elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EGE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D EGE
ATC / advisory: Tower EGE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Fatigue; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was pilot not flying on this high-workload LOC FMS Runway 25 approach into EGE; our second leg of a two-leg day. We encountered a very short GPWS warning (1 to 3 seconds?) as we passed over a ridge on short final; approximately 1-2 minutes before touchdown. With significant remaining daylight and good visibility; combined with previous experience on this approach; we concurred that we were in a safe position to continue the approach. Among the items contributing to the GPWS event is the large number of bulleted items listed on the airport briefing page; the EGE LOC FMS Runway 25 Technique Guide. As a Human Factors Engineer by education; I have found it peculiar that instead of monitoring the pilot flying's approach with care; I find myself reading multiple (perhaps far too many?) steps of what 'should' be done at various points on the approach instead of trying to maintain the 'big picture' of the basics: altitude and airspeed at each crossing point. Other factors/considerations: First; request by Denver ATC to 'keep our speed up' contributed to being high and fast for much of the approach. Next; sleep debt due to atrocious sleep quality at the long layover hotel which resulted in zero day sleep (despite hours of trying) prior to that sequence's red-eye flight the day prior. (Please see previous reports and literally pages of complaints from dozens of pilots on Hotel Committee's web page.) Lastly; delayed arrival on the previous leg resulted in no opportunity to take a planned nap during our 2.5 hours break prior to our EGE flight.Take additional action to replace current West Coast long layover hotel as it is frequently quite UNSATISFACTORY for day sleepers; thus leading to chronic crew fatigue. Also; state 'unable' when asked to 'keep our speed up' on EGE approach as it's a sure set up for a GPWS alert. Finally; remove and edit EGE briefing chart bulleted items and verbiage to a smaller; more manageable amount.




Synopsis: A fatigued air carrier First Officer described a momentary GPWS warning during a day VMC EGE approach which he attributes to ATC speed requests; the extensive airport approach brief page and lack of sleep.
Date: 201908
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight was delayed due to potent vomit odor coming from the back galley.  When we landed Captain called to see if it was any better.  It was actually stronger and liquid was leaking from behind coffee makers.  Captain advised us he would write a report and we asked him if we could crack the doors open for ventilations after disarming the doors and he said it was fine.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight attendants reported notifying Captain of severe odor in the aft galley after landing.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46; Tower SEA
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While the Seattle Airport was reporting visual conditions; a smoke layer from forest fires in Canada were restricting visibility and making it difficult to see traffic or the Airport. Not being able to clearly Identify the airfield due to this haze; the aircraft was assigned to maintain 3000 ft until established on the approach and cleared ILS 34L. As we were setting up for the approach; I heard ATC talk to another flight regarding a EMB175 on final and if this aircraft was able to see us and the airport. I heard him acknowledge both but was too concerned with our approach to hear what he was assigned. Just outside the FAF was when we picked up our first descending RA with the Aircraft 800 ft above us. I notified ATC of this yet the controller did not tell us where the traffic was or what it was. We received a second RA as the controller was sending us over to the tower. I told him that we received a second RA but not sure if he acknowledged. We were visual at this time and the FO was descending on the Glideslope when the third descending RA occurred and I noticed that the Aircraft in question was 400 feet above us. I switched to tower and told the tower that we were visual for Runway 34L and to pass on to approach that we received 3 descending RAs. The FO was stable by 1000 ft and we landed without incident. While I realize that I may have fumbled my verbiage during the event due to the speed that everything occurred at; I am still shocked that the controller allowed a plane to fly over at such a distance. Especially since we were on an Instrument Approach due to the hazy conditions.




