elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Left main tire blowout caused aircraft to depart runway to left onto gravel area then grass area. No damage to airport facility or airport equipment. No damage to aircraft; and no injuries. Light tire mark on runway. No indentation nor damage nor blemish in runway surface.




Synopsis: A small home built pilot blew a tire causing it to veer off the runway into a grassy area. The reporter mentions no damage to the aircraft; airport; or runway surface.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The crew arrived at the aircraft early in the morning. A fog and distinct smell filled the jet way and aircraft. An external air cart was running and connected to the aircraft; the APU and packs were also running. Flight Operations Manual (FOM) states do not use ground air and the packs at the same time to prevent the non-return valves from chattering.  A ramp employee confirmed that the packs and the external air cart had ran all night together.  The first officer had arrived 5 minutes before the rest of the crew and was unable to enter the cockpit because the door was closed and locked.  After a few knocks the keypad was used and the door unlocked and there was an individual in a sleeping bag laying on the floor; and he was just awaking.  It was still a few minutes before we could enter the cockpit because this individual had to get up and get dressed and pack up his camping gear. At this time it became evident that the aircraft had been deiced at the gate (full body) without being properly configured.  Maintenance was called on the phone to defer another item; but I also asked about the deicing. If the aircraft is going to be deiced there is a specific checklist to use to configure the aircraft.  If this station is allowing the aircraft to be deiced at the gate prior to the crew arriving there should be a procedure to make sure our procedures are being followed. This also applies to the deice vendor; they also have a responsibility to make sure an aircraft is properly configured prior to spraying it.  If we are going to have all contract personnel; at all our stations; we need some accountability; training and some supervision.  I have previously contacted both the Chief Pilot of Operations (CPO) and Security Operations Control (SOC) about this particular station and have been threatened with disciplinary action for doing so. As for the guy in the sleeping bag on the floor... all I can say is WOW.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported his aircraft was deiced early in the morning prior to his arrival without following his airline's procedures for doing so.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the Captain flying from ZZZZ. We landed on Runway 10 in ZZZZ at approximately XA47Z. We landed in ZZZZ and taxied to the South ramp to clear customs. After clearing customs; we started the aircraft up and taxied to the North ramp to be parked in position for our outbound fight. While taxiing to the other side of the airport it began to rain. It was raining enough that the wipers were needed to see in front of us.We had a marshaler guiding us into our parking spot. It was one situated in a position where we needed to nose in; and turn 180 degrees to face out.  He instructed us to turn right into the empty spot facing a wall. He then instructed us to turn right again.  As I turned the aircraft to the right (parallel to the wall and the taxiway) Co-pilot noticed the marshaler may have been getting us close to a GPU situated along the wall. Co-pilot asked 'are we clear?' I slowed the plane; basically to a stop to look back as far as I could. From what I saw through the rain covered side window we were clear of the GPU. I then moved my attention the the marshaler who instructed me to turn right yet again to face out (in line; wingtip to wingtip with the other parked planes). It was at that point we felt a slight jolt and realized the wing had come into contact with the GPU.After the impact; I set the brake and the marshaler ran over to the GPU. He was able to push it along the wall away from the aircraft. He then came back to the nose of the plane to finish parking us.After the engines were shut down; and the checklist complete we opened the door to inspect the damage. There was a dent in the slat; and part of the wingtip due to the collision.In the future I will use more caution when trying to maneuver the aircraft on a congested ramp. Looking back; it would have been a good idea to request a wing walker as well.




