elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PIT.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground PIT; Tower PIT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Taxi instructions were C; N; E; to Runway 28C. Once on E I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist. While running the checklists; we saw there was a hold line; an awfully long way from the turn onto 28C. Thinking it must be an ILS hold line; we crossed the line and then stopped abruptly; since I did not see any other hold line. Aircraft cockpit was maybe 25 to 50 feet past the line and prior to the turn onto 28C. ATC didn't say anything. We were then cleared for takeoff; and then looked over to see where the hold line was on Taxiway E in relation to the departure end of 28C. After airborne; we discussed the incident and decided that a report was warranted. Perhaps a diagram showing where the hold line is on the taxiway would eliminate any confusion.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the location of the hold short line for a Runway 28C at PIT airport is difficult to determine.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Air Taxi
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I am concerned over the corrective action that was listed for this airplane. This airplane had already been written up 2 times for a hydraulic leak in the last 2 weeks. The last time the corrective action was to tighten up a loose fitting in the Rear Bay and 'ops checked good'. We flew the aircraft for 2 legs and on the post flight; I found it was again leaking out the bottom drain hole of the Rear Bay. The concern for me was when I was reviewing the mobile manager for this airplane. I did this because the next day we were attached to another tail and I lost the ability to view the eLogbook over this. What concerned me was it stated that it was signed off as 'over serviced and no leak found'. I found this somewhat suspect as I have seen this corrective action before only have the same problem again. The other issue is that it is somewhat bothersome that the mechanics who last worked on the airplane weren't qualified enough to service the hydraulic system properly. I mention this because after the [recent] check they did; I found 5 Aircraft on Ground (AOG) discrepancies. I believe there isn't anything earth shattering in serving the hydraulic fluid in this airplane but could be wrong. I would be curious if this indeed was the problem and whether it has occurred again.If indeed the hydraulic system was over serviced; I believe this was done by a third party vendor and they should be instructed on the proper way to service the hydraulic system for the Hawker.Also; we need some formal mechanism to get feedback on discrepancies for an airplane if we get moved to another airplane and lose access to the eLogbook for a given airplane. If every pilot called maintenance to look up their last airplane; the normally poor response time of them answering the phones would be even worse. It would be nice to have read only of the eLogbook.




Synopsis: A HS-128-800 Captain reported a hydraulic leak written of as over serviced but the leaking reported again on the aircraft. Due to crews move among aircraft they cannot track the reoccurring maintenance discrepancies.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we landed student had the wrong crosswind correction input in. The wind was coming from the left and we landed on the right main gear first; as a result we 'popped a wheelie' on the right main gear and started veering towards the left. When doing so the student started adding full power as we were veering towards runway lights. We veered off the runway. I took controls and pulled power back to idle. Did not hear or feel us hit any runway lights and did a thorough preflight inspection after the incident and did not see any structural damage to the aircraft.




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported a loss of control and runway excursion due to a student pilot's improper crosswind correction.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When in cruise at FL300; we were assigned a descent from FL300 to FL260. We were then given a continued descent from FL260 to FL240. During this second descent we were again given a continued descent to 11;000 feet. The First Officer (FO); who was the pilot flying; began to reduce the thrust levers to not accelerate. As he pulled the thrust levers back; he identified that the right engine was rolling back appropriately; and the left engine N1 was not moving. The FO immediately pointed this out to me. We both tried moving the left thrust lever from the maximum thrust position to the flight idle position with no movement of the engine N1. The QRH was pulled out and I transferred the radios to the FO to allow myself time to run the QRH for a stuck thrust lever or a disconnected thrust lever in the QRH. Prior to executing the QRH; I notified OPS via ACARS; and I notified the Flight Attendant about what was happening. We then ran the QRH shutting down the left (Number 1) engine. Once the QRH was complete I asked the FO if he was okay flying the approach. I wanted to be free to monitor the aircraft and to look for any other issues that might occur. He stated that he was perfectly alright with flying the now SE approach. We then flew a SE visual with no further incident. The assumption is a failure of the thrust lever linkage. The appropriate QRH was run securing the number one engine. A SE visual approach and landing were then completed.




Synopsis: CRJ200 First Officer discovers at the top of descent that the number one engine thrust cannot be reduced by pulling back on the thrust lever. The engine is shut down and a single engine landing ensues.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Both GPS failed; ATC queried us as to our navigation; showing us going south of course. We asked for vectors. Later; when both GPS recovered; we still refused to accept clearance for the RNAV arrival; opting instead for vectors.


Second narrative: Both GPS 1 and 2 failed while at cruise at 36;000 feet. ATC advised we were drifting about 1/2 mile left of course. We requested radar vectors back on course and refused the RNAV Arrival into SMF. Both GPS recovered without further incident.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a temporary failure of both GPS in the vicinity of TPH VOR. After the systems recovered; the crew elected to refuse the RNAV approach and requested vectors from ATC.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On final Runway 35L DEN; approximately 500 FT AGL; experienced a 20 kt loss of airspeed followed by a Windshear warning. We started an escape maneuver and after two windshear callouts; the warning ceased and we continued with a normal go-around. On downwind; we were told to plan on the visual approach to 35R; adding to our workload. I selected managed speed [and] the aircraft started to accelerate. I'm not sure if I activated the approach; but I could have sworn the speed bug was at Vapp. To prevent a flap overspeed; I disconnected the auto pilot and auto throttles and went to idle power. We were definitely unstable at 1000 FT; but we were day VMC. I continued high and fast; working back to glideslope and approach speed. We then got a master warning light with 2 ECAM messages. I saw the one labeled 'ENG 1 EGT OVER LIMIT'. This confused us; because at that time; the power was still at idle. As we neared 500 FT; still 15 kts fast; coming out of idle; engines starting to spool up; I elected not to go around because I was uncertain of the condition of the #1 engine. Smooth winds; long runway; it was a safe landing. I never caught the 2nd ECAM message.


