elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Did not turn right over the ZZZ VOR as SID required due to traffic conflict on TCAS. Was having difficulty climbing at ISA +19 (weight and temp). Communication difficulty due to wearing mask (COVID-19). Traffic appeared to preclude turn on SID cause of inability to climb due to ISA + 19.




Synopsis: Pilot reported not being able to turn as required by the SID because of traffic.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cardinal 177/177RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While in cruise at 5500 ft. MSL and under VFR flight following from Approach Control; I noticed an airplane on my ADS-B converging on me at the same altitude. I began to try and acquire the other airplane visually; but was unable. Frequency congestion prevented me from contacting Approach Control to inquire about the other airplane. When the other airplane was within 1.5 miles of me; still not in sight; and with no traffic calls from Approach Control; I initiated a rapid climb to avoid a potential collision. The other airplane passed directly underneath me with only 300 ft. of vertical separation. I did not observe the other airplane make heading or altitude changes. After I was clear of the traffic; I descended back to 5500 ft. MSL and asked Approach Control: 'Approach Control; Aircraft X; did you see that traffic that just went under me?' to which Approach Control responded 'Contact ZZZ1 Approach on xxx.xx'. Because the frequency was busy; I did not re-engage Approach Control and changed frequency as instructed.I understand VFR flight following is provided on a 'workload permitting' basis. However; my handoff into the airspace was accepted by the controlling agency and my ATC flight following was never terminated by the controlling agency due to workload. In this scenario; I had an expectation that traffic separation services would be provided. Had Approach Control terminated my flight following; I would have climbed sooner and had more/safer separation from the converging traffic.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in congested airspace.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Fatigue; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: This is to follow up on the toxic fume incident at [our ARTCC facility]. While being briefed on the details; it turns out this was a bigger [mess] than I initially thought. The employees need as many people outside the building involved in this process as possible considering the entire chain of command has failed the employees. We inhaled these fumes for 3 days. We have some controllers who are still out. None of us have been seen or cleared by a flight surgeon since the incident. Please help them set up a plan for toxic fumes in facilities especially since their first thought was not the safety of the employees. On that day they put operation before the people and people suffered for 3 days sniffing toxic fumes.Independent external investigation. Complete transparency. Outside help to determine a plan. Get the people out of the facility in toxic situations until the air can be tested; that should be the first priority. Fast response for a hazmat team and hazmat experts not some tech ops guy that thinks he knows everything. Accountability. FLMs and Ops managers are now claiming their decision making was impacted which is why we didn't go to minimum staffing.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported there were toxic fumes in their facility for several days causing illness and incapacitation of controllers with no actions taken to resolve the problem.
Date: 201811
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I have had several incidents recently when not in communication with Ground Ops Personnel that involved being blinded by the extremely bright LED lights on tugs. Once a tug was illuminated right behind the Marshaller; rendering him invisible to the Crew. On another occasion; the pushback tug had its lights on and completely obscured the J-line. A third time; after pushback for departure; the tug's lights blinded us; so that we could not see the pin or the bag or the people holding them. This seems to be a new problem with the brightness of the new lights. We are not in communication with the personnel at these times; and it is challenging to establish communications. Flashing the taxi or landing lights just leads to people scurrying around and moving baggage carts or belt loaders. Trying to call Ops on the radio and conveying the message has taken many minutes. They seem truly confused by what I am asking them to do. Ground Ops should mirror our policy. We don't blind them with our taxi lights. They should not blind us with their tug lights.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported new ramp tractor lights are so bright that pilots are blinded to everything on the ramp.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. At 25;000 ft. near top of descent; I heard a loud bang sound near the windshield. The Captain's windshield shattered; but did not come loose. Pressurization was normal; but we donned masks just in case the window failed to stay together. First Officer was pilot flying. I asked him to advise ATC and start the diversion to ZZZ2 while I called Dispatch Ops; Station and cabin. I amended the release with Dispatch. We got to ZZZ2; wrote up the discrepancy; changed aircraft and went to ZZZ1. There was no evidence of a bird strike.I am not sure the cause. Maybe an issue with the windshield heat. I would be curious to find out what MX concludes.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a cockpit windshield shattered while in flight.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BFI.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D BFI
ATC / advisory: Tower BFI
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft Y had just departed IFR when Approach called us. Aircraft Y was returning VFR with an engine problem.  Aircraft Y was about 6 south of the airport at 1200 ft so I decided to [give them priority].  There was another [large transport aircraft] on one mile final Aircraft X on about a 12 mile final.  I called Approach and asked them to break out Aircraft X since he was still level at 2200 ft on the ILS.  I was trying to make a hole so Local West could land Aircraft Y on either runway.  About one minute later I found out that Aircraft X was already on Local West frequency.  I called Approach and asked them for a heading and altitude.  At this time Aircraft X had started to descend on the ILS but they were still above the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). There was training on Local West at the time and by the time that Aircraft X received the heading and altitude instructions they were below the MVA.  Aircraft X got as low as 1200 ft before the turn and climb started.  The two options were let Aircraft X land normally or issue the heading and altitude instructions before they got below the MVA.




