elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was departing ZZZ from the south ramp with a student pilot. We had been held up with our departure while waiting for the current tower controller to finish his personal conversation with a taxiing jet. We were cleared from the south ramp to the southwest; a route that is very frequently taken by our company helicopters to depart westbound and head to ZZZ1 for training. There was not mention of conflicting traffic; only a clearance for a VFR departure to the southwest. My student was in control of the aircraft and climbing for 1;200 ft. MSL about 1SM south of the airport. While I was looking down at the gauges; the student said 'that's an airplane'. I looked up and saw a Cessna (not sure if 152 or 172); at our exact altitude; flying head on with us. The aircraft was probably less than 1/2 statute mile in front of us. I immediately took evasive action and lowered our altitude; while at the same time the plane veered hard to its left and our right. I called ZZZ tower to ask if he had any idea about the plane that we had almost collided with. I waited for 10 seconds and got no response. When I called back a second time and asked about the plane; the Controller said that he knew about the plane and for us to continue southwest bound VFR. There was no mention of this aircraft on left base for Runway 34 to us; and no apology or acceptance of fault issued. The Controller seemed distracted after his personal conversation only a minute earlier.




Synopsis: Helicopter instructor reported a traffic conflict on departure that was not mentioned by the tower.
Date: 202010
Location: BZN.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: BZN ATIS can be received late due to terrain; no Digital ATIS; and early descent to land RWY 30.  When we initially tried to get ATIS; it was actually Johnson City; WY.  When we did actually get it; it was a little late and required re-briefing to change the plans.In addition; the company pages need more information.1 - Runway 12 is preferred; even up to a 10 knot tailwind (per AirNAV.com); although that information is not specific or clear on the chart; which simply says Runway 12 is preferred.  The additional information of up to a 10 knot tailwind would be helpful to ensure we are planning; for the most likely scenario.  In our case; the wind was 6 knots from the NW; so we were not sure which runway to plan without ATIS.  Knowing they operate with up to a 10 knot tailwind on Runway 12 would have helped. 2 - Company pages note a safety alert that states; 'terrain east of the airport does not allow for a normal descent to a straight-in-landing to Runway 30.'  Note it does not state what 'normal' is; prohibit a landing west; or prohibit 'trying' with early configuration and being prepared to go around or joining a left downwind visual to 30.  To me the Company page sounds a little like a prohibition; or at least; that it is not recommended.  But it needs to be clearer.  If it is prohibited; it should say that.  If it isn't; provide additional information.  Maybe it should state something like:'Terrain to the East of the airport does not allow for a normal descent to a straight-in landing on Runway 30.  If attempted; configure and slow early to maintain the VNAV path; and if unable; prepare for a go-around and fly the RNAV 30 via the FIDEP transition or if in day visual conditions with terrain in sight; enter a left visual downwind and visual approach to Runway 30.'




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported more arrival information is needed for BZN Airport.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Preparing to depart for return flight home. We started engine and monitored CTAF for 2 minutes before approaching midfield threshold.  No transmissions were heard.  Unable to taxi to end of Runway 33 due to construction; so back taxi on 33 was required.  Hearing no traffic calls we announced on CTAF that we were departing 33 with east departure; entering the active; and back taxiing on 33.  After crossing threshold 10 FT we stopped before reaching runway as visual inspection of inbound airspace revealed plane coming in for short final at high rate of speed who had not given any radio announcements.  Given time available and estimate of clearance from actual runway we elected to stay in the position we stopped.  Incoming aircraft appeared to visualize us; but proceeded to attempt landing.  At midfield of 1;400 foot runway they were still at high rate of speed and elevation of approximately 35 FT.  They touched down 3/4 down the runway rather than going around; and given speed they were still carrying we visualized them going off the runway .  Other aircraft did not appear to be operating safely or following non-Tower procedures.  They elected to land despite an aircraft being on the active runway endangering our aircraft as well as their own.

Callback: The reporter stated that he had crossed the hold short line after making several CTAF call; but had not yet entered the runway.  He estimated his aircraft's engine was ten FT off the runway.  When he saw the other aircraft he realized he could have not complete a 180 turn away from the runway on the taxiway nor could he enter the runway to complete a 180; so he decided to remain stopped.  The reporter was 'dumb founded' that the other pilot continued.  The reporter was the first person to the aircraft and helped the occupants out.  The reporter's only comment to the other pilot was 'I didn't hear you call CTAF.'  The other pilot said he had called; but FBO personnel stated that only the [reporter] called prior to the event.



