elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departure walk around revealed no abnormalities; and no abnormalities were noted on taxi; departure or post departure. No abnormalities were noted during the before landing checklist. I executed a stabilized approach per company SOPs. Descent rate and speed were normal. The flare; touchdown and initial rollout were normal. I noted no defects. After a few hundred feet of rollout I noticed the aircraft begin to decelerate rapidly and pull to the right as if the tire were flat or losing air pressure. I lifted my heel from a resting position with my toes on the rudder pedal; pumped the right brake once or twice to see if it had fouled somehow; then returned my heel to the floor. As the aircraft pulled to the right; I compensated with corresponding and increasing left rudder and brake input as it became more difficult to maintain the centerline. The aircraft came to a rest just beyond the intersection of Taxiway U and Runway 19L. I advised the Tower Controller that the aircraft was no longer able to move under its own power and I would need to shut down to investigate. I believe this event to have been caused by a degrading of the integrity of the tire as the result of contact with FOD at either the departure airport or arrival airport; as I noted no defects on my preflight walk- around. Perhaps the wheel was defective for some other reason. I believe Maintaining Control and having established SOPs and a stabilized approach contributed to a successful outcome to a mechanical failure that was beyond my control.




Synopsis: A PA31 tire failed on landing which caused the aircraft to be immobile after the pilot successfully guided the aircraft to a safe stop on the runway.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Pushed from [gate] and was told to contact ground at spot 5. Contacted ground and they said to taxi Alpha-Echo-Bravo to runway 4 and we were number 1 for departure; Once on Bravo taxiway; Ground told us to monitor Tower. Once on Tower Freq; the Captain taxied as advised by Ground instructions (crossing the ILS critical area). Tower then instructed us to stop before the critical area as we crossed the ILS Critical Area. I advised Tower that we were stopping at that point. No point did the ground controller tell us to stop before the critical area. Should be noted that today both times in LGA the ILS critical area was included in the ATIS. One time ground was advising to hold short during taxi instructions; the other time they weren't saying to hold short as the ATIS had mentioned and aircraft were crossing the ILS critical area with no issues.Due diligence should always be maintained both on the ground and in the air. Safety has been and always be my first focus while operating an aircraft. Missing the assignment of stopping short of the ILS critical area should have been a priority and questioned if there was doubt. The confusion is also compounded due to the fact before this flight I have heard ground stating to hold short of the ILS critical area. We operated to ZZZ and then returned to LGA. When we returned to LGA it was overheard the controllers to hold short of the ILS critical area. The following day the same message was in the ATIS and all aircraft in front of us were not stopping short of the area.  This is not said to be an excuse; but to point out when there is factors outside the flight deck that can start a crew down the wrong path of operation of the aircraft I should take even more precautions as a First Officer.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: A flight crew reported inadvertently taxiing into an ILS critical area due to communication ambiguities with the taxi clearance issued by ATC.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PLN.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Cessna 340/340A
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E PLN
ATC / advisory: CTAF PLN
Second aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was cleared to fly a visual approach to runway 32 at PLN by Minneapolis center. I announced my position relative to the airport on the unicom/CTAF frequency of 123.0 at 14 nm; 4 nm; and entering left base for the runway. I was monitoring both center frequency and unicom frequency. I did not hear at any time another aircraft broadcast any position reports for landing at the same airport. I did scan the area for additional traffic and did not see any. While on the base leg of my approach nearing where I was going to turn to the final approach segment; a Beechcraft Baron went right over the top of my aircraft approximately 50 ft from my aircraft. I continued on my heading to the north east and circled back and landed behind the aircraft involved with me in the near mid-air accident. The other aircraft departed after I landed. I suspect the aircraft was involved with some type of flight training. My opinion on what caused this problem is twofold. My inability to see the other plane ahead and his lack of position reports on the unicom/ctaf frequency while approaching the airport. In addition; the lack of a standard pattern flown by the other aircraft was most likely a contribution to the near mid-air. The other plane was not in contact with Center or I would not have been cleared for a visual approach. I did not hear any broadcasts of positions by any other planes from the time I started broadcasting my position when I was 14 miles out. I did hear the plane give taxi position broadcasts once on the ground but otherwise no communications whatsoever. Thankfully; this incident was just a lesson and not a fatal accident.




