elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Equipment
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our Flight Attendant was conducting her safety checks [and] found that the emergency lights in row 1D [and] F and 2D and F were not working in the cabin. I called Maintenance Control informing them of the write up. While we were waiting for Maintenance to arrive at the aircraft [Flight Attendant] continued to do her safety check for our flight. What she found in overhead bin was alarming to me.  [Flight Attendant] found the emergency light strip for the rows that I wrote up in the overhead bin. This is very concerning to me that an aircraft of ours is flying around with an important part for emergency equipment broken and basically put aside. I will be submitting an ASAP report as well to potentially protect the pilots if they were not informed of the emergency equipment [that] was broken in the cabin.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported improper maintenance procedures were noted on a recent flight.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other pushback
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During preflight we were notified of total dry ice of 1229 KG and a waiver was issued. Max without waiver is 966 kg. FO preflight and wore the CO2 detector. On pushback with packs off and starting engines his detector alarmed level 1 with .8 registering. Just to make sure it was not malfunctioning we turned the extra monitor on and it too alarmed. Told pushback crew to bring us back in gate and we shut down engines. Turned AC packs on and opened FOs window for ventilation as towed back in gate. Conferred with the HazMat specialist; maintenance; Ground operations; and Dispatch. Concluded to take off pallet position 3L which had majority of dry ice containing 861.7 kg. Continued on flight after receiving proper paperwork and redoing our preflight duties. No further issues.Excessive dry ice near cockpit causing monitor alarms to go off. I've carried a lot of dry ice using waivers and never had this problem. Not sure why this time it set alarms off. Prevention methods would be to carry less and maybe move it further back from flight crew; or in belly.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported returning to the gate after the crew's CO2 detector alarmed because of a large quantity of dry ice that had been loaded under waiver.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Other Contracted Service
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Photo Shoot / Video
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were hovering and slowly orbiting a news scene when the other news helicopter reported a drone sighting. The drone went from that helicopter directly towards my helicopter. It then flew directly above my helicopter before descending back to the ground. All of this was caught in news footage. We decided to depart the area immediately not knowing if there were other drones in the area.




Synopsis: A television news helicopter crew; hovering at approximately 1500 MSL while filming a news event on the ground; experienced an NMAC with a drone.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CVX.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: Hawker Horizon (Raytheon)
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were waiting to depart IFR out of CVX behind a King Air which was on the line with clearance getting her release. The weather was nearly VFR at about 1800 AGL [broken] so we were on the phone with clearance as well; engines running; waiting in line behind the King Air. A Hawker pilot asked 'Pilatus; are you waiting to depart?' We said 'yes; we're just waiting for the King Air to depart and than we are getting our release.' The Hawker said; 'OK we'll just pull up next to you and wait' The King Air departed and we were about to get our release when the Hawker says; 'Pilatus; we're just going to go around you and depart VFR.' I asked; 'Are you going to activate your IFR in the air?' He says 'yes' and I said 'well; you're bumping us out of line; here; thanks a lot.' 'Well; you have to do what you got to do sometimes' the Hawker pilot says. As the Hawker is taking the active and taking off we get our release and depart IFR shortly after. We were maintaining visual with the VFR hawker while contacting Departure/Center. I received radar contact from Departure/Center and continued to keep the Hawker in visual contact while flying the assigned departure from clearance. I then lost visual with the Hawker who was now in the clouds not IFR with Departure/Center. At that point I didn't know if I had separation and was a little upset at the Hawker pilot(s) and said 'Visual in the clouds; thanks a lot guys; I can't see you.' Thinking back at it now I probably should not of said that but at that point I was pretty upset at this unprofessional pilot(s) of the Hawker. In the future I might hold a little longer on the ground; allow my release to expire and/or get a new release from Departure/Center; to give time for proper separation in the IFR environment even though other aircraft may mess up system and cut you off.




