elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On DATE Aircraft X and Aircraft Y took maintenance delays in ZZZ. Aircraft X was for FMC 1 reset and Aircraft Y was for FMC 2 reset. Neither aircraft had a recorded Maintenance Item Control number for the task that was accomplished. The issue at hand is GPM XX-XY is very specific on resetting LMP essential components. It is also very specific on when a Ground confidence check is required and when it may not be required. GPM XX-XY.Z and XX-XZ.XA make note to a reset being within a 15 day window. What happened with these two aircraft were LMP essential components were reset and no record was noted to start the 15 day window. Suggestions - With this GPM reference changing so much recently; I am not sure the AMT's are aware of this. I believe LMP is a crucial program. I believe we are loosing the interest of AMT's with the LMP program as well as avionics. ZZZ1 recently hired avionics off of the street. That's unheard of. I have asked Maintenance management for avionics to be staffed in ZZZ like similar stations are. It has been rejected and the problem grows.




Synopsis: Technician reported concerns with maintenance personnel not recording their work on Low Weather Minimums Program (LMP) components and experience level for tasks at their station.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: H04.Airport, OK
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZKC
ATC / advisory: CTAF H04
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: THE RADIO FREQUENCY FOR TURNING ON THE RUNWAY LIGHTS AT H04 AIRPORT IS LISTED ON SOME WEBSITES AS 122.8 WHILE THE CTAF FREQUENCY FOR THIS AIRPORT IS LISTED AS 122.9.THE CURRENT SECTIONAL SHOWS THE CTAF FREQUENCY AS 122.9.  THIS IS PROBLEMATIC FOR PILOTS WHO MAY NOT BE AWARE THAT THE LIGHTS ARE CONTROLLED BY A DIFFERENT FREQUENCY OTHER THAN THAT LISTED ON THE NAVIGATIONAL SECTIONAL.   SOLUTION:  THE LIGHTS SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE SAME CTAF FREQUENCY.  OTHERWISE A NOTAM SHOULD BE LISTED FOR THIS AIRPORT EXPLAINING THAT THE FREQUENCY FOR TURNING ON RUNWAY LIGHTS IS NOT THE SAME AS THE CTAF FREQUENCY.PILOTS WOULD EXPECT THE LIGHTS TO BE CONTROLLED BY THE SAME FREQUENCY AS CTAF.




Synopsis: A Pilot reported the confusion on a night approach to H04 because the pilot-controlled lighting was not on the airport's CTAF frequency and not listed on the applicable Sectional. AIM 2-1-9 (c);(d);(e) list specifications.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAY.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C DAY
ATC / advisory: Tower DAY
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the PF and we were on base leg vectors for the visual 24R with ILS back up. Base turn to final with the runway in sight; cleared for the visual; 2;600 FT set for FAF crossing altitude; the aircraft was above glideslope. On turn to final the conditions were hazy with sunlight limiting our visibility. During the descent the Captain set the MCP altitude to the lower alt of 1;000 FT [~TDZ elevation] to avoid alt capture above glideslope and a possible 'thrust excursion.' I turned off the autopilot and subsequently descended below 1;000 FT [AGL] on base leg with the runway still in sight. I leveled off as Tower called 'low altitude alert' and captured glideslope from below at roughly 1;000 FT AGL. Uneventful landing and rollout. Captain subsequently called Tower for back-brief.Better crew coordination between pilots could have avoided any confusion about automation settings. 'Verbalize and read back' is easy at altitude; but we must ensure it at low altitude as well.


Second narrative: As pilot in command I should have been much more specific in briefing safe parameters regarding visual approach procedures and I should have been more aggressive in monitoring the instruments and taking action in the event of any altitude deviation during the First Officer's visual approach. In trying to prevent some of the automation traps inherent with the Airbus in certain scenarios I failed to ensure that basic airmanship in the terminal environment is paramount and requires quick and decisive action on my part.


