elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had just taken off from ZZZ on a 250 heading up to 1500 ft when we were instructed to contact Approach. Upon contacting we were cleared to 4000 ft and as we continued the climb at around 1300 ft MSL; the engine emitted a loud bang and immediate loss of power. I took control from my student and initiated a 180 back to Runway X while [requesting priority handling]. Approach cleared us to land X and had us switch to Tower. I flew the aircraft while my student took the radios. About 20 feet to touchdown the prop completely stopped and we coasted off the runway to Taxiway XX. Run-up was completed before take-off and had no drops in RPM or oil pressure. Takeoff was executed normally at full power/full rich mixture. No signs of engine issues until the sudden bang and loss of power.




Synopsis: Cessna Pilot reported sudden engine failure on climb out caused an air return.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Nuisance alert from ROW/ROPS [runway overrun protection system]. I was the pilot flying and upon touchdown in the first 1;200 feet of runway; a call out annunciated 'runway too short; brakes max brake'. Without hesitation I applied maximum brake effort and maximum thrust reverse. The airplane slowed to taxi speed in about 2;000 feet.The runway did not meet the standard assessment; so the application was used to calculate landing performance. An A320 [series aircraft] with both reverse; max manual; sea level; 168;000 pounds; no MELS; OAT 21; and dry runway computed 5;776 feet. Furthermore with medium auto brake 6;590 feet is required.Having never received this warning and not anticipating it; the command was startling but followed dutifully. At no point in time did it feel like the runway was insufficient for a safe landing. After the maximum braking effort we had to coast down the runway to the planned turnoff.


Second narrative: The initial reaction startled me a bit; realizing the aircraft thrust at idle; max reverse thrust; and touching down with adequate runway remaining. We were slowed to 80 KTS abeam the 'E' taxi high speed turnoff but taxied down to 'K' as requested. The aircraft had medium braking initially selected; but when the alert was initiated; max manual braking was used. The alert subsided when max manual braking and max reverse thrust was initiated. The event was debriefed after shutdown at the gate.With the point of touchdown between 1;200 and 1;000 feet down the runway and medium braking selected on the autobrakes. I believe that the Runway Overrun Warning/Prevention System (ROW/ROPS) alerted because of the high speed taxi near the end of the runway and the action to exit the runway in a timely manner onto the high speed taxi exit.


Synopsis: A320 series flight crew reports a Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) warning upon landing in BOS on Runway 27. The call out is 'runway too short; brake max braking'; which the First Officer applies along with maximum reverse. The aircraft is stopped well before the end of the runway and the crew does not understand why the alert was activated.
Date: 201711
Location: RNO.Airport, NV
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The Reno Special Operations 10-7B chart says:'During IMC operations to 16L and 16R; use the following guidance to ensure single engine climb capability in the event of an instrument missed approach commenced at decision height. This applies for all instrument approaches:SINGLE ENGINE GO-AROUND - Fly the published missed approach - Level off and clean up at 6200ft MSL - After clean up; continue climb at flaps up maneuvering speed'Having recently flown some -800 heavyweight single-engine go-arounds from decision height in the simulator; I have some concerns about the guidance in the second bullet above - 'level off and clean up at 6200ft MSL.' This procedure can put you very close to high terrain. Referencing perhaps the most commonly flown approach at Reno; the ILS Z or LOC Z Runway 16R Approach Plate 11-1; you'll notice that ZAKBI is the first fix on the missed approach procedure. It is roughly eight miles south of the center of the airport. ZAKBI is located nearly over; perhaps a couple thousand feet east; of a 6274 foot peak. This peak is depicted on the Reno ILS 34R 11-5 Approach Plate just south and west of step-down fix CALEG; and is likely the reason for the 6800ft restriction on that approach until passing CALEG. The issued guidance to level off and clean up at 6200ft MSL; 74ft below the highest terrain in close proximity to the missed approach flight path; presents an obvious safety concern. Perhaps the guidance on the Reno 10-7B concerning single engine go-around bullet two should be changed to read 'level off and clean up at 6800ft MSL.' This would provide at least 500ft clearance above the terrain near ZAKBI. It may also be wise to include a crossing restriction at ZAKBI of 'at or above 6800'' on the ILS Z 16R missed approach procedure and on any other chart ZAKBI is utilized. This restriction would be similar to the CALEG step down 6800ft restriction on the 34L Localizer Approach; and is appropriate given the two fixes are very close to one another. In the meantime I'd also suggest immediate guidance for crews to NOT level off below 6800ft on a single engine go-around in Reno.




