elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Wheels/Tires/Brakes
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Unbeknown to me; I flew a flight from ZZZ with an improper tire installed on my aircraft. I was scheduled to fly the same aircraft on the next leg and during the ETOPS (Extended Operations) pre departure service check the error was found and a new tire was installed.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that during preflight check an improper tire was found to be installed.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Performing flight [for] Aircraft X; we aborted a takeoff for two blown tires. It was a right seat takeoff. The Captain positioned the aircraft on the runway and controls were transferred to me. It was a static TO takeoff. We were cleared for takeoff. With brakes applied; I advanced thrust levers to the detent. [Instruments] and thrust were checked. The brakes were smoothly released and we started to accelerate. 80 knots was called. As we accelerated everything appeared normal. The aircraft then started to shake followed by a slight pull to the left. I had not heard V1 and began to pull the thrust levers to idle. The Captain immediately recognized and called for the abort and told ATC we were going to exit the runway. Around 90 knots the Captain called for control of the aircraft. As we cleared the runway; I made a PA for the passengers to please remain seated. We got a brake degrade EICAS message as we cleared the runway. We checked the EICAS hydraulic page the temperature on the right mains were in the yellow. We went through the QRH looking for actions to perform for a blown tire; but neither the Captain nor I found any such procedure to perform. The Flight Attendant was notified of the situation. Emergency service met the plane and confirmed our two left main tires were blown out. We preformed the After Landing and Shutdown Checklists. The main cabin door was opened and the passengers exited the aircraft normally to the awaiting shuttle buses.




Synopsis: Embraer 145 flight crew reported rejecting takeoff upon experiencing indications of blown tire below V1.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: E60.Airport, AZ
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying a return leg trip I overflew E60 at 4500 ft. MSL. I began to see parachutes in close proximity to my aircraft. I evaded the parachutes by making a turn to the east and dropping about 500 ft. altitude. The closest parachute was probably about 300-500 ft. in front of my airplane at the same altitude. The turn avoided the largest group of jumpers that seemed to be to the west of my position. I was not monitoring the Eloy CTAF at the time and was unaware of jumpers being released above my altitude.




Synopsis: Piper PA-28 pilot reported coming within 300-500 feet of a jumper while overflying E60 airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground PHX
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Clearance gave us the Stanfield 3 Departure with the OLIIN transition J2 ALIBY ....I was talking to Clearance and referencing an iPad with freshly downloaded government charts HI; LOW and APPROACH PLATES. I was not able to find OLIIN on either HI or LOW IFR Enroute charts so I asked clearance for a clarification how to transition from Oliin to J2. OLIIN was shown on the Stanfield 3 Departure but not shown on J2. After 10-15 minutes they came back and advised that CIE VOR had been decommissioned and that Oliin intersection took its place. I checked FDC NOTAMS and other sources and did not find any reference. On start up Ground told us to re-contact Clearance. They then amended our clearance to not include OLIIN or J2. We had another IPAD in the plane with government charts loaded (different source) so I checked it for OLIIN on J2. That set of charts did in fact show that OLIIN was on J2 West of CIE. We flew our amended clearance that did not include OLIIN. I re-contacted Clearance while in flight and advised them we found the intersection on J2 that was depicted on one source but not on another (both government chart downloads). I am following up with the source of the downloads that was missing the intersection.




Synopsis: A BE200 pilot was unable to find OLIIN waypoint on J2 on government charts downloaded to an iPad.  Clearance delivery advises that OLIIN has replaced CIE which is to be decommissioned.  The fix was located on a second iPad downloaded from a different source.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial fixed wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D10
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The FMS-stored route for XXXDAL01 includes the GLEN ROSE Arrival; including coming over the top of DFW; and the last two fixes are HURBS and [Runway] 13R. However; this is problematic for several reasons. First; the GLEN ROSE Arrival doesn't allow a turn direct to [Runway] 13R after HURBS Intersection. Second; this stored flight plan does not include ISABL at 11;000; it must be entered by the Pilot. But if; after being entered; the pilots change runways to [Runway] 13L; the ISABL 11;000 restriction will drop out. So; even after having verified the crossing points; it is possible for this restriction to drop out if the runway is changed; causing a violation; and possible separation. (Note: this did not occur on this flight. Everything went normal because of my awareness of the situation. I am just reporting this for safety awareness because I believe it is a problem; since I have encountered it in the past; and have filed an ASAP in the past on the issue.




