elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAB.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C DAB
ATC / advisory: Tower DAB
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was doing my CFII training with another instructor this evening when an issue occurred. I was positioned right seat; as he was left acting as safety pilot and PIC. We were cleared for ILS 7L by Daytona Approach. Daytona Approach tells us to slow from 100 KTS to 90 KTS for sequence. We complied and slowed the aircraft to 90 KTS. We were instructed to switch to Daytona Beach Tower. We established contact with tower and were cleared low approach for RWY 7L. Localizer and Glideslope were centered throughout the approach. TCAS warning system went off inside the aircraft to warn us of a nearby airplane. We could not see the airplane because he was in our blind spot (high wing airplane). My safety pilot tried calling Tower to ask what our instructions were and where the traffic was. At that time; tower frequency was blocked by multiple aircraft calling at once. At roughly 500 feet MSL; I was instructed to look outside by my safety pilot to find a low wing airplane to our 9 to 10 o'clock position at same altitude; converging at a very scary close distance. My safety pilot took evasive action and dove towards the ground initially to avoid an immediate collision. We both thought we heard orders 'side step to the right' by tower as multiple aircraft were still stepping on each other. We both agreed to turn right 20 degrees and level off momentarily. After turning right 20 degrees and started an initial climb; we find another aircraft on final for 7R approach at the same altitude not far from our current position. We both decided to split the difference of the two runways and headed 070 between Runway 7L and Runway 7R; climbing at Vx airspeed to get as much altitude as possible. At a safe altitude (1200 feet MSL); we switched back to Daytona Approach because tower frequency was still clogged up with radio calls. We exited Class C airspace to the south and headed to home base.


Second narrative: Just unnerving that if we had done exactly as we were instructed and had not had traffic collision avoidance in our aircraft there is a good chance my student and I would not be here right now.


Synopsis: Two instructors working together reported an NMAC on approach to DAB. Reporters were critical of ATC handling.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BED.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D BED
ATC / advisory: Tower BED
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were at 1;800 feet on a wide right base for Runway 23 at BED when we had a near midair with a drone. The drone was about 1;750 feet and within several hundred feet possibly up to 1;000 feet horizontally away from us. The drone was black with either orange or red blades. It had at least two blades but possibly more. It was roughly 30 inches long and 8 inches high. I pressed the IDENT button and immediately reported it to Tower. Upon landing successfully; Ground asked for more information (color; size; and my contact information).




Synopsis: PC-12 Captain reported an airborne conflict with a UAV on initial approach to BED.
Date: 202002
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Found two laptops with internal Lithium Polymer batteries that were undeclared.




Synopsis: Airline Ramp personnel reported two lithium powered laptops without required shipper documentation for air transport.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PSC.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Other Holding Pattern
Airspace: Class E PSC
ATC / advisory: TRACON PSC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the OJT Instructor on the sector. Aircraft X requested pop up IFR and to hold. The trainee issued holding instructions (per pilot request) over the VOR on a radial. I heard it was the 310 degree radio but the pilot was actually requesting the 130 degree radial. After two turns in holding the developmental noticed the aircraft entering a 5700 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude(MVA) so he climbed the aircraft to 6000 feet. No further incident. The developmental is far along in hours and I was wanting to let him work the position unbothered so I was sitting and monitoring the adjacent scope. I wasn't worried about MVA because I heard 310 radial and that would keep the aircraft toward lower MVAs. Expectation bias and hear back error on my part. I should have more vigilant involvement during training.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: A TRACON Controller instructing a trainee observed the trainee allow an aircraft to fly below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Yesterday I had my first experience dealing with a contaminated runway under our new performance system. It did not work well because of the lack of runway condition information.Once we left the gate we were at the mercy of ATC to provide the information; but PHL only wanted to give us braking action reports. Runway contamination was not reported on ATIS. When I pressed ATC to obtain Runway 9L conditions they asked the next landing aircraft for a report! This was after sunset; by the way.During my phone briefing with Dispatch we knew runway contamination was a likely issue and the dispatcher said 'good luck with that'. He said to 'look the runway over and stick a ruler out there and let me know the conditions and I will send you the performance data'. After takeoff I commented on my frustration with this new system on ACARS and he replied 'tell me about it; we are not impressed with the new way at all here'.A landing aircraft reported the runway 'wet' so we obtained WET data and departed (pretty dubious report as it turned out.)Am I missing something about how this contaminated runway system works? How runway condition information is obtained? Aren't the airport authorities supposed to provide accurate up to date information to ATC; and for ATC to pass it along to us? Is this problem isolated to PHL? Why isn't current runway condition data available directly to Dispatch?




