elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class A ZZZ; Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This is a continuing issue and problem with policy and procedures at [this company]. When we were given our clearance from ZZZ; we were given [Departure clearance and transition] As Filed. However [one of this fixes] was not on the flight plan on our release. After questioning ATC and having a discussion with them; the ATC strip filed by the company is not the route that they put on the release. ATC then notified us this is again happening on a continuing basis causing route issues and possible conflicts. We agreed to take a full route clearance which did not match the release at all. The release had [Route X] the ATC strip was [Route Y]. The Fuel was miscalculated at that point for the route on the release not on the ATC strip. Due to a maintenance swap we had enough fuel; only because it was fueled for a different segment. I contacted dispatch via ACARS with no response on why this is not only happening but accepted again. If we would have taken the As Filed we would have been severely off course from what ATC had assigned. On the way we were given direct ZZZZ1 intersection. When we made the turn ATC started asking us where we were going. We stated direct to ZZZZ1 intersection; but in reality we were turning completely away from ZZZZ1 intersection. We ended up getting vectors from ATC to avoid military airspace. Upon further investigation it appears ZZZZ1 intersection is not in the database and at some point someone created an incorrect waypoint named ZZZZ1 intersection around 100 miles away from where ZZZZ1 intersection really is.[Suggest] changes need to happen to be sure that the dispatch release and the ATC strip match. This is an issue that keeps popping up every few months and can cause serious complications to the pilots and ATC. Database issues keep happening and must have resolution along with training on manually created waypoints.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported that the company filed route once again did not match the route on file with ATC.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Attempted to land with a left quartering tailwind. Aircraft departed runway to the right and impacted sand berm off runway. Over flight of the airport and windsock to verify wind direction should have been completed.




Synopsis: PA-11 pilot reported losing directional control after landing with a quartering tailwind.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff. The FO was pilot flying as I was doing Initial Operations Experience (IOE). Climbing through 10;000 feet and 250 KTS we realized the landing gear and gear lever were in the down position. I raised the gear and oversped them. Shortly after (within 5 seconds) received a nose door and gear disagree master warning. I instructed the FO to slow to 220 KTS. I proceeded to run the QRH pressurizing system 2 and 3b. Shortly after; the gear indications showed the gear was up and the EICAS warnings disappeared. I proceeded to contact maintenance to advise them of the situation and subsequently opted to continue to [our destination] with the FO's concurrence.This event occurred because I became fixated on the FO's takeoff. I was distracted by the fact the Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) buttons were not pressed on takeoff and our departure; an RNAV 1; required a flight director. So I became fixated on getting the correct lateral mode for the flight director shortly after takeoff.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported the landing gear was retracted at a speed above the limit when the crew failed to retract the landing gear and it was not noticed until climbing through 10;000 feet and 250 KTS.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was practicing a landing from the rear seat of the aircraft with the owner in the front seat on Runway 17 at [a private airport]. On downwind the runway was clear; however when turning from base to final the front seat pilot informed me there is a tractor on the runway. I looked over his shoulder and observed the tractor stationary in the center of the runway we were attempting to land on and initiated a go-around at approximately 200 feet. We passed over the tractor and left the area.


Second narrative: My neighbor and I were practicing landings on crosswind Runway 17. I was in the front seat and the neighbor was piloting from the rear seat. Upon final the homeowner ran his tractor out on the runway and lifted the bucket to prevent us from landing. We narrowly missed the tractor doing a go-around. The runway blockage was witnessed by another neighbor who immediately came and reported that it was intentional. The tractor stayed on the runway until we landed on [a different] runway and parked the plane.


Synopsis: Two GA pilots reported a person parked a tractor on the runway to prevent a landing at a private airport.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Flight ABCD and Flight ABGD taxied out for departure within minutes of each other at SLC. I believe one was a CRJ900 and one was a CRJ200. I am reasonably sure that I used the right call sign but the flight strips were right next to each other in the bay and I apparently grabbed the wrong one. The aircraft got down to the end and the Local Controller departed the aircraft and it wasn't until after the aircraft tagged up that he/she realized that he/she had the wrong strip. It wasn't a dangerous situation this time; however it could have been because we routinely use visual separation between aircraft. It could have been a same route situation and we could have been expecting different routes and been applying visual. The similar sounding call signs and the darkness were the main culprits. I believe I would have caught the problem had it been daytime because I would have noticed the difference. Later on in the session there was another situation between Flight ACBD and Flight ADBC on the same departures respectively. We handled those without incident but it's another example of the problem we have with airline call signs. I also may have caught the first situation had I been a little less busy; the departure push was just starting; so when the original aircraft taxied; I wasn't busy; but I got busy just after that.




Synopsis: SLC Controller described an unsafe condition when two same company aircraft with similar sounding four digit flight numbers were confused with regard to routing's issued.
Date: 201710
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Cockpit/Cabin Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While completing the before takeoff the Relief Pilot used the Takeoff Flight Attendants Directory automated message in place of the manual 'please be seated for departure' PA announcement. The Flight Attendants indicated during the cruise portion of the flight that the canned before takeoff announcement from the automated directory; was not heard in all parts of the cabin. We wrote up the issue.The Flight Attendants then indicated that this has been an issue; not hearing the automated takeoff announcement on the 777-300 model. Since we; the pilots; are not aware of this being an issue until we are told by the flight attendants; it may not be an identified hazard in the [reporting] data stream. Previously; [there was] an identified hazard of not hearing the takeoff announcement when the announcement was manually made and before the -300's and the automated takeoff and landing announcements were available.Should the automated announcement continue to be the only means of prepare for takeoff; or should the automated announcement be backed up to assure proper communication occurs?The FM currently identifies cycling the No Smoking switch at 10;000 feet to identify to the Flight Attendants of sterile cockpit conditions and the canned announcement of; Flight Attendants prepare for landing; on some of the 777 Fleet; if used as the primary on some aircraft may create confusion; or may not be heard in all cabins as indicates by hazard above?Should our procedures utilize the canned announcements for takeoff and landing announcements in addition to the FOM approved seat belt sign on announcements as highlighted in the FOM or continue with previous FM guidance for the takeoff and double chime for sterile cockpit?




