elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff and during normal cleanup procedures; the caution light came on with an associated ECAM.  The Captain pulled speed to ensure we did not over speed; a quick glance at ECAM said max speed 230; I believe.  As PM; I confirmed it was not a Quick Action or ECAM exception.  I assumed control of aircraft and radios; and stated ECAM Action.  The Captain reviewed the ECAM and began to troubleshoot [the] problem.  The ECAM had very little information; and then he referenced the QRH.  I was coordinating with ATC to stop climb at 10;000 feet (safe alt in sector) and advised them of our speed and desire to hold. Captain confirmed max speed of 230 knots from QRH; so we slowed to 220 to provide a margin.  The slat/flap indicator showed slats were almost up; significantly less than 1.  We lowered gear to burn down gas to below max landing weight.  While still in holding; we selected flaps 1 and obtained normal indications on the slats.   Once all briefings; checklists and QRH procedures were complete; the Captain resumed flying duties and I requested to exit holding and obtain vectors for approach to Runway XX.  Flaps and slats moved normally and the landing was uneventful and normal. Captain taxied to gate and passengers deplaned. Flaps and slats retracted normal on the ground.  We discussed the need to declare an emergency; but did not initially since we were not sure of the actual problem; once flaps/slats moved normally; it seems all systems were normal.Aircraft may have sat on the ground during the COVID flying reduction; and therefore it seemed; to me; there might have been an indication problem or squat switch problem.  We did not declare an emergency because the aircraft seems to have a computer or indication problem and slats lowered normally once we started to configure.  In retrospect; any flight control problem is reason to declare emergency; but not sure if we then should undeclared once all was normal.  I have not flown much in the past 7 months; so I may have reverted to previously learned procedures.Any flight control issue is an emergency; even when corrected.  Better maintenance on aircraft.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a slat/flap indication problem on departure resulting in a return to departure airport.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During training the class of 5 new hire pilots and 5 [current company] pilots being trained on the 737 were told that the MEL was in the iPad and that they should look at it. I pointed out that [my air carrier] had not used a paper log book for nearly 20 years and that [my air carrier] had never carried the MEL. I asked when MEL training would be given. The answers was that it was not in the syllabus and that if I wanted it I should ask the fleet to provide it.The idea that pilots; who are completely unfamiliar with the logbook and MEL procedures; should teach themselves how to make the log book entries and then to defer MEL items using a procedure which was never actually explained to them falls far short of the level of proper training which is required to safely operate a 737. A failure to provide this training is a prescription for either 1) improper entries to be made in the log book; 2) the illegal dispatch of an aircraft because the MEL was not properly recorded or applied; and 3) the potentially operation of an non-airworthy aircraft.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported concern with the lack of training in MEL procedures during transition classes in a new aircraft fleet.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon landing and durning roll out aircraft veered left off the runway. I was able to regain control and returned to the runway. I damaged a runway light. No damage to prop. Small crease on lower cowling passenger side. No damage to engine. Returned to home airport.




Synopsis: C-150 Private Pilot reported runway excursion on landing resulted in runway light and aircraft damage.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Normal approach; on speed; stable. On touchdown we had a slight float; power off by 10 feet. Slight left-right roll prior to touchdown. Possible wake turbulence induced at touchdown nose pitched up and was rapidly corrected. Received high pitch report. Informed Maintenance about the possibility of a tail strike; and wrote up in logbook. Post flight inspection of the skid plate appeared to have been scraped. The skid actuator was still in the green band.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a tail strike resulted from a pitch up at touchdown. Wake turbulence may have been a factor.
Date: 202012
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger in seat XX1 would not comply with the Company Face Mask Policy; pre-departure and in cruise.  PAs were made from the flight deck addressing the face mask policy. Flight attendants requested numerous times for the passenger to comply. The passenger was verbally abusive during one of the requests. Personnel met the flight in ZZZ. The passenger might have been under the influence per conversations with the lead Flight Attendant.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a passenger became verbally abusive and would not comply with face mask policy.
Date: 201507
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electronic Library (other than Nav database)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The new manual contained in EFB publications has what appears to be guidance for replacing Jeppesen 10-7 pages with 'information pages'. This information and the 'information pages' manual is not supported with core guidance in other documentation; or even the EFB manual. All those documents still regard the 10-7 as the base document. An additional problem with the 'information pages' is their excessively distracting steps required to bring the 'information pages' data into use by the Pilot. Currently; you just open the JeppFD -Pro and select the Station button for the airfield you are viewing. Then; one finger swipe between pages. With the new 'information pages' procedure; which will use two different programs; you must back out of JeppFD -Pro; open another program; open the documents library; scroll up or down to locate the airfield you are needing to view the Station information for; select that page; and then either back out of the program or four-finger swipe over to JeppFD -Pro. Every time you four-finger swipe into this program; the 'information pages' page reverts to the default size; which is usually too small. Every time you four-finger swipe into JeppFD -Pro; it slowly reopens and opens to the default size; not the size you scrolled to. So unlike the 10-7 page in JeppFD -Pro; you need to resize the 'information pages' and Jeppesen page every time; four-finger swipe; and utilize a six-step process to open a new Station's 'information pages'.There needs to be a bulletin detailing how the 'information pages' will be used and then a bulletin changing the company and aircraft documents as required to support the use of the 'information pages'. The 'information pages' information must be reincorporated into the Jeppesen program JeppFD-Pro. That was the way it was tested and approved by the FAA not by using multiple programs requiring double-digit gyrations to switch between views; which is both distracting and additive in making the environment unsafe.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that the new 'information pages' procedure in the EFB for airport/company station information is not tied into other company documentation and is clumsy to use.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Door
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Apprentice; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This event occurred on the right hand wing dock; as I was moving sliders out to begin maintenance; with [a spotter]. As the lighting was poor; the controls very far away; and high noise. I was unable to hear or see very well what [the spotter] was trying to tell me. I stopped the slider short of making contact with the trunion door; when [the spotter] told me to go back. I thought he told me to go forward. At that time; I heard the door give way and stopped. [We] needed to move sliders out to open aircraft for inspection. More lighting is required under both wings and Mechanical stops on sliders; to prevent contact.


