elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; 2
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Heavy weather and thunderstorms moving through the bay area. Winds were gusting on the surface and all Bay area airports were using non-standard runways. OAK closed while we were on arrival and aircraft were holding and diverting. The frequency was very congested. We were a couple of miles north of MNTNA intersection descending via the FRLON2 Arrival. A large cell was just past the MNTNA intersection and we asked Approach if we could maintain present heading for one to two miles for weather and then go direct MISSS. That request was approved. We finished the deviation and reported we were turning direct MISSS.The turn toward MISSS ended up being a fairly hard left turn. The Controller at one point asked if we were turning direct MISSS and we answered affirmative. He then said we weren't headed to MISSS and gave us a heading. The navigational display clearly showed we were headed to MISSS. After established on the heading we realized we hadn't been given an altitude after deviating off the arrival. We were at about 6500 feet with 5500 feet set in the altitude window. We asked what altitude we were cleared to and the Controller said 7000 feet. We said 'roger climbing back to 7000 feet;' and he said just maintain 6000 feet. He then gave us a frequency change and added that we were never headed toward MISSS. With all the frequency congestion and the high workload; we just shrugged; acknowledged the frequency and pressed. We never got an altitude clearance when cleared to deviate off the arrival; but we should have thought to ask.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew; while deviating around weather; was questioned by ATC if they were proceeding to the cleared waypoint. The crew was convinced they were but ATC still questioned their track.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: ATR 42
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb; had a pitch trim Asymmetry [message]; followed QRH. En-route crew discussed possible issues with control of aircraft with pitch trim being stuck in a nose up trim. [Advised ATC] and landed in ZZZ normal. Notified Maintenance. Possible changes to QRH for Pitch Trim failure should include notes about uncontrollably issues and possible needing to divert to another airport.




Synopsis: ATR-42 Captain reported a pitch trim issue during climb was resolved with QRH procedure; but crew was concerned about further controllability issues.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A 4th gear pin was discovered installed after takeoff in the nose gear. Performed return and landed uneventful. Pin was removed and flight resumed to destination. The aircraft had just returned from several days of maintenance. At some unknown point; someone installed a nose gear pin that had no ribbon or markings. Using standard gear pins with proper markings would have prevented this occurrence.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported takeoff with an unknown nose gear pin resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were descending on the ZZZZ 1 arrival into ZZZ. As we were descending the First Officer extended the speed brakes to help us get down.  Upon retraction to about 50 percent stowed; the aircraft rolled right about 15 degrees. Then the autopilot rolled wings level.  Once the speed brake was stowed to 25 percent it rolled again to the right 15 degrees and then it went wings level again.  After the speed brakes were fully stowed; the aircraft rolled left 15 degrees and then back to wings level.  After that we knew we had a spoiler problem and we decided we would not use the speed brakes for the remainder of the flight.  After referencing the QRH and the manuals; we requested priority handling; we notified the flight attendants and we let the passengers know with a PA.  We descended uneventfully with priority handling and landed with vehicles standing by. We taxied to the gate.  We debriefed with maintenance and the flight operations.




