elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Other home after flying
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We are now grossly understaffed and are being scheduled to the extent of 121 rules. The unique situation [here] is that we have pairings that go around the world for an average of 17 days at one time. We constantly change times zones; sleep cycles (day/night); and now endure innumerable schedule changes that also disrupt not only food planning but sleep planning as well.This has led to extremely unhealthy habits that are unavoidable and damaging to our abilities to operate safely. I am an average aged pilot; fairly fit with generally healthy eating habits. After coming back from a short pairing with three 20 hour overnights in a row; it took a better part of the week to recover from it. I am not alone. What we are being asked to do is undoubtedly scientifically destructive to our persons let alone the potential to the operation.Here is a very brief example of a summary of just one pilot's schedule:Day 1: Commercialed in from the states to the Near East. Rest before flight 13h.Day 2: 10h duty day flying Near East to Far East. Originally a short overnight was assigned.Day 3: 50h overnight due to a broken airplane. Delays kept rolling. A 24/7 was assigned.Day 5: 14h duty day flying Far East to Australia. 20h overnight assigned.Day 6: 11:30h duty day flying Australia to Mid East. 18:30h overnight assigned.Day 7: 6:30h duty day flying Mid East to Far East. 21h overnight assigned.Day 8: Commercialed home.To endure the '20h' overnights and prevent two sleep opportunities in favor of one big sleep opportunity; we stayed up as much as possible upon landing. Though this helped to feel rested for the flights; fatigue accumulated and by the time I got home my body crashed.This is an example of just one week of this unhealthy; unsustainable schedule.They say knowing is half the battle. I wanted to document this continual; no-end-in-sight situation to ensure the knowledge was there that this situation IS happening and not changing despite us having a fatigue program in place that is supposed to help prevent the continuation of these types of situations when documented.




Synopsis: B747 pilot reported the scheduling practices used at her international airline were extremely fatiguing and unsafe.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SFB; Class E F11
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Working North sector we had numerous training pilots who were missing control instructions; needing information repeated; and requiring extra attention. After approximately 30 minutes of this I asked the Supervisor if I could be moved to a different position after an hour on North; the Supervisor laughed and walked away. About 5 minutes later the FD controller walked to the Supervisor and informed them I needed help. At this point I had stopped SFB departures for about 5 minutes to help get it under control. A few minutes later another Supervisor came over and I informed them I wasn't giving any more practice approaches - they laughed and began to walk away at which time I informed them I was serious. He then walked over and asked me what he wanted me to do - I informed him it was his call and didn't care but frequency congestion was an issue. As he left he informed me that I only had 5 aircraft; failing to consider the entire scenario. Open more positions for the North sector. Three times Supervisors where informed of an issue and it wasn't until I told them I wouldn't provide services that they did anything. The North sector is too busy to continue to allow it to be worked how it is. No attention was given to the position when I asked for relieve after an hour; when the FD controller informed the FLM I needed help; or when I stopped departures. It wasn't until I informed them I wasn't providing multiple approaches that they opened a secondary position. The fix is simple; open the sectors we have available to us; Oviedo or Paola.




Synopsis: F11 TRACON Controller reported being busy; asking for help; and being laughed at three times by Front Line Managers. The Controller needed the sector to be split.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach we got a HYDR QTY LOW alert.  After going around; we continued to run the applicable checklist.  We raised the emergency gear lever leaving the gear doors open after the gear extended.  The aircraft landed and stopped straight ahead.  No turns were made.  We remained on the runway for approximately 45 minutes.  Maintenance arrived and towed the aircraft to the gate where the passengers deplaned.  There were no reports of any injuries and I'm not aware of any damage to the aircraft.  Maintenance indicated leaking hydraulic fluid and possible broken hydraulic line.




