elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Yankee AA1
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A Grumman; tagged as an AA1; attempted to transition through LAX Class Bravo airspace southbound through the departure ends of the Runway 24 and 25 complexes at 900 FT. LAX was west traffic. The Controller working the aircraft on the helicopter position (controlling helicopters and transition aircraft) was able to redirect the aircraft out of harms way; but it could have been disastrous if he hadn't. The Controller redirected the aircraft to the LAX 'Mini Route' that crosses over the airport midfield at 2;500. That created issues as well since the route has several flaws. The Grumman ended up overtaking a C172 on the Mini Route. The Controller was able to separate the aircraft by using a lower altitude (2;000) that was not designed for the Mini Route (it's a potential conflict for LAX arrival aircraft if they were to execute a missed approach). The LAX Mini Route has several flaws. For example: There is only one altitude available - 2;500; it was designed for only one aircraft at a time which is impractical because it forces aircraft to hold north and south of LAX in close proximity to each other and in close proximity to SMO airport to the north and HHR airport to the south; therefore; multiple aircraft are controlled simultaneously on same and opposite direction flight paths with little margin for error; it spans approximately two miles over LAX and is RADAR controlled by LAX controllers with limited RADAR experience; the aircraft are handed off to LAX Tower by HHR and SMO Tower controllers who are not RADAR qualified; the route is flown incorrectly and erratically on a daily basis by inexperienced or unfamiliar pilots; and the route is a potential conflict for LAX arrivals and departures due to its proximity and limited margin for error. Recommend closing the Mini Route and not allowing fixed wing transitions through LAX Class Bravo within 5 miles and 3;000 FT; it's too dangerous. Transition aircraft should use the Special Flight Rules area that runs over the top of LAX at 3;500 and 4;500 FT.




Synopsis: LAX Controller voiced concern regarding the long existing VFR corridor that crosses over LAX Airport and the potential traffic conflicts resulting from same.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Got to Approach Control and we were told to hold at RADDY; thunderstorm over field. We held at RADDY with an estimated critical fuel that was right at our limits for whether we would divert or not. At the estimated critical fuel we were given heading in opposite direction and within 10 miles given heading to join arrival. Continued with arrival but had to deviate for weather. We still had plenty of fuel but not enough to shoot approach and land at our alternate with the fuel we wanted so we declared minimum fuel. On downwind for 16R we pulled up a new ATIS and had winds listed as calm. We had already checked landing data reference card and were good for a flaps 30 landing with over 3;000 FT excess runway available based on braking action wet/good. Continued approach and configured for landing. On final noticed that aircraft was having a hard time slowing and going down; first hint. We configured fine then I looked at wind arrow in airplane and it showed a tailwind in excess of ten knots. Asked student Captain to get a wind check and we were given [around] 360/15; gusting to 20. Don't remember exact winds. Thought about flaps 40 but we were below 1;000 FT so we did not reconfigure then thought of landing card check for a tailwind; didn't have time. Storm now seemed to be at end of runway with light rain so I decided to continue approach and landing. We could have made it to alternate with fuel that would have been below my personal minimum; but didn't feel comfortable with a missed with the storm in front and maybe extended vectors to alternate to deviate around weather. Winds may have died off but not sure. [We] touched down fine and aircraft stopped where we planned. We seemed to have thought of everything but we still found ourselves in a position we didn't like. We added more fuel prior to departure. Checked the landing data card; talked about fuel and set our bingo fuel while in holding. But it still got away as we took vectors from Approach. Fuel state was still alright but not what I would have liked. An earlier bingo to alternate would have eliminated any problem.




Synopsis: B737 Check Captain reports being assigned holding then having to declare minimum fuel during vectors for approach. On final below 1;000 FT; winds are noted at 15 KTS gusting to 20 on the tail. With ATIS winds of calm and a storm in the departure path the approach is continued to landing.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Clearing [Runway] XXL in ZZZ; a master warning light and bell sounded; with the ECAM; SMOKE AFT CARGO SMOKE. First Officer began the 'Immediate action/ECAM exception' search but the warning disappeared before he could complete it. The same warning sounded for about the same amount of time (5 seconds) right after crossing [Runway] XXC; but also disappeared before action could be taken. It sounded a 3rd time about 300 yards west of  concourse. We stopped; ran the checklist; including discharging the fire suppression agent. The last item on the ECAM action is to not open the cargo door until the pax have deplaned. We called both Ramp and Operations and asked them to relay this information. We then proceeded to the gate; at which time the aft cargo door was immediately opened. Thankfully there was no fire; but if there had been it could obviously have been serious for the baggage handler as well as the aircraft and its occupants.We have no direct means (that I know of) to communicate with the ground crew and tell them not to open a cargo door. Relaying through Ops or Ramp is not a great option when time is critical; as it is when we have fire indications. I have been told that other countries utilize the beacon; turing it off as a signal that it is safe to open the cargo doors. That would have been a very useful tool in this situation.




