elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Balloon
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Evening flight on south side of airport. Launched [and] headed southwest at 8 MPH. This was an instruction flight so [I] had [the] student do 1 touch-and-go midway through flight. After that takeoff; [we] continued southwest and on approach to land with [the] sun in our eyes; we were proceeding to land on a property that was wide open. As we approached property; we had visual of power wire and could see a pole behind house but could not see wire between the house pole and the road. As the student continued to land; [there was] a wire [that] could not be seen as we came over the road. Our crew then alerted us of a power line in our path [so] at this time; I took controls from [the] student and deflated balloon at 35 ft.; which caused us to hit [the] wire with [a] limp envelope and slide down [the] wire on the front side. The weight of the envelope caused the wires to touch and pop fuse to house. Both me and my student exited balloon with proper care to not create an arc.Both me and student were fine with no injuries. Aircraft has no damage but will be inspected before next flight. Power company came out and dropped line so we could retrieve envelope without damage to it or wire to house. Factors that led to this: Sun in our eyes was main issue. White cotton field really hid wire from point of view. X.XX miles total flight distance.




Synopsis: Balloon Flight Instructor reported striking an unseen power line that resulted in an unplanned landing.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I signed in to work; and went to get the person out of positions at Sector X.  The CPC who was working had just gotten someone else out 5 minutes earlier; which added to the confusion in my opinion.  During all of this; I was not wearing my eyeglasses because they fog up badly when I wear a mask for COVID.  I received a quick briefing; and during the briefing; I vaguely heard Sector Y tell the Controller who was working to 'start the Aircraft X down to FL310.'  Then I recall hearing a straight descent to FL310.  I was unable to really scan accurately because I could not see any data blocks.  Anyways; the briefing completes; and I sit down and put my glasses on and start working and scanning.  I answer a landline call or two; issue a few clearances; then look at Aircraft X who was now FL390 for FL310.  I notice that it looks like it will be close with an aircraft level at FL350; so I call Sector Y and asked them what they want me to do with the two planes and that I had just sat down.  After some back and forth; they told me to stop the guy at FL360.Well; the first Controller at Sector X should have never given a pilot's discretion clearance to FL250.  Secondly; we're supposed to comply with the SOP with ZZZ Center Sector Y; which would have the Aircraft X crossing the boundary AOB FL310; this was never done.I believe all of the relief briefings had a part to play with the lack of communication in this scenario.  Another aspect which compounded this all is that I wasn't able to wear my glasses due to the fogging up issue.  I wasn't able to properly scan before I really sat down because I trust the members on my crew.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported a near loss of separation and cited fogged up glasses due to wearing a face mask and poor coordination during a controller switch contributed to the event.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Arrival into ZZZ was forecast VMC with alternate of ZZZ1 for CB TEMPO line. Weather degraded on descent at both ZZZ and alternate; requiring Captain to come up with a new alternate with Dispatch concurrence. In the middle of this process ZZZ changed the runway configuration and field conditions; requiring several new ACARS weather requests as well as new performance data for wet runways. By this time Dispatch returned with several new alternate plans; requiring several more weather requests and Dispatch messages. All of this is occurring around attempting to brief the new approach; the new divert numbers and the new performance data; all of which was competing for space on our FMC screen; only to be transcribed by the PM for reference if and when it is needed.We have reached saturation with regards to our FMC and the data stream required by procedure. Lack of a flight deck printer is now degrading the level of Safety we; as end-users; are providing. Risk mitigation should not be something that we simply pay lip service to during check rides; unfortunately that is what seems to be this case in this particular instance. Printers should be placed on the flight deck of all Company aircraft posthaste.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported degraded weather at the destination and alternate required the crew to obtain a new alternate. Captain reported a runway change added to the mix and with no printer aboard the aircraft it made for a very busy scenario.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: MEL; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were dispatched with an inoperative SFCC#2 (Slat Flap Control Computer) and Inoperative SFCC#2 Channel.  This deferral negatively affected the safety of flight. Operating an electric airplane with inoperative flight control computers is not safe.  I called Dispatch and Maintenance Control in order to make the proper refusal.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported concerns with being dispatched with an inoperative Slat Flap Control Computer.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJU.TRACON, PR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SJU
ATC / advisory: TRACON SJU
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y was cleared for the Visual Approach to RWY10 approximately 3.5 miles southwest of SJU and was told to follow another aircraft landing Runway 10. Aircraft X was cleared for the ILS Runway 10 approximately 13 miles west of SJU. Aircraft Y continued on the downwind too long before starting the base turn. Approach called Local and said the current sequence wasn't going to work because Aircraft X was overtaking Aircraft Y who extended the downwind and to send Aircraft Y back to approach for re-sequencing heading 280.Approach issued traffic to Aircraft X and Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight. Aircraft Y made a series of left and right turns into Aircraft X's flight path. Local then told Approach to stop Aircraft X's descent at 2000 feet reference Aircraft Y turning into Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was observed at 1700 feet. Approach issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X about Aircraft Y and stopped Aircraft X at 2000 feet. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight again and then asked if they could continue on the approach. Approach canceled Aircraft X's altitude restriction once Aircraft Y was southbound and switched Aircraft X to Local. Approach controller was notified shortly after Aircraft X reported an RA. Approach controller relied on Aircraft Y to make a tighter base turn behind following traffic. Instead the controller should have had Aircraft Y follow Aircraft X or slowed Aircraft X sooner or called Aircraft Y base turn to ensure separation.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Controller reported shipping an aircraft to the Tower assuming it would turn from downwind onto base leg in time to be in front of straight in traffic. The downwind aircraft turned base late and into conflict with the straight in traffic.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Other Flight school
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: One of the instructors I oversee had expressed some interest/concern about the stall characteristics of the SR20 that he was flying. In order to better understand this he and I practiced some stalls on a proficiency flight. During the stall we allowed the stall to fully develop and upon entering the complete stall the right wing of the plane stalled prior to the left leading to a bank (approximately 55 degrees) and a loss of altitude (approximately 25 degrees nose low). After experiencing this we climbed back up to a safe altitude and performed another stall with the same results. I do not believe that any aircraft limitations where exceeded; nor do I believe that anything unsafe occurred. The aircraft was at a safe altitude and fully controllable at all times with the pull out from the resulting dive resulting in minimal G loading and no abnormal control inputs. However there have been concerns expressed by others in the flight program and in light of these facts I thought it prudent to submit a report of the event.




