elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: As a Line Check Airmen (LCA) I take extreme pride in my ability to consistently operate the aircraft in accordance with SOP. The new placement of the call for the landing checklist AFTER the landing flaps have been called for has led to an alarming number of missed or incomplete landing checklists in my operation. I can only imagine what this might look like in 'looser' cockpit environments. I complained about this development at the recent standards meeting and was told this was done to accommodate our non-Electronic Check List (ECL) brethren who find it an undo inconvenience to hold the paper checklist in their hand until final flaps are called for if the checklist is initiated at the gear down call as it has been done for [years.]Waiting until the final flaps are called for at 1200-1000 feet on a normal approach; in the international arena; often coincides with the landing clearance or the discussion of when we might get one. Now; the pending Flight Manual (FM) change will re-instate the setting of the missed approach altitude in this same vicinity thereby increasing the workload and verbalization at this point in the approach. My experience is already telling me that the landing checklist falls through the cracks at this point far too often. There is no open checklist displayed as a reminder and the change to call for it with final flaps seems; to me; to be among the most difficult of these 'standardization' changes to assimilate.




Synopsis: A B777 Captain reported that the new procedure as to when to use the landing checklist has increased the workload during approach.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff. Around 80 KTS we received a 'HYD 3 Low Press' caution message. It was the Captain's leg; and he aborted the takeoff. We notified ATC; exited the runway and ran the QRH for rejected takeoff. The message extinguished as we exited the runway. We talked to Maintenance and Dispatch; and since this was not a recurring problem in this specific airplane; we elected to try one more time. We also specifically briefed that if we got the same message again; we will abort again if speed permits. We received a second takeoff clearance and--this time around 60 KTS-- the same message appeared. This time we lost nose wheel steering on the runway as well. The Captain maintained centerline again. We came to a stop; re-engaged the nose wheel steering and went back to the ramp. Upon returning and speaking with Maintenance they determined that for some reason hydraulic system 3 lost pressure every time we moved the flight controls.The Captain aborted the first takeoff; because we hadn't yet reached the high speed phase of the takeoff roll. We talked about what happened; and decided that if we got the same message for our second attempt; if speed permits we would abort again; since hydraulic system three powers a good amount of flight controls and other important systems. We didn't put the aircraft in any undesired state. Only threat was that we lost the nose wheel steering during the second abort; but the Captain managed to keep the aircraft on the centerline.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 flight crew rejected their takeoff at about 80 KTS when they received a 'HYD 3 Low Pressure' CAS warning. The warning went out after exiting the runway. They elected to takeoff again; received the same warning; lost nosewheel steering and rejected the takeoff again. They re-engaged nosewheel steering and taxied to the gate for maintenance.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The ramp light post lights are extremely bright; causing a high amount of glare. The ramp lights are angled such that they shine directly into the flight deck. The gate is equipped with a DGS (Docking Guidance System). The DGS at gate X is mounted high and close to the ramp lights. Trying to use the DGS system in the glare was very difficult. Looking at the high mounted DGS while also looking up at the bright ramp lights blocked out all peripheral vision of the ramp on approach to the parking spot. In order cut the glare I had to deploy the flight deck sun visor.The ramp lights in the D terminal gates are too bright. Gate X DGS system is mounted high; causing the pilot to look up into the glare of the very bright ramp lights.[I suggest to] lower the lumens of the ramp lights; angle them better (more of a down angle); and mount the DGS systems lower so the pilot does not have to look up into the bright ramp lights while using the DGS.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported that both position and brightness of ramp lights at gate in CLT impacted ability to see Docking Guidance System.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class G ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We noticed the oil quantity and pressure were declining on engine number 3 and did a precautionary engine shutdown.  We needed to descend (drift down) to FL330 and were not getting permission to do so on the radio.  We put a request through the ACARS and received clearance to do so.  We proceeded to divert to the nearest suitable field and landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: While in cruise flight at FL350; noticed number 3 engine oil pressure and quantity indicating amber. Followed AOM/QRH procedures as oil quantity dropped to '1' and pressure indicated 'red'/unsafe. With Captain's approval; followed QRH and performed in-flight engine shutdown.


