Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EGE.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: I am writing to express concern about the new SOP policy in which the 1;000 feet call on approaches with and without vertical guidance regarding the 1;000 feet call. It now occurs at 1;000 feet above Touchdown Zone Elevation (TDZE) rather than above minimums. Making the call 1;000 feet above minimums creates a better rhythm to the approach; create a higher level of situational awareness and reduces distraction inside the FAF. Furthermore it is a standard that can be relied upon irrespective of the minimums' Height Above Threshold (HAT) which may vary greatly especially in mountainous terrain. Over the past couple days I have seen three scenarios where the current 1;000 feet above TDZE would be ill-timed; a distraction; or would not occur at all. All of my examples occurred during VMC.I have had multiple conversations with crews about this topic; and feel it bears a safety report. During the recent change in call-outs; we changed the '1;000 feet above minimums' to a '1;000' referencing TZDE. I feel this is a mistake; and decreases situation awareness and the operation's overall level of safety. During several approaches in IMC; I have had more than one crew member tell me he is foregoing the new callouts to use the old ones. That such a mentality exists speaks to the poor level of training; communication from our 'training department' and some of the call-outs themselves. During our first flight; we were in VMC; but made me think about the operation should we have been in IMC. The LDA DME Runway 25 (with GS) into KEGE has a DA of 8;331 feet or 1;790 feet DH. The 1;000 feet call would not be made prior to minimums in this scenario. It seems that the 1;000 feet call is an attempt at a reminder for meeting stabilized approach criteria. It seems an instrument approach in mountainous terrain is exactly the case where stabilized approach awareness is paramount. Furthermore; during an approach into KCOD on we began the GPS 22 KCOD. It has a straight in landing MDA of 5;620 feet or 544 feet AGL; almost 600 feet. So in that case we're not highlighting the stabilized approach criteria until inside 500 feet above MDA. Again; night; mountainous terrain; where stabilization and situational awareness are paramount. Another example came up during an approach into SBA; VMC again. On the VOR or GPS 22; the straight in landing minimums (MDA) are 920 feet MSL with a TDZE of 13 feet. That means the 1;000 feet call occurs at the 100 feet above minimums call; at the very bottom of the approach. I don't see how that's a good idea. And how does that highlight stabilized approach criteria? Had we kept the 1;000 feet call above minimums; it would occur just inside the FAF. This is also an approach with non-standard minimums in mountainous terrain.This is a topic that has garnered significant thought. It seems there are several overall genres in aviation that have significantly increased the level of flight safety as a whole.1) Adherence to standardization so when unique scenarios arise; those habits and rhythms serve as a protocol for operation2) Adherence to stabilized approach criteria; and3) Removal of non-critical items/callouts in critical phases of flight. With reference to those three topics from the aforementioned scenarios; our current policy degrades those philosophies effectiveness markedly.1) Every approach now has a different callout for 1;000 feet with respect to minimums; breaking the rhythm and timing of past experience; and in some cases the 1;000 feet call would never occur at all.2) It's somewhat ironic that the 1;000 feet call (highlighting a minimums for meeting the stabilized approach criteria) occurs at a different point with respect to the FAF and MAP on every approach that doesn't have 200 foot or 400 foot minimums.3) We have now added a callout that now often occurs inside the FAF when focus inside the FAF is flying the plane and anticipating minimums. That callout is not referencing minimums; but another piece of data located elsewhere on the chart. Furthermore all of these degradations in safety more regularly occur at airports with higher than standard minimums which usually occur in mountainous terrain and in uncontrolled; non-radar environments; precisely where standardization and stability are most important.Suggest changing the 1;000 feet call to reference the approach minimums rather than TDZE.




Synopsis: A Captain reported a recent SOP change moved the required callout from 1;000 feet above approach minimums to 1;000 feet AGL; which produces unclear procedural requirements on approaches to airports in mountainous terrain.  The Captain cited three examples from recent flights and urges a return to the old procedure of requiring a callout at 1;000 feet above minimums.