elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We encountered a near miss on a taxiway. We received a late night reassignment to fly. There was a snow event in progress at the airport. We deiced at the gate; pushed back and then deiced the nose on the ramp. We taxied out behind another [aircraft] at the top of the ramp. Ground control instructions were to follow company to runway 22L. The previous [aircraft] had a head start on us out of the ramp and with engine spool up time and easy on power deep in ramp as well as slippery surfaces we were a bit behind the leading [aircraft]. Our taxiway was not plowed as well as the main taxiways. I was slow also because of some nose wheel skidding. The First Officer was heads down for 4 pieces of Take-off data and I was taxiing and heads up. I was looking ahead to see where previous [aircraft] was turning. We never heard nor ever responded to any hold for or give way to any other taxi traffic. I just did not see Aircraft Y traveling east on the adjacent taxiway. The First Officer luckily; fortunately; and professionally looked up just in time to see Aircraft Y and called out 'WHOA WHOA' 3 or 4 times. I locked the brakes and stopped just feet from the other aircraft. It took 4 or 5 radio calls from us and the other Aircraft Y to finally get ground to recognize and respond to us that we had a problem and needed assistance.We should have deiced slimed windows. Follow traffic instructions became difficult with separation from that traffic assigned runway was not listed on the ATIS as a take-off option. The assigned runway indicated a tail wind and runway condition wet 5 5 3. The taxi conflict was cross cockpit from the heads up taxi pilot. The First Officer was heads down for 4 new pieces of needed take-off data. Frequency congestion and overload with multiple stepped on transmissions; similar call signs; ramp and gate occupied holds; etc; etc etc. We were unaware of a taxi conflict but I am also aware of the primary responsibility of see and avoid.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported ground conflict during taxi with another taxiing aircraft.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Once again Houston is the problem and outsource ramp people not properly trained is an accident waiting to happen. Upon arrival at IAH the copilot saw the ramp person was signaling him to release the brakes. I said no and asked why? After several more requests to release the brakes the copilot opened his side window and asked what the problem was. The ramp people said he parked [us] past the stop point and wanted the 'slope of the ramp [to] coast the plane backwards' into the proper spot. I refused. With no guidance; no headset; people in the aisle. He wanted me to possibly pop a wheely. I refused. The ramp guy got a headset. The tow bar was hooked to the plane; the tug was then hooked up to the towbar and we then moved the 6 inches to the proper spot. I also made a PA announcement to the passengers warning of this moment The jetway came up; and no injuries. I then [tried] to find someone to express my displeasure. I would [hate] to have a new captain fall for this. Cause it has been done many times before the ramp guy said!!!!




Synopsis: A320 Captain described ramp personnel encouraging what he felt were dangerous deviations from SOPs at IAH.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger in [seat] X4 was told twice by myself and co-worker to fix her mask properly. I told her that her mask should be over her nose and mouth. She told me that she was drinking her water. I stood there while doing my safety demo and not once did I see her take a sip of water. She got upset when I told her that she needs to wear her mask properly.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that a passenger became upset when asked to wear her face mask properly.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While crossing the mountains (which were approximately 5;000 feet MSL) at 6;600 feet assigned; and on the KEFFR3; near JWARD; just east of ELB; we received a TA/RA alert and were directed to maintain vertical speed. We had heard SCT direct a Bonanza to climb 300 feet which probably put him at 7;000 ft. We didn't realize he was on a crossing vector with us.When we received the TA/RA alert he was crossing from right to left at an angle and came approximately 2 miles and 400 feet from us. We advised SCT that we had received the TA/RA alert but that was not answered. Instead; about 10 seconds later SCT 'sort of' asked if we were descending to 4;000 ft. (as if he were suggesting he had assigned that altitude before). I am certain he had not given that altitude before because if he had that would have put us in the mountains we had just crossed. We advised we were then going to 4;000 feet.I know the LA Valley is very active and the controllers are very busy; but in this case I feel it was a simple case of too close. The controller seemed to have seen the event coming on by giving the Bonanza a short climb of 300 feet but that was just not enough. Had the TCAS directed a descent; [it] would have been impossible due to the mountains below us.




