Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: First let me say; we caught the error and did not fall into the trap. But given another day I could easily see myself making this mistake under the circumstances.We were repositioning a plane to ZZZ. I set up and briefed the RNAV approach to XY. The weather started to deteriorate making that approach not usable. So I set up and briefed the ILS YZ. We were then told that there had been an accident and that the ILS was unusable. We then began to get conflicting information as to whether we could shoot the RNAV to YZ. Which I set up and briefed. We were then told that we could not do that approach but that another airplane had gone into Runway ZZ and that was available although the ceilings made it marginal. At this point I did not brief that approach. At the same time we were talking to dispatch which wanted us to divert to ZZZ1 which we did. We set up the ILS and were heading into the downwind when Dispatch called and said we could go back and land at ZZZ and that they had received information that supported that. That information was not accurate. At this point dispatch started to become a threat because they were continually calling and the information they were giving us was not accurate. I am not placing blame on them it's just what it was.We diverted back to ZZZ. Then the controller also was confused as to whether the runway was a go to land on or the approaches were temporarily unusable due to the accident. He again offered runway 2 and said that a previous aircraft had made it in.We asked for holding at ZZZZZ to buy us time to think through the options. He put us at 5;000 feet I briefed the RNAV to YZ because now the controller said the RNAV was doable. It turns out it was not. We talked to dispatch and told them that contrary to popular belief there was still ambiguity as to whether or not YZ/XY were usable due to the crash. [Captain] had contacted the tower and was trying to get some information. During the next minute or so the controller heard what he thought was us asking for the approach...We had not. He cleared us for the approach. I did not bite because we were at 5;000 feet and that in order for us to have a reasonable descent I'd need something like 3;000 feet. So I didn't bite I told him I wanted to stay in the hold. During this the controller then came back and told me the 'The NTSB was on the scene now and said we could NOT fly any approaches to YZ/XY' great. But that ZZ was still usable.I then started setting up the approach for ZZ. Obviously we were getting tired by now. I think I had briefed something like 5 approaches at this point. I started briefing the approach and expanded the approach plate on the IPAD. You know that little note that says 'runway ZZ not authorized at night' was now off the screen. [The Captain] also looked at the back of the 10-9 plate and we were making notations of all of the runway notes etc. However that note for runway ZZ was out of my field of view. There was more discussion with Dispatch and that we were going to try runway ZZ. Almost simultaneously we got a message from dispatch and I scrolled the chart down and noticed that notation. However I have to be honest we came very close to shooting that approach. I told ATC that we could not shoot the approach because of that note. They said they did not have that note on their charts and that another plane had just made it in and were kind of wondering what we were looking at. Regardless we said we could not do it.We contacted dispatch and told them we were then heading to ZZZ1. Which we did and landed safely.I think I set up and briefed maybe 5 to 7 approaches; a couple over again because we had just so much going on. We did three diverts and a hold and were being lead down paths with incorrect information from ATC; Dispatch and Tower Controllers; cleared from altitudes on approaches which would of made for radical descents . We managed the workflow well and avoided all of these traps that were l aid for us. We almost though bit on the runway ZZ Approach. Why because ATC kept offering it; another plane had just made it so our expectation and bias was that it was usable. Yes we should always scroll up and down on the iPad to ensure all information is seen; that's our job. But given the saturation and the nature of the iPad and the fact that it was yet another approached briefed after 5 or 6 or I had lost track how many were briefed it is an easy enough miss. I wish that the really important notes were grouped into one place or that at night the release had some remarks. I bet you that if you did this as a Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario 50% of pilots would bite. We didn't not because I think we're better but because we just happen to catch it as did Dispatch but late in the game. We came oh so close to making the mistake that I felt I should ASAP it.


Second narrative: An aircraft mishap at ZZZ was the catalyst for general confusion on the part of dispatch; ATC ; and the flight crew with regard to the actual status of the airport and instrument approaches available. By my count we received 5 conflicting reports in the span of an hour which resulted in us being diverted to our alternate; re-diverted back to the destination; and finally being diverted again to our alternate where we landed. At one point in the process it was generally agreed by all parties that a runway (ZZ/ZW) other than the runway involved in the mishap (YZ/XY) was available. We listened to another aircraft execute the approach to runway ZZ successfully and got an update on the weather from them. It wasn't until we were actually prepared to fly an approach to that runway that we discovered; more or less simultaneously with dispatch; a small note below the lower margin of the approach plate stating that the approach was not to be flown at night. At that point we diverted to our alternate.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported that the primary runway at their destination airport was closed due to an aircraft incident. Several times they were given conflicting information regarding the availability of another runway; ultimately resulting in a diversion to an alternate airport.