elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During preflight discovered black tape over static ports. I photographed the discrepancy and forwarded images to maintenance. Maintenance responded via email to write the aircraft up as an Aircraft On Ground (AOG). I complied.Black tape was on the right side static ports from maintenance. After reviewing the log book and reading that the last maintenance had been performed on the pitot static system; I rubbed my hand over the static ports on the left side searching for tape. I had read previous NTSB reports where after painting or pitot/static system service this was the cause of several incidents. I'm glad the tape was black and not clear; as this made it easier to see. This was the second time in less than 30 days maintenance had been performed on the system for a similar squawk. Please reference the corrective action discussing that dry rot had been discovered in the hoses while performing a leak check. Dry rot takes some time to happen; are the hoses for this system not VISUALLY inspected in addition to the required checks every 24 months? I have previously written up several aircraft for cracking hoses hooked to the ADC in the nose compartment. The nose compartment hoses are sometimes covered in anti-chaffing wrap; which inhibits a thorough inspection. Perhaps with the age of the aircraft; an increased inspection interval is required.




Synopsis: C560XL Captain reported tape was left over static ports after maintenance was performed. Captain was directed by maintenance to write the aircraft up as grounded.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Electrical
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I am writing this after some stewing on this topic/incident and I am still unsure if this is should have been a maintenance write up; however; I am sure that this is a situation warranting looking into. My intent is to shed light into a situation that occurred in aircraft on successive days. Yesterday we had landed; had normal APU start after clearing the runway and APU had been running. When we had reached our 2 minute engine shut down; I shut down engine 2. The APU was up and running and showed electrical load prior to shutting down engine two; on the Electrical page. However; the load didn't seem to transfer and the ECAS screen filled with messages and we lost everything for a moment until engine 1 took over and EICAS messages cleared prior to reaching the gate. APU remained running and no issues continued. I talked with the oncoming Captain and in collaboration didn't see any reason for anything further since we had zero messages. Our collaboration was we were thinking I didn't let the APU run long enough for load transfer and secondary being a new Captain. Today in a different aircraft; APU again running for a while and pulled into the gate with both engines running. Electrical page shows APU full load on the electrical page shut down both engines and the same thing happened; however; this time while parked at the gate. Everything again resolved and all EICAS clear. I think nothing about it but mention it to a very educated and senior Captain; thinking maybe the APU hasn't been running long enough and it does this as a result; however now I am curious. I am still unsure if this is the result of the APU not running long enough before engine shut down or if this is a true maintenance issue. On a side note while reviewing the AOM about single engine taxi I also noticed that I may have violated a procedure in the AOM which states under CAUTIONS: Shall not be initiated until crossing all runways. Lessons learned would be write up everything and let maintenance determine the cause with their knowledge. Let the APU spool up for longer and verify in depth that it has reached full capacity. Continuously learn and continue to be willing to admit a mistake and always be willing to learn. Being a new captain I find myself seeking the wisdom of those senior to me; however it's important to verify then trust.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported APU electrical load transfer problems.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ASE.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: TRACON ASE
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X approached the airport; in the departure corridor; toward the final; at 105; showing a 270 kt ground speed; not talking to ATC; they ended up turning away from a first Aircraft Y on final; Aircraft Z; a second RJ; had to be re-vectored away and was delayed; Aircraft X was directly opposite direction to Aircraft A at the same altitude. The Controller transmitted on emergency frequency to contact ATC; the pilot called local and was controlled away from traffic.ASE needs controlled airspace to require two way radio communication with aircraft in the departure and arrival corridors. Due to the nature of terrain around Aspen; the constraints on aircraft performance and maneuverability; it is vital that controllers have the ability to talk to VFR aircraft flying close to Aspens arrival and departure traffic to mitigate conflict and ensure safety. Giving a VFR the option to not talk to ATC and fly close to Aspen is an unnecessary risk to the users. The notation on the VFR map can be missed or ignored and is not good enough. Aspen needs a Class C.