Synopsis: A MD-11 flight crew reported shutting down number 3 engine in flight when the oil pressure and oil quantity dropped.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was assigned to deadhead to ZZZZ and layover and ferry an aircraft back to ZZZ the following morning at XA00 local. I called Dispatch to determine the status of the airplane. Dispatch told me the flight was being delayed and asked me if I knew what was going with the aircraft to which I replied in the negative. Dispatcher explained that there was a cockroach infestation and the normal chemicals [company] uses in the USA weren't able to eradicate the cockroaches. So the airplane was flown to ZZZZ where they are able to use chemicals which are not approved in the USA. Dispatcher further explained it was their understanding the plane would require 24 hours after being fumigated before it would be habitable. While having my breakfast at XB00 local I received a flight plan pushed to my cell. I called Dispatch for an update and there was a new Dispatcher on duty. I explained to him what the previous Dispatcher had told me and he connected me with [Maintenance] Tech and the Tech said the 24 hours wasn't necessary and the airplane was ready to go. I called the First Officer with the update and we went to ZZZZ Operations in the terminal for the ride to the hardstand. Normal preflight; etc and just before the door closed I could feel the beginnings of a headache. I believe I commented to the First Officer at that time and he said he was fine. Enroute my headache kept getting worse and I informed the First Officer and once again he felt fine. Upon arrival I went to the clinic that administers services for [company]. I filled out reams of paperwork and met with both a nurse and [a] doctor. Doctor suggested ibuprofen and also told me they would prescribe high dosage ibuprofen which I declined. Inadequate safety precautions and using chemicals which presumably would not be legal in the USA. Much longer decontamination time after fumigation when using highly toxic substances.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported illness when company technician failed to follow safety precautions after fumigation using highly toxic substances.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter 222
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ZZZ is a non-towered Class E Surface Area airport. Weather was IMC at the field with 2 miles visibility in blowing dust. I called Approach and reported the field was IFR and requested a SVFR clearance for entry to land. I was told; 'No; we don't do that. The field is non-controlled.' I queried the controller about the Class E Surface Area and IMC; and was denied a clearance again. I then ask for IFR handling and was told 'No.' I thought I was quite clear about this IFR request but perhaps I was not - or it didn't come out as clear as I had thought. Regardless; in my mind I was not going to be granted the requested clearance to enter controlled airspace and land due to an interpretation of Class E Surface Areas. For 30 years I have been taught this operational application of the FARs - dating back to the old Control Zones. I have actually worked this procedure in Georgia; Alabama; Oregon; South Carolina; and Alaska. I went in and landed at ZZZ after reluctantly telling the Controller my intentions. Visibility was about 1/2 when I found the approach end of the runway. Before entering the BLDU (Blind Landing Development Unit); there was a small jet in a wide left downwind and another EMS helicopter transiting the west surface area to the north. Apparently; whether IFR or VFR; no separation was going to be available in this controlled airspace. I had not encountered this before and was greatly confused. I called Approach on the phone and got the 'no SVFR' response. I called the FSDO to get educated on the changes and the representative said he needed to research it and would get back. I also called my Director of Operations to get updated on the correct procedure and this was a surprise to [the Director] as well. I am still confused as to the correct procedure.




