elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: No GPS signal on KLN-90B; followed by a confirmation of no GPS via EFB (iPads). Reported to ATC. Other aircraft followed up with more reports. Transponder remained operative but was reported failing in other airplanes. Air Carrier Y aircraft was also seen and reported possibly performing a 'resolution advisory'. The collision path never appeared to show imminent need for reaction. Our TCAS never indicated closer than 1000' in any direction. Not confirmed if the events were related. Still really strange hearing Air Carrier Y on ATC at the same time as GPS outages. GPS failure in our aircraft as well as other aircraft in vicinity. Other aircraft experienced Transponder and GPS full loss of signal.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a possible conflict and loss of GPS on approach to DEN.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDPP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushed back out of MDPP; around 150 [passengers]. After engine start; FA called us to inform us a passenger was vomiting in the lavatory. We waited a few minutes; as we were behind traffic anyway and couldn't taxi. The Captain and I discussed returning to the gate; and decided if the passenger was still in the lav in 5 minutes; or if when they came out they were not feeling well; we'd return to the gate. After 2 minutes; the FA called and reported she was out and feeling better. We asked 'are you sure?' The FA said yes. We taxied; took off; and flew for an hour and 20 minutes without incident. At this time; they called to report our meals were ready. I asked about the ill passenger; and the FA told me there were 20-25 sick people in the back. Vomiting; diarrhea; etc. At this point; we knew we had an issue. We asked them for as much info as possible; if the people knew each other; stayed at the same resort; etc. It was then we learned people boarded the aircraft complaining of illness. This is the first time we heard any of this. I'm truly not trying to throw anyone under the bus; but it was frustrating to find out these details so late in the flight; where we are an hour from the nearest airport with few options. At this point; we requested direct [to destination] and tried to get a patch to MEDLINK. We were on the boundary of HF and VHF; so we never got a clear signal on the VHF frequency they gave us. The FAs came back that 3-4 passengers felt really sick; and the other 20 or so either felt off or had been sick in Puerto Plata. One had even been in the emergency room the night before in the Dominican Republic. Again; news to us. Most or all of the sick passengers stayed at the same resort. We got direct; were cleared visual [approach]; and parked offsite so the CDC could evaluate whether there was a bigger issue. After 40 minutes; they had evaluated the sickest passengers and determined we could go to the gate.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported unknowingly departing MDPP with 20-25 ill passengers.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Our flight plan was direct WLEEE3 AUS. During climb we were cleared direct BOCCK (named after the style of beer; I suspect) which we complied with. When I opened the WLEEE arrival on my iPad I saw that on the arrival there is a 'BBACH' intersection; presumably named for the composer. I figured we were correct in going to BOCCK; but I queried the controller to confirm (and yes; we were correct).I question the wisdom of having two intersections with identical pronunciations in such close proximity. To reduce the potential for confusion; how about renaming BBACH to BATVN (Beethoven)?




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported of similar sounding intersections that caused confusion for their flight to AUS.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence; 1
Light: Night
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Encountered severe turbulence at FL190-220. 90 degree bank angles noted. ATC specifically mentioned greater than 300 feet deviations in either direction. Control of the aircraft was barely possible; items thrown around the cockpit. A box was up-ended and debris scattered throughout the airplane. No personal injury noted. No obvious damage to the aircraft was noted. Weather conditions worsened after departure with convection noted south of the area. No previous reports of turbulence to ATC more severe than moderate turbulence.




