elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We arrived for our overnight flight and when the Customer Service Agent opened the aircraft door; there was an odor and a slight haze in the plane. We walked off the plane and discussed with the pilots that it was not safe to be onboard. The Supervisor showed up and said this was a regular issue when it is so cold and there is nothing they can do about it. The pilots had them disconnect the ground feed and started the APU. We cracked the doors to get fresh air and waited for the smell to dissipate before boarding the plane. Determine what is causing this fume issue and either maintain or reposition the equipment do the fumes are not entering the plane.


Second narrative: Boarded the aircraft into a haze of carbon monoxide fumes from the external air unit so strong we all immediately got a headache and we exited the aircraft into the jetway! We had to delay boarding because we needed to get the fumes out of the cabin before we brought small children and all passengers on board. Every station that has that has a external air unit needs a safe exhaust system that is nowhere near the aircraft.


Synopsis: B737-900 Flight Attendant crew reported haze and odor upon arrival. The entire cabin crew experienced physiological issues.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Tower, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower TEB
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ILS [Runway] 06 circle to land [Runway] 01 just after dark with gusty winds and windshear. Miscommunication in the cockpit dealing with 'programming' the airplane for the approach. Got distracted on the maneuver which got us close to the towers; then got a pull up prompt. Recovered and landed safely.[Cause was] Lack of cockpit communication.[Suggest] Training this approach with bad weather in simulator.


Second narrative: Clearance by Approach Control - Intercept the Runway 06 approach course and expect the Runway 06 ILS; circle Runway 01. Clearance by Tower - Cleared for visual approach Runway 06; at TORBY cleared to circle to land Runway 01. During the circle we received TAWS Aural Warning - ''Obstacle; Obstacle; Pull Up'. The pilot flying began a climb from 820 ft. MSL to approximately 1;300 ft. MSL. Message cleared and the approach was continued to a full stop landing. The aircraft was flown too close to obstructions during the circling to land approach. 2 contributing factors: Unfamiliarity with the procedure at TEB and reliance on autopilot.With the frequency that [our company] operates in and out of TEB; it may be advisable to add some type of briefing to the pilot [group]. This is a common procedure at TEB; but it doesn't occur frequently enough to build pilot confidence in the circle to land maneuver.


Synopsis: Fractional jet flight crew reported receiving a TAWS obstacle warning on a circling approach to TEB Runway 01.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: In flight between ZZZZ-ZZZZ1; we received an ACARS message from Duty Pilot stating that there was going to be an issue with my duty time compliance. I called scheduling and Duty Pilot. He explained that the X foreign government had moved our departure slot time out of ZZZZ1 later by 90 minutes; and this would not allow me to return to ZZZZ to start my scheduled duty time compliance in time to be legal. Duty Pilot; advised me that the Operations was involved and in contact with the FAA and all were working on a solution. After about an hour I received a call back. They looked at moving the airplane to ZZZZ2 or deplaning the crew to go into rest. Both of these requests were denied by the foreign country. I was advised by Duty Pilot; that we as a crew did nothing wrong and were legal to operate ZZZZ-ZZZZ1 at the time of departure. He said my only option was to continue the flight back to ZZZZ and file a report. The return leg was uneventful and I entered my rest period less than 1 hour later than what was legal.In doing a 7 day look back; crew scheduling had ample opportunity to better schedule my previous duty time compliance; so that a 90 minute delay would not have caused this issue. In our defense; we were not able to convince the foreign government to file a flight plan to ZZZZ2 and due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the crew was not allowed to get off the aircraft in ZZZZ1.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported an issue relating to duty time compliance.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HWD.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground HWD
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After completing a VOR check at the VOR check point and configuring the aircraft for departure I contacted Ground and received instructions to taxi to Runway 28L. Having just landed for the purposes of the VOR check I was not planning to do a runup so I intended to taxi to the hold short line and contact the Tower. As I was taxiing my attention was briefly on something inside the cockpit. At this point Ground called and told me told me to hold position. I realized I had taxied several feet past the hold short line. However; I was still some distance away from the runway itself. Ground then told me to contact the Tower. I did and received my departure clearance and departed normally. The hold short line in this instance was somewhat unusual in that it was perpendicular to the runway with the taxiway continuing another 200 FT before making a U turn to the start of the runway. I was expecting the more standard hold short line which is parallel to the runway that you encounter when approaching at a right angle to the runway. While my attention was inside the cockpit I missed seeing the hold short line. Although I'd been to this airport many times before I did not remember anything unusual about the hold short line; possibly because I might have previously made intersection departures rather than taxiing to the end of the runway. Clearly I should have been paying more attention outside the cockpit while taxiing and left inside the cockpit tasks until the plane was stopped. Contributing factors were the unusual placement of the hold short line and my unfamiliarity with the airport.




