elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46; Tower SEA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At 4;000 feet MSL on downwind; we were cleared by Seattle Approach Control for the Bay Visual Approach to RWY 16C.  First Officer was flying.  When we were handed off to Seattle Tower; the Tower Controller asked us if we wanted to switch to RWY 16L.  I told him we would prefer to stay with 16C; and he cleared us for a visual approach to 16C.  First Officer then began descending on autopilot using vertical speed mode and maneuvered for the runway using heading select mode.  I was performing the Before Landing Checklist and then noticed that we were more than one and a half dots low on the ILS glideslope.  I called out the deviation and the First Officer responded 'correcting.'  We continued to go further below the glideslope and I was about to call it out again when the First Officer disengaged the autopilot and leveled off at approximately 1;600 feet to intercept the glideslope.  I believe that the use of vertical speed mode instead of flight level change mode to descend before intercepting the localizer course eliminates a safeguard against getting below the glideslope. I should have questioned the use of vertical speed mode prior to interception of the localizer course. Also; I had my eyes outside too much and did not sufficiently back up the First Officer. I believe that using vertical speed mode for descent in the terminal area should only be used when already on final course and to intercept the glideslope from above.  Prior to that; I feel that flight level change mode to a set altitude is a better technique.


Second narrative: Upon turning base I determined I was high (above glidepath) and corrected using Vertical Speed (VS) with the approach mode armed. I was primarily using outside reference and when [I] crosschecked instruments [I] was below glidepath and reduced the descent with VS and shortly thereafter disengaged the autopilot and manually leveled at 1;600 MSL to stabilize and intercept the glideslope. We continued the approach to a normal visual landing.


Synopsis: B767-300ER flight crew reported they got low on a night visual approach to SEA in part because the Pilot Flying was using vertical speed mode.
Date: 202108
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Coalescer Bag
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon push back from the gate in ZZZ; a putrid/rancid smell filled the aft galley and was detectable by myself; the D flight attendant; the A flight attendant and at least 2 passengers causing eye irritation; headache and nausea for me; and a headache for the D. The Captain was notified immediately. Having experienced this leaving ZZZZ on the prior leg flown by this aircraft; the decision was made to return to the gate and have Maintenance look at the aircraft. The A; B; and C flight attendants all agreed that we didn't feel safe in an environment where we and our passengers were potentially breathing toxic fumes. A 21 point inspection was run at the gate and it was determined that the plane had no mechanical issues. I tried (as did the Captain) to mention that it was likely the odor was not reproduce-able at idle. It was only evident under power. It was deemed a safe aircraft; so we re-boarded the flight; only to experience the odor; eye burning; headache; and nausea after push back. A second gate return occurred and passenger and crew deplaned.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported two ground gate returns due to a recurring fume event during departure taxi.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We had briefed the LTOWN arrival to MEM and were approaching SPKER intersection when ATC asked our speed. I was PM and replied 315 KIAS. ATC informed us that the charted speed for that part of the arrival was 290 KIAS. He then instructed us to slow to 270 KIAS momentarily and then assigned us 290 KIAS as charted. The Controller mentioned that this was a common error on the new procedure. The Captain conducted what I thought was a thorough briefing. Neither of us noticed the 290 KIAS restriction attached to note Ball Note A on the chart. While I take full responsibility for failing to see this restriction I also believe from a human factors standpoint this chart needs to be improved.This plate has a very poor layout. I even remember briefing this arrival before and noting to the Captain that I thought the layout was poor and would inevitably lead to safety reports. I would bet there are a statistically significant number of altitude and speed deviations associated with this procedure. I am not trying to rationalize my failure; I should have caught this error before it lead to a speed deviation. That being said; a revision to the plate would help avoid these errors. The plate is broken into two pieces rather than the traditional fold out. The altitude and speed notes are small and easy to miss.




Synopsis: An E-145 flight crew flying the LTOWN RNAV STAR to MEM failed to comply with the Ball Noted 290 KTS restriction at SPKER. Unusual formatting and cluttered nature of the STAR chart was noted as a contributing factor.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PKB.Airport, WV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D PKB
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I had to ferry a helicopter to ZZZ. While en-route; I noticed the iPad my company uses for navigation had lost signal; therefore the sectional map underlay was not loading properly. There was an area on the digital sectional that was not loading; but I could still follow my navigational route displayed on the iPad. When the iPad finally got service; I could see the navigational line took me right through a Class D airspace. I was unaware of the Class D airspace on my route; as I could not see it previously. I was unable to contact ATC at the airport at that time because I was already well past the airport and out of range. I should have a backup GPS in the aircraft with me at all times and will begin to do so in case the in aircraft GPS loses signal again. I will also be reviewing every route prior to departing to ensure there is no controlled airspace or any other obstructions in my path.




