elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At approximately 3 miles outside of PAYMI; at 3;000 FT; on a vector to intercept final; and with clearance for the ILS 13 approach; I selected approach mode with the autopilot engaged. The glideslope indicator was passing through centered to the below glideslope indication; so the aircraft began a strong climb to 'catch' the glideslope. I disengaged the autopilot and began a smooth pushover. I topped out at 3;300 before correcting back to 3;000 prior to PAYMI.Do not engage approach mode prior to localizer capture. Be more situationally aware of where the glideslope is and where capture should occur.


Second narrative: Fast fingered Captain should wait until we are established on the LOC course inbound and at PAYMI before engaging APP mode for ILS.


Synopsis: Prior to intercepting the LGA Runway 13 ILS localizer; a B737-800 Captain selected the APP mode and as the glideslope indicatored passed through centered climbing; the aircraft unexpectely pitched.
Date: 201807
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Other Customer lobby check in
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Customer checking bag needed to remove his Generation One smart bag lithium battery. He was having difficulty removing battery and at some point the battery exploded filling the lobby area with toxic gas. Before a fire could start the bag was doused with a fire extinguisher and law enforcement was notified.




Synopsis: Customer Service Agent reported passenger inadvertently exploded lithium battery at ticket counter during check-in.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our pre departure duties our weight and balance performance indicated that a flaps 4 takeoff was required. I briefed the flaps four takeoff with the First Officer (FO) and input into the FMS that we would be performing a flaps 4 takeoff. After the pushback and engine start procedures I watched the first officer select the flaps to four. We ran an after start checklist as per SOP the First Officer reading from the checklist stated 'flaps verify four' I pointed at the FO's MCDU display where it said flaps four and then at the flap indication on the EICAS verifying that the flaps were set at four. We finished the after start checklist and taxied to Runway 01 and ran the taxi checklist. Tower cleared us for takeoff; and I called for the before takeoff [checklist]. There was an airplane on final for Runway 01 the takeoff configuration check issued a warning of no takeoff flaps; I again verified flaps were set at four on the EICAS a green 4 was displayed and the flap handle was securely set at 4. I was sure the airplane was properly configured for takeoff as we had previously briefed the flaps four takeoff and reviewed performance numbers from the ACARS. At that point I knew that I had made an error selecting flaps 4 in the FMS for the takeoff configuration warning. Due to feeling pressured with the airplane on final and being sure that we were in fact configured properly I instructed the FO to continue the takeoff.The FMS error was caused by my incorrectly selecting flaps 4 in the weight and balance takeoff conditions page 2 of 2; when I should have selected flaps 4 in the Perf Takeoff page 2 of 2. Looking back on event I realized that I should have not let myself be pressured to continue the takeoff even though I was sure the airplane was configured properly. A rejected takeoff should have been performed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The ERJ170 crew received a takeoff configuration warning because of an incorrect entry into the FMS. The captain decided to continue the takeoff as he determined that the aircraft was properly configured and there was another aircraft on short final.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: Tower MCO
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Suspected loss of wake turbulence separation between aircraft X and aircraft Y on final runway 36L.  Aircraft X had been cleared to land and aircraft Y was in trail with spacing deteriorating.  When the spacing was approaching minimums; final (1g) called the tower on the override line advising if aircraft Y does not have aircraft X in sight to break him out.  I then attempted to contact aircraft Y twice but received no response.  After the second attempt; the compression was below the minimum separation required for wake turbulence separation.  By the time aircraft y checked on; aircraft X was cross the landing threshold and rolling out.  Aircraft Y reported he had aircraft X on roll out in sight.  I issued him a cautionary and cleared him to land.  Aircraft Y landed without further incident.Make sure the aircraft is in communication with either tower or final when you are about to lose separation on final; or cancel the approach clearance in enough time so it's not an issue during transfer of communication.




Synopsis: An MCO Controller reports of a loss of separation between two aircraft on final. The Controller tried to break out the second aircraft but it was not on frequency until the loss had happened. The second aircraft landed.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: X26.Airport, FL
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I flew into an airport at night. It's a little non controlled airport. I was taxiing back to the tie down area and they have zero lighting back there. I wasn't so lucky as I hit another parked plane and totaled mine. I just think there should be sufficient lighting if you're gonna have planes coming in to tie down for the night. I just think the system they have blinds your eyes from multi bright colors to a pitch black windshield and a strobe that [is] killing your night vision. I'm prob going to be found at some kind of fault but I'm here to tell you that's a hazardous situation they have going on there at night for sure. Not good for pilots not familiar with the airport and the parking of the planes.




