elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SDL.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D SDL
ATC / advisory: Tower SDL
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on an instrument flight plan and had been handed off from Approach to Scottsdale Tower. We were cleared to land. Aircraft Y had also been cleared to land but because we were close together; Tower kept him on base to avoid us being too close together. Aircraft Y missed our tail on our aircraft by 5 ft. or so. Aircraft Y came on the radio and let Tower know we had a near miss. Fortunately we were able to come in and land without further incident.




Synopsis: A Pilot reported a NMAC while on short final.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Cirrus Vision SJ50
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Software and Automation; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: During the initial climb on the ZZZZZ2 RNAV departure off of runway XXL; we had a TAWS (Terrain Alert Warning) and a GPS lost warning. We also lost all GPS navigation guidance to the Autopilot. I took over by using the heading mode while informing ATC departure control that we had lost all GPS signal and requested Radar Vectors. I was given a Radar Vector to a heading of 140 degrees and instruction to remain clear of all obstructions. I also asked ATC if any other aircraft had experienced the same issue. The response was negative. Since; I had a second pilot; I instructed them to check the GPS integrity and satellite strength. While they were performing the task; I continued to fly the aircraft and communicate with ATC. After approximately three minutes after losing signal; we regained GPS signal and the second pilot confirmed system integrity. I subsequently informed ATC that we had regained GPS navigation ability and they eventually cleared us direct to a navigation fix and I reengaged the GPS navigation mode without any further problems to our destination.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported loss of GPS signal and a Terrain Alert Warning on departure.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aeroplane Flight Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During approach it became apparent the aircraft ahead of us might not clear the runway in time for us to land. At 1;300 FT we discussed allowing our aircraft to descend until 200 FT on the approach; if the aircraft had not vacated the runway; we would go-around. I reviewed the steps of the go-around with the First Officer. At 250 FT the 757 had not began a turn off the runway (at a 90 degree turn for the taxiway) so I called for the go-around. The First Officer executed a textbook go-around climbing toward 3;000 FT (assigned altitude by the Tower) for the missed approach. When approaching the 3;000 FT clearance altitude; the First Officer noted the yoke was extremely heavy and he had trouble pushing over. He had the trim switches full down with no effect. I assisted in the push over; we were able to stop the climb using excessive force on the yoke; [and] we reached an altitude of 3;150 FT and then engaged the autopilot.  The autopilot immediately kicked off so I took the airplane; pushed over with the First Officer's help and held the yoke in place engaging the autopilot. I could feel the pressures trimming off with the autopilot engaged. This time the autopilot held the altitude. We discussed what we both saw and elected to execute an autoland. We briefed the approach and received vectors. [Briefed] the First Officer during his PM duties that if he saw anything unusual to call it out and we would go missed approach again if needed.  During the autoland I noted the aircraft was slower than usual to introduce the wing low correction needed to counter the 9 knot crosswind. At 100 FT the aircraft began tracking to the right of center line; so I disconnected the autopilot and kept the aircraft on the centerline. The landing itself was uneventful however when attempting to fly the nose wheel to the runway; it was very difficult to push the nose over. I was able to get the nose down and complete the landing.  There was definitely something wrong with the aircraft flight controls. It felt as if the LSAS would enter a pitch hold mode and not allow normal flight control manipulation to counter this mode in leveling out.  Our election to use the auto pilot for autoland was to take the LSAS out of the picture.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported flight control anomalies during go-around and subsequent landing. Reporter could not be reached for follow up comments.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Just after takeoff we got a Master Warning light and the 'TAIL COMPT TEMP HIGH' light for 2-3 seconds then it extinguished. We performed the memory items; declared an emergency; and landed at 142;000 LBS. The landing was soft (100-200 FPM sink rate). ATC provided us with the needed clearances and there were no known deviations.