Synopsis: B737 pilot expressed concern about the design of the single-engine go-around procedures at RNO.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SDY.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G SDY
ATC / advisory: CTAF SDY
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was instructing a student pilot and he was preforming his 4th touch and go on Runway 19. The wind was 180 at 4 KTS. We were calling on the radio our position in the pattern right downwind; right base; and final for Runway 19. On our take off roll I observed Aircraft Y on final for Runway 1. With insufficient runway to stop; we decided to take off and make an evasive maneuver to the left.




Synopsis: GA Instructor reported NMAC on departure with opposite direction traffic at a non-towered airport.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The aircraft arrived from the hangar for the trip.  We were told that the aircraft had surpassed its parking to greater than XX hours.  We were told by management to accomplish parking per XX.XX.X that led us to work orders XX and XX1 before its next trip that was due out in the morning; requiring a lengthy delay and out of service condition.The aircraft bill of work was never updated to reflect the parking orders being required before the next flight.Find a way to monitor aircraft ground times and work requiring accomplishment.




Synopsis: Technician reported the aircraft was parked and the parking orders never updated requiring a further maintenance delay.
Date: 201506
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In a newer model aircraft; the autothrottle disconnected and would not reengage.  During cruise at FL380 in turbulence; the speed increased rather suddenly to Mach .83 and the Airspeed Warning Clacker sounded.  The thrust was reduced and aircraft speed was brought back within limits.  It was a busy phase of flight as we were in the process of having to divert.  After landing; Dispatch and Maintenance were notified and a logbook entry was made.This might have been avoided altogether by selecting a slightly lower cruise Mach speed; or a lower altitude; but more vigilance by both pilots would have been the only way to prevent this overspeed.




Synopsis: Enroute to diversion airport (for weather) crew of B-737 exceeded limit speed after the autothrottle disengaged and created an overspeed situation.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Weather elements / visibility: Sky Clear
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: The winds were 180/4; very light. Took off behind a heavy B777 on [Runway] XXC in ZZZ. We were aware of the potential of wake turbulence on the climb out; since I had also heard the B777 was cleared for the same RNAV departure as us. The spacing was good between takeoffs; but still thinking about the wake turbulence potential. The climb out was perfectly smooth; and at about 1;200 feet AGL we received the wind shear caution. That took me by surprise as our aircraft had barely any chop on the climb; and there were no indications of wind shear at the field. It took me a little bit to mentally get from the wake turbulence maneuvers to the wind shear maneuver. Before I was getting ready to call max thrust; the indication had gone away. The aircraft had no indication of performance loss in the form of airspeed or altitude or otherwise; this could've been the reason why the caution took me by surprise.At the end of the day; I should've executed the wind shear maneuver. Better to be safe with the extra power. Although; looking at the situation; I feel it was a bad caution message since the aircraft was acting like it would in smooth air; and I have encountered much worse wake and turbulence below 1;500 feet and not had any caution in any of those situations. We were cognizant of potential wake turbulence; the takeoff separation we felt was adequate; we tried to fly a bit upwind and above the B777's flight path.




Synopsis: ERJ-170 Captain reported receiving a wind shear warning on climb out that may have been related to wake turbulence from a preceding B777.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise flight at FL360; Master Warning; Fire Warning; Wheel Well Fire EICAS Illuminated/sounded. We also had a Duct Leak LP status message. First Officer was flying the aircraft. QRH checklist was called for and complied with and gear was extended. We both agreed that our best option was a course reversal and divert to nearest suitable airport. ATC provided excellent assistance with vectors and altitude descent request. Wheel well fire light remained illuminated for approx. 15 minutes before extinguishing. We contacted dispatch via Satcom to coordinate divert. They agreed with our decision and told us that all necessary parties would be advised. Later company representative was also contacted for additional input; at that point we discovered that they were completely unaware of our situation. We accomplished an uneventful approach and landing. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) were standing by and accomplished a visual inspection of our aircraft. All appeared normal and we taxied back to the ramp. Maintenance inspection revealed an actual duct leak in the right wheel well.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported receiving a Wheel Well Fire EICAS warning; as well as a Duct Leak LP message; in cruise flight on an overwater leg. The flight diverted to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CYYZ.Airport, ON
Weather elements / visibility: Clear
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Due to the unusual circumstances;I believe no one knew the appropriate documentation required.  We arrive to the plane in Toronto and find that we have GPS/ADS-S fail lights fleet wide and all airplane using this FMS were having the same issue so we contact dispatch who transfer us to maintenance control.  We discuss with them our concerns and informed them of what was going on; they were aware of the situation as they were dealing with other aircraft in the company with the same situation.  They then call a mechanic in YYZ to come to our aircraft they discuss the options with him and informed us that because the fault was fleet wide and there wasn't any faults in the aircraft systems it was just a Rockwell FMS faulty update that no MEL was required to operate that flight so the mechanic signed the log can.  And we contacted maintenance control to confirm that we were legal to fly and all necessary paperwork was correct they gave us the green light.  We operated the flight with no issues.  After this flight we also operated eight additional flights without anything in the MEL.  Today I operated a flight and found the appropriate MEL's listed on the release.  So I'm filing this ASAP to list all the flights I operated with out these 2 Mel's being listed on the release based on what maintenance control had informed us in YYZ.  I think [issuing] a memo stating what exactly was going on early so staff would've had a better understanding from the beginning of this unusual situation.