Synopsis: A PC-12 flight crew awaiting their IFR departure release from a non-towered airport expressed their umbrage at the pilot of a Hawker Jet that usurped their number one for takeoff position saying they were going to depart VFR and pick up their IFR clearance when airborne. The reporter's angst was increased when he watched the Hawker enter IMC without having obtained a clearance.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Service/Access Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After the external pre-flight by the First Officer; I noticed the EQUIP door light was illuminated. We called Maintenance and a Mechanic came out and inspected the equip door and assured us that it was closed securely; and they would MEL the EQUIP light. The discrepancy was entered into the logbook and the MEL was applied. The Mechanic showed us the MEL and mentioned that we would need to visually inspect it in our next destination; and that he had checked it. Push-back and taxi was normal. On takeoff roll approximately 120 KTS there was a lot of air noise; and after takeoff the aircraft did not pressurize. We requested a straight out and told Departure Control we would return. I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer. I ran the overweight landing checklists and returned to the departure airport. We decided to land overweight because of the extreme noise. It was very difficult to communicate with each other and ATC. The landing was only 1;600 LBS overweight and touchdown was less that 200 FPM. The First Officer inspected the nose area and the equip door in front of the nose gear was open. He closed the door and the light extinguished. The communication was difficult because of the noise. The First Officer's experience level and pilot handling are outstanding. I can't believe that the First Officer would miss an open door on the pre-flight; the Mechanic could miss it when he came out to check equip doors; and the push-back crew would miss it.




Synopsis: A B737 EQUIP door light was on during preflight so a Mechanic deferred the light. After takeoff the aircraft would not pressurize and the noise level was so high the crew returned to land overweight where the door was found open.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Proceeding direct [fix]; we omitted the ten (minute prior to entry fix) call to ARTCC. We checked in approximately two minutes prior to the Flight Information Region (FIR) boundary. ATC did not mention any problems with this. As an aside; we had a later conversation with ATC for the ten prior call to ARTCC. ATC said it was not necessary in a radar environment and they had letters of agreement with adjacent facilities for this type of handoff. A ten prior call would be necessary coming from a non-radar FIR the controller said. This is not noted on the charts that I noticed.This possible error was due to Jeppesen Flight Director (FD) having the information in inconsistent places. I found the note to contact ARTCC Oceanic ten minutes prior in the regional notes section versus the FIR notes popup box in Jeppesen FD. It is also in the General Enroute Notices section. I found the note for the other situation for contacting ARTCC; which is in the exact opposite place in the FIR popup box notes section. I compared this to the paper enroute charts and it does not mention a need to contact ARTCC from ARTCC Oceanic ten minutes prior.




Synopsis: A pilot thought they had erred in not checking in with the ARTCC until two minutes prior to the boundary. Since they were entering airspace with radar coverage they checked in in sufficient time.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft was at the gate with a #2 Stall Warning [System] that would not test. I had another aircraft waiting for maintenance and had received the request while working on a different aircraft. I arrived while boarding was in process and performed a BITE Test of the #2 Stall Management Yaw Damper and found no faults. I contacted Maintenance Control to defer the #2 Stall Warning System. There was a bit of confusion between myself and Maintenance Control on the MEL for #1 or #2 Stall Warning but we worked through that. I placed the aircraft on MEL; pulled and collared the Stick Shaker Right Circuit Breaker Auto Stow Circuit Breaker but missed the [step to collar the] Flight Controls Auto Speed Brake Circuit Breaker. The pressure; time constraints and distractions caught up to me on this one. Perhaps a list of circuit breakers to be pulled; in a list style with all the circuit breakers in one place instead of different paragraphs.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician missed a step in the MEL deactivation procedure and neglected to open and collar the Auto Speedbrake Circuit Breaker. He sighted time pressure and distractions as contributing factors.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PVD.TRACON, RI
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: TRACON PVD
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I arrived on an instrument flight plan; landed and canceled my flight plan on the ground frequency. A few minutes later I took off VFR and circled to the east of the field to climb about the overcast visible along my route. I proceeded on course to BDR once I was high enough to pass 2;000 FT above the overcast. Shortly after reaching PVD; I saw an air carrier pass 500 FT above me. My TCAS gave me about 60 seconds warning; just enough time to see it and make sure I was able to evade it. Shortly after the incident; I noticed that I was still squawking the IFR code from the previous flight. I'd failed to reset it to 1200. I believe that may have further confused the situation.




