elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [After takeoff; at] approximately 200 feet [AGL] we hit birds. We ingested them into the right engine.There was an immediate noise; slight yaw; erratic N1;N2 and associated engine instruments for a brief second (on the right engine) before they stabilized.The Pilot Monitoring and I (Flying Pilot) then noticed a burning smell. We agreed that returning to [departure airport] was the best course of action.The Captain notified the Flight Attendants; who heard the noise and also smelled the burnt feathers in the cabin; that we were returning. The engine was performing normally at this time; [I advised] that we would return to [departure airport]; stop on the runway while we were inspected by the local emergency ground personnel and then return to the gate. We notified Ramp/Operations to coordinate a new gate; finished the after take-off climb check; then started and completed the before landing checklist. We were below max landing weight. Actual weight was 141;300.Landing was uneventful; we coordinated with AARF to secure the right engine for inspection. They followed us to the gate where passengers deplaned and maintenance took the plane out of service.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after ingesting birds into the right engine.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C IND
ATC / advisory: TRACON IND
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were approaching Indianapolis airport from the southeast and being vectored in for a visual approach to 5R when asked if we had the field in site. We acknowledged and they cleared us for the visual while still on a vector taking us inside the final approach fix. We then turned to the west to enter a downwind because they left us high and so we could join outside the FAF for a stabilized approach. I notified ATC that we would be widening our base leg and they said no problem. We descended to the final approach altitude while in the turn from base to final approximately 2 NM outside the FAF. ATC notified us of a low altitude alert and asked if we still had the field in site. We responded that we did have a visual on the field and continued the approach as normal. There wasn't a need to take action. We were cleared for a visual and had the airport; approach environment; and runway in site.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB175 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during a day visual approach to Runway 5R at IND; could see no reason for the alert and took no action.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: TBM 700/TBM 850
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in transit to ZZZ [Airport]; with 2 passengers on board and just prior to entering ZZZ1 Center Control airspace; I started getting occasional low pressurization indications that eventually stopped. After and while in ZZZ Center airspace and talking to ZZZ Center Control I was directed to descend from flight level 310 to 270. After setting up my descent I received a low cabin pressure warning indication that prompted me to don my mask and drop the cabin masks as well. My TBM 850 aircraft is equipped with an emergency descent feature in the event of low pressure and that system went into effect turning me 90 degrees to the right and descending me. While descending I requested priority handling and was diverted to ZZZ1 [Airport] where I landed safely.




Synopsis: TBM 850 pilot reported a low cabin pressure warning indication issue during cruise resulting in a diversion.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: First Officer's leg. Push and start were normal. We taxied to [Runway] XXL; were cleared to lineup; takeoff. Just as takeoff thrust was achieved; a loud bang was heard and felt from the right engine. Aircraft veered to the right; EICAS (Engine Indication Crew Alerting System) messages were 'ENG FAIL R;' 'ENG CONTROL R;' etc. The Captain immediately took control of the aircraft; maintained centerline and slowed the aircraft. We advised Tower and cleared the runway; accomplished applicable checklists; [and] returned to the gate.


Second narrative: At takeoff thrust; there was a loud bang followed by EICAS (Engine Indication Crew Alerting System) messages relating to Engine Failure. Take off was aborted at 30 knots and returned to gate.


