elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Staffing; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was the OJT Instructor for the combined sectors Radar Assist position (D-side). We were very busy; this is nothing new for the sectors. Our facility was cited as failing to split sectors and failure to effectively assign D-sides to sectors and was often unnecessarily overloaded. Our staffing is far below a safe number as was noted by the ERC (Employee Review Committee) and as negligently staffed. All these factors play into this situation. While we were overly busy; trying our best to keep up with the traffic demand we as a sector failed to issue traffic merging procedures early enough to a VFR aircraft receiving radar traffic advisories. This VFR was at 5500 ft and was definitely within 100 ft and 0.5 miles of another non radar identified VFR aircraft at 5400 ft. A traffic call was not made until the aircraft was within 1-2 miles. This is a devastating situation; but it's due to the lack of safety culture from our upper facility management.Do what's right. We should split sectors and always have the staffing to do so; without question; no matter what the day or the forecast number of flights.




Synopsis: ZKC Center Controller reported issuing a traffic advisory too late due to an excessive work load.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DUT.Airport, AK
Weather elements / visibility: Volcanic Ash
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAK
ATC / advisory: FSS ENA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Service
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A Volcano [on the Aleutian Island chain] had erupted. Ash clouds were present and known by National Weather Service (NWS); to the best of our knowledge; these conditions were not known by other ATC facilities either.Unfortunately the NWS data (responsible for disseminating Volcanic Ash SIGMETs) is not being properly 'passed along.' As a result; this information is not properly dropping into our system; that system being 'OASIS;' Operational and Supportability Implementation System.It is unknown as to whether or not NWS is or is not disseminating the information properly. It is also not known if the opposite is the case and our OASIS system is simply not receiving; plotting and disseminating the information properly. When we talk to either of the two responsible parties; both continue to point fingers at the other; claiming that their systems are running properly. The fact is; information is being dropped. OASIS is not plotting or providing us; the controllers; with the necessary data we NEED to properly do our job; and pilots are being put in jeopardy because of it.In this instance; we had Aircraft X end up spending a lot of time and money heading SW to Dutch Harbor. A destination that is [very near] to the erupted volcano. Aircraft X ended up getting all the way down there and then had to land at another airport and eventually turn around and go back to [departure airport]. At least he did so safely with no incident; this time. This situation; stated in this [report]; is only one of MANY similar events that have occurred on a regular basis over the last month or so. Pilots are unnecessarily being led into harm's way because vital data is not being shared properly between two systems.Encourage the two parties responsible for the proper dissemination of this very important Volcanic Ash (VA) activity information; to work together to find and correct the issue; whatever that may be.We need this data sooner rather than later. The end result should be an OASIS system that properly and TIMELY plots and displays vital information on current VA activity. People's lives are put in danger when we do not receive data in a timely and usable manner.




Synopsis: An FAA employee reported that National Weather Service volcanic ash reports were not being properly disseminated to provide pilots with accurate Alaska information.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While unloading Aircraft X a BE-1900C in ZZZ1; I discovered HAZMAT that had not been declared to the crew. The HAZMAT was a 'Battery; wet filled with acid' UN2794; class 8. The HAZMAT had the appropriate paperwork; but the pilot notification paperwork was not completed; nor was the crew notified. Appropriate company management personnel were notified and a SMS was completed.




Synopsis: Beech 1900 Captain reported undeclared Hazmat had been transported to destination. Flight crew notification procedures were not completed at departure airport.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Rejected Takeoff
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the takeoff roll; a 'Config Spoilers' warning message appeared at around 140 knots indicated airspeed. A high speed rejected takeoff was performed near V1. V1 was 144 knots indicated airspeed and it is not recalled whether the V1 call was made yet or not. In the aftermath of the rejected takeoff; Air Traffic Control; Maintenance; and company were contacted; however calling for QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) items for config spoiler warning message and brake overheat was forgotten.Warning message appeared at high speed and near V1. It is possible that the abort wasn't accomplished until a speed between V1 and Vr. In the aftermath of the abort; QRH items were forgotten. Change the preflight brief to include specific actions for which an aborted takeoff will be performed; include the likelihood of a decision to 'continue' if the anomaly occurs after V1 to try and mitigate the initial reaction being to simply abort even when it is dubious whether one is at V1 or not.


