elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ZBW TMU (Traffic Management Unit) put in place a CAN-NOSIK re-route routing JFK departures up through R09. This increases the volume and complexity of this sector immensely. When I took the desk I noticed R09 was getting very busy; primarily with high-level traffic. I called our TMU to ask for ZOB to keep BOS and BED arrivals out of R09 airspace and down in R10 to reduce the complexity at R09. They were reluctant to do it but they asked; the STMC (Supervisory Traffic Management Coordinator) even asked 'well can you split R08 out?' I said it wouldn't help. It was very disconcerting to me that I was getting resistance from my own in-house TMU on a play that is regularly used to alleviate volume. It wasn't to re-route these BOS/BED aircraft; rather; to *NOT* shortcut them. Keep them on the routes they had when they departed. Subsequently we started receiving a high volume of eastbound traffic from CZYZ destined to BOS and BED. We inquired with our TMU and found that ZOB was unwilling to change the routes on those aircraft to keep them in Sector R10; instead they routed them all up into CZYZ (DTW; CYYZ; BUF; CLE; IAG; MSP departures; etc.) and significantly increased the workload and volume for R09 for the rest of the night. Our TMU advised that Command Center approved it at ZOB's request. This was baffling that our TMU was unwilling to do anything to help our Area; and instead worsened the condition. It has become very evident that there is no one in this building; management or TMU; that is concerned about either safety or the NAS; only concerned about keeping the planes running. TMU should accept the suggestions/recommendations from the Areas when they ask; and keep aircraft out of a sector instead of routing additional traffic into it.




Synopsis: ZBW Controller reported Traffic Management Unit refused to assist their sector while they were in high volume and complex situations.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During an IOE flight at approximately 700 FT after departure at night we experienced a complete electrical failure (no lights; communication; or navigation). After reaching a safe altitude we assessed the situation. We decided to make a left downwind and remain in the traffic pattern. We planned; briefed and executed an emergency landing gear extension and a no flap landing. After landing and clearing the runway: ATC; the gate and the company were notified of the incident via cell phone. Shortly after; Airport Operations arrived and took passengers and baggage to the terminal. Then our aircraft was towed to the company hangar. I'm not sure what we can do to avoid this event from recurring; but if it does it would be helpful to have a handheld com/nav in each aircraft; especially if the conditions are IFR.




Synopsis: Light Twin Captain experiences a complete electrical failure at 700 FT AGL after takeoff. After climbing to a safe altitude; flight returns to the departure airport for a no flap landing after emergency extension of the landing gear.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb; it took an unusual amount of rudder trim-initially 3 units-to maintain straight flight. While continuing to climb; I moved the rudder trim back to a more normal setting-around 1.5 to 2 units to see how the aircraft would respond. The control wheel continued to indicate a need for more left rudder trim. As TAS increased; the need for additional left rudder trim increased up to 5 units to maintain straight flight. After level off in cruise; I contacted maintenance to know if 5 units was within tolerance. They replied yes as long as we can maintain straight flight. Soon after; it took additional left rudder trim; now up to 6 to 7 units of left rudder trim to maintain straight flight. Then without any pilot input; we noticed the rudder trim gauge was increasing on its own; including some minor fluctuations in the gauge. At 10 units on the gauge; I decided to return to ZZZ and [advise ATC]. The rudder trim gauge eventually went to its maximum limit although actual rudder input wasn't at maximum. I gave the flying duties to the FO while I managed to emergency with ATC; company; crew; and pilot monitoring duties. The FO confirmed that there was still sufficient rudder input available though it still was about 7 to 8 units of rudder trim to maintain straight flight; both with and without the autopilot.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported an abnormal amount of rudder trim was required to maintain level flight. After consulting with Maintenance; a decision was made to return to the departure airport where an uneventful landing was accomplished.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZSU.ARTCC, PR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZSU
ATC / advisory: Center ZSU
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X was a helicopter eastbound on an airway. ZSU has a jump zone for paradrops on the airway and on the edge of an enroute sector and an approach sector. The Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA) on the airway is 3;000 feet and off the airway is 3;600 feet inside enroute airspace west of the jump zone. As aircraft X is nearing the eastern boundary of my sector and the western boundary of the approach sector (approximately 8 miles) the Approach Controller calls me for a point out on aircraft Y climbing for paradrops. I advised the controller to hold the jump aircraft because of the helicopter approaching from the west. The helicopter was in hand-off mode. The Approach Controller called me back to advise that aircraft Y was not responding and turn the helicopter north. I had to turn the helicopter 50 degrees north; off the airway to avoid the jump zone; in a MVA of 3;600 feet. I did ask the pilot to maintain terrain and obstruction clearance.Send this to the local safety council for analysis. I could have called the Approach Controller in advance to give them a heads up of the traffic on the airway approaching their sector from the east. I talked to the Approach Controller after the close call and he said the pilot never acknowledged the calls; only calling back to report that they were descending. The pilot never gave a 'jumpers away' call or '2 minutes to jumpers'.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported having to turn an aircraft into an area below the MVA due to a parachute jump aircraft not responding to instructions.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback and engine start during initial taxi out I had to stop the aircraft abruptly after attaining momentum for my turn out for a ground vehicle entering my taxi path.