Synopsis: B777 flight crew reported an engine failure on takeoff roll resulted in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PSP.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class D PSP
ATC / advisory: Tower PSP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxi out to PSP Temp runway 31L; we were given the clearance to 'Taxi to 31L via B; W; A'.  As we approached the closed 31L we briefly discussed whether to hold short the closed 31L; but since they issued clearance to 31L with no modifiers such as 'hold short closed 31L'; or else 'cross closed 31L'; we agreed that closed 31L was not restrictive in any way and our clearance was to the active 31L (Temp).  There is no stop line depicted on either the 10-8 or the 10-9 and in fact the 10-9 shows the closed 31L is being gone; removed from the chart and unlabeled; with 31LTemp clearly labeled as the only active runway.  After crossing the closed 31L; we were informed by Tower that we should have stopped prior to the closed 31L stop bar.  We asked where that instruction came from as a reference and were told that they had just changed the ATIS after our event to reflect that requirement.  It was not on the ATIS we recorded; nor was it in the PSP 10-7 Temp notes.The runway stop bar procedure at PSP conflicts with ATC instructions and [chart publication] depictions of airfield diagrams.  Due to the large change in procedures caused by this runway closure; this should be addressed clearly on ATC instructions and temporary airfield diagrams.


Second narrative: While taxiing for departure; Aircraft X crossed the hold short line for temporary runway 31L.  The temporary runway replaces runway 31L; and none of the hold short markings have been modified.  This causes pilot confusion; due to the runway designator; and the hold short lines are in an unexpected place.The temporary runway should not have the same designator as the closed runway.  Hold short markings should be adjusted for runway position.


Synopsis: Pilots and a Controller report of confusing hold short lines near no longer active closed runway. The pilots were advised by ATC that they crossed the hold short lines and should have held short of the no longer active closed runway. The pilots were told by ATC that they put this on the ATIS right after they had crossed the hold short line. Pilots stated it is not stated or shown anywhere that this would have been the correct procedure.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During pre-flight programming of the MCDU; Takeoff Performance page; I noticed the loaded EOAA (Engine out Acceleration Altitude) was too low by 520 feet. The EOAA that was downloaded vis ACARS was 3;180; but the EOAA for Runway XXR was 3;700 feet for Flaps 1; which we were using. Most of the time the ACARS-loaded EOAA value is normally within 30 feet; but this one was 520 feet too low! I have also noticed in a past flight from ZZZ1 Runway XY; that the EOAA was over 700 feet too low with reference to company data.In accordance with the Ops Manual; crews are to verify the accuracy of the EOAA when programming the MCDU for flight. However; if this is missed; the potential for a near mishap is significant.  I lack the technical knowledge in this matter to make a specific recommendation.  The requirement here is to ensure the EOAA value found in performance data is the same as the EOAA value that gets downloaded via ACARS in the MCDU.




Synopsis: A321 pilot reported the ACARS generated Eng Out Acceleration Altitude (EOAA) was not the same as the pilot company data recommended EOAA for this aircraft configuration and runway in use.
Date: 201603
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: For at least the past year and maybe longer SFO has occasionally conducted 'parallel dependent ILS approaches to 28L and 28R' in certain weather conditions. During this same time they have not used the ILS/PRM 28L and LDA/PRM 28R approaches at all.According to the AIM; in order to conduct parallel dependent ILS approaches the runways have to be separated by at least 2;500 feet; unless the airport has obtained specific approval. The runways in SFO are separated by only 750 feet. It seems improbable that SFO got an FAA waiver to reduce the standard 2;500 feet all the way down to 750 feet. After all; the whole genesis of the PRM approaches in SFO (that they are apparently no longer using) came about because the close proximity of the runways prevented parallel instrument approaches of any kind; hence the offset LDA/PRM for 28R and the straight-in ILS/PRM for 28L.So did SFO get a waiver to do these parallel dependent ILS approaches to 28L and 28R? And if so; perhaps there should be something on the 10-7 page telling us about it. Furthermore; since this was about the only airport where we actually conducted PRM approaches (that they are apparently no longer using); maybe we can stop wasting training time and money doing the PRM thing every year in the simulator.If they didn't get a waiver; then what exactly is going on here?




