elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had filed a flight plan for FL280. During the climb; a [ZME] Center Controller issued us a clearance to climb and maintain FL300. My FO responded accordingly. We were then handed off to the next sector; so we checked in. As we were climbing through FL287; then Controller said he thought we had filed for FL280; but was it our intention to climb to FL300? My FO responded that FL300 would be fine. So the Controller cleared us to continue climb to FL300. I don't believe we were ever anywhere close to other aircraft; so no conflicts ever arose. I'm not sure why the previous Controller cleared us to FL300 instead of our filed FL280; but it was fine for us so we just accepted it. I'm also not sure why the next sector Controller did not know that we had been cleared to FL300; but I think when we checked in we gave him our current altitude and that we were climbing to FL300; as that is our normal procedure in hind sight; I should have had the FO question the first clearance to FL300 to be sure that's what ATC wanted: perhaps that Controller gave us an altitude he was intending for someone else? At least it would have clarified things 100%. As I mentioned before; there were never any traffic conflicts or safety issues; but the potential was there.  So when we were issued an altitude higher than what we had filed for; we should have questioned it: just to make sure everyone was on the same page. I have noticed in the last couple months; that Controllers seem to be working multiple sectors and are off-line more frequently than was common in the past. Checking in when changing sectors and trying to obtain IFR clearances at rural airports is slower and more cumbersome these days. I suspect this is due to reduced staffing at various facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic. This reduced staffing does increase the potential for reduced safety of flight; in my opinion.




Synopsis: Captain reported ATC issued a climb 2;000 feet above the filed altitude; crew took the altitude and did not question ATC.  Another Center Sector Controller eventually asked crew why they were going to newly assigned altitude instead of filed altitude.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the First Officer on Aircraft X inbound to ZZZ [and outbound from it] in violation of [Company] Ops Spec and 14CFR 121.55. We were operating a 767 into and out of ZZZ for these flights. For the B767; ZZZ authorization was for use as an Alternate only. It is very difficult to be aware of every airfield in [Ops Specs] and its designation in regards to each fleet type. [Another aircraft we use] is used frequently to service ZZZ. There was never a concern that the B767 was not authorized. A trip in our published bid packet is assumed to be Ops Specs compliant. Therefore; I operated the flight inbound and outbound in violation. I was in error to make that assumption.




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported landing at an airpor not authorized in company Ops Specs.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were at a slow traffic time late in the evening shift. The Supervisor left the Tower Cab saying 'watch the phones for me.' He left himself on position on the computer and went down and took a 20 minute break. The departure push began and there was no supervisor or CIC in the work area. I pointed out that according to the SOP; we are not supposed to line up and wait on the Local Positions if the CIC is combined with any other position. Of course; we were confused because the CIC wasn't really combined; he was just not in the room. The controllers working the departures decided to continue to line up and wait as if the CIC was staffed. About 10 minutes into the push; the Supervisor came up and said 'I guess they came out early tonight' and resumed his operation. I have seen several times where the Supervisor has left the cab without assigning a CIC. This is dangerous because there are several new controllers at our facility and no one is there to back them up in unusual or busy situations. Most of the time; the Supervisor just runs to the bathroom or break room and is back within ten minutes. This time we were in a busy situation and the Supervisor was downstairs for over 20 minutes. I believe this is a safety issue and one that management has long ignored. They do not like to assign CPC's the CIC position. It leaves the controllers on position to figure things out by themselves. I believe this could be a factor that leads to a major safety issue.




Synopsis: Tower Controller expressed concern regarding the Supervisor's failure to assign a CIC when leaving the Tower for a break; the reporter listing some complicating operational restraints adding to the uncertainty.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon entering [runway] I had my student line up on the centerline of the runway and administer full power for takeoff. The student put in full power smoothly without any issues. At this point I made sure my student was keeping the aircraft straight down the runway; and moved my view point to the airspeed indicator; and then the engine gauges which were all sustained in their normal operating ranges. I looked at the tachometer which was also reading normal RPM's for takeoff. Approximately 4-5 seconds after I checked these instruments we experienced a loss of power. Both myself and the student heard the engine RPM reduce significantly. This loss of power occurred and lasted around 2 seconds. I took the flight controls of the aircraft and promptly aborted takeoff; notified ATC; applied brakes and exited the runway normally. I am positive that my student did not move the throttle in any way which would have caused the RPM decrease that we saw on takeoff. I estimate we lost approximately 300-400 RPM when the drop occurred.




