elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: As of Date the company has again instituted their [attendance] procedures. This results in Flight Attendants having to jump through major hoops going to a special clinic if they call out sick. If they don't comply; they face termination. This further results in flight attendants who would rather go to work sick with the possibility that they are COVID positive than go through the process defined by the company. I myself along with many other passengers and crew have been exposed to COVID by these flight attendants in the past. I do not feel safe going to work knowing that there is a greater possibility of flight attendants who are going to work sick putting myself at greater risk of being exposed to COVID-19.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the company attendance procedure could result in flight attendants who are COVID-19 positive reporting for work instead of calling in sick.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aeroplane Flight Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Exceeded 210 KTS restriction on the arrival due flight control issue discovered 6 miles prior to intersection. Declared emergency and advised ATC of intentions. Received priority handling and landed without further incident after completion of appropriate QRH procedure.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A MD-82 crew failed to slow for a 210 KTS intersection constraint because they were dealing with a flight control malfunction.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Overhead Bins; Latches
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: This aircraft is the new one that some roller bags fit on their sides. Because more bags are fitting into the overhead; it is very; very heavy to lift and close. We were trying to get them closed as quickly as possible as we were at departure time. One of the agents was helping us close them and even passengers helped as we couldn't close them by ourselves. It takes two people to close a full one. Two of my coworkers were complaining about hurting after the first flight and will probably be filing injury reports. A female passenger had opened one to grab some things out and I could see her struggling to close it. She also said it was very heavy for her after she closed it. The bags are supposed to go towards the back of the bin so the pivot mechanism will work and help close the bin; but we kept pushing the bags towards the back and they kept coming forward. So we were having to lift the entire weight of the bin. Also; a few people bumped their heads on the bins as they were deplaning; but when I asked them if they were okay; no one seemed to have any injuries.[I] suggest going back to the original bins that are simply a lid being closed like we have on [some of our older 737s].




Synopsis: Flight Attendant describes new larger overhead bins are harder to close due to the larger amount of weight they are designed to carry.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: As [I] was landing the plane pulled left. I couldn't correct in time; went off runway and flipped on back. Hardly any damage; no one hurt other than a scrape on leg; no stitches needed.




Synopsis: PA18 pilot reports losing control during landing; resulting in a runway excursion and the aircraft flipping on its back. Minor injuries and damage are reported.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Software and Automation; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: While on the PHIBO3 arrival [we were] given holding instructions over PALEO intersection. Just prior to that my FD PRO program crashed and I was unable to successfully relaunch it. I then switched to using the charts provided in the [Jeppesen] Trip Kit. Comparing the holding fix as depicted in my First Officer's FD Pro and my Trip Kit chart we discovered that the chart in FD Pro was not the current version of the chart even though my First Officer had the latest updates to FD Pro downloaded. The issue was not only that FD Pro does not contain the most current version of this particular chart but the inbound course for the holding fix is 3 degrees different than depicted in FD Pro. As a side note; the pattern was correctly depicted in the Airbus FMGC (Flight Management and Guidance system). I would also like to point out that there have been several times when the FMGC holding radials seemed to differ from FD Pro and crews usually override the FMGC to match FD Pro which is probably not the correct thing to do.




Synopsis: Airbus Captain reported discrepancies between the charted procedure and the FD PRO App on the PHIBO3 arrival to EWR.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIE.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E FWA
ATC / advisory: TRACON FWA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While enroute flight following from ZZZ to KMIE weather was reporting clear sky; 12000 feet. Approximately 40 South of Fort Wayne I asked Fort Wayne Approach to convert my flight following to IFR Flight Plan; anticipating the weather was not going to be clear sky as I was on top at 3500 MSL and noticing sky was not becoming clear as reported. I asked Fort Wayne Approach for RNAV 21 into Muncie starting on the CIKEP and they reported they could not grant the request. I noted I was never handed off to Indianapolis Approach which normally would occur at least 20 miles North of Muncie KMIE; and I was approximately 8 miles North. Fort Wayne Approach stated I was cleared for a visual to Runway 21. At this time I would have over flow KMIE if I had requested Indianapolis Approach. I saw an opening in the clouds and started a descent. I should have notified Fort Wayne Approach immediately and then was reminded by Fort Wayne Approach I was descending; at this point I immediately asked to cancel the IFR clearance and contacted KMIE Tower for permission to land. I should have asked Fort Wayne Approach for a hand off to Indianapolis Approach sooner. I should have reported descent and cancel IFR clearance sooner. I believe with the Government Shutdown ATC had distractions also leading to failure to hand me off to Indianapolis Approach. I shall be more observant in the future.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported issues relating to VFR flight to IFR flight and confusion of when to cancel IFR.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On initial climb out the FO smelled a faint electrical odor that seemed to be coming from the overhead panel or overhead map light area. I could not smell it on my side of the aircraft. The FO could only smell it when he was close to the overhead panel. We proceeded to climb for a while to see if the smell would disappear. After several minutes; the odor would intermittently come and go. We discussed our options and decided the safest course of action would be to do a precautionary return to ZZZ. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were advised; and the release was amended to return to ZZZ. An emergency was not declared. The flight back to ZZZ was normal; except for a smooth overweight landing. Logbook entries were made per standard operating procedures.


