elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JAN.Airport, MS
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I am unsure if this is considered an 'event' or a problem; but it seems like both. A long term problem we have had at JAN is with our Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) generator. When we turn it on during bad weather there is a better than 50% chance that the Mode S will stop working and the ASR will also not work properly. I understand that Tech Ops has worked hard to find and fix the issue and has even gone so far as to bring in outside help to diagnose the problem; but nothing has worked. This event happened at the end of my shift yesterday and when I came in today I found out that we were in Center Radar Presentation (CENRAP) Plus. While I was monitoring the operation in Radar all 3 scopes went dark and the ASR high voltage went into alarm indicating that the primary radar had shut down also while Tech Ops was troubleshooting the Mode S problem. It came back after about 10 seconds; but I called Tech Ops on the radar site and they said that they had no clue why it happened; and no idea if it would happen again forcing us to full CENRAP; and ATC alert.Not only is it unsafe working with spotty equipment; but the fact that it goes out when we turn on the generator makes it even more unsafe. The generator only goes on in bad weather and when it causes the radar to quit we lose our live weather; along with out low altitude; and collision alerts. We then have to use the Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) which is far less accurate than what the ASR gives us.These circumstances are the definition of the swiss cheese model. The combination of weather hazards with equipment that is not 100% creates a perfect opportunity for bad things to happen. As a controller and an FLM I feel that we cannot provide nearly as safe of services to the flying public as we could with functioning equipment.We have some of the oldest equipment still operating in the agency outside of a contract tower. I would recommend updating our systems to something more reliable. Be proactive and replace this aging facility before it stops being able to function completely. We work as best as we can with what we have; but before long the only thing that will be working for us to do our jobs is a PET2000 (Portable Emergency Transceiver); and a light gun.




Synopsis: JAN FLM reported of a problem with the facilities Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) generator. When turned on during bad weather it has a 50% probability of working. Tech Ops is aware of the problem; but is unable to fix it. FLM is concerned something bad might happen related to the ASR being out of service.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LFMM.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center LFMM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were in level flight at 320 on with Marseille Center frequency 127.54. We were in moderate turbulence and the airspace was relatively congested. We got a TCAS descent RA from the aircraft above us. The Captain who was the flying pilot disconnected the auto pilot and immediately followed the TCAS command. We descended from FL320 to 31;500 feet. As soon as we were clear of the conflict we climbed back to FL320. I reported to ATC that we had responded to a TCAS decent RA and that we had deviated from our altitude. The aircraft that descended into our altitude said he had hit severe turbulence and could not control his altitude. We never got a traffic advisory from TCAS only the resolution advisory. Our TCAS showed zero altitude separation from the aircraft.


Second narrative: Cruising at FL320; LNAV/VNAV PATH; Autopilot (AP) on; Seatbelt sign on. Started to experience Light Chop/Turbulence. Without warning TCAS RA; Descend popped up (NO TCAS TA; system went directly to RA) Disengaged AP and followed RA guidance. Advised ARTCC of 'TCAS Descent'. Aircraft visually acquired passing left to right at our original altitude. We descended 300 feet in response to RA. After clearing other Aircraft we climbed back to FL320 and advised ARTCC of return to altitude and details of incident. During event we heard [the other aircraft] call ARTCC and advise them of inability to maintain altitude due to severe turbulence. Do not know if other aircraft was unable to maintain altitude due to turbulence or if they chose to descend without ARTCC clearance. After event we did experience moderate chop. Flight attendants were seated. Turbulence was not forecast. Reported event to Dispatch along with turbulence report. TCAS descent response was prompt but smooth with no excessive G-loading and no issues for flight attendants.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew at FL320 experienced a TCAS RA with an aircraft above them that was unable to maintain altitude due to turbulence. A descent was initiated to FL315 to receive a 'clear of conflict' from the TCAS.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Tower, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were assigned the Stadium Visual for Runway 29 at EWR. We selected the RNAV (RNP) Y 29. All briefs were completed. On short final the Tower asked if we were on the RNAV (RNP) or Stadium Visual. I replied that we were on the RNAV (RNP). All three of us believed that the RNAV (RNP) was the same as the stadium visual.  The Tower was not of the same opinion.  Because of that misunderstanding we inadvertently deviated from our ATC clearance.  The rest of the approach and landing was normal.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reports being assigned the Stadium Visual for Runway 29 at EWR and selecting the RNAV (RNP) Y 29 in the FMC; thinking it was the same thing. ATC notes the difference.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff the Flight Attendant called the cockpit to inform us that there was smoke coming from the lavatory. The Captain immediately [advised ATC] and asked to return for landing. We then received an EICAS message and warning stating that we had Lav smoke; we then complied with the checklist items. We were given instruction by ATC to turn right to the airport and I executed a Visual Approach. I landed flaps 45 and brought the aircraft to a complete stop. The Flight Attendant stated she would like to evacuate and the captain gave the order to evacuate and we followed the evacuation checklist that is placarded.


