Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream G650
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other 145
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am a Second Shift Quality Control (QC) Inspector at a Manufacturer's Part 145 Repair Station. Copilot's flight control cable needed tension adjusted after pilot squawk earlier in the day. Company decided to do this shortly before the Second Shift ended due to early A.M. flight.  Aircraft Manager hurried Maintenance and Inspection personnel to get this accomplished.  Flight control cables rigged per Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and main access area between crew seats under cockpit floor was inspected for FOD and rig pin removal.  I gave 'OK to Close' to the Maintenance personnel for the affected area. Aircraft flight next day was uneventful; but Customer of this new aircraft wanted crew seats changed out. It was discovered while removing crew seats that adjacent inspection panels to center under floor panel were not secured but had been covered up by the cockpit carpet. Also discovered that the control rod attach point cotter pin was not properly secured. This was not clearly visible to me when I looked under the floor and gave the 'OK' to 'Close.'  Furthermore it was weeks later that I actually found out about this control rod and cotter pin issue.At the time of the Cable Tension Check; I was not made aware of the control rod having been removed; nor those other inspection panels being opened. Improper First Shift turnover accountability and lack of proper training to ensure all cotter pins are properly secured on both pilot and copilot control modules. Recommended to FAA that the Aircraft Manufacturer make a form for inspectors to use as a checklist for these cotter pins. Also recommended to FAA that the Aircraft Manufacturer and it's Partner not have such a hurried corporate culture for this new aircraft; as everyone feels pressured to get work done fast. Company Repair Station did in-house Safety Management System (SMS) safety investigation and subsequent voluntary disclosure to FAA who has asked those involved to submit a letter of their own actions. Not aware of any personal violations at this time; but FAA is continuing to investigate this matter with personnel involved. I thought it prudent to file this report to benefit others of the importance of a proper Shift Turnover Record and not to hurry the work scope regardless of any corporate pressure.

Callback: Reporter stated the Gulfstream G-650 is basically a 'Fly by Wire' aircraft using standard yokes with control cables that run under the cockpit floor to a Flight Control Module (FCM) for each pilot seat. Two interconnect rods are attached to the left and right FCMs for aileron roll control input to the Flight Control Modules (FCM). Control output to the ailerons is accomplished electrically via transducers. Elevator movement is accomplished using push/pull rods with a 'Force Transducer' connected to the FCM with electrical signals to the elevators.Reporter stated that one of the rod end's for the two roll control interconnect rods did not have the cotter pin ears properly bent over on the nut securing the attach bolt to the FCM. There were a lot of people involved with the flight control rigging and adjustments. Pressure from their Maintenance Manager to get the plane ready for flight including incomplete and inaccurate maintenance turnovers contributed to the missed inspection of the cotter pin.Reporter stated technicians working on the aircraft are not Certificated Airframe/Powerplant (A/P) mechanics. Lead mechanics only have Repairman Certificates issued under their company's Part 145 operation. The shift supervisors are supposed to have A/P Licenses. He has an A/P; I/A and ATP license. Company issued a revised maintenance policy to address some of the contributing causes after the FAA did a Human Factors study.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Inspector reports about contributing causes for not seeing an incomplete installation of a cotter pin at an interconnect control rod attachment to a Co-Pilot's Flight Control Module (FCM) on a Gulfstream G-650 aircraft. Incomplete information of aircraft status during Shift Turnovers and a 'hurried corporate culture' were also noted.