Second narrative: On climbout from ZZZ; I detected what seemed to be an electrical odor coming from the FO side overhead panel. The odor was intermittent and was only detectable if I raised up out of my seat to position myself closer to the panel. Climbing through about 15;000 feet; I smelled it again. The odor could not be detected from the Captain's side of the cockpit or anywhere else on the aircraft. The Captain and I talked about our options and decided to land back at ZZZ as a precaution. All operations where normal except for overweight landing. Dispatch and Maintenance were involved.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported electrical odor from First officer's side of overhead; which resulted in a decision to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While accomplishing the RIIVR2 arrival to LAX we were given the ILS RWY 25L. Approximately 5 miles prior to the RIIVR fix (common to both RWY 25L and 24R) we were told to utilize RWY 24R.Approach Control had us fly a speed higher than recommended by the FMS and they started our descent on the arrival later than optimum. When the change to runway 24R was given to us; we had little time to enter it into the FMS; reduce our speed and return to a normal vertical profile. We were able to safely accomplish everything to get the aircraft in a position to land and meet the stabilized approach criteria but not without significant effort and much 'heads down' time close to the airport in a high traffic area. It is not uncommon to be kept high and fast and given last minute runway changes at LAX. I believe our combined flight experience and good CRM were critical to a safe outcome. Had there been marginal weather or an inexperienced crew; there is a high potential for task saturation close to the ground; at a very busy airport; with a different outcome.




Synopsis: A B737 flight crew landing at LAX was issued a late runway change. They were 'heads down' for significant amount of time in a highly congested traffic area but were able to comply with the instructions and land safely.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the Post Deicing Checklist; a significant amount of fumes from deicing fluid entered the cockpit after turning on the bleed switches one minute after completion of deicing. We quickly turned OFF the packs to stop the fumes from entering the cockpit and cabin. I became nauseous and developed a mild headache later in the flight and ended up being removed from the flight sequence in ZZZ. I was later placed on non-flying status via the OJI process.We reviewed the Company deicing procedures after we stopped the fumes/before starting the #1 Engine and again while at cruise to see if we'd missed any steps. We noted that we hadn't since the Before Deicing Checklist does not direct that the packs be turned off. Alas; when the bleeds are turned OFF one minute after completing deicing; the pack switch configuration allows any deicing fluid that has entered the APU bleed air ducting to be directed immediately to the left pack. The Before Deicing Checklist should be amended to turn OFF the packs at the same time as the bleeds are turned OFF. The Post Deicing Checklist should be amended to delay turning the packs back ON until after each bleed source is used as a bleed source (e.g. APU for engine start or wing anti ice; engines for engine anti-ice or wing anti-ice). This would have air flow through the bleed ducts to remove any deicing fluid.




Synopsis: A Captain became ill after deicing when the engine bleed air switches were turned ON with the engines off. Apparently deice fluid in the APU bleed air entered the left pack.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was landing at ZZZ with winds reporting 170-11G17 so I preceded to land on Runway 17 with no issues. Taxied to the self-service fuel pumps and topped off the plane with 11.2 gallons. Started the plane and started to taxi out to Runway 17 for departure. Received AWOS information and winds were reported as 240-12G17. I changed taxi direction to Runway 26 which would be 20 degrees off my left nose. Performed run up and started take off roll. At approximately 40 MPH I lifted the tail off the ground and the plane turned quickly to the left into the wind. I applied full right rudder and brake to straighten plane up and it would not respond quickly enough so I pulled throttle still trying to keep the plane straight. The plane went off the left edge of the runway and at that point the gear collapsed and the plane stopped. I think that if you notice the wind change direction that much in a short period of time it would be best to wait a little longer and see if they stabilize or might be changing back. Also; at low speed knowing the plane will turn into the wind first then want to drift away from the wind.




Synopsis: Tailwheel aircraft pilot reported a wind change during takeoff led to a loss of control; runway excursion and gear collapse.
Date: 201511
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Other Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Today; an employee partially lost consciousness; and became unresponsive. She could not walk; and could not respond to questions. The clinic refused to render aid; stating that they would not leave the clinic area in order to attend to the employee. The decision was made to call for an ambulance to pick her up; since her condition seemed to be potentially life threatening. The ambulance took between 20 minutes and half an hour to arrive. At this time; I do not know if the employee survived the wait; or if she has recovered.We work at an airport; where aircraft incidents; traumatic injuries; terrorist attacks and other violent criminal acts might reasonably occur. In addition; natural disasters; severe weather and critical infrastructure damage could happen. Having emergency responders take nearly half an hour to respond is beyond unacceptable.




Synopsis: Ground personnel reported that an employee became unresponsive and the emergency responders took 20 to 30 minutes to arrive.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the preflight; I paid close attention to some previous write-ups because the brakes have been previously written up just a few days prior. After leaving the gate; I pressed my brakes as instructed by the normal procedures handbook. I did not feel any resistance at all on the brakes; but decided to pump them several times to see if that would improve the situation. I made this decision because sometimes the brake fluid is thick when the aircraft is cold. I wanted to determine if the copilot brakes were connected to give a proper description to Maintenance. Unfortunately these actions did not help. When we began our runup; I instructed the FO (First Officer) to hold the brakes with me to see if we had any braking control at all. The airplane began to roll at 1700 RPMs despite both of us holding the brakes. At that moment; I informed ATC that we would be returning to the gate and that we would have to cross the runways; but had little to no braking action. We received clearance to cross both runways and made a successful gate return.




Synopsis: C402 Captain reported returning to the gate for maintenance when the brake system malfunctioned during taxi and run-up.