elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Other school
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On Date; we experienced a runway excursion event at ZZZ. I was the CFI on board and I was providing flight training to a student pilot working towards their private pilot certificate. The excursion occurred on our initial takeoff out of the airport. The student pilot was initially on the controls and we were attempting a soft field takeoff on Runway XXR which is 3;XXX feet long by XX feet wide. Everything was normal up until we began to rotate which was around 40 kts. Upon rotation; we had too much aft elevator pressure causing our nose to pitch up to around 16 degrees. Along with this high pitch; too much right rudder input was made causing a yaw and roll to the right. We departed the right side of the runway and then we reduced the power to idle and slowed down in a straight line. There were no injuries and only minor damage to the propeller and skidplate. A few notable factors that I think attributed to this incident are as follows: The excessive pitch up reduced our visibility over the cowling and prevented us from noticing the extent to which we were drifting off to the right. The reduction of left wind correction during the takeoff roll. And the application of too much right rudder causing a further drift to the right. As for corrective action to prevent similar situations in the future: As a CFI I could improve my defensive positioning in a way to prevent excessive pitch and rudder inputs. I can set more strict personal standards in when to take over flight controls as well as making sure to be more distinctive in taking controls. And I can improve my ground instruction by providing more distinct visual references for students to look for when making control inputs. Overall; this was an unfortunate situation but I do look forward to learning from this mistake and helping to ensure others don't fall into the same situation.




Synopsis: PA-28 Flight Instructor reported excessive pitch up and right rudder input by the student resulted in a runway excursion during takeoff.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LGB.Tower, CA
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: Tower LGB
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was on final for Runway 30 and Aircraft Y was on final for Runway 25L. The aircraft were a tie for the intersection. The CIC told LC1 to watch her intersection with more than enough time. LC1 didn't send Aircraft Y on final for Runway 25L around until it was well over pavement of the runway and still an issue with the landing Aircraft X. The closest proximity was about 500 feet laterally and 50 feet vertically. When the airman complained; The LC1 stated that she didn't think it was very close. Refresher with the controller on LC1 about acceptable and safe separation of the intersection.




Synopsis: LGB Controller describes an operational error because a Local Controller did not send the slower aircraft around until it was already past the threshold.
Date: 201707
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While reviewing the paperwork before the flight; I noticed the aircraft had a lost cell phone in its maintenance history. A passenger reported they dropped an iPhone behind the sidewall panel at seat 38F near the floor. When the aircraft landed in ZZZZ; maintenance attempted to find the phone to no avail; and the aircraft returned to the US. Finally; Maintenance removed a cargo access panel and found the phone. My flight was 2 days later on this aircraft; but I feel it is unsafe to dispatch aircraft with known 'lost' phones. It seems this is Company's policy; as a similar event happened on a flight I was to fly; but the mechanic did find the phone before I had a chance to refuse the aircraft. I was told by the Operations Manager that Company deems it an acceptable risk. Does the union have an official position on this growing 'problem'? I was asked by the union to submit a report regarding this issue to help facilitate a discussion with the safety board. In light of exploding batteries and obvious security issues; I personally would not fly any aircraft with a lost phone. I understand there are a lot of electronic devices in the cargo holds; however we have fire suppression for those areas. This particular phone was behind the cargo hold; not in it.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported concern regarding company policy regarding cell phones which are lost/left on aircraft and not recovered before the aircraft is dispatched for subsequent flights.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: B737 was given clearance for takeoff and we were instructed by tower to line up and wait on 8R.  Upon the B737 rotating; we were cleared for takeoff.  Within 100 feet after rotation; we experienced wake turbulence that caused the airplane to bank 20 degrees to the left and the shaker went off momentarily.  The Captain initiated the proper recovery and the issue was resolved quickly.  We then continued with normal climb procedures and no other issues occurred during the duration of the flight.  The Captain was using a normal pitch rate prior to the wake turbulence event and I was just about to call 'positive rate' due to a positive trend vector/rate of climb when the issue was experienced.  Undesired aircraft state due to wake turbulence.  ATC in Atlanta likes to keep traffic closely spaced during departures and arrivals.  So we need to be alert of what type of aircraft is in front of us as well as make sure we feel 100% comfortable with the spacing.  If at anytime we feel uncomfortable; we should slow it down or even tell tower we need additional time for wake turbulence avoidance.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reports encountering wake turbulence just after takeoff from ATL in trail of a B737.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Green LED taxi lights are far too bright at DEN; in this specific case; Taxiway CN by 7W nearing Mike Taxiway. The lights are so bright it floods the cockpit and blinds the Crew making it impossible to see beyond the lights right in front of you. This same thing happens on the runway centerline LEDs at DEN and other cities; far too bright. Reduce brightness or go back to old-fashioned lighting. Green LED taxi lighting [is] extremely bright causing windscreen visibility problem.

