elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After takeoff from ZZZ on Runway XXR on climbout around 2;000 MSL we heard a loud thud off the front of the plane and felt the plane shudder. We noticed a power reduction on the Number 1 engine and received an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) message Eng 1 Stall. The Number 1 engine returned to full power shortly after. We also smelled a burning odor coming from the air conditioning system. We determined that we struck a bird or multiple birds on the departure climb out. We immediately [notified ATC] and returned to ZZZ airport. We return to the airport without further events. Upon arrival at the gate; on the post flight inspection we noticed damage to the Number 1 engine and left wing leading edge and engine nacelle. Also bird remains on the tail of the aircraft.




Synopsis: A320 flight crew encountered a bird strike after takeoff.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight was Sabre flight-planned to come in close proximity to the Cuban FIR just before entering the Port au Prince FIR at JOSES intersection.  As it turns out; we had to deviate west of track for weather and I became concerned we would need to enter Cuban airspace.  I could not find the Cuban overflight permit number in the Sabre briefing package.  Fortunately I did not have to enter their airspace; although I estimate that I came within 5 miles of the border.  Querying dispatch via Sabre SMEs; they replied 'We only provide the data for the plan route of flight and the countries and FIR's that are progressed during the plan. We can add NOTAM with the permit data for the adjacent FIR's but this would be difficult to manage and update. The crew can always ask the dispatcher for the permit number or they can refer to the airport database and get the permits they may need during the preflight briefing.'  I do not find this to be adequate as we cannot always foresee the need to deviate and by the time one is in flight looking at a thunderstorm area it is too late to look up the permit number on the internet.  In comparison; under [the old system] we were routinely given the Cuban overflight number as a company NOTAM. As a separate issue related to that deviation; the depiction of FIR data (frequencies); FIR notes; and special intersection notes are inadequate on the Jeppesen enroute chart in the EFB.  The tiny area that has to be touched to trigger display of the notes is hard to target in turbulence and the notes are incomplete (frequencies are not localized by sector location and the intersections do not provide the special notes that are on the paper charts).  Currently the iPad enroute chart is not an adequate replacement for paper charts in WATRS operations.




Synopsis: B737 Captain laments the lack of a Cuban overflight permit number while avoiding thunderstorms adjacent to Cuban airspace. He also believes that iPad displayed enroute charts cannot take the place of paper charts due to the lack notes and the difficulty bring what notes are available using the touchscreen in turbulence.
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the Captain on Aircraft X. Upon arrival at the aircraft our planned DG [Dangerous Goods] manifest showed 54 LBS of explosives in 7 packages. I queried Dispatch who patched in the DG personnel. I asked them exactly what were we carrying. They could only tell me that the items were the least dangerous explosives (an oxymoron if I've ever heard one); that the amount was right at the limit of what could be carried and that the explosives were the only type of explosives [company] would carry. Yet with all that information; they still could not tell me what exactly we were carrying. In the interest of safety; I had the cargo removed. We departed on time.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported refusing Dangerous Goods cargo due to Dispatch having no knowledge of what type of DG it was.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While nearing the approach on IFR flight to ZZZ I was cleared for the visual by Center.  Both Center and myself were having communication difficulties generated by radio traffic on frequency.  Center stated their current ATIS was dated and ZZZ Tower was closed. Center gave cancelling instructions but I decided to cancel IFR at that time.  While on approach I accessed ZZZ ATIS but allowed myself to be distracted by several targets on ADSB. I made the mistake of assuming landings were Runway XX; but in fact; one plane was in a left crosswind pattern for [Runway] XYL and one plane was beginning takeoff roll from [Runway] XYL.  I had announced my arrival [on frequency] (Tower).  At the time of seeing the plane in the pattern; I did not realize it was in the pattern and assumed it was departing the airport area.  On short final at approximately 300 feet AGL; I saw the other plane taking off from Runway XYL become airborne. I immediately side-stepped north and then corrected and landed uneventfully on [Runway] XXR.  In retrospect; I should have approached what had become an uncontrolled airport with caution; determined the local traffic and the runways in use before committing to a final on [Runway] XXR.  I should also have monitored the ZZZ Unicom frequency as well.




