elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During approach when extending flaps from Up/Ret to 0/Ext; the Slat Disagree light came on and the flap/slat handle jammed. Since we had a jump seater in the cockpit; we asked him to go back and visually inspect the slats. He confirmed that they were still stowed and flush with the wing. No asymmetry was felt in the controls. We accomplished the No flap/No slat landing procedure; an emergency was declared followed by a normal landing; and aircraft was taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: MD-82 crew received a flap/slat disagree warning; declared an emergency and landed without incident.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S56.TRACON, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E S56
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working departure sectors in a North flow. [A Cirrus] departed and by the time he checked in on my frequency; I observed what looked like a turn to the east. I asked him to verify heading 340 and he said 'negative; I am in a right turn to [next point] at 5000 feet. I asked the aircraft if he could provide his own terrain obstruction clearance below 10000 feet because he was already in higher MVA's (Minimum vectoring Altitudes) he replied that he could. I turned him away from the mountains and gave him a low altitude alert. I then asked him one more time to verify he had the terrain in sight. The pilot responded in the positive. His track wasn't getting him away from the terrain as fast as I would have liked so I turned him further to the East. I'm not really sure what to recommend. The pilot was issued a heading from the tower but never read it back.




Synopsis: A Departure Controller reported an aircraft departed on the wrong heading and was below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approaching IAH ATIS advertised possibility of receiving RNAV (RNP) 26R. Captain did a thorough STAR and approach briefing using the 767 QRG RNAV (RNP) Approach Briefing Guide. ATC cleared; and crew loaded; verified; and executed DRILLR5 STAR connecting to line selectable RNAV (RNP) 26R. There was no discontinuity on LEGS page of FMC. It read: SKLER-DRKAR-VECTORS-SOOPR-OWELL... to the runway. HSI magenta line showed a line continuing straight ahead from DRKAR as well as a curved RF path between DRKAR and SOOPR. Left autopilot was on and connected; and [mnemonic] procedure completed with TDZE altitude set in MCP. During the arrival briefing; I brought up that 'VECTORS' was in the LEGS page between DRKAR and SOOPR. However; PLAN and MAP mode showed the RF as stated above; with a curved RF path connecting DRKAR and SOOPR. After complete discussion among the flight deck crew; and referencing the QRH Briefing Guide (specifically under FMC Setup/LEGS 'Do not add or delete waypoints between the FAF/FAP/GP Intercept and the RWY/MAP inclusive') the entire crew expected the aircraft to follow the leg to SOOPR. Instead; after passing DRKAR the aircraft continued on 087 degrees heading/vector. Within 10 seconds; and before Captain could react; ATC advised that we were late to make the turn; and needed to discontinue the RNAV (RNP) 26R. ATC changed approach to vectors ILS 26R. Subsequent approach and landing were normal.




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) 26R arrival to IAH even though the FMC seemed to be programmed properly.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Experienced asymmetric thrust on climb out. FO was PF. EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) gauges were aligned but N1; EGT; FF; N2 were all 30 to 40 percent apart. We selected manual throttles and to balance the symmetry of flight. We could not increase the left engine without overshooting the max EPR. At that point the left engine was max EPR and all other gauges where reduced from the right engine by 30 to 40 percent. We leveled at 10;000 ft and observed very little thrust to accelerate or climb. Observing our lack of thrust we elected to return to ZZZ. At this point Maintenance speculated a bad PT7 probe on the left engine.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported that during initial climbout the Number 1 engine failed to produce normal thrust. The flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After 80 KIAS on takeoff roll and initial climb; co-pilot PFD was not reading airspeed. Associated issues included lack of yaw damper; aileron feel annunciator; and gear warning horn after retraction. Crew ran checklist for the aileron feel light and decided to return as we were already below max landing weight. Once on the ground; crew realized they missed a pitot tube cover. We removed cover; refiled flight plan and completed the fight.Contributing factors involved in this included a pitot cover that is missing a flag and a walk-around preflight that did not catch it. Moving forward; company is providing new pitot covers with added visibility and procedural changes including pilot and co-pilot sign offs on accuracy of workarounds and other preflight duties.




