elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201902
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The [Company] web site allows passengers a carry-on bag of up to 35 lbs in weight. The problem with this weight is that currently [Company] use the standard weights for adult passengers of 190 lbs during summer and 195 lbs for winter. This standard adult passenger weight includes 15 lbs allowance for carry-on bags. Therefore; when we allow up to 35 lbs per carry-on bag per passenger; we are exceeding the allowable carry-on baggage weight by as much as 20 lbs. This will invalidate our current weight and balance procedure. In addition; the allowable weight limit for the overhead bins is set at 85 lbs. Assuming that four bags at the allowed weight of 35 lbs each could be placed per bin; then we are exceeding the allowable designed weight limit for these bins by as much as 55 lbs. Also; the size of these bags is well above the industry standard. Currently we are allowing a carry-on bag of 24'H; 16'W; and 10'D. A 24in height is well above the industry standard of 21 or 22 in in height. These dimensions are encouraging passengers to bring oversize and heavier carry-on bags on board the aircraft.We need to review these allowable weights/sizes and make the necessary corrections as needed.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported concern with overweight and oversized baggage being allowed on the aircraft.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC; TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Shortly after taking position; ZDC ENO called for a late point out.  Aircraft X was already in my airspace descending out of 105 [10;500 feet] on V229 northeast of PXT.  The ZDC controller explained he forgot to flash the plane.  I said point out approved to 90 [9;000 feet].  Aircraft X leveled at 90 and proceeded through GRACO airspace before re-entering ENO.  GRACO called and asked me if I was working Aircraft X after he was a few miles in their airspace.  I explained the situation and asked if ZDC had pointed him out (they hadn't); then I pointed out the aircraft to GRACO.  No other traffic was in the area.I was previously familiar with the rule that the ZDC LOA requires the facility that takes the point out to handle all intra-facility coordinations; but prior to accepting the new CSIDE airspace; this was rarely an occurrence in my area because the airspace was structured in a way that it wasn't necessary.  Since it wasn't something I was used to doing; it didn't occur to me to make the coordination to GRACO as I assumed ENO would do it. Most controllers are probably familiar with the LOA requirement to ensure all intra-facility coordination; but this was a good reminder for me.  Had I taken more time to re-read the entire ZDC LOA; rather than just the new sections pertaining to Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM); I probably wouldn't have made this mistake.




Synopsis: PCT Controller reports of an aircraft that entered his sector with a late point out from ZDC; which later crosses onto another sector. Reporter realizes he should have pointed this aircraft out to the other sector in PCT's airspace.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Traffic was light on my sector. I noticed a limited data block heading south-east on a Licke tag. I brought up the data block and noticed the requested altitude of 17;500. Since the pilot was climbing out of 8;000 I checked the point-out history and noticed the Licke controller was in the process of getting point-out with Boulder and Toga sectors. I noticed the pilot approaching 13;000 and there was no coordination with me. I called the Morgan sector; who now had the tag and advised a point-out had not been coordinated and that it was now approved with me. The Licke controller it appears did not know that Quake airspace is above Boulder airspace and the Morgan controller had no idea that coordination had not occurred with Quake either.Was there a loss of separation with another aircraft? No. However; airspace violations occur at the facility each and every day. Sometimes a serious loss of separation does occur. My concern is that the general attitude in the facility is 'who cares?' People either don't appear to know their own sector airspace or the confines of adjacent airspace or they don't care. Since the introduction of the reporting program; concern over what used to be termed operational errors and deviations has become non-existent. I have actually heard some of my fellow controllers happily say after a loss of separation; 'That's what [the reporting system is] for!'It appears to me that the lack of accountability with the reporting program has created this environment; unintentionally I'm sure. This attitude has also spread to operational supervisors as well. Supervisors used to be actively engaged and would conduct spot corrections immediately and would on occasion also talk to the controller about performance concerns off of position. That does not really happen anymore. Everything is left to reporting.Hold people accountable for their performance. I absolutely include myself here too. We are in a safety environment. It should not take dozens of occurrences by the same person in order for the review committee to decide if actions is required. I think the program takes lack of accountability too far in the other direction.




