elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Other Preflight planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Logbook Entry; Procedure
Primary problem: Logbook Entry

Narrative: While flight planning crew noticed a sign off about the water service door being cycled by the crew. At 5'10' this reporter could not reach said door and with just under 4% of the population is reported over 6'3'; (guesstimate of size required to reach) one must assume the pilots could not reach the door without some assistance. This is forbidden under FOM (Flight Operations Manual) guidance Pilot Accomplished Tasks. Just want to ensure [Operations Management] is not requesting actions of pilots that are forbidden.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported the aircraft logbook appeared to indicate a previous flight crew had operated the water service door which is prohibited by the Flight Operations Manual.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MKC.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MCI
ATC / advisory: TRACON MCI
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on the JHAWK Arrival and had the flight plan and the arrival program in our FMS. I had the arrival displayed on my iPad and the other pilot had the ILS displayed on his iPad. As we approached the NOAHS Intersection; my iPad battery went dead. By the time the other pilot switched his iPad to the arrival; our FMS started turning to the airport rather than us switching to heading mode and flying a heading of 010. Approach noticed the turn in progress and gave a correctional turn and the flight continued with vectors to a visual approached. While the information that can be used on an iPad reduces the paperwork and weight carried; the time of battery life is not good on long trips so we will charge up the battery on our iPad's en route.


Second narrative: We were on JHAWK Arrival and had the flight plan arrival in our FMS. The pilot not flying had arrival on his iPad and the pilot flying had the approach on his iPad. As we approached NOAHS Intersection the pilot not flying iPad battery died and by the time the pilot flying was able to switch from the approach to the arrival page the FMS turned the plane toward MCI instead of the heading of 010. Approached noticed our errant turn and told us to turn 010. We now have chargers in the cockpit to ensure battery performance of both iPad's.


Synopsis: CE560 flight crew reports an iPad battery failure at an inopertune time during the JHAWK arrival to MKC; resulting in a track deviation after NOAHS.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout through roughly 13;000 feet; we felt multiple vibrations/shudders along with an accompanying HYD PRESS ON light. After discussing various possible causes - gear; flaps; speed brakes; etc.; the Pilot Monitoring could see that the speed brakes on the right side were partially deploying and retracting intermittently. After getting a weather update at ZZZ we requested to return. Approach and landing were uneventful. No emergency declared.




Synopsis: Cessna 525 Captain reported an intermittent partial deployment of the speedbrakes during climbout; resulting in an air return to the departure airport.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Approach Coupler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were flying the ILS 19 approach. We had been level for a few minutes at 2;000 MSL with the autopilot on and cleared for the ILS. The ILS approach was armed and the plane captured the course normally. We were configured with 10 degrees of flaps and told to slow to 150 KIAS. While slowing and preparing to finish configuring; the aircraft began a climb while on the autopilot. It departed 2;000 MSL and appeared to be climbing up to capture the glideslope. This is abnormal behavior and the autopilot should have maintained 2;000 MSL while the glideslope descended for capture. The monitoring pilot called out that the plane was climbing. The autopilot was clicked off by the flying pilot and a descent back to 2;000 MSL initiated. After the flight; the monitoring pilot stated the climb onset rapidly and rate was about 1;000 feet per minute. The altitude was at least 300 feet high above the cleared 2;000 MSL before the autopilot was clicked off and the aircraft flown manually back to 2;000 MSL. Then we did a normal capture of the ILS glideslope manually. The controller did not comment about the altitude and we continued the approach safely to a landing. We said nothing to the controller either as the airspace was extremely congested.




Synopsis: A Falcon 2000 Captain reported an uncommanded climb from 2;000 feet to capture the ILS glideslope from below; so the autopilot was disconnected and returned to the cleared altitude then continued the ILS approach manually.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout the number one engine overheat illuminated. I was the PM. We complied with the QRH procedures and declared an emergency. I completed the checklist up until the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist and then transferred control; so that I could conduct the landing. In the rush I inadvertently calculated the landing weight incorrectly; which resulted in an overweight landing. I did not discover the error until after we landed and I talked to the Dispatcher. The actual landing weight was calculated by Dispatch as 128;300 pounds.I had calculated 125;300 pounds. Because of the proximity to the landing field; I only had time to notify Base Operation to relay to Dispatch of our situation and that we were returning to [departure airport.] Dispatch did not have time to contact us airborne to relay the landing data; which we had already calculated. The computation confusion came about as everything was very rushed while trying to complete the QRH procedures and prepare for landing in a very short amount of time. I discussed the issue with the Dispatcher and entered the overweight landing in the logbook. I also discussed the issue with Maintenance Control.


Second narrative: The engine overheated on climbout at about 200 feet to 300 feet. We referenced to the QRH and shut down the engine. We declared an emergency and returned to [departure airport.]


