elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Cessna 340/340A
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: TBM 700/TBM 850
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a Developmental on satellite. A C340 departed [a Class D airport] and about 18 miles south called up with a rough running engine and wanted to return; the Departure Controller declared an emergency for him. When the C340 was about 12-14 miles south of [their departure airport]; Tower called for a release of a northbound aircraft; my Trainee said hold for release. I had her call right back and release the aircraft on a 330 heading as I saw it to be no factor with the inbound emergency. The Departure Controller kept the emergency on his frequency to avoid frequency changes. The departure; a TBM8 took longer to get airborne than I anticipated. The C340 did something I did not anticipate and headed right toward the departure end of Runway 24. The C340 was already on the visual and talking to Tower when the TBM8 came off. When the TBM8 came off and started his turn to the northwest; it appeared that the C340 was less than 3 miles and 1;000 FT from the TBM8. I eventually had divergence but am not sure if I had it in time; nor did I ask the Tower if they were providing visual separation. At no time do I feel safety was compromised. It was just an unusual situation based upon pilot actions and delayed departure. I should have double checked that Tower was providing visual.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a conflict event between an inbound emergency aircraft and a departure when the departure was late in rolling; the reporter noting uncertainty regarding Tower visual separation applications.
Date: 201909
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During approach clearance; ATC cleared us for the ILS 4R; maintain 1;500 ft. until established; which I read back. We bugged 1;500 ft.; but we stayed at 2;000 ft. ATC called us about 60 seconds later and said we needed to descend to 1;500 ft.We were distracted by a wake turbulence encounter when cleared for the approach. Even though I read it back; in my mind I assumed it was at or above instead of the maintain clearance; so I didn't say anything to the First Officer who was the Pilot Flying.Make sure the clearance is fully understood; even if we need to query ATC.




Synopsis: CRJ Captain reported a wake vortex encounter that resulted in an altitude deviation.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During our takeoff roll we had a RUD SYS 1 INOP message appear on the EICAS between 80 knots and V1. Since this indicated that there was a problem with a primary flight control we made the decision to execute a high speed aborted takeoff. We got the message at approximately 105-110 knots. We were able to safely abort; exit the runway; run all appropriate checklists; make all necessary communications; and return to the gate for an aircraft swap. We informed ATC of the aborted takeoff but did not deem it necessary to declare an emergency. During this event there were no reported injuries as well. After the aircraft swap we continued without any further incident.


Second narrative: On the takeoff roll somewhere between 80 knots and V1 I heard a ding; I looked down at the EICAS screen to see a RUDDER SYS 1 INOP message displayed. I called out the abnormality and the Captain commenced an abort. A NO TAKEOFF CONFIG message then displayed on the EICAS. Towered was informed of the abort and that we needed no assistance at that time; the passengers were notified by PA to remain seated. The Captain taxied off the runway; stopped the airplane; we ran the [checklist]; confirmed with the Flight Attendant that everyone was seated and then taxied back to a parking spot to contact Maintenance.


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff after 80 knots for a RUD SYS 1 INOP EICAS message.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were departing LAS. We were on the SID passing BOACH at [dawn]. With the sun coming up; we were temporarily blinded by the bright glare from three man-made objects southwest of our departure airport. I am told they are solar reflectors; but the reflection off of them was extremely bright to [the extent] that when I looked away I was seeing spots for several minutes.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain reported bright reflections from three solar fields southwest of their departure airport caused temporary blindness during climbout.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Globemaster (C-17)
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E S46
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a Controller on the sector. He gave a descent to an aircraft from 4;000 feet down to 3;000 feet. When the pilot read it back multiple aircraft keyed up at the same time. One of them was the correct pilot; another was another aircraft checking in; and the third was a C17 that thought the transmission was for him to descend to 2;000 feet. The Controller gave the instruction very clearly; and the descent was to a different aircraft to a different altitude. When the pilot called later he said that he always gets a decent to 2;000 feet there so he thought that's what the call was. When [the C17] descended to 2;000 feet that dropped him into a 2;000 foot (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). The altitude was recognized but not before penetrating a 2;500 foot MVA. A climb was issued and the pilot said he could maintain his own terrain and obstruction clearance. But that was after the MVA was already violated. It was obvious when the altitude read back was happening that more than one aircraft were keying up; it wasn't obvious that 3 were. Let alone an aircraft with a very different call sign descending to a very different altitude. This was a pretty clear case of expectation bias. The pilot was made aware of the situation. He said it was a very clear VFR day so he saw all the terrain just fine; and he just thought that is where aircraft got their descent to 2;000 feet.




