Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: TRACON A90; Tower BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Since we departed; we were told to do 310 KTS or better all the way into BOS. Once we were switched to the final approach controller; she was giving us vectors and told us to maintain 250 KTS until advised and that it would be a short approach. We maintained 250 KTS until we were told to maintain 200 KTS or better and we were cleared for the visual approach into Runway 27.As we were trying to slow down and get configured; I made a comment to FO. I said; 'We may have to go around.' He understood that I was calling for a go-around. He raised the flaps from 3 to 2. Then his hand was over the landing gear lever and he made a comment that we did not have positive rate to raise the gear. At the same time; I called for flaps 5. That is when we both finally realized that we were not on the same page. He moved the flaps to 5 and I performed a normal landing in BOS.Because we were below 1;500 and above 1;000 feet; I decided to finish the configuration of the aircraft. Looking back at it; I should have just abandoned the approach and performed a go-around and just come back in and reconfigured. Allowing to be rushed into a visual approach and miscommunication with my FO. The misunderstanding started because of my comment about a go-around during a very high workload moment.


Second narrative: We were on final approach for the visual Runway 27 BOS. I was the pilot monitoring. We had just been handed off from approach control to the tower. I originally called Boston tower on the frequency published on the approach plate of 132.22. For some reason they were using a different frequency of 128.8 and they had me switch to 128.8. Just after completing my radio call to tower and receiving our landing clearance the pilot flying said; 'We may have to go around; flaps 5.' I mistakenly thought he said; 'Go around; flaps 2.' At approximately the outer marker I moved the flaps from 3 to 2. When I asked about the gear we realized the miscommunication had occurred. We selected flaps five and completed the approach.The timing of pilot flying's call occurred at a time when I was still listening to air traffic control and I missed part of his communication. When I heard the phrase go around I instinctively thought I heard flaps 2; rather than flaps 5.


Synopsis: EMB190 flight crew describes a miscommunication during approach during which the Captain states 'We may have to go around; flaps 5' (full). The First Officer hears go around; flaps 2 and selects 2 then asks about the gear. At this point the Captain conveys that he intends to land; flaps 5 is selected and the unstable approach is continued to landing.