elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I operated ZZZ-ZZZZ. I compared Jepp charts to the Charts+. There are still critical errors with these new charts. The Jepp charts and the FMS (Flight Management System) list individual fixes on the DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) arcs (i.e.; D013N). The Charts+ still do not list these fixes on the DME arcs in Mexico where we need every piece of available information given we are flying out of radar services with high terrain all around the approach.  It is literally impossible to brief an approach when the charts are missing fixes! How does our company expect us to safely operate using charts with MISSING information? If we did not have Jepp charts; there is no way we could have adequately briefed this approach.The safest solution is stay with Jepp charts that are proven and reliable. These Charts+ are inaccurate; cluttered; and very difficult to decipher information. Charts+ is still unsafe.




Synopsis: Flight Crew evaluating new Navigation Charts recommends staying with current charts.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Filed route to IAH was on NNCEE ONE RNAV arrival. We were reassigned with Houston Center prior to commencing arrival to fly LINKK arrival. FMC was programmed with arrival and expected runway. After starting LINKK arrival which has same routing as the NNCEE; but some differences in altitude restrictions we were again reassigned the NNCEE arrival and descend via arrival. This occurred between SKALE and LINKK. The FMC was re-programmed with arrival and runway. The differences in altitudes on arrival are LINKK 12;000-15;000 for LINKK arrival and LINKK 17;000-FL200 on the NNCEE. This was the next point in the FMC. The altitude was set for the bottom on arrival of 6;000. We had descended below the 17;000 restriction down to 15;700. ATC was notified of this.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a late runway change on arrival to IAH airport resulted in undershooting the crossing restriction during STAR transition.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CRW.Airport, WV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C CRW
ATC / advisory: Tower CRW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Coming in to CRW we were assigned direct to STILT; FAF point for the ILS approach to Runway 23 - to 3;000 ft. in VFR conditions. We were cleared for the visual and we turned to a downwind from the FAF and went down to 2;400 ft.; which was the FAF altitude where we received an aural warning for terrain and [a] pull up alert. I disengaged the autopilot and climbed back up 3;000 ft. [and] hand flew the approach to Runway 23 without any other incidents. Being cleared for the visual with the ILS backup; muscle memory had me descend to the FAF altitude temporarily before realizing that CRW has different procedures regarding approaches for 23. Knowing that CRW is a special airport; staying at the higher altitude last received till established on the approach was all that was needed even though the visual was given.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on a visual approach to destination airport.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post-Flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon opening the main cabin door; we received a master warning indicating that the left engine was running. I verified that it was not shutdown and initiated the shutdown procedure. I believe this occurred due to the thrust lever not being fully idle when parking. I was trying to deal with a ramp issue with the air stairs malfunctioning and must have been distracted by that to have not realized the before we opened the door.The Shutdown Checklist has a thrust lever idle item. I think we should replace it or add a new item that says engines verified off since it is possible to have an engine still running with a very slight displacement of the lever above idle.




Synopsis: Pilot reported not realizing the engine was still running after opening the main cabin door.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: First flight pre-flight walk around found evidence of a bird strike on the aircraft right side behind the radome. The appropriate [Maintenance Log] entry was made with Dispatch notified. Having not flown the aircraft in; I had no idea when or where the bird strike had happened. I got distracted with an APU MEL issue that culminated in an aircraft swap and as a consequence neglected to notify ATC of a bird strike event.[Pay] better attention to detail. Perhaps add a requirement for post flight walk arounds after each flight.


Second narrative: We were assigned an aircraft with the APU on MEL for our flight to JFK. My FO (First Officer) recalled that in the past at [other airlines] we had a limitation on flying into JFK without an APU due to JFK airport authorities ramp procedures limitations. However; we could not find any information in our current Jeppesen airport pages regarding that type of limitation. When calling my dispatcher he along with several others he queried in [Operations Control] knew of no limitations. However; my dispatcher dug deeper and found an airport operator NOTAM which stated that ramp personnel are not permitted to approach the aircraft until both engines are shut down. This Airport Operations NOTAM is not available to the pilots through [mobile information app]. We discussed the issue and determined that if this was indeed the case; with an inop APU; the only choice on arrival at the gate would be to shutdown both engine to battery power so as to allow the ground crew to approach the aircraft and connect ground power. In our case the issue was eventually rendered mute after this aircraft encountered another mechanical issue that took it out of service necessitating an aircraft swap to an airplane with a working APU.1. Is this airport authority ramp operations limitation applicable to [our company]?2. If so; add information to the JFK Jeppesen Company Airport pages regarding same.Airport ramp operations procedures that impact APU inop operations.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported finding evidence of bird strike on walk around and difficulties finding procedure limitations for their destination airport.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: Tower PHX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We waited for a long time in the lineup prior to being cleared for takeoff. I felt like I was lulled into distraction. Takeoff clearance came immediately and I felt like I was behind the aircraft; not sure of our clearance and feeling rushed; but not communicating this information. Rotated correctly but felt like my scan 'dropped out' and I over rotated after liftoff. Remember seeing my airspeed bleed off and began to correct when I got a momentary stick shaker. I corrected with nose low momentarily and power and continued the climbout uneventfully.


Second narrative: It was the FO taking off. About 500 to 700 AGL; the Captain pitched the aircraft up at a fast rate. I noticed speed trend decreasing. I simultaneously blocked his pitch on the yoke by pushing yoke forward; and said 'No! No! Watch speed!' I realized that he was pitching towards stall fence on PFD. He corrected pitch. We had a momentary sound of the stick shaker.We talked about it. He felt awful. With the latest changes in our V-Bars and flight director going to a dual cue display; he looks visually onto the stall fence displayed and attempt to pitch the aircraft into these displays as if they were our old v-bars (pitch display).