Synopsis: C340 pilot; on a visual approach to Runway 32 at PLN; reports a NMAC with a BE58 on a straight in approach to the same runway. The reporter had made position reports on the CTAF and entered on the left base while the other pilot made no position reports.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During my preflight briefing with flight attendants; I reviewed how this particular aircraft used interphone handsets similar to B777 aircraft. Therefore; to place a Flight Deck emergency call; FAs must dial number 4 - no Alert button. To my amazement; only ONE out of six were familiar with this process. The others requested an actual demonstration on how to operate the interphone in an emergency.  After my briefing; FAs quickly understood the expected actions and required no additional instructions.This report is being submitted for track/trending. Additionally; for consideration this task be added to future training modules during recurrent Training and consideration of actual handset mock-up in training. This appears to be a 'familiarity' human factors issue; NOT inability to perform a specific task.




Synopsis: B767 Flight Attendant reported concern with other flight attendants lack of knowledge of the flight deck emergency call function on the interphone.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach into ZZZ while hand flying the aircraft I felt multiple elevator buffeting and pitching movement. I wrote the anomaly up as 'significant elevator buffeting.' After my rest period; I was contacted by two different sources that Maintenance in ZZZ had found three ULD cargo containers were free floating and the floor locks were not in up/secured position. Aft cargo position 32-34 were found to have shifted and moved during flight. This would explain the vibrations or buffeting I felt and the pitching movement. I don't think it needs to be reiterate the extreme importance of securing cargo properly or the catastrophic effects load shift have had on aircrafts in the past. Requalification and retraining would be the very least of suggestions to make sure this is mitigated.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported elevator buffeting on approach was caused by unsecured loads shifting in the aft section of the aircraft.
Date: 201508
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While at cruise at FL380; ATC informed us to 'turn right 30 degrees; immediately.'  As I confirmed the clearance; the First Officer (Pilot Flying) started the right turn.  While commencing the turn; I saw a co-altitude TCAS target (opposite direction traffic) at approximately the 10-11 o'clock position about 7-8 miles away and closing.  This was followed by a Traffic Alert (traffic; traffic); which was almost immediately followed by a Resolution Advisory (Climb; Climb). The autopilot was immediately disconnected and a TCAS climb initiated.  We climbed approximately 300-400 feet before we were advised 'Clear of Conflict;' and descended back to FL380.After the event; Maastricht Control offered an explanation.  He stated that the conflicting traffic had been on a different frequency and answered someone else's radio call to begin a descent. The conflicting aircraft erroneously started a descent to/through our altitude.   Listening more attentively to ATC when given new altitude clearance. (conflicting A/C)  Had ATC recognized the descending Aircraft earlier perhaps an earlier heading correction for us could have prevented the RA.  Everything happened in an extremely compressed period of time (approximately 30 seconds).  Had we not followed ATC and TCAS instructions immediately the outcome could have been much different




Synopsis: A B757-200 Captain reported receiving an RA from opposite direction traffic at FL380 in oceanic airspace from an aircraft that descended without clearance.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: APA.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D APA
ATC / advisory: Tower APA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 17L from Centennial; and instructed to fly straight out. Before we were even airborne the Local 1 Controller cleared a light twin for takeoff and also told them to fly straight out/runway heading. I was watching the aircraft on my ADS-B traffic display and saw them approaching us from the rear at high speed. Tower instructed me to turn right and proceed on course; and I responded 'unable' as there was an aircraft passing me on the right. I was taking evasive action and turning to the left away from the conflict. The Tower Controller had no idea about the proximity of the two aircraft. I don't believe proper spacing was given between both of us for takeoff; and tower absolutely lost separation between the two aircraft. A thorough review of Centennial towers air traffic procedures is a must. Near misses in similar situations are a regular occurrences at this airport and many are not reported.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported a near miss with a subsequent light twin aircraft departing APA. ATC's right turn instructions were ignored because of the overtaking aircraft.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Several months ago I noticed that the windsocks near A4 and A7 were extremely near the taxiway centerline.  At the time; I called the ASE Airport Operations and was told that the socks are 80' from the taxiway centerline.    We were in ASE again with a GIV with a 77' wingspan.  I pulled off the centerline away from the socks to ensure clearance.    There is NO way those socks are 80' from the taxiway centerline; runway centerline maybe.  With my wingspan; we did miss the socks; but care should be taken on larger aircraft (GV; G650; etc).  Please have the airport Manager verify the distance from the taxiway to the windsocks and maybe provide a note on the airport diagram as to the actual distance.




