elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At approximately 9;000 feet MSL; on an east downwind just after calling for Flaps 1; the Master Caution FLT CONT light and message illuminated. The Yaw Damper had kicked off and could not be reset. We then noticed that the flaps had barely started to move and had not gone to the commanded position. There was an asymmetry indicated. I declared an emergency to Approach and told them we had a flight control problem and we would need vector to accomplish the checklist. I first went to the Trailing Edge Flaps Asymmetry Checklist; which due to the actual configuration led me to the ALL FLAPS UP LANDING checklist. After running the checklist and checking with the advisory landing distances for abnormal configurations table and adding a safety margin similar to that used in computing certificated landing data (an additional 60%) since I was not interested in using max manual braking and maximum reverse thrust; I determined that it wasn't prudent to land on 17l and requested a runway with at least 10;200 feet of available runway. ATC offered 17C and I accepted. We briefed the flight attendants and let SOC know about the emergency and proceeded to execute a visual approach to RWY 17C. Weight was approximately 127;000 pounds and ref speed was around 180 knots. I touched down and used reverse thrust and spoilers to decelerate until 60 knots when I used the wheel brakes. I passed on the info to ARFF that I had not used wheel brakes until 60 knots and had no concern for hot brakes and requested taxi to the gate. I taxied to the gate uneventfully. Conferred with Maintenance about the problem; talked with the Dispatcher and finished the IOE paperwork for my student.




Synopsis: While approaching to land and upon initial configuration of aircraft; the Boeing 737-800 crew received a Master Caution warning and FLT CONT light. The yaw damper had also disconnected and could not be reset. An emergency was declared and all of the appropriate steps were accomplished prior to executing an all flaps up landing at about 180 knots. Aircraft was then taxied to the gate uneventfully.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Enroute from ZZZ; I was the pilot flying from the left seat; the Chief Pilot was in the right seat and working the radios. Near Foothills (ODF) VOR; Atlanta Center asked what kind of approach we would like. We replied the visual; and were told to expect the visual and report the airport in site. We were then cleared to descend to 7;300 feet. The IAF is DAYEL intersection at or above 7;000 feet (16.3 miles from the airport.) I had planned to remain at 7;300 feet until 4.5 miles from JASVU intersection (9.7 miles from the airport and 3680 feet above minimums.) As it came time to descend I request the Chief Pilot to set the Altitude Select for 5;700 feet for the JASVU crossing; he complied; and we started down. The airport was in sight. We were VMC but still on the IFR flight plan; after descending 300-500 feet; I had it in my mind we were already cleared for the visual approach and I asked the Chief Pilot if we were. About that time Center said; I see you have started descent and we replied that we had and canceled the IFR flight plan. We did not report the airport in sight; and apparently were not yet cleared for the visual. The close proximity to the airport; the need to start down; being in VMC and having heard 'expect the visual;' prompted me to start down; thinking that we had been cleared for the Visual. The Chief pilot didn't catch it either until I questioned him. There was no traffic conflict or separation loss. The Center did not mention any deviation. Although the proper crew co-ordination is for the pilot not flying to handle and talk on the radios; I have always found that if I talk on the radios as the pilot flying; it is easier to stay 'in the loop' on what is going on. Lesson learned is basic; if in doubt ask.




Synopsis: A corporate flight crew began a visual approach descent without clearance from ZTL because they heard 'Expect the Visual' and began a descent when they felt they would have normally.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On taxi out to Runway XY we smelled a plastic burning smell. I also saw a little haze in the cabin. I shut the air conditioning off (the bleed air was not on yet) and told Ground we had a problem and wanted to return to the ramp. Shutting off the aircraft didn't help so I decided to shut down the airplane and get everyone off. I told Ground I was shutting down and requested assistance.No one was injured and no sign of fire. The flap limit switch was set incorrectly and the flap motor overheated.