Synopsis: Pilot reported company confusion about the necessity of deferring the GPS system due to system-wide signal failure.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we were taxing out the Tower reported wind shear on final. We ran numbers for no flex takeoff. During departure off of runway 1; at 400 feet in the initial turn. We observed 2 Amber EICAS messages; Bleed 1 and bleed 2 over pressure. I was the Pilot Flying and the captain immediately pulled out the QRH and started to run the procedures one at a time. I continued as the PF and handled the radios as he was completing the QRH. We were told to maintain 4000 feet and I slowed the airplane to 210. We were able to reset bleed over pressure 2 with the message extinguishing. Bleed over pressure 1 message would not extinguish and the QRH stated to land at the nearest suitable airport which at that point in time was [the departure airport]. The Captain told ATC we need to return to the field. He begin running the QRH which called for us to retarded the throttle of the affected engine. Then eventually lead us to the engine out descent and landing. We requested a box pattern near the airport to get set up for the approach. Once all checklists were completed we advised ATC we were ready for the approach. We configured normally and landed single engine.




Synopsis: EMB-175 First Officer reported observing 2 Amber EICAS messages for Bleed 1 and bleed 2 over pressure. Bleed two is successfully reset using QRH procedures but bleed one will not reset which requires the engine to be shut down. Flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: FFZ.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D FFZ
ATC / advisory: Tower FFZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had a PA46 call for taxi instructions with the current ATIS. I advised the Malibu to taxi. The pilot read back runway assignment and started his taxi. The PA46 had an IFR flight plan on file and had been given his clearance by the previous ground controller. I failed to catch that this was an IFR PA46 as the pilot did not mention his IFR status when calling for taxi. I even asked the pilot what his direction of flight was since I did not have that marked on the VFR strip I was going to hand off to the Local Controller. All the pilot said when asked direction of fight was southbound; so I marked an 'S' on the VFR strip and handed it off to the Local Controller. This would have been a good time for the pilot to mention his IFR status. I would say that it is a fair estimate that 98% of our traffic is VFR.The pilot was cleared for take-off by the Local Controller as if it were a VFR flight to the South. The PA46 tagged up as IFR and the Local Controller brought it to my attention; since I was also the Controller in Charge at the time. TRACON called almost immediately and asked what was going on with the IFR Malibu. I briefly explained he had departed inadvertently without his release. The Local Controller circled the Malibu overhead while I coordinated with TRACON for a release. A release was given and the plane departed IFR with only one turn in the pattern. The weather was extreme VFR and there were no separation issues and the plane did not leave the Class D until an IFR release was given by TRACON. Contributing factors would be a pilot not advising ground of his IFR status. I am an IFR pilot and I always tell ground 'ready to taxi IFR 'destination'. I don't know if it is because I am a controller or that it was just the way I was taught. I would recommend pilots advise ground controllers of their type of departure requested IFR/VFR. We don't have an AIM here at the facility; so I can't say for sure what it recommends. I know we have asked the instructors at the Flight Schools to let us know and that has worked well. This type of occurrence is rare in my opinion.




Synopsis: FFZ Tower Controller taxied and cleared for takeoff an aircraft he believed to be on a VFR flight plan; but that was actually on an IFR flight plan.