elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Departing from LAX late there was some confusion regarding the FMC database vs the Jeppesen. According to the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM) the FMC database is good until the morning after the expiration date of the database. The problem is the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) JeppFD-Pro application automatically changes to the new update at the time of the FMC expiration date. We were cleared via Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) for the OSHNN6 SID but the EFBs had already swapped over to the OSHNN7. I recognize this problem every time it happens because of past experience related to this. As soon as I see the FMC expiration on the preflight I brief the Captain about the issue. Most don't realize there is a problem until I tell them. I usually have to review the AOM to ensure the correct solution; don't swap the FMC database. The solution to the updated EFB is to select the airport in the upper left and select the CAUTION icon. This opens a window asking 'Which LAX charts do you want to use?' You can select the previous day's charts from there. We did not have a problem but apparently others did. We got asked multiple times if we were on the correct departure. Apparently several prior to us were not. The OSHNN 7 is very different from the OSHNN 6.The OSHNN 7 now ends at MISEN versus HEC for the OSHNN 6. I agree we have procedures to trap the inconsistencies but guessing from ATC's questions and responses they didn't work very well. My big question is why we can't get the EFB and FMC databases aligned on changeovers.Have the EFB JeppFD-Pro application announce a required update at the next day when we are required to update the FMC. It then can act as a backup/reminder to the Pilot for a manual operation.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported that the Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag and the FMC database have different update times.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SMO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D SMO
ATC / advisory: Tower SMO
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was told by SMO tower that my flight of two violated the SMO airspace by approximately one mile and that he had to deviate an aircraft. According to my Garmin 430 and my GRT EFIS I was close but clear of their airspace. I have both TIS and ADSB traffic with alerts and could see all the traffic but none ever were an issue or gave me a traffic alert.I could see traffic in the area however at no time were any of them an issue according to what my displays were showing. At one point of the flight where I noticed that an area of their airspace extended out from the normal circle I deviated the flight to the north to be sure to be well clear of the airspace. I believe that the radar that located me inside the airspace was inaccurate. I will admit however that it would have been prudent for me to contact the tower even for flights near their airspace and in the future will do so.


Second narrative: I have a Garmin 496 on board. I was on the left of my lead aircraft and did not see us inside SMO Airspace according to my 496 GPS.


Synopsis: A flight of two aircraft at 2;000 feet were told after landing at their destination they had violated SMO airspace by 1 mile. Both aircraft had Garmin GPS equipment and saw themselves remaining outside SMO airspace.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: FO (First Officer) was pilot flying I was pilot monitoring. Pilot Flying called for auto brakes off landing (Flaps Full configuration). Load Planning had us tankering fuel (Landing fuel of 11;600 lbs) Landing weight was approximately 2000 LBS under max Landing weight for the A321 Aircraft. Upon Landing FO applied heavy brake pressure until slowing to approximately 70 knots indicated. Upon exiting runway the right brake temps were higher than normal. Upon reaching the gate the temp indicators were above 700 but were within limits of each other. The hot brakes were discussed in my post flight and the post flight walk around revealed no abnormalities. I greeted the next Captain and advised him of the high brake temperatures. His FO then did a preflight inspection and noted no abnormalities. After both inspections were completed; a nearby mechanic noticed the fuse plugs giving way and the right mains then deflated. That captain then notified me that the mains had gone flat and we discussed the situation. My concern is that the fuse plugs had not given way through two inspections and the third 'accidental inspection' may not have occurred if the ground personnel hadn't noticed that they finally gave way. This could have made for a more critical situation had it not have been caught.More reliance upon auto braking systems I feel like the FO's intention was trying to make it 'smoother' by having auto brakes off. Auto brake systems do a better job at this as this case demonstrated. More awareness that landing the 321's fairly heavy takes much more energy to slow the aircraft than the smaller 320 or 319; I know that sounds obvious to everyone but I feel it often gets overlooked.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported wheel fuse plugs melting at the gate after a First Officer landing using firm manual braking. The deflated tires were noticed by a nearby mechanic after preflight inspections had been completed.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise flight ECAM caution LGCIU 2 and CAB PR 2 fault. Actions initiated. Received interphone call from #1 Flight Attendant indicating strong odor throughout cabin. Five minutes later received call indicating #2 Flight Attendant was being administered oxygen. Due to crew member on oxygen [we] requested priority handling and Dispatch notified via ACARS. Paramedics met aircraft. Flight Attendant released. This flight was only 31 minutes. The ECAM LGCIU 2 had ECAM supplemental inoperative components that required crew discussion. The odor and subsequent flight attendant concern compressed our available time prior to landing. Our solid training had both myself and the First Officer working in unison to prioritize and complete all items.This flight was the first flight and engine run of the aircraft after an APU LP fuel valve maintenance write up. Perhaps a procedural change to include a maintenance test run of the engines after this type of write up to mitigate a repeat of this event.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a fumes event during cruise requiring one Flight Attendant to be put on oxygen.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: E170/Q; (MEM J42 GVE KORRY3) was navigating direct GVE instead of navigating via J42.  When [the crew] was challenged on their route; they stated the flight plan they filed was TXK J42 GVE and they were given an amended PDC of TXK J42 MEM then as filed.  They understood the PDC to mean proceed direct GVE after MEM.  Other than the call sign; this incident is exactly the same as another incident I investigated back in [a few months ago] involving a Hawker.  Like the E170; the Hawker (BKW J42 GVE JAIKE3) departed out of Dallas-Ft. Worth airspace and proceeded direct GVE after MEM due to the same amended PDC (TXK J42 MEM then as filed).Two possible options in order to rectify the situation:1) Move the last fix of the amended PDC back further west on J42 2) Treat an amended PDC as a FRC and read the entire clearance3) Pilot education