Synopsis: An air carrier First Officer advised of flaws in the programming of the GLEN ROSE STAR to DAL in his aircraft's FMC database.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After we started our taxi; we got a call from the Lead Flight Attendant (FA) that a passenger's two year old child was refusing to wear his mask. They stated that the child's Dad was very upset; and had some choice words about the situation. They also said they tried multiple times to get the child to wear the mask; but he refused. We made a decision to return to the gate and requested a Customer Service Agent meet us. After we return to the gate; the FA and Customer Service Agent talked to the Dad. They said he apologized; and that the child was finally wearing his mask. I asked the FAs if they were okay with leaving with the Dad and his child; they said yes. We pushed off the gate and continued to our destination without any further incident.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported returning to gate because a child passenger would not conform to face mask policy and the passenger's father was confrontational with the flight attendants.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: It was my second day on the line. This was a repositioning  flight with two other crew members in the back who I was taking to ZZZ to fly their lines. I was on standby for the first half of the day and I had just flown ZZZ to ZZZ1 then to ZZZ2 and was in IMC from take off to landing on each flight. I was unaware upon leaving ZZZ1 that they had scheduled me to fly these other pilots to ZZZ after reaching ZZZ2. So I operated the flight and all went according to plan except I had an unstable approach into ZZZ. Using the auto pilot for the approach I ended up descending below minimum altitude for the final approach fix and continued well below glide slope until I was approximately 1200 AGL at which point I disconnected autopilot; increased power to help arrest the descent rate; caught up to the glide slope and hand flew the rest of the approach. I relied too heavily on the autopilot and lost situational awareness. I also could have asked one of the other pilots to act as copilot.I think it would be safer to not have new hire Captains fly without an FO (First Officer) in hard IMC for multiple legs even if it is just a reposition flight. And if there is a crew member on board they should sit right seat.




Synopsis: Pilot reported inadvertently descending below minimum approach altitudes in instrument conditions and cited automation dependency as a contributing factor.
Date: 201712
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was contacted due to a sick passenger on board who fainted and hit his head on the floor and became unconscious. I attempted to contact the physician on call at Med link and was told to standby for the doctor. While being placed on hold the cell connection dropped and the call was lost. I was still on hold for the doctor when the Captain called back. I was still on hold for the doctor and was finally able to establish a conference call with myself; Medlink assistant and the Captain. The cell connection was again dropped while still remaining on hold for the physician to join into the conference call. The cell connection again faded and disconnected while awaiting the Physician on call only this time I was able to give the captain a VHF frequency to contact me on in case we became disconnected again. The Captain called me back through the ARINC VHF frequency and a stable connection was finally established. All three parties were still on hold for the physician on call to come into the conference call during a span of time that I estimate to be seven to eight minutes.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported issues with the Company's airborne medical communications system.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Golden Eagle 421
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: A preflight inspection was performed on the aircraft before takeoff with nothing out of the ordinary noted. Normal flight of 35 minutes under VMC. Weather was scattered clouds at 3;500 FT MSL with over 10 SM visibility. Cruise altitude was 2;500 FT MSL. Thirty miles from the airport pilot started cooling engine by reducing manifold pressure 2 inches every 3 minutes. Manifold pressure was 21 inches and RPM was set to 1;700 RPM. Position report was given to airport traffic (Unicom) 10 miles out and then again just turning final. First 10 degrees of flaps 6 miles out and gear down at 160 MPH and last 20 degrees flaps (total 30) when airspeed reduced to 140 MPH. Pilot could see two reds and two whites during descent on VASI. Pilot slowed to 120 MPH or less for touchdown. Pilot checked and verified 3 green landing lights three times---on base; final and just before touchdown. Also; pilot checked that front nose gear was down via mirror on side of left engine. All 3 gears were down and locked. Just before touchdown point pilot reduced manifold pressure back to engine rumble (15' manifold pressure) and started flaring at about 5 FT above the runway. Touchdown point was at the 1;000 FT marker. First 5 seconds of landing rollout normal and then left wheel started vibrating at 1;500 FT marker and after 2;000 FT marker left gear collapsed. Aircraft propeller struck ground at about the 2;000 FT marker and skid about 2;000 FT. The last 50 FT or so the aircraft veered to the left and skid about 30 FT into the grassy area and then stopped. Pilot shut off all electrical and all fuel. Pilot and crew then safely departed aircraft with no injuries. Preflight inspection should include a more thorough inspection of the gear system with a flashlight. Annual should include a more thorough inspection of the gear system.




