elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon configuring flaps from 25 to 30; Trailing Edge Flaps indicated a split and stopped tracking at 27 degrees. LE FLAPS TRANSIT light was also illuminated (amber light). A go-around was accomplished to enable time for non normal checklists to be run. LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT checklist was run which led us into TRAILING EDGE FLAPS DISAGREE checklist. Flaps were left at 27 degrees with flap handle at 25 setting. Vref15 +5 was the approach speed selected and an uneventful landing and taxi to the gate was accomplished.


Second narrative: On Final Approach to XXL in ZZZ and configuring from flaps 25 to flaps 30 at about 1;500 feet the trailing edge flap needle indicators displayed a split and the flaps stopped at approximately 27 degrees. The LE FLAP TRANSIT light was also illuminated. After taking a few seconds to realize what was happening and coming through approximately 1;000 ft the Captain called for a go around. I executed the go around; however upon attempting to retract the flaps we realized they were stuck at 27 degrees and would not retract at all. I continued to fly the plane and the Captain advised ATC and then ran the non-normal LEADING EDGE FLAP TRANSIT QRH followed by the TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE QRH. We received vectors from ATC and took our time setting up for a flaps 27 landing using the VREF15+5 knot wind additive. While being vectored back to the final approach course the Captain TEST and the FA's and made an announcement to the PAX. We landed and taxied to the gate uneventfully.


Synopsis: Flight Crew reported receiving a trailing edge flap asymmetry indication with a leading edge devices in transit light while on approach and elected to perform a go around in order to accomplish checklists and subsequently landed at destination airport.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We had a normal flight and landing. During our inflight arrival and performance planning there were no indications that any icing conditions existed at [the] airport. Stall protections speeds were utilized due to the common indication from flying through clouds in cold weather flying. Upon landing; runways and taxiways appeared to be completely clear of ice and snow other than a very thin layer of snow in the grass.Just after discontinuing reverse thrust at approximately 80 kts. I transferred controls to [the] Captain. He continued to slow the aircraft and exited at the intersection. Our estimated ground speed was between 5-10 kts. I hadn't yet turned off any lights and our visibility of the runway exit was good. The intersection appeared to be free of snow and ice. The aircraft was almost completely clear of [the] runway when it began to slide; which we suspect was from black ice. [The] Captain attempted to prevent the slide into the grass with continued brake application. We cut the corner of the grass bay and continued to slide onto [the] taxiway where the aircraft regained traction.[The] Captain assessed our taxi capability while I contacted Tower to inform them of the danger and our departure from the taxiway. Captain was confident in the aircraft's capability to taxi so we continued to the gate. During arrival at the gate; Airport Operations reported over Tower frequency that the taxiway sign had been struck and also that they had failed to de-ice that section of the taxiway. During post flight we only found damage on the bottom side of the right engine cowl. Passengers and flight attendants were unaware that anything had happened.




Synopsis: E175 First Officer reported that ice on a runway surface resulted in a runway excursion.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The A321 checked on at FL300 and was flying the JAGGR1 arrival. Cheyenne MOA/ATCAA was active FL290 and below. Descending via the JAGGR1 ensures separation with CYS ATCAA by using altitude (requires aircraft to be FL300-340 after clear of CYS). I gave the A321 a clearance to descend via the JAGGR1 arrival. He was vertically above CYS but laterally within the confines. I noticed him start to descend while still in the lateral confines (I noticed at FL296) of CYS by approximately 4 miles. I amended his altitude to FL290 and explained to him that he started his descent too early; as he was required to cross JAGGR waypoint between FL300-340. Pilots [need] to understand fully the RNAV arrivals and clearances. Also; I am no longer going to issue the descend via clearance while the aircraft are laterally within the confines of CYS ATCAA anymore even though it ensures separation. I will wait until they are clear so if they start down early by mistake they won't bust military space.