Synopsis: B717 Captain experiences a hydraulic low quantity alert during approach and goes around.  An emergency is declared and the emergency gear extension handle is used to lower the gear.  Aircraft is towed to the gate.
Date: 202008
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An X-year old child boarded the flight without a mask on with his parents. I politely informed the parents of the policy and they refused to comply; so I had a Customer Service Supervisor meet the plane to talk to them. He tells me that he 'doesn't have the heart to remove them from the plane;' despite our mask policy. Because he was allowed to fly; other passengers were at higher risk to contract COVID-19 and it negates our policy. Customer Service and employees; in general; need to unite and follow our policies. Clearly; other employees (including Ops) saw this family through the process and did not address it. This family should have never gotten to the plane before this was addressed. If we are going to make exemptions; then all work groups need to be on the same page. Customer Service Supervisors need to be trained to address these situations as outlined in our mask policy.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported family boarded with a child not wearing a face mask. The family refused to comply with the mask policy; but was allowed to remain on the flight.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: A B737 landing RNO; I attempted to hand off the aircraft 10 miles west of SWR. The handoff began to flash then flashed FAIL in the Data Block. I took the hand off back then forced the information to NCT RNO; using the RF function; and then re-attempted the hand off. The aircraft then failed again; so I re-adjusted the route and then forced the information again then restarted the hand off. The aircraft began to flash and I proceeded with my scan. The hand off did not complete in time nor did it auto flash when on the boundary; so the Controller at NCT RNO called and asked for us to flash the B737 and said RADAR contact. Once in their airspace I was able to flash the Data Block and NCT was able to take control of the Data Block. Hands off to NCT whether at RNO or Paradise/Kirkwood fail quite often; most of the time we are able to force the information then able to successfully hand off the aircraft. There are times when no matter what we do; re-routes; assigning hard altitudes or repeatedly resending the information the hands off will not work. We shouldn't have to trick the system into working properly. I attempted to do the correct thing and it did not work; which should've been caught but the aircraft also never auto flashed. To my understanding the system should have at least auto flashed or allowed me to hand off the aircraft properly when I attempted the first few times.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller described a failed automated hand off attempt to NCT RNO Sector; noting this problem is experienced on a frequent basis and needs to be resolved.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: On approach to Runway 16R in Seattle in scattered cloud conditions while visually following preceding traffic to the runway I armed the ILS approach mode as a backup to the briefed visual approach. All ILS approach and arrival briefings were accomplished. ATIS was advertising approaches to 16L and 16R and departing 16L. We were told to maintain 3;200 until BUGNE then cleared 16R. I noticed the aircraft cross slightly to the left of the 16R centerline so I disconnected the autopilot and corrected back to the 16R centerline. The identifier for the ILS showed 34L so we continued the visual approach to uneventful landing. After blocking in at gate we called ground control to inform them that the 34L localizer was active. I called Tower and TRACON on the telephone to inform them of the issue also. The TRACON Supervisor told me the localizer was supposed to be down for maintenance and that the 34L localizer should not have been operating.There were two primary issues. First; the localizer was active for the opposite direction runway when it should have been off. Second; I armed the approach as a backup while not visually assuring the identification. The deviation was identified and only a minor deviation occurred.




Synopsis: A B737 pilot flying a SEA Runway 16R visual approach in the ILS APP Mode noted a track deviation and while manually flying back to centerline noticed the Runway 34L ILS identifier was active. ATC reported the 34L ILS was supposed to be off line.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff with the First Officer flying; FO announced that being unable to trim the aircraft with the control wheel trim switch. I looked down on the trim indicator on the center pedestal and saw no movement while FO was attempting to trim. I checked the main trim cut off switch which was in the correct position with the guard down. I then took control of the aircraft after announcing so and attempted to trim with my control wheel trim switch with the same result. The horizontal stabilizer did not move either direction. I then reset the main stab trim cutoff switch and tried again with the same negative result. Unable to trim nose down or up. I told the First Officer we [would] return to the airport while I tried trimming with the alternate trim switches with success. I then engaged the auto pilot; handled the aircraft and ATC while the First Officer ran the checklists. When we were level on downwind I disengaged the autopilot and tried trimming with the control wheel trim switch again with success. All trim systems worked normally after that and we landed normally albeit overweight at 135;000 lbs with a soft landing.