Second narrative: After takeoff the Flight Attendant called the cockpit and informed us that there was smoke in the cabin I immediately [advised ATC] and asked to return for landing. We got an EICAS Lav smoke message shortly after the call. We came to a complete stop on the runway allowing emergency equipment enough space to approach the aircraft and did our checklist and ground evacuation.


Synopsis: EMB-140 flight crew is informed of lavatory smoke shortly after takeoff by the Flight Attendant. A lav smoke EICAS message is annunciated after the Flight Attendant call and the flight returns to the departure airport. Passengers and crew evacuate through the main cabin door.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Night
Aircraft: Tampico TB-9
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after departing PHL noticed that the alternator was not working. With climb established verified that the alternator Circuit Breaker (CB) had popped; likely because it was heat soaked from being parked in the sun all day. On resetting; the CB popped within 15 seconds. Turned off all non-essential equipment and directed cooling air to CB. [I] continued trying the breaker every few minutes with longer and longer durations until it finally reset. [I] was in communications with Departure when I was approaching the ABE Class C. I expected a hand off by this time and contacted Departure with no answer. Switched to ABE and they indicated that ATC had been trying to reach me. Apparently; my comm transmit/receive power levels dropped enough on battery with the intermittent alternator that I didn't receive radio calls. I suffered from a bit of get-home-itis; but I honestly believed I understood the problem and that it would resolve. And while it did; I under-estimated how long it would take to resolve. I did not consider that I would lose comm with ATC; perhaps while in Class B airspace. I should have at least advised ATC of the situation so they had the same information I did.




Synopsis: TB9 pilot experiences alternator failure due to a tripped circuit breaker. It was thought that the circuit breaker was over heated due to the aircraft sitting in the sun and would remain set after cooling; which after intermittent periods of lost comm; it did.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Ground Operation
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Towbar-less Tug Operators are daily; being ordered by Management to operate their tugs in an unsafe manor as judged by the Tug Driver. As I am being forced to often operate the tug and aircraft on company property and ATC controlled airspace; I find in many situations I am no longer confident of a safe outcome.It is my opinion that this station has an unsafe SOP that has resulted in a Runway incursion in the recent past; as well as other 'near misses' that are not reported because nothing happened; however; they may be an indicator of the unsafe SOP.No remedies to these incursions or ATC misunderstandings have ever been implemented at this station. Other issues of safe operation include chronic Ramp congestion that often does not allow safe movement of the Tug.This forced demand from the company is in conflict with their own [manual]. I believe there is a real safety issue here that requires a resolution from outside the station.Management still needs to move metal around the airport; understandable. However; as the environment has changed over the last few years (for several reasons) at ZZZ both within the company and ATC concerning safe aircraft movement our old procedures are no longer acceptable. Management demanding that [towbar-less tug] operators continue to move aircraft without addressing this safety issue is unacceptable for obvious reasons; the most obvious one being the safety of the flying public and of course myself.I'm suggesting a committee be set up outside this station to provide: a clarification on [our manual] (Tow operations member job description) Does the [tug] operator have the authority to determine the appropriate number of personnel for a safe move of that aircraft?I'm also suggesting that this station's SOP concerning the tug be reviewed and that new policies be implemented that will allow us to move ahead safely and not threatened.