Synopsis: A light twin pilot failed to reset his transponder code to 1200 after landing then canceling IFR so when he became airborne and at 12;500 FT still squawking IFR; he received a TCAS alert and saw an air carrier pass 600 FT overhead.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: STS.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower STS
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I will preface this by saying the airport is under major construction. Phase 4 had just rolled out with almost all brand new taxiway names and a new taxi route to Runway 20 involving using a closed Runway 14 as a taxiway up to Runway 20. I was working Ground Control and had Aircraft X taxiing to Runway 20; the active. He was instructed to taxi to Runway 20 via A4; Runway 14; and hold short of the yellow line and Runway 20. Our Tower had only been under the new taxi routes for a day and couple hours. Many pilots have been taxiing past the hold short bars for whatever reason regardless of reading back the hold short instructions: being unfamiliar; not understanding instructions; poor display of the hold bars and sign age for the runway. After making a right turn off of Taxiway A4 Aircraft X taxied down Runway 14. Instead of stopping at the new yellow hold short bars; Aircraft X blew past the line. I quickly issued a 180 degree taxi back to behind the yellow line to Aircraft X. Local and myself noticed at the same time and local sent around Aircraft Y; IFR; who was on 1 mile final on VFR approach. Once I saw Aircraft X cross back to the correct side of hold short bars; I re-issued hold short of Runway 20 at the yellow line. I believe this happened due to the new construction; poor signs and painting; pilot unfamiliarity/error; and hold short phraseology. I am including phraseology because standard and non standard variations of issuing hold short of Runway 20 have not worked on every pilot due to the weird placement of the hold bars and new signs.Many of my fellow controllers had wanted some sort of painting or sign improvement prior to this event happening. The yellow hold short bars; the small Runway 20 sign; and variations on hold short phraseology were not enough to keep previous pilots from crossing the hold bars. Also the Phase 4 project had not been live long; so an extra emphasis for pilots to be checking their NOTAMs and airport layout should be a priority for the pilots themselves.




Synopsis: STS Tower Controller describes situation where a runway incursion happened possibly due to airport construction.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During flight planning; the crew discussed the fact that the dispatch generated route flew through several Flight Planning Guidance's (FPG) that called for moderate turbulence at the planned FL. When the captain raised this issue with the dispatcher; the dispatcher remarked that the FPG was due to expire and that he had access to the [latest] forecast; which we didn't have access to; and that forecast didn't indicate the turbulence being a factor. I would like to point out the following facts:The dispatcher on duty during our briefing is in bed sleeping when we encounter the forecast turbulence. Just because a FPG expires; doesn't mean the turbulence is gone. It merely means that forecast expires. In fact; most times a new FPG replaces that expired one with little or no change in forecast turbulence. The so called forecast that the dispatcher referred to had no bearing on our flight [when] we were due to land.This has been a recurring problem and; as such; flight crews are learning not to trust the routing/altitudes provided by many of the new dispatchers. It appears too that many dispatchers are just 'pushing the button' and generating 'least cost' routes.As a result; the captain asked the dispatcher to calculate and add the fuel required to fly the route; but have the necessary fuel on board to descend below the forecast turbulence in the event it was encountered. This resulted in the addition of 5000 LBS of fuel. Once enroute; the next dispatcher on duty advised us of an area of moderate turbulence of greater size and depth than the original FPG in the exact same location. We descended below the forecast area and experienced a smooth ride.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported their Dispatcher flight planned through known turbulence areas for an oceanic flight.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This has been ongoing and nothing has been resolved. X break-room is extremely dirty. Floors have not been swept or mopped. Tables and counters have not been wiped down. If we are to wear mask because of COVID the break-room should remain clean. All the cleaning crew do is take out the trash and that is it and leave everything else filthy.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported the break-room is not cleaned properly.