Synopsis: Pilot reported loss of navigational display on the Electronic Flight Bag (iPad) due to GPS signal loss.
Date: 201510
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Altimeter was off by 310 feet at FL410. We landed; CA was going to write it up; but discussed it with duty manager and said that it isn't off and that you can apply a correction. Even with that chart; it doesn't explain why the altimeter is all over the place.So at FL410 it's 310 feet low; at FL350 160 feet at FL320 it's almost dead on and at 10k it's 140 feet high. That just doesn't make sense. When do you apply correction? Sometimes? How do I know that while I'm doing my approach at 10k feet the plane is really 140 feet low? Or is it really high but showing low? Something is off here; seems like an unreliable standby altimeter to me. If I apply the correction on the chart for each altitude; then at least some of those altitudes are still off.I also discussed the 'Altitude readings on standby altimeters (general check)' chart from the AMM. I was told this chart has no application as I am not a mechanic. As a pilot I am concerned with knowing if my standby altimeter is providing reliable information. The AMM page and the correction chart are the only items I've seen to help me make a decision as to when a mechanic needs to look at it.Bottom line is Duty Manager and Chief Pilot felt this is not a write up. I need help understanding why not. Some airplanes are not off. After a few write ups on this in the last year; I spoke with the mechanics; they said the culprit is water in the line; dirt in the lines and in some cases the lines are getting cracked. Why would they say all that if this isn't really a problem? When do I know it is a problem and how do I use that chart and when?Also; the images provided all flight level altimeter pictures represent 29.92 on all altimeters; the 10;000 altimeter represents the same local altimeter setting across all altimeters. Provide us with a procedure that we can use to ascertain the quality and reliability of information being provided by the standby altimeter.




Synopsis: DA2000 First Officer experienced a standby altimeter that was off by varying amounts at different altitudes. The Captain discussed the write up with the Duty Manager who believed that it should not be written up since a correction could be applied.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DAB.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Other All operations
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The sprinkler system that sprays the outside of the windows in the Tower was not working correctly. The northeastern window that faces Taxiways W; E; and Runway 16 that intersects Runway 7L was fogged and the intersections were not visible. Those intersections are the busiest most complex area for both Ground Control and Local Control.The sprinkler system needs fixed immediately.




Synopsis: DAB Controller reports of window washing equipment being out of service and foggy windows.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ABQ.Airport, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sail Plane
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Second aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I did two circles in a weak updraft and leveled out into cruise when I observed what seemed to be a DC10 at the same altitude; descending on a converging path. I immediately pushed the stick all the way forward to take evasive action; though observed that the collision path was still in effect. I opened the dive brakes approximately halfway to increase my descent rate and then observed the aircraft fly overhead perhaps 200-300 FT above. I dropped 1;000 FT in the order of 20 seconds to avoid the collision. No transponder or alert device was used in the glider.




Synopsis: Sailplane pilot reports an NMAC with a DC10 15 miles east of ABQ at 12;800 FT. Evasive action is taken by the reporter to dive under the DC10.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I checked in for our departure on flight XX. I got to the plane and was the first flight attendant to arrive. I went down to the plane and noticed a paint thinner smell and walked to the back of the plane and noticed the smell throughout the plane. I went to the front and asked the First Officer if he noticed the smell and he said; 'Yes'. That he would run the APU to get air flow. I felt uncomfortable with the odor and stopped the flight attendants in the jetway. The other flight attendants could notice the strong smell in the jetway. The Captain arrived shortly after the flight attendants and further assessed the situation when he got there and made sure no one boarded the plane as the odor was strong. I felt we should contact the base supervisor so [NAME] the B flight attendant contacted [NAME2]; the on duty supervisor. She came to the jetway and noticed the smells right away. Maintenance told the Supervisor that the way the heater was positioned attached to the plane that the wind was blowing in the heater exhaust into the plane. The Captain; was told by maintenance that there could be CO2 onboard but there was no way to measure CO2 with any devices.We need a safety measure to prevent crew and passengers to be affected by toxic fumes. If a device that measures toxic fumes available would help prevent an occurrence such as this. There also needs to be procedures in place that prevent the potential device (maybe heater) from discharging exhaust fumes into the aircraft.




Synopsis: B737-700 Flight Attendant reported a cabin fumes event during pre-flight. Flight crew was notified and maintenance requested.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We departed TEB in the evening. We misread the RUUDY Four departure. It was a mistake on our part. We climbed to 2;000 feet too soon. Instead of crossing level at 1;500 feet at WENTZ intersection we were climbing on our way to be level at TASCA at 2;000 feet. We were approximately 200 feet high at WENTZ.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A CE560 crew departed on the TEB RUUDY 4 and crossed WENTZ at 1;700 feet because they misread the departure plate.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Normal preflight and taxi leading up to the event. This was the captain's leg and it was a left seat departure. On departure from we were given a turn to the southwest. At roughly 1;700 MSL I noticed the PF/PIC reach to apply rudder trim. Immediately after I felt the aircraft yaw strongly to one side. I looked down and saw the rudder trim was full to the right and the ball of the slip-skid indicator was almost fully deflected. The PF/PIC corrected the condition with manual rudder input. It became quickly apparent the rudder trim had malfunctioned and the knob was stuck. The PM/SIC requested to level off at 3;000 while we ran the appropriate checklist ('rudder trim runaway'). Controls were transferred to the SIC and we ran the checklist which did not remedy the situation. We were advised the MSA in the area was 2;600 MSL. At roughly this point; we [advised ATC] we would like vectors back to ZZZ for an ILS approach. Controls were transferred back to the PIC. The appropriate standard checklists and flows were accomplished and we landed with heavy rudder input in ZZZ without incident. We were able to taxi into the gate under our own power. Upon shutting down; company was advised.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: DHC-8 flight crew reported a rudder trim runaway shortly after takeoff prompting a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb; the left IDG [Integrated Drive Generator] failed; resulting in the loss of the left generator. The pilot not flying executed the associated checklists and disconnected the drive; the APU was started; and Dispatch was contacted. Fuel burn was evaluated considering APU use and ETP [Equal Time Point] considerations. All parties agreed to continue to the West Coast. At the ETP; the fuel was 1;500 LBS over the required fuel. The flight continued uneventfully to the West Coast.




Synopsis: An unidentified air carrier aircraft suffered the failure of the Left IDG. They disconnected the drive; started the APU and continued to their destination.