Synopsis: B737 NG Captain reported experiencing several 15 degree rolls to the right due to a possible speedbrake/spoiler malfunction during arrival flight phase. The crew landed uneventfully without the use of speedbrakes.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GUC.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF GUC
Aircraft component: VHF
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While training a third party student I was making radio calls on CTAF at GUC. I had previously verified that the radio I was using (Comm 1) was operative. After several approaches (both to missed and to landings); during which I continued to make calls on CTAF; we ended up head to head on the runway with another airplane. Both aircraft were fully stopped while still a great distance from one another (probably more than 1000 feet). I made another call on CTAF and we taxied back to the FBO to find out what happened.We were informed that no one had heard our calls; so I went back out to the airplane in order to check the radios. I could not discern why Comm 1 was inoperative; so I wrote it up first and then called Maintenance. Maintenance Control asked the usual questions; including checking the volume and making sure the radio was on (both these things I had already checked); and then suggested I check the circuit breaker. The breaker was popped so I reset it as per Maintenance Control's directive and I cleared the write up according to the instruction of the Maintenance person I was talking to.Asking for frequent radio checks from the FBO are the only way I can think of to avoid this happening again. It was very hot (over 100 degrees F) in the cabin; despite having the temp control set to full cold. This might have had something to do with the circuit breaker popping.I am certain that for most of that training flight; we were hearing (and were heard on) CTAF. It was just right at the end when something happened.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot; practicing landings with a student and using CTAF procedures; finds himself nose to nose with another aircraft on the takeoff roll. After stopping with room to spare it is discovered that Comm1 had failed due to a tripped circuit breaker.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On an unpressurized ferry flight [to] LAX at a cruise altitude of 10;000 feet; got a TA on an aircraft below us 12 o'clock and climbing. At approximately 4 miles ATC gave us a traffic advisory at the same time we got an RA with a CLIMB command. As we were climbing the First Officer spotted the aircraft coming right at us and said 'TURN LEFT.' I rolled into a 35-40 degree turn as the ATC Controller was advising a right turn which we could not comply with at that point. We observed we were climbing with the other aircraft with a constant 100 feet separation. The First Officer still watching the other aircraft said 'DESCEND - DESCEND.' As I was lowering the nose the other aircraft passed behind us at close range. We climbed to approximately 11;300 feet before descending to 10;000 feet and returning on course. It appears we (both aircraft) were nearing the border between two sectors because we were not on the same frequency. Seconds before our Controller had given us a frequency change; then said to stay with him and then gave us the traffic advisory as we were responding to the RA. It is not apparent to me that the other aircraft maneuvered to avoid us or even saw us. The other aircraft was a Cessna Citation.




Synopsis: An MD82 Captain on an unpressurized ferry flight encountered an opposite direction Citation and responded to TA and RA warnings as well as directives from the First Officer based on visual contact.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GSP.Tower, SC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C GSP
ATC / advisory: Tower GSP
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was on ILS approach to Runway 4 at GSP when a VFR aircraft inbound to GMU went across final under Aircraft X. Traffic was called. GMU [Tower] was called. Aircraft X was below the clouds and stated he would execute missed approach if there was a RA. The pilot seemed to stay above glide slope to avoid the RA. Both aircraft eventually got each other in sight and Aircraft X landed.This is a known safety problem. The closest proximity of 2 aircraft in this situation is zero lateral and less than 100 feet vertical if the GSP arrival is on the glideslope and the VFR is in the GMU Delta airspace. However; it should not be taken for granted that aircraft on instrument and visual approaches will be at or above glideslope altitude. Since the VFR is under the GSP arrival; which is usually a jet; there are also wake turbulence issues.The Charlie and Delta airspace design is flawed. The FAA is either unwilling or unable to redesign the airspace to provide for the safety of the flying public.From my experience; the VFR aircraft involved are always inbound to GMU from SC72 (Chandelle). It is probably less than half a dozen aircraft that occasionally do this. When they depart GMU; they are instructed to fly over VPLOW when GSP Runway 4 is in use. If they were instructed to fly over VPLOW when inbound to GMU; the problem would be resolved. GMU Tower can instruct aircraft to remain outside the Delta and instruct aircraft where to enter the Delta; so there is no reason this solution would not work. It could be agreed to; briefed and implemented in 24 hours.This situation develops quickly and there are no guarantees that the controllers will see it before the RA or collision alert. When it is seen; or when the alarms go off; what does FAA management want the controllers to do?  Should we be breaking off the approach as a preventive measure?