Synopsis: The pilot of a PC-12 reported an encounter with severe turbulence with 90 degree variations in bank angle and 300 foot altitude deviations.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As an aircraft Dispatcher; I continuously see NOTAMs such as the following:!FDC 9/4064 (KMCI A3572/19) MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL; Kansas City; MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 19R; AMDT 11A... ILS OR LOC RWY 1L; AMDT 15B... ILS OR LOC RWY 9; AMDT 14A... ILS RWY 19R (SA CAT I); AMDT 11A... ILS RWY 19R (CAT II AND III); AMDT 11A... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA; MCI VORTAC UNMONITORED. 1906301313-1907302359EST!FDC 9/3940 (KMCI A3571/19) MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL; Kansas City; MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 1L; AMDT 15B... ILS OR LOC RWY 1R; AMDT 4A... ILS RWY 1R (SA CAT I); AMDT 4A... ILS RWY 1R (CAT II AND III); AMDT 4A... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA; BUM VORTAC UNMONITORED. 1906291704-1907292359ESTWhile this may be an issue for aircraft operating with radio navigation only (VHF/VOR); in no case should an advanced aircraft (GPS/RNAV) be restricted from utilizing MCI as an alternate (alternate minimums not authorized) because advanced aircraft (airlines/business jets) are FULLY CAPABLE of RNAV substituting for inoperative Navigational Aids. Further; the lack of standardization is alarming as one airport may issue the NOTAMs listed above and other airports issue the NOTAM below.!FDC 9/4427 (KCLE A3671/19) CLE IAP CLEVELAND-HOPKINS INTL; Cleveland; OH. ILS OR LOC RWY 6L; AMDT 3... ILS RWY 6L (CAT II AND III); AMDT 3... PROCEDURE NA EXCEPT FOR ACFT EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RNAV SYSTEM WITH GPS. DJB VOR/DME OTS AND ACO DME UNUSABLE BEYOND 10 NM. 1907021330-1907092359EST




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported differences in the way NOTAMs are written and possible confusion.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: DFW in the past 12 months has been clearing aircraft for takeoff before the preceding aircraft has even rotated down the runway. When they do this; I'd say we hit wake turbulence about 50% of the time; and putting in huge wing corrections low to the ground has always been frustrating. Well it happened again; and I'm going to start submitting reports every time now. We were cleared for takeoff a few seconds before the preceding E-175 had even rotated; and gave it about 5 seconds before we started the takeoff roll. At about 500 feet; we hit wake turbulence; which required near full-scale deflection to maintain aircraft control in the climb. We were still configured with flaps down but gear up. Wind was under 5 knots.Cause; ATC trying to get as many aircraft out of the airport in the shortest amount of legal time.Suggestions; bring back distance spacing; not just timing for aircraft separation.




Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew member reported encountering wake turbulence shortly after takeoff at DFW; and stated insufficient spacing was a contributing factor.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
Second aircraft: A330
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: B737-800 was being vectored to the ILS Runway 10 Approach at O'Hare; and had to be sent around due to inadequate spacing on the final. It should be noted that the weather was less then 1 mile visibility and snow. B737-800; was then worked by Departure; and brought back to the down wind for another approach. It was clear the pilot was frustrated about being sent around due to spacing. On their subsequent approach; B737-800 was observed at 120 knots ground speed 1 mile outside of the FAF. Normal procedure would have the aircraft hold the speed to the marker; and all other aircraft had been showing between 180 and 160 knots over the ground until inside the marker. In this case; B737-800 clearly opted to slow early. B737-800 ended over 4.2 miles behind the traffic they were following; where only 3 was needed. This caused A330 to collapse on B737-800. It appeared the monitor slowed A330 to their final; and ended up with just barely 3 miles at touch. But B737-800 then didn't clear the runway in time. This caused A330 to be sent around. A330 then had to fly to roughly an 18 mile final; and back at 180 knots indicated. All because B737-800 opted to choose there own speed. Deviate B737-800 for not complying; or advising they were unwilling/unable to comply with the speed restriction.




