elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Accelerating and climbing through about 15;000 FT I felt and heard a deep vibration in the aircraft. I asked my First Officer if he noticed anything. He said he did. I looked over all the engine gauges and they all looked normal. I felt the flight controls and they seemed normal except for the vibration. I didn't have any uncommanded movements. As we were looking for signs of the source of the vibration; the Lead Flight Attendant called up and asked if we noticed a vibration. With that many people confirming an abnormal situation and not knowing what it was; I thought it was prudent to return to the field to have it inspected. We informed ATC that we wanted to return and also called the departure Operations to let them know. As we were in our turn we lost the right generator. Assuming it was related; but not sure; we declared an emergency so as to get an expedited return back to the runway. We landed uneventfully. Upon discussion with Maintenance afterward; they believed that bearings inside the generator went bad and that is what was causing the vibration we felt.




Synopsis: During climb a MD-83 flight crew and flight attendant noticed an airframe vibration and decided on a precautionary return to land but the right generator failed so an emergency was declared followed by a normal landing. Maintenance discovered failed generator bearings.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was taking off at ZZZ on an IFR flight to ZZZ1. After I completed my before takeoff check I was cleared for takeoff and began to taxi onto the runway. As I lined up for takeoff I switched from ground idle to flight idle. During this process it appears that I knocked the flaps out of takeoff position. I added power and during rotation I realized that the lift I needed for takeoff wasn't there. I immediately looked to the flap position and noticed it was out of the detent and half way between 15 degrees and 0 degrees. I knocked it back into 15 degrees but in the moment of confusion had let up on right rudder pressure. Meanwhile the plane turned slightly to the left as the plane built up speed. At this time I corrected with right rudder and slowly rotated and made a safe takeoff.In order to prevent this situation from occurring again I will put the plane into flight idle prior to completing my pre-take off check. This way there will be no way of me accidentally knocking the flap lever out of position. I will also double check that the flaps are in position as part of my flow prior to adding take off power.




Synopsis: PC-12 pilot reported inadvertently knocking the flap handle out of the 15 degree detent just prior to departure; which resulted in an unsafe takeoff configuration.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: After landing on 26L [at IAH]; I was instructed to exit at Taxiway NR. After exiting; Ground first instructed us to taxi via NA-NE-WA-to parking. After read back it was changed to NR-WW-WA-to parking. Looking at diagram we appeared to be on NE; so I taxied straight ahead looking for WW. The intersection of NR and WW is not marked. After we passed it Ground instructed us to continue and join WB to parking; which we did.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain advised that Taxiway WW at NR is not marked at IAH. As a result he missed the turn given by Ground Control after exiting Runway 26L.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout; we experienced a Low Oil Quantity indication; and then shortly after a Low Oil Pressure indication for the number 2 engine. We initially assumed that we were having an oil gulping situation so we lowered the deck angle. The quantity continued to decrease and then we experienced the Low Oil Pressure indication for the number 2 engine. When we received the red Low Oil Pressure indication; we ran the QRH Checklist and were instructed to shut down the number 2 engine.After shutting down the number 2 engine; we contacted ATC. We then contacted Dispatch; Operations and the flight attendants. After landing flaps 15; we exited the runway and obtained the brake cooling data. We were given a 30 minute cooling time before going to the gate. We had Crash Fire Rescue check the brake temperatures and were told that the brakes were cool. We relayed this information to Maintenance Control and were advised to continue to the gate. The passengers were advised of the low oil situation via the PA and then deplaned.  I should have immediately taken the radios and controls while the First Officer ran the checklists; contacted Operations; flight attendants and ran the landing data.