Synopsis: Widebody Airbus Captain reported he was unhappy with the new company procedure for contaminated runway computations.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Valve
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing roll
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the landing rollout; I accidentally shut down an operating engine while attempting to deploy the thrust reverser. The left thrust reverser was MEL'd for this flight. During the landing rollout with all three landing gear on the ground I; instead of reaching forward and engaging the operating thrust reverser; reached down and used the shutdown/fuel cutoff switches and pulled thrust levers back into shutoff position in a manner used on previous aircraft to deploy a thrust reverser. During an abnormal situation (landing with one thrust reverser inoperative) I believe I reverted to [a] technique acquired on previous aircraft. There was no loss of aircraft control experienced during this incident and flight continued normally to the gate without incident. The pilot not flying was unaware that this happened until after the fact.


Second narrative: Pilot flying notified me after we exited the runway that he inadvertently shut down an operating engine while attempting [to] deploy the one operative thrust reverser. (Left thrust reverser was MEL'd) there was no loss of control. Flight proceeded without incident to the gate.


Synopsis: The Captain of a CRJ-700 inadvertently shut down an operating engine during landing roll; perhaps reverting to techniques learned on a previous aircraft on which he was qualified.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During cruise at FL350 something impacted the aircraft shattering the outer pain (LW1) of the windscreen on the Captain's side of the cockpit. I saw a brief shadow of something above the airplane an instant before it hit the aircraft. We accomplished the QRH items for windshield damage. The pressurization was normal and I still had adequate visibility through the bottom half of the windscreen. No other abnormalities were noted at the time. We notified ATC that we had a broken windscreen and that everything else seemed to be normal. The Controller asked us if we needed any assistance and we said no; but requested to slow to Mach 0.70. We then notified Dispatch via ACARS and told them of our status and asked them to coordinate with Maintenance Control to see if they had any other suggestions. Maintenance agreed that we had done all we could and Dispatch gave us a weather update for our destination and also for [several other nearby airports] should we need to divert if the condition worsened. We flew a slower than normal descent into our destination but other than that; the arrival and landing were without incident. I don't know if any other aircraft were in our vicinity above us or if weather balloons were in the area.




Synopsis: B737-300 Captain reported an unidentified foreign object impacted his windshield; shattering the top half. They slowed to Mach .70 and landed safely at destination.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp SLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We had just finished the before start check; and I selected the Ramp channel on the Audio Control Panel to talk to the ground crew. As soon as I selected the Ramp channel; a painfully loud feedback noise began playing through my headset. I turned down the Ramp Audio; and then tried to tell the ramp to get another headset; as this one was non-functional. I was under the impression the Ramp Personnel were adjusting the headset. As soon as the feedback cleared; I notified the ramp and asked if we were set to push. All seemed normal when I told the tug driver we were cleared to push. After we had completed about half the push; I noticed the left wing walker was closer to me than the wingtip; which I thought was odd. I only realized what was going on when the airplane stopped and the ramp agent who had been in my sight line started giving he hand signals. I tried to raise the tug driver with no success. I made signals to the Ramp Agent to initiate headset communication. The ramp agents responded by disconnecting the towbar; giving me the all clear signal and walking away; leaving the aircraft without confirming that the parking brake was set (it was not since I was still trying to establish headset communication; or that they were in fact clear to disconnect.This was unsafe for a number of reasons:1. Company policy regarding a face to face briefing if a headset inop push is required to occur. The ramp initiated a push without me even being aware that they had disconnected the headset; therefore; no such briefing took place.2. They disconnected without any confirmation from the Flight Deck that it was OK to do so. Initially when they disconnected the towbar; the brakes were not set on the aircraft; allowing it to potentially roll without warning. 3. There was absolutely no effort made by SLC ops to find another headset or address the issue. It is impossible to follow company procedure and SOPs when you are unaware that there is a problem.Ops needs to be more aware of what is required when a headset is inoperative; and that communication with the flight deck is critical. This situation with a differently sloped ramp or high wind could have very easily resulted in severe aircraft damage and even more seriously; injury to company personnel.




