elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: It was an unremarkable sortie in VMC conditions. Due to a report of moderate turbulence during the descent of a preceding aircraft; I directed early cabin cleanup and asked the Flight Attendants to take their seats before coast in. Spacing requirements dictated slower than normal speeds and nothing else was out of the ordinary. Once obtaining a visual on a regional jet in front of us; we were advised that we should maintain 170 Knots and were cleared for the Visual Approach. On Tower frequency; we were advised to slow to final approach speed (we were almost there already). I directed the final flap setting and a Before Landing Checklist. The flap settings before directing that final checklist had been flaps 1; then flaps 2; flaps 5; flaps 15 (after directing gear down). A very standard visual profile. I did not direct flaps 25 at any time.As the regional jet in front of us cleared the runway; the final approach segment of the visual commenced. Spacing with the regional was not an issue. We completed the Before Landing Checklist and prepared for landing when we heard the aural 'too low flaps' annunciation. Instinctively I looked at the center pedestal and found that the flap handle was between the 25 and 30 detents. I moved the lever into the 30 detent and then continued the visual final to landing. There were no external threats beside complacency and a familiarity between Pilots (we have been paired together all month). Spacing and directed speeds were not an issue; and when directed to slow to final airspeed; we were nearly there and were not rushed. I was really disappointed in the lip service we obviously exhibited with regards to the Before Landing Checklist. There was an expectation bias at work there also; as '30 flaps' had been directed and the First Officer had thought he had complied. I like to think that I dwell on each item of that checklist; but we both missed the inappropriate flap setting before the aural annunciation.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported an improper flap setting on approach which caused the Terrain Alert to activate.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing roll out
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I made a visual approach to Runway XX after completing a before landing checklist.An anti-skid check was performed as part of this checklist.I then landed on Runway XX which was dry and the wind was a light and variable. The approach was made at Vref +10 and touchdown was at vref within the touchdown zone.  Air-brake was deployed as well as the thrust reverser. As I applied my initial brakes the airplane slowed; but seemed to drift left.  I released brakes applied right rudder and continued the roll out and the aircraft straightened output still left of center. The aircraft continued to decelerate using reverse and nose wheel steering.  Slowing below 80 knots additional braking was used slow to a taxi speed. The airplane pulled left with additional braking and steering applied and the nose gear and left main tires went into the grass just to the left side of the runway at the speed of a fast walk and then came to a stop with approximately 1;500 feet of runway remaining just prior to the taxiway.  The right main gear remained well on the runway. There was no damage to the aircraft; airport surfaces; or airport signage. The aircraft was shutdown and passengers were deplaned and the runway was closed until the aircraft was towed back to the hangar. The crew had normal brake pressures and quantity indications and no reason to suspect a loss of fluid or braking ability. The co-pilot assisted in applying right rudder and his brakes at the slow end of the roll out. Maintenance has since found after further inspection a broken/damaged right proximity switch.  This would have the effect of leaving that switch in the air mode configuration on the right gear and braking only available to the left main wheels. The damaged switch will now be replaced.




Synopsis: Corporate Pilot reported that during the landing roll out as brakes were applied the aircraft began to yaw to the left; resulting in a runway excursion. Maintenance determined the right main gear squat switch had failed resulting in no brakes on the right main.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Company aircraft pushed first to the ORANGE line (far line) tail east. We then pushed to the BLUE line (near line) tail East. Company aircraft ended up slightly behind and to the right of us. We started engines; performed checklists; disconnected from tug; received wave off as per company procedure. We received clearance to taxi from ramp. Just as we were bringing power up to taxi; push crew from company aircraft raced (literally running like hell) across our path right to left to get back to gate. If we had not cleared the area before proceeding we could have run over them. That would be bad. This is something I had not considered before with respect to the dual taxi line procedures. We probably need to put a warning in the 10-7; as well as have ramp advise the near aircraft that a push crew may be returning to the gate and crossing their path. With apologies; I don't have a great suggestion yet on this. Dual taxilane procedures do not seem to allow for a ground crew pushing to the far taxi line any safe way to return to gate.




