Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The following event occurred at PHL. I was acting as the CIC in the TRACON at the time of the event. At the time; SWAP (Severe Weather Avoidance Plan) was in effect for ZNY; and as such; silent clearances off of PHL were canceled. The MXE Sector at ZNY (R25) called the PHL North Departure controller ('E') on the land line and informed him that they could not accept any more J6 traffic and that J6 should be stopped. The 'E' controller immediately informed me of the same. Right away; I walked back to the CICR position and called the Tower Supervisor and told him that ZNY R25 had told us to 'Stop J6'. Noticing that the Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) in the TMU (Traffic Management Unit) was on the phone; I updated the NIDS (National Information Display System) status board to show 'J6 - STOP /UFN (Until Further Notice)'.Once I was done updating the NIDS I walked over to the TMU to inform him of the ground stop and the notifications that I made. He was still on the phone; so I waited. While standing there; it became apparent that the TMC was on the phone with the ZNY Departure Director (ZNY PIT); who was telling the PHL TMC about the J6 ground stop. The TMC stated on the phone; 'I guess you will reroute our J6's then?' I believe that answer was 'yes'; the J6 traffic would receive reroutes. At that time; the TMC looked up to observe the ASDE-X Ground Radar Display; and it was clear he was looking to see where the J6 aircraft were that needed reroutes.At this time Aircraft X was stationary on Taxiway W; facing northbound; holding short of RWY 9L (Departure runway). The TMC stated on the phone to the ZNY PIT; 'I've got Aircraft X on the runway. Can we let him go?' The answer must have been yes. The TMC then called the tower to tell them that they could let Aircraft X go. It needs to be mentioned again that Aircraft X was not on the runway; he was stationary and holding short - with no traffic behind him.I said to the TMC; 'He's not on the runway.' The TMC said; 'Close enough.' I then said; 'That's dangerous. You're going to put some poor ZNY controller in a jam doing that.' My feeling was that the situation was dangerous because the J6 traffic must have been shut down for a good reason; weather; volume; some other safety related reason. It wasn't our call to make. The TMC replied to me; 'It's okay. Doesn't matter.' I then walked over to the North Departure controller to inform him that he might get the Aircraft X on the J6 route; and might need to talk to ZNY R25 about it. It was about 5 minutes or so before Aircraft X actually departed. Upon departure; I noticed that the route on the strip was not a J6 route; and that they center had amended the flight plan to J110. I confirmed with the Tower Supervisor that the aircraft had in fact been issued the revised routing - he had. The aircraft was handed off to ZNY R25; on the amended routing away from J6; with no further issue.I feel that it is extremely unsafe for any airport to continue launching traffic after a ground stop has been issued. When a stop is implemented for a route; airway; or airport during SWAP; it is usually because severe weather is impacting the route; severe turbulence is present; sector saturation and/or complexity is high; or any number of other fairly important safety-related reasons. The last thing that we at PHL need to be doing is 'Second Guessing' the importance of the ground stop; just to get one more airplane out. That last airplane out could be the one that flies into a thunderstorm; or that one that causes a controller to be overloaded. I saw and heard a TMC blatantly lie to the ZNY PIT in order to let them get one more plane airborne. 'On the Runway' is not the same as 'at the runway' or 'holding short of the runway'. This aircraft; at the time of the call; was holding short of the runway and was not blocking any traffic. The aircraft ended up getting the reroute anyway by the tower prior to departure (Which is a good thing - kudos tothe tower); but that only helps make the case. The TMC lied to try to get an airplane out - which could have been unsafe - instead of just accepting the extra 5 minutes it takes to issue the reroute. In fact; the reroute was given and the airplane was airborne about 5 minutes later. No harm done. But there could have been harm if the TMC had gotten his way - and this airplane got airborne on the J6 routing.There needs to be an adjustment of the 'safety culture' or 'safety attitude' within TMU; especially here at PHL. This sort of thing is not an isolated incident. In fact; we routinely land and depart with a tailwind component just to stay in a favorable configuration; even though we have other configurations available. Safety should always be the top priority of everyone who works in the National Airspace System. When it is not; when safety is compromised for efficiency; the multiple layers of safety are eroded and we move closer to an accident.




Synopsis: PHL TRACON Controller In Charge reported an issue relating to the Traffic Manager advising ZNY Center that an aircraft was on the runway; when it was not; and the possible impact it might have when airborne.