Synopsis: Flight instructor assumes control from student pilot and rejected the takeoff when he heard a significant reduction in engine power for unknown reasons.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Descending from 8;000 FT to 6;000 FT MSL on BOJID arrival; at approximately 7;400 FT; Captain (pilot not flying) noticed a yellow target on TCAS; ahead and just left of flight path; approximately 800 FT below and ascending. Captain asked PHL Approach about the target; and Controller said he was 'not talking to him.' A 'Climb' RA then occurred; and First Officer (pilot flying) executed the maneuver; climbing to approximately 7;800 FT before 'Clear of Conflict' advisory annunciated by TCAS. Controller then remarked that the target aircraft 'must have seen' reporting aircraft; as it appeared to descend subsequent to the RA. Target aircraft came to within 400 FT vertically of the reporting aircraft. Crew never made visual contact with the target aircraft. Reporting aircraft leveled at 7;800 FT; reconfigured MCP IAW POH procedures; and re-confirmed clearance to descend to 6;000 FT. Controller then advised company flight behind reporting flight of the traffic and that it had triggered an RA. As the Controller humorously remarked; 'That airplane must think he's the only one in the sky;' as he flew perilously close to two airliners flying a published STAR.




Synopsis: A B737 at 7;400 FT; descending; had a near miss on the PHL BOJID arrival and took evasive action in response to a TCAS RA from an aircraft apparently at the PHL 7;000 FT Class B ceiling.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed ZZZ1 ENROUTE TO ZZZ2. 100nm west [of] ZZZ; wheel well fire EICAS'; [advised ATC] [and] ran QRH dropped the gear. Diverted into ZZZ; landing uneventful.


Second narrative: Wheel Well Fire warning on EICAS. [Advised ATC]; diverted to ZZZ; QRH completed; EVAS Deployed; notified company and station; Oxygen Mask on landing; Vis to 08 and cleared rwy.  Shut down Engines; ARFF cleared A/C; started APU; started engines; taxied to ramp.


Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew reported an uneventful diversion due to EICAS 'Wheel Well Fire'.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SLC.Tower, UT
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft X went around short final due to wind shear two times. Both were from the weather and created a potentially dangerous situation with the departure traffic at the time. At the time; I was combined with LCW/GCW/GCE/CD. There were several aircraft calling in on different frequencies and I was scanning both sides of the airport to verify compliance. On the east side; there is construction that is making every aircraft taxing a complex situation. When the aircraft went around the first time; I was talking to an east side aircraft so I was totally distracted. The facility had a runway incursion just last week over there so it is a point of focus and cannot be ignored. Even with busy traffic at the time.Regional management has dictated how we are to divide the positions very specifically with the reduced staffing.  The problem is that the CIC cannot adjust to the real time situations because we are being told specifically how to split positions from individuals outside the facility that don't understand our traffic. There has been zero input from the people actually working the positions on this. In this case; all the locals should have been combined and ground and clearance should have been combined. We should not have to be dealing with go-arounds on one side of the cab and complex taxiway/runway configurations on the other. Their knee-jerk reactions have created an unsafe environment because we can't work the traffic in a safe manner. Every Controller and Supervisor I have talked to has said this is not safe. We are all willing to have a conversation on how to improve workload in the Tower. But there has been no conversation. Just dictates from a bureaucracy that doesn't understand our operation.  Collaboration is not telling us your decision after it has already been made.