Synopsis: A pilot began taxiing at SEA on the new BLUE line closest to the terminal. An ORANGE line aircraft's ground crew; slightly behind and outboard of the BLUE line; headed to the terminal and ran in front of the lead taxiing aircraft.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was the A FA (Flight Attendant) on Aircraft X; during boarding the flight attendants in the back of the aircraft discovered a passenger that had a hover board they asked him about it and said that his kind of battery was OK that he talk to the CSA (Customer Service Agent) about it. We then notified the CSA and informed her that they are not allowed on board we had to look it up in everyone's manual just to be sure. The hover board was removed prior to departure and the passenger exited the aircraft with it leaving his wife on the aircraft.Gate Agents should check all skateboard looking device to make sure they are not hover boards


Second narrative: We noticed a self balancing device in the overhead. Passenger said he had spoken to several Company employees; including the agent; about the device. Passenger said the type of battery was permitted. The F/A (Flight Attendant) Manual and the CSM (Cabin Service Manager) say that these devices are not permitted. The agent confirmed that she had spoken with the passenger about the device but seemed not to understand our policy as she let the passenger bring the device onboard.Passenger choose to deplane with device.Note: Captain could not find anything specific in the FOM about self balancing devices.Agents need to know policy to help keep these devices from being boarded. This extended our delay and was not a good experience for the passenger.FOM should have guidance about these devices as the FAM tells F/As to report them to the pilots.


Synopsis: Flight Attendant crew reported a Self Balancing (Hover Board) device in the overhead during boarding. The device is not permitted per company policy and the passenger chose to deplane with the device.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft reported a buildup they needed to deviate around that was not depicted on the radar scope. They also requested lower [altitude]. I gave him they deviation and called the previous sector to get control for descent. Aircraft X was at [Flight Level] 140 and I gave him pilot discretion descent to [Flight Level] 110 which was the bottom of my altitude limit. When he reached 110 he requested lower while still on a deviation; so I called ALB Approach and pointed [out] Aircraft X descending to 090. Upon reaching 090 he requested lower [altitude] and I called ALB Approach back and they gave me control so I descended him to [Flight Level] 070 and when he got to [Flight Level] 070 he said 'I need lower now' and that he was getting severe turbulence [Flight Level] 075-060. No injuries were reported when asked. He was handed off to Catskill Sector and they descended him to 0440.




Synopsis: ZBW Center Controller reported an aircraft that needed to deviate for weather and immediate descent for turbulence.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just shortly after rotation and becoming airborne; the pilot yelled out that we had a near-miss hit with a truck that was in the middle of the runway. I never saw the truck; however on turning crosswind and on a right downwind departure; I confirmed that there was a truck in the middle of the runway that was just slightly past the mid-length area of the field. The truck was stationary.Lessons Learned:1. During taxi from the mid-field apron area to the run-up area prior to takeoff; I had my head primarily in the cockpit to set-up the routing. During that time; I should have been scanning the entire runway and adjacent areas that were in my view.2. The pilot and aircraft owner insisted that there be a backup Garmin 496 on the dash. This piece of equipment on the dash; with a bird's nest of wires; obstructed a considerable amount of my forward view. I complained a number of times but should have absolutely insisted that it be taken off the dash; most especially for departure and arrivals. After a long conversation with the pilot after this incident; it was agreed that this piece of equipment should no longer be on the dash.3. Prior to arrival; we had verified that there was a NOTAM of surface spraying; however the NOTAM never said that there would be a vehicle on the runway. During arrival and prior to departure; we never noticed any vehicles spraying in any area. I would assume that if a vehicle was to be working on the runway; that the runway should be closed and a NOTAM of runway closure. We questioned the FBO on Unicom on turning downwind; however; they were not aware of a truck on the runway; but were aware of the current NOTAM.As a new flight instructor; this incident reminded me to stay alert and be vigilant at all times. I was with a very good friend who is a very accomplished pilot and I see that as [contributing]. I believe I was relaxed and should have been scanning outside on taxi instead of primarily focusing on entering the routing. However; we are not sure if this would have made a difference because the pilot never saw the truck in the area or on the runway when taking off.




Synopsis: GA instructor pilot stated the pilot flying noticed an unreported truck on the runway just after takeoff.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SLN.Airport, KS
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZKC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLN
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the GPS 17 to SLN while in IMC; traffic was observed on TCAS. Traffic's indicated position was -400 FT climbing on a direct collision course. We maneuvered the aircraft right of the approach course and climbed 100-200 FT. TCAS indicated the other aircraft passed 300 FT below us. We returned to the approach course and completed the approach. After breaking out of the clouds it was clear the other aircraft was flying VFR in IMC conditions. Tower also advised us of the traffic but offered no vectors and stated they were not talking with that aircraft.