Synopsis: SMA pilot at a CTAF airport holding off the runway; witnessed another small aircraft land long on a short runway then experienced a runway excursion.
Date: 201212
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Gulfstream III (G1159A)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As the CIC; I was providing general supervision to the entire operation in the Tower cab. A Gulfstream III (large category aircraft); was on an ILS Runway 16R approach from the North. A Cessna 172 (small category aircraft); is on a VOR-A approach from the Southwest. TRACON CPC coordinated with the Tower to provide visual separation between Gulfstream III and Cessna 172. The Tower accepted visual separation responsibility. Although the Tower provided visual separation with the two IFR aircraft inbound for IFR separation; the Tower Controller did not and could not provide visual separation when wake turbulence was involved. Per JO 7110.65U 7-2-1 a 2. The Tower must not provide visual separation between aircraft when wake turbulence separation is required. When the Gulfstream III was over the landing threshold; the Cessna 172 was 1.93 miles in trail on final. In complete honesty; I was not aware of the wake turbulence visual separation requirements in reference to wake turbulence; since we can not and do not provide this separation. When asked and as able; we always accommodate and accept visual separation (when wake turbulence is not involved). In asking the Tower working LC1; they had the same lack of awareness. That also seemed to be the general consensus of most CPC's at our facility. Even though this separation is prescribed in the 7110.65; it is the TRACON's responsibility and we cannot provide it. However; as a recommendation; if Tower personnel are briefed with a refresher; perhaps they will be more vigilant with this separation and can send an aircraft around or notify the TRACON ahead of time for alternate instructions.


Second narrative: Gulfstream III  on ILS 16R Approach; Cessna 172 on a VOR 16R Approach. TRACON called and asked if we could provide visual between the two; which I did; except I didn't have the required IFR wake turbulence between the two; the small aircraft was behind the large. We have never had to apply this separation before.


Synopsis: Tower Controller described a request from the parent Approach Control requesting that visual separation be applied not realizing that 'wake turbulence' was involved and Tower was unable to provide this type of visual separation.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: UUWV.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A UUWV
ATC / advisory: Center UUWV
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: GPS jamming over Russia beginning at waypoint LOGMU; FL 340 w/associated alternating ADS-B; l and R alerts.  Jamming continued to waypoint NIBIM when unable RNP alert received. Jamming continued to waypoint UBONA; FL 340; when alerts cleared and GPS reception returned to normal operation.  Max ANP indication 5.0.  Additional alerts received were runway sys; GPS; terr pos; and ADS-B out R. All QRH checklists were accomplished for each alert with no resolution. Aircraft remained in VHF radio contact with Moscow control during entire event.  Aircraft position verified on-course with Moscow at each waypoint on flight plan until jamming ceased and GPS updating returned to normal.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported GPS jamming.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737-800
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight Attendant (FA) 1; 2 & 4 arrived at the Airport and were stranded at Security due to the fact our General Declarations was not provided to Security check and we needed to wait till Ground submitted to Security. The Pilots and FA 3 all came from the inbound flight thus they were already on board. When we arrived they were already boarding and some passengers were already on board. I told the Captain we cannot board without a minimum crew and we need to deplane and do another security sweep. I advised him it is Security Violation and FAR Violation. FA#3 said she did not agree and many times informed both the Ground Supervisor and the Captain in front of the First Officer they cannot board and should not board until the FAR minimum crew requirements is met. She was totally ignored and I was too. The Captain insisted it is ok and I repeatedly said to him it is not and I will not violate FAR.  The other Flight Attendants were all in disbelief.  The Captain overstep his authority and violated FAR.I am not sure what transpired between the Ground Supervisor; the Captain; The First Officer and FA #3.  She told me she was helpless. She will be in a better position to report the incident prior to our arrival. I can tell in her demeanor she was very upset.The Ground Crew told #3 the they were given a go signal by me to board without us while we were waiting to be cleared. I don't appreciate the lying and using us as scape goats to wrongdoings.I informed the male Supervisor before closing that I will file an ASAP report so they know.There should be a rigid training on the importance of Security and the Captain to respect FAR/FAA and not violate it.  Flight Attendants should be heard and not ignored; respected and not pushed because of their authority.Flight Attendants are the first line of defense in any given situation inflight yet powerless even in a situation where the Pilots imposed their authority when it is blatantly a violation.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported being held up at security with two other Flight attendants; due to paper work which the company should have provided. While waiting for the reporter and the two others; the Captain elects to board the aircraft with one Flight Attendant. Upon arrival at the aircraft the reporter explained that the full crew is required for boarding and the aircraft needed to be deplaned and a security sweep accomplished. The Captain refuses to do so.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CHS.TRACON, SC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZJX
ATC / advisory: TRACON CHS
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Enroute at 2;000 feet when I received a message on GPS and EFIS saying RNAV signal is lost; ADS-B is lost. iPad does not show correct location. No problem because VMC and not going anywhere. No navigation and no traffic. I called Approach Control to ask if they knew of any GPS outages. They said they hadn't and nobody else was having a problem. After landing; about 20 minutes later the system was back to normal. Another pilot had the same experience. Called Approach Control again on the landline and they advised that they had gotten several reports but they had no prior record of it and they should have been advised that Navy was doing testing offshore. There were no local NOTAMs and when I went back to look; there was a NOTAM for the outage lasting for about a week at various times for Center. Send [a] NOTAM to all Approach Controls that underlie testing area and also to local airports so that flights that never touch overlying airspace are aware of possible outage. They should also be sent to EFB providers so they can include it in their system. Had this occurred in IMC it would have spiked the workload considerably and only VHF navigation would have worked.