Synopsis: C90 Controller described a go-around event claiming a previous inbound who was sent around because of spacing issues slowed to below assigned speed to the Outer Marker and caused a subsequent go around.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was conducting OJT for a developmental on RADAR. The Supervisor suggested splitting the RADAR (West and East) for training due to an abundance of staffing. This in itself was fine; moderate traffic at the time and splitting is a good training tool. After the split occurred; and the Trainee was getting his bearings on how to work a split final; the RADAR went out; and we had to go to CENRAP. With our procedures on working inbounds during a split operation; we have to get a sequence number for our next arrival from the person owning final (in this case RADAR West.) Being that we do not have the staffing to work a split operation very often; to say that our abilities are rusty is an understatement. During CENRAP; RADAR is required to call inbounds to the Tower; and that did not get done while the RADAR was out. With the moderate traffic; complexity of splitting the operation; and then dealing with a runway change (which means map change; frequency changes; approach changes and trying to talk through all the procedures with a trainee) calling inbounds to Tower simply slipped my mind. I do not think that the RADAR West Controller nor the Supervisor who was monitoring the operation during the outage caught that [the] inbounds were not called either. More staff so that we would be more proficient in working a split operation. A RADAR update that works the first time; without having numerous outages after the installation.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller providing OJT described a failure to complete Tower notification requirements during CENRAP operations; complicated by split sectors to enhance training familiarization.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On taxi-in to gate; just entering the ramp a NY/NJ Port Authority vehicle turned the corner and drove directly in front of the aircraft without regard to the aircraft as we were taxiing in. To us it appeared that the driver looked at us and continued to drive directly in front of our path so that he did not have to wait on us to pass. I had to hit brakes quick and bring the aircraft to a jarring halt.  Had the flight attendants been up doing the safety demo; they would have been knocked down by the force of the braking.I suggest: 1. Revoke the AOA driving privileges of the driver of the vehicle for violating safety rules. 2. Require all NY/NJ Port Authority personnel with driving privileges to undergo recurrent training reiterating safety rules and right of way rules for aircraft over ground vehicles.


Second narrative: The Port Authority seemingly can do whatever they want driving around the airport; I just think if they slow down and look both ways for traffic all of this can be avoided.


Synopsis: An air carrier taxiing to the gate at LGA; took evasive action to avoid colliding with a Port Authority SUV which apparently; knowingly taxied directly in front of their aircraft.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL340 and approximately 40 minutes from arriving to our destination the FO noticed a little crack on the center lower portion of RH side windshield. Due to the position of the crack it was difficult for us to determine if the crack was on the outer or inner layers of the windshield. We followed the procedure outlined on the QRH for windshield cracked and decided to request a lower altitude from ATC as a precaution. FO was following the steps outlined in the procedures and I was flying the aircraft. As we started descending from FL340 to FL250 the windshield crack increased in size substantially so I decided to request even a lower altitude just in case the windshield completely failed. We informed the flight attendants and asked [them] to take their seats. ATC asked if we needed 'priority handling' we answered yes so ATC cleared us to 11000 feet and direct [destination]. At that point due to the crack being bigger in size we were able to determine that the windshield had cracked in the outer layer. We messaged Dispatch and Maintenance control informing them [of the] situation and requested fuel burns at 11000. Fuel on board at the time was 6600 pounds and we were approximately 36 minutes from the airport. I decided the condition of the flight was safe and we had enough fuel and good weather to continue to destination. We continued the flight at 11000 feet and 250 kts for fuel economy. We safely landed with over 4000 pounds of fuel.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported they descended to a lower altitude after noticing the First Officer's windshield had developed a crack in the outer pane.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Hawker 900
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft Y departed and was climbing in reference to Aircraft X. Our Center/TRACON LOA allows Center to increase speed reference known traffic. I saw Aircraft X out of 11200 ft while Aircraft Y was at 8800 ft. Since 11000 ft had been vacated and Center had the handoff on Aircraft Y I assumed Aircraft X would keep his climb rate and climbed Aircraft Y to 11000 ft. When I next checked Aircraft Y was leveling 11000 ft while Aircraft X was showing 11600 ft with less than 3 miles separation. The way I understand the LOA is that if Center has the handoff on both aircraft I can climb my aircraft to 11000 ft; since it has been vacated. However; if Center speeds Aircraft X up; changing the climb rate they should advise me since I am authorized to climb in reference. I believe Center should either not speed up aircraft when they have the handoff on the aircraft climbing in reference or should wait to take the handoff until after they sped up Aircraft X so I know that the climb rate has changed.




Synopsis: C90 TRACON Controller reported a loss of separation after clearing one aircraft to climb to an altitude that another aircraft had just left.