Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At LAS we have a device called the RICD (Runway Intersection Coordination Devise); it is used to show ownership of the runway intersection of Runway 25R and Runways 19L/R. If the light is green; it's your intersection. If the light is red it is not your intersection. I was working the LC2 position; and had a couple aircraft taxiing out for departure. LC1 called over and coordinated the intersection to be my control after Aircraft Y. While my second aircraft; Aircraft X; was holding in position; I coordinated the intersection back to LC1 behind Aircraft X.  When Aircraft X was about 2/3 of the way down Runway 19R and already airborne; LC1 yelled over 'Hey are you rolling that [Aircraft Type]?' My reply was 'Yes; that was the coordination; Aircraft X back!' To which LC1 replied 'But I have the light!' At that point I looked over at the RICD and it was in fact red indicating that I do not have control of the intersection. I cannot say with any amount of certainty what happened with the RICD. I don't know if I was never given the light behind the Aircraft Y departure as it was coordinated; or if for some unknown reason I accidently gave up the light at the wrong time. I think as a facility we have good procedures in effect to control the use of the intersection. The only problem is not knowing what happened with the light at the RICD. We as controllers just need to be more aware of what is actually happening; not just seeing a green/red light and making our decision solely on that.


Second narrative: The local 2 controller coordinated the intersection to me after Aircraft X and I acknowledged it with my operating initials. I observed Aircraft Z in position on Runway 19R during the coordination. I put Aircraft Y in position on Runway 25R awaiting departure. After a short time the runway intersection devise (light) beeped and the light turned green indicating the intersection was now owned by the local 1 controller. I observed Aircraft Z in his right hand turn and cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff Runway 25R. Aircraft Y commenced his departure roll when Aircraft Y reached midway between taxiway A3 and A4 I noticed that the Aircraft X was also rolling on Runway 19R. The two aircraft were simultaneously rolling but were clearly not going to be in danger of collision so no safety alert or cancellation of clearance was issued. After listening to the tapes the coordination was clear and after Aircraft X the runway intersection was to go to LC1. I believe I heard what I wanted to hear and understood that I was getting the intersection after Aircraft Z instead of after Aircraft X. That coupled with the runway intersection devise beeping and turning to green on my position (LC1) reinforced my belief that it was my turn to depart. I scanned the runway and observed no conflicting traffic and cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. It was only during a subsequent scan that I noticed Aircraft X also rolling on Runway 19R.The coordination procedures for managing the runway intersection were changed a while ago (1-2 years maybe). I've always thought that this was a mistake in coordinating the intersection for departures that haven't yet been cleared for takeoff or are in position on the runway. I'm not sure if it would have made a difference in this case but it might have helped me with my incorrect assumption on the coordination. The runway intersection device was either switched too early or switched on its own. It has been a reliable coordination tool for the most part but has been known to be faulty in the past. If the coordination is done for the aircraft in position or currently on departure roll I believe it lessens the time gap between the actual coordination and the time in which the aircraft reaches the intersection and the light (RID) in actuated. When making the coordination when the aircraft isn't even on the runway broadens the gap and in my opinion increases the probability for error. In either case the RID light is a key factor in a successful and uneventful sharing of landing surfaces. If the RID is unreliable or the transfer is given too early it add to the error margin. Additionally the physical locations of the two primary local control positions (LC1 & LC2) are too far apart. They are currently on opposite sides of the control tower. If we were somehow able to bring those two positions physically closer together it would prevent these things from happening in the future. If both controllers (LC1 & LC2) can see and hear what each other are doing at the very moment it's be done it would not only streamline the coordination but also allow for smoother flow of the departures from the airport.This incident happened during a slow period of traffic. Had the two LC positions been combined during this time period I believe it would have also prevented this from happening. Having the two locals combined would have alleviated the need for the coordination of the shared surface area. In this case two controllers needed to coordinate to use a runway surface that is shared when the positions are split. If those positions are combined this coordination need not happen. One controller could have easily accomplished this task. By combining the positions it would not only have eliminated the coordination portion (which is where I may a mistake) but also would have eliminated the need for the RID light switch (which is where I think LC2 either made a mistake or the RID failed).


Synopsis: LAS Tower Controllers reported confusion about who owned a runway and procedure at the time of an error. Two aircraft departed two different crossing runways; a policy and tool is in place to avoid this situation. Both Controllers wonder if the tool changed ownership on its own; or how neither realized what was happening.