elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback and while starting #2 engine (#3 and #1 engines already started); received a Level 1 Alert for L Hyd Pump Off for #3 eng; push back crew had already checked off and cleared; continued starting #2. Had to use hand signals to push back crew to reattach headset to notify of hyd problem as we consulted QRH; when alert went away. All hyd systems were normal and operating correctly so we continued. We had a short taxi to RWY 16R. After we were given clearance for takeoff; I glanced up at the overhead panel and discovered APU still running. This occurred prior to takeoff power applied and immediately cancelled takeoff clearance as we rolled to the next high speed taxiway to clear. After we cleared; we realized that we had never completed the After Start checklist due to the distraction of the temporary Hyd alert. After we debriefed as a crew and completed all checklists; we executed an uneventful takeoff The cause was a distraction; which shifted our attention away from executing a normal sequence of events.Don't let a low priority event interfere with current priorities. We should have completed the After Start checklist; then consulted maintenance; which in turn would have set us up for the expected sequence once we cleared maintenance off and proceeded.




Synopsis: The flight crew of an MD-11; distracted by a short duration hydraulic pump pressure warning during engine start; failed to complete the after start checklist during a short subsequent taxi to the active runway; and had to reject their takeoff at low speed when the realized their error.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Scheduled to operate in an aircraft with some questionable deferrals.  I expressed my concerns to the Duty Chief Pilot; Dispatcher; and Maintenance.  Upon raising the landing gear after takeoff; using LDG Gear Warn Sys 2; received ECAM warning message of: GEAR SYS 2 FAULT.  Followed ECAM and switched to Sys 1; thought it would be OK; above 10;000 MSL while accelerating to climb speed; received Gear Warning Overspeed message.  Both PFDs displayed red zipper and ECAM had overspeed warning message.  Was in conference with Dispatch and Maintenance immediately following; and consensus was this is not how the system should be working.  Lost direct contact with Dispatch via radio (weren't able to use ACARS at all-deferred prior to block out); received message from ARTCC to return to the departure airport.  Didn't declare an emergency; because it appeared the gear was retracted and would have in the event we didn't receive a gear green down and locked; which we did.  Landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: An A300 crew departed after expressing their concerns about the aircraft's airworthiness and immediately after takeoff the ECAM alerted GEAR SYS 2 FAULT with normal indications. While accelerating and troubleshooting the GEAR OVERSPEED alerted so the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Fatigue
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 60 NM west if our destination at approximately 15;000 FT; we lost all data from both FMGCs. We tried unsuccessfully to restore any or all data; leaving us with no traditional electronic navigation. We had good ADI information; complete with speed; VSI and altitude information. Because of the late arrival and long duty day; coupled with the potential for complications; I elected to declare an emergency with Approach Control. We received a heading direct to the airport and flew a visual approach. We were able to use stand-by navigation for ILS information and good PAPI information. The approach and landing was otherwise uneventful. Company Dispatch; Maintenance and Flight Operations Duty Manager were notified.


Second narrative: Only ECAM was CABIN PRESS-set manual landing altitude. Lost all navigation ability. Lost all non-precision and non-precision ability. Declared emergency. Approach vectored us to a visual approach and normal landing. STBY NAV selected on Captain's RMP; course and frequency set. Glideslope appeared unreliable. Unable to reload any info back into FMGC using the MCDU.


Synopsis: While descending on an arrival; both A320 FMGCs failed causing lost precision and non-navigation data; so an emergency was declared followed by a visual approach. The RMP frequency and course were set; but the glideslope appeared unreliable and the only ECAM displayed was CABIN PRESS.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Wind
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 1 hour into flight we received an ACARS message from Dispatch Center.  They were advised from ZZZ Ramp; we had 10 lithium batteries in position 11L per the Dangerous Goods (DG) paperwork.  We actually had 19 lithium batteries in position 11L.  Weight and Balance was correct because they were weighed in the container; just incorrect amount on the manifest. [The cause of the issue was the lack of] attention to detail. [Suggest] double checking paperwork.