Synopsis: BFI Tower controller reported a Local Control Trainee sent an aircraft around and issued instructions below the MVA.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On walk around; FO (First Officer) found elevator hinge cover on backwards or damaged. Flight canceled This is the third aircraft in two months I have found this problem. I'm very concerned that this is not being taken seriously. I think every pilot at (airline) should have a safety bulletin; with a picture of the hinge cover so they can see what to look for on a walk around. There should be a fleet wide check on this safety problem.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported that the First Officer found an elevator hinge cover plate installed backwards; resulting in aircraft damage and a cancelled flight.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 5 minutes after departure; received a Level 2 'Brake Overheat' Alert. The CONFIG synoptic showed the right center brake at 550 degrees and the rest of the brakes were approximately 90 degrees. We stopped our climb; slowed to 250 K and IAW [In Accordance With] the checklist; lowered the gear. The brake immediately started cooling. At 300 degrees; we raised the gear and continued our flight. We communicated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control via SATCOM and relayed the info. We decided we would land using 50 flaps and manual brakes. The plan was to roll out to the end of the runway allowing the aircraft to slow as much as possible without applying the brakes. We coordinated this with Tower on final. We also briefed and prepared to execute an emergency ground egress if necessary.  Enroute; the brake continued to slowly cool and on final was 90 degrees. Landing and rollout were uneventful.  During taxi back to parking; the brake temperature started to increase again about 150 degrees hotter than the rest of the brakes. We had [ground personnel] check the temps before we shut down completely or allowed the ground crew to approach the aircraft. The brake peaked at about 350 degrees and the other brakes showed 150 degrees or less. The First Officer did an outstanding job throughout coordinating our intentions and ensuring all checklists and special steps we had discussed were accomplished.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported the right center brake showed an overheat at 550 degrees about 5 minutes after departure.  The flight landed normally.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 25 minutes into the flight at FL370; the left engine vibration indication began climbing into the 'yellow band'; and remained there. Cockpit crew performed 'memory items' in order to return and maintain engine vibration within normal limits. The left engine was near idle and power to the right engine was added in order to maintain airspeed. Airspeed was slowly decaying anyway; so a descent and return was requested. A few attempts to return the left engine to normal power were made. That was a step that the engine vibration checklist called for in the event that possible engine ice might be the cause of the vibration and power 'cycling' might remedy. It did not. A return to [the departure airport] was accomplished followed by an uneventful overweight landing.




