elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Weather elements / visibility: 12
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DAL
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Second aircraft: Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were proceeding south on a Class B clearance toward overflight of Love Field; which was in sight. We were in contact with Love Approach (not Tower or DFW Approach) and following the visual track assigned by the Controller. We were advised of traffic above us; which we did not spot. A King Air 200 or larger came into view from our upper left descending through and below our altitude and crossing from upper left to lower right. Estimated miss of 300 feet. They were in a left bank heading for a landing on one of Love Field's Runways 13. We could clearly make out the tires; landing gear doors and some details inside the main gear wheel wells. The King Air must have been on a different frequency and Controller. I wondered why the King Air did not get a Resolution Advisory (RA) when I spoke with the Controller; but he didn't seem to notice. Since there was clear relative motion and they were faster than us and in front of us; no evasive action was needed.




Synopsis: C172 instructor pilot reported a NMAC with a King Air in the vicinity of DAL airport.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PDX.Tower, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: IFR departure; advised ATC upwind due to engine failure. I asked if he wanted to stay on my frequency and stay in the pattern to land. He said yes; so I issued him right traffic. I didn't solicit a cancellation of IFR; or ask if he could maintain terrain and obstruction clearance.




Synopsis: PDX Tower Controller reported an aircraft which lost an engine and returned to land flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. The Controller did not solicit IFR cancellation or ensure the flight crew had terrain in sight.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot monitoring as we approached runway 7R. While configuring for landing; we got an amber ICAS message and rolling motion as I selected flaps from 20 to 25. Also annunciated was the Leading edge light advising us we had an asymmetry problem. I felt the flap handle binding as I moved it toward 25 so I placed it back at 20 degrees. We abandoned the approach to run the checklist.After running the checklist and preparing the cabin and passengers for the landing we went back toward the airport and landed on 7L at our present configuration. We taxied back to the gate without incident. After landing we found that the inboard leading edge slats were only in the takeoff position while the outboard leading edge was in the landing position.




Synopsis: A B767-300 developed an asymmetric leading edge slat accompanied by a binding flap handle and roll motion when flaps 25 was selected on short final. The approach was abandoned; the checklist completed and the flight returned for an uneventful landing.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator ControlSystem
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I departed my home airport and landed at ZZZ full stop and taxied back for a takeoff. Engine making full power at 60 knots added slight back pressure on yoke; plane became light on mains but with no rotation; checked airspeed passing 70 knots. Applied full back to yoke; still no rotation. Pulled throttle to idle; plane settled back onto runway. Began max breaking. Pulled mixture; slowed before running off end of pavement; past 200 feet of grass overrun and down a 20 feet ravine. Came to a stop in brush; with no injury to pilot. I checked the movement of yoke; free and clear but the elevator was not moving. I looked through baggage area into tail section and found the up elevator cable broken at the turnbuckle. The break was at the section where threaded section meets the barrel.

Callback: Reporter states that the turnbuckle failure occurred between the previous landing and the incident takeoff; a time of only a few minutes.  The reporter has since discovered that AD 2013-02-13 has been issued requiring extra control cable and turnbuckle scrutiny during a normal annual inspection.  This AD affects several other Piper aircraft.



Synopsis: PA28 pilot reports failure of his aircraft to rotate during takeoff even with full aft elevator input. The takeoff is rejected resulting in a runway excursion and damage to the aircraft but no injuries. A failed elevator control cable turnbuckle was discovered during post incident inspection.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On short final the engine stopped.  Emergency procedures were followed.  Carb deice was already pulled. Pushing the throttle in did nothing to return the engine to service. The aircraft was maneuvered to land short of the runway in a field about 900 ft. short of the runway.




Synopsis: Pilot reported engine failure on short final approach; causing the pilot to land in a field 900 ft. short of the runway.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departing ZZZ; neither autopilot would engage during climb out. The first officer checked circuit breakers; reset the glareshield autopilot disconnect bar; and we tested each yoke disconnect button but neither autopilot would still engage. No QRH procedure could be found. We reported the autopilot issue to ATC and requested to stop our climb at an altitude below RVSM. Next we called ZZZ Maintenance and their suggestion to reset the stab trim autopilot cutout switches successfully restored autopilot function; and flight continued normally at normal cruise altitude.This was the first flight of the day for both pilots and the first flight in several days for the aircraft. Preflight distractions included a previously unseen route error that kept wanting to reload from the CPDLC auto load and update. During pushback; a ground crew wing walker wanted us to abort our number 2 engine start because she felt the tug driver had cleared us to start sooner than she wanted the engines started. After pushback ATC informed us we only had 3 minutes to taxi to make our departure slot time.Suggest adding 'Stab Trim Cutout Switches' to the Before Start Checklist; and/or including a QRH Procedure for 'Neither Autopilot Will Engage.'