Synopsis: Pilot reported having to stop for a vehicle in the aircraft's path during pushback.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / Allegro
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Experienced a sudden loss of oil pressure and uncontrollable propeller RPM resulting in propeller overspeed. Partial power was used to maintain safe RPM by reducing throttle to keep RPMs in limit. An [expedited] landing was made at ZZZ.




Synopsis: M20J pilot reported loss of oil pressure and propeller control.
Date: 201408
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We] were cleared for takeoff behind an A320. We were about 3.5 [miles] in trail through most of the climb. We caught a little bit of wake and the plane bumped. This set off the shaker briefly. We flew through the wake with no further occurrence.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence after takeoff in trail of an A320 that resulted in a momentary stick shaker.
Date: 201309
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Violated 2 FAR's. First [I] blocked 4 out of 5 jumpseats with parked carts. Company's official procedures require flight attendants to park 4 half carts at both doors 1L/1R which blocks 1L aft and 1R jumpseats. [I was] also required to park liquor cart in cross-aisle blocking 1 Center L and 1 Center R jumpseats. This is official procedure as well as necessity as galley is too small in relation to the number of passengers and extent of service. Secondly [I] left unsecured carts unattended. Because there are only 2 aisle flight attendants who can attend only 1 cart each. Three of the 5 unsecured (there are no tie downs) carts are by definition unattended. Galley Flight Attendant and Purser are both in galley setting up and breaking down 3 tier carts while aisle flight attendants work in aisle so cannot be considered aisle flight attendants. With this configuration there is literally no other way to accomplish service. Also did not deploy cart restraints (not sure if this is an FAR violation) for two other cart positions (this is where half carts are stowed 1 behind the other). Reason for this being that rear cart restraints cannot be deployed as required (by placards) at same time that front cart restraints are deployed. I.E.-if rear restraints are deployed then carts protrude past the front restraints. It would obviously be even more dangerous to leave front restraints un-deployed (especially because the brakes on these carts; particularly the half carts; do not work) so I didn't use rear restraints. Luckily there was no bad turbulence and we did not have to take our jumpseats during service. Made sure to put all carts away in housing (though there are no tie-downs in housing either; which the un-reconfigured 767s still have) as soon as service completed--which took a full 4.5 hours.




Synopsis: B767 Flight Attendant believes that the aircraft she is working is not properly configured to allow compliance with FAR's and comply with company procedures for passenger service.
Date: 201503
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Nose landing gear did not extend during landing. After a go around was accomplished the First Officer completed the QRH for gear disagree. This did not fix the problem. We stated our intentions to do a low pass of the tower so a visual check could be done. The tower verified our nose landing gear was not extended. After delaying vectors to prepare for the approach and coordinate with the flight attendants; we completed a landing with only the main landing gear extended. All passengers deplaned via the main cabin door with no injuries. Things were happening very quickly and we didn't have much fuel to play around with; but we did our best to get everyone on the ground safe and sound.




