of this particular deficiency and it was via a notice of deviation from the FAA. I don't know what either the FO or I could have done to prevent this incident without the proper support of before mentioned entities. Not only did we brief and operate per SOP but we went over and above. We have way too many versions of FMC's and software versions. Clearly; if one of the more prolific operators of the Airbus is given notice of a deviation then the problem has a far greater potential and maybe detrimental consequences. If problems are known and only communicated post incident; then the system itself has failed.

Callback: The reporter stated their flight departed from Runway 17R. Since this event he has heard from other pilots that other carriers aircraft with Honeywell FMS's have a similar problem on the YOKES FOUR RNAV. Based also on the Controller's comments the reporter would guess this has been an issue for long enough to have identified the system with the anomaly.

Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: An A319 equipped with a Honeywell FMS had a track deviation flying the DEN YOKES FOUR RNAV after the waypoint CHICI dropped from the flight plan. ATC indicated the missing CHICI waypoint was a common anomaly on Honeywell FMS aircraft.