Synopsis: Aircraft collided with other parked aircraft on ramp poorly lighted.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SDF.Airport, KY
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SDF
ATC / advisory: TRACON SDF
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At SDF there are 2 parallel runways. During the inbound rush every night we open 2 feeds and 2 finals. One for each runway. Splitting the airspace down the middle. I was working west feed and had a 10 place upwind/downwind/upwind pattern going to build spacing for the west final controller who was already busy with a 30 mile long final. At a west feed arrival gate south of the airport 3 planes were coming in. 2 jets and an Aircraft Y between them at 7000 ft. I descended the first jet (Aircraft X) to 8000 ft and told him to expect 17R (west runway). I handed off the Aircraft Y to the east feed who was less busy than I. The watch supervisor then told me to hand all of the planes to the east feed controller. I told Aircraft X jet to now expect 17L and gave a vector to the east downwind. I continued working my planes when I heard the east feed controller tell me he did not want to talk to them; point out approved. I scanned his airspace and determined Aircraft X was going to be first and did not need to be slowed or paper stopped so I descended him to 6000 ft. One minute later the east feed is calling traffic for Aircraft Y who was less than 3 miles behind Aircraft X and at 7000 ft. He descended Aircraft Y and he called Aircraft X in sight. By this point separation was lost. What led to the event; I work straight mid night shifts 5 nights a week. On the weekends I sleep normally at night. Monday nights are usually accomplished by staying up for 24 hours. I thought that Aircraft X would outrun Aircraft Y and my scan did not get back to it in time to make sure. For the midnight shift; let midders have a 4 night 10 hour shift to allow more time off for recovery. Half on Mon-Thurs. Others Tues-Fri.




Synopsis: SDF Approach Controller has a loss of separation when an aircraft on final over takes another.
Date: 201604
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Scales are a trip hazzard and hard on back lifting bags off the ground at the ticket counter.


Second narrative: The re-design of the lobby area is not ergonomically correct. We are daily straining our backs tagging and lifting bags up to 70 lbs off floor level to a bag belt 15 inches high. There is not always an agent available to help us with baggage as they are daily short of staff. We are experiencing back pain on a daily basis since the remodel. This will surely cause permanent damage to our spines. We have had the new setup for approximately 3 weeks and there are already four agents injured. The new scales at the counters causes us as well as our customers to trip on them constantly. When passengers place their baggage on the scales; they step on the edge of the scale causing the weight to reflect a heavy bag. Also the new monitors are placed much farther away to our right causing not only eye strain but neck strain as well. My contact lenses were designed for a monitor 15 to 20 inches away from my face. The new monitors are approximately 24 inches away and the applications are sized for a 15 inch screen. My prescription glasses do not work as well. These applications should be enlarged and programmed for a 21 inch screen. The security aspect of this design is also frightening. There is not enough of a division between customers and agents. Passengers will reach over and grab their boarding passes before you are finished or if angry; will get frighteningly close. This occurs especially on the end positions as a divider was not constructed as before. Passengers have come up behind us to either look at our screens or grab their luggage because they forgot to remove an article.


Synopsis: Three airline ticket agents contend that the redesign of the baggage scales to near floor level causes a personal safety issue for the agents if passengers chose to walk behind the counter. The additional distance that bags need to be lifted to the bag belt is also causing back strain.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TOA.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TOA
ATC / advisory: Tower TOA
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was holding short of Runway 29R requesting a straight out departure.  At that time there was an IFR coordinated business jet on Taxiway A abeam the antenna site.  I departed Aircraft X without delay to give them ample time to distance themselves from the jet; and it was my plan to delay getting the release with SOCAL on the jet for that same reason.  However; the CIC dialed the shout line to the Laker Sector anyway.    Then the front line manager who was working the Ground Control position coordinated a Runway 29L crossing and the Laker Controller responded back to the call the CIC had made; both at the same time.  I hurriedly coordinated with the Ground Controller in order to respond to the Laker Departure Controller.  I departed the jet and then noticed that arriving Aircraft Y; a helicopter; was over taxiway hotel at the same time that another small aircraft was trying to taxi southbound on that taxiway.  I believe there were two causes for this event.  One was me rushing to get two coordinations done at the same time.  The other was both me and the Supervisor on Ground Control failing to adequately scan the airspace to visually acquire Aircraft Y we were coordinating for.Even though the CIC initiated the call to the Laker Sector; I had the option and should have decided to simply call them back at a later time.  That would have let me better focus on my coordination with the Ground Controller.  Second; the Ground Controller should be aware of the Local Controller's traffic before they coordinate with them.  Talking with that Front Line Manager later in his office; he admitted that he was not aware of Aircraft Y's position before he coordinated with me.  Since Aircraft Y arrived almost immediately; that indicates that Aircraft Y was on a short left base and obstructed by the roof of the Tower Cab when the coordination was made.  Thirdly; I as the Local Controller must be diligent in visually acquiring Aircraft Y traffic I am coordinating for.  Extra care should also used when working with a front line manager that may not be as proficient at working traffic as a CPC.