Synopsis: A Controller conducting on the job training reported multiple aircraft responded to the trainee issuing a descent clearance and one of the aircraft descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Furnishing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During taxi in and talking with Ground Control; the COMM 1 radio started to get continuous static that was annoying.  I had the First Officer turn off the Wi-Fi and the static ceased immediately.   I called for Maintenance and entered the discrepancy in the logbook.  The Mechanic conferred with Maintenance Control and they MEL'd the Wi-Fi inop under 25-10-1.  This required we leave the Wi-Fi OFF.  The Mechanic said the Wi-Fi vendor would be able to troubleshoot the system during the next leg.  Neither of us was sure how that would happen with the system OFF.  About 40 minutes after takeoff; we got an ACARS message that read; 'PLEASE CYCLE POWER ON WIFI AND LEAVE IN ON POSN.  THE POWER SWITCH SHOULD BE BLANK WHEN THE SYSTEM POWER IS ON.  AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED MESSAGE.  DO NOT REPLY.' The First Officer and I weren't sure if this was a normal recycle message or part of the trouble shooting I previously mentioned.  I got an ARINC phone patch with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; explained the request; and said we wouldn't do in-flight troubleshooting concerning an open MEL.  They all agreed and we flew the next two legs to ZZZ and then to a major maintenance station without the Wi-Fi.  We asked for Maintenance to meet the aircraft to work the MEL; and briefed the oncoming Crew at the end of our trip.  I don't know what the final resolution was.  So there are two issues. 1. Why does turning off the Wi-Fi cause static on COMM 1 to cease?  2. The Wi-Fi vendor may be encouraging crews to troubleshoot MEL'd items while in revenue service.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Wi-Fi system created a continuous static in COMM 1 so it was turned OFF which stopped the interference. In flight an automated ACARS advised the crew to turn the Wi-Fi ON which the crew refused to do because inflight troubleshooting was not acceptable.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On take-off runway XX; received flashing green hydraulic pump low pressure. Landing gear would not retract. The ECAM was indicating that the green pumps failed. Leveled at 2000 ft. [Requested priority handling] with ZZZ departure. After 2-3 minutes; the hydraulic issue stopped. Pumps back to normal. Raised landing gear. No other issues noted. I continued to ZZZ1 for priority handling. No issues with configuring for landing.Aircraft was released from contract heavy maintenance for a right main landing gear change. Maintenance suspects air in green hydraulic system.Possible issue with heavy maintenance at ZZZ.


Second narrative: On departure from RWY XX; when landing gear was selected 'Up'; the gear did not retract and a hydraulic warning was indicated on the Airbus ECAM notification system. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) [requested priority handling] with ATC and we entered a radar box pattern at 2;000 ft. to stay within appropriate distance of ZZZ runways. The Pilot Monitoring began to accomplish the ECAM steps. Within 2-3 minutes; the hydraulic warning indication recovered and the landing gear was able to be retracted normally. The Captain recovered to ZZZ1 with priority. The aircraft was able to be configured normally for an uneventful landing. Maintenance had recently been accomplished on the right Main Landing Gear. Unknown to what extent that maintenance may have contributed to our situation; but maintenance at ZZZ1 suspected air in the hydraulic line resulting from heavy maintenance. Possible issue with heavy maintenance on right main landing gear at ZZZ.