Second narrative: The situation happened very quickly and in busy airspace with lots of radio congestion. At first; it was hard to tell if it was an indication issue. The QRH doesn't show anything regarding low oil quantity; so it's only with low pressure we realized there was a legitimate loss of oil occurring. I think given the time to accomplish and delegate tasks; we did well.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after shutting down #2 engine due to low oil quantity and pressure.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On J6 in the EED area and continuing for several minutes; a blinding reflection occurred from an apparent solar array WSW of LAS (NW of our position). The effect was similar to a LASER illumination when glancing toward the vicinity of the reflection.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported a blinding reflection that lasted several minutes from an apparent solar array in the vicinity of EED.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After an exhausting morning we arrived [at] JFK for a passenger trip to ZZZ. The FMS would not accept the pre departure clearance so I did the clearance via radio with ATC. We were given the departure. I verified the clearance twice with ATC. The FMS was loaded both crew verified the clearance. After takeoff we were following the FMS for the departure; after CRI we were planning on the right turn to NEION intersection; that's when ATC questions our turn and he immediately assigned us a south bound heading. ATC gave us a telephone number to call after we arrive at ZZZ. We complied after landing at ZZZ. There was no threat to persons or property during this event.  ATC needs to be more specific during the clearance; he should have stated radar vectors after a heading off of CRI. Or there needs to be a waypoint after CRI. The climb and heading of is stated further down the SID but we missed it. (Possible fatigue onset) the heading needs to be more obvious. It was also communicated to the pilot in command by ATC personnel via the phone conversation that this departure has also been causing 'problems' for the airlines. This incident seems to happen once or twice a week says ATC. The crew fatigued upon reaching ZZZ.




Synopsis: An aircraft on a SID proceeded to a point on their flight plan after the SID transition. The aircraft are supposed to stay on the SID heading expecting radar vectors. This is not indicated clearly on the SID and causes confusion for aircraft on a regular basis.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Prior to door closure; a passenger asked to get off the flight with not much of an explanation. The pilots requested to have the passenger's bags removed from the aircraft and agents /operations denied the request as it was a domestic flight and they wished to avoid a delay. There seems to be a pattern with passengers asking to deplane at the very last minute with little to no explanation as of recent. Crew members were uncomfortable with their luggage remaining on board. I believe situations like this; airlines should be required to make sure all bags on board are accounted for when a passenger exits and checked bags removed whether international or domestic.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reported that a passenger requested to get off the airplane without claiming their luggage.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This aircraft had a history of keypad cockpit door chime failures. The keypad had been replaced earlier in the day. Upon arrival to the airplane I tested the cockpit door chime and it failed to ring. Maintenance was called where the Technician advised he was going to MEL the door chime which required the removal of power to the entire keypad. So; with power removed from the keypad emergency access to the cockpit is inhibited. There would be no way to enter the cockpit should there be an incapacitation of both crew members. There is no key access in this design on the Airbus. This MEL on the Airbus should be eliminated. With it; a flight deck crew is sealed off from the cabin without an option for emergency access should the need arise. I would have refused this aircraft had the Technician not been able to fix the chime; resulting in this MEL being applied.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported concern about an MEL on the fleet that allows aircraft to be dispatched with the cockpit access keypad inoperative; since that would preclude any emergency access to the cockpit.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: MARQO ONE RNAV STAR: Runway 8 was closed. We were set up for the RWY 14 transition; then somewhere before COROE; without enough time we were told descend and use the RWY 8 transition. I tried to set up the transition on an FMS system because the pilot not flying was new and wasn't acting fast enough. I told him to fly and attempted the modification. I then found myself too close to COROE without a transition route and quickly requested a heading. ATC reiterated his instructions and we went back and forth wasting time with me trying to explain we couldn't navigate it and needed a heading and altitude. He didn't get that we lost our FMS routing because of his late request. THEY SHOULDN'T ISSUE these changes so late in the game as well as keep us high too long which was another issue adding to the complications. While this was going on I selected heading hold after COROE which was basically the runway 8 transition until I finally got a heading and new altitude.They shouldn't be allowed to issue a different transition while landing another runway; besides adding distraction and confusion. Our systems won't do it unless we have much more time to set it up and figure out we will have to plan on raw data approach if it isn't an RNAV or RNAV back up. RNAV is not allowed on an FMS airplane anyway.Tell ATC to learn and understand our aircraft and pilot capabilities and that the more complex the request; the more dangerous it is since we may not know until after we have gone through the distracting procedure of attempting to comply; that it is too late to do anything. And in our case; left without a route in the FMS while crossing the initial waypoint of the arrival transition. (Thus my reason for requesting a heading of which they fought and took too long to provide.)Bottom line; special changes and requests to these very specific and restricted arrivals should not be issued or expected to comply with. Either have us fly the arrivals as is or provide vectors; speeds; and altitudes. My future response in this situation will be; 'UNABLE RNAV' and if that doesn't elicit radar vectors I will have to declare an emergency.




