Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Night
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ZZZ to ZZZ1. Leg five of five on day one of a four day trip. I was Pilot Flying and the Captain was Pilot Monitoring. Departing ZZZ during reported windshear. Take off was accomplished bleeds off as per FSM. At acceleration height the Captain accomplished his flow and we continued on course normally. While at cruise altitude of 17;000 ft. we received a Master Caution Cabin Press warning. I announced it and then looked up at the bleed panel to see the bleeds were still selected off. Knowing that is not the correct position I selected them on and was going to call for the checklist when the caution extinguished. The Immediate Action Card for this caution describes donning oxygen masks and deciding if we need an emergency descent. Finally it refers us to another checklist in the Emergency and Abnormal checklist. As neither of these were necessary to solve the problem; we decided to forgo the checklist because the problem was solved. With the caution extinguished we continued with the flight as normal while monitoring the cabin pressure indications. The cabin maintained pressure and landed without further incident.I see this as an oversight of procedure that could have been solved by better monitoring; checklist and flow usage. At acceleration height on windshear takeoffs; the bleeds shall be selected on per FSM. While reading the after-takeoff checklist; the bleeds are also to be referenced and verified on. During the 10;000 ft. flow; pressurization should be checked and ensure it is in normal limits. And finally while setting cruise power the pressurization shall be monitored. All of these were missed so I believe they are probably systematically missed during flows since most takeoffs are accomplished bleeds on. Another cause could have been fatigue. We were on Flight Duty Period Watch and both the Captain and I took an extension. During debrief with the captain after the incident we both see the long day could have had an effect. As a lesson to be learned from; I see that as Pilot Flying I shall keep an eye on the flows and make sure at cruise we are pressurizing. Another lesson is to not take extensions. While I was not fatigued; there is no reason to continue past federal limits which could lead to a fatigue event.




Synopsis: First Officer reported loss of cabin pressure caused by engine bleed air switches not selected to on after a bleed off takeoff.