Synopsis: B777-200 Captain reported that while airborne; Dispatch notified them of an incorrect number of Lithium-Ion batteries listed on flight crew hazmat documents.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; Fog; Rain; 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: P180 Avanti
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Departed TEB on the TEB8 we thought normally; after performing all required safety checks; checklists and briefing the departure. Prior to departure; ATC gave us the option of the RUUDY 4 or the TEB8. We discussed it briefly and since we were initially assigned the TEB8; we told ATC we wanted to stick with the TEB8. During the departure ATC mentioned something to the affect of; 'thought you were going to make your turn earlier;' then he handed us off to the next guy. He surprised us; so verified the FMS; which was correct and was what we were flying on autopilot; and continued on our way. Hearing no urgency in the man's voice; or hearing any conflicts on the radio or TCAS; we took it as FYI and continued.




Synopsis: P180 Captain describes a comment by ATC during the TEB8 departure. The comment was 'thought you were going to make your turn earlier' before the hand off to the next Controller.
Date: 201206
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at FL410 I noticed the pitch trim indicator was moving uncommanded. Normal cruise is around 0.3 units nose up. The trim was indicating about 2.5 units nose up and increasing. I notified my partner and he put both hands on the yoke and was prepared for the aircraft to rapidly pitch up. I was expecting the autopilot to disengage; it never did. The trim indication stopped at 8.0 units nose up. My partner disconnected the autopilot and said the airplane was trimmed and flying normally. He bumped the pitch trim switch and the indication immediately went back to a normal cruise setting of 0.3 units nose up. He then re-engaged the autopilot. We were both monitoring the trim indication and after about five to ten minutes the situation repeated. This time the trim indication stopped at 8.3 units nose up. My partner once again disengaged the auto pilot; bumped the pitch trim switch and the pitch trim indicator returned to a normal cruise value. At no time during these events did the clacker sound as would happen if the stab was commanded to move with the autopilot engaged. We reviewed the checklist and discussed what we would do if the attitude of the aircraft were too changed uncommanded. We contacted Maintenance via flight phone and were transferred to the ACP. We all were in agreement to continue to the destination and monitor the situation. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Looking back; it is my opinion that the stab never moved uncommanded. I believe this was just a faulty stab trim display indication. I believe that by verifying what the airplane was doing before rushing into memory items and/or checklist items we were able to maintain positive control of the aircraft. I can see how it would be easy to assume something was happening and without verifying make the situation worse.




Synopsis: CE-680 First Officer reported noticing pitch trim indicator reading abnormally high in cruise flight. When autopilot was disengaged it was apparent the indicator was wrong and the trim was not actually moving out of the normal range.
Date: 201503
Location: EGGX.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center EGGX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At [approximately] 18W on NAT C at FL310 SLOP R1 we encountered moderate wake turbulence. We saw northerly winds and decided to offset to R2.At that point it was smooth. Then wind shifted to SW direction which prompted us to return to R1 offset. We could see contrail of an aircraft at FL340 so we turned toward R1 and away from his contrail. Suddenly we hit severe wake turbulence and were in a 30 degree bank and climbing. The First Officer; pilot flying; disengaged the autopilot to control the aircraft altitude and attitude. Control was regained but not before we climbed approximately 300 feet. We learned later that a B747 was ahead and 1000 FT above us. The aircraft at FL340 was a B767 and not the source of our encounter.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported wake vortex encounter over the North Atlantic from a B747 ahead and 1000 feet above them that resulted in a 30 degree bank and an altitude deviation.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Pneumatic System & Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight immediately after switching from ground air to APU air FO (First Officer) and Captain both noted musty; dirty sock smell on flight deck. After calling the #1 FA (Flight Attendant); she also could smell the odor in the forward cabin. Other FA's could not smell odor in other parts of cabin. APU air was discontinued with a dissipation of odor. All passengers and crew were deplaned at the gate. FO complained of a head ache and was removed from further flight duty. Due to the length of time required for replacing FO and required maintenance trouble shooting Captain was released by [crew software] due to FAR part 117 crew duty limitations. APU was written up on Dates for requiring oil service.[I] suspect APU oil loss as a contributing factor.Without knowing status of maintenance action on APU; this cannot be answered. Must follow up with ZZZ Maintenance personnel.