Second narrative: We received our PDC and it stated: TRISS4 TXK J42 GVE KORRY3. There was an amendment above and it stated: TRISS4 TXK J42 MEM. We thought that we were supposed to fly direct from MEM to GVE. ATC wanted us to remain on J42 to GVE from MEM. The original filed flight plan was what we were supposed to fly.The amendment was confusing and there was no need for it. ATC should not use amendments unless there is an actual change in the route. Or if they want to use the amendment; then they should provide the whole route (including all fixes) on the route.


Synopsis: A ZID Controller and the flight crew involved describe a track deviation due to a misunderstanding of the amended PDC.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This morning; I had noticed I overflew my destination ZZZ by about 10 SM. I had just been concentrated on the wrong thing; when I noticed that I was not 10 miles from my destination; but past it; I immediately contacted Center. In doing so I had realized that in switching to comm radio 2 earlier that flight where I frequently talk to other freight pilots; I had inadvertently muted Center. After contacting them I got vectors to quickly turn back and descend; landed without incident.




Synopsis: Cargo operations Captain reported overflying destination airport.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Relieved Controller briefed that Aircraft X was holding in Guam airspace.  Reset times to keep from flight information automatically coordinating with Tokyo Center.  Aircraft entered ZOA airspace and eventually Tokyo airspace without correct coordination. A 'hold' button that keeps controller from being inundated with error messages would have solved problem.




Synopsis: Oakland Center Controller reported a UAV entered ZOA and Tokyo airspace without proper coordination.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Maule Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X did not give any calls for any of the legs at an uncontrolled airport; ZZZ. Aircraft was 100 feet vertically above me on final and came in to land. Corrective action was taken by turning right and then executing a go around. At the very same time; other aircraft executed a go around on the runway heading. Other aircraft gave the go around call only.




Synopsis: C-152 Pilot reported a NMAC event during landing pattern training at non-towered airport with an non-transmitting aircraft.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Detection and prevention technologies with data collection and education for all invested parties. Tricesylphosphate hydrocarbon and organophosphates are extremely toxic and dangerous and should not under any circumstances be underestimated as these are neurotoxins.A retrofit to use only electric packs would completely eliminate this horrific issue altogether.


Second narrative: Without detection/indication system for cabin air quality; a flight crew cannot be reasonably expected to accurately identify a potentially caustic/toxic/noxious fume event.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported a fumes event shortly after takeoff. Crew executed an uneventful return to departure airport.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the load closeout verification we missed that there was a remark about dry ice being on board the aircraft. During taxi out Ground Control called and said company wanted us to return to the gate. Upon calling Operations they said we had dry ice on board and that the ramp had failed to deliver a NOTOC (Notice To Captain) for me to sign and retain. We returned to the gate; I signed/retained a copy of the NOTOC for dry ice exceeding 5.5lbs per box; verified that the large dog that had been loaded was not in the same pit as the dry ice; topped off the fuel back to the dispatch release ramp amount and proceeded without incident.I need to be more careful to make sure we read all the remarks in the load closeout.


Second narrative: During the load closeout verification we missed that there was a remark about dry ice being on board the aircraft. During taxi out ground control called and said company wanted us to return to the gate. Upon calling ops they said we had dry ice on board and that the ramp had failed to deliver a NOTOC for me to sign and retain. We returned to the gate; I signed/retained a copy of the NOTOC for dry ice exceeding 5.5lbs per box; verified that the large dog that had been loaded was not in the same pit as the dry ice; topped off the fuel back to the dispatch release ramp amount and proceeded without incident.I need to be more careful to make sure we read all the remarks in the load closeout.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported ground return to gate to correct required Hazmat document errors.
Date: 201910
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the GOATZ1 Star into LAX we were vectored off arrival prior to SLI. A 747 was also approaching SLI from south and vectored off just prior SLI. We were behind and kept 1;000 feet above the 747 by ATC. After one orbit we were sequenced behind the 747 for the visual 25L with just under 6 miles trail. With a strong tailwind directly lined up with runway; we discussed the threat of wake turbulence and agreed to fly the approach 1/2 to 1 dot high. We briefed that touching down at far end of touchdown zone (and discussed runway was 11;000 feet long) would be best method to maintain above wake with tail wind and eliminate that threat. Even though ATC did slow us down in an attempt to maintain our distance behind the 747 eventually; the 737 approach speed had us close in on the 747. At about 200 feet; we started to catch some wake turbulence and the First Officer slowed the descent rate and maintained above the turbulence; which put us higher on final. We were in the flare with the tailwind and floated with power at idle. We touched down just past the touchdown zone.




Synopsis: B737 NG Captain reported landing beyond the touchdown zone after an unstabilized approach caused by deliberately flying above glide slope to minimize wake turbulence from preceding B747.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Flight phase: Other Departure / Pushback
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Employee was struck by vehicle traveling on the service road while marshalling a flight out for departure.




Synopsis: Ground personnel reported that an employee was struck by a vehicle while marshalling a flight out for departure.