elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft were assigned to the crew. Work card XX-XX-XX was used for the type X Aircraft while performing the work two discrepancies were noted: Step X; verify battery switch on. No reason given or instructions to turn it off. The next was Item Y; instructed us to make sure no ECAM messages. The type X Aircraft does not have an ECAM system. Both items have been fixed with the revision to the work card. Type Y Aircraft work card XX-XX-YY was assigned and while working this card it was noted in step Y you N/A the step if the airplane is parked less than XX days no action required for the water disinfectant. However step Z 1 tells us to reset circuit breakers with only one block to stamp. This causes a conflict between both actions if one was done and the other not. Step A; instructs us to make sure there is no ECAM messages. The type Y Aircraft does not have an ECAM system. With these minor errors the blocks were stamped off. The type Y Aircraft work card has not been corrected.The reason the mechanics find it necessary to continue working after finding these minor errors is they're afraid to stop production of the aircraft. They will be labeled trouble makers and now more than ever their afraid to cause problems to give the company a reason to fire them. As to reduce manpower. The root cause is the inability of the company to publish a work card that can be used by the Mechanic without having to ensure others have done their job correctly. This problem is not new; we continue to encounter sloppy card production.Develop a system when a problem is found or when there is a need for clarification it can be addressed right away without local management involvement. I found this to be the case for me yesterday and it led to a heated argument and I was told to do as your told. What a way to bring closure to an issue.




Synopsis: Technician reported work card discrepancies for two different types of aircraft and being pressured to continue working after finding these errors.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RDU.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1.5
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C RDU
ATC / advisory: TRACON RDU
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: As we were being vectored for landing on 05R; the Controller kept us high (RDU had switched runways from 23L to 05R). While tracking the 05R LOC; we were about to capture the 05R glideslope from above at approximately 6.5 to 7 miles from the runway and suddenly the glideslope needle jumped full scale up to the 'top of the case'. This gave the illusion of the aircraft suddenly diving for the ground. I immediately pulled up and abandoned the approach. The Controller vectored us back around for another approach for 05R. The subsequent approach and landing was uneventful.This is the second time in as many months that I have experienced this glideslope anomaly. The last one was in MKE at night. This glideslope anomaly is something that has just started happening. In over 43 years of flying; with many thousands of IMC approaches; this has never been a problem until now.


Second narrative: On arrival and approach to RDU; we configured early to get down to glidepath. Once on glidepath; we noticed that the flight director went blank with the course deviation indicator and glideslope indicator precessing dramatically from top to bottom (and left to right) of HSI. Getting confused as to what was happening; we abandoned the approach and were vectored around the pattern for an uneventful approach and landing.The Captain explained that this was the second time in the last month that he has seen this anomaly. He suggested we write this report to bring light to a possible adverse condition with the flight director system.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported executing a go-around on approach to RDU after experiencing a glide slope anomaly.
Date: 201208
Location: CYYZ.Airport, ON
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center CZYZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying the YWT4 into Toronto; we were cleared to cross ROKTO at 250 KTS and 11;000 FT with restrictions. We were following the YWT.ROKTO4 because that is the first chart you come to that says YKT and it has a crossing of ROKTO at 11;000 FT. However; that approach is for turboprops only. That is written very small at the top of the block on the page. Crossing ROKTO at 11;000 FT and 250 KTS as cleared; Toronto Center asked us about the crossing window we missed. We were unsure of what he meant and asked. He said many [company] crews miss the crossing window; but other airlines do not. He then handed us off to Approach. The First Officer obtained the phone number for Center from Approach. From the hotel; the First Officer called Center and it was explained that there is a crossing window of 16;000 to 14;000 FT at ROKTO for turbojets. That is on a different chart which we should have been using which is the YKT.YKT4 for turbojets only. We're cleared to cross at 11;000 FT by the same Center Controller so we did not violate an altitude but did have the incorrect approach plate out.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain; descending on the YWT4 arrival to CYYZ with a hard altitude assignment at ROKTO; is queried by the Controller why so many crews from his company miss the depicted altitude at ROKTO. There are two identical arrivals except for altitude and airspeed restrictions; the YWT4 for turbojets and the ROKTO4 for turboprops.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSU.ARTCC, PR
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZSU
ATC / advisory: Center ZSU
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While working R1-R5 positions combined; Aircraft X departs SJU on a 350 heading climbing to 5;000 ft.  As soon as he leaves the SJU tower airspace I cleared him direct JAAWS to join the JAAWS9 departure. X miles behind the tower sends Aircraft Y on the same heading; climbing to 5;000ft.  As soon as I have communication with Aircraft Y; I stop him at 3;000ft because he climbs much faster than the Aircraft X.When I stopped him; Aircraft X was still climbing out of 4;000 ft.  Within the minute; Aircraft Y was less than 3 miles behind Aircraft X.  Because I stopped his climb; they maintained radar separation.  A few months back our LOA with SJU tower provided us with 5 miles in trail separation for same headings departures.  Even though 3 miles is radar separation approved by the 7110.65; our airspace configuration is a little complicated; there is a lot of crossing traffic even for departures; and we have to provide the center 5 miles in trail separation.  We have numerous times asked management to change the LOA back as it was before; but our request have been ignored multiple times.We obviously have a safety issue here.  Whether is the LOA or training CPCs at the SJU tower.  But this situation has happened more than once in less than a week.  Clearly something needs to be done.  Had I been busy; distracted; frequency failure; they would have lost separation.  Either we change the LOA or train CPC's better with aircraft characteristics and radar separation.  It took me a few days to complete this report; my password was reset but took a few days to receive email.