Synopsis: EMB175 Captain reported three descending RAs during an ILS approach to Runway 34L at SEA caused by an aircraft on approach to the parallel runway. The reporter believed that ATC was remiss in allowing the other aircraft to get so close.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PIT.Airport, PA
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower PIT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [I was] working Local Control; departing Runway 28R; also landing Runway 28R; 28L; and Runway 32. Traffic [was] light; no stand-alone supervision in the cab; so I was unable to use LUAW for my 28R departures. I had 3 aircraft to depart; all filed over EWC VOR; and needed to meet release times for TBM/APREQ airports. Arrival traffic was on about a 12 mile final when I switched the first aircraft to departure. Since I was unable to LUAW; I had to clear the next 2 aircraft from the parallel taxiway; facing the downwind direction. Basically; as soon as I switch aircraft #1 to departure; I was able to clear aircraft #2; and then do the same with aircraft #3. A G-IV had taxied out from a hangar located north of the departure end of Runway 28R. I was not in a position to allow him to cross Runway 28R until my arrival had landed. Total wait time about 4 or 5 minutes. The G-IV asked Ground Control for the phone number for the supervisor; and this was given to the crew. When the G-IV got to the approach end of the runway; I called them and asked if they were ready for departure. The reply was they would be ready in 'a minute'. When I got on break; I stopped in the TRACON to inform the Supervisor what had happened. The supervisor informed me that they had already spoken to someone in the G-IV. This might explain why they were not ready when they got to the runway. Please re-visit the no LUAW criteria. It does not enhance safety; it degrades safety by forcing controllers to clear traffic for departure from a non-standard location. It forces a controller to guess as to how fast an aircraft can make the turn to the runway; will he start take off roll immediately; and will he even start to move as soon as I expect him to. In this case; it delayed an aircraft from crossing a runway in order to adhere to a regulation that; I say again; does not enhance safety.




Synopsis: PIT Controller voiced concern regarding the LUAW requirements that reference the presence of a supervisor/CIC; describing unnecessary departure delays resulting from this policy.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Earlier in the week the APU was replaced due to a chemical smell in the cabin. On our previous leg with the APU running on the ramp and the air on we noticed a fuel smell in the cabin. The PIC said it was from another aircraft's exhaust. I replied there wasn't another aircraft around us; and it smelled like fuel. We turned the air off and the smell went away. We departed and landed. APU running again and fuel smell again; this time we had one engine running and passengers on board. The line guy came up to our window and informed us we had fuel draining out the back of the aircraft and we should check it out. We shut down the engines and I exited the aircraft to take a look; fuel was pouring out of the aft drain and dripping/running out of the belly. A large pool of fuel formed under the tail. I asked the passengers to deplane and escorted them back into the FBO. This problem seemed to occur only when the air was turned on with the APU. We had flown the aircraft 9 legs since the APU was changed. The temperature outside had been perfect all week so we only need the APU generator and not the air. I don't know if the fuel leak was from an improper install or it occurred after. On the descent I debated starting the APU to get things done as soon as we could because we were pressed for time as usual and running late. We had another passenger trip schedule exactly 1 hour after scheduled arrival but the previous passengers were late. I did not start the APU in the air as I thought I should not rush things; what's the hurry? I'm thankful I didn't.




Synopsis: CE560 First Officer describes a fuel smell in the cabin that appears and dissipates when the APU air is turned on then off. During the next engine start a lineman notes fuel coming from the tail of the aircraft and informs the crew. The reporter suspects an improper APU installation to be the cause.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I experienced [an] engine malfunction shortly after takeoff; after the 2nd turn [in the pattern I experienced] shaking of the aircraft [and] loss of power. [Advised ATC]. Cause of engine failure unknown. Fuel [was] 3/4 [full]. Landed safely without any damage or injuries.




Synopsis: C150 pilot reported executing a successful forced landing at the departure airport after loss of engine power on downwind.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E L30
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were descending on the TYSSN3 arrival into Las Vegas. The KADDY Intersection has a crossing restriction of 12;000 FT and 250 KTS. The automation was used and we were meeting all altitude crossings accordingly. Prior to reaching KADDY we began picking up moderate wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft. The Captain (pilot flying) overrode the aircraft and shallowed the descent and it was now in a non-managed configuration. Also the aircraft was put into heading for maybe 5 seconds and he rearmed the NAV. The KADDY fix showed magenta and we were clearly going to make the restriction no problem.I was watching the descent and was waiting for it to level at the alt constraint of 12;000 FT before continuing down after KADDY. What happened is it went below 12;000 FT; I said to the Captain to watch his altitude; KADDY has a 12;000 FT restriction. At this time we were at 11;600 FT and ATC gave us direct to PRINO essentially deleting the KADDY crossing. ATC never said anything about going below 12;000 FT but we clearly descended early. We talked about what happened and realized the aircraft was not put back into managed descent so it didn't honor the constraint. We needed to make sure we continue to use our CAMI procedures especially in those high workload environments.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported overshooting a crossing restriction on the TYSSN3 arrival to LAS; with a wake vortex encounter cited as contributing to the workload.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Dash 8-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Propeller Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise flight the Number 1 Prop RPM went from 900 to 1070 the torque also went up; I reduced the torque to match the Number 2 Engine. All other indications were normal so I increased the Number 2 Prop RPM to sync it with the Number 1 Engine. As we got closer to destination I reduced the power levers to flight idle to see what would happen. The Number 1 Engine would not go below 45% torque; landing in this configuration did not sound like a good plan; so we elected to shut down the Number 1 Engine. We contacted Dispatch to inform them of the situation and we then ran the Engine Shutdown Checklist. The prop would not feather with the condition lever but did feather with the alternate feather switch selected. The engine was still running at 45% so not knowing the cause of these issues we elected to shut the engine down with the T handle.




