elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Postflight procedures
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we arrived on the FBO ramp in Aircraft X; we were directed to park in a corner directly in front of a propeller Aircraft Y. While were closing up our aircraft; the pilot of the Aircraft Y approached my SIC (second in command) and asked if there was enough room for home to fit between our airplane and an Aircraft Z. The SIC told him there was not enough room and that he should wait. The line personnel told him they'd move our airplane so he had enough room to depart. As the line personnel start connecting our plane to the tug; the Aircraft Y pilot loaded his passengers and started his engine. Immediately after starting; he began taxing between Aircraft X and Aircraft Z. While moving; Aircraft Y was being rocked by the winds on the ramp causing his wing to move up and down. As he approached our aircraft; he maneuvered to place one of his wings over our wing and the other over the nose of Aircraft Z. The line personnel gave the Aircraft Y pilot thumbs up and never attempted to give the signal to stop movement. As his wing crossed over ours; the two wings were within a foot of each other; especially due Aircraft Y's wing rocking. They got so close that one line guy actually tried to keep the Aircraft Y's wing from striking our wing with his hand. Aircraft Y made it past both our aircraft and Aircraft Z without making contact; however; it was in very close proximity.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of a ground conflict between his parked airplane and another pilot taxiing in close proximity.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Second aircraft: Robinson R44
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After announcing out intention to depart from Runway XX at ZZZ; during our initial climb; we identified Aircraft Y approaching head on. After a moment of indecision; we realized that we were about to collide with this aircraft. We initiated an evasive maneuver by lowering our nose and banking to the right; east northeast. After narrowly escaping the collision I make a call on the CTAF frequency asking Aircraft Y if he was aware that Runway XX was in use. His reply was that he was landing on XY. I informed him that the wind was favoring XX and he replied that no; the wind favored Runway XZ; and he added something that was not clearly heard by us but to the effect that he can use any runway he want. I informed him that we narrowly avoided a midair collision and he responded that he had us in sight the whole time.It should be noted that he made no attempt to alter his course until the moment that we began our evasive maneuver. In my opinion; it was our maneuver that alerted him to our position; and only at that time did he alter course. Immediately after the encounter; I determined that the ASOS was reporting the wind at 320/11 gusting to 19 kts. The actions of the pilot of Aircraft Y clearly rose to the level of 14 CFR 91.13 'careless and reckless.'




Synopsis: SR-22 Instructor reported executing a successful evasive maneuver during initial climb due to an NMAC event with another aircraft landing on the opposite runway.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [Our new dispatching software] continues to give bad information. It must be programmed to recognize a single runway. When that runway is currently closed it assumes the airport is closed and recommends an alternate. A flight can NOT be dispatched to a closed airport. Adding an alternate doesn't matter. It's recommending illegal advice.  ANALYSIS  FLT to ATL  DESTINATION RUNWAY CLOSED  CLT - RUNWAY 18R/36L  ARRIVAL WINDOW APRXX/XD03Z-XEF3Z  DESTINATION CLT - ALTERNATE RECOMMENDED - THRESHOLD-EXP ALT ARRIVAL RUNWAYS 18R/36L CLOSED ANALYSIS DONE ON DESTINATION STATION ONLY PER ANALYSIS RULES CLT KCLT XB52Z 33003KT 6SM BR OVC055 13/13 A2987 RMK AO2 SLP109                              CLT RAMTAF XA32Z 0108/0202                    FM0800 00000KT P6SM BKN020 OVC040               FM1300 00000KT P6SM OVC035                  FM2000 30007KT P6SM SCT120     CLT does not require an alternate. By adding CAE an additional 3;174 pounds of fuel will be carried. The alternate does not allow Dispatch assuming the airport is closed. It's a trap. This program is giving illegal advice. It also advices to add unnecessary fuel that counts against my [arrival fuel average]; while the company has begun to discipline dispatchers for what they feel is a high [arrival fuel average].




