elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ROA.Airport, VA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ROA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on visual approach for 24R visual backed up by the RNAV approach in visual conditions we received terrain warning and pull-up between HIBAN and WUDAG between 3300-3450. We were cleared for the visual approach at 4000 feet when abeam the airport. I stayed at 4000 until between HIBAN and prose where I then set 3700 ft at 180 knots and flaps 20 had already been selected. I then set 3200 feet to not go below WUDAG and turned the autopilot [off] and hand flew I was above 3300 between WUDAG AND HIBAN when we got the ground proximity terrain and then pull up. We verified we were above 3220 at WUDAG in visual condition I climbed up 100 ft from [our] current position and the warning didn't last more than 3-4 seconds. Once leveled off and confirmed 100% there were no terrain clearance issues we continued the approach to landing.




Synopsis: Flight Crew reported Ground Proximity Terrain Warning on approach.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MMFR.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Rudder
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at cruise flight FL330; smooth air; autopilot on; we experienced a momentary un-commanded rudder movement resulting in yaw to the right. Autopilot remained engaged and we got no ECAM; master caution or warning. We discussed this as being highly unusual but felt that we could have hit some wake vortices. The flight resumed normally for approximately 2 hours when we got a second rudder movement shortly before we left cruise altitude. At this point we knew something was not right. At that time we decided to report the condition to maintenance. Both occurrences were brief; lasting no longer than 1 second.During both movements; the autopilot remained engaged and we got no ECAM messages; cautions or warnings. The aircraft remained in full control at all times and maintained normal flight profile. For this reason; ATC was not advised.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported 2 instances of un-commanded rudder movement while in cruise flight.
Date: 202105
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DJI Mavic Air 2
Operator: Recreational / Hobbyist (UAS)
Operating under: Recreational Operations / Section 44809 (UAS)
Flight plan: None
Mission: Recreational / Hobbyist (UAS)
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Motor Mount (UAS)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Recreational / Hobbyist (UAS)
Reporter function: Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person UAS Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I'm writing because I have concern over the quality of the DJI Mavic Air 2.  During my post flight inspection of my drone; I noticed fatigue cracking in the body of the UAV.  The cracking is right around the pilot point for the front motor supports.  I've done some research online and noticed that this apparently is a common problem among other DJI Mavic Air 2 operators.  I did some digging and I noticed that the FAA currently doesn't regulate small UAVs; and I have concerns over the process to close any safety concerns with these manufacturers.  There seems to be a gap as the FAA really would like to regulate the operations of the vehicle; but they currently don't have standards in place for the certification of the vehicles.  From my perspective there needs to be some sort of regulations in place to ensure the UAVs will operate safely and the burden of airworthiness should not be bore solely by the operator; but OEMs need to take responsibility for their equipment as well.  Note; that I did land without any incident; and have reached out to DJI on the matter and I will not be flying until the issue is resolved.




Synopsis: Pilot noticed fatigue cracks in post flight inspection of UAS.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Second aircraft: Super King Air 200
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We were] climbing through 15;300 FT for our assigned altitude of FL210 when TCAS alerted us to traffic 100 FT above and 2 miles. We briefly lowered the nose; saw the aircraft crossing from left to right directly at us. We immediately climbed and turned away from the aircraft. The aircraft (appeared to be a King Air 200 or 300) crossed 100-300 FT directly below our aircraft. If we had not performed evasive maneuvers; a collision would have occurred.


Second narrative: [Our] location [was] approximately 10-15 NM southwest of JAMIE Intersection.We briefly lowered the nose; saw the aircraft crossing from left to right directly at us. We immediately climbed and turned away from the aircraft. The aircraft (appeared to be a King Air 200 or 300) crossed 100-300 FT directly below our aircraft. If we had not performed evasive maneuvers; a collision would have occurred.


