elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was Pilot Flying going into LGA on the KORRY 4 arrival landing Runway 31. The last ATIS in LGA advertised the Expressway Visual to Runway 31. We had set up to cross DIALS at 2;500 feet per the visual approach. We briefed the visual to 31. During arrival the new ATIS came out. We did receive it but both myself and the First Officer failed to notice that they changed the approach to the LOC 31. Last clearance we received with approach was direct LGA and to descend and maintain 4;000 feet. We were currently at 250 kts. As we approached LGA; I had assumed we were going to get a very late approach clearance to cross DIALS at 2;500 feet and cleared the Expressway Visual. Not wanting to be unstable I started slowing the aircraft to 210 kts assuming Approach would be giving us the clearance. LGA Approach then asked why we were slowing and what airspeed we were at? We notified them that we were at 200 kts. The Controller told us that we must ask to slow in NY and that we have traffic behind us. I told them I was expecting DIALS at 2;500 feet. They said that they were doing the LOC 31 and they take us over LGA. At this point we realized what had happened. Approach did ask us if we had the current ATIS information when we checked in. We quickly switched approaches and continued the flight with no further incidents. This all could have been avoided had we read the new ATIS more carefully. I should have questioned if approach was going to give us DIALS at 2;500 feet. And lastly; I should have asked before slowing down on my own. I believe fatigue and expectation bias played major roles in this incident.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported slowing from assigned speed in anticipation of clearance for the wrong approach into LGA airport.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While on the gate we received an ACARS message that we would need to extend our [Out of Duty] time if we were going to continue the flight. We responded and said we would extend our [Out of Duty] time. We received an ACARS message that our new [Out of Duty] time is XA:12z. We continued the boarding process and then pushed off the gate at time XW:24Z. We taxied to Runway 18L for takeoff. We sat there for 5 minutes and then got cleared for takeoff. On the takeoff roll we received an ACARS message which we did not responded to because that is a critical phase of flight. After we were airborne we pulled up the ACARS message and it said that if we were not off the ground by XW:12Z we would need to return to the gate. My concern is that those are two contradicting messages. One says our [Out of Duty] time is XA:12Z the other says if not off by XW:12Z return to the gate. I personally think that our [Out of Duty] messaging system or process needs to be looked at.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported the flight crew did not receive an important message via ACARS from the company until airborne.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On descent; the FLAPS DRIVE EICAS and STATUS messages annunciated. The outboard Trailing Edge Flaps failed to extend to the commanded flaps 5 position. The flap handle was at the flaps 5 position. We referenced the QRH and AOM for the appropriate checklists. Aircraft position was approximately 8;000 FT/230 KTS/ 570;000 LBS. We discontinued the approach and got extended vectors from Approach Control as we ran the checklists. We contacted the company via SATCOM to inform the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control of the situation and status of the aircraft. Explained the situation to verify there wasn't anything that the crew might have missed. Afterwards SATCOM was terminated. We declared an emergency; requested fire truck assistance and commenced the approach. Approach was uneventful except for loss of 10 KTS at 600 and 400 FT; which we reported to ATC. Wind was 290 at 16 KTS. Touchdown was uneventful. The aircraft exited [well before the end of the runway]. The BRAKE TEMP EICAS message annunciated for the #5 brake; for which we informed ground personnel. The flaps were not retracted so Maintenance could assess what made the flaps not operate normally.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B747 flight crew experiences a flap drive failure while attempting to extend flaps to 5 during approach. An emergency is declared and a partial flap landing ensues.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C F11
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I descended an aircraft to 2700 feet. There is an obstruction at 2900 feet but at his rate of descent I always easily clear that antenna. The pilot asked if he was getting down to get under weather and I said no; it was to get under arrivals. Next thing I know he is below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. I issued 2900 feet but he did not acknowledge. His rate of descent was extremely unusual and unexpected. I think he was hurrying down on his own in hopes of turning toward the airport. I told him I could not turn that close on an instrument approach so he went the long way. I think it would help if pilots told us they were doing a non standard rate of descent. I think I will never anticipate a standard rate again.