Synopsis: Bell-222 pilot was denied SVFR clearance to a non-towered airport in Class E Surface airspace. Approach Control denied a subsequent request by the pilot for IFR clearance to the airport apparently due to confusion over the request for 'IFR handling.' Pilot landed visually in IMC.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MGM.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D MGM
ATC / advisory: Tower MGM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Upon arrival into the terminal environment at MGM; flight crew was informed of a portion of runway lighting reported as inoperative. Information was not published in NOTAMs and Dispatch was not aware. During the time spent in researching suitability of the given conditions; the flight crew observed Rwy 28 with VMC conditions. The crew determined that the runway lighting that was visible was suitable to execute a safe landing. Some factors to take into account: filed alternate was ZZZ. Crew knew that the weather to get back to ZZZ was not ideal. Having experience occasional moderate turbulence; and 30 knots more headwind than planned. Extended taxi time leaving ZZZ; and stair-stepped altitude climb out had us approximately 300 pounds behind on fuel. Having had a same day previous min fuel declaration; we determined ZZZ was not best action. In our judgement at the time; landing at Montgomery was the safest course of action. Unreported facility malfunctions.Safest decision was madeBuy more time. Request vectors; or holding to further coordinate airfield suitability with all available resources.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported the runway lights at this location were inoperative and there were no published NOTAMs.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed ZZZ with functioning radio. Wind was calm. Enroute to ZZZ1 the radio became inop. Unable to get AWOS I observed the windsock as being limp and decided to utilize Runway XX. Scanned the area for traffic and didn't see any. On roll-out; observed another aircraft airborne that had evidently done a touch and go to the north. I quickly exited the runway at the very first possible taxiway. The other aircraft didn't appear to notice what had just happened as he continued to do touch and goes. Seriously considering installing a backup radio to prevent this from happening in the future.




Synopsis: GA Pilot reported an inoperative VHF radio and while attempting to land at an uncontrolled airport; encountering another landing aircraft from the opposite direction.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot/Static Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the originating preflight; the First Officer noticed brown paper shoved in the safety relief valve / static port hole. He removed the paper and the rest of the preflight was normal with no discrepancies noted.Investigating the paper it was obvious this paper was used during the recent painting of this aircraft into our new livery. The paper was partially covered in the new color.The logbook history did not reveal when the painting occurred; it went back to (date). During this time the logbook showed X airworthiness checks by Maintenance.




Synopsis: A B737 air crew discovered paper shoved in the safety relief valve/static port hole. It was obvious this paper was used during the recent painting of this aircraft into a new livery. The aircraft had flown following airworthiness checks by Maintenance.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was on a ferry flight in my C172 with one fuel stop. Primary Nav was using a Garmin 96 handheld GPS. I have had this unit since 2006 and flown it coast to coast with accuracy no problems. I had been flying in a 5 KT headwind which would leave me with a 30 minute reserve. Weather was CAVU making that reserve ample. The problem on arrival was a heavy snow cover that I did not expect. The snow cover caused the whole area to lose definition that made hundreds of fields look the same. There is a 200 acre lake just south of [enroute stop] that was hidden by the snow cover. The whole situation made me very nervous. I announced 10 [miles] North on CTAF and asked for advisories. I then got a wealth of advice. Several local pilots with good intentions advised me on the best landmarks to use to find [the airport]. They included several white water towers; large buildings and a highway. Instead of trusting my GPS; I followed the advice and quickly became disoriented. In many hours of flying I never experienced anything like this on a CAVU day. My GPS became more confusing with each turn. After 20 minutes of searching I no longer had the reserve to continue. I chose to land while I had power and options. I found a road that had no traffic or power lines. It was also lined up with the wind. The landing was smooth with no damage. By now I was squawking 7700 with pilots relaying to ATC. I gave them my position. Fire and PD arrived quickly and secured the road. [The airport] sent me 6 gallons of 100 LL via one of the pilots. He brought a local high time pilot who volunteered to fly me to [the airport]. The take off went well. The other pilot had not flown in a few days and had to work to find [the airport].... What I learned was to trust my equipment and be leery of well-meaning advice. I finished the flight to [destination] with no problems.




Synopsis: C172 pilot; unable to locate landing airport due to snow cover; ran low on fuel and landed on a road without any damage to aircraft.
Date: 201807
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Airport Personnel; Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This bridge at [the gate] is being replaced with new bridges. The first bridge [Gate X] at this time was inoperative. However the Gate Room Access Door to this bridge was accessible with badge swipe. Once door is opened the floor was removed and it was drop off more than a foot. There was no signage of any kind on the door or bridge (yellow safety tape). We were still using the 2nd bridge [Gate Y]. Either during the arrival or departure process it would be to easy make mistake and step into this bridge with no floor.




Synopsis: Ground Personel reported an inoperative Jet Bridge with no floor; still 'accessible with badge swipe;' presenting a safety hazard.