elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BIH.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF BIH
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Had a longer release with Dispatch about all the closures/construction going on at BIH. The last thing I said before release was 'I think I'll be good if I taxi toward 8-26 because that runway isn't closed.' The NOTAMs are somewhat unclear to me. What exactly does work in progress mean? Closed intermittently?After checking the NOTAMs again. Construction worker telling me to turn around. Barricades further down the taxiway. Unclear taxiway construction markings. Poor visuals on airport diagram 10-9. I felt very helpless in this situation. After seeing more barricades which I could not see from my parking spot I realized my mistake; stopped; and made a 180 with assistance from a construction worker. When I now was able to get onto a good portion of the taxiway; an FBO worker; and the same construction worker marshaled me through the tightest area of the ramp. I estimate less than 1 feet of clearance between a trailer and a jet. I did see this from my parking spot but thought it was too narrow to pass safely. We need better taxi diagrams. Especially when construction is going on. This airport is becoming unsafe to operate at.




Synopsis: Captain reported the NOTAMs and construction markings at this location were insufficient to prevent a taxiway incursion.
Date: 201709
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We received two computer parcels of mail from the USPS with Dangerous goods lithium battery labels covered up with stickers by the USPS. We had also had a similar incident two weeks prior where a computer laptop dangerous goods Lithium battery label was covered up by stickers. These computers were rejected back to the USPS. The USPS ramp clerk who was given this mail had made the comment that if the postal customer tells the USPS that there are no dangerous goods in parcel that the USPS post office will put a sticker over the DG label.These computer parcels are still factory sealed and if the box was indicating that there is lithium batteries we would have to believe that the presence of lithium batteries still exist even if the USPS customer indicates no dangerous goods. We have also seen rejected mail parcels returned to the USPS with this issue returned to the company for transport; with the same stickers covering up dangerous goods labels.




Synopsis: Air carrier Ramp Agent reported receiving mail from the USPS with 'Dangerous Goods Lithium Battery' labels covered up with stickers by the USPS.
Date: 201502
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am a safety rep assigned to ORD baggage handling. It was brought to my attention this morning that a fellow employee had a serious near miss incident involving two golf carts and an electric baggage tractor. According to the information I received; the golf carts did NOT stop at the stop sign located at the bottom of the B side south ramp incline. The ramp individual on the electric baggage cart had to be alert and take evasive action to avoid a potential tragedy. The electric baggage tractor involved weighs in excess of 6800 LBs alone. We all know who wins this battle. This is not the point that I am trying to make though. This is and has been an ongoing problem that has clearly NOT been addressed. I witness this on a daily basis and report this at virtually every safety meeting but it continues to be an issue. Obviously this is not directed towards [a single contractor] alone. This applies to everyone on the ramp. My biggest safety concern in my work area is this very occurrence. Driving speeds; driving the wrong way and not stopping at stop signs need to be taken seriously and all individuals need be held accountable BEFORE a serious injury or death. I strongly believe that if this does not happen that one day the worst WILL happen. This complete disregard for safety should be the TOP priority for all employees and the appropriate action needs to be taken by management and the employees themselves.




Synopsis: A baggage handler and safety representative at ORD describes a near collision between two golf carts and a baggage tug that was narrowly averted. He believes the primary problem is driving too fast and not obeying traffic rules for airport vehicles.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: SA-227 AC Metro III
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When attempting to set takeoff power the left engine did not produce more than 25-30% torque. After verifying that this was not due to a momentary lag of torque; which I have experienced on many Metro engines/takeoffs; the takeoff was aborted however the plane was heading to the left of center line due to the higher torque achieved by the right engine. When the power levers were brought to idle the plane straightened down the runway to the left of the center line. The nose wheel steering button on the power lever was being pushed but either it was not working or was not effective enough to turn the plane back toward the center line. I verified with my left thumb and finger that the nose wheel steering switch was in the armed position and also pressed the 'park' steering function for additional turning help. When I (quickly) recognized that wasn't working left power was applied with the hope that there would be some power and right brake was applied to try to turn the plane to the right however; it didn't work and instead the plane started turning to the left and exited the runway where the plane stopped and was shutdown. After shutdown it was observed that a left propeller tip hit a runway edge light.