Synopsis: ZSU Controller reports of saving a loss of separation by using altitude. Tower Controller did not provide enough spacing to allow faster climbing departure following slower climbing departure.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Work Refused; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When I was loading it wouldn't let me lock it out because the battery was showing up as Hazmat when it wasn't; so [Load Planning] directed me to move it. When we brought the plane back in the pilot refused it all together. The indicator on the scanner is so minuscule I didn't see it. The Hazmat notification did not pop up on the scanner too. Pilot requested paperwork for Hazmat. There was only one bag tag for both pieces. There was no Hazmat sticker on the box which is why I was confused; since it was not considered a Hazmat but the computer recognized it as a dangerous good.




Synopsis: Air carrier ramp personnel reported ground gate return of aircraft due to required Hazmat documentation errors. Captain refused to transport the Hazmat item.
Date: 201810
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SFO; Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I recently flew a trip out of SJC. Evidently; the FAA has 'improved' the shape of SFO's Class B airspace. It no longer has the traditional wedding cake shape. We are not allowed to navigate using our iPads. Additionally; the defining points of the Class B are not in our database (737). So; if the FAA were looking over my shoulder; how would I ensure I comply with the 200 knot restriction? What legal method do we have of defining that airspace?




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported due to the updated/irregular design of the SFO CLASS B airspace; not being able to navigate with iPad; [and] lack of FMS defining points; they are unsure how to comply with FAR requirements.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Second aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Staffing; Weather; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During this session I had approximately 9 aircraft entering my airspace at the same time. There was moderate to extreme weather on the west downwind; with light to moderate weather on the east downwind. I do not recall the exact cause of the loss of separation but upon entering my airspace several aircraft requested vectors to deviate around the weather. I did not have enough spacing between the aircraft coming from the adjacent sectors to accommodate this operation safely. This lead to me using extreme vectors to ensure separation; while attempting to get the aircraft on the final approach course.I believe that having the final position split during this operation would have helped greatly; so that Simultaneous Approach procedures could have been used and the workload could have been divided. Additionally; increased spacing between the arriving aircraft prior to entering the final airspace could have been used to accommodate for the deviations around the extreme weather conditions.