Synopsis: GSP Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict over intersection VPLOW. Controller stated this is an ongoing issue between IFR and VFR aircraft near VPLOW intersection.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower BWI
Second aircraft: Widebody Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the Local Control position during a west operation. Traffic was very light with only a few departures for Runway 28 and a couple of arrivals for Runway 33L. Ground Control asked to cross Runway 28 at R1 with Aircraft Y behind my aircraft that was on departure roll. I approved Ground Control's request to cross. After my scan to make sure I had the required spacing for my next departure; I issued Aircraft X a departure clearance off of Runway 28. Right after the Aircraft X flight began takeoff roll; Ground Control alerted me of Aircraft Y flight crossing down the field. I immediately canceled Aircraft X takeoff clearance; and advised the aircraft to stop the roll due to traffic crossing midfield. Aircraft X stopped short of Taxiway Delta on Runway 28. The aircraft was then taxied clear of the runway and into a hold area to reconfigure. I did not use a memory aid for the crossing which would have aided in preventing this incident.My recommendation for myself would be to utilize the memory aids regardless of the traffic complexity. This is not a facility issue. Management recently stressed the importance of memory aids in our local read and initial binder.




Synopsis: Baltimore Local Controller reported approving an aircraft to cross a runway after the departing aircraft. Local then cleared an additional aircraft for takeoff before the aircraft had finished crossing downfield.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Tecnam P2012 Traveller
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Takeoff was normal until rotation. Rotated at 75 knots; but didn't lift off until 100 knots. Verified flaps were at takeoff. Climb-out was at 100 knots. At around 400 feet AGL; started a turn and was scanning the instruments when the stall warning went off. The airspeed had dropped to 77 knots. almost instantly. I performed a stall recovery and proceeded to climb to 3;000 feet MSL. At cruise; I noticed all 3 airspeed indicators were showing different airspeeds and the altimeters were different as well. The true airspeed and ground speed were displaying higher than indicated. I pulled the ALT static air and pilot airspeed dropped about 15 knots; but I could not tell which reading was correct. I informed ZZZ Departure and returned for a visual landing. I verified my altitude with ATC and the pilot altitude was correct but the PFD2 was showing about 200 feet lower. On approach airspeed was showing 120 - 130 knots; but the pitch attitude was too high and the controls were mushy. Post-flight walkaround found pitot and static openings OK; but the static system drain lock open.




Synopsis: P2012 Traveller Captain reported performing an air turnback due to unreliable airspeed and altimeter functions caused by the open static system drain.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Dispatch
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I'm writing to bring attention to fatigue issues with FAR 135 [dispatchers]. I am a Dispatcher. Specifically; since there are no restrictions on the amount of hours a [dispatcher] can work; leadership at my company allows some [Dispatchers] to work extremely abnormal amounts of hours. Specifically; [Dispatchers] are allowed to work a double shift for several consecutive days. 'Double Shifts' are an average of 16 hours long and can go as long as 20; always with no formal breaks. Younger [Dispatchers] are signing up for this many hours for the Overtime Pay. However; this is leading to many mistakes that are relatively minor; for now. Missing radio calls from pilots in the air; not recognizing adverse weather conditions along a flight path until someone alerts the [Dispatchers]. Not recognizing when a pilot is in danger of going over duty and/or flight time limits; etc. Other [Dispatchers] working nearby are assisting in identifying and correcting these mistakes and lack of recognition from fatigued [Dispatchers]; but it is not in the context of a healthy CRM 'checks & balances' relationship nor positive teamwork.Due to staffing shortages; management appears to only be happy that all shifts are covered; and are not concerned about the overall cost and liability to all parties involved; especially our passengers. Certainly training and development can play a role in reducing these common mistakes. One only has to cite any number of fatigue studies done by the FAA to know that fatigue can make any of these small mistakes to become serious mistakes that could have grave consequences. After raising my concerns several times; and not wanting to face potential consequences of using my company's safety reporting system; I feel it prudent to report it here. Fatigue rules exist for Part 121 operations for a reason. Just because Part 135 operations involve fewer passengers; why safety should be allowed to be compromised. Safety systems work best when they are proactive; not when reacting to a worst-case event. I believe safety is being compromised by having zero duty time restrictions for [Dispatchers] at my [company].




Synopsis: Air taxi Dispatcher reported company Part 135 dispatchers are allowed to work very long hours and that fatigue has compromised safety.