Synopsis: Cessna pilot reported an NMAC event in the landing pattern.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 35A.Airport, SC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class G 35A
ATC / advisory: CTAF 35A
Second aircraft: Fighting Falcon F16
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had a very scary encounter with three F-16s in South Carolina just south west of 35A while flying along in a R44. While flying at 2;500 feet and northeast bound I saw them pass me on my right side several miles away from me; at my altitude; and headed on a similar course as me at a high rate of speed. As I kept my eye on them I noticed that they had turned and started heading directly towards me. They were still probably a minute away from me so I continued to just watch as they rapidly approached me at my altitude and at my 3 o'clock. So I immediately entered a high rate descent but only to have them descend with me at my same rate. I descended from 2;500 feet to about 250 feet AGL only to have them descend to 250 feet AGL as well still on a direct collision path with me. At approximately 700 to 500 feet away from me they then made a very aggressive high speed turn in the opposite direction I was headed! I was very frightened from the incident. I was shaking for a few minutes afterwards.




Synopsis: R44 helicopter pilot reported he was 'frightened' by the close; and apparently deliberate; pass of three F-16s.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approaching the end of the MODESTO FIVE arrival; the Captain had to query ATC which runway to expect.NORCAL responded '28 right'. A minute later; NORCAL cleared us for the 'FMS 28R'. Due to lack of familiarity with the arrival/FMS visual we had not loaded the approach beforehand and were not able to immediately find and load the approach in the FMS. We had to ask NORCAL for vectors/visual approach. We continued the approach and landing without incident and without any loss of separation.We believe the controller was referring to the 'FMS bridge visual 28R approach' when he cleared us for the 'FMS 28R' approach. Experimenting on the ground we found that this is identified in our FMS as the 'RNV28R' approach.If we were advised earlier in the arrival; we could have identified and loaded the approach.I guess you just have to know what is coming by having flown with someone else in the past who is familiar with the arrival. I got the impression that the MOD5 always ends in an ILS28R or an 'FMS bridge visual 28R approach' and the controllers expect everyone to know that.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported confusion in the cockpit when they were cleared for approach to Runway 28R but were not sure; because of terminology issues; which procedure to load in the FMS.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ1.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After the parking checklist was completed we found a ACARS printout informing us of an overweight landing.  The printout listed the Max Structural Landing weight of 146;300; the actual landing weight section was blank.  Using our ZFW and arrival gate fuel we were approximately 200 pounds overweight on landing.   This overweight landing was due to two shortened routings we received by ATC saving time and fuel.  We completed a post flight debriefing which included a review of the OFP (Off-line Flight Planning) - FMS INIT LOAD section.  The flight was dispatched to land only 568 pounds below max structural landing weight.  We failed to identify this threat before departure or enroute which led to the subsequent error.Our expectation bias of recent low passenger loads and light aircraft combined with a lack of recency of experience was a threat we didn't identify properly.  Plus in past experiences if a potential landing weight concern exists; Dispatchers have highlighted this threat as a note in the OFP.