Second narrative: Turned APU bleed on; smelt the dirty socks odor. Reached up and turned off bleed. Asked Captain if he smelt that; he said 'what the dirty socks smell'. Wrote it up and got everybody off.When reviewing the AML I saw the APU oil had been serviced twice in the last 3 days. Should have known something was wrong.APU oil isn't serviced that often. When it has to be serviced twice in 3 days it needs to be looked at and not just serviced.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported a fume event during preflight boarding. Maintenance was requested and the aircraft was eventually swapped.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: SNA has no Centerline Lights [CL] and the CL paint is worn out/faded to nothing. A low visibility takeoff; if conducted by the letter of the law (FARs); would require 5000 RVR because there is no visible CL.Suggestions: At minimum; repaint the centerline markings. Better install Centerline lights. With <6000 feet of runway; night landings are a challenge even in good visibility with no CL. Depth perception would be greatly enhanced with CL.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported that runway centerline paint is faded and no runway lights are installed; causing visibility issues at SNA airport.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While operating VFR on an eastbound heading; I encountered a flight of [3] aircraft proceeding in loose formation in a northeast direction. At the time; I was communicating on the CTAF of the local airport while transiting their airspace.I attempted to raise the aircraft on the CTAF frequency as I saw their positions on ADS-B but only had one of the aircraft visually. I was reluctant to turn north because of aircraft operating at a nearby airport; and was reluctant to turn south as I did not have visual confirmation of the position of all three aircraft in the 'formation.'Because of the overcast layer above; my ability to climb was restricted by the ceiling.As I approached the formation flight; when I was very close; I finally observed all three aircraft and was able to execute a turn to pass over their path.I should have made a turn well before I approached them to eliminate the conflict well ahead of time; including a turn back to the west to create greater separation by flying behind their 'formation.' I was focused on visually identifying all three aircraft and my inability to contact them on CTAF; where an earlier decision to execute a turn around the other aircraft would have avoided this situation entirely.




Synopsis: Cessna 172 pilot reported an NMAC event with a flight of three non-communicating aircraft. Upon establishing visual contact with the formation; the Cessna pilot executed a successful evasive maneuver.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We landed in ZZZZ and held for 45 mins waiting on a gate. Once our gate opened; the ground crew tried to marshall us to the wrong gate. Once ops got them to the proper gate; we started our parking process. It was a very tight spot and almost all of the line were covered with snow. [Another airline] left a cargo can elevator parked on our right side that was very close but our wing walker and guide man were giving us go signals. I proceeded very slowly towards the gate knowing it was a tight fit. I had given instructions for the First Officer to say stop if he was uncomfortable with what he saw as I could not see the equipment any longer. The wing walker responsible for the right wing dropped his wands and ran towards the guide man. I stopped the plane just as my FO (First Officer) said stop. Not once did I get a stop signal from any ground personnel. There we sat for about 45 minutes. [The other airline] arrived to try to start the elevator; but it wouldn't start (common for diesel engines in -10 temps). They finally found another gate for the company plane behind us and pushed us back and took us to [a different] gate. I get the harsh temps; blowing snow and 25 knot wind environment is trying for the ground folks; but the communication between ops and ramp personnel is limited at best and the lack of basic ground handling skills is still very apparent.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported unsafe gate parking process due to non-standard marshaling crew; ramp conditions and vehicles illegally parked.