Second narrative: Denver Center cleared us to descend via the JAGGR1 arrival. We programmed the FMS and confirmed 9;000 FT as the bottom altitude. The descent mode was initiated just prior to the JAGGR waypoint. The aircraft was at FL300 and the alt restriction at JAGGR is FL300. The aircraft should not have started a descent; but it did. At approximately FL295; both pilots and ATC noticed the error. Denver ATC issued a clearance to FL290 and resume the JAGGR1 arrival.


Synopsis: An A321 Captain and the ZDV Controller involved both describe an altitude deviation while the A321 crew is attempting to comply with the altitude restrictions of the JAGGR 1 RNAV arrival into DEN. The aircraft had responded to an MCP input in an unexpected way.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: On the RNAV RNP Z RWY 05 Approach in visual conditions; SEA Center advised two targets maneuvering around the DSD VOR. One aircraft was no factor and clear; the other aircraft he said would present an issue. Neither [aircraft] seemed to be talking on the frequency. As we kept descending on the approach; near WONEK which is near the DSD VOR; we got the TCAS RA commanding a climb to avoid traffic off the left; maneuvering. After clear of conflict; we reestablished on the glide path outside the FAF; and landed in visual conditions.RDM is getting more chaotic with the increased flight training and air carrier operations. A note on the airport information chart would be appreciated about flight training. Also; maybe an outreach to the flight school advising them that if RDM is landing 05 and 29; be vigilant and be required to monitor SEA Center (128.15) if maneuvering near the DSD VOR.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported receiving an RA on arrival into RDM from light plane traffic in the vicinity of the DSD VOR.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout from ZZZ at about 25;000 feet the FO (First Officer) front window completely shattered. Our actions as a crew was an immediate level off and communicated with ATC. Reading the checklist came to a point of putting on shoulder harnesses; at this point I requested a turn for ZZZ. We worked together to get the airplane turned around with a new routing. The FO worked with ATC and I went back to the checklist for its completion. The last item on the checklist asked if the glass was inner or outer. In our case it was outer. Final line on checklist reads continue as normal and take off shoulder harnesses. So this is where I recognize the error; as dire as ' put on shoulder harnesses;' this was not the time to turn around. We once again discussed our situation with one another with a completed checklist and cautiously went with the checklist; that this is ok to continue to ZZZ1. Our fuel situation was fine as we proceeded to ZZZ1 fairly quickly. We were left separated in situations and busy unnecessarily. This is my disappointment.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a lack of clarity when following the checklist for a shattered cockpit window.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PDK.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am aware that the pilot-controlled lighting frequency at PDK is different from the CTAF frequency of 120.9. I was on a VFR approach to PDK at night with a commercial instrument-rated pilot in the right seat when the Tower was closed. We both found it extremely difficult to find the PCL frequency buried in the Chart Supplement. We tried keying on multiple frequencies including CTAF 120.9 and UNICOM 122.95 but could not activate the runway lights. We heard another pilot attempting to turn on PCL on the CTAF frequency as well. I was able to continue to a safe landing by referencing taxiway lights and the runway environment illuminated by my own landing lights. After landing; we finally found the PCL frequency of 120.0 in the Chart Supplement and found that the lights were working. I understand that it is the PIC's responsibility to be aware of such exceptions to common procedures; but I think it would be highly beneficial; especially to those unfamiliar with the airport; to publish critical information such as PCL frequencies in a more accessible manner; e.g. on the sectional/TAC or on the airport diagram. An even better solution would be to consolidate the PCL frequency onto CTAF to reduce pilot workload in a critical phase of flight.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot reported difficulty determining the correct pilot-controlled lighting frequency at PDK airport.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: There was a thunderstorm approaching the airport and our flight was behind schedule. Center was having difficulty getting a clearance.... We taxied to Runway 14 and held short of the runway on Taxiway C or B while waiting for clearance and made a call on CTAF that we were holding short of Runway 14. We were using Runway 14 because winds were relatively calm and there was a thunderstorm right off the departure end of Runway 32. After getting clearance; we called CTAF that we were back-taxiing on Runway 14 and completed our runway checklist. As we neared the end of Runway 14 and made a 180-degree turn; we heard a Cessna call that he was taking Runway 32 for departure. We immediately contacted CTAF to let the Cessna know that we were still on Runway 14 and back-taxiing. The Cessna responded by saying he was 'rolling' on Runway 32. I then moved the aircraft slightly off centerline in case I had to exit the runway with him taking off directly in front of us. We could not see each other from opposite ends of the runway because of the hump in the center of the runway. We waited at the end of Runway 14 and saw the Cessna take off and make a left turn out. We then waited on the runway for this aircraft to clear the area as he seemed to turn into our departure corridor on turn out. The only thing I can think of is that perhaps this pilot did not realize that the reciprocal of 14 was 32. I cannot understand why a pilot would willingly take off with another plane preparing to depart from the other end of the runway.