Synopsis: ASE TRACON/TOWER Controller reported an airborne conflict between IFR and VFR aircraft. Controller suggested ASE should be a Class C airspace to keep VFR and IFR separated in the ASE departure and arrival corridors by requiring two way radio communication.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TTA.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G TTA
ATC / advisory: CTAF TTA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While practicing touch-and-go landings and traffic pattern work with an instructor; after announcing on CTAF that we were departing Runway X; closed traffic; Aircraft Y announced departure Runway X to the southwest. I announced when I was turning downwind leg of Runway X and Aircraft Y announced shortly after they were turning crosswind Runway X for departure. Immediately after this call; my instructor and I spotted the aircraft climbing through the downwind leg at pattern altitude perpendicular to our flight path within a few hundred feet; then turning to the southwest and continuing a climbing departure. Attempts to contact the aircraft on the CTAF frequency were unsuccessful after the event.




Synopsis: C152 student pilot reported an NMAC with another small aircraft in the traffic pattern at a non-towered airport.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Failed; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Around 100 kts we got an anti-skid inop. Takeoff was smooth with no other indications so we continued. On climb out we were told that ZZZZ found rubber on the runway. At this time we checked the hydraulic page and found the A side leaking. We ran our checklists. Coordinated with Dispatch; FAs (Flight Attendants); and Maintenance. Upon reaching ZZZ1 Center we [requested priority handling] and coordinated with ATC. We manually extended the gear and did a low pass down the runway. We were told by the Fire Chief that our left inboard tire looked damaged. The normal gear indications did not show the left main down. The overhead panel did. We came in for a normal landing and smoothly touched down. [Captain] said his brakes were mushy; so I joined home on the brakes. Mine worked fine. We stopped on the runway and shut the engines down. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) came into inspect us and Maintenance pinned the gear. We were towed to the gate.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported a failure in the anti-skid system resulting in a blown tire.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 6
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B HOU
ATC / advisory: Tower HOU
Aircraft component: Rain Repellent System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon breaking out of the cloud base in moderate rain; the visibility with wipers on high was terrible. All images were nothing more than a blur. Runway lights were a scattered blur! It was very difficult to discern the approach lighting system; the runway edge lights and taxiway lights. Runway and taxiway markings were all but impossible to see. The 'rain repellent qualities' of theses windshields are nonexistent! My experience with our old aircraft equipped with rain repellent is that one press of the button would have provided a crystal clear windshield. This reduced windshield visibility in rain is an additive condition that is obviously degrading Safety. In retrospect; with a 900 ft. ceiling and six miles visibility; we should have diverted to an alternate because of inadequate visibility through the windshield in rain. If something can be done to improve the rain repellent qualities of these windshields; we need to do it.




Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported ineffective windshield wiper system; resulting in difficulty seeing the runway when landing.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to Runway 22; we were IMC; an ILS and the First Officer (FO) was flying. We had SPS and an approach speed of roughly 153 with the gust. ATC had put us close behind a flight and we discussed the possibility of the go-around. The FO configured for flaps 3; gear down. We did the approach checklist to the line. Then I heard tower clear another flight to depart off of Runway 31. Then we discussed that it appeared that he had landed and the runway would be clear. During that; I lost my place and forgot that we had not put in FLAPS 5 or run 'below the line'. We passed 1000 feet; then 500 feet and then heard 'TOO LOW FLAPS'. I immediately noticed that we were not in FLAPS 5. I made the poor decision to not GO AROUND; but to move the flaps to position 5. At the same time I believe I heard the FO call FLAPS 5. I verified FLAPS 5 before landing. In my brain; I had made the decision to call a go-around if we were not configured before landing. We ended up configured before landing; before 200 feet I believe.We landed with no incident.Both the FO and I discussed afterwards that we had noticed the stall speed indication was higher than 'normal' but I was attributing it to gusting winds and the SPS configuration.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight crew became distracted by traffic ahead on final approach and did not finish completing the final flaps configuration until just before touchdown.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach into LAX we had programmed the FMS for the RIIVR3 arrival and ILS 24 approach; after being advised to expect it for landing. We confirmed all the waypoints and any altitude and speed restrictions and found no errors for that arrival and approach to 24L.We were cleared for an approach after RIIVR intersection which has a transition to 25L and 24L. We still assumed 24L for the landing runway. However after we passed the extended center-line for 25L the controller queried us and asked us to turn left to re-intercept the ILS to 25L now. We switched from LNAV to HDG select and re-programmed the FMS for 25L. We intercepted the course and commenced the approach with no further issue or comment from the controller. We could query ATC on exactly which runway to expect and which approach we are cleared for if in any doubt.