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher laments the dispatch planning software that his company has begun using and believes that it is creating extra work.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At 5;000 feet on downwind encountered wake turbulence that caused aircraft to roll rapidly from right to left to right with bank angles approx. 30 degrees. The autopilot did not disengage and the aircraft recovered without incident. We asked ATC what we were following and they informed us we were following a heavy 777 that was following another heavy aircraft. We informed them we had experienced wake turbulence and gotten approx. 30 degrees of roll. At this point we had cleared the wake turbulence and asked for the max separation they could provide on approach. They informed us we had legal separation but would give us as much spacing as traffic would allow.ATC was helpful and accommodating and we continued the approach without further incident. ATC told us they were going to file a report so the event was on record and could be investigated. In my opinion there was no failure of any flight crew or ATC personnel.  The purpose of this report is to provide a record of the event. It seems that there has been an increase in wake turbulence events lately which may require revisiting the current guidelines. Following multiple heavy aircraft even though we had proper separation.   No errors were committed by any involved personnel; but separation policies may need to be reviewed.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B777 on approach to ATL that resulted in rapid left and right rolls.
Date: 201703
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As a new lead on the crew I observed for the first time the installation of the R/H Side stay on the R/H main gear during a stay for all landing gear replacements. I observed with great anxiety while a crew of 4 installed the side stay using nothing but their bare hands and a scissor lift. The side stay weighs 138 lbs and is awkward to handle. Meanwhile; special equipment meant to install heavy and awkward main gear parts sets to side of the hangar with a red tag stating that we are waiting for engineering to approve the use of this important and safe tool. It is my opinion the present procedures are unsafe and an accident waiting to happen and should not be attempted without the right tool for the job. In my 30 years I have had on the job injuries and the first question I always get from management is; 'what could you have done to prevent this incident?' I feel there is no excuse to the lack of cooperation and procedures to mitigate an accident certain to happen if these procedures continue unsafely.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Lead Technician reported that Airbus A320 mechanics are unable to utilize the proper equipment to install heavy landing gear parts due to lack of engineering approval.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Enroute to] IAH; we were given new routing to MULLT-LINKK1. While enroute; the airport had a 25 kt. gain over the runway. All arrivals went into holding. We were given direct to MULLT; hold as published; leg length our discretion. I opted to do 20 nm legs for passenger comfort since our EFC was about 30 minutes away. During holding I was notified from Dispatch that we were approximately 60 nm. offshore. I immediately changed the holding pattern back to 10 miles hoping that would keep us within 50 miles. Before I could query ATC; they gave us vectors to ZZZ-IAH. ATC never said anything about us being more than 50 miles offshore. The other factor is our iPads do not have moving maps enabled in JeppFD. If we had that; I would have thought to watch it; and put a 50 mile ring on the moving map. I called my Dispatcher after landing in IAH; and she told me that we had other flights going over 50 miles offshore due to Houston Center routing. We were not the only flight. Task saturation was also a factor. I recommend Company enable the moving map capability in JeppFD-Pro; it would give us much more situational awareness.




Synopsis: E175 Captain reported that workload and iPad limitations resulted in the aircraft exceeding 50 miles from the coast during a hold.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A MD80 called us climbing out on the departure. My trainee RADAR identified the MD80. The next transmission was for the MD80 to 'climb unrestricted maintain 11;000'. The MD80 read back 'unrestricted maintain 11;000'. The next transmission was to the MD80 'traffic 12 o'clock; 20 miles turning northbound a Boeing 737 restricted above you'; the MD80 replied 'traffic in sight'. My trainee instructed the MD80 to maintain visual separation from that traffic and the MD80 read back we will maintain visual separation. The MD80 busted his altitude and at 11;300 my trainee turned the MD80 to a 180 heading for traffic and asked the MD80 to verify they still had the B737 in sight and were maintaining visual; the MD80 replied verify that traffic is at our 11 o'clock.  My trainee replied affirmative and the MD80 replied we are maintaining visual separation from that traffic. The MD80 didn't appear to take the 180 heading and was climbing very well so we waited until the MD80 had vertical separation and issued the new altitude and route to fly.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a climb above authorized altitude during the application of visual separation.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we entered arrival area for our final destination; ATC informed us airport was closed due to disabled aircraft on runway. No WX alternate required per flight plan; so we diverted to a nearby airport. Informed Dispatch via ACARS [and] received our divert airport as our alternate. Dispatcher informed us (after landing) that they had declared min fuel for us with ATC. We landed with 5;000 pounds. Gate arrival was right at our 'non extended' (Flight Duty Period) FDP day. After discussion; we both decided we were fit for duty for an extension and that this was 'unforeseen operational circumstance per FAR 117. Coordinated with Dispatch for FDP extension. Pushed off gate for our original destination. On starting left engine; ATC advised us they observed 'some kind of unusual fire/smoke from left engine.' All engine indications normal. We shut down engine and towed back to gate for maintenance inspection. With this additional delay; and with ATC now reporting ground stop for ZZZ; we decided it was unfeasible to depart and reasonably stay within FDP extension time. Advised Dispatch.