Synopsis: Air Traffic Controller reported descending an aircraft to an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No aircraft
Mission: Training
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I am a Check Airman and just gave a simulator [training session]. We finished early and the crew asked to go through some trim scenarios. This may be common knowledge; but if not; I wanted to put it on paper.  1) The QRC/QRH guidance for 'trim runaway' has 'grasp and hold' as the final step. This does not work with fast trim. It works with slow autopilot trim; but if the wheel is spinning under fast trim; there is no human way to grasp it and stop it. I burned my hand; nobody else was able to stop it running away. When 'trim runaway' was presumed to be an autopilot-only situation; this made sense; now that we know the aircraft can command fast trim; this needs to be addressed.  This manual needs to be updated. 2) When the trim is set very far forward; and the Pilot Flying is hauling back on the yoke to keep from descending; the manual trim wheel (stab trim cutout switches to off) resists turning. This may have to do with pressure on the jackscrew; the trim is forcing down; the elevator forcing up; but once the trim is really far out of sync with flight conditions; it is nearly impossible to manually move the trim wheel to regain proper trim. The force is exceptionally difficult; it feels like there is a brake on the trim (probably the jackscrew). The Pilot Flying 'gave up' less than a minute into manually trimming. High airspeed (I pushed the throttles forward on him) made it much worse. He had to pull the throttles back to even get a turn in.This might all be coming out in testing; but from a ten-minute exercise; it became clear that there are more complicating factors to examine than just training on hitting the stab trim cutout switches. If the trim is too far out before that happens; what we've been taught doesn't seem to work very well; or at all. 'Grasp and hold' being the directive that simply is unfeasible except under autopilot trim runaway and then manually trimming to regain neutral control inputs is also nearly impossible. I wanted to put my experience down for you to look at. I've rarely been surprised by aircraft response; [so] watching the trim wheel bind up was an eye-opener. Simulator trim experiment shows inadequacy of guidance.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported the runaway stabilizer procedure was inadequate when demonstrated in the aircraft simulator.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I cleared Aircraft X to 11;000 feet which was the lowest I could clear them. I accidentally said 10;000 feet; but corrected myself and listed to be sure the pilot readback 11;000 feet. They reported weather and that she expected a visual approach and asked for a fix on the RNAV approach to set up for it. I didn't know the fix; but since 11;000 feet was the highest terrain in the area; I told them they could start heading toward the fix while I found it. They turned direct and began descending below 11;000 feet. I first noticed it at 10;500 feet. I asked them to say altitude. They reported 10;500 feet descending to I think 7;200 feet. The fix in question has an altitude of 7;200 feet if you are cleared for the RNAV approach. I gave them a low altitude alert; informed them that they were cleared only to 11;000 feet and told them to climb immediately to 11;000 feet. They said they were starting the climb; but had the field in sight and wanted to cancel IFR. I accepted the cancellation.This was pilot error. Perhaps I should have pursued a pilot deviation.




Synopsis: ZLC Center Controller reported they observed an aircraft descend below the assigned altitude and below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Airspeed slowed to 190 KTS which was 20 KTS below the planned speed of 210 KTS during the configuration for approach about 15 NM final. There was wind sheer from nearby thunderstorm activity and the aircraft configuration was Flaps 1. The monitoring pilot called out 'watch airspeed' noting the downward trend and upon adding power I noticed the auto-throttles were disengaged. The auto-pilot and auto-throttles had been disengaged during the GILLL 1 Arrival due to the autoflight systems inability to comply with the restrictions on the arrival. The auto-pilot was subsequently re-engaged but neither pilot noticed that the auto-throttles had not been re-engaged and that the 'thrust' FMA was absent. We did not slow to below minimum maneuver speed for flaps 1; but were approaching an undesirable aircraft state before correcting. Contributing to the difficulty of compliance with the GILLL 1 Arrival was a change of the arrival transition from PEGLG to BBQUE and about three vectors off and then back on the arrival by ATC. Each time we were vectored off the arrival or told to hold an altitude and discontinue the profile descent after having been previously cleared to 'descend VIA.' We were given relief by ATC on some of the altitude and/or speed restrictions but were to comply with the subsequent restrictions. This required an increase in both flight and monitoring duties with multiple changes in flight modes; FMC programming and automation.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports getting slow during arrival after multiple revisions to the arrival procedure by ATC; requiring autothrust and autopilot disengagement. The autopilot is re-engaged; but the attempt to reengage the autothrust system is not successful and not initially detected by the crew.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The student was on his second solo as a student pilot; in the traffic pattern; and after 4 touch and go's the student landed and skidded to the left. The student shut down the airplane when he stopped on the grass area.  It appears the student landed with his foot on the brakes due to markings on the Runway. The aircraft was sent to Maintenance for inspection. Total flight time was 0.8 in this lesson. The wind conditions at the airport were: 100 at 10 knots; Visibility 10.