Synopsis: Maintenance employee reported that they are ordered by management to operate tugs in an unsafe manner.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After taking off we were asked to contact departure; and as we were climbing to assigned altitude Instructor started smelling fuel and looked out the window. The left fuel tank had significant fuel leak through the fuel cap (the fuel cap was tightly secured in place) and instructor notified ATC of the incident and requested visual approach back to [departure airport].




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported a significant fuel leak after takeoff.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: wake turbulence
Aircraft: Airliner 99
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After a full week of flying and a 14 hour duty day; I was coming in for landing into SLC. I had been told to expect Runway 16L while I was on the left downwind over Redwood Road. Just past midfield; I was given a runway change to Runway 17 following an Airbus 319 and cleared to land behind traffic. As I became busy setting up the aircraft for landing and running through checklists; I began turning onto base. I intercepted the glide path as I turned onto final. As I continued down the glide path; I began to feel some light turbulence around 500 ft. AGL. I then began to suspect that I might be in the glide path of the A319 that had landed before me. The turbulence became a little stronger and I felt uncomfortable with the approach. I decided the best course of action was a go around and another attempted at the landing. I commenced the go around and returned for another approach. The second attempt was uneventful.




Synopsis: Beech 99 Captain flying into SLC reported executing a missed approach at 500 feet AGL after encountering wake turbulence from the preceding A319.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: A Flight Attendant noticed a smell as she was coming up to do demo. This was after the door had closed. I couldn't smell anything. However; after the demo I walked a little further than row 6 and then could smell something. Not pleasant. Not food or human related. The B and C thought it smelled like nail polish. It didn't smell like that to me and it was very strong. It gave me a slight headache. It's hard to describe what the smell is because I don't know what it was...sorry that isn't helpful but there was a smell. We checked the overhead bins to see if something had spilled. Everything looked normal.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported fumes smell in the passenger cabin and experienced slight health issues.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft checked on my frequency slightly off route ; no issue. I descended the aircraft to FL270 ; updated his route in URET and handed the aircraft off to ZJX sector 66 . Everything appeared to be working fine ; I was not busy at  all or distracted ; it was business as usual. I noticed the aircraft stopped flashing to J66 and switched it to J66' s frequency as usual . later ; I switched the following AC to J66 and went to go drop the Aircraft X data block off my scope ; but somehow still had track control of the aircraft. The target was no longer in ZTL airspace and was now in ZJX airspace which alarmed me. I called J66 to make sure they were aware of the aircraft and that everything was OK and when I asked if they had radar(track control) on Aircraft X ; J66 said yeah ; no problem . I hung up the line ; reflashed Aircraft X to J66 . the datablock flashed just a few times and stopped flashing . I reflashed the aircraft a 3rd time ; and J66 took track control of the aircraft . I'm not sure why it took so many times to flash the aircraft before it was accepted ; but this is not normal . I spoke to a fellow controller about this situation and he said he has seen this issue at other sectors in the past ; but never at ZTL sector 32 . It may have been an automation issue with this one aircraft ; I'm not sure . The problem was solved via coordination ; and no unsafe situation regarding separation was noted. Since I believe this was a rare occurrence and might have been the result of an unknown automation issue ; I don't see any way this could have been prevented ; but I will alert my supervision and fellow controllers to keep an eye out for this kind of anomaly in the future .




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described an automated hand off problem when the data did not transfer to the receiving controller as expected.