elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EUG.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-20 Pacer/PA-22 Tri-Pacer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E EUG
ATC / advisory: TRACON EUG
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Both the instrument rated pilot and the instructor missed a change to an old familiar approach. Neither of us had shot this approach since the change. The minimum altitude on the arc had changed from 3;200 to 3;700 and we both saw what we expected to see. It looked like a '2' to me until passing 3;300 when approach told us to maintain 3;200 (the MVA). Then I saw that it was a '7'. Another factor that may have had an effect was that we were both trying out smaller format electronic approach charts. From this I re-learned the importance of challenging each number on the approach chart to verify that they haven't snuck in a change.




Synopsis: A failure to note changes in the MEAs on an IAP to EUG resulted in the two pilots aboard a PA22 descending below the MEA while flying an arc transition.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We were on the ILS 09R at PHL approximately 15 DME when the Localizer exhibited erratic deviations on both the Captain and First Officers  Primary Flight Displays. The Flight Director and Auto Pilot was engaged and attempted to 'chase' the course which started to worsen the situation. ATC advised us that we appeared to be about a mile south of the localizer course; slightly less than 1/2 dot deflection at this point. The First Officer disengaged the autopilot and hand-flew the approach with no further issue. The deviation appeared to subside as we got closer to the field and we were within stable approach parameters from the Final Approach Fix until touchdown. Also; the NAVAID had been positively tuned/identified per company SOP prior to commencing the approach. Course deviation on the HSI followed by ATC advising us that we were right of course. Unreliable Localizer signal at PHL which is apparently a known issue.The First Officer disconnected the autopilot and hand flew. I notified maintenance and was told by multiple maintenance personnel both on the phone and in person at the aircraft that this was a known issue with runway 09R; it happens all the time; and that there's a NOTAM in effect regarding the issue. I searched all of the NOTAMs  and could not find anything remotely related to unreliable LOC/ILS on 09R. I do not believe that the FAA would allow a malfunctioning NAVAID to remain in service and do not think there is any merit in the maintenance department's claim that this is a known problem that we should just accept and learn to deal with. However; if there is a known problem with this or any other NAVAID that necessitates a procedure change; then the company should disseminate that information to the pilot group with an FIL; etc.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported the PHL Runway 09R Localizer is unreliable and caused a course deviation. The reporter stated maintenance personnel told him it was a known issue and a NOTAM was published but their are no NOTAM's addressing this issue.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared to take-off; runway 1R; with the instruction to keep the preceding Airbus in sight.  I delayed pushing the power up until I saw the A320 rotate.  As I rotated off the runway; I was surprised to see a Business Jet (I believe it was a Hawker; but not positive) rotating off the parallel runway about 100 yards ahead of us.  Had we been advised and had a visual on the traffic departing the parallel; this would have been a little close; but with nothing said; it was quite the surprise.  If I had not delayed the start of the takeoff roll to get proper separation; we would have been much closer. It would be nice if the Tower would do their job of providing proper separation between IFR traffic instead of passing the responsibility onto the flight crews.  At a minimum; it would be nice if they were professional enough to advise us of the potential conflicting traffic if they expect us to maintain separation for them.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reports being cleared for takeoff on 1R at LAS; with the additional requirement to keep the preceding A320 in sight. The takeoff is delayed until the A320 rotates and results in a formation takeoff with a Hawker on 1L. The reporter believes the Tower is not providing proper separation.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exhaust Pipe
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After completing 2 touch and go landings; I landed and the nose wheel gave me an extremely hard shimmy. After the airplane came to a complete halt I taxied to the hangar without further shimmy and inspected the nose wheel. I found that one of the exhaust pipes had broken about 9' from the tip inside the cowling. The ensuing hot gasses were blowing directly on an H-Bracket in the nose wheel assembly weakening it causing it to partially fail. This partial failure caused the nose wheel not to track properly upon landing causing the extreme shimmy I felt. I contacted Ground Control and advised them of what happened in case the missing piece was still on the runway. Except for the extreme shimmy on landing I did not feel anything different in the airplane handling. I do remember the airplane had a slight shimmy during the previous touch and go landings; but nothing out of the ordinary.




