elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C JAX
ATC / advisory: Tower JAX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: OPS vehicle called local control (training in progress) to request to go into the RSA to sweep up some glass from a broken light.  He said he would be on the asphalt but clear of the runway by taxiway Juliet.  This was established between several transmissions. OPS confirmed more than once he would be clear of the runway. At no time did he mention or did we approve him to cross runway 8/26. Air carrier was informed of the men and vehicle on the west side of the runway. OPS then proceeded to cross the runway to the north side without permission.  Before local could key up to tell air carrier to go around they were telling local they were going around on their own due to the vehicle. OPS then called local to try and confirm what he was approved to do.  He was already across the runway and on the north side which is not by any taxiway like he originally stated. We could have been a little clearer on communications with the OPS vehicle about what he wanted to do.  Even then though; we cannot read his mind that he needed to cross the runway.  So if he never would have mentioned this to us we wouldn't know.


Second narrative: Aircraft X on final for RWY 26 when OPS vehicle called Local for coordination. OPS requested to sweep glass from a broken runway edge light and stated that they would be on the pavement but at no time across the runway edge line infringing onto the runway.  At no point in time during OPS request did they mention crossing runway 26 and OPS was instructed to hold short of the runway at all times.  There was some confusion apparently because OPS really wanted to sweep glass across and down the runway and needed to cross in doing so.  This was not requested to Local control and OPS was told to proceed with their operations. OPS turned out onto taxiway J and then proceeded to cross runway 26 while Aircraft X was on short final. Aircraft X was re-sequenced by Local and landed without incident.Recommendation is that OPS be fully aware if a runway crossing is granted or denied by Local/Tower.


Synopsis: JAX Controllers report of a runway incursion by an airport vehicle with an aircraft on final that goes around due to the vehicle's position.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff; once takeoff power was set; a dirty sock/gym odor was prevalent till about 7-8 minutes into the flight. After approximately 7-8 minutes the odor dissipated. All systems were normal; and recorded the information needed for Maintenance. Write up was made; and Maintenance met the aircraft for a fumes form to be filled out.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported dirty sock odor for 7-8 minutes after takeoff.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: On final approach; fully configured and cleared for approach to Runway 4R; at approximately 500 feet we visually acquired a fixed wing aircraft departing Linden airport in a climb toward us. We received a TCAS RA and began to execute the climb maneuver when the RA terminated resulting in zero gain of altitude. We continued to an uneventful landing and reported the RA to Tower after landing.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a climb RA at 500 feet on final approach to EWR.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [During approach we] got a Flaps Fail caution message selecting flaps 30 on a left base prior to landing. Retracted the gear and notify ATC to have some vectors close to the airport to analyze and develop a plan (weather was not a factor being VFR; just the fuel being 2;300 LBS). First Officer (pilot not flying) run the Flaps Fail QRH. Declared emergency with ATC to have fire and rescue vehicles standing by. [We] advised Flight Attendant of the abnormal situation. Also; made announcement to the passengers of the failure and the faster than normal speed on landing and the presence of fire rescue vehicles. Landing and rollout was uneventful.




Synopsis: Regional jet Captain experiences a flaps fail caution message during approach when flaps are selected to 30. A go-around is initiated and the following approach and landing is conducted with flaps less than 30.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I flew a trip ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ in which the aircraft was past the due date for the weighing requirement in 14 CFR 135.185. While doing preflight planning I happened to overlook the due date; which was documented by an aircraft status sheet in the aircraft's logbook folder as well as in the aircraft's AFM. I believe the oversight was due to distraction from saturation associated with additional COVID-19 guidelines; limited recency of experience also due to COVID-19; as well as mental saturation due to the additional considerations and extra planning that goes alongside flying into a complicated mountainous terrain airport like ZZZ1.




Synopsis: Pilot reported flying a trip with the aircraft being over due on the CFR 135.185 weighing requirement.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On multiple occasions HDG on Garmin G1000 has 'X-ed' out for 2 seconds to several minutes. This causes me to cancel my IFR training mission multiple times and return to base. I have attempted to have this issue resolved by several certified avionic technicians to no avail. After online research I have found blogs describing the same issue; so this is not happening to just me. My avionics technicians have had communication with both Cessna and Garmin about the issue. Apparently; both Cessna and Garmin are aware of this and are saying it is a software glitch. I consider this to be a 'Safety of Flight' issue since I could lose HDG during IFR in a critical situation and it appears to be across the aviation community with Garmin G1000.




Synopsis: Cessna 206 pilot reported the Garmin G1000 GPS system has 'X-ed' out on multiple occasions from 2 seconds to several minutes at a time.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Management has stated they want the Logbooks on-board ETOPS trips 30-minutes prior to departure. This is an unfair burden to me as an ETOPS Lead Mechanic; and a violation of critical behaviors. Yesterday; September 2014; Management once again reiterated this policy. This time; however; Supervisor X stated he was being pressured from Shift Manager X to get the ETOPS logbooks on-board 30-minutes prior to departure. Safety and compliance must be a priority over scheduling. Creating artificial timelines to get the Logbook on-board to satisfy scheduling concerns is a detriment to safety and compliance. Furthermore; I was advised by a Mechanic that Shift Manager Y has limited mechanics taxi/tow walkarounds to obvious damage and bird-strikes. This follows a Mechanic documenting B757 brake cracks on three occasions. The cracks on the brake's faceplate is a known defect and can easily be seen through the wheel spokes. This is another example of ZZZ Management favoring scheduling over safety.