Synopsis: PA28 instructor pilot describes a runway excursion by his student during the second student solo in the traffic pattern.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Arriving Denver on the CLASH 3 STAR. Initially planning on 35R. We were given Runway 35L descending through 15;000 feet. Immediately after getting runway change; we were given a heading and cleared to 11;000 feet. ATC then cleared us for 9;000 feet. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight (we did) and turned us to a heading of 325 degrees and cleared us for the visual approach to 35L. That heading essentially aimed us directly at the FAF DYMON. I selected 7;000 feet in the altitude alert and continued the descent visually. Shortly after leveling at 7;000 feet; ATC advised us altitude alert; minimum altitude our sector 7;500 feet. I climbed up to 7;500 feet and remained there until glideslope interception. Flight continued uneventfully to DEN.I should have stayed at 9;000 feet until glideslope intercept.


Second narrative: Arriving DEN on the CLASH 3 STAR. Initially planning on 35R was given Runway 35L descending through 15;000 feet MSL. Immediately after getting runway change; we were cleared to 11;000 feet. ATC then cleared us for 9;000 feet. ATC asked if we had the airport in sight; we responded in the affirmative; and ATC turned us to a heading of 325 degrees; and cleared us for the Visual Approach to 35L. That heading essentially aimed us directly at the FAF DYMON on the ILS for Runway 35L.The Pilot Flying (PF) selected 7;000 feet in the altitude window and continued his descent visually. Shortly after arriving at 7;000 feet; ATC advised us Altitude Alert and stated minimum altitude was 7;500 feet in our sector. The PF immediately corrected our altitude to 7;500 feet and we stayed at that altitude until glideslope intercept for the ILS to 35L. We landed uneventfully in DEN.When cleared for the visual; stay at your last safe altitude assigned until intercepting glideslope; or have better awareness of the minimum altitude in the sector you are flying. Another option would be for visual clearance to land including a minimum altitude if required.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported getting an altitude alert from ATC after descending below the minimum safe altitude during arrival to DEN airport.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While flying at an altitude of 3;000 feet; ATC assigned new altitude of 2;500 feet. I mistakenly entered 2;000 feet in my autopilot.  Once leveling out at 2;000 feet ATC informed me of my error and reassigned existing altitude (2;000 feet) as my new altitude.I believe this occurred due to a heightened work load environment I was experiencing at the time; rapid fire instructions being given by Controller within his busy airspace; and my reduced flight proficiency due to fewer hours flown over the prior several months.  I plan on making a concerted effort to fly at a minimum of once per week to maintain suitable level of proficiency.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an altitude excursion and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Second reporter function: Lead Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We went out to the aircraft and found the slide of the L1 door resting on the entry stand. We tried to push the slide back; but there was no way to re-secure the slide and we could not pin the slide. For safety purposes we were told to pull the stand away from the airplane and the slide then fully deployed.


Second narrative: I assigned Technician Y and Z to the aircraft which was parked in hangar to continue the cabin odor Job card. I was notified that the L1 door slide was laying on the platform on the stand.  Myself and others went to the aircraft to inspect the L1 Door. After further investigation there was no way to re-secure the slide or pin the slide. For safety purposes [it was decided] to move the Stand to prevent any injuries or further damage to the aircraft.


Synopsis: Maintenance crew reported aircraft escape slide detached from entry door.