elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Chancellor 414A / C414
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: A TFR was in effect over the foothills north west of the field. I was using in-plane Garmin 696 hardware receiving XM satellite updates displaying the graphical depiction of the TFR over a forest fire. I had departed for a one hour VFR flight and was curious if I could see my father-in-laws house which was near the fire. The XM satellite info depicted 12;000 MSL to surface TFR as well as a graphical area hashed in red. I flew over the TFR at 17;500 and circled down to 13;000 near the south eastern corner of the TFR. I was careful to not go below 13;000 in the hashed area I was displaying on the G696 navigator. We descended below 13;000 only after exiting the TFR displayed and landed. I was told to call Center by the attendant at the FBO. He informed me Center had increased the TFR to 13;000 MSL to surface and the area had increased. Those changes had occurred sometime that morning; he did not specify. I explained the XM satellite information had not updated or did not show the changes during my flight over the TFR; and if they had I would not have inadvertently entered the corner at 13;000 MSL. He explained no harm was done but to be aware that the area had increased in size and altitude for my departure. Upon departure the next day the G696 was showing the TFR larger and at FL180 to surface. He explained he was trying to make sure Center was getting info out to all areas of notification; and he wasn't sure why XM was not updated in a timely manner. Next time I will call the local Center and verify the TFR parameters before flying over it or near it. XM information is not always immediate as I had been led to believe.




Synopsis: C414 pilot reports inadvertently entering a fire fighting TFR when his G696 with XM does not depict an increase in the dimensions of the airspace that occurs after takeoff.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At FL370; we were about 20 minutes from ZZZ; we noticed we had a mis-compare between the ADC 1 and 2 readout. We notified ATC about the problem and requested a descent to find warmer air suspecting we had freezing moisture in our static lines. We worked with ATC the whole way into ZZZ advising them of our misleading altitudes and speeds. We crossed traffic and received a traffic advisory but not an RA. ATC did not mention any issues. We landed and had mx look at the static system. The problem was a large amount of moisture in the static lines. We are working with maintenance to find a static port cover for the plane. We've also mentioned to the plane owner that we could start hangaring the plane to reduce this chances of this problem again.




Synopsis: A Cessna Citation Excel Captain reported an anomaly with the pitot static system; suspected to be due to icing; which affected the air data computers.
Date: 202005
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing; Taxi
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Had a BRAKES auto brake fault ECAM on landing. Taxi to gate was normal. Autoparked Gate X. Set parking brake and realized immediately that the aircraft was slowly moving. Applied normal brakes to stop aircraft. Reapplied parking brake. Ground crew gave us the chalks in signal. It pains me to write this because I am a brake pressure fanatic; but since this was my first trip in over 2 months; my scan was rusty; and I didn't verify the brake pressure; and this happens. Pressure was definitely normal with the second parking brake attempt. Sent report and called maintenance.


