elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I went out to pre-flight the aircraft while the Captain remained in the FBO to print out the flight plan; etc.  In performing my cockpit preflight checks; I missed the fact that the Hydraulic Pump switch was in the OFF position; rather than AUTO (which is where it had been when we left the aircraft the night before); because Maintenance had been working on the aircraft's brakes overnight.With the passengers on board; I went through the Before Start checklist while they were being briefed by the Captain; and initiated the Engine Start on Number 2 as he came up to the cockpit and strapped himself in. As Engine 2 came on line; I saw ramp staff waving to indicate that the aircraft was moving. Both the Captain and I hit the toe brakes; and then he tried the Emergency Brake; but without hydraulic pressure; the aircraft continued to move. The Captain took the controls; instructed me to contact Ground Control; and steered the jet toward the taxiway; away from parked aircraft. He attempted to start Number 1 engine as we moved; hoping to fix the problem that way; but due to the aircraft's configuration; the start was unsuccessful and he had to shut it down. As we taxied onto A taxiway; the possible source of the problem finally occurred to me and I asked the Captain to check the Hydraulic Pump switch position. Braking was quickly restored and I informed Ground Control; but they responded that they'd received a call from [the FBO] advising that we'd left with the GPU (Ground Power Unit) still attached; and that the GPU access door was still open. I got clearance to taxi back to the ramp.Once the aircraft was parked and Number 2 shut down; we discovered that the mounting plate for the plane's electric receptacle had been damaged as we moved with the GPU attached; before the electric cable had pulled loose. The GPU was not damaged.




Synopsis: EMB-500 First Officer reported they were unable to stop the aircraft after it began moving on the ground during engine start due to the hydraulic pump switch in the off position.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Fairchild Swearingen Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working Local position during the midnight shift and RADAR called and asked if she could use Runway 18R for a landing aircraft. We were advertising Runway 36C and Runway 27 for arrivals. I approved it and switched the localizer and approach lights to Runway 18R. I changed the configuration on the AMASS; however I did not notice the X's on Runway 18R. Someone during the day or night shift prior to mine had put X's on the AMASS to indicate Runway 18R was closed. Runway 18R was not closed and I do not know why someone would put the runway closed on the AMASS. The Runway 18R CLOSED placard was not being displayed. There was no reason to deny any aircraft a landing clearance to Runway 18R. When Air Carrier X reached a 2 mile final; the AMASS alerted me that Runway 18R was closed. I visually scanned the runway and there were no vehicles or aircraft in the vicinity of the runway and I allowed Air Carrier X to land Runway 18R. It was an honest mistake to have the Runway 18R closed on the AMASS; and I saw no reason to send Air Carrier X around due to this oversight. The X's on the AMASS skipped my attention as well as the previous controller on local position. I make it a habit in the relief briefing to verbally state the status of the AMASS. Our facility's relief briefing checklist requires us to verbally state the status of all Runway's; i.e. closed; open; active or not active. I would recommend putting larger X's on the AMASS ASDE-3 for a closed runway. Change SAFETY LOGIC ALERT RESPONSES. I believe AMASS is great asset to the aviation community and I know it has increased safety at the airports where it is installed. However; I believe AMASS should be a reminder versus a primary means of sending an aircraft around on a closed runway. The Controller; not a piece of programmed equipment should have the final say in this decision making. In my experience; I have seen more false alerts than saves with this equipment.