Synopsis: A B1900 flight crew; after back-taxiing on Runway 14 and announcing their movements on CTAF at a non-towered airport; moved off centerline to avoid conflict with a Cessna that departed on Runway 32.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At gate 15 minutes prior to departure; ATC advise there was a ground stop. We continued boarding and ten minutes later ground stop was lifted. We pushed on time at (time); taxiing to runway; pushed Attendant call and waited for verification; it was received. Once that occurred; I called for Before Takeoff Checklist. During the accomplishment of this checklist; heard audible ring from ACARS; stopped checklist and noticed we received Dispatch message saying there was a ground stop again in place. I disregarded message; finished checklist; and Tower then cleared us for takeoff.My complaint with this event; if there is a ground stop in effect; then ATC should be the notifying party; NOT Dispatch. If we were at gate; I could understand the communication from Dispatch; but not after the aircraft is pushed. The only reason Dispatch should be contacting aircraft after brake release until after takeoff; is if there is a safety of flight concern or National Airspace System closure. This occurrence was a distraction that could have been easily been prevented if Dispatch could look to see what phase of flight we are in.




Synopsis: While taxiing for takeoff in a B737-800; company alerted the flight crew on ACARS; which was very distracting; with a non emergency message. Flight crew ignored the message and proceeded to takeoff.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Taxiing into gate; we could have hit the fuel cart because it was in the wrong box. Night time. Raining. Late night. When we got closer [the ground personnel] said 40 feet to go but First Officer said 'Stop!' First Officer shouted out window for crew to move fueling cart. Very hard to see the lines due to rain but it was in a box. Cart was moved to the proper box and we taxied to the gate. I went down on the ramp to talk to the ground personnel and fueler. Fueler said ground crew put fuel cart in wrong box (yes there were two boxes). Ground crew apologized. If I didn't have a very good and very forceful First Officer; there's a good chance I could have hit the fuel cart. Excellent job First Officer! Only have one painted box for fuel carts; not two.




Synopsis: An aircraft was being guided into its gate when the First Officer noticed a fuel cart was parked in the wrong spot in the path of the aircraft.
Date: 201508
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At block time MEL 34-55-01 was added; TCAS entire system inoperative. Maintenance knows the MEL manual is incorrect; we go through this often with them. Asia and India have never allowed this deferral. I told Maintenance I was absolutely certain; no doubt at all; it could not go; and I would not file it with TCAS inoperative. The crew called and completely agreed.The reason Maintenance thinks it can be deferred is this is how the MEL is written; 34-55-01 Traffic Collision and Avoidance System (TCAS) -- Entire System B 1 0 (O) (M) May be inoperative provided: System is deactivated and secured; and Enroute or approach procedures do not require its use. Remarks or Exceptions Note(s) Countries requiring TCAS (e.g.; India and China) will allow MEL deferral of an installed TCAS system or components.They do not allow this deferral; and never have. We have repeatedly tried to get the MEL changed to no avail. This is one of the biggest flight safety issues we have; without TCAS the crews are defenseless when they need to route around weather etc. They get little assistance from China ATC. I tried to file a flight a few weeks ago without TCAS; happened on taxiway; aircraft could be fixed overseas; and they would not accept it either. The MEL must be changed; maintenance knows this is a no go; but always quote the MEL; and become quite belligerent about it.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported a known incorrect MEL that would allow dispatch with TCAS inoperative into countries that do not in fact allow that condition.