Second narrative: During the approach to Runway 35L in DEN we experienced a loss of 20knots on short final and windshear warning. We initiated an escape maneuver and went around. The go around itself was uneventful. On downwind we were assigned Runway 35R. This added to our work load. I reprogrammed the FMS for 35R. On final I noticed the master caution lights on the glare shield. I tried to figure out what was causing it. I realized on the ECAM that the left engine was over its temperature limits. Auto thrust was disconnected; however the caution light remained on. We were out of the stabilized approach parameters. Captain made the decision to continue the approach since we were uncertain of the condition of number one engine. The Landing was uneventful.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported executing a go-around after encountering wind shear on final at DEN.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing to our cruise altitude we got a HYD 2 EDP FAIL EICAS. We ran the QRC/QRH. It did not reset. After fifteen minutes or so we then got an HYD 2 LO PRESS EICAS with the associated messages that follow (BRK RH FAULT..BRK LH FAULT..HYD 2 LO QTY)...We then ran the QRC/QRH HYD 2 LO PRESS which led us to the QRH Hydraulic System 2 Loss.... We landed uneventfully and got towed to the gate.




Synopsis: E190 First Officer reported losing #2 hydraulic system. After running the procedures a normal landing was executed.
Date: 201907
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Other all
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I operated flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 on behalf of [Company]; an FAR Part 121 air carrier. The first flight lasted 2 hours and 11 minutes while the second flight was 6 hours and 13 minutes; all block times. The two flights put my total hours flown in 7 consecutive days at 38 hours and 01 minutes. This violates 14 CFR 121.471(a)(3) which states that no certificate holder conducting domestic operations may schedule any flight crewmember and no flight crewmember may accept an assignment for flight time in scheduled air transport or in other commercial flying if that crewmember's total flight time in all commercial flying will exceed 30 hours in any 7 consecutive days. I was not aware of this incident as at the time it happened. I became aware of it yesterday; through an email from the [Safety and Regulatory Compliance] for [Company]. According to the letter; this incident was discovered after a recent internal audit showed that an [Company] crew scheduling rule in the AIMS system that impacts some FAA regulations was inadvertently turned off. [Company] has promptly addressed the problem and has created a long-term plan for a comprehensive fix in order to mitigate future events. I; as a crewmember; will also be more vigilant in the future and duly scrutinize every flight assignment to make sure that I am in compliance with all CFRs before accepting it.




Synopsis: Flight crew for air carrier reported they flew beyond the maximum allowed flight time during 7 day period.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon landing at their destination of ZZZZ1 and looking at the W/B (Weight and Balance) for the next flight ZZZZ1-ZZZZ2; I noticed the W/B had Dry Ice loaded in the lower forward compartment. I checked the W/B for the ZZZZ-ZZZZ1 leg; and ZZZZ had loaded Dry Ice in the lower forward compartment and did not notify me; thus no 0.4% overburn had been applied. Flight crew did not say anything to me as well. Dispatcher suggested better ramp training for them to be aware of need to inform Dispatcher if Dry Ice will be loaded in lower compartments of 777. Also; suggest programming [Software] to trigger an FPS ball alert to the Dispatcher anytime Dry Ice gets loaded in a lower compartment of a 777. I made this suggestion previously to [Name] in an email sent on [Date].




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported unmanifested Dry Ice had been transported to destination.
Date: 201912
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Snow
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: De-Iced at gate after a 10 ft. push. During a snow event; Iceman released the aircraft after de-icing. He declared the aircraft de-iced. Problem was; there was considerable snow sticking to cockpit side windows and front nose area. When Captain observed the forward fuselage area; it also was covered with snow.This is my second de-ice this year when the [aircraft] was certified as 'Clean' by a de-ice crew and in fact the aircraft was NOT clean.




Synopsis: Captain reported that on multiple occasions; the aircraft was not properly de-iced prior to departure.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the WYNDE7 Arrival into ORD; the plane was cleared to descend at 300 KTS and cross WYNDE at 11;000 feet. After arriving at 11;000; the aircraft began slowing to 250 KTS. After looking at the descent page on the FMC; the 250 was highlighted for 10;000 or below on the descent page. This was neither commanded nor desired; as Chicago Center questioned us on our airspeed at the same time we realized the plane was slowing without being in the constraint parameters. A new ATIS report had arrived; and we were analyzing the crosswind and tailwind components for landing; as they were approaching limits. In the brief period we had looked at this information; the aircraft had slowed. Our aircraft had the older 737NG FMC and I was familiar with the lack of reliability and unpredictability on this model. However; I did not anticipate an aircraft slowing while level at 11;000 feet to the 10;000 feet and below speed.[Our company] would like us to maximize the use of the VNAV function; but the lack of reliability and unpredictability; which is neither explained in the flight manual or trained for in the flight training; makes me question the viability of the system. Using VNAV on the older 737 NG models is like letting a 4 year old drive a car while sitting on your lap. You have to constantly watch; help and correct; but you give him all the credit. And your workload is reduced; because after all; he drove; didn't he? Its fine in an empty parking lot; but not on the freeway. VNAV has been a constant issue on this plane; and many issues probably never get documented. However; the 'what's it gonna do now?' and 'why did it do that?' factor on this plane is higher than any other aircraft I have ever flown with automation. I believe better instruction; and clarification of the realities of the system; its limits; and limitations needs to be addressed.




Synopsis: B737 NG Captain reported a speed deviation during arrival to ORD. Captain stated the FMS VNAV performance on older NG models is poor and requires constant monitoring.