elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Weather Radar
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Event occurred during descent phase. Captain was the pilot monitoring; First Officer (F/O) was the pilot flying. Aircraft had sat for several days down for maintenance. [The maintenance airport] experienced heavy rainfall for an extended period prior to flight. Flight was uneventful until the descent phase of flight. At approximately FL220; the radar showed 'Weather (WX) FAIL' accompanied by a grinding noise; as if the radar was stuck on one side of the sweep. Radar was secured. At approximately 15;000 MSL and 325 knots in the descent; an additional loud bang and excessive airflow noise occurred; accompanied by multiple EICAS messages; including 'IAS DISAGREE.' Captain's side display was showing approximately 250 knots. F/O's side display was showing approximately 330 knots; which agreed with standby instrumentation. F/O called for 'AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE' checklist. The autopilot and autothrottles (A/T) were disengaged; and the A/T ARM switch was turned off. F/O continued flying manually throughout the remainder of the flight. Captain elected to leave the Flight Directors on; as the lateral guidance was still valid; we were VMC; and at that range we already had the field in sight. It was agreed that the F/O would disregard the pitch guidance until the instrumentation issue could be corrected. Captain continued running through the checklist from the QRH; it was determined that the F/O's instrumentation was valid; and the Captain selected the right side Air Data Compute (ADC). From that point forward; as we slowed to 250 knots; the airplane essentially flew normally. F/O continued to manually hand fly the descent and approach to an uneventful landing. After inspection; the aircraft was taxied back normally. On post-flight inspection; the radome had a large structural failure; which likely caused an asymmetric airflow disruption which affected the Captain's instrumentation.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reported multiple system anomalies resulted from the inflight structural failure of the radome.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Stratotanker 135
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Fighter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was vectoring Aircraft X for a RWY32 ILS Approach into ZZZ from the south. He was too high to intercept the localizer below glideslope so I issued him a vector across the localizer (to the east) for descent. There was a flight of two [military fighters] in trail so I didn't want to use the west side of the localizer. The MVA on the east side of the localizer is 3900 so I issued a descent to 4000 and told him to expect a turn back towards the localizer in a few miles. Approximately 2-3 miles later I issued the turn back to the localizer with no response. I tried multiple times on different transmitters without a response. Aircraft X was now approaching a 5900 MVA and descending through 5500. I keyed up on guard frequency to attempt to issue the turn again which Aircraft X responded to and advised that they could no longer hear me on the original frequency of [VHF]. Aircraft X executed their turn approximately 1 mile away from the 5900 MVA descending through 4500. I instructed Aircraft X to expect vectors on guard or to change to my frequency [UHF] if able. Aircraft X came up on [UHF] and no further communication issues were noted. I could have kept Aircraft X at 6000 until he began his turn back toward the localizer but I wanted to ensure he had enough time for descent to be below the glideslope. I was also running out of airspace and would have needed a point out with [Center]; so I opted to start Aircraft X's descent early. I also probably should have issued a low altitude alert on guard; but wanted to attempt the turn away from the MVA while I still had time.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported no response from a military aircraft until using guard frequency. Flight was then switched to UHF and turned before entering a higher MVA.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RNT.Tower, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D RNT
ATC / advisory: Tower RNT
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on about a 3 mile final approach to runway 34; inside the Class D. A [warbird] was instructed to follow me and report me in sight. Evidently; the tower assumed that [the warbird] was a Cessna 172. The [warbird] came within 100 yards horizontally and less than 30 ft. vertically (as told to me by the pilot afterwards) before he saw me and took evasive action and did a left 360.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reported an NMAC on final to RNT airport with a warbird.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to land we received an RA to climb. [An air carrier] came from behind us on the parallel runway and was too close. We climbed per the RA and let them pass. After clear of the conflict we continued with the approach. It is in my opinion the [air carrier] flight was disregarding safety and coming completely too close to us as they were racing to the runway.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported getting an RA on approach from another air carrier who he felt was operating somewhat recklessly.
Date: 202003
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Hazardous Material was found in a different pit than what was indicated on the DSTG (Departure Staging Guide). It wasn't surrounded by the 15 bag minimum.