Synopsis: A small aircraft pilot incurred HWD Runway 28L after he did not recognize the runway hold short line on Taxiway A because of its distance from the runway and because it was perpendicular to the runway orientation.
Date: 202008
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Exceptions for face coverings is active eating and drinking and clarified as safety related duties including making a PA per policy. However; I have sought clarification from in-flight and have failed to address critical phases of flight concerns and emergency procedures. Wearing a face covering reduces the ability to perform safety functions critical to the safety of everyone on board. Why are we sitting away from jumpseats while customers are able to sit in all usable seats. We need to sit in our assigned jumpseats and not use alternate seating especially on full flights. Safest place is a jumpseat. Takeoff and landing; we need to stay in brace position and a face covering can hinder evacuation commands; communications with flight deck and instant situational awareness that is distracting due to face coverings. Pilots are able to remove face coverings for safety of flight issues on the flight deck and why are flight attendants not being allowed to be subject to the same safety and security standards? We need exceptions that are not political; safety of flight is our top concern.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that having to wear a face mask could affect the FA's ability to perform certain safety functions; especially in the case of an emergency situation.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the GRNCH arrival. Landing south. At approx. BUGGZ int; airport changed to landing north. ATC tells us to expect 36L. We change the arrival to landing north. Shortly after; ATC clears us from 11;000 ft to 7;000 ft. We readback. Passing 8;000 ft; ATC asks us; says did he give us 9;000 ft?  We say no; 7;000 ft. He tells us to maintain 8;000 ft; we climb from 7;800 back to 8;000 after advising him we were passing thru 8;000. ATC was busy to begin with and they got busier with the runway change landing south to landing north. At times; the controller sounded confused regarding our clearance; at one time asking us what fix we were flying to. I know that new arrivals have started in many cities; and do not know if this was a factor. It was the first day of the new database.We did nothing wrong. Proper read backs were given. We were busy from south flow changing to 36L then to 36R while working around some weather and managing the arrival. The controllers were very busy. I am concerned about the altitude assignment and the controller changing the altitude assignment. We have confidence that we received a clearance to 7;000 ft.We worked hard to communicate with the busy controller and use proper radio phraseology. We were very surprised when he asked about our altitude as we were sure we were where we were supposed to be.




Synopsis: Pilot reported possibly over shooting an assigned altitude after being questioned by the Air Traffic Controller.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TTPP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower TTPP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Numerous little distractions kept us from noticing that the fuel was out of balance until after takeoff.  Distractions included being a day late due to a mechanical; 35-minute late van; aircraft not being at the gate when we arrived; aircraft not cleaned or catered; aircraft repair not complete due to contract-maintenance error; late fuel slip; late final weights; communication with load planning about need to move passengers for balance; inop VNAV; NADP1 departure; ACARS2 and Sabre learning curve.  Additional factors include the fact that because we dispatched with fuel on board (from our cancelled flight the night before) a fueler never had the chance to fix the imbalance.  Finally; we suspect the yellow IMBAL annunciation did not catch our attention because we are so used to seeing the yellow CONFIG annunciation on takeoff.  Also; we have gotten used to just looking at the total fuel indication; and we forget to check the individual tanks for balance.  We assume the imbalance was created by extensive APU use by the tow crew the day prior.  Enough fuel was burned to indicate that the APU was running for many hours.  We should have caught this imbalance on the preflight but missed it.  It's noteworthy that before push we discussed feeling like we had lots of little alligators at our heels; one got us.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported departing with fuel out of balance; citing a number of distractions as contributory.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At 31;000 FT in cruise a RED and AUDIO BLEED AIR DUCT message occurred. Ran the appropriate QRH. At that time the engine bleeds closed and the aircraft started a slow decompression. We declared an emergency with Center. At that point; started a very quick descent from 31;000 FT to 8;000 FT due to cabin pressurization rising. At 8;000 FT we finished the QRH; informed the flight attendants of the situation; and we diverted. We did not brace the cabin. Cabin altitude never went above 10;000 FT and the passenger oxygen mask never deployed. Landed with no further events.