Synopsis: A widebody transport crew inbound to LGB responded to a TCAS/RA advisory to 'maintain vertical descent.' The crew saw a Bonanza crossing left to right. According to the report no traffic information was issued to the crew.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were inbound to DFW on the KLNDR 2 RNAV.  We had been cleared to and had just leveled at FL190 just outside KLNDR. We at this point had not been cleared to descend via the arrival. We heard cleared to descend via KLNDR 2. PF set 15;000 and started to descend. ATC asked if we were level at FL190 as we had not been cleared to descend via the arrival yet. 'You were to expect cleared via the arrival shortly.' At 18;500 we started a climb back to FL190 but ATC told us to descend via KLNDR 2. We continued to descend via the KLNDR 2. Nothing else was said about this confusion by ATC or by us.There was a lot of confusion and freq. congestion between ATC and other aircraft over the new DFW RNAV arrivals that were effective the day before. That contributed to the confusion between our aircraft and ATC over the freq. on being cleared to descend via the arrival. Because of these factors and the quick level off at FL190 and upon hearing cleared to descend via the arrival not expect to be cleared via the arrival is why this event occurred.More CLEAR and CONCISE communications between ATC and PILOTS during these very high workload and complicated RNAV ARRIVALS. Especially when the arrivals have just been changed.


Second narrative: There was a problem with the understanding of the clearance during a very complicated; high workload (descent checks) RNAV STAR.There have been an increasing amount of modifications to these RNAV STAR by ATC because of out bound traffic from DFW and LOVE when approaching the terminal area from the NE and SE. Also with most of these STAR's being developed for NEXT GEN aircraft it has highly complicated and increased our workload in older aircraft; During phase of flight we should be focused on managing the aircraft; and often times find ourselves heads down trying to fly the STAR.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported they thought they were cleared to descend on the DFW KLNDR 2 Arrival; but ATC said that it was an 'expect' clearance.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Cooling System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out about FL200 to FL340 we received the L RARV status message. We completed the Non-Normal checklist; which it just stated Left Ram Air Regulating Valve has failed. I understand that it is just a status message; but I also felt that the systems knowledge I had was conflicting with what the checklist was saying. Meaning; I didn't know what state the position of valve was in. Was it fully open; closed or partially open. I wasn't sure. I looked at the ECS page and the Left Pack was still showing green. But even if the RARV was fully closed the pack should still maintain a green status because the pack is still receiving air from the bleeds off engine. So I was concerned with a possible overheat situation or a possibility of another event that I wasn't aware of. So I'm thinking ok; are we limited to 25;000 ft? I wasn't sure and FO wasn't sure. So I tried to gather all my resources and looked at MEL book; because to me that can give an understanding of systems as well. Well the MEL stated with the L RARV failed consider the PACK to be inop. I'm thinking ok; I'm headed in right direction but still am conflicted on whether to continue to FL340 or maintain below FL250. I'm thinking I don't want to be in a worse position than I am now later down the road. So I asked dispatch and mx if they agree. They asked if I could make [our destination] at FL240. I said no; will need a fuel stop. They called the divert; and so I thought ok well I guess they are concerned as well. So we diverted.Do not base the current situation inflight off the MEL book as that had influenced some of the concerns I had with the situation. The Non Normal checklist will direct you as to what you should do next. My previous company didn't have that guidance in our checklist when it came to some of the non-normal events; and that also influenced my concern. Learning that the CRJ900 checklist will direct you as to what will take place next.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain received an L RARV status message while climbing to FL340. The QRH indicated that the Left Ram Air Regulating Valve had failed; but the reporter was not sure what that means precisely and elected to divert.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on initial climb out of about 2;000 MSL when the L HYD PRESS LOW light came on. As the non-flying pilot; I reached for the QRH to begin working the problem when the light extinguished.Just after the flying pilot called for the slats to be retracted; as I performed my climb flow and turned off the aux hydraulic pump and the hydraulic transfer pump. I noticed that the left hydraulic system had lost pressure and the quantity gauge read just below two quarts. I performed the QRH procedures and we decided the return to our departure airport. We landed normally and taxied to the gate with no further incident. A Contract Mechanic informed us that we had an O-ring on a securing nut fail causing the left hand system to drain almost all of the hydraulic fluid. He then proceeded to get us back airworthy in a very timely manner. I commend First Officer and the flight attendants for their calm and professional demeanor during our event. Positive training; standardization; and CRM were key elements that assured our situation turned out safely.