Callback: The reporter stated that LED intensity did not appear consistent because; while all the lights are very bright; some appear brighter viewed on straight segments; but others are brighter in turns. The LED section on 7E at Mike is dimmer than some other lights when viewed straight on. The reporter did ask ATC about the brightness and was told the LEDs are not adjustable. The reporter did also compare these LED to ABQ's lights which have recently been upgraded and some lights are now adjustable. The DEN lights should be also; they are a safety issue.



Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported the DEN green LED taxiway and white LED runway centerline lights are too bright and create visual interference which prevent pilots from seeing beyond the non dimmable lights.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Non-rev passenger cleaned her seat area with bleach. I smelled the chemical. Number three notified the Captain and the number one Flight Attendant. They called for the customer service. The customer service representative talked with the passenger and had the bleach removed from the aircraft. Flight continued on to ZZZ without any further incident.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger cleaned the seat with bleach.  Bleach was removed from aircraft and flight departed.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Holding Pattern
Airspace: Class E ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was providing OJTI on YQG/DRE combined.  The trainee was certified DRE and was due for a check ride the following day at YQG.  I've never had to sit with this particular trainee before.  We were in and out of the hold for both CLE and DTW.  It was evident that we would be holding at least 10-12 aircraft for DTW and a handful for CLE.  There were very few over flights or departures scheduled; I opted to leave the sectors combined for volume while training. During the entire session the trainee consistently placed aircraft into head-on situations while putting them at the same altitude.  The trainee refused to use positive control even as I instructed trainee to; and appeared to be at least three clearances behind at all times.  I had to intervene and take over control of the frequency numerous times; at least three of which were to fix an imminent traffic situation.  The trainee's lack of a plan and poor execution of led to a unorganized and more often than not unsafe sector environment.  There were no airspace violations or losses I'm aware of; due to the work of myself and the D-side. I would normally just call this a bad training session; debrief and move on.  I imagine if the trainee was not already certified at the sector I would have intervened much sooner and not let the spacing coming out of the hold become such an issue.  None of the above listed problems occurred at the sector trainee was training at; all happened at the sector trainee already had.  I let the problem go further than I normally would to see if trainee had the ability to recover.  I shutter to think what would have happened if trainee were sitting there by herself.  Trainee created numerous situations that would have been either NMAC's or at the least TCAS events.




Synopsis: ZOB Controller instructing describes a situation where the developmental is working a combined sector. The developmental is certified on one of the combined sectors where all the problems occur. The developmental has aircraft head-on at the same altitude; then refuses to use positive control. The instructor fixes the problems so there were no losses of separation.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During climbout and after establishing initial contact with Approach; I had made two more replies to their queries (IDENT; and Radar Contact). While performing my cockpit duties there was a momentary break in radio chatter. Upon immediate investigation; I realized that the frequency box on the Garmin GTN 650 had 'flip-flopped' back to CTAF (122.7). I immediately switched the frequency back and heard the last three alpha/numeric identifiers of my call sign. I answered this call and was handed off to the next successive Controller for the route. Prior to the loss of communications I had isolated the crew from the passengers on the audio panel mounted above the Garmin GTN 650. It could have been at this point that I may have inadvertently touched the 'touch screen' of the GTN 650 which could have 'flip-flopped' the frequency.