Second narrative: After arrival to the gate we received an overweight landing message. After reviewing our ZFW and fuel load we determined that we landed approximately 200 lbs over max landing weight. After discussion between the CA and I we agreed a lack of CRM was the ultimate cause of the deviation. My thought process was as follows:Our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was planned to land almost 1;000 lbs below MLW. As part of my pre-flight planning I always note the spread between both takeoff and landing weight verses the maximum values. A 1;000 lbs gap on landing did not stand out to me as something I would need to worry about. During our flight to ZZZ1 we received a number of shortcuts that shortened our route; and early in the flight we were certainly heavy on the fuel. However; as we neared the top of descent our fuel number vs the HOWGOZIT had dropped and was just several hundred pounds heavy.When requesting the landing data our FMC wt was about 3;000 lbs over MLW; and while it mentally recognized this; I did not verbalize it to make sure the CA was also aware (again in my mind I was not thinking landing weight was going to be an issue). I also did not mention our weight as a potential threat during my arrival briefing.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported an overweight landing.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp Tower cleared us to taxi to Spot 13.  While preparing to turn right to turn south towards Spot 13; I noticed a twin prop (Fokker?) taxiing right toward our intended taxi route. I executed an emergency stop with my nose over the line for that taxiway. The Fokker also stopped briefly; then continued taxiing south without any call on Ramp Tower. The frequency was a little congested so it was about 60 seconds later when we were able to query Ramp Tower whether she wanted us or the twin prop to have the right of way.  (There had been NO mention of the other aircraft when we got our taxi instructions from Ramp Tower.)  She stated she had cleared him for Spot 14 and he was obviously confused.  By this time; he was off the ramp and could not be contacted.  Had I not stopped; there would have been a collision.  The pilot of the other aircraft taxied to the wrong exit spot for our ramp.  He was cleared to 14 and taxied to 13.  Additionally; he stopped late; and then proceeded to taxi without getting on the radio to clear up right of way or to ask if he had clearance from his wingtip to our nose... it was less than 20 feet. Follow taxi instructions. When in doubt; get on the radio and ask.  When clearance may be an issue; ask on the frequency - don't just plow ahead and assume it'll work out!




Synopsis: DC-10 Captain experiences a near collision with a twin turboprop aircraft during taxi on the ramp. The other pilot stopped then continued on to the wrong spot.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: There is an issue [with] pilots (captains?) which happened to me for the fourth time in less than two months. These are pilots who have told me they want boarding to happen quickly because they are in a rush to get home. It makes me very uncomfortable to know that a pilot is doing his/her job in haste. This can only lead to dangerous mistakes. Having made the announcement for flight attendants to arm doors; although each time the flight attendants were proactive with passenger compliance during boarding; it often takes a bit of time for them to get aft and arm their door(s). These pilots have yelled to me from the cockpit; 'What's taking so long?' and I explain they are just doing what must be done. The captains will then get on the PA and say; 'Arm aft door(s);' or something to that effect. The passengers hear this and react as if the flight attendants don't know what they're doing. It's embarrassing and unprofessional. More seriously; it flusters; distracts and intimidates the flight attendants who; in turn; overlook important issues; possibly allowing mistakes to happen. They then tell me their doors are armed and the cabin is secure; although they have not really had the chance to complete their compliance; so the cabin is; in reality; not secure. We all want to depart just as swiftly as possible; but safety and regulatory matters should not be jeopardized to achieve this. It would be appreciated and of importance if the pilots could be reminded that the flight attendants do have quite a bit to contend with and a lot of it can happen last minute; while a CSR is usually standing at the cockpit door telling the pilots; 'If the flight attendants would hurry up' they could push back. Just because the last passenger has boarded the aircraft does not mean that all is safe in the cabin for push back.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant contends that flight crew and CSRs telling cabin crew to expedite passenger loading and cabin preparation jeopardizes safety.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFB.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SFB
ATC / advisory: Tower SFB
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student pilot was flying inbound on the Jessup arrival. He was flying 120 degrees toward SFB at 1;500 ft. He was then told to resume own navigation towards the airport and contact SFB tower. After establishing communication with them; the tower instructed him to descend at discretion and continue toward the airport.  He was told; number 3; cleared to land on 9C. He saw two aircraft ahead of him; and assumed he was the third aircraft following them. He was on final on 9C with an aircraft that was next to him; (which was cleared to land before him) approximately 100-150 ft. horizontal direction; same altitude. Tower instructed him to go around; which he complied with and then resumed the rest of the flight without incident making a full stop on 9R.




Synopsis: A student pilot became confused about his position on final relative to other aircraft at SFB and was instructed to go-around when he got too close to other aircraft.