Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: It was a VFR summer day with light to moderate traffic.  RNAV departures were in use and I was working departures on Runway XXL and arrivals on Runway XXR.  After putting Aircraft X in position; an unexpected Aircraft Z checked in to the NW requesting to take pictures on 'site 4.' No pre-coordination of 'site 4' or an expected photo flight was previously relayed. I delayed Aircraft X's takeoff clearance until I understood where the Aircraft Z would be in relation to the departures. Around XA:52Z I cleared Aircraft Z into to the BRAVO airspace and clarified his intentions; where he wanted to go and how long he would be there.  At XA:53:50Z I cleared Aircraft X for Takeoff via RNAV ZZZZZ.  He read back the clearance with ZZZZZ as the appropriate initial RNAV fix.  I put Aircraft A into position and cleared him for takeoff on a North RNAV routing at XA:54:30 and put Aircraft B into position.   At XA:54:50Z I coordinated a handoff for Aircraft Z with LC3 that ended at XA:55:03Z where I described 'site 4's' location and duration of the photoshoot for pop-up VFR Aircraft Z. During this time I was scanning Runway XXR for Aircraft C on short final and Runway XXL for Aircraft A's departure roll. LC3 accepted the handoff and immediately started a traffic call for his departure Aircraft Y who was lifting off Runway XYR.  During our coordination Aircraft X made a hard left turn to the Southwest right off the departure end.  At XA:55:07Z I started issuing a safety alert. At XA:55:08 the CA [Conflict Alert] on the radar activated. LC3 shouted his guy was stopped at 2;000 with my guy in sight.  With Aircraft X climbing out of 025 rapidly; I looked at the window and verified that Aircraft B had leveled and was behind Aircraft X.  I stopped the safety alert and advised traffic was no longer a factor and issued a turn to a heading of 295.  Aircraft A was rolling and I wanted to make sure I had room before turning further.  After checking Aircraft A's position in his roll; I turned Aircraft X to a 360 heading and eventually back to a 290 heading before switching him to departure.Part of our procedures is to ensure that departures are on the correct RNAV track prior to switching them to departure.  The pivot where the RNAV tracks split is about 1.25 miles off the departure end of Runway XXL.  At 180 knots (3 miles a minute) it takes about 15 seconds for a departure to leave the departure end and turn on their appropriate track.  It is clearly inappropriate to fixate on any part of the operation for 15 seconds; yet at any point in that 15 seconds the pilot has the ability to inadvertently turn off course; in which case it is our responsibility to notice and correct.   Any time I am looking at the departure end; I am not looking at the runway; final; radar; etc.  The scan is vital and takes time.  When I last looked at Aircraft X before the event; he was flying straight on course.  After scanning both runways and the final during my coordination; I look back expecting to see him approaching his pivot point.  Instead I see him half a mile off course in a southwest bound turn.   There was some expectation bias there on my part.  I wouldn't say the timing of the coordination was a cause of delay in seeing the wrong turn; as I was still scanning during coordination.  Had the aircraft that lined up on Runway XXL started rolling without a clearance; I would have seen that immediately as that is where I was in my scan.  I would say the timing of my scan needs to be adjusted to make sure an aircraft doesn't immediately turn left off the departure end as this one did and then come back to check the RNAV track a few moment later.  I usually check when they are about .5-1 mile off the departure end which I did in this case but with his turn being as early as it was; a half mile put them approaching  the Runway XYR departure corridor rapidly.  I waited to launch Aircraft X while collecting information from Aircraft Z as that is not something I do every day; and as a TMC before the COVID schedule; rarely did at all.  I could have gone ahead and coordinated with LC3 before launching Aircraft X so it was taken care of.  In hind sight; this would have delayed the departures by a minute or two but; in this situation;  it would be justified in my opinion.  It would also have been helpful to have a sheet depicting where site 4 was so that so much time wasn't taken up having Aircraft Z verbally relay it; and then relaying that information to LC3.  While it is well within our ability to handle VFR pop-ups; the extra coordination does take time and attention.   From the pilot side; we were always required to verify departures in the FMS; fix by fix; together as a crew and agree on the programming.  The Captain would typically enter the data and the Co-pilot; with the departure plate out; would verify every fix.  It took an extra few minutes to do this but was deemed essential as a wrong turn out of ZZZ or ZZZ1 was not an option.  It was mandated on every flight to prevent situations just like this.  I'm not sure if every company has a similar policy but they should.  If [airline] were to implement such a procedure it could help nation wide.


Second narrative: We were departing Runway XYR in ZZZ on the ZZZZZ1 departure.  After autopilot was engaged at 600 feet; but before reaching acceleration altitude of 1;000; I was checking the FMA for FMS and Autopilot engagement; when I saw an Amber TCAS mark showing +600 feet and much too close to us.  At that moment my First Officer verbalized seeing an aircraft very close out the window.  The other aircraft was climbing above us and crossing our RNAV path from right to left.  I immediately turned off the autopilot and stopped my climb.  Then we received 'Monitor Vertical Rate.'  Tower then requested for us to level off; which we had already done.  Then we received; 'Clear Of Conflict.'  We could see the other aircraft adjusting with a right turn back to their proper path.  We proceeded to clean up our aircraft and complete all checklists.  When we were clear; ATC gave us instructions to continue our climb.  We continued on the ZZZZZ1 and on to our destination without further event.It seems as though the other involved aircraft took off of XXL and made an abrupt and incorrect left turn in to our XYR departure corridor.


Synopsis: Pilot and Controller reported an airborne conflict on departure.