Synopsis: Despite regular and specific observation of a normal landing gear extension; the pilot of a Cessna 421 suffered the collapse of the left main gear during landing roll out.
Date: 201401
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: One hour into flight I was Relief Pilot in Bunk. We hit severe turbulence for 15 minutes followed by continuous MOD TURB. It lasted nearly 30-45 minutes. When my break was over I returned to cockpit. They told me they gained/ lost 100 FT and it set off the overspeed warning horn for 4-5 seconds. They did not know how much the VMO exceedance was because of the side to side and up down motion of the turbulence. Prior to flight the weather picture showed a severe blob of weather. But the flight plan has notes telling pilots to not even ask for [the normal alternate routing around] Mendoza valley then up the Pacific. The flight plan notes discourage pilots from even asking for [company specific alternate routing]. We are told in ground school it is only 100 miles difference. Yet the flight plan notes say that route costs $9K to 16;000 dollars more. I find that hard to believe.  Net result we scared a full flight of CUSTOMERS because some guy who sits at a desk and has never flown this route decided to write notes on the flight plan demanding that pilots disregard safety. Please look at the notes on the flight plan. Fleet CA 777/787 and some other guy wrote these notes DO NOT ASK DISPATCHER FOR [alternate routing].  This was the one time that if I'd been the CA I would have called and asked for [the alternate routing]. I know this sounds harsh; but I am a Captain in training. And things like safe flight planning must prevail. The pilots told me they deviated more than 100 NM around this weather and even that was not enough.




Synopsis: B777 Relief Pilot reports encountering severe turbulence while he is in the bunk. The area of severe turbulence was known prior to departure but the Dispatcher did not plan around it and the crew was discouraged from requesting a different route.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D98.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While entering the local practice area; clearing turns were being performed prior to maneuvering. During one clearing turn; another aircraft was seen above and to the side. I continued the turn and entered a descent to remain clear of the other aircraft. The other aircraft was flying straight and level; and I do not know if it was in the practice area maneuvering or passing through; it appeared to be flying straight and level when I first saw it. A system such as ADS-B would be beneficial to avoid this situation in the future. As the aircraft was initially obscured by the wing during the first clearing turn; it was only during the second turn that it could be seen. Having ADS-B or a similar system provide alerts in all directions; even blind spots; would be hugely beneficial in ensuring a clear area; in addition to visual scanning and clearing turns. Furthermore; an established practice area frequency and reporting points would ensure separation of aircraft maneuvering in the practice area. Multiple schools use the same area; at the same time; so coordination prior to flight is currently difficult. Speaking to each school about using a common frequency and performing regular callouts would greatly increase the safety of the practice area. I do not know if the other aircraft was a training flight; or an aircraft passing through; which would be more difficult to coordinate with. The importance of clearing turns and correct visual scan is evident for me; in performing those actions; a potential conflict was avoided.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot cites the importance of clearing turns for avoiding conflicting traffic in the practice area and suggests that ADS-B and a common frequency would make it even safer.