elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201905
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: At rotation the flight deck door fully opened. The door was immediately shut by one of the forward flight attendants. Upon inspection; the Boeing door flight deck access switch was found disarmed and the switch in the off position. We immediately repositioned and rearmed the switch. The flight continued without incident. Several errors where made that led to this situation. The initial preflight procedure was either not done properly or the switch was disarmed afterwards. And; the before push check of the flight deck door was not done properly.I cannot say that there was anything specific that led to these errors. The flight was late; a maintenance swap; and a last minute crew change. We were hurrying but I did not feel rushed. We were dealing with iPad and flight planning difficulties related to the changes that kept us more occupied than normal.Two company norms did not help our situation: First; I have found that several flight attendants on the Boeing door; disarmed the flight deck access switch and put it in the off position. This is done to keep the door from closing and locking while at the gate. I assume this is common practice on another equipment because it is so widespread. I have never liked the practice disabling safety equipment! If a lock prevention method is to be used; I prefer to use the galley curtain folded into the jumpseat gap. This is just as effective at keeping the door from locking and it is blatantly obvious when it is used. On a side note; care should be used with the curtain also. I have found instances where the curtain was folded into the space above the gap and dislodges the jumpseat oxygen mask. Second; many pilots (including myself) use the flight deck door lock panel area on the pedestal to store all of the printed materials. I will use more care to ensure this material is folded to fit into the blank space only.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported the flight deck door came open upon rotation due to a switch being in the wrong position.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DCA.Airport, US
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was assigned and flew the FRDMM arrival into DCA for the first time. The weather was nice and there was no severe tailwind. We completed the arrival without any deviation but felt the need to submit a report about the arrival itself. This arrival is not realistic for aircraft not equipped with and approved for VNAV operations for a number of reasons. Due to the close proximity of [many of the] fix[es]; the variations in crossing restrictions (above; between; below); combined with multiple speed restrictions both of us were frantically going back and forth trying to process the information; set the parameters; and fly the aircraft. Also; the arrival 'dumped us out' just as we had to find the river and fly the non standard river visual approach. I think this is unsafe since both of us were completely out of the loop for anything else that was occurring--checklists included. We had no time to monitor the aircraft. Combine this with flight attendant calls; weather/ATIS gathering; radio communications; etc. and this gets out of control rapidly. I understand this arrival was designed to lower controller workload but the revised procedure just transferred that workload to the flight crews. IT IS UNSAFE; and is also unduly setting flight crews up for violations. I will attempt to not accept this arrival in the future for these reasons. They should get rid of the FRDMM RNAV STAR or [restrict its assignment only to aircraft with appropriately compliant VNAV/autothrottle capability]. If they do keep it at least publish a constant glide angle that we could reference to keep us 'in the middle' of all the required altitudes.




Synopsis: An ERJ Captain recounted his concerns regarding the complexity of the FRDMM RNAV STAR to DCA and the capability of his aircraft's RNAV system to comply with the multitude of airspeed and altitude crossing restrictions.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Loss of Captain's Airspeed tape and all airspeed information. Low Airspeed aural alert and Airspeed Unreliable message. All FO instruments normal. FO maintained aircraft control. QRH run. Talked about possible ice crystal encounter. Airspeed information cycle and few times from low to high to low; then returned to normal about two minutes later. Flight continued. Dispatch; Maintenance; and ATC notified.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Captain's airspeed tape and airspeed information failed in flight accompanied by the LOW AIRSPEED aural warning and AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE message. About two minutes after the anomaly began the airspeed returned so ice crystals were suspected.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The First Officer (FO) went outside to complete the preflight walk-around. Upon returning; he advised the aircraft was ready for flight. The FO was qualified; I had no reason to believe the preflight walk around wouldn't have been completed properly. The flight departed and was completed without incident. Upon arrival; the FO completed the post flight inspection. Maintenance met the aircraft. When the FO returned to the flight deck; he advised me that the Maintenance personnel found damage to the aircraft from a lightning strike. At this time; I proceeded to the ramp to meet with Maintenance. Maintenance showed me the strike damage on the nose of the aircraft. After I saw that; I completed a total walk around of the aircraft. On the left side of the fuselage; more lightning strike damage was found. In total; 18 strike marks on the aircraft skin were found. I immediately called Maintenance Control and advised of the situation. A write-up in the logbook was made at this time. The return flight was canceled. I looked through the current Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) and old AML to view aircraft history. In the old AML; I found a write-up for a lightning strike to the aircraft left nose. The write-up was cleared and noted no defects or damage found in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual. [Our flight] did not encounter any convective activity during flight or a lightning strike. Either the [earlier] lightning strike inspection was not conducted properly or there was an unreported lightning strike on this aircraft between return of service and today. If the [earlier] inspection was done properly; then the pre and post-flight inspections of this aircraft have not been done properly. As the Captain; I delegate the duty of the pre/post flight walk around to the qualified First Officer. I should always be able to trust they are inspecting the aircraft in accordance with [Company] policies and procedures. In this instance; maybe the FO didn't know what lightning strike damage looks like.