Synopsis: The pilot of a KIS4 experimental aircraft noted a considerable shimmy from the nose landing gear after landing. When he arrived at the hangar and inspected the nose wheel he discovered that a failed exhaust pipe had been directing hot gases onto the nose wheel assembly; causing a partial failure.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At 5;000 FT; vectors for Runway 4R. ATC called single engine traffic 10 o'clock 500 FT high. We visually obtained traffic. TCAS indicated 400 FT above as the traffic passed overhead. We received a 'monitor vertical speed' indication (red bars above). First Officer descended 2-300 FT to increase separation. Reported descent to ATC. No further incident.




Synopsis: ATC alerted an air carrier about traffic during vectors for EWR Runway 4R. With the traffic in sight and TCAS alerting the crew descended; so the traffic flew 400 FT overhead.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LSE.Airport, WI
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D LSE
ATC / advisory: Tower LSE
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: First Officer (FO) was flying and we requested RNAV to 31 due to stronger crosswinds on 36. Weather was CAVOK. Prior to our descent I briefed the chart regarding the numerous GPWS erroneous incidents that have occurred at this particular airport; I also briefed the cold temperature charts. We agreed to be especially vigilant to potential GPWS warnings and that we would act accordingly; i.e. immediately stop our descent if we encountered such message; then assess the situation. FO briefed the RNAV to 31; MSA and obstructions in the vicinity. We also talked about a recent email regarding LSE which also specifically discussed the numerous GPWS occurrences pilots have had there.Upon our descent to La Crosse airport we had to respond to a GPWS warning 'pull up' message. The warning occurred while we were descending at a steep angle of attack from about 6;000 feet to I believe 2;500 feet to catch up the RNAV Flight Path Angle (FPA). We had been cleared for the visual approach and also cleared to land by tower. Upon receiving the 'pull up' warning FO did not alter his angle of descent and I had to firmly state 'stop your descent' 'pull up'. We stopped our descent and reestablished our approach shortly after the FAF with no further warnings. We debriefed the approach at the gate. FO; who is still on probation; was descending too steeply to 'catch' the FPA because we were left a bit high by approach control. Because we had terrain in the vicinity the GPWS went off. Over correcting actions led to the warning. Also; the FO should have immediately stopped his descent upon receiving the warning message as we had briefed earlier. Crew members should request full approaches from center and not accept visual approaches even if they have the airport in sight.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain reported a new First Officer established a high descent rate between 6;000 feet and about 2;500 feet on the LSE Runway 31 RNAV then was slow to arrest the descent after the EGPWS alerted PULL UP prior to the final approach fix.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Tower, NV
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing LAS on BOACH 8 from 26R. Climbing out on SID; and maintaining visual separation from preceding aircraft; I was hand flying and deviating upwind of wake. I overshot the 4800 ft. - 7000 ft. restriction prior to ROPPR and was advised of the overshoot by the First Officer several miles prior to ROPPR. Altitude was corrected prior to ROPPR. We were still with Tower at that point. The altitude window was set for FL190 as we were still on a climb via departure. So no audible altitude warning.I could have used CWS (Control Wheel Steering) to avoid the preceding aircraft wake while retaining VNAV for autopilot altitude control.