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported auto pilot not engaging as required and non QRH procedures were used to get autopilot to function correctly.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Orion (P3)
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C JAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON JAX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Accepted hand off on an Orion; westbound to NIP from Warning Area/Sealord airspace. Data Block and Flight Progress Strip indicated flight was VFR but aircraft was level at 4;000. After providing advance approach information to pilots; they requested a visual approach to Runway 10 at NIP; which caused me to question the status of the flight since it was showing as VFR. I asked pilot if they were on a VFR or IFR flight plan and was advised they were IFR. I contacted Sealord and was told the aircraft was IFR and that they had amended the flight plan to IFR as it departed the warning area. I told them that the Data Block and flight plan in the NAS indicated the flight was VFR and that this was a potentially very dangerous situation so they needed to ensure accuracy of the information they put in the NAS since the only thing on the flight plan that had anything to do with IFR was a remark in field 11 that read IFR which technically means nothing. Until I changed the Data Block to enable MSAW processing; this IFR flight was not receiving MSAW processing and being handled by the receiving facility (me) as a VFR aircraft. Additionally; the actual flight plan was not properly updated at Sealord so the arrival strip did not even print on the JAX FDIO until a solid 20 minutes after the flight had landed. Upon further research; the flight had departed NIP IFR on a NIP12 stereo flight plan; went VFR in the warning area and then was not updated to reflect current status upon leaving Sealord airspace. These are very common problems with Sealord; they routinely hand traffic off to us that are not properly updated in the NAS and we frequently do not have current and/or accurate strips on the traffic from the warning areas or get them significantly later than is useful to the RADAR controller working the flight. Interaction with Sealord is the most difficult aspect of working at JAX; they get things wrong more often than they get them correct and they do not seem to understand the dangerous element their noncompliance imposes on the RADAR sectors. Recommendation; extensive refresher training of Sealord personnel on proper procedures for NAS flight plan processing; interphone communication protocol and JAX/ZJX LOAs.




Synopsis: JAX Controller described an event where a displayed flight plan status was in fact IFR contrary to all VFR data block indications.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: An E145 was at 110 and switched to TRACON; a B737 descending out of 130 to cross at 090. Based on the speed of the E145 it appeared TRACON reduced the speed below 250 KTS which allowed the B737 to catch the E145 on the back side while passing through 110. Prior to the B737 passing 120; I informed him of the E145. Pilot reported aircraft in site and I issued instructions to maintain visual separation. Pilot read back 'ok I have him in site'. I restated the need for him to read back he will maintain visual separation. Pilot read back 'I will maintain visual' and didn't read back call sign. At this point separation was lost and I told pilot we need certain phraseology. I then switched communication of the B737 to TRACON. The simplification of visual separation acceptance by the pilot. Pilots are NOT informed the proper phraseology to accept visual separation. The FAA requires a specific read back and pilots are not held accountable for this phraseology. The FAA does not educate or insure accountability of the pilots. This has been a problem since the inception of visual separation in the en route environment. The requirements by the FAA for pilot read back needs to change or the FAA needs to take the time to educate proper phraseology to the pilots.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event when applying visual separation and the pilot's response not in total accordance with requirements; the reporter suggesting that flight crews should be more aware of ATC separation mandates.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Due to GPS jamming in ZLC airspace and to the fact the airport was using a north flow instead of the south flow; Dispatch had planned and filed us for; and we received a pre-departure clearance that was amended to use a non-RNAV departure that worked with a north flow.  Our clearance read: ... BCE GRNPA1 KLAS.After departure; we needed to deviate around some thunderstorms in the area; and Center cleared us to do so direct MLF when able.  After checking in with Los Angeles Center; we were told; 'Cleared direct Milford; GRNPA 1 Arrival.'  Since our PDC included the GRNPA 1 already and it was already programmed into the FMC; we didn't realize MLF had its own transition on the GRNPA1.  After passing MLF and proceeding toward BCE; Center asked if we were on the arrival.  That's when we first realized the clearance had been different from what we had programmed and made the turn to KSINO to re-join the arrival.  There were no observed traffic conflicts due to our deviation.I should have referenced the STAR and queried ATC to clarify the clearance.  Also had ATC used the phrase 'cleared direct MILFORD; GRNPA 1; MILFORD transition' it would have alerted us to that the fact that the transition we were cleared to use had been changed.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reports being cleared to LAS via BCE and the GRNPA1 arrival. Due to weather deviations the route is changed to direct to MLF and the GRNPA1. The crew does not notice that MLF is a transition on the GRNPA1 and turns to BCE after MLF. ATC intervenes.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing; gear indicator light was not displaying gear down. Requested fly by tower for visual confirmation of gear down. Tower confirmed gear down. Proceeded [to] go-around and land. Upon landing; gear collapsed.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reported the gear indicator light was not displaying green during final and gear collapsed during landing.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Pins
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: PS-1 check was in work by our day shift Mechanic. We then changed a nose gear tire that was worn; and proceeded to work the check. I pulled the nose gear pin so we wouldn't forget later to do it. I then went back to the RT main landing gear and lubed the aileron tension regulator in the right main landing gear wheel well and then pulled the gear pin. I then went to the LT wheel well; lubed the left aileron tension regulator and then pulled the LT gear pin and then closed both main landing gear doors. I then took my ladder and laid it on the ground forward of the gear doors; so the ground crew could use it; I then laid the gear pins on the ground at the bottom of the crew stairs so whoever was going up in the plane next could put them away in their spot inside the aircraft. The entire time my mind was on all the things I had to do next; never realizing that I hadn't pulled the center gear pin. I then serviced the eight tires that were slightly low; shipped a bunch of parts; processed the worn tire for shipping and continued the check and paper work. I told my co-worker I had pulled the gear pins and that they were at the bottom of the crew stairs. He was the next to go up on the plane; so he took them up and put them away. We finished the check; the paperwork; processed and shipped all parts and then launched the aircraft. I was notified this morning that the plane flew...with the center gear down; would not retract. They removed the pin and did the appropriate inspection. Looking back; I see that my mind was on all the things I had to do next to get the aircraft ready for its flight; and I didn't give the simple task of pulling the gear pins enough thought; it's a simple task that I was confident that I had accomplished. I should have double checked it and not assumed.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician forgot to remove MD11 center gear pin and aircraft flew subsequent leg with center gear down.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Social distance cannot be adhered to due to lack of spacing. Nothing is setup in the bus to promote social distancing.




Synopsis: Maintenance employee reported that social distancing on the bus is not possible due to lack of spacing.