Second narrative: During the takeoff roll; a 'Config Spoilers' warning message appeared at around 140KIAS. An aborted takeoff was performed. V1 was 144KIAS. After the procedure was performed we exited the runway and contacted ATC; Maintenance and company. However; calling for and performing QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) procedures for config spoilers and brake overheat messages were forgotten.In the time immediately after the abort attention was so focused on communicating with ATC; Maintenance and company that calling for a performing the QRH procedures were overlooked.Expand and include in the preflight briefing more detail on required procedures that need to be performed immediately after an aborted takeoff.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported a high speed rejected takeoff due to a warning message. Following the abort; checklist was forgotten for the warning message and brake overheat.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While in cruise the Second Officer who was flying from the left seat decided to balance the fuel load. As per manufacturer's limitations; at this altitude; the only way to transfer fuel is to use a slight slip of the aircraft. Altimeters were checked before takeoff with the Captain's side (the Number 1) reading the same as the Co-pilot's side (the Number 2). At altitude the Number 1 side read FL450 and the Number 2 side read FL450; +60 FT. The First Officer (pilot flying) applied rudder trim to slip the aircraft. The Number 1 altimeter connected to the autopilot; which was flying the aircraft; stayed at FL450 the Number 2 altimeter rose to FLl450 +320 FT. The Number 2 altimeter at the time was feeding information to the transponder which transmitted a false altitude of FL450 +320 FT as the aircraft was still at FL450.




Synopsis: When the flight crew of a G-IV sideslipped the jet to transfer fuel while at FL450 the right side (First Officer's) altimeter indicated 45;320 FT verses 45;000.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After doing safety demo and walking through the cabin for the final safety check; my A FA informed me that the passenger seated in XX1 was not wearing her mask and that she informed her that she needed to put it on. A FA then asked me when I was doing my walk thru to see if she was complying with her request and I said sure. On my way back to my galley I observed passenger XX1 sitting with her mask off. Since this was the second time I used the last approach to try to get her to comply. I spoke with her about her mask she said she couldn't wear it because she was drinking coffee I said I understand but as the announcement states if she isn't actively drinking she has to replace her mask. She then pulled her mask up and said this is ridiculous. I walked back to my galley and informed my A FA that I had spoken with her again about her mask because she had removed it again. At that point we had made the decision that once inflight we would have the Captain make another general announcement reminding everyone to wear a mask. When I walked through the cabin for my final compliance check before landing she had her mask on.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger not complying with face mask policy.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Texan T6/Harvard (Antique)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Landing Runway 21 at ZZZ; placed gear down on downwind and all gear indications for down and locked were checked per checklist. Turning base; again gear down and locked were checked per checklist/GUMPS. Flared and settled easily onto runway gear up. Touched down on centerline; and only as it slowed (not enough air over rudder at that point) was I unable to keep it from drifting a few feet off centerline. Lifting plane to get plane back on gear; as soon as weight was removed (plane lifted the slightest amount) the gear handle popped down and gear fell out (were not in up-locked position). No injuries. Limited damage.