Synopsis: NCT TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation resulting from poor interfacility coordination.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Parked Pre-Departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The ACARS takeoff data for Runways 28 in SFO do not include the entire special engine failure on takeoff procedure for departures that require a right turn.  The data only includes guidance in the event of losing an engine before starting the right turn.  The briefing page for SFO states that should an engine fail after starting the right turn we need to continue the right turn and intercept the 340 degree radial.  At a minimum the ACARS data should include a reference to the briefing page so crews won't try to reacquire [acquire] the 294 degree radial after starting the right turn.  The FOM states that ACARS data is most current and should be used in the event of a conflict of information.  This is not safe or legal.  This is the second time that I have written this up with no action that I am aware of.




Synopsis: B757 Captain believes that the ACARS takeoff data is not complete without mentioning actions for an engine failure off Runway 28 after a turn to the north is commenced. The guidance is only for failures prior to commencing the turn.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We had just landed on [Runway] 25L in Las Vegas. As I transferred control to the Captain we heard ATC instructions which we believed instructed us to exit Taxiway A6 and cross [Runway] 25R. I repeated the instructions to ATC. As we were approaching the 25R hold short line; I observed that a B737 was still holding short of 25R and partly blocking my full view of the runway. I got a little suspicious when I saw that the B737 was still holding there and took a closer look down the runway of 25R. It was then that I saw another B737 just rotating off the runway. I didn't have time to say anything. I just slammed hard on the brakes and the Captain joined me on the brakes. We did come to a stop just short of the hold short line. No part of the aircraft crossed the runway. After returning to the gate we contacted the Tower for further explanation. The Captain spoke to the Tower Supervisor. He replayed the tapes and his response was that Tower Controller told us to hold short. The Tower Supervisor said they did not clearly understand my response. The Captain and I both believe we heard a clearance to cross Runway 25R. However; if I had read back the clearance instructions incorrectly there was no response from Air Traffic Control to correct it. I do not believe there were any passengers injured from the sudden braking. However; Captain made a follow-up PA to the passengers.There was clearly a miscommunication between us and Air Traffic Control. However; I think there are some lessons to learn from this incident. We have to remind ourselves not to respond to ATC while still decelerating after the landing phase. I think if we had waited until we were completely off the runway before responding to ATC; then there would be less chance of miscommunication.




Synopsis: MD83 First Officer reported landing at LAS on Runway 25L and hearing a clearance to cross Runway 25R at A6 during deceleration with reverser's deployed. This was not correct and at the last moment an aircraft departing on Runway 25R was detected. Hard braking was employed to avoid crossing the hold short line.
Date: 202110
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Wheel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Aircraft X was a RFD (Required Fleet Directive) under Vendor Maintenance. During the visit the nose tires were replaced. Two 737 MAX tires were installed on a 737 NG aircraft. When the aircraft landed in ZZZ; it was discovered the incorrect tires were installed. ZZZ techs replaced the tires. Currently a team is working with our QA team who is having the investigation with Vendor [Maintenance].




Synopsis: Technician reported B737 MAX nose tire and wheel assemblies were installed on a B737-900 aircraft arriving at their station.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: COI.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Narrative: While (left) downwind in the pattern following other traffic in the pattern; another aircraft about 100-200 ft. below us headed in the opposite direction flew straight at us. We initiated a climb and turned left to avoid traffic; then departed the pattern due to the event. We believe that the other aircraft might have been maneuvering to the 45 to the downwind; but being so low and flying opposite to traffic pattern (with the existing traffic already flying at altitude) was dangerous. We do not know if he was on the radios; and did not hear him radio his intentions; so there was a lack of communication. The airport is uncontrolled and people often do not use their radios; but the entry procedure of this aircraft could have caused serious issues.