Synopsis: B777-300 Captain reported an anomaly with the automatic announcement system.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were filed [on our short route to DCA] which has a filed cruise altitude of 8;000'. Since we were below 10;000'; we were cruising at 245 KIAS. On [approach] we had already been descended down to 4;000'. ATC queried us on our airspeed to which we responded 245 KIAS. The First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) then thought about us cruising below the Class B airspace and exceeding the max speed of 200 KIAS. We pulled up the VFR sectional chart to find out that we were in fact below the Class B shelf at 4;000' for a small quadrant. We then asked ATC if they required a specific speed to which we were told our discretion. By then we were back into the next Class B quadrant which went down to 3;500' and we remained in Class B for the remainder of the flight.The thought of us flying below Class B airspace hadn't occurred to me since that is usually not a factor for us. Once in a while you will hear ATC inform you that you will be exiting the Class B airspace when you are on extended vectors for an approach. That is your reminder that you should slow to 200 KIAS if not already slowed to below that airspeed. That reminder didn't apply in this case since we were still on the cruise portion of our flight. I believe this experience made both crew members more aware of using our resources to their fullest extent. Having the VFR sectional chart open when cruising on these low level escape routes would have identified the different Class B airspace quadrants that we would be encountering during our routine flight.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported they inadvertently exceeded the 200 kt airspeed limit operating below the Class B shelf inbound to DCA.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to the runway at ZZZZ I forgot to call for final flaps and slow to approach speed. The First Officer called it just below 1000 feet and I immediately configured and slowed. The landing was uneventful. I expect FOQUA (Flight Operations Quality Assurance) will report me for not being on-speed at 1;000 feet or even 500 feet. Visibility was good; the runway was long and given my experience with [foreign] ATC I thought the best and safest course of action was to continue the approach and land; even though I probably exceeded the speed called for by Company Policy.Fatigue and complacency. The flight had been easy and my approach was controlled and unexciting until I forgot the flaps. I think my First Officers were lulled into complacency; thinking I was on top of things. Which I was; until I wasn't. I'd gotten a good night's sleep before the trip and got one short nap inflight. I never sleep well if there's any turbulence at all; and we had a lot of light chop. So; I got forgetful right about the time they decided I was doing okay. I think they all might have been shy about calling me on my error. The weather was good and for all they knew; I was the kind of guy who liked to configure late; which I'm not. We all get tired and those inflight naps don't always work out.


Second narrative: After a long night of flying and landing in day VMC I realized we had not selected final flaps and advised the Captain. We reduced speed and configured for landing but had not completed the Landing Checklist until passing 1;000 feet. We made the decision to continue and land due to the assessment that the aircraft was in a stable configuration and we were tired and this was the safest course of action at the time.This event illustrates the subtle effects of long duty periods into the circadian low. In the future I will give greater attention to all crew members being vigilant to adhering to SOP.


Synopsis: B787 flight crew reported fatigue and complacency led to an unstabilized approach; but continued to land.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Approaching SOORY on NAT track; we were given two SIGMETS by Commercial Radio concerning thunderstorms. The areas were plotted on our chart showing our cleared track in the center of the area. Between SOORY and 44N50W we detected severe weather on our track. We requested deviation from track 90 miles from the storm. At 30 miles from the thunderstorm we started a deviation to stay clear of weather. Approximately 10 miles left of track we received a SELCAL relaying ATC message 'unable deviation'. I informed ATC that I was exercising Captain's emergency authority and we would descend 300 FT. All part 1 and North Atlantic orientation chart procedures were followed and we twice relayed new estimates for the next fix. In spite of having Pegasus aircraft with data link we never received Sigmets from Dispatch. We copied entire Sigmets via HF. It would be useful to have a printed copy of Sigmets instead of writing them in turbulence at night from a fast talking radio operator. It would also reduce frequency congestion if we could answer affirmative when asked if we have Sigmet XXX. Nowhere could I find that it is required to declare an emergency in this circumstance. It would be helpful if are manual could address this issue.


Second narrative: I was the Relief Pilot on this flight; I was just coming off my crew break. Before I sat down to fly the aircraft I notice on radar a very large Thunderstorm on our flight path. Approaching SOORY on NAT track; we were given two SIGMETS by Commercial Radio concerning thunderstorms. The areas were plotted on our chart showing our cleared track in the center of the area. Between SOORY and 44N50W we detected severe weather on our track. We requested deviation from track 90 miles from the storm. At 30 miles from the thunderstorm we started a deviation to stay clear of weather. Approximately 10 miles left of track we received a SELCAL relaying ATC message 'unable deviation'. I informed ATC that I was exercising Captain's emergency authority and we would descend 300 FT.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reports deviating around a thunderstorm on a North Atlantic Track using Captain's emergency authority when ATC cannot provide a clearance to do so.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On aircraft during the shutdown sequence we had an issue as we were too far forward and needed to be pushed back a few feet to allow the ramp to connect to the door. We worked the problem and we were distracted and during the sequence of events as we ran the Shutdown Checklist after being re-chocked; and the right engine was left running. It was not discovered till after both of us left the cockpit. We noticed the engine was running and re-entered and completed the re-run of the shutdown checklist.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported becoming distracted after parking airplane and departed aircraft with one engine running.