Synopsis: A regional jet Captain experiences failure of the nose landing gear to extend during approach; resulting in a go-around. All attempts to extended the nose gear are unsuccessful and a landing with the nose gear retracted ensues. Passengers are evacuated through the main cabin door.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were holding short of Runway XX at Taxiway XX. Tower cleared us for takeoff on Runway XX shortened. In the past; I have back taxi from [Taxiway] XX into position on Runway XX for takeoff. When we accepted the clearance; we stated we were back taxiing and ATC did not respond. After I back taxied this time; Tower says that it is NOTAMed out that we cannot back taxi; but I had already done so.The NOTAM came out [the previous month] and I have not been in ZZZ since then. I did not interpret the NOTAM to mean I could not back taxi since I had done it before. Our takeoff numbers are based on 1;000 feet. shortened from the threshold of Runway XX not from Taxiway XX which is nearly 1;400 feet. from the threshold. So; for me to accept a Taxiway XX takeoff; I would have to have run new takeoff numbers. On my release; there is no data for Taxiway XX takeoff. While the declared distant in one NOTAM is 5;650 feet.; we are not allowed to use all of that in the next NOTAM when we are unable to back taxi from Taxiway XX.If ATC does not want us to back taxi; they need to state that this will be a takeoff from Runway XX/Taxiway XX. The company needs to provide us with takeoff data for Runway XX/Taxiway XX departures if this is what ZZZ airport is requiring us to do. NOTAMs need to be revised so they are not conflicting. Do not state in one that I have 5;650 feet and in the next NOTAM that I am not allowed to use all of that declared length.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported conflicting NOTAMs referencing a runway with restrictions and ATC issuing an alert after the crew was in position ready for takeoff.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I received a [weight and balance notification] on my messaging tool about flight XXXX regarding 15 bags being needed to secure Hazmat. The ramp had X-bagged the flight and I noticed a radioactive Hazmat quick-pack item 1 on the [load plan] in Pit 3 and there was only 8 bags; not the required 15 bags. I then noticed item 1 was moved to Pit 4 with 65 bags. The ramp then proceeded to [finalize] the [load plan] and [load report]. I notified the Manager on Duty and I was advised to have ZZZ1 do an audit on arrival.


Second narrative: Flight arrival audit. Hazmat loaded forward pit with not enough bags to secure it. Hazmat moved to Pit 4 but not secured; just left it on top of bags upside down (Radioactive Hazmat).


Synopsis: Air carrier Load Planner and Ramp Supervisor reported Hazmat cargo not configured correctly for air transport. Hazmat documents were updated to indicate corrective action completed but the cargo configuration was not corrected.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: RV-8
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At ZZZ; Aircraft Y (RV-8) based out of ZZZ nearly collided with the aircraft I was operating (Aircraft X) on the downwind leg of the left traffic pattern for runway 36. My student and I had returned from an uneventful local instrument training flight in the area. After landing; we (my student and myself) elected to taxi back to the runway to practice landings in preparation for my student's check ride. Throughout the duration of our time in the traffic pattern; my student was making proper radio calls on CTAF. While in the pattern for our last lap on the downwind leg; Aircraft Y radioed on CTAF (ZZZ- Aircraft Y; left downwind 36). Aircraft Y made no prior calls to the aforementioned. I immediately radioed Aircraft Y for clarification of his position as he frequently enters the traffic pattern in a non-standard manner. With that; I looked out the left side of the aircraft; and saw Aircraft Y turning less than 100 feet below; and to the left of our aircraft. I took control of the aircraft and ensured separation would be maintained between our aircraft despite Aircraft Y making no effort to ensure proper traffic pattern entry or separation. Aircraft Y frequently performs inappropriate and dangerous takeoffs; landings; and maneuvers at or near. The owner/operator of Aircraft Y needs remedial training as he is an unsafe operator who frequently violates FARs and has blatant disregard for safety. There was no reason for him to enter the traffic pattern recklessly; and to risk not only his life; but the life of myself and my student.




Synopsis: A Cessna 172 pilot reported that while flying downwind for landing an RV8 pilot flew into the pattern without communicating his position or intentions causing a near miss.