elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: An air quality monitoring system [needs to] be installed on pressurized turbine powered aircraft.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer recommended that an air quality monitor be installed on pressurized turbine aircraft.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Arrival process and COVID screening under new ZZZZ guidelines contribute to extreme fatigue; physiological and psychological concerns. The entire process takes more than several hours. The arrival screeners are unprepared for each flight adding time to the process. The crew is sequestered within the airport during the process without access to toilet; food; or water. Cell phone contact with the company or union is prohibited during the testing phase. The threat of a possible positive test result and subsequent 14 day quarantine in an unknown government facility causes great psychological stress to the crew member.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported COVID-19 screening in foreign country contributes to fatigue; physiological; and psychological concerns.
Date: 201807
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were notified before boarding that [the] aircraft had a fume incident the day prior. We notified the Captain about the previous fume event. During inflight right before descent we noticed a very strong smell and notified the First Flight Attendant and Captain. The fumes got in my throat and had I felt a burning sensation. I tried to cover my nose and mouth upon landing.During landing while strapped in my jump seat I noticed a deadheading crewmember looked very pale. When I asked him if he needed medical assistance upon arrival he agreed. I notified the First Flight Attendant to let the Captain know we needed an ambulance. Since I had the burning sensation in my throat and a pounding headache a family member drove me to an emergency room to get looked at as suggested by Inflight Supervisors.The plane had a fume event the day prior. Why would they put our health and safety at risk and use the plane right away?




Synopsis: A321 Flight Attendant reported feeling ill from exposure to fumes in the cabin during descent.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator Control Column
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X was scheduled for flight ZZZ to ZZZ1.  First Officer (FO) and I reviewed the aircraft maintenance issues prior to arriving at the airport noting MEL 27-11 and associated MELs.  At the aircraft during preflight; I reviewed the MEL procedures for 27-11 and worked with FO Name to perform the test procedures listed.  The test stated: To verify both control columns are connected; proceed as follows:  1. Hold LH control column in neutral position. 2. Try and move RH control column forward and backward. 3. If there is no relative movement between the control columns; they are connected.  While performing this test; we could see that if the LH column was moved the RH column didn't move at all; and same with the RH column.  We immediately called Maintenance Control who said that didn't sound right; and said he would call Maintenance back to the aircraft.  Note: the disconnect handle was still in place.  Once Maintenance arrived; we performed a flight control check with the hydraulics on.  At this point; it was noted the LH column only controlled the left elevator and the RH column only controlled the right elevator. No EICAS messages populated.  The only EICAS message was 'Pitch trim Disconnect' which was associated with the original MEL.  Maintenance was confused and said they had done all the control checks and that everything checked ok.  We sincerely believe that had a flight been attempted; it could have resulted in a catastrophe. Poor maintenance flight control checks.  Aircraft released to line with defective controls. I believe if maintenance had read the MEL and done the control check that was listed; they may have caught the system malfunction.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported MEL procedures determined that aircraft had flight control issues and could not be flown until maintenance corrected the problems.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: LAS 15 miles in trail; sequencing Aircraft X behind Aircraft Y. Aircraft X was filed CABAB.VIKSN.Q162.BTY. To get the necessary miles in trail the Aircraft X was turned 20L for spacing.  When he was over J92 he was turned back LIDAT BTY rest of route unchanged.  30 seconds later I re-verified with the aircraft that he was already in the turn southbound to stay away from the Nellis Complex; he assured me he was.  I then asked the D-side (Newly certified today) if Nellis was watching; he replied yes Nellis is watching him; which I interpreted as point out approved which I later learned that was not the case.  The aircraft ended up approximately 3 miles in Nellis' airspace before making the complete turn Southbound. 3 months ago aircraft started filing routes similar to Aircraft X; whether it was over KENNO or VIKSN/Q162. This routing puts the aircraft a few miles closer to the boundary of Joshua approach which when we need to sequence causes a harder turn to the North to get the necessary miles in trail.  Then once they are turned back on course a much harder turn to attempt to keep them out of the Nellis ranges.  These routings have led to multiple violations to Joshua Approach as well; especially with Airbus [aircraft] when they make the turns early.  In this situation and many others we need to re-evaluate these routings.In the future I would turn the aircraft earlier and keep in the mind the speed difference especially with a large tailwind out of the southwest.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller reports of an aircraft that is slow in turning and ends up in another facilities airspace leading to an airspace violation. Controller states this aircraft turned like an Airbus even though it was a different company.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DCA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback prior to taxi; load closeout showed 167 pax no lap child. Agent's Souls on Board (SOB) was 168 including 1 lap child. Requested DCA ops to confirm status of lap child on a/c. Operation's Answer was 'Tell me what you need for numbers and I will give it to you.' My reply 'That's not the way it works. Contact agent and confirm SOBs.' It took one inaccurate voice reading plus one inaccurate REV 1 to obtain an accurate REV 2 Closeout and finally takeoff. This was a violation of proper Security and Safety procedures.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported receiving a weight and balance without a lap child which is not in agreement with the load sheet from the Gate Agent. Station Operations' is contacted to reconcile the discrepancy; which operations offers to do without contacting the Gate Agent. The Captain asks that the Gate Agent be contacted to properly reconcile the discrepancy.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Transponder
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: While operating flights it came to my attention that these flights were filed and released by our company operations above flight level 290 in ADS-B required airspace. The affected airspace were Vietnam; China (Sanya) and Hong Kong.  I contacted operations a couple times during this week with questions about our equipment coding on our flight plans. The questions arose from inquiries from Hong Kong clearance delivery and departure control about our capabilities to accept altitudes FL290 and above.  Operations informed me that the coding on the flight plans was correct and would look into the problem with the higher altitude confusion. The response I received; was that we were RNP4 authorized and should not be limited below FL290.After further research; I discovered that we do not have Operations Specifications approval to operate ADS-B equipment in these FIR's. I became aware of this after our last trip into VHHH.


