Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the Captain and the Pilot Flying on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Me and my First [Officer] answer my call touch with doing a quick turn out of ZZZ and was initially given the ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure with a South Flow. As we were pushing back from the gate; the Ground Patrol indicated that they had just switched to a North flow as we started Engine #XX. We also received a change of departure to the ZZZZZ4 from clearance delivery from the original ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure. We had already updated the departure based on a South Flow; and I went to update the departure as my First Officer went to update the TPS performance data based on the North Runway XX. I also was discussing the special 7P procedures for an engine failure and how we would set it up. During all of this discussion; other aircraft were pushing off their gates behind us and we started the #XX engine and set up for a single engine taxi to Runway XX. I neglected to have my First Officer confirm my FMS entries; and we taxied to Runway XX with only 2 aircraft ahead of us. The short line for takeoff prompted me to call for starting the #2 engine and then the Taxi Checklist. Ground had us cross Runway XY and contact Tower; who quickly stated to us that we were next for departure. With an aircraft on 2 mile final; Tower stated we were cleared for takeoff Runway XX; as opposed to stating the first fix on the RNAV departure. We took off and at 400 feet I called NAV. My First Officer pushed NAV but the stayed in ROLL. I stated again for NAV and the same result occurred. I quickly realized we needed an immediate left turn to stay clear of the restricted areas; so I manually made a sharp turn left and started following the river as my First Officer tried to get the FMS to engage the flight director. I was visually staying over the river to avoid transgression into any restricted areas. Departure saw that we weren't tracking the ZZZZZ4 like we were supposed to and we eventually asked for and were given a heading and told to climb to 5;000 feet; and that was quickly changed to stop our cling at 4;000 feet. I complied and the Controller queried us on what departure we were assigned; and he re-cleared us to fly the ZZZZZ4 LYH transition. By this time; it was apparent to us that the FMS was missing departure SID and transition; so it took a minute or two to re-enter the proper departure. We resumed the departure and then the Controller climbed us to 5;000 feet after we had passed some conflicting traffic. By this time; me and my First Officer were making sure that we were cleared to a specific fix in the departure and making sure it was entered and activated properly. Once we got up and going on the proper departure and caught up with making sure the aircraft was cleaned up for climb and cruise climb we discussed what must have happened to [start the] problem. I quickly made sure to take ownership of the lack of confirming the new departure waypoints with my First Officer during the taxi to the Runway XX. I allowed myself to get hurried by ground events and failed to have the final SID confirmed by my First Officer. First Officer was still very new to the aircraft and I did the cardinal sin of not slowing things down so that we both were satisfied and assured that all preflight and FMS inputs were confirmed calmly prior to accepting a takeoff clearance. I especially felt terrible that I had just put my new First Officer in jeopardy and that I wasn't setting the professional example for all flight operations. Later on down the road on our flight to ZZZ1; ATC gave us a number to call regarding a possible flight deviation. When we parked at the gate in ZZZ1 I called the number and kept my phone on speaker with the cockpit door closed so that both myself and my First Officer could listen and respond. I spoke with an [employee] and he took my license and contact information and then asked us about the details of the events leading up to this deviation. I told him of our inability to get the FMS to engage the RNAV departure right after takeoff and my actions to stay clear of restricted areas as we worked the problem. He thanked me for the information and indicated that there might be an investigation. He DID confirm that we did NOT penetrate any restricted areas; and that this was a failure to fly the assigned SID. No other aircraft was moved out of our way; as we simply stopped our climb at 4;000 feet per ATC instruction. I feel that the brunt of blame is on my own lack of proper CRM practices; and that in my hurry to get things done on a short taxi I let events drive me; instead of me driving and slowing our events in the cockpit to ensure all items were covered and confirmed. ATC did not clear me for takeoff with the usual SID first fix; which might have alerted me to any missing waypoints; as well. I also had a fitful night of sleep; as my dinner the night before did not agree with me during my normal sleep time in our overnight the night before. I apologized to my First Officer for creating this problem and not setting to him the type of example I expected of myself and others. He also felt bad about not stating any concerns ahead of time; and we both agreed that this was one of those 'I won't ever let that happen again!' moments. Follow procedures slow down events when multiple changes impact flight routing and clearances.