Synopsis: SR20 instructor pilot reported demonstrating exceptionally deep stall characteristics to a fellow instructor.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Door
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was replacing the Nose Gear Actuator Door in accordance with Gulfstream's Computerized Maintenance Program (CMP). After removal and installation; the Task Card required a [Landing] Gear swing. The Gear swing according to the Maintenance Manual was not accomplished because the Maintenance Manager said the cycling of the [Nose] Landing Gear Doors is good enough. The aircraft was released from Maintenance without completing Step-E (5) of the Gulfstream CMP Card; Chapter 32-30-61.

Callback: Reporter stated she signed-off only the portion of the Gulfstream CMP Task Card involving the removal and installation of the NLG Doors Hydraulic Actuator. An Inspector had also signed-off the same items. She has been working 14-years as a mechanic with an airline and now in corporate aircraft maintenance. A Representative from a Federal Agency had called her; informing her that he had also called the aircraft Manufacturer; asking if a full gear swing (all three landing gears) was really required as noted in the Manufacturer's Computerized Maintenance Program (CMP) Task Card. The Manufacturer indicated they were in the process of changing the Task Card procedure to NOT require a full gear swing after a Nose Gear Door Actuator replacement.Reporter stated that at that time; and even now; the current CMP Task Card was all we had to use. As an Airframe/Powerplant (A/P) licensed Mechanic; we are required to follow the CMP procedure and the Maintenance Manager should have done the same also. The Representative from the Federal Agency talked with the General Manager; who is the boss of the Maintenance Manager. The General Manager noted to the Federal Representative there was an internal procedure in their organization for reporting and that she should have used that procedure instead. Since the event; she has been placed on probation by the Maintenance Manager.