Second narrative: A more thorough post lightning strike inspection would have resulted in finding the damage before putting the airplane back in service. Also; a more thorough walk-around could have resulted in finding the damage earlier.


Synopsis: EMB-175 flight crew reported that maintenance personnel noted lightning strike damage after a flight in which no lightning had been encountered.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Tailwind operations at airports around the country are out of control. They have become the norm not the exception; almost ubiquitous. DCA is one of the most flagrant violators; constantly ignoring tailwind ops either because they are too lazy to turn the airport around or the forecast has winds clocking around 6 hours in the future. Places like DCA and LGA have very little margin for error as it is; tailwinds only exacerbate the problem. My last 3-day; over 50% of my takeoff and landings were in tailwind conditions. That is not a statistical outlier. I can't remember a trip where I did not experience a tailwind [landing]. What's worse is the severity of the tailwind that controllers will allow; not just 1 or 2 knots; but 7; 8; 9 knot tailwinds are not unusual. Whether it's a function of controllers being lazy or overwhelmed and under confident in their ability to rapidly and safely reconfigure matters not. What does matter is in the past few years airports around the country are operating with tailwinds far too often. There is an accident coming; people will die. The tailwind will be at minimum a contributing factor; probably causal. This lax attitude toward tailwind ops must stop now!




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain has noticed a trend of tower controllers continued use of operations in tailwind conditions.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had just leveled at 13;000 FT when both MCDU's went 'blank' (just menu prompts; with no FMGC prompt for a few seconds) and both Map displays went blank on the ND's. We were able to re-enter the initialization information and restore Nav/map capability after a few minutes. Just after the FMGC blanked; ATC assigned 7;000 FT. We advised ATC of the loss of Navigation and requested to remain at 13;000 FT; as well as assigned heading. ATC re-assigned us as requested; with a slight change in heading assigned. We were able to re-establish the FMGC within a minute or two and resume the arrival. No emergency was declared and I am not aware of any Priority Handling for Traffic Priority received. The FMGC and IRU drift rate were written up to Maintenance on arrival.




Synopsis: A320 Captain experiences a dual MCDU failure during arrival. Vectors are requested while the reset procedure is performed successfully.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P50.TRACON, AZ
Aircraft: Talon (T38)
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E P50
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was training on the sector and released Aircraft X. We were just finishing up a runway swap and I only climbed him to 5000 ft instead of 7000 ft which I can do with look and go procedures. I stopped his turn at heading 070 instead of letting him roll out to a 120 heading to try and get him more on course. Because it was a military jet they rolled out very wide and fast which brought them closer to the terrain sooner. I saw he was heading at the 6200 ft MVA and asked if he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance through 6200 ft before he entered the higher MVA; which he could; so I climbed him to 11000 ft and shipped him to the departure controller. Had I just used my look and go procedures normally this wouldn't have occurred or I could have just let them roll all the way out to the 120 heading on departure.