Synopsis: Ramp Personnel reported Hazmat cargo was shipped in wrong cargo location and incorrectly configured for air transport.
Date: 201910
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/General
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Audit
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Recently I went to ZZZ and met with several Tooling Supervisors from around the system to discuss the issues they were having with Company's Oxygen (O2) Service Carts. I found that ZZZ had modified the O2 Service Cart with no engineering support or OEM drawings or documentation. They did not update any information in the company's Tool Tracking System; with these modifications. They changed/added lines; gauges; check valves; and shutoff valves without being oxygen cleaned. I am not sure if the gauges were checked for accuracy. I inducted this new O2 Service Cart into the Company's system based on the drawings and certificates that the OEM provided to us. This cart looked nothing like what was initially sent to ZZZ. My name and employee number is still [on] the last sign off on the NOW modified cart. I was disturbed about the fact that the Supervisor and his technicians had no sense that their modifications were illegal and needed proper documentation.There seems to be a casualness about the proper handling of Tooling/Test Equipment. There is a lack of understanding of the importance of proper procedures; and accuracy. Also; just like performing work on aircraft; any work on tooling should be recorded. Untrained personnel should not be modifying testers. Oxygen has the added danger of contamination which can cause explosive and deadly results. This mentality starts at the top; our Supervisors of our local Tool Rooms; and goes down to the floor. I think a yearly CBT (Computer Based Training) on Tooling/Test Equipment and our SOP would show the importance of our test equipment and the impact it can have on our aircraft and people's lives. This attitude towards test equipment affects the safety/reliability for our fellow co-workers and our customers.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported that station technicians modified company oxygen service carts without documentation and used unauthorized and uncleaned components for modification.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SFO.Tower, CA
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SFO
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Traffic was moderate but complex with a recently certified controller working the 28/28 shoreline configuration. There were closely spaced parallel approaches to both 28L and 28R. In the middle of the traffic; a B737 got a low altitude alert and without hesitation the local controller issued a low altitude alert and advised the pilot to check their altitude immediately. I assumed it was an anomaly since they had the field in sight below about 1;400 feet at the time. The B737 crew immediately came back and said they were correcting. This surprised me. Their altitude was not far off of the expected altitude for the segment of flight. I still wonder if they were low or our equipment was faulty.




Synopsis: A Tower Controller describes a low altitude alert issued by a newly certified Local Controller to a B737 on short final. The altitude did not seem far off and the reporter wondered if the equipment may have been faulty; but the crew acknowledged the deviation.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FXE.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D FXE
ATC / advisory: Tower FXE
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on final on a practice ILS approach the tower called out base traffic at my 11:00. My safety pilot (flying pilot was on foggles) saw the aircraft and asked me to take a look. I observed the plane on base and figured that was the plane to follow and reduced speed and resumed the approach on foggles. A few seconds later my safety pilot issued a warning and I looked up and observed a plane (high wing Cessna) making a turn from the south to west directly at me. I took evasive action by making a right turn.Apparently the tower figured this aircraft was going too close to me and told him to turn west. When he did that he did not advise that my traffic was being turned to the west and the controller turned him right into the final approach heading the opposite way.The controller NEVER should have turned him westward against Final approach traffic (me). A left 360 on base would have been much safer. This was a very dangerous situation compounded by the fact the controller did not tell me that the traffic he had called out for me to follow was now being turned westward away from the final.