Synopsis: Tower Controller working a late night shift allowed an aircraft to land on a closed runway according to the AMASS equipment; the reporter offering several suggestions to improve the equipment functionality.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LIT.Airport, AR
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E LIT
ATC / advisory: TRACON LIT
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Descending from 6;000 feet to 5;000 feet; maneuvering through clouds. (Note: turning the heading knob sometimes creates a situation where heading would sync to present heading; therefore stopping the turn). CA had begun slowing to 200 KTS for Class C airspace; flaps were selected to 8 passing through 220. CA asked FO for more deviations for weather and lower to get below the cloud layer that was at about 4;500 feet. FO asked ATC for maneuver and lower. ATC gave us heading to maneuver; but said [they] would give a lower [altitude] in a couple minutes. While receiving ATC instructions; CA turned heading bug to maneuver; yet heading synced to present heading. CA turned autopilot off to maneuver around clouds while FO was responding to instructions. While dodging clouds speed had bled off. CA was applying more power when stick shaker momentarily occurred (at approximately 150 KTS). As CA was already adding power; stick shaker stopped immediately with no loss of altitude and no stall. After assured stable; flaps 20 were selected. After increasing speed to approximately 200 KTS; ATC gave us a lower altitude.Upon turning base; FO turned heading bug for base heading and had heading sync once again in the turn. This also happened when turning to final approach when FO spun heading dial to final approach course. The heading sync issue was written up and MEL'd.Despite high saturation of work load and weather; still need to maintain a positive scan of all aircraft systems to maintain safe flying conditions.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: CRJ900 flight crew reported heading syncing with current heading when the autopilot heading knob is turned initially. The crew disengaged the autopilot to hand fly and airspeed is allowed to decrease to stick shaker.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: SF 340B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arriving for dayshift in the hangar; I found a SAAB 340B aircraft with both left main wheels #1 and #2 removed and the aircraft resting on a bottle jack (axle jack). Upon discovery; directed the [Maintenance] crew to place the aircraft on main jacks to support the aircraft in a safe; level condition with both wheels removed. Jacking procedures are clearly defined in Chapter 07-10-00-02 for the SAAB 340B+ aircraft. [Recommend] quite simply; follow the appropriate maintenance procedures outlined in the Technical Manual (TM). Advise on-coming shift regarding anomalies preventing compliance and maintain a keen awareness of unsafe conditions and attributes as they pertain to employee welfare and aircraft configuration at every level of the maintenance effort. Maintenance Manager.




Synopsis: Upon arriving at company hangar; a Maintenance Manager discovers a SAAB 340B+ (plus) aircraft resting on a bottle jack (axle jack) with both left Main wheels removed. Jacking procedures in Technical Manual (TM) Chapter 07-10-00 were not followed.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying on an IFR flight plan in IMC. I was in contact with Approach. Just before ATC vectored me to the ILS approach; I lost radio contact with Approach. I tried using my backup radio; which did not work. Then; I attempted to contact a Tower; where I still could not hear their transmissions. I still flew the last assigned heading and altitude. Fortunately; I had received the telephone number for a different Control Tower on a previous flight. I used that number to call from my cell phone. I explained my situation and asked them for the phone number for my destination Control Tower. I also told them to contact my destination Tower and tell them to expect an airborne phone call from me. If I couldn't reach them by telephone; I told them that I would then squawk 7600 on the transponder; fly direct to the Initial Approach Fix for the ILS approach; and then fly the ILS approach.On my first attempt to call; my cell phone reception was dropped. I then squawked 7600 and turned to intercept the IAF. After a few minutes; my cell phone reception improved and I called again. The Control Tower gave me a landing clearance over the phone; and I flew the ILS approach. Once I broke out of the clouds; I was able to contact Tower by radio again.I was fortunate to have re-established communications with my cell phone. However; I was also fortunate to have the other Control Tower's phone number stored on my cell phone. I would like to point out that the cell phone number for tower facilities is not made available on instrument approach charts; sectional charts; or even on the airport's page in the Airport/Facility Directory. If I had not been able to contact them; I would have had no way of finding the phone number for the other Tower; unless I tried reaching a Flight Service Station by phone.In order to make this information more quickly accessible to pilots in an emergency; I would like to suggest publishing the phone number for an airport's control tower in the 'communications' section of the airport's A/FD page.