Synopsis: B737NG flight crew experienced a left engine overheat shortly after takeoff. They shut down the engine per QRH and declared an emergency.  A safe but modest overweight landing occurred due to an inadvertent miscalculation.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Skin
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Our Air Carrier's ZZZ Line Maintenance group NEEDS TO BE REMINDED OF FAA REQUIREMENTS TO NOT FALSIFY MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY ON OUR AIRCRAFT. During the walk around at ZZZ; my First Officer discovered five missing fasteners on the fuselage in various locations. Maintenance request write-ups were sent via ACARS and ZZZ Line Maintenance was notified by radio. We offered to have the First Officer come downstairs to point out the missing fasteners. Soon afterwards; customer service said maintenance was done and closed up the cabin doors. We received a new Maintenance Release; stating that all missing fasteners were replaced. Based on prior negative experience with ZZZ Line Maintenance; I decided to go downstairs after we arrived in ZZZ1 to see if all the fasteners had really been replaced. Unfortunately; one of the missing fasteners on the left side of the fuselage near the center tank sump drain was still missing and had not been replaced as stated in the Maintenance Release. I suspect that the hole with the missing fastener probably doesn't have a nut plate; and to avoid delay somebody signed-off the fastener as having been replaced when in fact it could not. I have heard of and personally experienced a bad attitude from some of the AMTs employed by our company who scoff at us when we write-up missing fasteners. It is clear they view missing fasteners as no big deal and something that should be overlooked in the interest of not delaying flights. Our maintenance personnel should instead be reminded that the best way to avoid delays is to complete work on our aircraft correctly and completely AT ALL TIMES. In the future I will stay down on the ramp at ZZZ to make sure the work is completed correctly and so I do not inadvertently fly an unairworthy aircraft. I was unable to write-up the still missing fastener using the ACARS; but contacted ZZZ1 Line Maintenance by phone and told them about it. They said they would take care of it. Hopefully so. Upon arrival at ZZZ1; hole with missing fastener clearly shows. Airworthiness Documentation issue. Maintenance Inspection Not Completed.




Synopsis: A Captain reports on the need to remind their Line Maintenance group of the FAA requirements to not falsify maintenance activity on company aircraft. After writing-up five missing fasteners on the lower fuselage of their B757-200 aircraft; only four were replaced. But the new Maintenance Release stated all five had been installed.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Ramp
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other towing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I was the brake rider on A/C X from Spot XX at ZZZ hangar line in front of Hangar XX. Tug driver was following line that is on ground which is painted and not labeled. Came to find out that is the wrong line; which is painted for CRJ and EMB regional jets. Came to find out this information out because Aircraft X  right wingtip came in contact of hangar door.Wrong Improper line placement and not labeled. Repaint lines with proper identification on them. Also repaint all lines so you can see them in the night properly because all line are faded. improve lighting outside on hangar line to make it more visible. Remove lines that are not needed


Second narrative: Maintenance was moving Aircraft X from Spot XX at ZZZ hanger line in front of Hangar XX. Tug driver was following line that is on ground coming out of Spot XX; which is not labeled. After the event management told us that the line was used for CRJ and EMB regional jets.The yellow line coming out of Spot XX did not provide enough clearance for the aircraft winglets of a Aircraft X to clear the Hangar XX doors.The line needs to be removed or labeled for the proper aircraft.


Synopsis: Maintenance reported wrong lead in lines resulted in confusion and an aircraft was towed into contact with a hangar door resulting in winglet damage.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Pitts S-1 All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I am the pilot/owner of Pitts S1S; Aircraft X. Upon returning to ZZZ from a short VFR pleasure flight; I was cleared for a visual approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ. The approach and landing were normal. However; immediately after touchdown; the right main tire chattered and squealed as if the brake was locked up. The aircraft began pulling hard to the right and I countered with left rudder input in an attempt to maintain directional control of the aircraft. To no avail; the aircraft continued right and as it slowed it began a clockwise ground loop. The right main tire lifted off the ground and the left wingtip and outboard side of the left aileron scrapped the ground as the aircraft came to a stop with the tail wheel about three feet off the runway and the nose pointing southbound.Tower radioed me regarding my status and I told them I was OK and will attempt to taxi the aircraft clear of the runway. I taxied the aircraft a very short distance onto taxiway; shutdown and secured the aircraft systems. I egressed the aircraft and inspected the airplane. The right main tire was flat and the tail wheel assembly was damaged and bent from the side load during the ground loop. I was not injured during this event. Subsequently; ZZZ aircraft operations met me and we proceeded to transport the aircraft back to my hanger after talking to FAA and NTSB personnel which the Tower had contacted.




Synopsis: Pitts pilot reported indications of a main wheel brake locking up on landing; causing a ground loop.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After push and disconnect; the towbar came loose from the tug. At that time; I was in the middle of the after start flow and left the APU on. It was not noticed until later in the flight. This in turn led to Maintenance write-up due to fuel totalizer disagreement which was caused by the APU fuel burn enroute.




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported Auxiliary Power Unit was left running during flight resulting in higher fuel burn.
Date: 202109
Aircraft: B737 MAX 8
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was very concerned to read a pilot bulletin a short time back about the intercom issue on the Max 8's where if certain switches are left in the wrong position the passengers in the back can hear the pilot's conversation up front. I know the easy answer is to make sure the switches are in the correct position. However we all forget things; and it is just a matter of time until someone forgets and a career or two are potentially ended as well as the airline put into a difficult PR position based upon a thought to be private conversation being overheard by a passenger. Is there any plan to have this system permanently disabled? If so; when might that occur? Any information you can pass on regarding this would be greatly appreciated. This is a topic of common concern in conversation on the flight deck amongst pilots.




Synopsis: Captain reported concerns over the cockpit/cabin intercommunication system allowing crew conversations to be heard by passengers.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 1000
Aircraft: B727-200
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff upon gear retraction GPWS sounded 'Whoop whoop pull up terrain' followed by erroneous airspeed and altimeter indications on both #1 and #2 airspeed and altimeters. Also standby altimeter appeared to be unreliable; about 3;000 feet error. ATC advised mode C on transponder was also in error so stopped squawk on Mode C.[We then] asked to divert to a nearby alternate. ATC provided needed vectors and separation. During final approach phase lost most of A hydraulic system but were able to extend landing gear normally.At 1;000 feet GPWS again gave warnings - 'Too low - Flaps' but we were properly configured and on glide slope. [We] made a routine landing [but] engine #1 and #3 thrust reverser failed to open.




Synopsis: B727 First Officer reported that multiple system failures resulted in a diversion.