Second narrative: I was the First Officer on [Aircraft X] from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I am a new First Officer with approximately 45 hours on the aircraft. It was my first time to fly into ZZZ. I was joined by Captain. Captain did a great job briefing me on the issues with this airport before arriving. I was the Pilot Monitoring; while Captain was the Pilot Flying. Upon receiving the clearance; our routing was changed from the ZZZZZ2 Departure to the ZZZZZ4 Departure. Captain programmed the routing while I was doing the walk-around. At this point; we reviewed the flight plan; briefing the departure; enroute; and arrival. Additionally; Captain gave his departure brief. At this point; everything was programmed correctly. We were expecting a departure from RWY XZ; the runway we had just landed on. After receiving our EWBS and TPS; Captain called for the Before Start Checklist and instructed me to contact Ground for permission to push from the gate. Upon switching frequencies; we heard a communication with a flight in which Ground instructed Delta the flow was switching to a north flow. Captain then made adjustments to the FMS and announced 'I have changed everything to RWY XX'; or words to this effect. I did not have the opportunity to review his changes in the FMS as we immediately began briefing P-56. I am not sure what he did in the FMS. While P-56 was not as great of an issue in the prior briefing; it was certainly a factor while taking off of RWY XX. We set up the 1-nm circle around ZZZZZ as well as tuned the [restricted area] off of ZZZ. At this point; we were still hooked to the tow vehicle; but had not pushed from the gate. As soon as we had finished discussing P-56; Captain instructed that I request a clearance to pushback. In hindsight; I should have prompted the Captain to re-run the Before Start Checklist at this point; which would have had FMS as a review item. We had been parked at Gate XX. When we got the clearance to pushback; we were now blocking the alley; preventing other aircraft (who were waiting on us to move) to push back. With these aircraft waiting on us; there was now a level of pressure and urgency in the cockpit to pick up the pace. We ordered the updated TPS and I reprogrammed the takeoff performance and thrust settings for the takeoff. Additionally; I prepared for the cross-bleed start checklist in QRH. Captain mentioned he was expecting a wait to the runway and instructed I seek permission to taxi. This where I understood we would complete any set up and review. When we turned the corner of the terminal; there were only 2-3 aircraft waiting for the runway; two (2) [Company XX] aircraft; and one (1) [Company XY] aircraft. The taxi was significantly shorter than we were anticipating. We were cleared directly onto Taxiway J; cleared across Runway XY; and instructed to switch to Tower. At this point; the two [Company XX] aircraft had departed leaving only the [Company XY] aircraft. The [Company XY] aircraft was blocking taxiway J (main entrance to RWY XX). As we pulled up; an [Company XX] aircraft was crossing the numbers to land. We were only stopped for a few seconds before we were cleared to line up and wait; with additional instruction that an aircraft was on a six (6) mile final. Due to performance numbers of the aircraft and short runway; the Captain decided to enter the runway via Taxiway E; back-taxi on RWY XX; and perform a u-turn and therefore be able to use the full runway. Just as we were finishing the u-turn; we were instructed '[Aircraft X]; Runway XX; cleared for takeoff; traffic 2 mile final'; or words to that effect. At this point; we knew there was an aircraft right behind us; and we were watching the [Company XX] aircraft just vacating the runway. As soon as it was clear; we began the takeoff roll. At most; we were stopped for a couple of seconds. I was looking at my MFD and PFD; but I just could not identify the issue. Looking back; I realize the magenta line of the MFD was not located on the screen where it should have been. This had been the first time that we were lined up with the runway and were able to see the routing as we would fly it on the MFD. However; there was insufficient time for me to process what I was seeing before the aircraft began its takeoff roll. After takeoff; at appx. 400 AGL; Captain called for 'NAV'. I pressed the NAV button; saw it populate on the standby box of the FMA; however; it did not move to the active box. At this time; I realized there was an issue. Captain continued to fly the aircraft by hand; with a turn to the left to avoid the P-56 restricted area. Captain