Synopsis: An IFR BE-55 pilot became temporarily NORDO after he inadvertently selected the CTAF departure airport frequency on his Garmin GTN 650 touch screen frequency selector.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: After establishing communication with the Tug Driver I released the brakes and was cleared to start engine 2. Roughly 4 seconds after beginning the engine start sequence; the Tug Driver requested we abort the engine start. I conducted the engine start abort memory items and then called for the checklist. After completing the checklist I asked what the reason for the abort was. The Tug driver mentioned that the wrong 'plate' was attached to the tug and was too small for the Q400. The tug driver didn't want us to have an engine spinning as they tried to correct the issue. I thanked the tug driver for making the right call and keeping our operation safe.I've noticed a large pressure across our system; at all levels of the operation; to turn planes as quick as possible to have no delays; and if we do have a delay then to start pointing fingers at whomever is to fault. After such a challenging season with our performance; I understand the push to get our operation back on track; but I think that pressure is being applied in the wrong places and safety is starting to be sacrificed for the zero delay metric. This tug driver noticed something was wrong and spoke up; potentially saving us from another safety event; but the plate being used should be verified before we get to that point. We can focus on hitting zero delay or we can focus on doing things right; usually one parameter will bow to the other. My recommendation would be to make safety the uncompromising priority again.


Second narrative: During the pushback process; the captain began the engine start sequence on the number two engine after being cleared by the pushback team. Immediately after commencing the start sequence; the captain was told by the tug driver to stop the start. The engine start was aborted. The ground crew said they called for the start to be stopped because the wrong plate was attached to the tug for the Q400 and the crew would have to disconnect the tug. The crew ran the Engine Start Abort checklist successfully; completed engine start; and pushed back from the gate once the rampers had correctly configured the tug.Ensure the correct plate is on the tug prior to commencing capture of an airplane.


Synopsis: Q400 flight crew reported that the ground crew asked them to abort engine start due to an incorrect tow bar attached.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LHD.Airport, AK
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D LHD
ATC / advisory: Tower LHD
Second aircraft: Globemaster (C-17)
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was returning to Lake Hood strip when I contacted LHD Tower. They informed me of a C17 on approach to Elmendorf AFB; caution wake turbulence. At that point I called the Tower and requested a 360 for separation which is standard practice entering LHD airspace. I made a 180 and flew north for a bit admiring the view of Denali then continued the turn toward LHD. I crossed the north shore of Cook Inlet just west of Point Mackenzie at 1100 ft; 3.6 miles behind the C17 according to radar data. About mid-channel I hit the wake turbulence from the C17. It was the most violent turbulence I have ever experienced. May have lasted for a second but caused substantial damage to the aircraft. Both bottom wing skins are wrinkled and spars are cracked. I was light; 1 passenger and 20 gallon gas onboard. If I was at gross I don't believe we would be having this discussion. I have been flying out of LHD for over thirty years without incident. Is the C17 to blame or does the approach need to be changed; I don't know.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported the aircraft was damaged following a wake turbulence encounter with a C-17 in the vicinity of EDF.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flight was conducted as normal; with nothing unusual to note. Prior to pushback; the Captain and I received paperwork for notification of hazardous goods (dry ice) and we verified it was within limits; and also recorded on our load sheet. Once we landed and parked; the Captain and I noticed an individual on the ramp with a clipboard; out of standard ground personnel attire. During my post flight inspection; I said hello; and continued my inspection around the aircraft. A few minutes later; I was deplaning in the jet bridge; and this individual approached me; and identified themselves as an FAA Inspector; asking if they could see a copy of our load sheet. After providing them with the load sheet; and the notification of hazardous goods paperwork; the inspector informed us UN3373 was labeled and onboard the aircraft; but not accounted for in the paperwork. The rampers in [departure station] only documented dry ice onboard; and not UN3373; both were within the same package. We immediately went down to Operations; and made sure the company was aware of this mistake; and contacted the appropriate individuals responsible for Safety and Hazardous Materials. The FAA Inspector; who specialized in Hazardous Materials Safety; informed us that a majority of the time when dry ice is onboard; there is a good chance UN3373 is also in the same package. In the future; whenever I see a notification of dry ice or UN3373; I will make sure to ask the rampers to double check the package and see if [they] are listed together. Additionally; during my preflight inspection; I will try to visually verify the transported materials; and see if they are labeled correctly on our load reports; and hazardous materials paperwork.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 First Officer reported they operated a flight with UN3373 aboard; a restricted item; without it being listed on their hazardous goods manifest.