elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BDL.Airport, CT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C BDL
ATC / advisory: Tower BDL
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on a cross country flight and was using an iPad with Foreflight software. This was the first time that I have used digital moving maps for navigation. In the past I have use paper charts. When I realized that I was in BDL airspace at 3;500 FT I quickly checked my paper chart and saw that the top was 4;200 FT. I immediately turned 90 degrees and climbed to 5;500 FT. Too many sources of information (iPad; GPS; paper charts) on a turbulent day in a small plane can be distracting.




Synopsis: A pilot in VFR turbulent weather; using his iPad for navigation the first time; discovered himself in BDL Class C Airspace.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was departing IFR from a non-towered field. After receiving my clearance via cell phone I initiated my takeoff. I notice the plane was wanting to takeoff at an indicated airspeed approximately 20 mph lower than normal. I committed to lifting off because I would not have enough runway to stop by this point and the plane was ready to fly. I recognized the airspeed was indicating improperly because the pitch and VSI was appropriate for a Vy climb; but the airspeed was way off. Pitching for a Vy airspeed would have put me into a building. I decided to remain visual and return to land. On final I split the difference between my indicated airspeed and GPS ground speed which was higher. I landed without incident and cancelled IFR via cell phone. I reported the condition to Maintenance and noted it in the log.Familiarity with known performance and power setting is what helped me ID this before entering IMC. The biggest thing is having options when taking off into IMC. Always consider the possibility of having to circle back to land and always leave the option available.




Synopsis: C-172 pilot describes an airspeed indication problem discovered too late to abort his takeoff on an IFR flight. A successful return was made before entering IFR conditions using pitch and power settings known to provide appropriate speeds.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We planned for the Visual to Runway 16L and talked about the possible assignment to 17R. When checking in with Approach we were advised to expect 17R. We briefed and programmed the RNP Z 17R. AS we approached the IAF I was preparing for what to do (i.e. what fix to use based on location of active waypoint) and/or the state of the IAF (i.e. active waypoint or not). To the best of my recollection; the IAF was on LSK L2; then I placed it IAF under IAF; although a review after the fact stated we 'could' place in on top of it. We both complied with VVMI prior to execution. The aircraft continued on downwind with no descent. Almost simultaneously; as we noticed the wrong picture on the MAP display; the Controller asked us if we were descending. By this time I had disconnected automation and was following the purple line while both of us were monitoring altitude restrictions based on our clearance. The Pilot Monitoring reprogrammed the approach and the rest of the flight was uneventful. No further calls from ATC; altitude; or course deviations occurred. Consider calling the field in sight and requesting visual approach. We do believe that the IAF (since we were close to it) might have auto-sequenced from L2 to L1 (active); and as we know the programming in this case would have been different. Therefore; maybe a closer look at the distance remaining to the active waypoint might have helped prevent this situation.




Synopsis: B737 MAX8 Captain reported failure to descend as charted while flying the RNAV (RNP) Z approach to Runway 17R at DEN due to an FMC programming error.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon climb-out I noticed the left engine oil pressure falling from 50 PSI indicated on takeoff to 35 PSI. Being suspect of the left engine from a previous flight; I notified ATC that I would be returning to land due to a low oil pressure indication on the left engine. ATC gave me a vector to the Final for ILS and descended me from 6;000 FT to 2;300 FT for an intercept. Just outside the FAF for ILS the left engine oil pressure was showing around 5 PSI and the Left tachometer was beginning to decrease in RPM along with an audible change in propeller noise. I decided to shutdown and feather the left engine in a controlled manner before it lost all oil pressure. The ILS was then flown single engine to about 1;000 FT AGL where I broke out of the cloud bases and saw the runway. I notified the Tower that the left engine was shut down and declined any emergency services to be waiting upon landing.