tried repeatedly to hit 'NAV' again but the FMA stayed in ROLL mode. I was instructed by Captain to 'figure out what was going on with the NAV' or something similar; causing additional distraction as to the source of the problem. In my training and experience; I had never seen NAV not populate the active box and was confused what would cause this issue. At this point; the only course guidance we were receiving was a magenta line shooting to the southwest. However; we knew we were supposed to be flying over the river to the northwest-west. The priority was to fly the aircraft. At this point; we had not coordinated a plan. I asked Captain if he wanted me to request vectors. Captain replied 'no'. He continued a climbing left hand turn to approximately south-southwest. The confusion was compounded when he did not track outbound on the [restricted area] of the ZZZ. As he did not want vectors; I assumed I was missing something. I noticed our speed was increasing and queried whether Captain wanted 'flaps 1'. Captain replied in the affirmative. During this period I was observing him looking out of the left window; based on future discussion; Captain said he was trying to keep the aircraft over the river. I told Captain the routing had been cut off and it was sending us to the wrong point. By this time; Departure saw our turn and reached out to us; providing a vectored heading (I believe it was 270) and a climb to 5;000 [feet]. This was revised to 4;000 [feet] a few seconds later due to traffic. We were assigned a fix back on the departure; received a clearance; and corrected the box. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Upon review of the flight plan; we discovered the ZZZZZ4 had been erased from the box. Therefore the aircraft was trying to fly direct to the next fix. I am not sure whether the deletion occurred when Captain changed the runways; or when he was making subsequent changes to the FMS. Captain did not request that I 'confirm' his changes and I failed to instruct 'activate'. As a new First Officer; I was overwhelmed by the busy airport. While I was comfortable during the initial pushback request; the last minute runway change put in motion a series of events in which I could not catch up. The pressure and urgency in the cockpit left little time to double check work. In hindsight; I should have informed the Captain that I needed him to slow down and that I was task saturated. As a result; I did not double check the Captain's inputs into the FMS. Additionally; we failed to re-brief the departure. I also feel I was distracted by the departure near P-56. While we should have been focused on confirming the route changes associated with the runway change; we were target-fixated on avoiding P-56. At any point; I had the opportunity to inform the captain that I was unable to keep up with the pace of the flight; however; this did not occur. The decision to pushback so quickly created an unnecessary urgency and distraction in the cockpit. We should have checked our routing; and re-briefed the departure before we left the gate or asked for some time to do so in a holding pad prior to taking the runway. Once we began to taxi; there was no time in which we were able to stop and review our work. We barely stopped for more than a few seconds at any time; which was insufficient to review; much less comprehend our routing. Once we were in the air; weidentified the navigation error. However; communication between Captain and myself broke down. I saw him turning left; but was unsure what his plan was. I knew that it was a critical phase of flight with a busy airspace and vectors were a solution. Had I gone ahead and made the request to Departure; this issue would have been greatly minimized; if not avoided. As a new first officer; I learned valuable lessons in this incident. I have to speak up. If we are moving at a pace in which I am uncomfortable or I am behind the aircraft; I need to tell the captain. Additionally; there was no reason we needed to be in a rush out of the gate. When I was instructed to seek pushback clearance; I should have spoken up that we had not briefed the routing and were not prepared to push from the gate. Once we were in the air; we needed to keep communicating our plan. I should have taken the initiative to identify the issue and resolve it. I salute the professionalism of the Controller to quickly identify the aircraft was off the routing and providing immediate assistance. He was instrumental in our efforts to get the flight back on track.


Synopsis: EMB-175 flight crew reported incorrect management of FMS resulting in course deviation.