Synopsis: DHC8-200 Captain reports Number One Propeller RPM increasing from 900 to 1070 on its own in cruise flight. The torque also increases. When the Number One Engine power lever is reduced to idle the engine will not go below 45% and it is decided the engine will need to be shut down. The prop would not feather with the condition lever but did feather with the alternate feather switch.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Helicopter Gearbox and Drive
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While performing a transmission and mast replacement on aircraft; the maintenance technicians were installing the drive link collar set onto the splines of the main rotor mast. Following procedures in the Bell Maintenance Manual 206L4 Chapter 6; paragraphs 1-7 we found that the collar was not positioned correctly. The technicians then read the instructions again and realigned the collar set so that it was correctly installed. It was inspected and the splines were engaged per the manuals instructions. From that point maintenance resumed without error and the safety and security checks were performed.




Synopsis: Lead Maintenance Technician reported that a main rotor mast and transmission were improperly indexed during installation and required corrective maintenance action.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other On Final
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In traffic pattern with 2 other aircraft. RWY XX in use. A 3rd high wing joined pattern from either the 45 to downwind in front of me or straight in. Didn't see where they came from. I was downwind; #3 to land; with 2 on final. Strobes and ADSB on. I extended downwind for spacing and in doing so entered Class C for ZZZ1 briefly before turning base. On final; a C172 turned in front of me but was slightly above. I inquired on the freq 'Do you see me below you?' His response was 'you flew into ZZZ1 2 miles'. (It was actually about half a mile.) I told him I extended my downwind for spacing. His response was that 'you had options'. I am not sure what he meant by that. But evidently he insisted on flying a tight standard pattern regardless of other traffic.




Synopsis: Pilot flying RV7 aircraft reported near miss with C172 aircraft on final approach.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Following the Loupe 2 SID; we were required to turn to a heading at 1.8 DME from the SJC VOR.  As we climbed out of 3;600 feet; I lost the DME signal on my side; I then asked the pilot not flying to call my turn; but he lost his DME signal about the same time.  As we checked on with NORCAL on 121.3; I stated; 'Please call my turn; we lost the DME signal.'  He asked us to IDENT; and gave us the required turn.  He then asked what happened; and the pilot not flying replied; 'Our FMS autotuned and we lost the DME signal momentarily.'On the taxi out for takeoff; we both displayed the SJC VOR along with the DME; and we had this during the takeoff and initial climb.  What we hadn't noticed was that the VOR on power up went to autotune; apparently a new feature with the new software revision loaded in the FMS.  As we climbed out; the autotune feature went to the LIN VOR as it got the signal; and dropped the SJC VOR.  As we followed the ATC given turn; the not flying pilot manually tuned in the SJC VOR and we got our DME back. This can be prevented by the following actions: More information on the subtle changes in the FMS when new software is loaded. Always manually tune the VOR for a vector departure. On subsequent trips that week on the same aircraft we noticed that on every power up; the VOR went to autotune. There was no deviations of altitude and airspeed; or TCAS event during the departure.




Synopsis: A fractional flight crew reported that a recent FMS software revision allowed VOR autotuning after takeoff which caused this flight to lose the departure airport DME for a required turn. The solution is to manually tune the VOR.