Synopsis: A pilot performing practice instrument approach with a view limiting device was advised by his safety pilot that another aircraft was turning towards their position. The pilot removed the view limiting device and performed an evasive maneuver. It was reported that ATC had turned the aircraft towards them.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: AVL.Airport, GA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While I was working R44 and AVL ATCT called to release the airspace for the evening. The AVL Controller briefed me that the ILS for Runway 34 was the active approach for the evening. Approximately 30 minutes later; a CRJ7 was inbound to AVL. I cleared the aircraft for the ILS Runway 34 approach. While on final; the CRJ7 informed me they lost the localizer and was going missed. It was also stated that they never had the glide slope. After climbing to altitude he stated he was receiving the ILS 16 LOC. My Supervisor then pulled the tapes from the briefing to confirm that the AVL Controller stated that Runway 34 was the active runway. Before receiving confirmation; the CRJ7 was forced to divert for fuel concerns. Just a few minutes later; a CRJ2 and another Air Carrier both AVL arrivals checked on. I put both into a holding pattern until we could sort out what runway we were to use. All 3 aircraft also stated that they were not receiving any automated weather from the AVL ATCT. At one point the CRJ2 attempted the GPS approach to Runway 34. They were forced to go missed due to visibility and diverted back to [their departure airport]. The other Air Carrier also returned to [their departure airport]. There is only one way to fix this situation. AVL ATCT needs to stay open later and open earlier! That is the only way to reduce risk. The AVL airspace is very mountainous and dangerous. The ARTCC has many RADAR and radio limitations in that area. The safest way to work aircraft is for AVL to work their own airspace. In the morning before AVL opens; we have many issues with aircraft reaching ARTCC on the ground to get clearances. AVL ATCT needs to be able to work these aircraft! This has been an unsafe situation for many years and has fallen on deaf ears.




Synopsis: ZTL Controller voiced concern regarding the AVL Tower hours of operation; providing examples of flawed coordination regarding the ILS in use resulting in go-arounds and diversions.
Date: 201901
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Seatbelt
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Is there a standard for seat belt buckle installation on aisle seats? Typically; the buckle is installed for an aisle seat farthest away from the aisle. However; I have noticed on a variety of fleets this is not true at random seats; including this 737-900. In particular seats 21C (mine) and 21D have the buckle installed on the aisle side. The belt and buckle on 21D; currently unoccupied; hangs in the aisle and is invariably kicked by anyone walking by. This subjects the buckle to unnecessary wear and tear and damage. It also poses a trip risk or possibility of lacerations to pedestrians' ankles and a potential hazard during an evacuation.




Synopsis: An Air carrier Maintenance Tech reported a lack of a published standard for seat belt buckle installation on aisle seats.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In cruise flight at flight level 300; PAX attempted to open 4L door in flight.Flight crew diffused situation by requesting PAX return to seat; and observed no further disruptive behavior. Took precaution by locking down cockpit door; crew and able bodied PAX watched PAX in question for any other suspicious behavior. Spoke to dispatch and agreed to continue to destination where ground security and law enforcement met the aircraft and took individual into custody.PAX may have had mental disability and no further disruption was detected after the flight crew explained the severity of his actions.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported a passenger tried to open a cabin door in flight.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working an inbound log item in the cabin of the aircraft. I had been previously asked if (time permitting) I could take a look at the deferred TV system; after I took care of the log item. I observed that the TV system appeared to be operational. The ELB (Electronic Logbook) showed log page deferred per MEL. Per this MEL the TV system should be deactivated by opening and collaring 3 circuit breakers in the flight deck. I went to the flight deck to check the status of the circuit breakers. I observed the circuit breakers to be closed. I then noticed 3 circuit breaker collars on the center pedestal. I asked [the] Captain if she knew where the collars came from. She informed me that she had removed the collars from the circuit breakers and closed the circuit breakers. She said that she had been directed to do so by [Maintenance Control] whom she had spoken to on both the phone and the aircraft radio. The MEL had been reversed without my knowledge. This posed a danger to me since the system was not deactivated as I had anticipated it to be. This posed a danger to the passengers; as this occurred during boarding and neither the Captain or [Maintenance Control] could have been aware of the integrity of the TV system during power-up. The MEL was now out of compliance. If I did not have time to address the deferral; I would not have known that the MEL had been reversed. The aircraft could have been dispatched with an MEL that was not in compliance.Mechanics must be notified when [Maintenance Control] direct flight crews to cycle circuit breakers. This is especially important when a mechanic may already be working on the affected system. MEL items should never be applied or reversed by someone who hasn't set foot on the aircraft. A person cannot guarantee that an aircraft is MEL compliant without personally observing or accomplishing the maintenance actions of the MEL.




Synopsis: Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported that Maintenance Control did not notify him that deferred system circuit breakers were reset by flight crew.