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported the FO over-rotated after takeoff and got a momentary stick shaker before reducing pitch.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Several months ago D01 developed new procedures for landing Runway (RWY'S) 16L/R. These procedures designate one runway as the 'high' runway for an ILS approach and the other 'low' runway for visual approaches. The idea is to get the aircraft established on final with 1;000 feet vertical separation and reduce the number of TCAS RA's. In order to build in this vertical separation an aircraft on the downwind for the high runway must go out to a minimum of 15-18 NM final even if they are number one in the sequence.Aircraft X was inbound to DEN and [identified as] a medical emergency with ZDV prior to entering D01 airspace; a 63 year old unconscious male. AR1 informed me that he attempted to coordinate a visual approach to RWY17L; which would have been the shortest route; but it was denied by the Traffic Management Unit (TMU). Instead they were told to vector Aircraft X to a right down wind for the ILS RWY16R approach. When Aircraft X checked in with me on FR and re-stated they were a medical emergency; I immediately asked the Supervisor if I could descend Aircraft X early and clear them for a visual approach to RWY16R via 7110.65 ch. 7-4-4; which could save them potentially critical time. I was told no and that I had to comply with the new SOP. Aircraft X was now required to fly to a 15NM final and given no priority handling.When I was off position; I asked the Supervisor why he wouldn't allow me to clear Aircraft X via the 7110.65 rules. He said if I had; and it caused a TCAS RA with traffic on the parallel runway; he thought there would be serious repercussions from the [management].1. Develop a SOP that is not so rigid and allow the controllers to use their judgment when an emergency exists.2. Allow Aircraft X to make a visual approach to RWY17L; even if it causes a temporary delay for departures off RWY08.3. If the only space for Aircraft X was on RWY16R; assign them the RNZ approach allowing them to avoid a 15 NM final.




Synopsis: Denver TRACON Controller reported an emergency aircraft inbound could not turn early due to a SOP that had been implemented; which then had the aircraft fly a 15 mile final.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RDU.Airport, NC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E RDU
ATC / advisory: TRACON RDU
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload; Physiological - Other; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [While descending via] the ALDAN arrival into RDU we missed the assigned crossing restriction for the final fix of BUTTS. We were task saturated in the cockpit and missed the crossing.Although not a direct influence on this event; the new RNAV procedures that include numerous altitude 'gates' (ceiling and floors) create an extremely high workload and cause task saturation in the cockpit. The FMS does not allow for us to assign multiple restrictions to a single fix; so many of the altitudes must be manually computed for the crossings. The task saturation from these crossings contributed by condensing the time available for additional flight duties.Amend the RNAV procedures to include single altitudes at fixes and not gates.


Second narrative: On descent into RDU via ALDAN 1 RNAV ARRIVAL there where 6 altitude crossing with combination of speed restrictions. We complied with all but missed the last fix restriction (crossing BUTTS at 6;000 FT). I think; I was under the impression we [were] going to be vectored for final before we reached BUTTS; but he [Controller] wanted us all the way down with RNAV arrival. As a result we missed BUTTS at 6;000 FT. We asked ATC if that crated any traffic separation conflict; and he replied 'Negative'.Event occurred because it was the first time I was using this arrival STAR; and I was unfamiliar with the approach plate; and also I didn't pay attention to the whole plate; and also task saturated due to the fact that we had multiple crossing restriction; in combination with performing checklists.Don't assume you are going to be vectored before you reach the fix!!! Be completely familiar with the approach plate ask for help from your pilot not flying to identify fixes and restrictions.


Synopsis: An EMB-140 flight crew failed to comply with the 6;000 FT MSL crossing restriction at BUTTS on the ALDAN RNAV STAR into RDU. Task saturation due to multiple crossing restriction restraints; in particular above/below windows; was cited as the primary contributing factor.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Weather elements / visibility: VFR; 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Special Use MOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Military Trainer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing ZZZ1 airport after a couple touch and goes I noticed Aircraft Y flying in front of us a mile or so. Before coming to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2 airport; I checked ForeFlight and erroneously gleaned that the airspace surrounding ZZZ1 and ZZZ was an MOA. But upon further inspection saw it was a Military Area. I did not contact ZZZ Approach at all. And am very sorry for my mistake. I recently got back into general aviation a few months back because of a lack of flying at my commercial flying job due to COVID.




Synopsis: Small aircraft pilot reported inadvertently entering an MOA.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: IAH at night and positioned at Spot XX on North Ground frequency 118.57.  North Ground Control issued clearance to Runway 33L via - NB left on ND right on NC hold short of NR call Ground on 121.7. Ground Control on 121.7 subsequently asked us to follow an aircraft on taxiway WB (near WW) and follow Aircraft Y on WB to Runway 33L.I began to make a left turn on NE to join WB at WW as there are no taxi lanes on the ground from NC to WB.  Ground Control asked why we were turning left. We attempted to explain that there was no defined path for his instruction.  At night with no painted center lines to follow; (and as typical for the Aircraft X a nose taxi light that is only marginally better than a candle) it appeared that we may depart the hard surface and end up in the grass or dirt. It was only when I turned on my landing and runway turnoff lights that I could see there was hard surface between NC and WB.There are no painted taxi lines between these taxiways. I rarely allow the nose wheel to depart a centerline unless I am maneuvering in a holding pad. The only guarantee that you are not encroaching on other aircraft or obstacles is to ensure that your aircraft is over a center line. There needs to be painted taxi lanes between these two taxiways if there is going to be a clearance from one to the other.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot taxiing at night in IAH reported turning at the wrong spot due to lack of painted taxi lanes on the pavement.