Synopsis: Beechcraft Baron pilot shut down the left engine due to low oil pressure indication and returned to departure airport.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZZZZ DG (Dangerous Goods) Specialist knowingly and purposely attempted to mislead the crew as to the documentation of the hazardous material to be carried aboard the aircraft. It first began with the DG Specialist wanting to present the Hazmat for inspection to the First Officer without all the documents. The FO (First Officer) stated that inspection would be conducted once all the documentation was complete and present. The ZZZZ DG Specialist later said the documentation was present and ready for inspection. The FO quickly determined the paperwork was not authentic. In fact; among the documentation was the Hazmat Summary from a different aircraft; parked right next to us. All the positions of the Hazmat stated on our initial paperwork were the exact positions of the other aircraft. The ZZZZ DG Specialist simply changed the aircraft tail number to suit the Hazmat Summary. By referencing the container numbers; we were able to determine the proper location of the Hazmat. We had to show/ explain in detail to the ZZZZ DG Specialist and other ramp personnel the errors. The ramp said that they were just going to offload the Hazmat; but when I asked them which positions were to be offloaded; they couldn't answer since they didn't even know the correct location of the Hazmat. If not for the attention to detail by the First Officer; this entire matter could have been easily overlooked. Once the documentation was properly completed; and more fuel was added; we then required a new release and weight and balance. We had to wait for the Ramp Manager;; who went home while this situation was being resolved; to return to the ramp to verify the weight and balance. The lack of professionalism and attention at this facility is extremely poor and possibly dangerous. The actions of the ZZZZ DG Specialist were reckless and deceitful. Cause: Either untrained personnel or simply recklessness.




Synopsis: B-777-200 Captain reported refusing to transport Hazmat after it became apparent the DG Specialist knowingly and purposely attempted to mislead flight crew regarding DG loaded on aircraft.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Regional Approach had just let us descend to 4000 ft on final to 13R. We were just about a mile west of MORRY fix when Approach cleared us for a visual approach. My FO was just starting to descend to 3000 ft when I noticed a TCAS target appear approximately 3 miles southeast of our position. It was below our altitude and roughly 500 ft below our current altitude of 3800 ft. I told my FO to stop the descent at which point as the target got close we received a Climb TCAS RA. At the same time approach then called a target to us and I told approach we were responding to a TCAS RA. The VFR Aircraft passed at our 12 position roughly 300 ft below us. Approach asked if we still had the runway in sight and we were cleared the visual approach and switched us to tower. Before leaving frequency I asked Approach if that was a VFR aircraft he declared yes; but didn't seem concerned! I still would like to know why or how this VFR aircraft was able to fly at that altitude inside our approach to 13R without anyone doing something. Regional Approach was swamped with the time of arrivals to DFW and very task saturated. However someone needs to research who the VFR pilot was and track them down and teach them DFW airspace restrictions.


Second narrative: At approximately 16 DME on the ILS 13R DFW; after we had been cleared the approach; and as I began to descend from 4000 ft to 3000 ft; we received a TCAS RA. The other aircraft was spotted visually at our 12:30 and approximately 1 mile. TCAS indicated that it was level; 400 ft below our altitude. It was headed due north; possibly along I-35W. As I began climbing in response to the TCAS RA; ATC called out the traffic to us; and the Captain replied that we had the traffic in sight and we were climbing in response to a TCAS RA. As soon as we were clear; I resumed the descent and finished flying the approach uneventfully.The weather was night VMC. We were configured with flaps 2 and all exterior lights on. Speed was approximately 170 KIAS.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported responding to an RA from VFR traffic transiting DFW airspace apparently without clearance.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We flew the GIBBZ arrival to GIBBZ; and hit an FMC discontinuity [after GIBBZ]. We asked ATC for further instructions and were given a heading. The Controller stated that we should have followed the routing on the small insert in the corner of the arrival procedure. This routing is hard to locate; and does not load from the FMC data base. The procedure appears to be designed to create this error. We were still recovering from numerous changes to the published procedure by ATC when when we arrived at GIBBZ.