Synopsis: A CRJ-700 CAS and AUDIO Warning alerted BLEED AIR DUCT so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed with a descent to 8;000 feet and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.
Date: 201302
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After being out of aviation for nine plus years I recently returned to Air Carrier X at ZZZ Airport to work Line Maintenance. My fifteen years in aviation did not prepare me for Line Maintenance as I had mostly worked in Overhaul type work. Air Carrier X has recalled many mechanics [at ZZZ] that are new to Line Maintenance and are not being trained in the work they are expected to perform. All of the aircraft are ETOPS rated and everyone is given ETOPS awareness training. The problem is that we are not being taught the different fleet types and work is being performed unsupervised by those who possess only the awareness training. Many become ETOPS qualified after just a two week class for a fleet type; but have no experience on the plane. Computer Based Training (CBT) has become the 'norm' but lacks the quality of instructor lead training when a question arises. This lack of training; supervision; and practical experience is a problem waiting to happen. The effort is not made to have new mechanics work with someone who is experienced; or to try to keep the new person on the same fleet type so that that airplane can be learned. The experience level is high at ZZZ; but without proper protocols this asset has not been realized and could have many downfalls.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) returning to Line Maintenance after a lengthy furlough describes an environment where new and returning mechanics are not being trained in the work they are expected to perform. Aircraft are all ETOPS rated; but work is being performed unsupervised by those who possess only ETOPS awareness training; not actual experience.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post-Flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was made aware by the Human Resources department of an ongoing investigation into a potential procedural misstep I may have made. Flight had a biohazard situation with a passenger haven given birth in the 1st class cabin. Vendor maintenance reported to the aircraft on arrival. I received the phone call in Maintenance Control and queried the mechanic about the situation. I referenced a manual's Biohazard Contamination section and followed the procedures for aircraft dispatch. The mechanic reported that there was minimal evidence of bodily fluid stating that the crew and attending medical help contained the contamination to blankets and coverings. The universal infection kit was used during the flight. I asked the vendor if there was a cleaning crew that was qualified to clean a biohazard spill. He responded yes. I requested that the crew clean the area per procedures which he confirmed was completed. I requested that the contaminated articles be disposed of per the manual procedures. He confirmed that would be complied with. He suggested that the seat be deferred and the area be cleaned precautionary on return to the U.S. The seat cushions were removed and secured and the seat was deferred per MEL. The current manual revision requires that the row of seats be removed from service; a fact I am not sure was required in this version. If so; I did not defer the seat next to it per procedure.This is a common occurrence and falls directly in Maintenance Control's responsibility. Due to many factors including the severity of the biohazard issue i.e. minor cut to birth and even death on an aircraft there needs to be some latitude to the level of response needed to return the aircraft to service. The manual requires research in 2 other manuals providing cleaning procedures but does not give any definitive solution to allowing the aircraft to depart stations. The manual needs clarity and provide Maintenance with a full understanding when the clean-up is complied with and the aircraft can return to service at all stations other than the class 1 stations it references.




Synopsis: Maintenance Controller reported being informed of possibly mishandling a biohazard cleanup and MEL entry into the aircraft logbook after a passenger had given birth on the flight.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After takeoff; we thought we were cleared to PAUKI. I read back what I thought was PAUKI. We had been cleared to FLUKY and were eventually given vectors to FLUKY. Make a greater effort to understand the clearance when issued by ATC. Though; I'm still not sure if we made the mistake or ATC did.




Synopsis: After departing BWI; an air carrier crew was cleared to FLUKY Intersection on the TERPZ TWO RNAV departure; but understood and read back clearance to PAUKI Intersection; which is 41 miles further southwest.