elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201501
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FCU (Flight Control Unit)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While enroute approaching cruise altitude of FL350; encountered a 'AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT'. The Captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying. Waiting to level-off before completing steps in the QRH (computer reset); we discussed the procedure. After level-off; we followed the 'in-flight' procedural steps; to include the 'wait 5 seconds'. Due to a lack of clear; concise procedural steps after the 'wait 5 seconds' -in flight- portion we were uncertain of procedural completion; additional actions or problem resolution. There is no end of procedure or directive to indicate if one is required to finish using the steps listed under 'on ground'; (incorrect phase) but further down to the computer reset items. Otherwise; it does not specify if you leave the M21 CB out; or where to correct the barometer reference. Without clarity; we were lead incorrectly to 'finish' the procedure incorrectly setting a AUTO FLT 1+2 FAULT; (pulling the CB; 7 minute delay; loss of autopilot; loss of auto thrust; etc); which complicated the original fault. FCU reset needs additional structure and stronger procedural outline in order to safely; effectively and COMPLETELY address the fault. The phase of flight should be in bold; not the wait 5 seconds. The similarity can lead to inadvertent following of incorrect procedure which could prove excessive or potentially unsafe depending on phase of flight.




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reports being confused by the QRH FCU reset procedure after receiving an ECAM for AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT in cruise.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff roll; above 100 KTS; pressurization controller failed and switched to alternate. Continued takeoff and applied QRH procedure when workload permitted. Passing 6;000 FT; ALTN controller failed and pressurization started to indicate below sea level. The Captain again applied the QRH procedure while I flew the airplane and talked with ATC. I requested a level off at 8;000 FT and informed them of the possibility of a return to the departure airport. The decision was made to return and we landed without incident. As we taxied in; I contacted Operations and they assigned us a gate and requested we contact Dispatch since they were unaware of our return. Since I was flying and monitoring ATC; I did not hear all the coordinating the Captain did. I assumed Dispatch was contacted since an emergency was not declared. I feel as a Crew; we handled the situation well.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer experiences a pressurization controller failure on the takeoff roll. Climbing through 6;000 FT the alternate pressurization controller fails and cabin altitude is noted below sea level. Crew elects to return to departure airport.
Date: 201703
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This flight was already running late due to a mechanical at the departure airport that involved the exit row handles. The aircraft was full of upset passengers that were needing to make connections and very antsy to get off the airplane. I was the number one and I did the all call to verify and disarm; I bent down to disarm the door and was crouched down when I heard the gate agent knocking at the window. The first thing I did was looked back to make sure the number three was disarmed without realizing that even though I had bent down to disarm the door I never fully completed the action because I was distracted by the agent's knock. I was rushed and the passengers were right at my back to get off the aircraft. The agent opened the door and the slide fell out of its pack but never fully deployed.I was given this trip on reserve and had only been number one a few times since I started flying; so I didn't have much experience of being able to juggle all the duties; especially with an already late airplane with angry passengers. I should have performed monitor and challenge correctly and even though it was a hectic and rushed flight; I should have slowed down and taken my time instead of being so flustered about trying to help make sure my passengers made their flights.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported they did not disarm the cabin door and subsequently the slide fell out of its pack; but did not fully deploy. Distraction was cited as a contributing factor.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C MDW
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We noted a difference in a published altitude on a missed approach when comparing the approach plate with the aircraft database. We briefed the ILS 31C approach to Chicago-Midway Airport. The missed approach instructions on the approach plate direct a left turn toward Peotone and an altitude of 2;100 (or below) until crossing IGECY. The LEGS page of the CDU displayed the IGECY altitude as '2100A.' [Although] our procedures should preclude an altitude deviation should a crew fly the missed approach; I believe the possibility exists. The [commercially provided] approach plate text would lead pilots to level off at 2;100. Should a pilot become busy with missed approach tasks and check the LEGS page for the correct altitude setting (rather than the printed approach plate); he/she could easily set the final altitude in the [MAP procedure] (2;600).




