elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ADS.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ADS
ATC / advisory: Tower ADS
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying at 2;500 feet inbound to KADS; and the tower advised 'proceed direct to the numbers'.  In my experience at KADS; this always means to descend directly towards the approach end of the runway (the numbers); and it even suggests a request to proceed without delay (direct to the numbers; not a more typical base-final approach).  KADS is often busy so the tower often provides such routes to expedite traffic handling.As I was descending; the tower contacted me and asked my altitude when I was at about 2;000 feet.  He was clearly not pleased that I was descending; but advised ok to proceed.  He said he had advised me to stay at 2;500 feet; but I am quite certain he just said 'proceed direct numbers'.  In retrospect; I can see now that he could have meant proceed laterally to the numbers but stay at altitude.  But since I had never been asked to do this; I did not even think of that as a possibility.  What I SHOULD have done is CONFIRM my altitude intentions.  For my lesson learned; it is to always confirm altitude intentions; even if it seems otherwise clear to me.




Synopsis: A general aviation pilot reported confusion with the ADS tower about the inbound VFR arrival and altitude.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Fatigue; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Once again; almost each week; I am assigned an XA:00 short call duty after having landed at XF:00. The trip in this case was even worse than usual since it was seven hours and fifty-seven minutes until on duty time. I awoke at several hours after midnight to commute in for the reserve trip assigned. I flew a flight which departed just before noon with one Captain. [I] then had a 3:57 hour layover at the airport; so of course it was 3 minutes shy of the contractual hotel room for rest. I then flew with a different Captain on an oceanic flight landing at an hour before midnight body time. I had adequate rest at that destination and then we departed at shortly after midnight body time from back to my domicile landing a couple of hours after daybreak. There is absolutely no way to then rest when we are required to be phone available at all times. I received a call mid day for a short call for that night; which I accepted because if we don't; the Crew Desk reports us to our Flight Office. At XC:00; I received a phone call from the crew desk assigning me a trip for that morning. I told them I was fatigued and unfit for the trip. At that point; I had slept 6 hours in the previous 38 hours. We are short on pilots and these assignments are happening all of the time. It is extremely unsafe and it must be changed.




Synopsis: A B757 Reserve First Officer called in fatigued after being assigned another short call trip because she was only able to get six hours of sleep in the previous 38 hours.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Arriving at the gate myself and the two other Flight Attendants around me smelled an extremely strong smell of fuel. We called the Purser and they reported smelling it also. She then called the pilots. Passengers around us starting covering their faces with hands; coats; blankets. We were told by the pilots after everyone was off the aircraft that one of our engines would not shut down. They had to 'force' it [down]. The fuel smell came into the cabin through the vents. The flight was cancelled as they worked on fixing the engine.




Synopsis: B767 Flight Attendant reported a fuel odor in the cabin after arrival at the gate.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In flight the cabin crew informed us of a rubber burning smell in cabin. We did the Smoke/Fumes Checklist. [We] declared an emergency [and] requested Airfield Rescue and Firefighters. We exceeded 250 KTS below 10;000 FT to meet emergency.


Second narrative: [This report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A MD-80 pilot declared an emergency and executed a high speed approach after flight attendants reported a rubber burning odor in the cabin.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Stall warning activation on approach. The set up to this scenario came from being high and fast due to being turned in earlier than anticipated on approach. To help slow the aircraft; I had the speed brakes extended and flaps 15 while descending and slowing. We were still high at a point 10 miles from the field. I called for 'Gear and Flaps 20' to help me keep the speed back while increasing descent rate. Problem; I left the speed brakes extended. We slowed quickly and while passing approximately 8 miles out and 3;800 FT received a stick shaker. I stowed the speed brake and advanced the thrust lever. This corrected the problem. We elected to discontinue the approach and requested vectors back around. We were given a descent to 3;000 FT and vectored around for an uneventful approach. At the time of this occurrence the pilot not flying was busy configuring; changing radio frequencies and contacting Tower. I believe this problem happened due to the fact I left the speed brake extended when it was not required. Lesson learned: Keep hand on extended speed brake in order to not forget it is deployed.




Synopsis: While on a high; fast approach the Captain extended the speed brakes; landing gear and set flaps 20 in order to regain the profile then received a Stall Warning when airspeed decayed rapidly because of the extended speed brakes.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reverser Position Indication
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During descent from cruise altitude of FL330 and through FL240; we noticed a Master Warning light illuminate without any associated annunciators. We continued the flight trying to figure out what was causing the Master Warning. Reaching 9;500 FT; we noticed a dimly illuminated 'Right Thrust Reverser' Unlock light. Upon noticing the full illumination of the light and test of the indicator lights in the cockpit; I completed the memory items for the associated malfunction and called for the checklist. While completing the checklist; the 'Right Thrust Reverser' Unlock light would not extinguish.Noting that we would be executing a visual approach via a traffic pattern to the runway; I elected to follow the checklist and shut down the engine in an attempt to assure minimal effect should the reverser deploy in a more unfavorable altitude and attitude: i.e. in the traffic pattern on a turn to final within close proximity to the ground. After completion of all checklists; including the single engine approach and landing checklist; a normal approach and landing was made. The flight concluded without event.