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported gear did not retract after takeoff.
Date: 201704
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on the arrival into [destination] when the Flight Attendants notified us there was an electronic device emanating smoke in the cabin. I directed the flight deck crew to don oxygen masks and set the regulators to 100 percent and established crew communication. I then [advised] ATC and asked for direct [destination]. Shortly thereafter; the Flight Attendants notified us that the device and its spare batteries (which were also in a state of thermal runaway) were contained in the ion battery emergency containment bag and there was no smoke.The device was apparently an e-cigarette. As the device was contained and there was no smoke; I elected to discontinue the QRH. However; the flight deck crew remained on oxygen for the duration of the approach and landing. Approach and landing were uneventful. My biggest concern is that after attempting to notify the Flight Attendants that we were on oxygen; I never called them back. They were making announcements on my first attempt and I simply dropped calling them back off my to-do list. They were surprised when we landed and were surrounded by Fire Rescue.Distraction management continues to be an issue for all flight crews. As a Check Airman; I should have done a better job of communicating. Better use of all my resources would have kept this from happening. I found myself doing the lion's share of the work in the cockpit when I had a very competent First Officer to help me. Simply dividing a few more of the tasks would have freed up my mind and allowed me to think more clearly.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported the flight crew donned oxygen masks and asked for direct destination after a Flight Attendant reported smoke in the cabin related to thermal runaway of an e-cigarette battery.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Descending on the EAGUL5 into PHX; Center cleared us direct HOMRR with no speed restriction until reaching HOMRR. The STAR requires crossing HOMRR at or below 16;000 FT at 250 KTS. The FMS was programmed with the arrival; and VNAV was selected as well. All seemed well as we descended to and crossed HOMRR at 16;000 FT/250 KTS. However the next fix VNNOM required crossing between 11;000 FT and 10;000 FT VNNOM is 4.1 NM from HOMRR. Crossing HOMRR at 16;000 FT; we realized that it was almost impossible to lose 5;000 FT to 6;000 FT in 4.1 NM. At this point I clicked off the automation and pointed the nose down; achieving a descent rate of better than 6;000 FPM. Our airspeed increased to 280 KTS and we crossed VNNOM high and fast. I do not believe that we caused a conflict with any other aircraft.I have flown many; many VNAV STARs in this aircraft; and it has never been off before. The STAR called for crossing HOMRR at or below 16;000 FT; and the FMS should have been in a position to make the next subsequent fix.Obviously we could have done a better job monitoring the situation; however this occurred during an extremely high workload period. We made; programmed and verified 2 runway/ approach changes during this descent prior to HOMRR. In fact the first change went from a landing east flow to a landing west flow. This could actually explain why the FMS logic chose 16;000 FT at HOMRR instead of lower....Landing east on the EAGUL5 requires crossing a different fix immediately past HOMRR (SMAAK) between 15;000 FT and 14;000 FT.This is a really poorly designed STAR. Something should be done to warn other crews not to fall into the same trap that we did.




Synopsis: When; while descending via the EAGUL RNAV STAR to PHX; their FMS system failed to compute the need to cross HOMRR well below the maximum 16;000 FT in order to cross VNNOM 4.1 NM later between 11;000 FT and 10;000 FT; the flight crew initiated an expedited descent and exceeded the 250 KTS charted max IAS. Multiple runway changes by ATC; including a switch from a downwind arrival to land east to straight in to land west were cited by the reporter as likely contributing factors.
Date: 201807
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: On this day with a flight load of up to and over 60 flight releases to be built due to a sick call; the operation became heavily delayed. With thunderstorms over the East Coast this creates many challenges for each dispatcher on shift. With checking routing; flight following; and all the many aspects of dispatching a flight; it makes it easier to make mistakes. There is no reason we should be working up 60 PLUS flights in an operation like this one. There are many East Coast flights; many transcontinental; and many international flights which all require much attention to planning and flight following. Having to field calls; and attempt to plan flights is a difficult task when dealing with so many flights; thus creating a safety hazard. There NEEDS to be acknowledgment that there are too many flights on a normal day of operations; much less on a day we are down a dispatcher. This airline has grown immensely over the years; which is typically the goal of an airline. There needs to be more people hired to bring us up to a better staffing amount. There should be AT LEAST 4 new hires in the next class to be able to distribute a more balanced and more manageable amount of flights. Only hiring enough to bring us back to fully staffed just puts us where we started a year ago when we started losing dispatchers. It doesn't help the day to day schedule of flight distribution. The 2 missing relief lines just will help alleviate so many junior assignments.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported excessive workload related to insufficient staffing.