Synopsis: Falcon 2000 Captain reported experiencing lack of yaw damper; aileron feel annunciator; and gear warning horn after retraction in addition to no First Officer airspeed indication. Flight returned to discover the right pitot cover had not been removed.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DAL
ATC / advisory: Tower DAL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared the visual approach to 31L at Dallas Love Field while flying a right downwind to Runway 31L. As I turned from downwind to base I pointed the nose of the aircraft toward downtown Dallas as our closure rate became closer to the buildings and I started my turn from base to final we received a GPWS caution 'Terrain' 'Too Low Terrain' at approximately 1;600 feet MSL. I stopped my descent rate and continued the turn to final in order to correct the flight path. The terrain caution stopped and we continued the approach to an uneventful landing. ATC never advised us of an altitude alert or warning. The correct action would have been to go-around on the approach since our procedure is to correct the flight path; which we did and we were able to silence the terrain caution. It also says that; if on approach; initiate a go-around for any of the following: night; IMC; unable to acquire terrain visually.We were flying a night visual approach and had the terrain in sight and correcting the flight path; but since it was night conditions we should have initiated a go-around.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew received an EGPWS 'Terrain; Terrain' and 'Too Low Terrain' warning while flying a visual approach to DAL Runway 31L at night. The warning is silenced and the crew continued for a safe landing.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Passing through 10;000 feet near ZZZZZ INT on the arrival into ZZZ; we received a BRAKE OVHT Warning Message on the EICAS. We followed the QRH and the message went away. It appeared to be a false indication from the start. We had been in flight for [XX] minutes with no abnormalities. Suddenly; at the same time we received the EICAS message; the RHOB brake temp went from 00 to 16 and turned red. While executing the QRH procedure; the temp of the RHOB dropped back to 00. We cleared the message and the flight went on toward ZZZ. A few minutes later; we received an IDG 1 caution message while passing through 7;000 feet; Again; we ran the QRH procedure and proceeded to disconnect IDG 1. The message went away and no further abnormalities were encountered. The flight landed safely in ZZZ 10 min later.The BRAKE OVHT message was likely a system glitch; but we followed the QRH. The IDG 1 message was displayed due to a mechanical irregularity.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported a brake overheat light activated while en-route to destination.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCI.Tower, MO
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MCI
ATC / advisory: Tower MCI
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Approach Controller left us high and fast compared to the preceding Aircraft Y. We were instructed to slow and descend which we did. We were asked if we had the Aircraft Y in sight which we did as well as the runway. Our ground speed was roughly 35 kts. faster than the Aircraft Y as ground speed mini had our approach speed at 160 kts. Our spacing was roughly two and one half miles according to our ND. The Aircraft Y did not clear the runway with sufficient spacing and we were directed to go-around. While on subsequent vectors and turning base; ATC advised of VFR traffic that would be at our 12 o'clock position and 500 ft. below. That traffic was in sight visually; as well as on the TCAS. While on our base leg; that aircraft climbed to within 300 ft. and we received a TCAS RA with instructions not to descend. The autopilot was disconnected and level flight was maintained. Once we were clear of the conflict; automation was restored and we landed without further incident.MCI was operating on Runway 27 with high winds from the west. With this not being their normal two runway traffic flow; spacing issues could become more challenging. When we were given the instruction to slow and descend; a comment was made about the Controller having forgotten about us. It didn't help that the Aircraft Y was not able to make F or E as the Tower had hoped and then was instructed to expedite to C8. For the TCAS; the same Controller that didn't allow for enough approach spacing may have felt an earlier turn to base and final was a good way to help us out to make amends. After the initial base vector; he did shorten our turn by 10 degrees to allow us to pass behind the other aircraft; which would have worked had that aircraft maintained a VFR altitude.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported an NMAC on approach to MCI following an unstabilized approach.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PWK.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 60
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Weather Clear unlimited visibility. We were on an IFR flight plan being vectored into PWK at 5000ft and 250kts. ATC never warned us of the glider and ATC did not have a Primary or Secondary target. We did not receive an RA or a TA. The glider moved from our upper right crossing in front of us in a descending left bank. I disengaged the autopilot and banked right about 20 degrees and descended 300ft. The copilot immediately notified ATC. ATC replied that they did not show a target. We then climbed back up to 5000ft and on heading.




Synopsis: G200 Captain reported a NMAC with a glider while inbound to PWK. Glider reportedly had no transponder and ATC was unaware of their position.
Date: 201906
Aircraft: Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Tactical
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a routine inspection; I found several problems with the Main Rotor Head Assembly. To include corrosion and worn bearings; I checked the maintenance manuals and found several of the pieces of the main rotor head to be out of limits. As far as the corrosion was concerned; I informed management about this situation. First; I was told I wasn't supposed to be looking at any of that and second that the customer doesn't want anything done about the issues. I was coerced into signing the discrepancies out of fear for my job. At my age; I felt at the time I didn't have much choice. The sign off was as follows. Treated affected areas with Corrosion X. Item not to be addressed at this time per customer request. No further action to be taken at this time.The Worn bearings issue. Item not to be addressed at this time. Per customer request.




Synopsis: AS350 Maintenance Technician reported being told not to write-up discrepancies found during inspection.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SDP.Airport, AK
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Prior to April 05; 2014; the CTAF for SDP (PASD) was 122.3. This was also the same frequency for the pilot controlled lighting. The latest Alaska supplement and Alaska Terminal procedures came out on that date. It now shows the CTAF and pilot controlled lighting frequency as 122.8. Unfortunately; the frequency for the pilot controlled lighting has not been physically changed. The original frequency (122.3); is also monitored full time by either the Cold Bay FSS or the Kenai FSS. It would make sense to me to switch the CTAF and the pilot controlled lighting back to the original frequency. Since it is monitored by the FSS; it would also add an additional level of safety for aircraft operating in the Sand Point area. We have made several pilot reports to Anchorage Center and to the Kenai FSS informing them of the discrepancy. So far there has been no NOTAM released relating to the issue.




Synopsis: A pilot reported the SDP (PASD) CTAF and pilot controlled lighting frequency was recently changed per the latest published Alaska supplement and Alaska Terminal procedures. Despite the frequency change on the published charts to 122.8; pilots wishing to control runway lighting must use the previous frequency of 122.3.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Squat Switch
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff aircraft momentarily indicated landing gear air/ground fail. Message immediately extinguished. Landed on the longest runway at the nearest suitable airport without incident. Emergency was declared.




Synopsis: An E-145 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable airport when they received an EICAS air/ground fail message on takeoff.