Synopsis: Captain reported improper communication procedures by the pushback ground crew after experiencing a tug driver headset malfunction.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We] were working on the LH (Left Hand) engine on Aircraft X troubleshooting the Left Engine Fire loop 2 issue. We found that the LH Engine Fire loop wiring for Loop 1 fire loop from the pylon connector to the  loop 2; connected to the wrong fire loop. Loop 1 wiring was/is connected to Fire loop system Number 2; wiring for loop 2 system for the fire loop from the pylon connector to the Number 2 loop is connected to the wrong fire loop. Loop 2 wiring is connected to fire loops system Number 1.




Synopsis: Maintenance technician reported that an engine fire warning loop was improperly installed; causing a safety hazard.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight landed and taxied to the gate. Aircraft stopped abeam the gate waiting to be marshaled into the gate. Galley truck observed initially stopped to give way to the aircraft then proceeded to cross the VSR (Vehicle Service Road) when the aircraft stopped short of the VSR waiting for the green light. The galley truck started to cross the VSR when aircraft was given the green light and started to move forward. The pilots seeing the truck crossing stopped their movement to avoid a collision.




Synopsis: SFO Ramp Agent reported observing a truck cut in front of an aircraft as the flight received the green light to turn into the gate. The aircraft stopped to avoid a collision.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Upon doing my preflight checks- I noticed that the orange patch on Raft #2- in the overhead bin- had no mooring line cord under the patch at all. Upon investigation I found that the entire cord had either been pulled out or fallen out. There was no cord left under the orange patch. The pin it was attached to was also in a precarious position. Our current preflight- according to our manual - is only to verify it is present; not to check whether the mooring line is secure under the orange patch. This raft was within inches of inflating in the cabin had it been jostled or pushed in anyway. I have written about this before. I have attached pictures this time. My recommendation is that the preflight for the 10 person raft be changed to:Verify that the raft is present in the last overhead. ADD:That the mooring line is securely fastened underneath the orange patch in an ordered fashioned. If I would have had to access or use the 10 person raft on my flight; my success would have been low as the line would have most likely caught on something in the plane and deployed.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported Raft #2 in overhead bin missing mooring line and activation pin exposed posing a hazard of accidental inflation in the passenger cabin.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BDL.Airport, CT
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 2
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON BDL
Aircraft component: Weather Radar
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were doing the published missed approach for Runway 24 in BDL due to a windshear aural warning. We were lucky to be flying a new 767 aircraft with the newly installed predictive windshear equipment. This equipment is only installed on our newer 767 aircraft and that may have saved the day. Predictive windshear gave us approximately a 5 second head start on the windshear. Once the windshear aural stopped we cleaned up the aircraft and continued on the published missed approach. ATC assigned us 3000 feet and we maintained 3000 feet. The radar was attenuated and we could not see the next rain cell ahead. We entered a rain cell with moderate rain and turbulence which caused a sudden increase in airspeed from 230 knots to 275 knots. I pulled the thrust levers back to flight idle as the airspeed appeared that it might exceed 250 knots but the aircraft continued to accelerate to 275 knots. This brief momentary bump in airspeed only lasted a couple of seconds before the airspeed reduced back below 250 knots. I'm filing this report to document that the aircraft did exceed 250 KIAS below 10;000 feet while encountering windshear. I hope our company will install predictive windshear on all aircraft. I have replayed the scenario in my mind many times and the predictive windshear equipment played a huge role in the success our initial windshear recovery. Secondly; I've been on the 757 and 767 for 24 years and there has always been a problem with radar attenuation. I tried reducing the radar gain; but that did not help. Having the ability to have the Doppler Radar uplinked to the aircraft could be a lifesaving tool. We never saw either rain cell that we encountered due to radar attenuation.


Second narrative: [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].


Synopsis: The flight crew of a B767 that encountered a significant windshear event on arrival to BDL provided testimonials to the performance of the installed predictive windshear system.