Synopsis: F11 TRACON Controller reported receiving numerous arrivals simultaneously which were deviating for weather. Two aircraft passed with less than required separation.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: Tower MCO
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X on ILS 18R; switched to MCO tower 11 N of MCO; at the same time working 5 other aircraft turning on the approach. When I got done clearing an air carrier for the approach; I noticed Aircraft X was in conflict with Aircraft Y; 3 north of MCO at 800 feet on a 3W (MCO Tower tag); talking to the local west controller 3W tag; targets merged with no point out. I was startled and I called a FLM over to question the operation. Last time this happened I was tagged with a category A error. The FLM acted as if he did not want to pursue or take action against the tower controller. Then when the tower controller pointed out Aircraft Y 5 minutes later after 5 or 6 more arrivals go by; I said traffic observed; and that's when I was spoken to about wrong phraseology to the tower controller. This facility is allowing more and more helicopters; picture takers; aerial surveyors and law enforcement into Bravo airspace and creating more unsafe operations compromising safety for special accommodations. The opinion of controllers is disregarded in consideration of these operations.




Synopsis: F11 Controler reports of Class Bravo violations which are being worked by MCO Tower and not pointed out to the F11 Controller.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While in the descent between 10;000 and 8;500 feet Captain asked me; 'Did you see that?' I looked up in time to see an object going by the nose of the airplane; a few feet above us and opposite direction. The object passed us so quickly I did not have time to really get a look at it. The Captain asked if it was a drone; I said it might have been but I wasn't sure. The Captain notified ATC that we had a drone pass closely by us. The closure rate and size of the object meant that was not sufficient time to react if it had been necessary. Luckily the object missed us. The flight continued without further event.




Synopsis: EMB-145LR first officer reported a NMAC with a possible UAV during descent.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departing ATL Runway 26L on CADIT 7 departure to MPASS. We turned the autopilot on at 1;000 FT with Profile and NAV selected and began slat retraction 10 K after reaching S speed. After the turn to 300 degrees RNAV to MPASS; ATC told us to delete the 250 KT speed restriction at ZOLAN. After deleting the speed the aircraft automation turned the aircraft inside of MPASS. ATC advised us that 'in the future deleting the speed restriction at ZOLAN does not mean go direct to ZOLAN.' We indicated that the automation was flying the departure and we showed us .1 mile left of course. He indicated we were well right of course.  The FMC logic apparently does not understand flying over a point after deleting a speed. We recommend not deleting a speed until passing MPASS. A contributing factor may have been changing the clean up altitude to 1;500 FT instead of 3;000 FT. At 1;500 FT we are closer to the airport and to S+10 much sooner.




Synopsis: ATC deleted the ZOLAN 250 KTS restriction prior to MPASS on the ATL Runway 26L CADIT 7 MPASS transition and after doing so; an air carrier's FMS turned the aircraft precede direct ZOLAN.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft Cessna 210 veered off runway after touchdown.  No damage to aircraft.  No injuries to passengers.  Aircraft was able to taxi to parking under its own power and did not require assistance.

Callback: Reported confirmed no mechanical problem found after event.  Crosswind the likely cause.



Synopsis: C210 pilot reported a runway excursion likely caused by a crosswind condition.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PAE.Tower, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D PAE
ATC / advisory: Tower PAE
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on downwind we were cleared to land on 34 left; with no other planes in the pattern. On short final; with all strobes and alternate flashing (wig-wag) headlights operating; our aircraft was at 100 feet AGL and over the threshold; Tower cleared a single engine aircraft to depart on 34L in front of us. Another Tower Controller immediately came on the radio and directed the incursion aircraft to immediately halt and hold position. It complied; but was on the runway side of the hold short line. We were instructed to 'go-around' and turn crosswind at our discretion. We climbed to 1;000 feet MSL and entered downwind. The Tower then released the incursion aircraft cleared to depart 34L. We were again cleared to land 34L. PAE ground stated 'training' was being conducted.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported a conflict during their final approach to PAE airport when an aircraft was cleared to takeoff on same runway then stopped by Tower; but not before aircraft had incurred the runway.  Reporter was instructed to go-around. Pilot reported ATC training had been a contributing factor.