Synopsis: A Mechanic reports that a full Landing Gear swing was not accomplished; as required per Gulfstream's Computerized Maintenance Program (CMP); on a G-V aircraft after replacement of the Nose Gear Door Actuator. Maintenance Manager said the cycling of Nose Gear Doors was good enough.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TYS.Airport, TN
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Premier 1
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower TYS
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As the pilot not flying; on approximately a 7 mile final (visual approach) for runway 23R at TYS; on command from the pilot flying; I moved the gear handle to the extend position. Nothing happened.  We cycled the gear handle several times to no avail.  We leveled off at pattern altitude (2;500 feet MSL) and with permission from Knoxville tower; we overflew the runway and entered right traffic for runway 23R. We then worked through the Alternate Gear Extension checklist and successfully extended the gear with a '3 green' down and locked indication.  The tower visually verified the gear appeared down.  A byproduct of the alternate gear extension procedure is that the inboard gear doors do not retract (that is; when there is not a normal electrical circuit to the gear system; which appeared to be the problem).  We landed uneventfully but damaged the inboard gear doors as they dragged on the pavement. I am told both inboard gear doors will have to be replaced.  With permission from the tower after clearing the runway; I exited the airplane to manually close the inboard gear doors so that we could taxi the airplane to the ramp without further damage to the gear doors.There seems to be a problem with the electrical signal to the gear system.  Maintenance will have to troubleshoot the gear system to isolate the actual problem.  We followed procedures as trained.




Synopsis: RA-390 (Premier) Captain reported landing gear would not extend with normal system; but was successfully deployed with the alternate system. Some damage to gear doors resulted; since they do not retract when alternate is used.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: TCAS RA 'CLIMB CLIMB' Command immediately after takeoff. Target displayed '00' on the tip of the nose. We took evasive action. Command 'CLIMB CLIMB' and target of '00' stayed with us until about 8;000 feet. Advised ATC we had an RA and inquired about traffic. ATC confirmed no traffic existed.ACARS'ed Maintenance Control. Although the RA had discontinued; they had us cycle the transponders. The incident happened using the R transponder. We cycled them and selected L transponder. By the time we reached cruise; the system was operating fine and Maintenance and Dispatch cleared us to continue. No TCAS abnormalities occurred for the remainder of flight.Maintenance reported some history of this problem and that cycling the transponders resolved the issue. It seems to be a situation in which the aircraft is picking up its own shadow and reading it as a conflict. In the past; Maintenance cleared this as an intermediate problem that cleared itself. It appears that it is more serious. I wrote it up under FRM codes 34.45.05 and 34.45.07. After landing; I called in to Maintenance to make certain this item was given proper attention. They agreed that the system needed in-depth testing and informed me they intended to remove the unit and give it a full bench test.




Synopsis: A B757 TCAS issued 'CLIMB; CLIMB' commands accompanied by a target indicating 00 on the nose. ATC advised no traffic in the area and the alert ceased at about 8;000 feet. Maintenance reported that aircraft's previous Null Bus Fault record.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Level at 21;000 feet on the arrival; Aircraft X took a 125 degree heading to deviate for weather. We were shooting a narrow gap between two radar returns. We had been on this heading approximately 20 miles; and were just penetrating the gap; when ARTCC issued a turn 30 degrees to the right; without explanation. We replied; 'Unable'; as to make that turn at that point would put us directly into the cell on our right that we were avoiding. At this time; we also observed traffic on our TCAS; approximately 10 miles distance at our 11 o'clock; 200 feet below our altitude and descending. Approximately 30 seconds elapsed; as we watched the TCAS traffic descend below our altitude. The next transmission we received from ARTCC was; 'I know you're deviating for weather; but when I tell you to turn; it's important.' We chose not to engage in further discussion of this matter over the radio. Clearing the weather; we proceeded direct to [fix]; and completed the rest of the arrival; approach and landing normally.




Synopsis: Aircraft deviating for weather was issued a right turn. The pilot had to refuse the clearance due to weather. The pilot observed traffic on their TCAS descending below them.