Synopsis: P50 TRACON Controller in training reported vectoring a departing aircraft below the MVA.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the descent we missed a clearance to descend 'via' the arrival. We had been receiving descents in manner not what we were accustomed to on this arrival. We did not think that anything was amiss until ATC queried us as to our altitude. We were vectored away from the arrival; descended; and resumed the arrival without incident. The night before my sleep period was interrupted at midnight due to a party in the room next door. Phone calls were made and the noise subsided. Sleep was difficult to obtain after that. Wake up was at 5 a.m. the next morning. There was some confusion during ATC's query that I now recognize as coming from fatigue. I might have; at that time; been flying in a mental fog.




Synopsis: During descent the crew of an ERJ-170 missed a crossing altitude clearance by 10;000 feet; and was subsequently vectored and descended by ATC to regain the approach profile.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RST.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Fog; Snow; 3
Aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D RST
ATC / advisory: Tower RST
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were coming in on the initial ILS approach for runway 31 into RST. My first officer wrote down the incorrect altimeter setting due to hard to understand weather read out on frequency. Current altimeter setting was 29.21; he relayed 30.21 for our settings which put us 1;000 feet below assigned altitude. We broke out and I initiated a climb and asked for current altimeter at the field from approach control. They said low altitude alert; and gave me current altimeter setting. We continued the approach and landed safely. It was a CRM mistake; because my first officer didn't tell me he couldn't fully understand the weather. That way I could have helped listen for clarification on the correct setting.




Synopsis: Business jet Captain reports descending to the final approach fix altitude at RST using the wrong altimeter setting; resulting in being 1;000 feet low. ATC is queried and the correct altimeter setting is provided along with a low altitude alert.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the Pilot Flying. En route climbing out of 14;500 ft.; we heard a bang and slight yaw motion of the aircraft. We noticed #2 engine had failed. The Captain stated 'I have the aircraft'; assumed control of the aircraft and disconnected the auto pilot and auto throttles. He directed me to inform ATC of our engine failure and request a return to ZZZ; our nearest suitable airport. He then asked for the QRC for Engine Fire/Engine Severe Damage or Separation Checklist. We performed the Challenge; Response; Response Checklist along with QRH and non-normal items. We [advised ATC] and requested to have CFR (Crash Fire rescue) on standby at the airport.The Captain then informed the flight attendants and the passengers of the situation and that we would return to ZZZ. I ran the appropriate checklist and non-normal items. We requested delay vectors as we prepared to return to field. After completing our QRH and non-normal procedures; we had an uneventful single engine landing in VMC conditions. After clearing the runway; we were instructed by ATC to hold position and contact CFR on a discreet frequency. The Captain made a PA to the passengers and informed the flight attendants that we had no adverse indications in the cockpit. CFR asked for what assistance we requested. We had them assess the outside [of] #2 engine for any damage or fire condition. They assessed and gave us the all clear. We proceeded back to the terminal and parked the aircraft. No passenger stated anything other than 'good job' and 'thanks for getting us back safely.'


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported an engine failure during climb that resulted in a precautionary landing.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZSU.ARTCC, PR
Aircraft: Cessna Single Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZSU
ATC / advisory: Center ZSU
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was at FL110 with assigned altitude to cross GABAR intersection at FL060. When the aircraft was east of DANDE intersection; I noticed a VFR aircraft climbing opposite direction out of FL075. I attempted to communicate with Aircraft X several times for a traffic alert because the aircraft was in a frequency blind spot. I was able to relay the traffic information and a vector through company aircraft in the vicinity; to avoid a possible conflict. Closest proximity 4.7 NM and 700 feet. Area between DANDE and GABAR is a common area of frequency range problems.The frequencies must be fixed ASAP to improve coverage. The process for getting them fixed is unacceptable and the added workload that is required to keep the unthinkable from happening is a distraction and threat to the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS).




Synopsis: ZSU ARTCC Controller reported an unsafe situation relating to frequency blind spot.