elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LSE.Airport, WI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LSE; Tower LSE
Aircraft component: Tablet
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was my first time into LSE. After receiving and acknowledging taxi instructions and while taxiing to RWY 36 for departure I passed the hold short line without stopping.  The controller called saying that I had passed the hold short point at which point I stopped.  He asked if I would be ready for takeoff soon to which I replied in the affirmative; he then cleared me for takeoff.I was using an expansion of the small fore-flight airport diagram on the LSE home page rather than the larger diagram associated with the taxiways button. That diagram has a hs-1 balloon in the location where the problem occurred.  When I went past the hold-short markings I remember thinking the hold-short was for RWY 4 and that since it was so far from RWY 36 that there would be another hold short area for that runway.  Had I been using the larger airport taxi diagram I don't believe I would have made this error.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reports not recognizing the Runway 36 (and Runway 4) hold line on taxiway F at LSE and continues on to taxiway E. ATC notes the incursion.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff; pilot door opened causing a loss of control accident.  This situation was made worse by the fact the plane door is a gull wing type.




Synopsis: Pilot door opened during takeoff causing loss of control.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While departing on the TEB RUUDY 4 DEP; we received both a traffic advisory from ATC and from our TCAS system about a plane flying below us; opposite direction.  I was the pilot flying and elected to keep my nose down at about 1400 feet in order to maintain visual separation with traffic.  The RUUDY 4 calls for 1500 feet until WENTZ.  TCAS was telling us that the plane was about 2 miles away and at 1000 feet or so (or there abouts; things were moving fast!).  The PIC on the plane (I currently hold an SOE restriction) indicated to me after the incident that I should have been at 1500 feet as per the SID.  After thinking about it and interpreting the rules I agree.  My rush to think about keeping visual separation; while important; trumped my thoughts [to] follow the DP as it was designed. We knew that TEB Tower was in contact with our traffic and we were with NY Tracon; so separation was always assured and was never violated in this instance; even despite the lower altitude.  Quick thinking would have yielded better results in this case.  With everything happening so fast; one has to know all the rules of the road to prepare quickly.  They create departure procedures for a reason and adherence to them is paramount; unless in the event of RA advisory which did not occur.  No sooner then I realized I had leveled off too early; NY TRACON has us climbing.  I am now however better prepared for this type of situation and learned more regarding the rules of SID's.




Synopsis: CE680 First Officer reports crossing WENTZ below the RUUDY 4 depicted altitude due to a traffic advisory although the traffic was at 1000 feet.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Cessna 180 Skywagon
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We departed OSH and climbed to 11;500; direct to Gary Indiana; and then direct to Cincinnati Lunken Airport. Although we were over the Chicago Class B Airspace I called Chicago Approach Control for advisories. They gave us a squawk code that began with a '6' and we complied. The Controller wasn't receiving a return; but when we ident'd as requested; he said he 'had us.'Then the transponder went off the air as well as the Garmin 430. I checked circuit breakers and then the ammeter which showed a discharge. On the remaining operating communications radio (KX-155) I told Chicago we wanted to cancel radar advisories. At that point I wasn't sure if we had a generator failure or not. The weather was clear with unlimited ceiling and visibility. We shut down all electrical equipment except for the battery operated Garmin 696; conserving the ship's battery power for our landing at Lunken. We started a slow descent at about Kokomo to be under the floor of the Cincinnati Class B airspace when we arrived in the Cincinnati area.I turned the King radio on to get the Lunken ATIS; turned it off; planning to turn it on again near Lunken. We proceeded under the Cincinnati Class B airspace toward Lunken Airport and; when I tried to turn the radio back on; found it had failed. We neared Lunken and I called the Tower on the telephone (cell phone) and advised them of our problem. The Controller cleared us to land on Runway 21L and we did so without incident. I called the Tower when we reached the hangar.When I got home; there was a phone message from Chicago Center and the Controller said he wasn't sure if I was the pilot of [the offending aircraft]; but they wanted to make sure we'd gotten on the ground safely. I called back and talked to a Supervisor who said there was 'no problem'. He said they had mistakenly shown us as being IFR; but he knew we had cancelled. We never were IFR...we were outside the [Class B airspace] (over it) at 11;500; and had asked for VFR traffic advisories.