Synopsis: First Officer reported late runway change during approach to LAX. Crew was able to reprogram FMC and complete the approach to the newly assigned runway.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Fire Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After landing and just prior to clearing the runway the LH ENGINE FIRE plastic protective switch cover broke (flew) off. After clearing the runway the LH ENG FLAMEOUT caution message posted on the EICAS. We noticed that the LH ENGINE FIRE pushbutton had been activated.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: During rollout the left hand engine fire plastic protective cover came off. The engine fire button was activated by an unknown source.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CXO.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flew from ZZZ to CXO under foggles with a safety pilot and conducted practice approaches and holding pattern under VFR with assistance of Houston Departure Control and CXO Tower: ILS 14; hold at CX; practice approach NDB 14; and was inbound on practice RNAV (GPS) 14 approach when we lost GPS and Com 1 radio when lowering the gear. Raised landing gear and conducted missed approach and received radar vectors to repeat the RNAV (GPS) 14 approach. Just outside of FAF FOBNA lost all electrical power; GPS; and both com radios. Changed squawk to 7600 for lost communication and conducted climbing turn to the west at 2;000 ft. transponder went dead along with all electrical devices connected in the aircraft. Retrieved handheld transceiver and; with some difficulty; adjusted to correct frequency and renewed contact with Houston Departure Control. Announced situation and returned to [departure airport]; in communication with Departure Control but inoperative transponder. Lacking power to lower landing gear; conducted manual gear extension. With no lights to show gear position; conducted level flight and climb maneuvers at known engine settings to confirm airspeed and climb rate consistent with gear extended. Requested and received approval from Houston Departure Control to change to CTAF when about 7 miles from ZZZ. Changed to CTAF; announced position and requested help from ground with inspection to confirm gear down during flyover. Flew standard traffic pattern from Runway 15. Inspected aircraft and found alternator belt displaced from pulleys.Closer observation of engine gauges could have shown the alternator offline before loss of GPS; radios; and standard gear extension. Continuing the approach to the missed approach point was considered but with other traffic (CXO was busy) and no communication on a clear VFR day it appeared safer to leave the congested airport area; renew contact with Houston Departure Control; and return to base.




Synopsis: PA28R pilot experienced total electrical failure during practice instrument approaches to CXO in VMC. He elected to divert to his home field. After manually extending the gear and using a handheld transceiver; he landed safely.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: PC-12
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y was climbed to FL210 above Aircraft X at FL200 and given direct SHV airport. Aircraft Y was then handed off to Sector 30 Monroe Low. Aircraft X was being handed off to my Sector (83) UIM Low from Sector 30. When Sector 30 took the hand off on the Aircraft Y; I then switched the aircraft to Sector 30 after ensuring there was no traffic call needed between the Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. Sector 30 has control for turns and lower on Shreveport landers which Aircraft Y was. Since Aircraft X was on our mutual sector boundaries when Sector 30 took the hand off on Aircraft Y; I did not reference Aircraft X to Sector 30 in relation to the AIT that Sector 30 has control for turns and lower on SHV landers. I continued to work additional traffic when I saw FL130 interim altitude put in Aircraft Y's data block. At that time Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were lateral and approximately 3 NM separated. I immediately called Sector 30 and asked if they were descending Aircraft Y. I believe he said he was and I asked about Aircraft X; during this call I had PVD'd Aircraft X back on Sector 30's scope. I don't believe he remembered Aircraft X. I hung up and was going to turn Aircraft X but there was such a huge speed difference and I knew the aircraft were both safe so I did not execute a turn. I don't believe we actually need this AIT; especially for descent. Where Sector 30 has control for turns and lower is still approximately 70 NM away from SHV Airport and well inside UIM Lows airspace. With the new 4th Line coordination we have in effect in ZFW there really is no need for this AIT. To prevent other incidents from occurring this should be looked at. Sector 30 having worked Aircraft X did have the 'known' traffic for the Aircraft Y however since this AIT occurs 15 NM inside of UIM Lows airspace there is a chance that the known traffic will be mistakenly overlooked. Also; there could be a change of controllers and this known traffic could easily be overlooked in the briefing. Sector 30 is a large sector and most controllers have their MDM's set right at the limits required and no further out which could facilitate missing the limited data block if the traffic is dropped; or if not dropped it's feasible that the data block could be under the limits of the MDM. This situation has a high probability of occurring again.




Synopsis: ZFW Controller described a conflict event listing the current AIT procedure as contributing to the event.