Synopsis: A Corporate aircraft on a GPS approach to SLN had a near miss in IMC with an aircraft climbing VFR in the clouds but not communicating with anyone.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were diverting.  [We were] on final and were stabilized for a flaps 45 landing. The Captain was jockeying the thrust levers pretty well; but it didn't seem like we were gaining or losing airspeed at an abnormal rate. At about 700 AGL we got an amber WINDSHEAR caution. The Captain said continue. We continued on speed and on glideslope and landed normally.We should have gone around; plain and simple. On the one hand; I think this may have been a bit of a self-induced windshear on the part of the Captain; because big power changes can cause the plane to think it's in windshear a little more often. On the other hand; you never know; and that's not sufficient reason to ignore SOP and not go-around. It is definitely hard to override a Captain and call for a go-around when the Captain has made the decision to continue. It's also hard having been based in ZZZ in the past and seen days where you couldn't land anywhere if you didn't fly through an amber windshear. There's a tendency in this company to continue during amber windshears; despite what the CFM says; and it's a powerful cultural habit to resist. The danger; of course; is that this is the one time where amber gives way to red and you are already behind the curve. That is an unacceptable danger; which we ought not to have accepted. The failure is a double failure in this case; the Captain for not immediately executing the go-around; and me for not being assertive and demanding a go-around. This is something that I'm trying to correct. The fact that we were diverting certainly was a contributing factor. We are already concerned about fuel in that case; and don't want to make the situation worse. In this case we would still have had enough fuel to come back and try the approach again. Now; when you are low on gas; then sometimes you are forced to fly through an amber; but we were not yet at that point. Just go-around. There's no fault; it doesn't cost you anything but time; and it's the prudent course of action. The culture of no go-arounds will only change when people like me speak up and start going around. It's going to take a bit; but hopefully we are moving in the right direction.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer describes an approach by the Captain continued after a windshear caution at 700 AGL; to a normal landing.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BHM.Airport, AL
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower BHM
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: BHM Runways 24/18 in use; SCT040-050 with light to moderate precipitation 2 miles off Runway 24 departure end on the centerline extending to 10-12 miles moving southeast. Approximately 10 minutes prior to Air Carrier X's departure; a B737 and CRJ departed through the precipitation mentioned above with no complaints. Prior to Air Carrier X's taxi; two other aircraft were taxing for departure on Runway 24. Air Carrier X called for taxi and requested Runway 6 to depart away from the 'thunderstorm.' I informed Air Carrier X of the recent policy change and denied the request for an opposite direction departure. I also offered a heading after departure north of the precipitation; passed along the weather I observed on the Tower Display Workstation (TDW) which had moved further to the southeast away from his flight path and diminished in intensity; and the recent departures ride reports. Air Carrier X was concerned about the safety of flight/passengers and the policy change. After dialog with Air Carrier X he informed me he wanted to file a complaint. Air Carrier X was cleared for takeoff on Runway 24; looked at the weather RADAR when he was lining up and requested a 360 heading on climb out. I coordinated the heading with the Departure Controller and issued the heading. I observed Air Carrier X on climb out without binoculars climbing through 10;000 FT in VMC. At no time did I feel as though I jeopardized the safety of flight by issuing Runway 24 to Air Carrier X. Local policy changes are in the works.




Synopsis: BHM Controller described an event when an Air Carrier requested an opposite direction takeoff because of weather near the airport. The request was denied because of new 'opposite direction' procedures.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 4
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DAL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We were cleared to taxi out to Runway 13R; cleared to cross Runway 18 and hold short of the ILS critical area. As soon as we crossed Runway 18 my First Officer (FO) asked me if that was the sign. I said I didn't think so because it was so far away and I'd never seen a sign that far away. I told him I thought it was for Runway 18. As it turns out I was wrong and my FO was right.I find it a little frustrating that the ILS critical hold short areas are not on the 10-9 page.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported that the ILS Critical Area hold sign for runway 13R at DAL was located in a position which caused confusion and a runway incursion.