Synopsis: SA-227 Metro III Captain reported rejected takeoff due to loss of torque on one engine resulting in a loss of directional control; and a runway excursion.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise we had a (R) 14 DUCT warning message. The Captain ran the QRH. It instructed us to pull the right engine back to idle and to land at the nearest suitable airport with Flaps 20. We descended from FL300 down into [nearest suitable airport] and landed uneventfully there.




Synopsis: CL-65 First Officer reported receiving (R) 14 DUCT message. QRH directed a diversion to nearest suitable airport.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying the ILS 27R to ORD. When cleared for the approach level at 4;000 ft; we twice had to disconnect the autopilot from the aircraft wake ahead of us. Spacing was the usual 3 miles and winds were straight down the path at 40 kts. Other aircraft were radioing similar issues with wake.  I decided to hand fly the approach the rest of the way to better control the speed and avoid the wake. The Final Controller told us to slow to 170 kts and contact Tower. We were cleared to land by Tower and continued the approach at 170 kts. Spacing was holding at 3 miles; but as we approached the marker I noticed our spacing was closing faster than normal. At about 2.5 outside the marker I made the decision to start slowing to avoid going around. (Full disclosure; I have been in the exact situation before and had to go around twice on this approach.) What I misjudged was how fast the 737-700 slows down. We were at approach speed too early and the Tower asked our speed and instructions. We made the aircraft behind us go around from my error in speed control.


Second narrative: While on ILS 27R into ORD; we were experiencing wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us and appeared to be quickly closing the distance between us. We had been assigned 170 kts until the final approach fix 'SIBLY' and began slowing 2 miles prior to the fix to stop the closure. The Tower Controller queried our speed; and emphasized we were to hold 170 until the fix.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported slowing below assigned airspeed to avoid wake turbulence from aircraft ahead on approach to ORD; forcing traffic in trail of them to go around.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While on approach we were dealing with very strong winds on the surface; with gusts up to 48kts and a windshear report of loss/gain +/- 15 kts from another aircraft ahead. Our first approach resulted in a go around. After executing the go around we determined we did not have enough fuel to attempt to divert. All of the airports we could have diverted to were just as windy; so we decided the best course of action was to stay in the area instead of diverting; and then only having enough fuel for ONE approach at our alternate airport.We heard another plane get in so we set up for our second approach. While intercepting the localizer; we received clearance for the approach and were told to maintain 4000 until established. Because of the stress of the wind; aircraft configuration; decreasing fuel supply and running checklists; we lost track of our clearance and proceeded to descend to 3500 (the altitude listed for the initial approach fix) before we were established. This caused an RA with another aircraft; which was below us. The CA complied with the RA and it was a nonevent. We climbed back to 4000 and proceeded with the approach; this time resulting in a landing. We taxied to the gate with no issues. In the future we will slow down our decision making and will better deal with the distractions.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported a go-around due to windy conditions. The crew decided to try another approach during which they descended below their assigned altitude which caused a TCAS RA. The second approach resulted in a landing.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was coordinating for the [Company] code share. I was watching ACARS for all [Company] flights when Aircraft X messaged that they had been given a hold for a change of runway configuration. Dispatcher X was working that that flight and replied 'Copy; shouldn't be long'. Dispatcher X did not send hold fuel numbers; although it should be noted that the flight did have a planned alternate. Dispatcher X then immediately left the building to pick up breakfast. Dispatcher X did not seem to realize they had another flight inbound to LGA and I did not see them ask anyone to watch their flights. Aircraft Y sent a holding report via ACARS. Aircraft Y was sequenced directly behind Aircraft X on the LGA arrival and did not have a filed alternate. It was Dispatcher X's aircraft. When I noticed that nobody responded to the ACARS I asked the other two dispatchers working Dispatchers Y and Z if the Dispatcher X had asked them to watch his flights. They said no; although Dispatcher Y said that maybe Dispatcher X assumed he was going to watch the desk even though he didn't ask explicitly. Dispatcher Y was on a phone call so I said I would run the numbers. I sent an ACARS at saying 'hold; standby for numbers'. While I was running hold numbers Aircraft Y sent another ACARS at that they had been cleared in to LGA. I acknowledged this and checked to see that Aircraft X had been cleared in to LGA as well. After the Dispatcher X returned to their desk I asked them if they had asked anybody to watch their flights while they were gone. They said something along the lines of 'yeah; these guys' and gestured at the Dispatcher Y and Z. I mentioned that he had another flight that held immediately after Aircraft X and that I had started to run numbers for it until it was cleared in. They were surprised and thanked me. Both flights held only briefly in this instance and arrived safely; but the fact that a Dispatcher left the building knowing he had a flight holding without sending hold fuel numbers or communicating a plan to the Captain; without realizing he had another flight about to hold; and without specifically informing another Dispatcher that he was leaving while a flight was holding and did not seem to think this was a big deal is concerning to me.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported another Dispatcher left their duty station while they had flights holding without notifying their peers.
Date: 201503
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A and D flight attendant out of jumpseat during landing due to doing CPR on ill pax. Passenger was coming out of the forward restroom and had a loss of breathe. Passenger came on board with a personal oxygen container (POC). After exiting the restroom he sat on the jumpseat and complained of not being able to get a 'good' breathe. (D) was seated on the forward j/s and (A) was in the galley. I asked the passenger if he felt sick; light headed; nauseas; etc. he just said he needed a moment because he couldn't get a good breath. A Flight Attendant (FA) went and got his girlfriend at this point. As we continued to assess the situation the passenger's skin on his hands and ears began to turn blue. we immediately notified the FD; paged for medical assistance; and had the AED/EEMK delivered. We had 2 doctors; 2 emts; and a RN respond. At this point the passenger passed out. We had trouble getting any vitals on him. The FD connected us to medlink and we relayed our concerns about the passenger. We connected the passenger to the AED. He had a pacemaker which made the aed very confusing. It would call for a shock; ask to administer shock; then say no shock advised to continue CPR. The RN and doctor wanted to remove the aed but we advised it needed to stay on. The RN and doctor let us know we needed to get the passenger to the nearest hospital asap. Our crew decided to divert. We continued CPR. We had all passengers and responders seated at 10;000 feet for their safety. A and D continued CPR through landing (I doing compressions; she doing breaths). Our aircraft was met by EMTS. The passenger was pronounced dead at the hospital. Our crew did an amazing job. We exhausted every effort to save the passenger's life. The one major problem we had was the AED with a pacemaker. It will continue to register a heart rhythm; advise shock; then say to continue cpr even when a shock should be administered. I truly feel their should be some sort of override for situations such as these. Also; the FA group should be advised of the problem with the AED when a pacemaker is present. Our responders were absolutely amazing and deserve a great deal of thanks [from training].