Synopsis: Commercial Captain reported a discrepancy between charted procedural altitude constraints on the MAP from the ILS Runway 31C at MDW and the constraints published in the aircraft's FMS database.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Workload; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: 250 KIAS speed restriction on SID. [We] briefed on ground during departure briefing. [We] used Level Change 250 on MCP until 11;000 FT MSL to avoid VNAV exceeding 250-KT restriction. [We] encountered wake turbulence from preceding aircraft while on departure climb vectors from Center around 10;000 FT MSL. On climb from 11;000 FT to 12;000 FT announced and selected VNAV; which accelerated climb speed to 270 KIAS. A few minutes later; ATC asked if we were at 250 KTS. We replied; 'Slowing.' TCAS distance from the preceding aircraft was in excess of five miles and the Controller never mentioned a possible deviation. We were assigned FL230 and normal speed leaving 14;000 FT.I simply forgot the speed restriction since it had been so long before that we briefed it due to ground congestion leading to departure delays. Additionally; numerous altitude assignments; heading changes; and frequency changes departing MDW made for a very busy departure. Furthermore; we encountered wake turbulence around 10;000 FT MSL; which added another threat to the departure. I announced the change of speed profile (VNAV); but the pilot not flying didn't challenge my mistake. It might be prudent in the future to change the Econ VNAV speed to the SID assignment of 250 KIAS in case the assignment is forgotten. Also; it would be helpful if the pilot not flying checked in on each new frequency above 10;000 FT MSL with the speed restriction just to serve as a reminder to the flight crew as well as ATC.


Second narrative: The wake turbulence incident switched our attention from airspeed control to position of the wake turbulence aircraft. We should have paid closer attention to airspeed and MCP selection during the evolution.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew departing MDW reported exceeding charted 250 KT restriction in part because of distraction from wake vortex encounter.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CHS.Airport, SC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class C CHS
ATC / advisory: Tower CHS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Fatigue
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain [was] Pilot Flying. He briefed the OSPRI arrival and ILS to [Runway] 15. ATC kept us high; then Cleared for the straight in visual. Gear; flaps and speed brakes out to get down. We both missed that the glideslope was out of service on the ATIS. We realized we were too low and leveled off around 1;000 feet. At some point we got the low energy speed warning. We had left the speed brakes out. Retracted them. Disconnected the FD's. Captain called for a go around. Preformed the GA and returned for the RNAV 15. Busy day flying around storms. Last flight at night. Short flight. ATC keeping us high. Expectation bias to the ILS. I had recently been to CHS at night and the ILS was working. New Captain to [aircraft]; all his other time was in Boeing aircraft. My failure to trap our errors earlier. I will create more effective barriers going forward. For example: Request ILS/RNAV approaches vs visual at night. Get delay vectors when ATC keeps us high.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported flying low and slow during transition from the STAR to the approach procedure due to missing the ATIS report of the glideslope out of service.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 350
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: A380
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the ANJLL arrival; Runway 25L Transition; approximately between CRCUS and KRAIN (could be further east on the arrival); [we] encountered significant wake turbulence from an A380 12.5 nm ahead and 2300 feet below. This is an area where orographic turbulence is usually encountered; but there was no mistaking being caught in the wake of the A380. It wasn't wake 'turbulence'; it was a wake 'took control of the aircraft' event. Autopilot was on; speed was assigned; I think at 250 knots. We were exactly where we were supposed to at the assigned speed. [We] pitched up; rolled right significantly; leveled and then rolled left. I disconnected the autopilot; pulled up and banked left to get into the clean air; which I pre-determined earlier when advised we were following an A380 due to the earlier slight left wind from about 11 o'clock at 7 knots. There may have been other pitch and roll excursions as I exited into clean air. [We were] completely at the mercy of the A380's wake; until clear. The FO advised approach of the encounter. I also advised him to advise approach that we were offsetting .2 NM; I think; to the left. We quickly set an offset into the flight plan and continued. Approach advised that the A380 was now proceeding to the Runway 24s or 'north complex'; which further diverged our paths. We asked the passengers if they were ok and they also asked if we were ok. Everyone was fine. Nothing came apart or out of its carriage. No damage.During oceanic operations we use SLOP (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure). I now firmly believe that we must use a SLOP procedure when following a much larger aircraft. Advise ATC that we are SLOPing into the direction of the clean air. Also; it seems INSANE to be at the same arrival altitudes the massive aircraft was just at. We should always use the top most altitude on all arrivals and in this case; request a 1000 or 2000 ft separation on the arrival or a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ARRIVAL and APPROACH.