Callback: The reporter advised they had selected a runway of intended landing but the legs after GIBBZ were not displayed when that runway was selected. He couldn't recall whether their ultimate landing runway was a north or southbound one; but did recall there had been a runway change issued subsequent to their initial clearance 'via' the STAR. He reiterated his complaints with respect to the complexity of the chart and noted specifically that he was aware that there was a note advising that flights advised to expect Runway 12 should expect vectors after an intermediate fix (GYSLO); so he was certain they had not landed on 12. The reporter believed it would be necessary to manually 'build' the legs subsequent to GIBBZ.



Synopsis: A B757 flight crew descending via the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD had to request vectors after GIBBZ because their ND did not display the tracks after GIBBZ associated with their landing runway.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GRK.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 310/T310C
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E GRK
ATC / advisory: TRACON GRK
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were in cruise at 9000 feet on an IFR flight plan. We were talking to Gray approach at the time. I recently had ADS-B installed in my aircraft and I got a traffic target on my Garmin 530W. It looked like it could be a conflict. I called Gray approach and asked if they had target at my 12 o'clock. Took a little [time] to respond. My wife and I were both looking for the target. It got within 200 ft of our altitude and was pretty much head on. I was debating turning but I wanted to get a visual if I could to make a better decision. I was going 200 mph or so and the target was going like 240 knots according to my iPad so not much time to figure it out. I had my 530w traffic page set at 6 miles for this exact reason to catch them sooner. We got a visual on the target probably 1.5 miles out. They went under our right wing. We were south bound they were north bound. When they passed ADS-B was alerting 300 ft separation but it had gotten to 200 ft.I complained to Gray approach told them that was way closer than I liked. I am on an IFR flight plan for a reason; to get some more eyeballs looking out for me. The controller kinda blew it off and almost immediately handed me off to Houston Center. Even though I did not have to make an altitude change; I was aware of the situation and ready to do so because of ADS-B traffic. Maybe the controllers were preoccupied or they were shorthanded or busy handing us off. Regardless; way too close for me and my family.




Synopsis: C310 pilot reported an NMAC at 9;000 FT while on an IFR flight.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon preflight; found aircraft left [overwing] emergency slide panel release pins painted over (forward 2 of 3 pins). This was confirmed by the First Officer; then by Mechanic X. Also; via ACARS; asked Maintenance Control to please reference company Alert Bulletin XXX. Per Alert Bulletin XXX and Engineering Order 25-YYY; paint should be removed from the overwing slide enclosure ball locks. Maintenance removed the paint from the effected areas; and then reported to Captain and First Officer the ball locks were never painted over. Logbook sign-off read; 'ATA Chapter 05-35: Please comply with Engineering Order (E.O.) 25-YYY; inspection of both sides; left/right paint removal from the overwing slide enclosure ball locks.' Suggest Maintenance; as well as the pilot group; could have this information disseminated; to avoid a potentially dangerous situation and to be in compliance with the 2008 Engineering Order and the 2011 Alert Bulletin. The Paint Vendors could be more proactive in not painting over the ball lock release pins.




Synopsis: A Captain reports he found the left overwing emergency exit slide panel release pins painted over during a preflight of an A320 aircraft.
Date: 202109
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other unknown
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: Tower MCO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The MCO ILS 18R procedure has a charted altitude from YAGGO (IAF) of 6;000 feet MSL. This altitude results in turning final 1;000 feet above the glide slope with less than sufficient distance remaining to descend and slow in a stable manner.  Recommend the FAA review the min altitude from YAGGO to NAVAL and revise to 5;000 to allow a smooth transition to the glide slope. In the interim would recommend an ops alert outlining this threat and suggest refusing an approach clearance from YAGGO and instead requesting vectors to final to ensure intercepting below glide slope.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported; for the MCO ILS 18R; from the IAF altitude to the GS intercept altitude there is not enough distance to make a smooth transition. Pilot suggests the IAF crossing altitude should be re-evaluated and be 1;000 feet lower.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While offloading inbound flight agent found a smart bag that had been checked with the battery still inside. From the bag tag it appears the tag was issued at the kiosk [at departure airport].




Synopsis: Air carrier ramp personnel reported during offload at destination gate checked smart bag loaded in cargo with Lithium Ion battery installed.