Second narrative: During the short taxi in from Runway XX in ZZZ to Gate X (less than 3 minutes) we parked the aircraft with both engines running since we were still within the 3 minutes cool down period. As the Captain set the brake; and before he can verbalize 'Brake Set' the aircraft began to move forward. The Captain immediately stepped on the pedal brakes and stopped the aircraft. Prior to landing we received a ECAM message 'AUTO BRAKE FAULT' which went away after a few seconds.  After landing we had normal braking and steering. At the time we didn't think anything of it; but after we reset the brake after the movement at the gate we thought they might be connected.  We reported it and called maintenance.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a brake issue on landing and re-occurring at the gate. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: U90, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C TUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON U90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared off the STAR to CALLS and cleared the visual approach; following a runway change from 29R to 11L.  Initially high on the path; we were correcting in VNAV; and rolled the FAF altitude into the MCP when cleared the visual approach.  Descent rate was high and correcting; and as we approached 5;000 FT; it was evident terrain would be a factor; and the Captain directed me to climb; as we got the Terrain Caution and visual symbol on the Map display.  Approach also alerted us we were below MVA for the area as we were climbing.  Once clear of the terrain; we descended to 5;000 FT MSL and completed the visual approach without incident.  When faced with a time-sensitive change to the briefed approach; ensure fully re-briefing the new game plan; not just loading the correct data into the FMC.  Most importantly here is verbalize the terrain issue and step-down altitudes because they were not in the LEGS page due to being cleared direct the FAF; preventing a safe VNAV descent path.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reports descending below MVA during a night visual approach to Runway 11L at TUS after a last minute runway change from Runway 29R. The reporter was attempting to descend to the FAF altitude prior to reaching CALLS. The crew; ATC; and the EGPWS all became concerned at the same time and corrective action was taken.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow; 0.75
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon pushback at ZZZ; ATIS A reported 3/4 mile visibility with light snow. This concurred with our snowfall intensity based upon visibility chart and our aircraft was deiced using 100% DOW UCAR AD-40 with a holdover time between 1+00 to 1+30 minutes. Upon completion of deicing; ATIS E reported 1/4 mile and heavy snow and an RVR of 2400 touchdown and 2600 rollout. The snowfall intensity based upon visibility chart does not have a holdover time for heavy snow in this case but it does contain an RVR component; which indicated that an RVR of 2400 equated to light snow.As we approached the end of Runway 01; the Tower reported RVR of 4000; but ATIS G reported 1/4 mile visibility and heavy snow.  Since the RVR is a reported measurement and the Tower visibility is subjective after discussion amongst ourselves we completed the cockpit inspection of the wings; finished our checklist; and departed without incident.  I did not complete the cabin wing inspection required in the AOM for heavy snow because I felt the reported RVR was a more accurate MEASUREMENT of visibility and reflected what I was seeing out my window.Recommendation: Determine and delineate which of these two sources takes precedence when determining snowfall intensity based upon visibility for the calculation of holdover times and required cabin/cockpit wing inspection.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew expressed concern they may not have complied with policy when they departed in snowy conditions without conducting a wing check from the cabin.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Had electrical issues on climbout of ZZZ. Diverted to ZZZ1 and advised ATC.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a B767-300 aircraft had electrical issues during departure climb and diverted.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: It was after flying 1 leg from ZZZ-ZZZ1 that we found out our Z [Flight Attendant] sat in the jumpseat a/c right; to avoid contact with crew as she had previously flown with someone who tested positive for COVID-19.


Second narrative: Was notified that the Z Flight Attendant occupied R2 jumpseat(s) for takeoff and landing. Z FA was concerned with social distancing. Encourage FAs to look at other options or maybe a temporary approval from FAA to occupy different jumpseats during this time.


Synopsis: Two flight attendants reported being notified that another Flight Attendant on the same flight had possible exposure to COVID-19 and as a result occupied a different jumpseat in order to maintain social distancing from cabin crew.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLA
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Loss of reception to both GPS receivers; Garmin 530 and 430 at the same time. Occurred at 2;000 FT MSL; 7 miles west (254 radial) from the POMONA VORTAC. Helicopter was flying eastbound straight and level; autopilot engaged and coupled to 530.

Callback: The reporter stated the there was no weather interference and known environmental influence which he was aware of at the time to cause the signal loss. He has researched this and previous GPS signal loses and does not believe they were the result of aircraft system's problems because they occur simultaneously and both GPS systems indicate no satellites available. The reporter stated that he checks the scheduled satellite outage reports as part of his preflight and several outages he has experienced occur during a time period list but for a different geographical area. He is wondering if there is an outage spillover of some type.