Synopsis: A pilot reported questioning if SFO has a waiver (due to displaced landing threshold) to conduct parallel dependent ILS approaches.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff and during initial climb; flight crew noticed an oily and musty fume/odor in the flight deck. The odor dissipated momentarily; but returned and flight crew was concerned since it was from an unknown source. Pilots contacted [the] Flight Attendant to see if fumes were noticeable in [the] cabin. Flight Attendant described a plastic-like odor behind [the] cockpit door and up until row 3 in the cabin. Concerned for the safety of the passengers and crew; pilots decided to make a precautionary landing and return to ZZZ.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a precautionary air return after noticing an oily and musty odor in the flight deck during initial climb.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Other Reposition
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After holding short at [runway]; Control Tower told us that we were cleared to cross [runway] and expedite as there was another aircraft about to land. I started to advance engine throttles to expedite runway and saw aircraft getting closer to landing and I heard my taxi partner saying 'go ahead; expedite'. I thought we were in danger zone (middle of runway crossing it) and aircraft was ready for landing. There seemed to be a delay in the response of the aircraft to accelerate. We wanted to cross the runway and clear the path for the aircraft to land (and avoid a collision). I lost control of the aircraft trying to clear the runway. Aircraft did not respond to the right turn; ending on the grassed area. It all happened very quickly and I found myself in the middle of an expedite situation that required immediate action. In an aircraft landing situation like this; it would have been different if the control tower instructed us to wait for the other aircraft to land instead of clearing us to cross runway and expedite. Another suggestion is to improve taxi/engine run-up training to include practice for expedite situation.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician lost control of an aircraft following an expedited taxi across a runway with approaching landing traffic.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GRK.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D GRK
ATC / advisory: TRACON GRK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: The flight operated from ZZZ to GRK following the the ZZZZZ departure to ZZZZZ1 Intersection and then direct to the airport. This route brings flights from the east to the airport just south of multiple restricted areas. At approximately 12-15 miles east of the GRK at 4;000 feet; We accepted a visual approach clearance for Runway 15. We noted the restricted areas to the north of the field and made a 'dogleg' downwind to base for the runway with a course correction to avoid restricted areas to the northeast; followed by a turn just inside the published ILS Runway 15 FAF for a normal landing. Upon touching down Supervisor wished to speak to our crew and or management to inquire about procedures into the airport.Based on my discussion with the ATC manager on duty at Gray Approach; there have been multiple occasions where other aircraft have penetrated restricted airspace and have had near miss collisions with military UAV's that took evasive action. In some cases the the restricted airspace is within 3 miles of the 15 runway east downwind. Per the traffic manager; controllers EXPECT crews to fly a traditional box pattern while executing visual approaches on left downwind legs to 15 at a rather close distance; or enter a midfield crosswind entry to a right downwind. There are no specific instructions from ATC at the time of a visual clearance to fly a specific pattern. I recommend additional coordination between company management; union; and Gray ATC to develop set of procedures and or additional guidance/recommendations for our flights that can incorporated into 10-7 station pages.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an restricted airspace violation near GRK and was told this is a common occurrence; which sometimes results in conflicts with military drones.
Date: 201408
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Passenger
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was deadheading on this flight. A passenger of size came to sit in 12B and informed me he would be sitting in 12C. I complied. This passenger proceeded to take up his seat as well as half of mine. I could not sit back in my seat. This is a safety concern. In the event of an emergency situation I would not have been able to take the brace position. For take off and landing 12A had their armrest up and my back was jammed up against that. During flight; I stood in the galley. The working crew called the agent to review situation. Agent told passenger that if seat rest would not go down he would have to purchase a second seat. Passenger started to show that the armrest would go down and agent walked away. In fact the armrest only went 1/4 of the way but the agent left before seeing that. I had no alternative but to sit there; if I had walked off flight I would have been charged with job abandonment. Even though I didn't feel safe.




Synopsis: A passenger reported the passenger seated in the aisle seat next to him/her was of such size as to make it impossible to remain in the center seat unless the arm rest between seats A and B was up in which case the reporter intruded on the space of the window seat passenger. In addition; it would have been impossible to take a brace position should it have become necessary.