Callback: Reporter stated that since Management started putting time lines on Maintenance personnel to have the Logbooks on-board ETOPS aircraft 30-minutes prior to departure; an unwritten cryptic message is being sent to technicians that scheduling has priority over their responsibilities for safety and compliance.



Synopsis: A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports his Air Carrier Management has stated they want the Logbooks on-board ETOPS trips thirty minutes prior to departure. Creating artificial timelines is a detriment to safety and compliance. He also notes a Shift Manager has limited mechanics Taxi/Tow walkarounds to obvious damage and bird-strikes.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BJC.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D01
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was approaching Class B airspace and being vectored to my home airport. There was mild to moderate turbulence at the time. The controller called and instructed me to change heading; descend; and change frequencies. I repeated back the instructions. I was instructed to descend from 10000 feet to 9000 feet and I apparently acknowledged this in the read back; but in my head; I heard 7000 feet. I changed heading and began descending; and called the next frequency. On that call; I identified my aircraft; assigned heading and stated 'out of 9 point 8 for 7.' The new controller gave me a brief acknowledgement. It was busy. General Aviation aircraft are frequently instructed to descend low in this area because of landing and departing commercial aircraft. I did notice I seemed lower than usual. When I reached about 7200 feet; I was called by a controller with a low altitude alert. I responded I was cleared to 7000 feet and asked what altitude he would like me at. He stated I was actually cleared to 9000 feet and to climb. I immediately did this; and shortly afterwards; asked to call the TRACON because of a possible pilot deviation (which I did after landing). The rest of the flight and landing were uneventful. Obviously; a miscommunication was the root of this problem. Because I received multiple instructions from the controller in significant turbulence; I misheard the assigned altitude; though I apparently initially acknowledged the correct altitude. When I called the next controller and stated the altitude I had 'heard;' which was incorrect; she did not catch the error. This two-part error chain caused the deviation. To prevent an error on my part like this again; writing down the instructions from ATC would allow me to check the instruction and verify it at the time and later. Also; when I noticed that I seemed lower than usual; I should have called ATC and verified the assigned altitude.




Synopsis: BE 35 pilot reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC; after mistakenly descending to 7000 feet instead of ATC assigned 9000 feet.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ROA.Airport, VA
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ROA
ATC / advisory: Tower ROA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While operating flight to ROA; we had a GPWS event. I was the Pilot Monitoring; and the First Officer was the Pilot Flying. We were cleared for the visual approach to RWY 24 in very visual conditions. As we crossed the mountains on an extended base to final; the GPWS event occurred. We took immediate; appropriate action and arrested the descent. Once clear of the conflict; we continued on the visual approach to land without any issue.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a GPWS event during approach in visual conditions.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working in the Tower with all positions combined. We were arriving and departing Runway 24. East RADAR brought two airplanes to the final approach course; a Dash 8 and a CRJ2; at the same time and had the Dash 8 cut in front of the CRJ2. The Dash 8 was supposed to be providing visual separation with the CRJ2 but there is no way that he could do that as the CRJ2 was behind him. East RADAR called up and asked if I 'had visual on the aircraft.' I replied 'I see them' because there was no way that it was possible for me to provide visual separation with the two as there was no other approved separation existing. I explicitly did not say that I could provide visual separation. My guess is that they were separated by less than one mile. I cleared the Dash 8 to land; but did not tell him anything about minimum time on the runway because I had already planned to send the CRJ2 around. Somehow the Dash 8 touched down and turned off at Taxiway Alpha before the CRJ2 got to an unsafe altitude for a go-around so I cleared him to land as well. Runway separation turned out to not be an issue. However; in my opinion this was an extremely unsafe operation. I assumed that the RADAR Controller had done everything required of him until I listened to the tapes later and found out that things were in fact far worse than I had originally thought. More practice sequencing from the Approach Controller and additional instruction on how to properly apply visual separation.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described a developing separation problem on final. Controller noted the TRACON Controller's application of 'Visual Separation' as questionable.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: Heavy Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach to 25L at LAX; ATC vectored a heavy Airbus onto approach in front of us. When I expressed concern for wake turbulence ATC stated only 3.5 miles was required between us. Since there was a tailwind on the approach and calm wind on surface I advised ATC that I'd like to slow to final approach speed to get more spacing with the heavy. On handoff to Tower; Approach Controller again reiterated that 3.5 miles was sufficient with a heavy Airbus. I thanked him and switched to Tower. We ended up with 4-5 miles separation and still experienced wake turbulence on short final.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported ATC was uncooperative when he requested more spacing to avoid wake turbulence on approach to LAX.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I am working on the module to train our pilot group on accomplishing the cold temperature altitude corrections.  The FAA publishes a list of airports. This document contains the list of airports that corrections should be accomplished at; and gives the segments that need to be corrected.  At the bottom of the document there is a list of military airports that should get the cold temperature altitude correction also.  If you read the AIM; the FAA charts put a snowflake on the chart notes with the temperature that requires correction.  Jeppesen puts notes on the approach charts also; that suggest that corrections should be made.  When I looked up these military airports; neither the FAA or Jeppesen charts have the note that cold temperature corrections are necessary.  Apparently; the FAA Chart Publication is not used as the source by Jeppesen for the Cold Temp Airports. The NASR database is our primary source for the Cold Temp notes.' There is apparently a breakdown in the transfer of information at the FAA level.  Despite the military airports being on the list that require the correction; that information is not passed to the pilots on the approach plates. This may have to do with the approach procedures at military airports are not developed by the FAA.  Whatever causes it; the end result is the charting does not correctly denote cold temperature corrections are necessary.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that approach charts at certain military airports do not have a note requiring cold temperature altitude corrections.