Synopsis: MD-80 Captain reported struggling to get the FMS re-programmed after a late runway change from ATC. Reporter recommended ATC stick with the original clearance and minimize short-notice changes.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After boarding was complete ATC notified us of a 50 minute gate hold. I made appropriate periodic PAs to Passengers. Our wheels up was :50 so I told Agent and Crew to plan to push at :40. At push time no one was ready. I had to go to the top of the jet way to find the Agent and there was no Pushback Crew. As a result we were rushed despite the 50 minute delay. At this point there was a serious chance that we would not make our wheels up time. At the last moment the A Flight Attendant tossed the napkin on to the console and closed the cockpit door. The last digit of the count was illegible and I made the mistake of assuming it was correct. As we approached the runway we were cleared for immediate takeoff. I rang the cabin to notify the Flight Attendants and as we took the runway the A called up to tell us that there was a Passenger that thought he might be on the wrong aircraft. I had the First Officer instruct everyone to remain seated and that we would sort it out in the air. Above 10;000 feet I confirmed the load sheet count of 46 and compared it to the napkin count of 4 (illegible). I contacted the A who said her count was 47. Further investigation revealed that our extra Passenger was a connect for [a different airport] that had failed to exit at the last stop and remained on the aircraft despite the numerous PAs referring to our destination. I suspect that he was in the lav during the through count process. We coordinated with Dispatch to have a [customer service agent] meet him.Slow down; it's always wise to slow down. Also; our procedure of verifying the count as the very last thing to occur before push; seems like there could be a better time to discover this showstopper; especially when faced with a potentially significant delay if an error is detected. Maybe I haven't been paying attention but I ride other airlines and I've never seen flight attendants actually count Passengers before pushback. The potential error chain has too many links with our system.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737NG flight crew reported they departed with an unaccounted passenger onboard.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TMB.Airport, FL
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TMB
ATC / advisory: Tower TMB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working Local Control South on Runway 9R at TMB on an East configuration. I had an IFR practice approach a PA28 complete his low approach and was instructed to fly runway heading and maintain 2;000 FT. I had a successive IFR Departure a CL60 which was released by MIA Departure with a left turn to heading 300. Once I had more than 3 miles of separation from the PA28 off the departure end of the runway; I cleared the CL60 on runway heading initially in order to avoid Cessna's in the traffic pattern on 9L. After coordinating with Local North; I instructed the CL60 to start the left 300 turn and issued traffic of a Cessna in the left crosswind indicating 1;000 FT; the pilot replied he had the aircraft insight. Immediately after that traffic call; I issued the second traffic call which was the PA28 that was already talking to MIA Approach. The pilot first responded with 'looking' followed by 'got him insight.' Once I saw the CL60 in his turn I then switched him to MIA Approach. AT all times the operation was safe; no form of separation was broken; and I had all aircraft in sight at all times. This was also the first time on position I had to work with the new RADAR system 'FUSION'. I had to adapt to the new RADAR that I had never seen before prior to being on position this time. My recommendation is before implementing a new RADAR and having to use it without ever seen it before; familiarization time must be given to the Controller before getting on position and working traffic.




Synopsis: TMB Controller described a near separation loss when utilizing FUSION RADAR equipment for the first time. The reporter noted some familiarization with the new equipment should have been in place before usage.