Second narrative: I notified the operator to stop. The dock was against the truion door so I motioned and hollered for the operator to retract it but the operator pushed the extend button damaging the aircraft.


Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician inadvertently damaged a landing gear door panel while positioning docking equipment as a result of a breakdown in communication with his co-worker.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Operations wanted to reduce to minimum fuel load to accommodate extra bags. I told them the minimum fuel load based on a revised alternate. They wanted less so they called Dispatch. A Trainee with a Dispatch Supervisor tried to convince me to take less. I explained why not and refused to go lower. After some back and forth I reiterated 'NO.' The multiple Agents kept intervening. I stood my ground. The Dispatch Supervisor sent down Revision #3 with a lower fuel load than I told him was my final load. I told the Agent I wasn't going to depart with less than I had originally stated. The FO was in agreement with me. The Chief Pilot got involved and I got very little support. I held my ground. As it turns out my fuel calculations were spot on and if the fog bank that was about 1/2 to 1 mile from the approach end of the runway had indeed rolled over the field; or we had to fly a missed for ANY other reason; I would have had to declare minimum fuel; or if the return trip involved any MINOR delays if I had acquiesced to Flight Plan #3; we most likely would have been very close to Emergency fuel. As the Chief Pilot stated; by the book and the Dispatch computer we were legal; barely. But by my knowledge of this route; the weather and the ACTUAL landing flows on the morning of the beginning of a very busy holiday season; those numbers would have been insufficient and may have caused an unfortunate sequence of events.The Pilot in Command is the FINAL AUTHORITY on the fuel load; unless Dispatch wants to err MORE on the side of caution; NOT LESS. Ground Ops has taken control over the decision making process and is interfering on every level of the Captain's duties. I am afraid a younger or new Captain would have wanted to avoid looking like the 'Bad Guy' and be a 'Team Player' as one of the interfering Agents referred to me NOT being; and just went along to make everyone happy. This is a very; very dangerous game.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported being pressured by company personnel to lower minimum dispatch fuel request.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Narrative: I was loading the FMS for our flight from ATL when the Captain entered the flight deck. I had entered the computer flight plan route of SUMMT ZELLE. The Captain and I completed the normal greets and I finished loading the FMS. I then had to get the clearance from ATL clearance because the aircraft was ACARS deferred. The clearance we received was SUMMT6 SUMMT as filed. The Captain and I reviewed the routing; but when we looked at it we saw the SUMMT was in the takeoff line; but did not verify the departure. The rest of the pre-flight and taxi out went as normal. Upon taking the runway ATL Tower said Air Carrier X RNAV RONII cleared for takeoff 8R. The Captain then noticed we did not have RONII as the first waypoint. On the takeoff roll the Captain asked me to ask for vectors once we lifted off. ATC provided vectors until we could get the departure loaded and then gave us direct ZELLE and the flight continued as normal.The threats on this flight were many. I was on day 5 after picking up this flight from another First Officer. The Captain was on day 3 with a short overnight the night before. Both of us were a little tired; but not fatigued. The ACARS being deferred changed my normal flow of loading the ACARS. Complacency caused us to do a check quickly when we checked the flight plan route. This event showed me a couple of things. I need to be more vigilant when loading the FMS. Also we should have aborted the takeoff; cleared the runway; and sorted out the problem instead of continuing the departure.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 First Officer; distracted by an inoperative ACARS unit; loaded an incorrect flight plan in the FMS that went undetected during the pre-taxi review. During takeoff the Captain realized the first fix was missing from the route and had the First Officer request an initial vector from ATC.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I noticed the new JeppFD-Pro depiction of the 162 nm line off shore is different than the paper chart version. Specifically; the OHLAA intersection on AR24. The paper chart has OHLAA depicted inside the 162nm mile; the electronic one does not. The first version of the electronic data was even worse; depicting portions of AR23 outside the 162nm line. The paper chart depicts the line as a curve; which to me makes more sense; since the coast is not a series of straight lines. The JeppFD depiction is a straight line. It seems that the dispatch tools today show OHLAA as being outside of the 162 nm line. We should remove the paper charts; or fix the line on whichever source is wrong.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the electronic JeppFD-Pro depiction of the 162 nm line offshore is different than the paper chart version.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 350
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were departing for a ferry flight on [this CL-350] that just came out of maintenance. All indications were normal. We were given a takeoff clearance. We commenced our takeoff roll with a right approximate 10 kts crosswind; full aileron deflection into the wind; all indications normal. At approximately V1 it felt like the left wing dropped and aircraft yawed to the right then to the left as FO was making corrections. It was a substantial controllability change that occurred in a brief moment. FO indicated verbally and through his actions he was concerned. I immediately retarded the throttles; and aborted the takeoff; and exited the runway. Upon shut down and subsequent post flight; the left gear assembly was excessively hot; had a strong burning smell; and the #2 tire was deflated and unattached from the bead. It would appear although unknown that we had a brake or wheel/tire malfunction. We attempted to troubleshoot the unfamiliar condition; declined to depart; and returned to the ramp which other than shutting down on the taxiway and inspecting seems like was our only option.




Synopsis: CL350 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff after experiencing directional control issues following a main gear tire failure.