Synopsis: An A319 flight crew; cleared for a visual approach from a base leg vector to Runway 24R at DAY; descended too low and was informed by a low altitude alert from the Tower. The Captain's decision to reset the MCP altitude alert from the FAF crossing altitude to TDZE; apparently uncommunicated to the PF First Officer; may have contributed to the loss of situational awareness.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The weather was much worse than forecast. Wind gusting to 50kts. I attempted the ILS. We briefed and set up for a wind shear landing (bleeds off; props 1020). I was unable to keep the aircraft on a stabilized approach; and conducted a miss. In the subsequent miss; climb out; call approach; plan a return to ZZZ; call Dispatch; talk to the flight attendants; and talk to the passengers; we forgot to turn the bleeds back on. Climbing thru 10;000 ft; the master caution 'cabin altitude' illuminated. We knew immediately what the problem was; ran the checklist; and restored pressurization.This was an extremely difficult approach that had both crew members taxed to their maximum. With all the procedures to follow; and still try to fly the aircraft safely; it was simply task overload; and switching the bleeds back on during initial climb out got missed. We were able to restore pressurization quickly; once we had the time to deal with the issue. Lessons learned; go slower; and more methodical regardless of the situation. Make sure each item on the checklist; or flow is accomplished.




Synopsis: Captain reported a high workload led to the flight crew missing the restoration of engine bleeds; leading to a pressurization issue until it was recognized.
Date: 201905
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other After Departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post Aircraft Departure
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Load planning called dispatch to notify the Captain of flight ZZZZ-ZZZ that a 110 pound shipment including a hazmat non-flammable gas AOG 10 pounds is on board and was not included on the manifest.


Second narrative: ZZZZ Ops called to advise me that that a Hazmat AOG item was left on board [Aircraft X] out in the bulk pit. ZZZZ didn't know how to manifest it once they realized it was onboard and the plane was airborne back to ZZZ. I advised the Ops agent to contact the Cargo Help Desk. We both called the Cargo Help Desk and talked with [personnel]. She said since they had no manifest for it and the aircraft was already airborne; there was nothing that could be done. After talking to my Shift Manager; I contacted Dispatch and the ZZZ station to advise them of the situation.


Synopsis: Airline Dispatcher reported flight crew notification of Hazmat cargo on board aircraft but not listed on load manifest.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ13
Aircraft component: Service/Access Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff; FA (Flight Attendant) called to say door 2R was open. There was no indicator light on. Cabin was not pressurizing. Returned to ZZZ landing uneventfully. Dispatch was notified; no priority handling requested. Aircraft was under landing weight. Was told by FA front edge of door 2R was open 3-4 inches.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that a door opened resulting in a pressurization leak and a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise flight at FL340; we got an AIR COND FAIL caution light and heard the EMER system come on in the cabin. Immediately following this indication we noted a change in cabin altitude with a sustained cabin climb of approximately 2;000 FPM. This was followed by the CABIN LOW PRES warning indicator within a few minutes.We donned O2 masks and asked ATC to for a descent due to a cabin pressurization issue. In the descent we ran the checklist for both cabin PRES LOW and AIR COND FAIL. While in the decent ATC asked if we wanted to [advise] for the descent; we replied yes. At 10;000 feet.; we advised we would divert and [situation] was over.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Transport flight crew reported a failure of the pressurization system; which necessitated an immediate descent and a diversion to a nearby airport.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ2
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was at 15;000 ft flying when I noticed my door latch was starting to come loose. There are 3 parts to the door latch. The hooks; (which are inside the aircraft and hook onto the door to keep it shut) the handle; and the knob. In order to move the handle out of the locked position you need to push in on the knob and pull the handle at the same time. On Date however as I was cruising at 15;000 feet I noticed the knob was starting to rotate a bit and the screw on the knob looked loose; then it went in as if it was pushed. At the point the handle fell back because the knob was no longer keeping it in the locked position. Causing the hooks to unhook from the door; which subsequently led to the emergency exit door opening in flight; I held onto the door for 2-3 minutes trying to keep it under control. I slowed the aircraft down as much as I could to help. But the door then ripped off the hinges and most likely landed in a field. At that point I requested priority and turned direct to ZZZ and made a normal landing there.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that during cruise the door latch came loose resulting in the emergency exit door opening in flight and eventually detaching from the aircraft. Pilot diverted and made a successful landing.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Late night departure. Last minute (w/in 3-hour of departure time) trip pick-up after 3 weeks off work. Received planned DG (dangerous goods) message via ACARS on preflight. Discussed w/FO (First Officer). Planned DG message had all information I believe we needed (category; placement; type; quantity; etc.) very detailed. Briefed DG as part of pre-departure briefing. Thought that was all we needed since it was so detailed. While pushing back received final DG message on ACARS. FO made comment he wasn't sure if we needed this message prior to push. Too late now (as we had already pushed). Discussed we would look it up in [the] FOM once in a low-threat environment (airborne). Once at cruise referenced company FOM section X.XX.X which states company policy is more restrictive than FAR and we are not to push until final DG summary is received.