Synopsis: Cessna pilot experiences a generator failure at 11;500 FT over ORD Class B. The flight continues to destination after canceling flight following with ATC and turning off most electrical equipment. An uneventful landing ensues using a cell phone for landing clearance.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Lever/Selector
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We] were practicing touch and go landings in a Cessna 172RG as part of a Biennial Flight Review (BFR). While on rollout after the fourth landing; the landing gear lever was accidentally moved by [the pilot receiving instruction]. This led to the nose gear retracting before any corrective action could be taken. The retraction of the nose gear led to the nose falling to the ground and the propeller striking the ground multiple times. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway with the nose resting on the ground. [The pilot receiving instruction] was taking a BFR after several years out of flying. I believe this lack of recent experience led [him] into becoming slightly flustered during the touch and go. The gear lever was raised instead of the flap lever; as raising the flaps before taking off on a touch and go is standard procedure. The problem could have been avoided by starting off in a non-complex airplane to ease the transition back into flying.




Synopsis: A pilot and instructor experienced a nose landing gear retraction during a touch and go when the pilot receiving recurrent training moved the landing gear handle rather than the flap handle.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Observer; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The First Officer accomplished the walk around and declared the aircraft 'good'. During cockpit checks the ground crew asked if we needed de-icing. I queried the FO (First Officer) and he said no. During taxi the lead flight attendant called to inform us that a pass riding crew member saw ice on the wing. I elected to pull over and have my FO accomplish a wing check. The FO checked the wings and had a short discussion with the passenger; a Flight Attendant. He still did not detect ice on the wing. We accomplished an uneventful takeoff and flight. On arrival a deadheading pilot approached us to say he saw frost on our wing. We agreed that company guidance precludes takeoff with any frost or ice on the top of the wing surfaces and that we simply didn't see any. We pledged to much more vigilant in the future.