Synopsis: SLC Tower Controller reported an aircraft went around twice due to windshear and also reported that the way the Tower cab positions are split up are not flexible and not safe.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approaching The Airport; I was following a (other carrier) Regional Jet. I was told he was doing 130 knots eight miles from the field. I immediately started to slow but the spacing wasn't good; so Tower told me S-turns to the north were approved; which I did. Spacing looked good so I continued. Tower told the Regional Jet to expedite off at D2 but didn't; and continued all the way down to the end of the runway. I was just about to round out when it was obvious the Challenger wasn't going to clear the runway; so Tower told me to go around. As I was climbing out; I heard Tower tell a Police helicopter to immediately descend. I looked out the windscreen and saw the helicopter right in front of me. It didn't look as though I was going to out climb him; so I immediately initiated a right hand turn to avoid. We never got an RA; but when we cleared the top of him; the TCAS read -200 feet. We continued around in a right traffic pattern and landed without incident.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a late turn off of proceeding aircraft resulted in a go around; then  evasive action was necessary on the climb to avoid a collision with a helicopter.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Shortly after being handed off to NYC Approach near the SWEET Intersection going into EWR; ATC cleared us from 7;000 feet to 6;000 feet on a heading of 110. Once the descent began; ATC issued a traffic alert for an aircraft climbing through 5;000 feet on a southwest heading towards us that he was not talking to. I acknowledged the traffic; picked them up visually and stated we may get an alert on this traffic.My FO (First Officer) put his hands on the controls in preparation for flying manually. I then noticed the TCAS target climbing through about 5;300 feet; and within seconds we received a Climb RA. The FO manually took control of the airplane and complied with the RA.After a few blocked transmissions; we were able to advise ATC. Approach then issued a turn to 190 as we leveled around 6;300-6;400 feet. Once cleared of the conflict; we returned to 6;000 feet. The remainder of the approach was uneventful and the were no issues with our cabin crew who were performing their final cabin checks. Our altitudes were about 500-600 feet apart and the lateral distance appeared to be a similar distance.Regarding the conflicting traffic; it was a low wing; single engine general aviation aircraft; possibly a Cirrus aircraft. The conflict occurred precisely at the 20 mile DME ring of the Class B Airspace; and the aircraft was climbing as well as turning southbound at the western edge of the Class B.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported taking evasive action after receiving an RA from a light aircraft on descent into EWR.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Government
Operating under: Other 107
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A \; Class E ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other UAV Operator
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon departing from Delta airspace; Tower switched Aircraft X over to Departure. Upon climbing; Departure advised Aircraft X to climb and maintain 10;000 feet. Shortly after Aircraft X was instructed to climb up to FL190; Aircraft X then read back the altitude of FL190. It was understood that Aircraft X was to climb and maintain FL190. FL190 was then programmed into the autopilot after that clearance was given. The instruments were crossed check; and autopilot was confirmed FL190 set. The aircraft was correctly climbing at 105 knots; 500 fpm; for FL190. Shortly after; departure switched Aircraft X over to Center. On initial call; it was communicated that Aircraft X was climbing out of 6;000 feet for FL210 (as that is what was filed). Center then replied that departure had given Aircraft X the wrong altitude and was to climb and maintain FL190. Aircraft X replied and confirmed FL190. Aircraft X also stated that departure had given the correct altitude of FL190; and that it was climbing for FL210 (as the flight plan was filed for FL210). This is where the communication error became apparent. Even though the autopilot was confirmed set at FL190 and that is what the pilot intended on doing; the way the statement to Center came across made them think otherwise. After that statement; Minneapolis Center gave Aircraft X a number to call. When in contact with Center on the phone the main concern to them was safety of flight. As the other Aircraft X was at FL200; when the call of 'climbing through 6000' for FL210' was made. The event ended without aircraft separation being broken. Accuracy and diligence in the phraseology to ATC is important. The Aircraft X should have initially communicated to Center 'Aircraft X (tail number) climbing out of 6;000 feet; for FL190; expecting FL210'. It is understood that the verbal read back needs to be for the altitude cleared to and not the altitude expected based on the flight plan filed.




Synopsis: UAV operator reported miscommunication with ATC while drone was inflight.