Synopsis: MD-83 Captain experiences a Tail Compartment Temp high light shortly after takeoff which quickly extinguishes on its own. Memory items are accomplished; an emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Our flight to KBWI was filed as: BKW RAVNN5 KBWI. Shortly after departure we were cleared direct to BKW. Once on with Potomac Approach we were cleared to YAEGR intersection and cleared to descend via the RAVNN5 arrival. Near CAASH intersection the Approach Controller asked 'if we were authorized the arrival;' we replied 'yes.' The Approach Controlled asked 'under what FAR are you operating under?' We replied 'FAR Part 135.' The Approach Controller then told us the RAVNN5 arrival was not authorized for FAR Part 91; 101; 103; 105; 125; 133; 135; and 137. We were given a left turn to 360 and a descent to FL190. We were then cleared direct BUBBI and then via the ANTHM1 arrival. The controller asked if our approach plates showed the restriction; and because of our work level sequencing ourselves unto a new arrival at an intermediate fix we stated 'No.' We told Potomac Approach that we would take a closer look at the RAVNN5 arrival on the ground and communicate with our company that we are not authorized to file or fly the arrival. We continued with the ANTHM1 arrival and landed at KBWI without further queries.Upon a closer look at the RAVNN5 arrival into KBWI we did in fact find small print regarding the FAR Part 91; 101; 103; 105; 125; 133; 135; and 137 restriction. We assume that the RAVNN 5 is not authorized due to presidential security. Although we were not in close proximity to Restricted Area 6611A.Going forward [flight planning] should be notified that we are unable to fly the RAVNN5 arrival into BWI. I will also take it upon myself to be more diligent when reviewing all approach plates for restrictions.




Synopsis: CE-750 pilot reported planning to fly the RAVNN5 arrival to BWI until ATC advised him it was not authorized for his flight that was operating under FAR Part 135.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: ILS XXL approach unavailable due to notam (INOP). RNAV XXL Approach. Vectored to final approach segment. Marginal weather above minimums. Crew recognized the profile data and the VDI were not consistent inside the final approach fix. Crew initiated go-around and advised tower. Tower advised 'low altitude alert' simultaneously. Crew returned after vectors for the same approach RNAV XXL to an uneventful landing. Crew debriefed the first and second approach. Overall; excellent team effort to identify the situation and go-around.RNAV approaches require 'cleared; established; and protected' guidance to perform properly. ALL of those criteria were met - however - inside the FAF; the crew recognized the data was improper with reference to the VDI. This discrepancy led to the decision to go-around and reset for another approach. The second approach performed with good data and no discrepancies.More proficiency training in the simulator and during normal operations on the line (choosing to practice these approaches more often). As always; if something isn't right or unstable -- Go-Around!


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew on RNAV approach noticed vertical information was not consistent with the approach. They executed a missed approach simultaneously with Tower advising a low altitude alert.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other After Landing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing; aircraft skidded straight ahead. Brakes were unresponsive. Tower reported smoke from tires. Aircraft began vibrating and making noise from rear. Aircraft then slowed and stopped on runway. Upon exit; both main tires were flat spotted and blown out.Parking brake lever was in the off position. It seemed that the parking brake was on in spite of the position of the lever.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].

Second callback: Reporter stated he was the FO on a training flight. The initial landing was OK; but as he started to apply the brakes he noticed the pedals felt hard; as if the brakes were already applied. That's when he realized the brakes were unresponsive and apparently locked as the Pilatus PC-12 began skidding down the runway. Reporter stated Maintenance arrived and changed both Main tires due to being flat-spotted and blown. While jacking the aircraft; Maintenance noted that both main tires spun freely. Pilatus aircraft do Not have an Anti-Skid System; just basic application of brake pedals and hydraulic fluid. The incident aircraft was one of their newer PC-12s. He has heard of other pilots experiencing brake lock-ups on the newer aircraft. His company does change the brakes to a different type when they receive a new aircraft. He does not know if the removed brake or the replacement brakes are steel or composite type brakes. Reporter stated the Parking Brake is a T-type handle that is pulled out and turned clockwise as brakes pedals are applied to lock brakes. A valve is involved in the process. Unlocking only requires turning the T-handle counterclockwise to release the brakes.