Synopsis: BE20 pilot reported detecting a burning plastic smell on taxi. After shutdown; the odor was attributed to an overheated flap motor.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Ramp
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After landing at night in ZZZ we taxied as instructed by Ground to a surface designated point. When we arrived; there was an outbound jet taxiing on the south line and another air carrier under tow on the north line. We advised ZZZ Ground of the conflict and they then instructed us to just take the south line after the outbound jet. The First Officer advised me that there was not a ramp frequency when there actually was. We thought we had been cleared in by Ground but by the time I taxied in I felt like something wasn't right due to the congestion on the ramp. I asked again ' Are you sure there isn't a ramp?'.  He then found the frequency on the 10-7 after we had entered the ramp area. After parking at gate; I made contact with ramp and relayed our confusion. Contributing factors include; unfamiliar operations at ZZZ. First time operating there in over a year plus first time at the new terminal. New First officer fresh off OE and only my Xth flight segment in a year due to pandemic reductions.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a ramp incursion resulting in a conflict and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After push back was complete; the push back crew stopped our aircraft and asked us to set parking brake. I reached down and pulled the parking brake handle up; while also pressing the brake pedal. I reported over the headset to the ground crew that the parking brake was set. Moments later; the ground crew reported the aircraft was rolling forward. At the same time; I noticed the aircraft was rolling as well. The ground crew called us over the headset to advise us; at which point I stopped the aircraft roll and reset the parking brake. The aircraft rolled about 10 feet. I asked if everyone was okay and if there was any damage. The report back from the ground crew was that everyone was safe and there was no damage. We continued with our flight at the point. Big takeaway here is that we need to always look to verify that the parking brake light is indeed on; thus verifying the parking brake is in fact set. I cannot honestly say if I checked for the light or not.


Second narrative: We were pushed back in ZZZ; and cleared to start engines. I was starting number 2 when we were told to set brakes. I thought I saw the Captain set the parking brake; and then I looked back at the egt to finish the start. A few seconds later; I heard the ground crew calmly say; 'sir; you're rolling.' The Captain jumped on the brakes and reset the parking brake. He then asked the ground crew if everyone was ok. The ground crew said everything was fine. The rest of the flight was uneventful.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported aircraft began rolling after tow bar was disconnected after push back.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FFZ.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 40
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D FFZ
ATC / advisory: Tower FFZ
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying the PA44 north of CHD; about 4 miles south of FFZ; the drone appeared to the left of the left wing tip; at close proximity. Drone was red with black and approximately half a foot in diameter. Tower was immediately notified.




Synopsis: PA-44 instructor pilot reports an airborne conflict with a drone at 2;700 feet 4 NM south of FFZ. Evasive action is taken.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After an arduous day of rapidly changing weather and after waiting for a broken deice truck; we had to deplane the passengers so as not to get too close to the tarmac delay program fines and wait for the visibility and heavy snow that moved in to clear. While waiting; my First Officer and I looked up our flight duty period limitation and decided it was 12 hours. We were supposed to fly to ORD and then continue on [two hours] for the night. We did not leave in time to make this leg happen within the 12 hour FDP limitation. I called Crew Scheduling to inform them of this and was told we had been approved for a FDP extension. I informed [them] that I;as PIC; did not approve this. They insisted that was not necessary and had me talk to the Manager on Duty. He informed me quite bluntly that PIC approval is not necessary for a FDP extension and I insisted it was and quoted part 117 which states 117.19 Flight duty period extensions. (a) For augmented and unaugmented operations; if unforeseen operational circumstances arise prior to takeoff: (1) The pilot in command and the certificate holder may extend the maximum flight duty period permitted in Tables B or C of this part up to 2 hours. This is a fairly black and white statement that shows both parties should agree to the extension. He insisted this is not the case nor within the 'spirit of the regulation.' He ultimately told me I either fly the extension or call in fatigued. I did not feel it proper to do either of these but felt intimidated and wondered what repercussions would come of my being adamant in my stance. I was unwilling to break a regulation and decided that calling in fatigued was my only option yet not a desired outcome. My understanding of part 117; I thought was fairly solid. Company management has bent some sentences to use part 117 as a coercion tool to add 2 hours of flight duty period to every single day of flying with no recourse for the crew members. It is now recorded as a fatigue event which it really is not. The Company now does not have to report the FDP extension to the FAA nor do they have to financially cover me for the trip because I was forced to call in fatigued or suffer the consequences. There is no way to avoid another event such as this until the Company stops intimidating crews into extending their day.




