elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: While reviewing the PANGG[2] RNAV Arrival; the Crew noticed that note one is invalid. The note states; 'EXPECT RNAV (GPS) Approach or RADAR vectors to final approach course.  If approach clearance not received by STERE; proceed inbound on RNAV (GPS) Z RWY 22L routing.' The problem is that the RNAV (GPS) Z RWY 22L has been removed from our JEPPS and EFB. There is now a RNAV (RNP) Y RWY 22L and X RWY 22L.

Callback: During the callback it was determined that the PANGG2 was the arrival in question but that note 1 is still the issue since the reporter no longer has the RNAV (GPS) Z Rwy 22L in his chart coverage.



Synopsis: B737 First Officer arriving MDW on the PANGG2 believes that note 1 should be revised to the RNAV (RNP) Y RWY 22L; since the RNAV (GPS) Z RWY 22L has been removed.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through approximately FL300; we got a Cabin Altitude Warning light and horn. We immediately donned our oxygen masks and performed the Cabin Altitude Warning Horn QRC and asked ATC to stop our climb and for a lower altitude. ATC approved our descent and issued a clearance first to 16;000 feet then to 10;000 feet. We established communications with each other and began the descent. We didn't initiate an emergency descent as the cabin pressure was showing 5;000 feet and holding steady. We had no other abnormal indications. Upon crossing approximately 24;000 feet the Cabin Altitude Warning light went out and the horn stopped. We continued the descent towards 10;000 feet as we were only 140 miles southeast of KATL and we were planning on a diversion to ATL (once we coordinated with Dispatch). We informed the Flight Attendants that everything was ok; that we had an abnormal indication in the cockpit; but that we were fine. They informed us that everyone was good in back and that there were no indications in the cabin and that the masks had not dropped. I established voice communication with Dispatch; informed them of the issue and we all concurred that a divert to ATL was the best course. We informed ATC of our intentions and were issued a clearance to ATL. We informed the Passengers that we had an abnormal indication in the cockpit; and that all was fine but the prudent decision was to divert into ATL. We didn't declare an emergency and executed a normal landing without incident. We taxied to gate where we were met by Maintenance and informed them of the problem and filled out the logbook.We had issues; initially; with communication because we were distracted by the warning horn. Had we silenced the horn; it would have made initial communication easier.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported diverting to a nearby alternate after receiving a Cabin Altitude Warning.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approached ZZZ in gusty conditions with the autopilot engaged. At approximately 700 feet AGL executed a go-around. Although I pushed the TOGA button; the aircraft did not enter go-around mode and the addition of power caused an excessive sink rate along with a sink rate GPWS message. Autopilot then disconnected and the captain pushed the TOGA button again; at which point a normal go around was performed.I now know the autopilot does not handle gusting approaches well.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported that the aircraft did not perform as expected after pushing the TOGA button while the autopilot was engaged on a go-around.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff; the left engine failed at approximately 120 KTS. Aborted; Left engine reached 800 degrees. [We] called for the emergency equipment. After inspection from the fire department; returned to gate with no other issues.




Synopsis: MD82 Captain experiences engine failure at 120 KTS during takeoff followed by RTO.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Wrong seats installed in Aircraft at the emergency exit row on both sides. The Aircraft over wing escape had the wrong seats installed forward of the emergency exit. The tray table blocked the emergency exit and the seats in the emergency exit should have had tray tables in the arm rest they did not this was also the wrong seats installed at that row.




Synopsis: An MD-80 had normal seats installed in two of the emergency exit seat rows. The seatback tray tables could block the emergency exits.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Other Unwanted situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Performed normal preflight duties and procedures; ATIS advertised Runway 10L [departures] IMC conditions. 300 overcast plus 1/2 mile and fog. During our briefing we noted company provided single engine failure procedure requires PDX VOR to identify 8.4 DME fix. We checked radio aid and found it to be inoperative. Checked chart NOTAMs as well as flight release NOTAMs. PDX VOR should have been in service. We contacted ATC (PDX Ground) and they stated that the PDX VOR was decommissioned over 1 month ago. Our engine failure procedure requires us to identify the PDX 8.4 DME fix so that we avoid rising terrain in the Columbia Gorge. Since we cannot determine how fast we will climb on a single engine waiting until we reach 1;031 FT could cause us to enter this area of rising terrain. If we reach 1;031 FT before 8.4 DME we are allowed to turn and head out the Columbia River towards the Pacific Ocean.[There appears to have been] inadequate review by the company when providing engine out procedures at our scheduled airports. An alternate procedure should have been provided without our inquiring.




Synopsis: An A320 flight crew discovered their company's special engine failure procedure for departures from Runway 10L at PDX required DME information from the OTS PDX VOR.
Date: 201705
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DAL
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I wanted to share a climb gradient issue out of DAL. When departing DAL on Runway 13R or 13L; the published SIDs have a waypoint crossing restriction at DRSET to be at or above 4000 ft MSL. The associated SIDs are CURLO 4; KKITY 4; LNDRE 4; and SWTSR 3. This point is only 7 NM off the departure end. This requires a climb gradient of 501 ft per NM to meet this restriction. The SIDs only list a climb gradient of 500 ft per NM to 1200 ft to meet obstacle clearances. The additional climb gradient to 4000 ft has been a challenge to meet in the older model aircraft and heavies; especially if a reduced takeoff thrust setting is initially programmed.List an [accurately determined] ATC climb gradient of [XXX] feet per NM to 4000 MSL for the associated SIDs on the charts. In addition; list the distance from Runway 13L/R to DRSET. As a side note; make Crews aware that the published climb gradient is for obstacle clearances unless explicitly labeled as an ATC climb gradient. Pilots need to be aware that a higher rate may be required to meet ATC crossing restrictions on a SID or Departure Procedure; and that ATC assumes we have calculated the climb rate required.

