elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After V1; upon rotation the left engine began to have compressor stalls. After the Captain and I verified the situation; the Captain reduced the left throttle; which stopped the stalls. The left engine was still producing minimum thrust with normal rotation. We were concerned that whatever caused the problem with the left engine (i.e. ice; FOD) could result in problems with the right engine. Therefore a decision was made to immediately return for a landing at the departure airport ASAP. We declared an emergency and requested Fire/Rescue vehicles. The Captain flew the plane and handled ATC; while I ran the Single Engine QRH procedure. We were vectored to a short approach; so I was unable to fully complete the checklist. We did get to the part to set up for a 28 flaps landing (11 flaps go around) and we set the bugs accordingly. We made a routine landing (below maximum landing weight) back in the departure airport. The left engine was secured and we had Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters inspect the left engine for any damage/fire/heat/leaks. All looked normal; so we returned to the gate and terminated operations.


Second narrative: [We] had multiple compressor stalls on left engine during rotation. [We] declared an emergency; complied with appropriate checklists and returned to land. No damage or other anomalies were observed.


Synopsis: After V1 an MD-82's left engine developed compressor stalls but functioned normally with reduced thrust; so an emergency was declared and the crew returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During ZZZ visit; Aircraft X had 7 of the 8 flap actuators scheduled to be changed. While changing the Number 1; Number 2 and Number 3 flap actuators on the left hand side; we found several issues.My findings on the previous installation of the LHOBI (Left Hand Outboard Inboard) Number 4 Flap Actuator show a grievous disregard for following the written procedures and it is also evident that there was no RII (Required Inspection Item) performed on this maintenance action. This Actuator was installed [at the beginning of the year]. The following is a list of all the discrepancies associated with Actuator Number 4: 1) The actuator Retract up stops were physically approximately .625' apart; the Limit is .010' max. 2) The Number 3 flex shaft at the IB side of the LHOBI Number 3 Flap Actuator did not have the B Nut installed; the shaft end only was installed into the Actuator. Please Note that the inner diameter of the crush washer located at the Inboard side of the Number 3 Actuator shows clear evidence of long term wear from continual contact with the rotating flex shaft hexagonal end. Simply put; the washer was 'Loose' for a long time. This location is a common disconnection point for the purpose of separating the Inboard and Outboard Flaps which simplifies many aspects of Flap maintenance including Repair and Return of Flap Actuators. Number 3) The Inboard and Outboard Pillow Blocks on the Ball Nut of the LHOBO Number 4 Actuator were not safety wired. 4) The Base Mount Nut Cotter Pin was not replaced with new and was not bent over.Failure to follow procedures and lack of inspection over site while changing the Number 4 LH Flap Actuator. Rigged whole flap system and verified all safeties after installation of 7 flap actuators. The one actuator that was not scheduled for change was the LH Number 4 which was replaced in ZZZ1.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Maintenance Technician reported previous maintenance discrepancies on flap components.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was informed that we were going to have another 'simulated hijacking military training exercise.' Various members of Management gathered in the front of the area and discussed the paperwork they had for the exercise and then brought it to my sector. Once I received the paperwork on the mission; I informed Management that this appeared to be very similar to the last exercise one month ago. The first event was also reported. I informed Management that this was unsafe because the airspace and time frame would be to busy and to complex to accommodate the exercise; and that we just went through this one month ago. As I went on break I spoke my point of view on this to a member of Management as well as my union representatives. Upon returning from break I informed the CIC that I would be working the exercise under ARTICLE 65. I was then told to go on break and they 'would find someone more comfortable to work the exercise.' Later I found out that the exercised was moved a few miles north into the departure corridor putting the mission head on with departures. I cannot speak on how the exercise went as it was moved into a different area. It is unsafe to allow these types of exercises to continue to occur anywhere within these sectors. These types of exercises should only be permitted in less dense airspace with fewer aircraft.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a 'Simulated Hijacking Military Training Exercise;' the reporter noting a similar event was conducted very recently and that the time and place selected for this event was unsafe.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. On initial climb after takeoff about 500 feet the number 2 engine overheat light illuminated with no other adverse indications. Departure climb and turns were continued normally until we had a chance to address issue. Checklist had us reduce throttle to idle and after awhile the overheat light extinguished. Checklist had us operate engine at reduced thrust and keep overheat light extinguished. Asked ATC for return and declared emergency. Two different ATC controllers asked for the same emergency info (SOB; fuel remaining and which engine had the problem) which I believe was excess communication and may be better for controllers to coordinate between themselves for this. Sent diversion message via ACARS to dispatch. Briefed flight attendants and made assurance PA to customers. Single engine procedures were briefed if needed but engine was OK in idle and decided to land normally with symmetric thrust on short final and flaps 30. Unfortunately flaps would not extend beyond 25 so used captain's emergency authority to not go around and land with 25. FO did a fine landing - normal descent rate and smooth. Due to high gross weight; landing was fast and brake energy higher than normal. Total time takeoff to landing was 24 minutes. Taxi into gate was normal. Maintenance write ups were made for engine overheat; flaps and overweight landing.


Second narrative: Shortly after takeoff the Right Eng. Overheat light illuminated. I was the pilot flying so I call for the QRH checklist which the Captain accomplished. In accordance with the checklist we reduced power to idle on the Right Eng. Shortly after reducing the power to idle the light went out. We returned for an uneventful overweight landing.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew experiences an engine overheat shortly after takeoff. QRH procedures are complied with and the flight returns to the departure airport with the offending engine at idle until short final. The flaps will not extend beyond 25 degrees but the approach and landing is continued with thrust equalized.
Date: 201904
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Portable
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While performing [maintenance]: Install 'PULL' strap on FA (Flight Attendant) O2 Masks- Aft Galley CTR (Center) Aisle FA O2 Box; found O2 canister safety pin and red streamer still installed when I opened the panel to install the pull straps. This safety pin clearly says to remove after canister installation; and should there have been an emergency requiring use of these O2 masks; it would prevent O2 canister from working at all. Per the [Engineering Order] task card I removed the safety pin and streamer before closing the panel and performing an operational check of the repacked O2 masks.