Synopsis: Shortly after takeoff the flight crew of an MD-83 suffered the loss of the left hydraulic system. They complied with the appropriate checklists and returned safely to their departure airport where Maintenance replaced a broken O-ring on a securing nut which resolved the problem.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Another Flight Attendant] and I were working the flight together mind you [this person is a new hire] and [the other FA] was working AFT... she was in the last phase of her beverage service when the wheels of the aircraft were deployed. There was NO PHONE CALL AND NO CHIME OR ANYTHING.. so now safety is involved because if the beverage cart out and being around passengers. I had [the other FA] come back with the cart as quick as she could cause we were closer to landing and when she got back to the front of the plane I had [the other FA] leave the cart in the front and I had told her to take her seat and I will put away the cart as quick as possible. I had a few passengers ask if I needed help but I was not going to put anyones safety in danger due to a pilot error.


Second narrative: The safety department contacted me to inform me that a communication chime was not received or heard by the flight attendant in the landing phase. This may have led to a situation where a service cart could have been unsecured during landing.The flight was the last of four legs for the flight crew. The transition to this leg was expedited due to some delays impacting the arriving leg. As a result; the flight crew boarded the airplane with the passengers already loaded and the Flight Attendants already onboard. The Captain deliberately stated on multiple occasions to me 'No rush.' To the best of my knowledge; all checklists; SOPs; Chimes; etc. where accomplished completely; deliberately and without rush. To my recollection; the arrival chimes where accomplished; however; there is no aural feedback in the flight deck that I could reference for their accomplishment. To the best of my recollection; an arrival message was given over the PA to the cabin; and all checklists; including chimes; were accomplished per SOP.


Synopsis: CRJ-900 Flight Attendant and flight crew reported that pre-landing notice was not heard in the cabin and the service cart was not stowed when the landing gear was deployed.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HAO.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: TRACON CVG
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was alleged to have been given an altimeter setting of 30.41; however I only read back and wrote down 41 in my read back sequence. The number in the colesman window left over from the last flight that was closest to something ending in .41 was 29.41. So I entered 29.41Departing HAO I said 'Cincinnati Baron N-----; off HAO leaving 900 feet for 3;000.'There was no correction of my reported altitude by ATC at that point. I was assigned to level off at 3;000 during the climb. I did level off at 3;000 feet as indicated on my altimeter however with the altimeter setting off by an entire inch meant I was really at 4;000. There was another Baron in the opposite direction that 5 minutes or so prior was at 4;000 and was assigned to climb to 8;000 and at that time the other Baron was given a new ATC frequency. This other Baron was now on another frequency and therefore I couldn't hear anything about the separation issue and the fact that the other Baron was alleged to have been given course deviation instructions. After arriving at 3;000 feet (really 4;000) my ATC frequency was pretty quiet (because the deviation instructions and the separation issue was going on; on the newly assigned frequency given to the other Baron) After being at 3;000 (really 4;000) for several minutes the controller came back onto my frequency and said you just caused a separation situation that required deviation instructions; call this phone number as soon as possible.




Synopsis: A BE55 pilot reported receiving an altimeter setting of 30.41 prior to departure but enters 29.41 in error. On departure he leveled off 1;000 feet above the assigned altitude of 3;000 feet causing a loss of separation.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: L30.TRACON, NV
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: New First Officer out of IOE was the Pilot Flying.  Accepted a visual approach to Runway 25L.  Visually saw terrain and saw terrain altitude 4;609 FT.  First Officer asked for 4;900 FT to which I said there is terrain at 4;609; no lower than 6;000 as we made a wide left downwind.  Approaching the terrain we got a terrain warning and climbed to 6;500 FT.  ATC never said anything to us.




Synopsis: B737 Captain with new First Officer reports a terrain warning while on a wide left downwind visual approach at 6;000 FT for Runway 25L at LAS. The Captain had advised 6;000 FT until past the ridge at 4;609 FT; but the warning was activated and a climb to 6;500 FT initiated.