Synopsis: A King Air flight crew suffered an NMAC with another King Air climbing through 15;000 FT.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were given the GRNPA ONE RNAV ARRIVAL into LAS by Los Angeles Center and told to cross LUXOR at 250 KTS at 12;000 FT. Furthermore; we were given a speed reduction to Mach .76 for spacing into LAS. We programmed in the crossing restriction and speed properly and started a managed descent to comply with the crossing restriction. Soon after we started the descent the aircraft rolled abruptly in a moderate manner for about 10-15 seconds. Both the Captain and I noted that it was the wake turbulence from the aircraft in front of us. The Captain told me that if it were to continue to do a V/S descent at 1;000 FT to get above the other aircraft's descent path so we are not following the same path of the aircraft in front of us the whole way down into LAS and exposing ourselves to wake turbulence dangers in doing so. Sure enough; a minute or two later; we get another roll (this time more severe than the last one) from the wake turbulence from the aircraft in front of us.To safely stay out of the wake turbulence; I put the aircraft in a V/S descent mode for 1;000 FT a minute to get above the aircraft in front of us. At that time the Captain advised Center what we were doing and why we were doing it and told Center that it may be difficult for us to cross LUXOR at 12;000 FT. Center told the Captain to contact Approach Control and advise them of the situation. Once the Captain switched over to approach the frequency was extremely busy and he could not get a word in. Meanwhile; I went back to managed descent as we were above the aircraft's path ahead of us. All in all; we may have missed the crossing restriction by a few hundred feet. Once again; the reason we missed the restriction was the need to stay out of the wake turbulence from the aircraft in front of us.




Synopsis: An A321 First Officer reported encountering wake vortex from preceding aircraft on arrival to LAS that was a factor in missing a crossing restriction.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Aircraft component: Oil Storage
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through FL 280; the #1 engine oil quantity dropped to 0%. A short time later; the #1 engine oil pressure reading dropped; turned red; and stabilized around 7 psi. Moments later; the #1 engine low oil pressure annunciator illuminated. The F/O (First Officer) remained Pilot Flying; while I; as Captain; performed the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) Checklist. The #1 engine was shutdown per the QRH. I then contacted Center; [requested priority handling]; stated our situation; and requested a divert direct to ZZZ. We were given clearance direct to the airport and descent to lower altitude. I contacted Dispatch via ACARS (Automatic Communications Addressing and Reporting System) to inform of our engine shutdown; [priority handling by ATC]; and divert to ZZZ. I contacted the flight attendants to have them secure the cabin for landing in 20 minutes. I informed the passengers of our situation and divert. The remainder of the flight involved preparing for our single-engine landing; including QRH Checklists; briefings; obtaining weather; landing performance and brake cooling data due to the overweight landing. I requested ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) meet us following a full-stop on the runway to ensure the safety of further taxi. I; as Captain; assumed pilot flying duties 20 miles from landing. Approach cleared us for a visual approach to Runway XX; and Tower cleared us to land. After stopping; ARFF inspected the aircraft; reporting no issues. We obtained clearance and taxied uneventfully to the gate. I wrote the discrepancy in the logbook; and left the aircraft with our local Maintenance Personnel. Despite [requesting priority handling]; I felt no need to exercise emergency authority. However; we did land intentionally overweight. The landing performance and brake cooling data supported that decision.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that during climb; #1 engine oil quantity dropped to zero; followed by loss of oil pressure; requiring an inflight shutdown of the #1 engine and diversion with priority handling.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X on  a STAAV6 departure; had departed runway 25R. The departure essentially flies out then makes an arcing right turn to an approximately 030 heading. (There are RNAV points on the departure plate that plot the exact route of flight.) Aircraft Y [a turboprop]  was cleared for takeoff behind Aircraft X and ordered to maintain visual separation with Aircraft X. Aircraft Y complied with the instruction and turned to the assigned heading 290 off of Runway 25R. By this time; Aircraft X is talking to departure and Aircraft Y has been switched to departure. The 290 heading pointed Aircraft Y right at Aircraft X that was in it's right. The departure controller turned Aircraft Y farther right than the 290 heading to avert Aircraft X. This all occurred approximately 9 [miles] northwest of the airport.At the time; training was being conducted in Local 1. The On the Job Training Instructing (OJTI) didn't think it was the best practice to apply visual separation with Aircraft Y because of it's extreme performance as a Turbo-prop. The OJTI allowed it for training purposes so the developmental can understand how Aircraft Y performs. In the future; the developmental knows to give a bit more 'room' for this turbo-prop versus jet powered aircraft. Anytime separation and/or safety may be compromised; the training should be scaled back instead of allowing the developmental to make a possible error.




Synopsis: LAS Tower Controller reports on the use of visual separation during a training session; with the second aircraft performing better than the trainee expected. TRACON Controller turned aircraft further to avoid more separation issues.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At 108 knots [on the takeoff roll] the auto ground spoilers deployed uncommanded.  We rejected the takeoff and complied with  all checklists.