Second narrative: Not sure if I even need to file a report for this; but when our filed destination airport shutdown due to a disabled aircraft on the runway; we diverted to a nearby airport. Dispatch declared 'Min Fuel' for our flight. We did not declare 'min fuel'.  We had 6600 pounds about 10 minutes out from the airport.


Synopsis: A MD-83 shut an engine down during start after Ground Control reported 'some kind of unusual fire/smoke from our left engine'.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Wind
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing trough 14;000 feet; Number 2 engine suddenly shook and had a classic indication of an engine seizure. I looked down and noticed the EPR rolling back and the N2 at near 0 and low oil pressure light illuminated. CA stabilized the aircraft. After situation assessment; CA had me take control of the airplane and we leveled out at 15;000 feet. We both determined ZZZ1 [airport] would be an acceptable divert option due to winds in ZZZ (Heavy Crosswind out of SE limits). ECAMs and QRH procedures completed and we safely landed in ZZZ1 on Runway XX. CFR determined there was no fire; nor any indication of fuel leak/oil leak etc. Because of the Number 2 engine being failed; CA elected to have us towed to the gate; which was accomplished by the Ground Crew.


Second narrative: Climbing through 14;000 feet Number 2 Engine seized; loud bang; aircraft kicked to the right; no N2 rotation; EPR rolled back to zero; low oil pressure light illuminated. Gave FO aircraft control; told him to level at 15;000 feet. I ran ECAM; QRH; and radios. Shutdown Number 2 Engine; and ran Engine Out Immediate Landing Checklist. Notified Washington Center of situation. ZZZ [airport] had crosswinds in excess of 20 knots so diverted to ZZZ [airport] Runway XX. FO flew while I set us up for ILS to Runway XX ZZZ [airport]. I took control of aircraft intercepting the LOC. Single Engine landing was uneventful. Cleared Runway; Fire Marshal looked over Number 2 Engine; no fire or leaks found. Shut down aircraft. Maintenance towed us to the gate.


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported an engine failure during takeoff resulting in a diversion to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At the FNCHR fix on the FNCHR 1 RNAV arrival to MEM. The airbus FMS system does not display the altitude window (10;000 to 16;000) at FNCHR as any kind of constraint. We attempted to fly the arrival in full automation (profile) but early in the arrival we had to resort to level change and manual speed control. I was distracted by doing everything manually and was relying on the displayed constraints on the ND. The F/O noticed (late) about a half mile past FNCHR we were about 200 feet high. So I estimate we were about 300 high (16;300) at FNCHR. Always enter something manually at every fix if it does not display it as part of the loaded nav data base. Then if you do not reference the plate (which I should for every upcoming fix anyway) and rely on the Nav Display as I did; you won't miss a restriction. Do not ever trust the Airbus to fly any of these arrivals as published in profile. I have not talked to one pilot that has had any luck doing this.




Synopsis: Airbus Captain states that his aircraft does not comply with the FNCHR 1 RNAV arrival to MEM using full automation and the altitude window at FNCHR is not displayed on the ND.