Synopsis: T-6 Pilot reported landing gear failed on landing.
Date: 201511
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During flight planning; I checked the fuel remaining vs. fuel required at CP-1 on the ETOPS Analysis at the end of the Operational Flight Plan; noting only a 700 pound pad at CP-1. Upon reading the Critical Point diversion Profile and Time; I noted the critical fuel scenario was predicated on a diversion speed of 256 kias. This is inconsistent with both FOM; ECL; and FM guidance. (Flight Plan and ETOPS Analysis attached)FOM describes the ETOPS Analysis page of the OFP. Item 9 titled Fuel (Critical Fuel Component Breakdown) states 'Descent/CRZ FL100/Approach' and assumes an emergency descent and cruise at FL100 'at the approved single engine diversion speed....' FM ETOPS Flight lists the 777-200A single engine diversion speed at .84M/290 kias. FM and the aircraft electronic checklist list the recommended speed as 320 kias/.83M. Regardless of which speed is used; it is significantly higher than 256 knots for ETOPS considerations; with a higher fuel burn. Most notable of the ETOPS concerns is fire suppression. By using 256 kias diversion speed in calculating the fuel required at a Critical Point; the flight may not have adequate fuel to divert at the approved single engine diversion speed as specified in Flight Manual and FOM guidance. On this particular flight; utilizing the slower speed results in a 205 minute diversion time with no option to increase the diversion speed under the worst case scenario. If the procedural guidance in the FM; FOM; and ECL recommends a diversion speed of 320 or 290; the flight planning process needs to use that number to calculate the diversion fuel in the critical fuel scenario.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported noticing a flight planning anomaly related to ETOPS fuel calculations.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 3
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We taxied over to the deice pad in DEN to remove snow and ice accumulation. During the deicing process; I notice the deice crew did not spray the winglet. I asked on the radio to make sure our crew would deice and anti-ice the winglets (both upper and lower). A different voice than that of our deice crew stated over the radio that winglets no longer had to be deiced. I asked her; 'Since when?' She stated over a year. Our deice cards on the flight deck have a publication date of [date]. That is two and a half weeks ago. The cards state that the winglet is a critical surface; which means it has to be deiced and anti-iced. We asked the crew to deice and anti-ice the winglets anyway since it was the conservative thing to do. During our flight to ZZZ; we were able to confirm in our manuals; the Operations Manager; and the [other Company document]; that winglets are indeed critical surfaces and should be deiced or anti-iced. Upon landing in ZZZ; I contacted the Chief Pilot on Call. He put me on hold to talk to his people and told me that we were correct. He stated that the DEN station would be contacted to make sure all deice crews were aware of the requirement to deice or anti-ice the winglets.




Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported that the de-icing crew did not de-ice the winglets; and believed that it was no longer necessary to do so.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PGV.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: CTAF PGV
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Tanks full at takeoff; sumped all points after fueling; departed on Runway 5. Normal power on initial climbout. 8 to 10 minutes into flight reduced fuel flow and some loss of power. Another 5 minutes complete power loss. Tried mixture; throttle; fuel selector to aux tank; at this point 1 mile from PGV 3;500 feet. Spiral down to field. Ended up not aligned with runway at too low an altitude and had to land off the runway at an angle. Safe landing but some damage to the aircraft. Tanks near full when on the ground. At this point reason for fuel flow problem not determined. [It] would be good to practice spiral down to runway. [I'm] not sure what to do to detect the flow issue. Fuel pressure normal; full fuel; hot day; sumped for water. Maybe a larger sump sample. Maybe longer settling time.




Synopsis: Homebuilt aircraft pilot reported engine failure resulting in an off airport landing.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While enroute on a personal flight; at 6500 ft [the] engine quit. ATC directed me toward [an alternate airport] at a heading of 300. I realized quickly that I could not see the airport and was heading deeper into mountains with fewer landing options. I turned eastward and began searching for best possible landing spot. Nothing appeared perfect so when I had lost altitude to the point that I needed to land; I chose the best spot within reach and landed there. I chose to direct 100% of my attention to safely landing the airplane and delay troubleshooting until after the landing. After safely landing the aircraft with no injuries and no damage I found that the fuel selector valve was on the right tank. I normally operate with fuel selector on BOTH. The RIGHT TANK position was unintentional. I transported an additional 9 gallons of fuel to the aircraft to assure a safe margin. Selected an appropriate take-off area and departed the field the following day.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported executing a forced landing following engine failure related to fuel starvation.