Synopsis: A Cessna pilot reported losing radio communications with ATC but was able to contact the Tower on their cell phone for an approach clearance.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: While executing a Visual Approach at night we received an altitude alert from ATC. I had selected an altitude which would allow the aircraft to level off at the final approach point but apparently on base leg that altitude was lower than the MVA. Terrain was in sight at all times and we did not receive an EGWPS warning. We descended into the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) of this sector which apparently triggered the ATC low altitude alert. Maintain awareness of airspace and terrain constraints even when conducting visual approaches.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-700 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during a night visual approach to SLC.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We taxied out of the terminal for takeoff and made a call to CTAF. We advised CTAF and inquired if anyone was in the traffic pattern. No one responded. My crew and I briefed both Runways 01/19 for our departure briefing. The wind was calm and I choose to depart Runway 01. As we made our way to the Runway 01 we heard some traffic entering the traffic pattern for Runway 19. We advised the traffic (business jet) our intentions and told them we would wait for them to land on Runway 19. I continued to monitor CTAF while my First Officer picked up our clearance.... I heard a Cessna on CTAF; taxing out to Runway 19 for his run-up. I again advised CTAF our intentions. We received our clearance from Center and finished up our checklists. I again made a call to CTAF. No one responded. We took the Runway 01; we made another call to CTAF regarding our take off and advising our departing to the northwest. Brakes released and take off thrust set. At 60 KTS we heard a Cessna on CTAF advising they were entering and taking off Runway 19. At this time I aborted my take off and I then saw the Cessna enter the runway at the departure end. My First Officer advised to CTAF that we were aborting our takeoff. The Cessna seemed startled and said that he would get off the runway and we could continue our takeoff. We advised that we were exiting the runway. Once clear we completed the rejected takeoff QRH procedure. We had time to wait to complete the brake cool down so I taxied down to Runway 19 and held short in the run-up area. I really feel we did everything we could have done. We made our intentions known. We made numerous calls to CTAF and even spoke to the other aircraft.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported having to reject takeoff at an uncontrolled airport due to opposite direction takeoff traffic. Reporter stated that all appropriate communications had been made on CTAF; but the other aircraft apparently failed to hear them.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Fume event on initial climb from ZZZ to ZZZZ reported by #1FA (Flight Attendant). Stopped climb at 10;000 feet and stayed by the ZZZ airport as we investigated the situation. After approximately 25 minutes we decided that a return to field was necessary and ATC was notified. During final approach due to high task loading; there was possible momentarily flap limit over speed. Landed without further incidence and priority handling was canceled. Airbus warning system did not indicate this and there was no paper limit report produced. The potential flap limit over speed was put in the AML (maintenance log).


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: A330 flight crew reported executing an air return due to a fume event during initial climb.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon receipt of load closeout and automatic up-link takeoff data to our FMC's; we noticed a 6 knot increase in our planned V2. Upon further review; the up-link had flaps F5; yet our original departure plan had flaps 15. We immediately noticed; compared then through ACARS requested a new TPS with flaps 5. All numbers matched so we proceeded and departed. Somehow; the TPS system changed our Flap setting after we got our original paperwork. We received no notification. If the system or Load Agent changes flap setting for takeoff; flight crew should be notified. The event; if not noticed by the flight crew could possibly lead to a low speed event. I commend my First Officers for quickly catching the change and correcting everything. Clearly there was no danger or violation for us. I submit this report only to prevent another crew from possibly missing flap changes.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported a discrepancy relating to the flap settings and speeds during pre-flight.
Date: 201403
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Accessing Sabre and weather planning systems are horrendously slow virtually everywhere; but in Hong Kong it is nearly impossible with continuous time outs of the internet connection and waiting for pages to load for five to ten minutes. This cuts into preflight planning time; causes crews to not be able to flight plan properly; and miss out on critical information. There is no wireless internet connectivity in the flight operations in VHHH (Hong Kong) unless you stand by the door to operations and use the airport's free internet connection. This is absolutely absurd at a major airline that does virtually all flight planning by internet. There is simply no excuse for this and it very well may impact safety of flight. It needs to be corrected immediately.  Some flight crews preflight at the airplane where there is no internet connection except; again; for the free airport connection. What kind of way is this to operate an Airline?




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain laments the lack of high speed internet connections at many company flight planning facilities and the additional time required to print flight documents and do flight planning. Flight planning at the aircraft is especially maligned.