Synopsis: TOA Local Controller reports of bad communication with the Ground Controller; which causes an airborne aircraft to fly closely to a departing aircraft.
Date: 202107
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Integrated Audio System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We flew four legs in the B737 MAX over a two day period.  We found the runway proximity alert system (whatever it is called) [Runway Awareness and Advisory System; RAAS] to be an amusing distraction at times; but a safety hazard at other times.  At the same time that crews are likely to receive takeoff clearance with altitudes; headings; and frequencies there is a loud runway alert system talking over ATC and cockpit communications.  It is a real problem that needs to be looked at.




Synopsis: B737 MAX Captain reported that the runway proximity alert system is distracting and possibly hazardous when it talks over ATC and cockpit communications.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Upon returning from a break I assumed the FLM position.  I was briefed about an Aircraft X atop clouds VFR searching for ground contact.  The pilot made several course corrections trying to establish ground contact.  The controllers on position and an adjacent controller were all soliciting pilot reports and contacting approach controls attempting to find a solution for the pilot of Aircraft X.  After several failed attempts to find VMC conditions I started looking for a pilot in the facility.  A controller from a different area was found to be instrument rated and an Instructor.  Also; this controller had time in and was familiar with the Aircraft X type. This controller was set up on an unopened position and given communication with Aircraft X solo.  The Certified Professional Controller (CPC) aided the pilot and asked many questions relating to his knowledge of the deicing equipment and also to attain information as to whether the pilot may be hypoxic as Aircraft X was above 14;000AGL without oxygen.  Upon getting information about bases the CPC assisted the pilot in a descent to 5;000AGL after coordinating with APCH as to the situation.  The pilot of Aircraft X broke out and was again VFR at an altitude below 6;000AGL and was able to proceed and land under VFR conditions.Pilot's knowledge of weather along route continually updated and not fly into conditions not certified for.




Synopsis: A Front Line Manager (FLM) describes a situation where a VFR pilot is stuck above the clouds and cannot find a hole to get VFR through. The FLM queries all sectors to see if any of them are VFR. The FLM then searches the control room and finds a controller who is a pilot; and familiar with this type of aircraft. The controller gets the aircraft though the clouds into VFR conditions and the plane lands safely.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was departing TEB to the first waypoint; WENTZ; on the RUUDY 3 [4] departure. At WENTZ I leveled out at the assigned altitude of 1;500 FT and activated the autopilot. However it did not turn on and I proceeded with the normal procedure of pressing the autopilot disconnect; and then attempted to activate the autopilot without success. I then repeated the above; again without success. I then proceeded to fly the aircraft manually but found I had drifted up to about 1;700 FT and proceeded to return to 1;500 FT. At this point I was about midway between WENTZ and the 2 mile distant TASCA waypoint. When I reached TASCA I climbed to 2;000 FT as required. About 5 minutes later I was able to activate the autopilot and proceeded without incident. Upon reflection; upon failure to activate the autopilot; I should have devoted my full attention to maintaining altitude and course instead of working on the autopilot.




Synopsis: C525 Captain approaching WENTZ at 1;500 FT (RUUDY 4 from TEB) attempts to engage the autopilot without success. During this time the altitude drifts up to 1;700 FT prior to WENTZ and is corrected back to 1;500 FT; but TASCA is crossed at 1;500 FT instead of the 2;000 FT published.