Synopsis: Medium Transport aircraft Captain reported making contact with a Ground Power Unit while being marshaled in to their parking spot.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There was a guest assigned X3; despite the fact the seat is blocked as per social distancing guidelines and safety of FA's.The Customer Service Agent (CSA) refused to reseat the guest; which made me feel very uncomfortable to say the least. A CSA was informed and asked to reseat; however they refused the request; which violated the policy; jeopardizing safety of flight attendants; as well as created a major inconsistency. As a solution there was an option to move a guest traveling by themselves; like anyone from Row X-Y; that was not done by the CSA.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the blocked seat in front of the FA jumpseat was assigned to a passenger. The CSA would not reassign the passenger per social distancing policy.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on the DRLLR arrival into in IAH. We initially loaded the 26R transition and approach while on the ground.  On our initial check in with approach we were assigned 26L.  We changed the runway in the FMS and checked to make sure the fixes matched up. We verified that the runway and approach loaded; the downwind point changed from DOOM to VLDEZ and the rest of the fixes were correct. Upon reaching DOMNO the plane didn't start to turn and went into roll mode and we flew past the fix. We immediately started to turn back to rejoin the arrival and that was when ATC asked us if we were turning. We rejoined and nothing else was said. Later in the day the  Chief Pilot called me and told me that ATC had sent an email to him about the incident and also that 3 other of our planes also had the same thing happen.  He explained that it was a known issue with the database.  The problem arises when there is a runway change and the downwind point changes.  The FMS will create a duplicate waypoint and that is where lateral navigation will be lost.  Both of us thought we verified the flight plan correctly and did not see a duplicate waypoint in the flight plan.  Discussing the incident we think that maybe the duplicate waypoints were separated by a page break and we didn't recognize that there were duplicate waypoints. The main threat was the runway change in the FMS with a known database error.  That led to the undesired aircraft state of being off course.  The error that we had was an improper check and verification of the FMS flight plan after the fact and not being quick enough to intervene when we didn't make the downwind turn.  To prevent this from happening again I can ensure a closer verification of the flight plan.  The database issue with creating duplicate waypoint is something that absolutely needs to be fixed.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reports that his aircraft failed to turn at DOMNO on the DRLLR 2 to IAH. The Chief Pilot informs the Captain that there is a database error that creates a duplicate waypoint when a runway change is initiated.
Date: 201708
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other General Ramp
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Shift Change
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I am a lead ramp service person here. I have been primarily working the flights in gates 2 and 3 We are beginning to have a problem with people running across the gates in the middle of working the flights. The people involved are usually [other company] employees who are coming out of the 2 stairwell running across gate 2 and 3 ramp gate area to catch the bus behind gate 4. I thought these employees were supposed to come out gate 3 stairwell access point. Some have walked behind running engines. We are lucky no one has gotten hurt yet. Some have almost gotten hit by ramp equipment. Another issue is some of these employees are not wearing ID badges in place we can see them. As I am a ground service crew I have challenged a few to remind them to wear their IDs. Just a couple of days ago I was pushing a plane out gate 3 and a person running for the bus ran under the wings and behind my aircraft. I work evenings and problem gets worse as the night progresses. I believe these employees should only come out of the gate 3 door. This may solve the problem. Maybe this need to be addressed. I will report this also when I get the time. Also besides running across the gates we stages cargo for flights in the area. Some of this cargo is high value and should not be exposed to personal not working the flights.




Synopsis: A ramp service person reported that during service times people are running across the ramp to catch a bus. Sometimes when aircraft engines are running.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Ground CLT; TRACON CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: FMS/GPS inop; our dispatcher filed IFR using BUCKL 7 DEP BUCKL; CAE; direct CRE; direct to destination. Clearance delivery gave us Panther 5; CAE direct CRE instead; then asked us if [we] were RNAV EQPT and we stated that we were not; that we were only VOR EQPT. After a short silence he told us to expect radar vectors to CAE; radar vectors to CRE.I shortly afterwards reviewed our NOTAMs that stated CAE VOR was out of service and that Panther 5 is N/A unless RNAV EQPT. During taxing the ground controller asked us if we had the NOTAM about CAE VOR and we told we were to be given radar vectors. Never heard any more about this during the rest of our flight (or afterwards). I assumed our clearance was legal since we had been cleared using the Panther 5 DEP and were given radar vectors through the whole departure; and that ATC authorized the flight plan and gave us the clearance. After further thinking I am now in doubt if ATC had authorization to issue the Panther 5 to start with and if we should had refused it.