Second narrative: We were climbing out on the BOACH 8 Departure with the preceding aircraft in sight. Throughout the rotation and climbout; we were picking up the wake turbulence of the aircraft in front of us. The Captain was hand flying and elected to climb faster than normal to stay above their wake. As we were approaching ROPPR I was looking outside at the aircraft in front of us; and missed that we were quickly approaching the altitude restriction at ROPPR. Passing 6800 ft. MSL with a more than 3500 fpm climb; I called the altitude restriction at ROPPR. The Captain leveled the aircraft at 7400 ft. MSL and descended back to the 7000 ft. MSL altitude restriction.The departure and altitude restriction was thoroughly briefed prior to the flight. Other than maintaining my situational awareness; I believe that if we are hand flying and in VNAV we should still set the first hold-down restriction. Once the autopilot is turned on then we can set the top altitude of the climb via. I have been conditioned to listen for the 1000 ft. to go chime. However; I did notice the flight director cueing a level off and the autothrottles reducing the thrust; but by the time my brain registered why this was happening it was not quick enough to arrest the climb rate.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported overshooting an altitude restriction climbing out of LAS. A wake vortex encounter reportedly caused some distraction.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb up to cruise altitude; RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP EICAS message appeared. We ran the RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP QRH and Rudder System 1 came back online; Rudder System 2 did not. We notified Dispatch via radio. [The Dispatcher] could not get a hold of Maintenance Control; they tried a second time. We tried to relay the problem to our Dispatcher; however at that point they had a difficult time hearing us. The [Maintenance Controller] who answered said he was 'busy' and told [Dispatch] to tell us to air return. We confirmed with [our Dispatcher] 3 times via ACARS if they really wanted us to return. At this point; they confirmed it and we were only 30 minutes away from the destination airport. We checked to see if we had enough fuel to return. We landed without incident; swapped aircraft and headed back out towards destination.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer experiences a RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP EICAS message during climb. QRH procedures are accomplished but only Rudder System 1 is returned to normal operation. Maintenance indicates that the crew should return to the departure airport; which is accomplished; although at the time they are closer to their destination.
Date: 201308
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 17C using the ILS 17C as back-up. ATC cleared a 737 to join the final in front of us with approx 4 NM separation and asked us to maintain 180 knots to 5 NM final. We declined that instruction and told Approach that we could maintain 170 to 5 NM final (based on ability to slow and our perception that we were overtaking the traffic in front of us). ATC modified their instructions. Configuration at 5 NM was 170 KTS; Flaps 20; gear up - on glideslope; autopilot and autothrottles engaged. At about 5 NM/2;000 FT AGL; Captain asked for gear down to begin to slow. As the gear extended we encountered wake turbulence from the 737 4 NM in front of us resulting in a sharp roll to the right (about 20 degrees). Captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; leveled the wings and asked for Flaps 25 (now about 1;800 FT AGL). Speed was approx 160-165 knots with some speed deviation (+ or - 5 knots) due to thermal activity.When I selected Flaps 25; we immediately received a TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message and saw the TE FLAPS caution light illuminated. Our first response was to verify that the flap handle was actually in the 25 detent - it was. The flap position indicator indicated 20 degrees. Our first instinct was to initiate a go-around; but very quickly changed our mind and decided that the safest course of action was to simply land in our current configuration. Captain stated his opinion that we should simply land; and I concurred with that decision. I provided Captain with a Flaps 20 reference speed and he adjusted his speed accordingly and we landed without further incident. Touchdown and rollout were normal and we left the flaps and flap handle where they were (parked with flaps extended and gave the airplane to Maintenance in that configuration).


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported wake vortex encounter from preceding B737 on approach to DFW resulting in a sharp roll.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Level at 6000 ft on the JIIMS2 RNAV Arrival DASHA Transition; between JIIMS and WOJIK fixes. Received a TCAS RA to descend; no sooner than I started the descent the RA command immediately changed to a climb. We climbed to about 6400 ft before returning to our assigned altitude of 6000 ft. I briefly saw the traffic before focusing all my attention to following the TCAS commands. TCAS maneuver was performed per SOPs. ATC never said a word to us before; during; or after the event. It appeared they had a lot to say to the other aircraft though. Both aircraft were under ATC control with the same controller at the time of the incident. Other aircraft either changed altitude or turned the wrong direction creating a reduction in separation with us.As long as there are at least two aircraft in the air at the same time this type of event may occur again. Know and follow SOPs.




Synopsis: A heavy jet Captain on the PHL JIMMS 2 RNAV Arrival took evasive action to a momentarily TCAS RA DESCEND command followed by a CLIMB command. The climb from the other IFR traffic was to about 6400 ft before returning to 6000 ft.