Synopsis: A passenger became unconscious during flight and was assisted by physicians; a nurse and EMT personnel while the flight diverted. The passenger was declared dead at the hospital despite intense inflight professional attention.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During approach to JFK's VOR or GPS 13L/R. Weather Overcast 1;000 feet. Wind was light. Captain was flying. I was the pilot monitoring. Approaching MINS I saw and called the lights and airport at 12-1 O'clock. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and called for vertical speed down 700. It became apparent that the rate was too much for the distance from the runway; and the Captain corrected by shallowing the descent. We continued for a normal touchdown on JFK's Runway 13L. I think this would be a good approach to see in training. It can be challenging when the ceiling is near minimums and transitioning to a visual descending turn to landing on 13L.


Second narrative: The approach being flown was the JFK VOR or GPS 13L. I don't recall the ATIS reported WX; but it was at or near minimums for the approach. I was the pilot flying. In the approach brief I asked the First Officer (FO) for a V/S of 700 feet/min down at DMYHL in order to have a reference as there would be no glideslope. I believe that we were configured to land at CRI. We broke out of a BKN cloud layer at DMYHL and acquired the runway. The FO put in V/S 700 feet down as I started a descent. I descended 200-300 feet by the time I realized the 800 feet at DMYHL is too low to start down with 3.6 miles to go-around the corner to the 13L runway. I leveled off a little above 500 feet. At about that time the Tower called a warning about our altitude. With a clear view of the runway and level; I continued around the corner then descended to land. I have flown this approach sporadically over the span of many years. Recognizing that 800 feet at DMYHL is low; for the distance remaining to the runway; is the key to doing it well.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew descending early from minimums for landing on Runway 13L at JFK using the VOR or GPS RWY 13L/R approach with a ceiling of 1;000 feet. The Captain recognizes the error at the same time the Tower issues a low altitude alert. Flight continues to a normal landing.