Second narrative: While operating flights Operations Department filed flight plans and issued the flight plans to the crew having the crew operate the aircraft above FL290 into airspace that required ADS-B; airspace affected were Vietnam; China (Sanya) and Hong Kong.ADS-B is installed and operational in the aircraft. Guidance for its use is found in the FCOM. After; discussions with Company operation concerning the filing strip and discussing the inquires by Hong Kong and China ATC the flight crews concern was not alieved. The crew researched documentation found that the company had not been issued operation specification; which is required for the use ADS-B.


Synopsis: A US carrier aircraft operating internationally with ADS-B installed did not have the ADS-B Operations Specification on file indicating its aircraft were authorized flight above FL290.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At 4;000 feet; cleared to 3;000 feet and cleared for the ILS Runway 16R between AGANE and CELAK at SEA. Aircraft was flying below the glideslope and continued to gradually descend at a normal rate when the PF (Pilot Flying) asked for the touchdown zone to be set in the altitude window. I paused with my fingers on the altitude window selector knob and asked the PF he wanted to set 1;900 feet in the altitude window instead; since we had not captured the glideslope nor met all the remaining altitude constraints prior to the glide path intercept point. We continued a gradual descent below 3;000 feet and below glideslope with automation off. In the confusion he continued to descend and seemed distracted by my question. I noticed he had now descended well below glideslope; was slowing; and continuing to descend. BFI airfield was directly off the nose and visible. I think this may have added confusion to the Captain's situational awareness. I immediately pointed out that we needed to be higher and began steady; slow paced altitude and airspeed callouts to help the Pilot Flying return to the ILS profile. The Pilot Flying continued to hesitate due to lost situational awareness. We crossed BUGNE at approximately 1;500 feet MSL. I made at least two more inputs in a calm and well-paced manner that we needed to climb and cross FINKA at 1;900 feet. The situational awareness and recovery actions of the Pilot Flying improved and we crossed FINKA at 1;900 feet. The aircraft was properly configured with all SOP items and checklists completed; and the approach proceeded to an uneventful landing.




Synopsis: B737NG First Officer reported the Captain descended below the glideslope on approach and appeared to be unaware of the deviation even after being advised.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Rejected Takeoff
Airspace: Class B EWR
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the takeoff roll at 75 knots; I heard the master caution chime and moved my eyes to the EICAS.  On the screen I read in my head; E2 REV DISAGREE.  Before I could verbalize the message; the CA who was PF; called an abort.  He believes the speed at abort was 95 knots.  I radioed ATC we were aborting takeoff and made a PA for the passengers to remain seated. The aircraft came to a stop and then we coordinated with ATC to taxi off the runway slowly.  On a taxiway with the parking brake set; the CA called Maintenance Control and they instructed us to gate return.  Local Maintenance MEL'd the E2 thrust reverser and we continued on to our destination.  Threat was gusty winds in EWR which may have slightly affected the stowage of the thrust reverser; causing the message to generate.  Error on my part as PM was not verbalizing the message immediately; wasting a few fast moving seconds.  UAS was the high speed aborted takeoff.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported noting an E2 REV DISAGREE light on takeoff roll at about 95 kts that resulted in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The aircraft I was assigned; Aircraft X; arrived on [date] with a scheduled departure on [3 days later]. I; and the AMT I was paired with; installed Pitot Probe covers on the night of [date]; and created an open entry in the AML for this Maintenance Action. The [staff] were instructed by our Base Manager to transfer the item to the following log page; and release the aircraft as airworthy. I believe this is in direct violation of CFR 121.709 as they declared the aircraft as airworthy knowing that the aircraft was in fact not. With aircraft being parked on the ground for extended periods of time; Pitot/Static Covers have been installed [in accordance with General Procedures Manual] on varying aircraft during this time. Due to complaints from the planning department; and other shifts; [overnight maintenance] personnel have been instructed to release aircraft as airworthy and transcribe any open maintenance entries for Pitot Covers to the following log page. This is a violation of CFR 121.709 as the person releasing the aircraft as airworthy knows and fully understands that the aircraft is not airworthy in its current configuration. Providing more clear procedures on what action should be taken in the AML for open items related to installation of Pitot Covers; or extended on ground Maintenance operations. Or to have planning create Long Term [overnight Bill of Work request] for any aircraft scheduled to be on the ground longer than 48 Hours; so an airworthiness release is not necessary until ALL Open AML Items (Pitot Covers included) are closed.




Synopsis: Technician reported disagreement over procedures for releasing an aircraft for service after an extended maintenance event with an open logbook item.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BKL.Airport, OH
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D BKL
ATC / advisory: Tower BKL
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Third leg of the day; we departed on a flight to PWK. We were assigned 2;000 FT. PIC was hand flying the airplane; I was running the after takeoff checklist. I heard the warning sound of the trim; and looked over to see the PIC pressing the yoke full forward and the airplane climbing through 1;900 FT. I immediately pressed and held the AP/Trim disconnect red button; when the PIC noticed the 'Hat' on his side had gotten stuck in the nose up position. We briefly hit 2;300 FT and descended back to 2;000 FT. The rest of the flight was uneventful; and we were never queried by ATC. Pitch trim was written up and ops check found it to be ok.




Synopsis: BE400 Captain as the pilot not flying in the right seat hears the trim warning sound and notes the pilot flying struggling to level off at 2;000 FT. The autopilot/trim disconnect switch is pressed and held by the pilot not flying as the pilot flying detects the trim switch 'hat' is stuck in the nose up position. The remainder of the flight is uneventful and Maintenance can find no faults.