Synopsis: Pilot reported an NMAC event with a nonreporting aircraft while in landing pattern.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Clear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Wingtip
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Private pilot student working toward a commercial certificate; practicing a simulated engine out within 1 mile of the runway from 2;200 AGL. The student was guiding the aircraft toward the runway. We had passed the threshold and were still high. I (the instructor) was directing coordinated S turns in order to not overshoot the available runway. We were using Runway X with winds approximately 330 at 7kts. On the last turn back toward the runway we were just west of the runway and I then noticed that airspeed was getting too low; we attempted to still land the plane; at this point only about 20ft above ground. We continued the descent and were touching down on the runway but not aligned with the runway. The student initiated a bank to realign the aircraft with the runway and the left wing apparently scraped the runway without any indication on the flight controls. I took the controls and leveled the wings; controlling the aircraft through a bounce. We departed the runway at an angle into the grass median between the runway and taxiway A. We continued the ground roll in the grass; crossing taxiway G before coming to a stop.  Upon shutting down and inspecting the aircraft we found the scrape on the left wingtip and corner of the left aileron.




Synopsis: Instructor Pilot reported a wing tip impacted the ground during training and the aircraft departed the runway during landing.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MHT.Airport, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C MHT
ATC / advisory: TRACON MHT
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for the ILS 17 into MHT; when we were descended to; 2500 ft given heading 140 to intercept; and cleared for the approach. We were passing a scattered layer when we got the field in sight. As the aircraft turned from heading 140 and intercepted the localizer; we received 1 'Terrain' aural annunciation. I immediately reached to turn off the autopilot; asked the FO (First Officer) to look for terrain; and scanned around myself. We saw no terrain and received no further warnings. I left the autopilot on and had the aircraft continue the approach and land in a normal; stabilized fashion. I believe this was an anomaly.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported receiving what was suspected to be an erroneous aural terrain warning while intercepting the Runway 17 localizer at MHT.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While briefing a training flight with my student we discussed that the aircraft had been released from maintenance that morning after dealing with a baggage door issue. My student then went to preflight the aircraft and I joined him a few minutes later as he was completing the preflight. As we boarded he strapped both our flight bags in the rear seats through the open baggage door while standing on the wing. As I was getting in the right seat of the aircraft he closed the baggage door and got in the left seat.After start checklists were run; taxi clearance was received and; while taxiing to Runway 18 the taxi checklist was performed. At the run-up area; the before takeoff checklist was performed including engine run-up; and all items were normal including all annunciator indications.After being cleared for takeoff and passing 50 KTS we felt an unusual swerve and vibration as the Tower called to inform us a door was open. I called abort and we both applied brakes while simultaneously pulling the throttle back to idle. Braking by both pilots or over application of brakes by one or the other; caused one tire to blow and flat spotted the other. The aircraft remained on the runway at all times and we taxied off the runway while informing Tower. We then noted that the baggage door had separated from the aircraft.We called the FBO; explained the situation and requested assistance. Upon arriving at the FBO the door had been returned by line service where pictures were taken of it. When viewing the pictures we noted the door latch was in the closed position.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The instructor and student pilot aboard a DA-40 both braked aggressively when the cargo door separated from the aircraft during their takeoff roll. One main gear tire failed and the other was flat spotted as a result.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Refueling
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was relieving the 84 D-side to start my shift.  I plugged in the 84D before the briefing pointed out Aircraft X refueling on AR203 block alt FL280-FL300 with Aircraft Y in tow with sect 93/83.  The 84D gave me a briefing as the briefing continued I overheard the 84R coordinate the same information with sector 86.  2-3 min in to taking over 84D the flight plan for Aircraft Y appeared in the SPA [Special Posting Area] of the URET [User Request Evaluation Tool] showing overdue as well as negative RVSM [Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum].  I asked R84 if sector 86 knew the Aircraft X flight is negative RVSM because of its refueler.  84R said no; so I informed the supervisor and then advised the sector 86 D-side that Aircraft X was negative RVSM until Aircraft Y separated from said flight.  I am unaware of any of the coordination done with the prior 84D and the M62 sector.When the controller joins a negative RVSM with a RVSM aircraft before the track is dropped; change the equipment of the RVSM aircraft to negative RVSM and coordinate with the next sector so they are aware which aircraft is negative RVSM and which is.




Synopsis: ZID Controller reported another controller didn't know that an aircraft was Non-RVSM due to another aircraft in the flight while refueling.