Synopsis: Technician discovered emergency oxygen canister improperly installed rendering it inoperative on an A319.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We departed ATL Runway 8R on the KAJIN2 RNAV Departure behind an Airbus A320. We were issued and accepted takeoff clearance as the preceding A320 was lifting off. We immediately started our takeoff roll. Once airborne and climbing through approximately 1;300 feet AGL and accelerating through about 190 KIAS; we flew through the wake turbulence of the A320. We rolled left approximately 25-30 degrees. As we rolled; the pilot flying; First Officer; disconnected the autopilot and assumed manual control. Our airspeed reduced to about 185 KIAS and the airspeed trend vector dropped under our indicated speed by about 10 knots. Simultaneously; the stick shaker momentarily activated. The FO (First Officer) immediately lowered the pitch and rolled the wings level. The stick shaker activated for less than one second. Once wings level; the airspeed began to increase again. We continued to accelerate; climb; and resumed the departure. We had no other issues. The cause of the momentary stick shaker was a result of the increased load factor from the roll and the simultaneous slight degradation of airspeed. All of this was due to the wake turbulence off of the A320. After the event; the MFD wind read out showed we had a tail wind. Perhaps a more off-set departure route would help mitigate wake turbulence occurrences when a tail wind is present during the initial climb portion of a departure.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing ATL in trail of an A320. Reporter suggested different procedures might help when departing in tailwind conditions.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post Flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On day six of reserve after a double deadhead and a limo ride around XA:30 my first officer and I arrived at the hangar to find that they were still painting the aircraft. Around XD:30 the plane was done with paint and the maintenance personnel there said we could do our walk around while they were finishing up paperwork. When I got out to the aircraft there were several people walking around the aircraft opening hatches and making sure it was good to go. Leaving my first officer to do the walk around I went up into the aircraft and started the APU and began looking through the logbook to make sure it was filled out properly. Airworthiness and two day sign offs completed and they were. I then finished the cabin check to make sure everything on the interior was accounted for. When I noticed that my first officer had not come in I went outside to find out what the problem was. He told me that several of the wing and flap rubber seals had been painted over. He also found several pieces of tape that was left over from the painting process. He was of the opinion that we should not accept the aircraft due to the poor quality of the paint job. I talked to the Company personnel there; which included mechanics; about the airworthiness of the aircraft. They were of the opinion that while it did not look good there was nothing unairworthy about the aircraft. I called maintenance control as well and asked them about the painted over seals and was told there was no issue bringing the plane to ZZZ. At that point I decided to fly the aircraft to ZZZ.[4 days later] I found out that a flight discovered that the hydraulic panels were painted shut. While I did not check the hydraulic panels myself I did see one of our mechanics going clockwise around the plane checking the panels to make sure they opened. My assumption at this point is that the paint was still wet when we left and dried them shut. But as I did not open them I cannot be sure. I recommend in the future that all planes picked up from paint should be picked up in the daytime. Doing a thorough inspection by flashlight is difficult. Also a procedure should be made specifying if the flight crew is responsible for verifying the quality of the paint job or not. Had I not been distracted by the poor paint job on other parts of the aircraft perhaps I would have caught the panel being painted shut.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported the aircraft was ferried after having been painted. Days later; panels were found painted shut.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Airplane was towed to gate. After the safety inspection was completed we were allowed to board. The entire cabin and flight deck smelled like fish. The APU; air conditioning packs and APU bleed were on. The cargo bins smelled normally. The smell was so intense that the entire flight crew had to deplane after a short stay on board. After reporting the issue to the Gate Agent; Dispatch and the ZZZ Chief Pilot; we were given a tail swap to operate flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. [Aircraft] was then assigned to a different flight crew. I recommend that the airplane be sufficiently cleaned before being assigned to another crew after we reported the problem.




Synopsis: Airbus First Officer reported strong odor of fish during preflight resulting in an aircraft swap.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were being vectored for the River Visual 13 to LGA from the east side. We were instructed to turn right after calling the statue of liberty in sight and proceed to RAIOH fix and fly the visual approach to runway 13. The Pilot Flying (PF) was flying visually and headed toward the east river accidentally instead of the Hudson River. The Non Flying Pilot (NFP) noticed the error and called out the correction to the PF who immediately corrected the course. ATC queried us to verify we were headed to RAIOH fix. This was a high work load environment neither crew member was familiar with this visual approach the FMS had been previously set up with the visual fixes and was used to assist the PF with the correction. While flying visually we need to also verify with the onboard navigation when possible on our position. Both crews need to increase awareness and scans in high workload environments. NFP need to query the PF sooner if he even suspects their might be an issue. It took a few minutes to realize what flight path the PF had chosen since we turned over the intersection of the two rivers.




Synopsis: Pilot reported following the wrong track during a published visual approach.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X has an open item. It states 'unknown substance throughout aircraft interior; ceiling panels; speaker cover; [and] cabin door area. Aircraft interior cleaning required...' It is my understanding that an unknown substance must be identified before we could fly the aircraft. [Company] is flying a plane in violation of the [Company Manual].




Synopsis: Mechanic reported a Widebody aircraft has an open item stating unknown substance throughout the passenger cabin surfaces.