Synopsis: An Air Ambulance pilot reported that at 2;000 FT; seven miles southwest of POM; his helicopter's Garmin 530 and 430 simultaneously lost the GPS signal with both displays indicating no satellite signal for several minutes.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: JAC.Airport, WY
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was released for departure off of JAC airport via the GEYSER Departure Procedure. The aircraft departed Runway 01 at JAC and reported on frequency. I radar identified Aircraft X 2 miles north of JAC and asked the pilot to confirm his altitude. I gave a control instruction to the pilot; leaving 14;000 feet MSL cleared right turn direct a fix south of Aircraft X's position. The pilot read back the clearance correctly. Continuing my scan I began to ship another Aircraft to ZDV and while doing so noticed a radar hit showing a right turn of Aircraft X at about 10;200 feet MSL. The minimum IFR altitude in that area was just over 11;000 feet MSL. The departure procedure requires a right turn to intercept the outbound course from the JAC VOR. At times a quick turn by an aircraft is translated as a bigger turn by the radar system; therefore I couldn't tell initially if that turn was due to the aircraft or the radar. I finished shipping the aircraft to ZDV and watched Aircraft X for the second radar return. The second radar return showed a continuation of the right turn southbound. I immediately restated the clearance to not turn on course until leaving 14;000 feet MSL. The pilot again responded with the correct clearance given. I informed my manager of what was happening while I continued to monitor the aircraft's climb rate. Aircraft X had a climb rate that was fast enough to stay out of high terrain so no low altitude alert was issued. The manager left and I then shipped Aircraft X to the next sector in ZLC after a handoff was accepted. Sector 08 received Aircraft X and continued their climb. The data block was dropped leaving R16's airspace. The response by the pilot was that the fix NALSI is a fly by point instead of a fly over fix. The FMS of the Aircraft X is being stated as the reason for the early turn. I have never witnessed an FMS system make a 'smart turn' 10 miles from a fix to stay on course. Not all aircraft make that early of a turn including Aircraft X flown by company to many destinations from JAC. I believe that fix needs to be made a fly over fix to mitigate the ability of an FMS system making that error.




Synopsis: ZLC Center Controller reported an aircraft turned early leading to a climb below the minimum IFR altitude.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We took off and the Captain called for gear up and I complied. The gear never retracted. The caution message appeared followed by the landing gear/lever disagree message following. We continued the normal call outs and cleaned up the airplane until we reached a safe altitude. Tower switched us over to Departure and he cleared us to 15;000. We asked to stay at 3;000 so we could take care of the issue at hand. We never declared an emergency. We then ran the appropriate QRH checklist; the Captain flew as I tried to fix. The QRH did not fix it so the Captain and I decided to transfer controls to me since he had more experience notifying who was needed to be notified. He then performed the crew brief and got a hold of the appropriate people. After we reached Dispatch; they told us to make our way to destination and we could divert to an en route alternate if need be in case fuel was an issue. We then climbed to 10;000 and made our way there. The Dispatcher's computer was down so he had to run the fuel numbers by hand which took longer than normal. The Captain and I both decided we would not be able to make it to destination and by about that time the Dispatcher gave us the new numbers and amendments to land in ZZZ for the diversion. We then made a safe landing in ZZZ and at no time were we in danger. The CRM was great. We could have climbed to a higher altitude to conserve fuel and also it would have been easier to contact everyone via radio at a higher altitude. It's easier to burn fuel than outright not having it.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer experiences the failure of the landing gear to retract after takeoff. The QRH is consulted to no avail and the Dispatcher requests that the crew attempt to make it to destination and divert if it becomes necessary. It becomes necessary.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Cooling Fan; any cooling fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 75 minutes into the flight; the flight attempted a call to Dispatch via SATCOM to advise of an equipment cooling overheat EICAS message and fumes in the cockpit and cabin. No smoke was reported. The crew's SATCOM call was unreadable and dropped when conferencing with [Maintenance Control]. Subsequently; I attempted 3 calls to raise them on SATCOM and my coworker on Sector XX attempted a SATCOM call [as well]. All 4 calls failed to connect. Aircraft is equipped with Iridium and this happens too frequently. It compromised the safety of flight as we were unable to provide Dispatch and Maintenance Control support in a timely manner. All information relayed was delayed because we needed to use ACARS communication in this situation.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown with a flight crew regarding a cooling fan malfunction and associated fumes.