Synopsis: Flying at FL370; B-757-200 crew experienced vibration and power loss in the left engine. Crew executed an uneventful landing back at the departure airport.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: CVAU; 15
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Bellanca Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Ground loop occurred after landing and the collapse of the left main landing gear.  The contributing factor that caused my loss of control and the resulting ground loop was a broken/missing (was not found) bolt in the left landing gear attach point.  There were no injuries.  There was no damage to property.  Minor damage occurred to the landing gear center attach bracket and the left wheel.  There was no damage to the wings or tail surfaces.  There was no prop strike. The plane did not cause any traffic disruptions or airport closure.  In retrospect; this was could have been prevented if I had caught the broken/missing bolt during preflight. On a positive note; landing this aircraft at the appropriate; recommended speed helped prevent this ground loop from being a violent landing.




Synopsis: Aeronca 11AC Pilot reported the left main gear collapsed due to a missing gear part.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There was no Ground Marshaller at the gate so the Captain stopped the aircraft prior to entering safety zone. The ground crew walked into position a minute or two later. Lit wands were used and Captain taxied down the line towards the gate. About the position that we are used to stopping; we noticed we were still being directed forward although our positioning clearly did not feel right. The Captain stopped the aircraft while direction to continue forward was still being given by Ground Marshaller. A tug and towbar were then hooked up at Captain's direction and the aircraft was pushed back into position. It is my belief that--if the Captain had continued to follow the Director's signals--a turning engine would have come in contact with the jetway. A thorough debrief was conducted with the Ground Supervisor who guided the aircraft into the gate. Though all parties were composed and professional during the debrief; I was not convinced that the severity of the situation was completely understood by the ground crew.Ground crew training on proper marshal placement of -700 aircraft versus -800 aircraft. Lines are in different places and extra attention must be given to ensuring the aircraft is stopped accordingly.




Synopsis: The flight crew of a B737-700 refused the Ground Marshaller's guidance into the gate when they became uncomfortable continuing further into the safe zone than they felt appropriate for their aircraft. They later determined they were being guided to the stop line for a B737-800; located some 12 feet further into the zone than that appropriate for the shorter -700.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When BWI is in an east operation; Runway 15R departures are either given runway heading; climb to 040 for GRACO; or turn right heading 330 for WOOLY departures. A B737 departed and BWI Tower called me and said; 'I accidentally gave the B737 a 330 heading. Can you turn him back to runway heading?' I said roger or affirmative. I immediately displayed the aircraft to WOOLY and BWIFN who would have conflicting traffic. I observed the B737 stop his 180 degree turn approximately halfway through it; pointing directly at an A319; a RAVNN3 arrival; worked by BWIFN. Both aircraft were at or climbing to 040. When the B737 checked on he sounded confused and said 'the Tower gave us a 330 heading. I was simultaneously yelling across the floor to BWIFN; 'I'm going right and climbing!' As BWIFN responded; 'I'm going left and descending! I issued the B737 a further right turn to avoid and climb above traffic. When all else fails; good ATC usually works. I believe standard separation was maintained. These are both re-occurring problems. First BWI Tower controllers have no limitation put on their use of the RADAR D-Brite. They however; are not trained to a level commensurate with their duties. This manifests itself repeatedly. BWI is required by LOA to check the D-Brite and ensure the aircraft auto acquire to the appropriate sector. They routinely turn and switch aircraft without checking the D-Brite. If they had; this situation might have been avoided. Unfortunately; this happens with regularity. Second; the RAVNN3 arrival is perilously close; in a BWI east operation; to these northwest bound aircraft who depart Runway 15R making a 180 turn directly at the RAVNN3 arrival roughly 5 miles apart; at the same altitude; during a critical phase of flight and making a frequency change. It is an outdated heading; based on different BWI traffic from years ago. If these 15R departures went left; or the RAVNN was moved; or if a BWI departure SID was built; with de-conflicting altitudes; this would not continue to occur.




Synopsis: PCT Controller described an unsafe condition claiming BWI Tower controllers do not abide by the LOA with regard to ensuring departures are assigned to the correct PCT sector; adding; new procedures could help prevent similar events.