Callback: The reporter states that the first indication of trouble was the spoiler handle moving aft and the RTO had already been commenced when the takeoff warning begin to sound. The auto ground spoiler system was deactivated and placed on MEL by Maintenance so the flight could operate as scheduled. The actual cause of the anomaly was a throttle switch pack located in the pedestal that would normally detect reverser activation during takeoff and deploy the ground spoilers.



Synopsis: DC10 Captain experiences ground spoiler deployment at 108 knots during takeoff and rejects.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I arrived at work early and flexed in. I received a call from the tower to come up ASAP to assist. I was notified by the LC that communications had been lost (landlines work; no radio); and that PET-2000s [back up radios] were being used. I coordinated the information with Tech ops; who notified personnel about the issue. When I arrived in the operation; an [aircraft] was taxiing when communications were lost; and communications were lost for an indeterminate period of time before the PETs were activated and tuned.The cause of the event was the power bump on starting the engine generator. Tech ops notified us that the breakers had been tripped at the [receiver/transmitter] site; and needed to be reset.The fact that this happened early in the morning with minimal traffic resulted in the best possible outcome - had workload been greater; this sort of outage (which could occur whenever the engine generator turns on) could result in communications loss during critical phases of control; and could easily result in losses of separation and more serious safety events.Tech Ops indicated that this loss would not have occurred had a battery+DC bus been present; as required by FAA Order 6950.2D. Appendix one calls for power source 'D' to be used at [receiver/transmitter] sites; and that code denotes that commercial power and batteries + DC BUS are required for RTR sites. Tech Ops indicated desire to comply with this; and that it would mitigate these issues; but that he had been told by his superiors that ZZZ doesn't need one.




Synopsis: Tower Controller reported loss of radios and equipment requirements that were not being followed.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: During the course of planning for my next medical certificate; I noticed the Company showed my certificate expiring two months earlier than I was aware of.  Due to the COVID extension from the previous year; it appeared I did not need a new exam until the following [Month X].  I apparently did not fully understand the details of the COVID extension.  Nor did [the app] alert me of the expiration of my medical.  The FAA letter I received after the extension showed a [Month X] expiration in bold typeset.  Further down in the letter however in normal typeset it shows an exam due six months before. The actual certificate I received in the mail from the FAA shows the following [Month X] as the expiration date.The COVID medical extension caused confusion for multiple parties; including myself; my AME; the company; and possibly even the FAA itself.  The bold typeset states a [Month X] expiration which apparently does not apply to the COVID extension. The verbiage in the FAA letter is difficult to understand and lends itself to multiple interpretations.Clearer verbiage and guidance regarding the COVID medical extension would certainly have helped. Closer attention to detail by all parties involved would hopefully mitigate these types of threats during an unprecedented pandemic.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported confusion regarding medical certification expiration date in reference to the COVID-19 extension.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Attitude Indicator(Gyro/Horizon/ADI)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise enroute to ZZZ; the Captain side Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI) went blank. After a minute or so; I heard a crackling type sound and noticed a very strong electrical odor. A mechanic was on board and noticed that the ADI breaker had popped; so logically we left it out and I transferred control to the First Officer; and I became pilot monitoring.When we noticed the odor; we re-checked our oxygen masks and I briefed the FO (First Officer) that if we see smoke of any kind; we were to don the mask and goggles; establish communications; and proceed to the nearest suitable airport. Since we knew the likely source of the odor and it had dissipated; I elected to continue the flight without declaring an emergency. I kept the cockpit bright to detect any smoke until below 10;000 feet MSL on the way in to ZZZ.Furthermore; I opened the QRH to the smoke; fire and fumes checklist and briefed it just in case the problem returned. Also; the FO and I agreed upon the nearest suitable airport as we progressed along the route in the event of a smoke/fire emergency so no time would be wasted getting on the ground. Again; with the breaker popped and no more odor; I deemed it safe to continue with robust contingency planning along the route.As we descended into ZZZ; the Captain side HSI began to flicker on and off. Not knowing if this was a related issue; I immediately instructed the mechanic to find and pull the breaker. He did so; and we landed without incident in ZZZ without my primary displays.During flight after the ADI breaker popped; the mechanic decided to closely scrutinize the aircraft maintenance log. He found that days earlier; the Captain's 'ND' (technically HSI on the 767) had been written up by the crew because it was flickering. The corrective action was to replace the ADI - the incorrect display; which was ultimately the one that failed on our flight.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported electrical odor and multiple navigation equipment failures.