Second narrative: Walk around on cold; clear morning; sun already up. Saw frost on outside of engine; but none inside engine cowling; on bottom of wing; or leading edge. Looked at top of wing from jet bridge and concluded no need to deice. I informed Captain of this. On taxi out; a Flight Attendant traveling in a window seat reported frost. Captain and I concurred to stop aircraft so I could do a wing check. I again didn't think I saw anything and asked Flight Attendant if he was okay with my assessment. He said he was. Takeoff and landing uneventful. At block in; a pilot came to the cockpit and told us he saw frost on top of wing before takeoff. Captain and I discussed importance of clean wing and discussed better techniques of looking through multiple windows - I'm aware of company policy towards going with ice or frost on top of wing or critical surfaces and will up my vigilance in the future. I was under no time constraints or pressures and I fully understand the adverse effects of a contaminated wing.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported departing without realizing frost was present on the top of the wings.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Our aircraft received radar jamming activity from military assets for approximately 30 minutes beginning approximately 400 nm NW of St. George; Utah while in cruise flight. This continuous jamming activity resulted in multiple aircraft system failures that I will document below. The first indication of jamming activity was the appearance on multiple colored radar 'strikes' on the Nav Display of both pilots during this activity. I have seen this activity before on multiple flights neat military airspace North of LAS; and it always manifests as a display of spiked; multi-colored returns on the Nav Display when radar is turned on. These 'spikes' will extend towards the aircraft and stand-out as no other weather returns are displayed.However; on this occurrence; we witnessed the following additional failures. First we lost GPS position on one GPS receiver; shortly followed by the second receiver failure. On POS page of the FMC; GPS-L and  GPS-R; both failed. Next we had displayed on both PFD's 'TERR POS' failure indications. Next; the XPONDER FAIL light was illuminated; and both transponders indicated failed on the control display amber fail light (ATC however said they were getting our returns). Next; both the Captain and FO clock failed to indicate any time on the displays: --/--. This was also confirmed on the POS INIT page on the FMC. Shortly after; the ANP (Actual Navigation Performance) en-route exceeded cruise RNP of 2.0 with amber displays of plus 2.00 and up on both Nav Displays; also confirmed on the POS page of the FMC's.I then asked ATC if they were aware of any military jamming activity on-going; and ATC confirmed that there was. I passed on our failure modes; and then another flight crew stated the same issues affecting their aircraft. ATC Center then stated he would bring this to the attention of the ATC Sector Director. Very shortly afterward; the jamming stopped and all aircraft systems went back to proper indications almost immediately.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported experiencing jamming activity which resulted in loss of GPS position and multiple other system failures. Shortly after the Captain reported the issue to ATC; the jamming stopped and systems returned to normal.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Tower, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Taxied out to Runway XX for takeoff. Instructed to hold short of taxiway. Upon arriving at taxiway; told to switch to Tower and given takeoff clearance.  About the same time; the FO reminded me that the takeoff checklist was not completed. Completed take off briefing and checklist as we approached runway.  Aircraft weight was 230;000. TO data called for max power.  Due to our light weight aircraft accelerated very quickly.  Once airborne we cleaned up the flaps and leveled at 3;000 feet. As we leveled I was still hand flying as I was unable to get the auto pilot on due to how quickly the airplane was climbing. Speed was now exceeding 250 knots.  I clicked the auto throttles off and realized we had not armed LNAV/VNAV for takeoff. It was quickly selected and once course and speed corrections where completed; automation was selected on.  About the same time we were given higher and the rest of the flight was uneventful.As is usually the case this report was compounded by several items.  The most significant was not arming LNAV/VNAV for departure.  This was attributed to rushing the briefing due to calling for the Takeoff checklist late as we approached the runway for takeoff.  Another obvious issue was the very fast acceleration and climb due to max power takeoff and a light aircraft. Due to city traffic we arrived later than normal to the aircraft. This aircraft had multiple deferrals that took time and as well.  None extremely significant on their own but when place together it caused the issue that lead to this report. First Officer and I reviewed our actions and fully understand the importance of making sure our pre-flight; briefings and checklists are properly completed.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported taking off and being very light and realizing they did not arm the LNAV/VNAV for departure.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the DRLLR5 arrival into Houston we were given the RNAV RNP runway 26R. When we entered the approach into the FMC we failed to close the discontinuity up between the arrival and the approach. When we were supposed to start the turn over DRKAR we continued straight out on the 087 heading per the DRLLR5 arrival with the autopilot on. Just after passing the DRKAR fix we disconnected the autopilot and started the turn to get back onto the approach. Shortly after commencing the turn the Approach Controller queried us to make sure we were turning onto the approach. We told him we were in the turn and got back on to the course just after passing DRKAR and continued in without any further incident. ATC did not query us again and we landed with no other issues.


Second narrative: We were coming in on the DRLLR 5 arrival linked up to the RNAV RNP Y 26R. We had initially planned for the ILS 26L...not the default runway which would have been 26R...the First Officer (FO) was just wishfully thinking. When we checked on we were told to expect the RNAV RNP so the FO loaded it into the box. We had previously checked all altitudes and waypoints on the previous arrival and approach combination. But we failed to do it when we changed approaches. It left a discontinuity between the end of the arrival and the approach transition at SKLER. SKLER and DRKAR are very close together and we had just passed SKLER and I looked down and realized the DRKAR was white and not magenta...IOW it was not the next active waypoint and it should have been. I hurried and tried to jam it into the box but was too late. The autopilot; under our command (or lack thereof); went straight on the vector portion and did not turn at DRKAR. The FO disconnected the autopilot and turned onto the course manually. We did not go more than a mile past DRKAR and while turning; ATC did query us. We got back on the course line and continued with the approach. It was VMC so not of much consequence. It could have been a little more sporting IMC and in more challenging conditions.


Synopsis: B737NG flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV RNP arrival into IAH after failing to close a discontinuity in the FMC.