Synopsis: B-757 Captain reported Hazmat company procedural error of gate departure without required Hazmat document.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HBI.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E HBI
ATC / advisory: CTAF HBI
Second aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Listened to ATIS 20 miles out and prevailing wind favored Runway 21. Was on a left downwind for 21 when listened to ATIS again and wind was now 020 at 9 KTS. Decided to cross over midfield and enter a downwind for 3. [I] made the call on the radio [and] made another call when over midfield. At that time; saw a Piper fly underneath from the Runway 21 direction. It passed about 200 FT below. Suspected it was performing a low; IFR practice approach. Wondered why I never heard the Piper on CTAF. Checked my Comm 1 radio and noted the volume was all the way down. [I] had forgotten to turn the volume back up after an earlier discussion with my passengers. [I] then entered a left downwind for 3 with no issues. [I] never heard anything from the Piper aircraft. Suspect he tuned back to ATC after his missed approach.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reports a NMAC with a Piper while over flying the HBI airport at 2;000 FT using CTAF procedures. The reporter discovers his radio volume has been turned down to talk with passengers and not returned to a listenable level.
Date: 201511
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were instructed by the Captain to clean up the service early; secure the cabin; and be seated for the remainder of the flight. The following issue is common practice and quite honestly makes no sense as it precludes us from performing the final compliance check and ensuring the cabin is indeed secured for landing.'B' made an announcement for trash collection only and that the rest would be on the 'honor system.' Not for seat backs; tray tables; seat belts; or bag stowage. When I was walking through collecting trash; several people in that section still had service items and when I asked to collect them; I was told; 'She said we could keep them.'Upon the 10;000 foot bell; I went to do the final walk through because the cabin was most definitely not secure; but the Captain called and told me to stay seated. So we landed with tray tables down in the back; some [seatbelts] not fastened and dangling in the aisle; and bags in laps and blocked egress; as well as service items out. 'B' made an announcement as acknowledgment to the pilots that we were ready; 'cabin secure.' It was not.When the pilots instruct us to clean up and be seated for the remainder of the flight; they are expecting that we are securing the cabin and taking our seats for safety. We should be doing that; all of it. This honor system announcement is not one I have found in the manual and it is not completing our obligation for the compliance check for landing. And it doesn't happen. People have earphones in and don't hear; some are sleeping and don't hear; others don't see the risk to safety in not complying. Bottom line is those things are a hindrance in an emergency and valuable time is wasted; and injuries that could be avoided become a factor. The instructions to 'clean up the cabin and be seated for the remainder of the flight' need to followed; and our actions include securing the cabin so we do not have these issues.




Synopsis: The B737 Flight Attendant reported that final cabin checks are not accomplished if the flight attendants are advised by the Captain to be seated early.