Synopsis: G-IV Captain believes the windsocks are too close to the taxiway centerline at ASE for his 77 foot wingspan aircraft to pass without deviating.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PUB.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D PUB
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01; Tower PUB
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X and Aircraft Y both released by approach.  Aircraft X launched 'Runway heading' off RWY 8R and climbing to 7000.  Aircraft Y was launched after Aircraft X had crossed departure threshold of runway 8R also runway heading and 7000.  Aircraft Y increased speed such that he was overtaking Aircraft X.  Aircraft X had been switched to departure frequency.  I called departure controller requesting a turn for Aircraft Y and advising I could maintain visual separation in the turn.  I was told to keep Aircraft Y on runway heading and then I shipped him to departure.It is quite possible; due to the nature of traffic at PUB; to never encounter this situation during training.  Given that both aircraft perform similarly I thought I had provided adequate spacing.  I was wrong.  I would recommend a wedge of departure airspace 15-20 degrees to either side of runway heading to allow tower controllers to issue turns in for IFR departures should it be necessary to maintain spacing.  Another recommendation would be to only release one IFR at a time; or some other similar measure to help ensure IFR separation is maintained with multiple IFR departures.




Synopsis: PUB Tower Controller reported of departing two similar type aircraft and the second aircraft over taking the first.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Our aircraft had an inoperative Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) requiring us to perform an air start. During the air start I; the Captain; accidentally commanded the First Officer to start engine number one (left engine). The ground crew had cleared us to start engine number two (right engine). The ground crew was within the hazard area of engine number one in order to attach the air start cart. Fortunately; as the engine was starting the supervisor noticed it and removed himself from the hazard area. I had fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but had accidentally verbalized 'engine one' without thinking and due to inattention had not caught my verbal error. We then shut down engine number one and after reconfirming that engine two was clear we started it instead. We then pushed back safely from the gate and performed a cross bleed start of engine number one in a deice pad; away from equipment and personnel.The ultimate cause of this event was just inattention. As stated above I fully intended to command the start of engine number two; but due to a mental lapse; I verbalized 'engine one' and didn't even realize my error. The First Officer was inexperienced in the irregular starting procedures associated with an air start. Had I more thoroughly briefed him on the need to start engine two and not engine one perhaps he would have caught my error and queried me on it.As stated above it was simply my inattention to my verbal command mistake; and once I caught it the engine was already starting. In the future; I will be sure to include the criticality of starting engine number two only; during an external air start in my briefings. Especially with a new First Officer.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported the crew started the wrong engine during an air start procedure.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: B737-700
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: A B737-800 departed LAX South Complex on LAXX Departure Procedure. A B737-700 departed North Complex on LOOP Departure Procedure. The -800 checked on at shoreline. As the -700 was checking on; I noticed that the -800 was still on what appeared to be the 250 departure heading; not the required 220 heading at the SMO 160R to separate this aircraft from the North Complex which is on a 250 heading. As soon as the -700 stopped its transmission; I issued a southbound turn to the -800 to effect separation. I am probably going to start issuing all of these non-RNAV departure an initial heading as soon as I talk to them. This situation of the pilot not turning to the required heading is happening very often and I'm not sure; but I think that 'Fusion' makes it a little harder to discern when this turn is started. Aircraft are not turning when they are supposed to and so the controller needs to correct the situation.




Synopsis: SCT Controller described a developing conflict with LAX departures when one aircraft failed to turn as required; the reporter listing 'Fusion' RADAR as one contributing factor.