Synopsis: CRJ200 Captain reports being intimidated by his duty Manager into accepting a two hour extension to his duty day under FAR 117 without the Captain's consent; necessitating a fatigue call.
Date: 201210
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: DC Generation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Upon arriving at the aircraft [for the]first flight of the day; there was no GPU [Ground Power Unit] present. I heard several explanations as to why but I was assured that when a GPU became available; it would be brought over for our use. In an effort to keep the flight on schedule I applied battery power to the aircraft in order for the Flight Attendant to begin preflight of the cabin. Once battery voltage reached 22 Volts; I powered the aircraft down and we continued to wait for a GPU. Ramp personnel brought over what appeared to be an AC GPU with a rectifier device to convert the power to 28V DC. This device was plugged into the External DC receptacle on the nose of the aircraft (the rear External AC receptacle was at no point utilized). Voltage on the Right Main DC Bus was observed to be approximately 25.5V with External Power applied. Following two normal engine starts using GPU power; I signaled for the GPU to be disconnected. The First Officer and myself then observed the '#1 DC GEN HOT' light illuminate. At this point we had not yet begun push back and were still at the gate with the propellers in feather. After following the checklist procedure and discussion with maintenance control we turned the #1 DC generator off allowing it to cool and then turned it back on. Although this initially appeared to correct the problem; the '#1 DC GEN HOT' caution re-illuminated and after discussion with Maintenance Control and contract maintenance; we determined it was safe to ferry the aircraft for repair.




Synopsis: For an unknown reason; the aircraft experienced a DC generator overheat fault following the use of an AC Ground power unit with a DC rectifier to provide aircraft power at the gate.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: INS / IRS / IRU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight; we received a warning on the FMC; 'VERIFY POS: IRS-IRS.' We noted that the left IRS was showing a very large error; over 25 miles at the time and growing. We consulted the QRC; FOM; Flight Handbook and Systems Manual for guidance as to specifically what the error meant and how to handle it. We cross checked our remaining navigation information and determined the right IRS was working properly. We notified Dispatch via ACARS; and contacted Commercial Radio to let them know of our navigation failure as per guidance in our manuals. We continued to carefully monitor and cross check our position and performed several extra plots on our plotting chart to ensure our position was correct. Our position was indeed correct operating on the good IRS. We also began monitoring a coastline VOR as soon as it was in range and used it as an additional check to continuously verify our position. After radar contact with Center; and after beginning our descent the left IRS generated a FAULT annunciation and apparently failed as the Captain's flight instruments failed. The First Officer then became the pilot flying. We then declared an emergency and got radar vectors to the airport. The checklist was consulted and that restored adequate instrumentation for the Captain to continue flying. We then landed uneventfully and wrote the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook.




Synopsis: An air carrier flight; eastbound over the Pacific Ocean; suffered a single IRS failure and eventual loss of the Captain's flight instruments. The flight continued utilizing the First Officer's instruments and IRS data.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Premier 1
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft X was an LGB arrival. The ILS was out of service and Runway 30 closed. The aircraft was unable to do an RNV (RNP) approach to 26R. He opted for the VOR Circle to 26R approach. Once on the approach and switched to the advisory frequency he began a descent for the airport. The Low Altitude Alert went off. I gave the pilot the low altitude alert just in case he was still on frequency. He came back on frequency saying that he was executing a missed approach. The ceilings were too low for them to get the airport safely. The pilot decided to divert safely to [another nearby airport].We've had this issue in the past were a Low Altitude Alert goes off on Runway 26 approaches. In this scenario I'm not sure if the pilot was trying to get under the layer by bypassing the approach restrictions or if it was the usual Low Altitude Alert we have gotten in the past.




Synopsis: SCT Controller reported a low altitude on an aircraft into LGB runway 26R and wondered if it was an actual low altitude alert or one that might have been in error.