Callback: Reporter stated that this report was initiated from training and weight and balance discussion rather than from any particular incident. Reporter stated that the ATC required climb gradients for the altitude restrictions at the first waypoint are not published on the four SIDS mentioned in the narrative; and that manual computation has to be accomplished to ensure that the restrictions are made. Reporter stated that he used FMC generated distances from Runways 13L and 13R to DRSET and field elevation to determine the required climb gradient to meet the DRSET altitude restriction. Reporter reiterated that these restrictions are often difficult to make with a fully loaded aircraft; especially with a reduced power setting for takeoff; and stated that some confusion exists regarding these restrictions.



Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported that climb gradients to DRSET should be published for Runways 13L and 13R on four SIDs at DAL.
Date: 201702
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: ATC cleared us to fly a 030 heading to join the GABRE1. I had never flown this SID.  I had my IPAD zoomed in on the Runway 6L/R departure side so I wouldn't miss the charted headings. This put SLI out of view on the IPAD. I mistakenly asked the First Officer to sequence the FMGC between GABRE and FOGEX.


Second narrative: During departure off runway 6R at LAX; GABRE1 departure; ATC issued 'turn left 030 and join the Gabre departure.' This was the first time for both pilots performing this SID and the first time departing this runway for the FO. LAX had a rain storm and was departing east. Once instructed to join the departure on the 030 heading; I extended the inbound radial to FOGEX and inserted it into the FMGC. With concurrence from the Captain I executed it. ATC queried our course and advised we were supposed to intercept the Seal Beach VOR 346 radial northbound. Upon review both pilots had the departure zoomed in on their Ipads and did not have the SLI displayed.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported deviating from the published procedure due to not having their IPAD/EFB set to display the complete procedure.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BTL.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other 141
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D BTL
ATC / advisory: Tower BTL
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was on a training flight with my student and was coming in to land on runway 23L at BTL.  Runway conditions were some compacted snow and a little bit of ice; the ramps were all covered in snow.  Upon touchdown the airplane veered to the right; indicating that I had a locked brake; I also believe that I hit a patch of ice as I touched down.  I used left rudder to try and maintain lateral control to initiate a go-around.  Upon increasing power for the go-around the airplane veered more violently to the right causing us to veer off the right side of runway 23L.  There were no injuries; nor was there damage to the plane or the runway environment.




Synopsis: Flight instructor reported loss of directional control and a runway excursion after landing at BTL in snowy and icy conditions.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TPA.Tower, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B TPA
ATC / advisory: Tower TPA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Intended to land flaps 30 in windy conditions with add speed of 14 knots.  Visual approach on Visual Approach Slope indicator and slightly below ILS glide slope. We received a Ground Proximity Warning alert for 'too low terrain'. Rechecked landing gear was down and landed. We realized on very short final that flaps were actually set to 25 instead of 30. We did not select flaps to 30 since we were so low. With the extra speed we had added for the gusty winds; I felt we were safer to leave them set at 25 and land.


Second narrative: While on final approach  we experienced a Ground Proximity Warning 'Too Low Terrain' aural warnings. Knowing that we were on glide slope and Precision Approach Path Indicator and the runway was in sight in VFR conditions; we decided to continue the landing. We ensured that the landing gear was down and that we were free of terrain; however; on short final the Captain noticed we were at flaps 25 instead of 30. It was decided to safely complete the landing since we were stable on speed and path. We already had built in a 14 knot wind additive for the windy conditions. The entire approach was stable including at the 500 foot 'Stable' call out point. I take responsibility for misreading the flap gauge; and will certainly give it more focus in the future. One potential factor; not an excuse; is there was the distraction of balloons going by our aircraft around the time of the landing checklist. I reported the balloons to Tampa Tower.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew conducting a Visual Approach reported the flaps were set incorrectly resulting in a Ground Proximity Alert on short final.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LIT.Airport, AR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After starting the right engine; we received an R RARV FAULT status message. I contacted Maintenance Control; discussed the situation and decided to return to the gate to attempt the system reset. Once at the gate; I again contacted Maintenance Control and we together performed the system reset procedure. At the completion of the procedure and after turning the packs back on; [Flight Attendant 1] reported smoke in the cabin. [Flight Attendant 1] then initiated an evacuation using the main cabin door and jet bridge. The FO (First Officer) and I completed the evacuation checklist. I was initially not aware of any injuries. However; while I was deadheading back to base; I was informed that [Flight Attendant 2] had a bruise on his chest from the event. I was also informed that he had notified in flight management of the injury. I am not aware of any injured passengers.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported smoke in the cabin related to an air conditioning pack issue resulting in an evacuation.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RSW.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Small Transport
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C RSW
ATC / advisory: TRACON RSW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was issued a heading on departure to avoid VFR traffic in the area by my trainee; NW bound. Turn NW bound without a climb was not enough of a turn to completely avoid the MVA in area and the aircraft 'Rode the boundary' of the 2;500 MVA at 2;000 for 2 miles before a climb was issued.  Climb the aircraft earlier or turn out further west to avoid the MVA.




Synopsis: RSW radar Instructor reported developmental failed to climb traffic resulted in entering a higher MVA.