Synopsis: A CL65 Captain questioned whether the ATC issued CLT Panther 5 Departure was legal because of their aircraft was VOR only.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Second aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During the BRDJE 3 Arrival into DFW at FL240 we experienced a wake turbulence event requiring disengagement of the autopilot and manual normalization of aircraft attitude. We believe we passed through the descent path of a 787 ahead of us on the arrival. The wind conditions appeared to be a direct headwind which likely kept the wake of the aircraft laterally aligned with the published routing. When sufficient spacing is unavailable; utilize lateral course deviations to the upwind side to mitigate the possibility of a wake turbulence event.




Synopsis: Embraer jet First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence at FL240 in trail of a B787 on arrival into DFW.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZHN.ARTCC, HI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZHN
ATC / advisory: Center ZHN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This is an ONGOING problem. Every day; the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) assigns sector R3 flow control where R3 needs to cross EVERY jet into HNL approach at 10000 MSL at 250 knots at BAMBO and have them 10 miles in trail. The problem is that HNL Approach does NOT take the handoffs at BAMBO. When my D-side called today; the coordinator said they do not see the aircraft and to 'keep them coming.' If HNL Approach cannot see an aircraft at 10000; I don't think it should be standard procedure to cross all aircraft at 10000; which is an altitude that HNL Approach cannot see the aircraft. As an R3 person; I am not certified in HNL Approach Airspace; and I'm not comfortable keeping my planes going into an airspace where I do not know their MIAs; MVAs; and I am not looking at all their traffic. I feel this is a safety issue; because I should not be responsible for their airspace; as well as my own airspace.If HNL Approach cannot see an aircraft at 10000; we should be crossing the aircraft at a higher altitude. HNL Approach does not climb aircraft into our airspace at R3; so maybe we should just stop all aircraft at 17000; and let HNL Approach take care of descending the aircraft down into their airspace. The current procedure creates lots of workload; at an already busy sector. It is very distracting to call EVERY aircraft at BAMBO at 10000 for a handoff; and it is a safety issue; especially during the rush when we may need to call 20 planes in a row.




Synopsis: Hawaii Center Controller reported that the flow control directives regarding arrivals to HCF TRACON airspace are unsafe and create extra workload for the controllers.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Icing; Turbulence; Snow; 6
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: IFR departure; climbing through 4000 feet MSL on a 040 heading the aircraft encountered IMC flight conditions & light snow. Light to moderate mixed ice began accumulating on the leading edges of both the left and right airfoils. Pneumatic de-ice boots were turned on and began their cycle. Center cleared the aircraft to 9000 feet MSL; direct ZZZ. Upon climbing through 8500 feet MSL the aircraft's Central Advisory and Warning System (CAWS) reported an amber caption denoting a failure of our pneumatic de-ice boots. A visual inspection of the pneumatic boots cycle confirmed the CAWS indication. While in icing conditions both pilots were in agreement to contact Center; request priority handling; in an attempt to exit icing conditions and divert the aircraft to ZZZ1. Center cleared the aircraft down to 6000 feet MSL; direct ZZZ1. While in the descend to 6000 feet MSL the moderate icing conditions continued. [Center was notified and acknowledged my diversion] request; notified approach; and instructed the radio handoff. Approach cleared the aircraft down to an altitude which was VMC. Within 10nm of ZZZ1 both pilots confirmed the airport in sight and advised Approach. Approach cleared the aircraft for the visual approach to runway XX. The crew executed a no flap landing as directed per the AFM. ZZZ1 ground cleared the aircraft to parking. Upon engine shut down the crew informed all emergency personnel no further assistance was needed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: PC-12 flight crew reported during climb they encountered ice when an amber caption denoting a failure of the deice system came on.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Guest was noted with a vented mask during boarding. I was able to furnish a mask and requested it be place over the vent at the very least; as vents are no longer permitted. Please ensure we are still checking for this situation. It is not fun to be consistently working this problem on board the aircraft. If we are not adhering to this policy can it be amended?




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported having to inform a passenger about the no vent mask policy and questioned whether the policy is still being adhered to.