Synopsis: A Pilot reported GPS interference.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Our original plane diverted and we were given a replacement plane. Upon entering the plane; a strong chemical smell was very apparent. We turned on the APU and ran packs to try and dissipate the smell. I started to get a headache from the smell and instructed the crew to get off the plane. I called Dispatch and was conferenced in with [Maintenance Control]. Apparently this plane had been at the hangar for the last 176 hours and among other things had received new carpet and flooring in the galleys. The smell may have been from the glue. The Supervisor and a representative from Flight Ops came on board as well. I determined that due to the smell it would be unsafe for myself; crew; and passengers to be on this plane in its current condition.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported refusing aircraft during preflight due to strong chemical smell throughout the aircraft resulting in health issues.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Approach control cleared for us for the visual when we declared airport in sight. We had been set up on a right downwind. Using the RNAV Y chart as a reference; Pilot Flying (PF) initiated the descent to be above 2400 between the two fixes and was about to start the turn for the right base turn when we got the [advisory] Terrain Pull up. This also while scanning to maintain visual contact with the airport. I executed the escape maneuver. After completing the escape maneuver I commenced the base turn and continued the visual approach.Downwind leg too far out from airport and crew needed to maintain altitude for longer. Commercial passenger flights should always be vectored for the RNAV 21 due to the surrounding terrain and high terrain due east of final approach course for 21.


Second narrative: We were in contact with approach control. Approach control cleared us for the visual for runway 21. We called the runway in sight. We were set up on a right downwind for the airport. We backed the visual up with the RNAV 21 approach. We began to descend to 2400 for [an] intersection off the approach while beginning a right hand turn for a base leg for RWY 21. The turn was clear to the right and right when we were about to begin our turn a Terrain Pull UP warning went off the captain flying immediately initiated the escape maneuver. After the maneuver was completed and conflict cleared the captain started his base turn while maintaining visual of the run way; and continued the approach.


Synopsis: EMB-140 Flight crew reported a Terrain warning during visual approach.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 7X
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After being cleared direct to FUBRR we obtained the TEB ATIS and placed the approach into the FMS. The airplane crossed FUBRR and turned to the WEST. Since the airplane turned past 90 degrees we elected to continue the turn back toward FUBRR and informed the Controller what had taken place in our FMS. She acknowledged and asked if we were heading back toward our route FUBRR. I confirmed that and we kept the turn coming completing a full 360. In that 360 it was noticed that the FMS had FUBRR and a second route to FUBRR with the JAIKE STAR. Apparently the FMS was sequencing back to MXE after crossing FUBRR. Since this was not caught in time the aircraft had crossed the fix FUBRR and turned WEST. After turning back to FUBRR we completed the rest of the STAR and landed in TEB.




Synopsis: Falcon 7X First Officer reports making a 360 degree turn during the JAIKE 3 arrival when the aircraft reaches FUBRR and starts turning to the west. The crew informs ATC and continues the turn and returns to the arrival.