Synopsis: When their MD-83's normal stab trim failed to function after takeoff the flight crew returned to their departure airport. After maneuvering for approach employing the alternate stab trim and autopilot the normal system returned to operation when the autopilot was disconnected for final approach and landing.
Date: 201409
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E D10
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While climbing out on the RAMBL 1 Departure; ATC gave us 'Climb via SID; except maintain 17;000 feet'. The Pilot Monitoring read back the clearance and said 'climb unrestricted to 17;000 feet. ATC did not correct the readback; and we proceeded to continue the SID with a climb to 17000 feet. If the clearance readback to ATC was not correct; the Controller should have corrected us; however; I should have made sure this was his intention.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 Fligt Crew reports being cleared to 'Climb via SID; except maintain 17;000 feet'. The First Officer read back; 'climb unrestricted to 17;000' and was not corrected. The crossing restriction at ARILE was not clomplied with.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SBA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON SBA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was instructing. Trainee issued a descend to 040 from 090 to Aircraft X. Aircraft X descended through a 055 and 047 MVA. Trainee anticipated descent rate wouldn't be a factor. I was researching a TEC route for an IFR overflight; and failed to prevent Aircraft X from descending through the MVAs.Do not allow trainees to anticipate descent rates. Issue altitudes that satisfy MVAs.




Synopsis: SBA TRACON ATC instructor reported a trainee issuing an aircraft a descent below the MVA.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ASH.Airport, NH
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ASH
ATC / advisory: Tower ASH
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was given vectors to the final approach for ILS14 at ASH. My glideslope receiver became inoperative and I either advised Approach Control or Tower (I don't recall who I was speaking to at the time.) that my glideslope was inoperative and I was converting to a localizer approach. During the descent I popped out into visual conditions and shortly after that the Tower came on with an urgent message 'Altitude alert; suggest you pull up immediately.' I advised the Tower that I had good visual contact with the field and that there was no conflict. The Tower also mentioned something about being below the MDA. I am not sure why I got this warning message from the Tower but I am thinking they still believed I was on an ILS approach. I have sent an email to a flight instructor asking for clarification but I do not believe I was ever below any MDA before obtaining clear visual conditions in and around the approach path and around the airport. Visibility below the cloud layer was excellent with a ceiling at the time around 1;400 FT while on the approach.




Synopsis: A light twin's ILS glideslope failed on the ASH ILS14 so the pilot continued on a Localizer Approach and ATC issued a LOW ALTITUDE ALERT PULL UP but the reporter believed he was above minimums when he became VMC.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Manuals; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The flight was a ferry flight with no passengers or flight attendant. It was an empty aircraft with 1500 lbs of ballast fuel added. While holding; we calculated decision fuel by adding reserve 1800; burn to alternate 800; and a burn of about 200 lbs to the destination which gave us a decision fuel about around 2800 lbs. We held till we had 3800 lbs and I decided to divert to the alternate because the weather over our destination was not moving and it was becoming apparent that we were not going to have enough time to get in. Dispatch also advised us that the approximately 800 lbs burn was at 17000 ft altitude (we were at 12;000 ft). When we were enroute to the alternate; Dispatch advised us that we couldn't burn into the 1500 lbs of ballast fuel that we had. So our real reserve was not 1800 lbs but 3300 lbs. Since we were already on our way to the alternate at this point; and the weather was good; I made the decision to continue to the alternate. We landed with a little over 3000 lbs which was below the reserve fuel of 3300 lbs. There was confusion over whether our reserve fuel was 1800 lbs or 3300 lbs and we didn't realize it was the higher number till advised by Dispatch. Dispatch also advised me that their software doesn't account for ballast fuel when planning for decision fuel and as a result we were not advised of the higher number earlier during the flight. I contacted a few other pilots and there is definitely confusion over whether the ballast fuel is used for actual ballast or to 'trick' the weight and balance program to giving us a proper calculation. I will verify the release paperwork for the 'reserve' fuel number and not just assume it to be in the vicinity of 1800 lbs. I think the company should clarify the reason for the ballast fuel and specific requirements of the ballast fuel for empty flights as there seems to be confusion about it. In addition; pilots should be made aware of this potential for confusion. Because of the added stress of holding during weather events; the potential for this to be overlooked is greater.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 ferry flight with ballast fuel diverted because of poor destination weather after holding and learned ballast fuel cannot be burned as holding fuel.