Synopsis: Beechjet 400 flight crew received a 'Master Warning' light during descent; and then a 'Right Thrust Reverser' unlock light. Following the checklist; the right engine was shut down as a precaution and the aircraft was landed safely.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A passenger's Lithium Ion battery powered wheelchair device tag was delivered to the Captain that was incomplete. The lithium ion check box was checked; but neither the checklist for battery secured nor battery removed where complied with or checked as required. Upon questioning the ramp workers about the lithium ion battery no one seemed to know where the battery was; eventually it was determined the battery was removed from the wheelchair and in possession of the passenger. After confirming the battery was with the passenger in the cabin it was determined that the cabin battery seat location on the mobility device tag was also not filled out as required. After gathering the required information a new mobility device tag was filled out correctly and supplied to the Captain. After takeoff I became more concerned about documentation policies not being followed that I wondered if anything else was not complied with. With regard to pilot Flight Operations Manual; there is an example of the battery powered wheelchair and mobility device tag. Below it is a note that states if the battery is removed and boxed; only the Company X-designed battery box can be used. At this point I asked the purser to go check with the passenger and see how the battery was stored or protected. I was told the battery was in a cardboard box; placed inside the passenger's carry-on luggage. Upon arrival in ZZZ1 I went to customer service and asked about the Company X-designed box for wheelchair batteries; I was told that one exists but no one could recall seeing one being used in recent years. So my experience was this; it caused an extension to our already delayed flight delay do to incomplete forms; a violation of several requirements to safely carry a lithium ion wheelchair battery and some confusion as to whether a Company X-designed battery box is required for lithium ion wheelchair batteries to be carried in the cabin.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported wheelchair Lithium Ion battery was transported in a unauthorized Hazmat container.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Tire
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a quick turn at the gate. [Flight] crew wrote up nose wheel shimmy. I looked at the Part Number (P/N) of the nose tires on the plane and noted it to be XXXX-581YZ. I grabbed two tires out of our tire cart and was going to create the request in the maintenance computer program after returning to the office. When I went to get all of the maintenance computer transactions done; I noticed that the XXXX-581Y tires that I installed on the aircraft were not 'Effective.' I notified Maintenance Control to have [the next Maintenance Station] change the tires and put the right ones on. Not creating a material request for the tires before installing them [caused the problem]. [Recommend] following proper procedures for requesting parts. Verify with Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). ERJ-190 and ERJ-170 nose tire Part Numbers (P/N) need to be more different than just a single letter at the end. Time pressure.




Synopsis: After replacing both nose tires on an ERJ-190 aircraft; a Line Mechanic realizes he installed tires that were not 'Effective' for the aircraft. Mechanic noted that only a single letter at the end of the tire Part Number (P/N) marked the difference between the ERJ-170 and -190 nose tires.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After departure with flaps and gear up; still on runway track; the rudder deflected slightly; uncommanded by the pilots. Autopilot 1 was engaged. It was not a violent deflection; but it was not subtle either. It happened twice within a few seconds of each other. The first one got our attention but was not verbalized. The second time we both said that this was not right. We brought up the flight control ECAM screen. We also engaged autopilot 2. We continued the climb and when we turned on the SID track; it happened again. We entered some very light turbulence; and it happened again. We now ruled out the possibility of turbulence and were convinced the rudder was the issue. Early on; we selected the flight control ECAM page to see if we could see a deflection of the rudder; but that would be difficult unless we were staring at it at the moment it happened. It occurred again as we climbed above 10;000 FT. It was at that point we both agreed there was an issue with the rudder and that we should return. The First Officer was assigned the flying duties while I arranged our return to the field. Once we started our descent and return; things seemed to operate normally. When I informed the flight attendants of our plans to return to the field; they had already become aware of what they felt was a usual movement of the tail. They all made it clear that things did not seem right to them. The approach and landing was uneventful.

Callback: The reporter states that he is not aware of what actions were taken by Maintenance to return the aircraft to service. When autopilot 2 was engaged the problem did not go away resulting in the decision to return to the field.



Synopsis: A319 Captain experiences uncommanded rudder movement during climbout and attempts to troubleshoot the problem. The crew elects to return to the departure airport as the movements continue passing through 10;000 FT. No further deflections are felt during descent and approach and a normal landing ensues.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While operating Aircraft X; during the takeoff roll on runway XXR in ZZZ; as we were coming up on V1 speed it felt like something struck the landing gear and the aircraft swerved to the right of centerline. The Captain called for the rejected takeoff and we followed the company rejected takeoff procedures; directional control was maintained and we slowed the aircraft with max thrust reversers and braking. Abort speed was approximately 115-118 knots and takeoff weight approximately 41;000 pounds. We vacated the runway and returned to the gate where we found the left outboard main tire had come apart. Seems that the cause was the tire coming apart.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ-135 flight crew reported a high-speed RTO was accomplished due to a main gear tire failure.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Fluid
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About 30 minutes after departure; right hydraulic quantity EICAS; a few moments later right reserve light; status page showed right hydraulic quantity .45. After discussion with Dispatch; returned to departure airport. The hydraulic quantity rose to .55 then back down to .45 and stayed there during the remainder of the flight. Aircraft operated normally from the point of hydraulic warning until the approach phase. Just prior to intercepting the localizer; at flaps 1 and 210 KTS; the autopilot pitched up at approximately 2 g's. The autopilot did not disconnect; but the First Officer immediately did so. The remainder of the flight was normal. Probably pitch up related to hydraulic problem.




Synopsis: B757 Captain experiences a right hydraulic quantity EICAS about 30 minutes after departure and returns to the departure airport. During approach; with the right hydraulic system operational and the autopilot engaged; a vigorous pitch up occurs. The autopilot does not disconnect but is quickly disengaged by the First Officer and a normal landing ensues.