Synopsis: Two pilots report their Pilatus PC-12 was unresponsive to braking upon landing as the aircraft vibrated and skidded straight ahead. Upon exiting the aircraft both main tires were found flat spotted and blown out.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Very light wind was not favoring either runway. Runway 24 is the preferred runway. I had not observed any planes in the pattern for either runway. I remember hearing a plane announce downwind for runway 24. I continued my approach and touch and go on runway 24. During climb from takeoff on runway 24; I observed a Piper Cherokee on the runway beneath me rolling out from his landing on runway 6. I immediately turned left to move away from any other planes that might be approaching to land on runway 6. [This] is an uncontrolled field and some of the planes based there do not have radios. Extra vigilance is required to see and avoid planes at uncontrolled airports. I announced my position on downwind; but forgot to announce my takeoff from the touch and go. Everyone should always announce their position in the pattern; departure; clearing the runway; etc. at uncontrolled airports.




Synopsis: A general aviation pilot climbing after a touch-and-go at a non-towered airport reported observing another aircraft rolling out on the opposite direction runway. Poor radio usage was noted as a factor.
Date: 201310
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During enroute cruise at FL400 and flight planned Mach; the Number 2 engine rolled back to approximately 60% N1. The rollback was rough; like a cough; and was noticeable through both N1 gauge indication and aircraft feel. During the rollback; the autothrottles disengaged. As PF; I slightly reduce power on Number 2 as the engine stabilized and started to recover to normal power. No malfunction indicators or messages were received. The engine operated normally for the remainder of the flight. The SAT was approximately -58 degrees and the anti-ice was off. At the time we were deviating around radar returns for weather; but were not in any rain; turbulence; or dense clouds. We couldn't really tell the thickness of the weather because it was still dark. Shortly before the event; I had turned on the wing lights to check for icing and the wings were clear. Suggest investigation of potential high altitude; low temperature (below -40 SAT) engine icing.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer experiences an engine rollback at FL400 to 60% N1; then a slow recovery. High altitude low temperature internal engine icing is suspected.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had MEL 25-57-02 for positions at XL and R which voided those positions for small cans. The first step is for Dispatch to notify the ramp about the voids. This was done several hours before loading. The Load Verification Manifest is no longer available as the auto WB system is paperless; but I had been told that cans are only allowed to be in the positions set forth by the ramp agent who builds the load sheet. This is the person who was notified by Dispatch and told about the voids. There was some confusion on my part as to how the new paperless system should not allow a voided position to be filled. Turns out the auto WB system does not 'Know' about MELs at this time. Once airborne; we received a message from Dispatch notifying us of a possible position transposition and after we landed it turned out that the cans were put in the wrong place.It appears the ramp agent transposed the positions that were voided. The Auto verify system is not currently capable of catching those errors. A Load Verification Manifest is no longer available to the crews as the Auto WB is paperless. I understood that the load crew was aware of the MEL and expected the Auto WB to protect the voids.1. Have the ramp agent present the Auto WB device so the crew can verify the voids. (Short term) 2. Have the Auto WB system be able to pull MEL's and protect against these kinds of errors. 3. Have the release system add another tab showing the load plan so crews can verify the MEL voids on the computer before signing the release. This way; the crew can see the plan before stepping. 4. When maintenance MELs and voids a position; could they add a placard over (on top of) the position's scan code (Barcode) with a void message? This could prevent the Auto WB scanner from (seeing) scanning that position; and the operator would also see the void warning.




Synopsis: Cargo Captain discovers that the new paperless automatic weight and balance system is not aware of MEL restrictions on loading and requires human intervention; but the humans responsible are not aware of this requirement.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G OAR
ATC / advisory: CTAF OAR
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Upon landing at OAR; AWOS reported 10 mile visibility; clear below 12;000 feet. On final the ceiling was not 12;000 feet and clear; it was 600 feet and broken. I was able to safely land; but after waiting an hour the entire area became overcast at about 500 feet; yet OAR AWOS was still reporting clear below 12;000 and 10SM visibility. This is very dangerous as this is the only weather reporting in the area which can be much different than MRY which was reporting VFR. The AWOS needs to be fixed before someone at night relies on it and is killed by flying into IMC.




Synopsis: Pilot reported the AWOS at OAR airport was not reporting accurate weather.