Synopsis: CL-350 Captain reported encountering significant wake turbulence on approach to LAX 12 miles in trail of an A380 that resulted in a momentary loss of control of the aircraft.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-42 Cheyenne IIA
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: ELB / ELT
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I loaded the airplane.  Non-crew personnel were in and out of the airplane while on the ground. After start; I noticed an unusual audible alarm. I did not associate it with the ELT alarm. Garmin 750 would not capture satellites; so I set up flight on backup Garmin 500 which worked fine. Flight progressed normally and I was handed off from Departure to Center. On Center [frequency]; another pilot noted he heard an ELT alarm. I tuned to 121.5 and heard the ELT alarm and reported it to Center. After a few minutes; I checked my ELT and noted the arming switch had been moved to the 'On' position. I moved the switch back to 'Arm.' ELT alarm stopped and after a few minutes; the Garmin 750 captured satellites and operated normally. The airplane went into maintenance on landing and I have advised Maintenance to check the ELT battery.If you hear an ELT; check your own first. If your Garmin 750 will not capture satellites; check your ELT. The Garmin 750 in newly installed; and I am still learning it. When it behaved abnormally; I thought it was a radio problem. I should have simply reverted to basics.




Synopsis: PA-42 pilot; hearing reports of ELT broadcasting and noted that his GPS system would not acquire satellites; discovered that his ELT was transmitting.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We were on a] visual approach arriving Runway 06; departing Runway 16. I was CIC in the Tower when the event occurred. I was not given any notification that a C182 was IFR and on a practice instrument approach to Runway 24 or that the aircraft was on an opposite direction practice approach to opposite direction landing traffic. I was aware that the C182 executed their missed approach over the numbers for Runway 24 rather than at the published missed approach point. However; I was unaware of the CRJ traffic's go around at the same time. It was not until about 20-30 minutes later when I overheard the trainer talking to the trainee on Local Control about the situation that I figured out what had happened. Still after I gained knowledge of this; I still was under the impression that the C182 was VFR; not IFR. Nothing during this incident was brought to my attention to coordinate during; or handle after the fact. Obviously with these new and seemingly constant changing 'opposite direction; same runway' rules; the RADAR Approach Controller should have never let this situation happen in the first place. This incident goes to show a perfect example of 'worse case scenario;' or the situation happening at 'the wrong place at the wrong time' where one IFR aircraft executes a wrong missed approach at the same time an opposite direction IFR aircraft goes around without any instructions. While I should have been made aware of what was going on from the beginning; my recommendations would be that better communication should have been involved throughout.




Synopsis: Tower CIC described a conflict event when traffic conducting opposite direction operations initiated a go around and experienced a TCAS RA; indicating intra-facility ATC communications coordination as contributory.
Date: 202007
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I received a phone call from Person X...with HR. Person X called me to tell me that I could return to work the following day from my 14 day quarantine. However; I was never told to quarantine and my schedule was never adjusted accordingly. I was directly exposed to a coworker who tested positive for COVID-19 and [who had] told the company of the results and the people [the coworker had] worked with and was around. My name along with several others was provided to local management but they failed to take any action to pull us out of work. Only 14 days later did I find out that I was in fact supposed to be in quarantine; but instead management kept me at work for my regularly scheduled shifts. In fact; I even worked several extra shifts during that time period.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported being told to return to work after completing a 14-day quarantine. Reporter stated that they had not been previously told to self-quarantine nor had they been notified they had been exposed to a co-worker who tested positive for COVID-19.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 0L7.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Solar glare from Ivanpah Dry Lake Solar Power Plant. Unable to maintain VFR due to solar glare. Had to go on instruments for approximately 2 minutes due to blinding cockpit illumination. Southwest bound intercepting V21.

Callback: Reporter stated he had departed HND airport and was traveling abeam 0L7 airport in the process of intercepting V21 when the event occurred.



Synopsis: A small aircraft pilot intercepting V21 southwest bound from HND was temporarily blinded by the Ivanpah Solar Field reflective glare.