Synopsis: A-321 Captain reported intermittent ECAM SMOKE AFT CARGO annunciation during taxi at destination airport. Reporter highlighted ramp communication issues upon gate arrival.
Date: 201201
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: When acquiring infant life vests to distribute from aft stowage compartment I noticed that Preparation for Evacuation cards dated 9/96 is still located on the stowage door. Our commands for evacuations and other related information on these cards have changed several times. These cards are severely dated! In addition I witnessed many improper and FAR violations by flight attendants. No compliance of carry on baggage stowage on floor of business class; stowing bags of used linens on floor in crew rest area. Also extra headsets provided by cleaning staff are boarded on dog houses containing emergency equipment behind row 39CEH. This is common practice. I removed headsets to over head bin 39C as well as underneath seat 39C.




Synopsis: A B767-300 Flight Attendant reported that Preparation for Evacuation cards were outdated and flight attendants routinely disregard FAR's regarding cabin baggage stowage procedures.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Inbound on the DRLLR 1 arrival into Houston the FMS/autopilot failed to sequence past the DOMNO fix.  When reaching this fix; the plane automatically disengaged LNAV and went into basic roll mode instead of making the required turn.  Right as this happened I turned the plane back to intercept the arrival and my First Officer re-engaged the nav function of the autopilot and we reintercepted the arrival. Had we both not been watching the airplane that closely we could've had a fairly significant deviation at a lower altitude over the top of a busy airport.  As it was; as Houston Approach called to verify that we were making the turn; we were already in the turn back to course.  Approaching that point there was not a single sign in the flight plan or the FMS or on the course depiction on the ND that the airplane would not make a turn as expected.




Synopsis: EMB-135 Captain reports that the autopilot failed to turn over the DOMNO fix as programmed; during the DRLLR 1 RNAV arrival to IAH. The deviation is immediately detected and corrected.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Flight Crew Harness
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During pushback Captain's shoulder harness released and contacted the circuit breaker panel. Then during the After Start RECALL check the FLT CONT and SPEED TRIM FAIL lights illuminated. Upon inspection of the CB panel the MCP DC 1 CB on P18-1 was found out of position. It was determined this was caused by the shoulder harness contacting the CB panel. Reset CB. Contracted Maintenance Control. Continued to destination without issue.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information].


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports circuit breakers being tripped inadvertently during push back when the Captain's shoulder harness releases and strikes the circuit breaker panel.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival; as the A FA; I made disarming announcement; disarmed door and cross checked my door (L1) and the R1 door.  I then waited for jet bridge and CSA; gave thumbs up; waited for knock; then opened door. As I was opening I heard the interphone 'ring.' The D answered it. After I stepped away from door to let guests off; I asked the D what the back FAs needed. The D stated that they were relaying that the AFT doors were disarmed. I had forgotten to call them.I take full responsibility. I rarely fly A; and due to COVID; I haven't been on an airplane in almost 2 months. I was trying to go slow and be cautious. But missed that important step.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported forgetting to notify other FAs that the AFT doors were disarmed. Flight Attendant stated not having been in an airplane for an extended time due to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the event.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ2
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were en route to ZZZ from ZZZ1. We were dispatched with MEL 24-1-02 Single Generator inop. We were running the APU in accordance with the MEL. The MEL was briefed on the ground and we were both aware of the restriction to divert if we lost the APU. The APU then did an auto-shutdown in-flight at cruise altitude.  We ran the QRH; sent a note to dispatch and all agreed ZZZ2 was the best divert. We notified ATC; notified Dispatch; the Crew and the Passengers. We ran the Divert Checklist and landed at ZZZ2 uneventfully.


Second narrative: While en route between ZZZ and ZZZ1; we diverted to ZZZ2 because we were down to a single generating source of aircraft power. Our right #2 Engine Driven Generator System was deferred requiring us to run the APU generator during flight. We briefed the MEL thoroughly and discussed contingency options prior to leaving. While in cruise flight at 38;000 feet; the APU automatically shutdown due to low pressure leaving us with the single generator. We elected to divert to ZZZ2 after confirming with Dispatch. We ran all our checklist appropriately and landed without further incident in ZZZ2.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported APU auto shutdown in flight causing diversion and precautionary landing due single generator operation per MEL.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed with cabin pressure selector in dump position.  Discovered climbing through 10;000 feet with Cabin Pressure warning. Requested descend to and maintain 10;000 from ATC and completed checklist. Problem discovered and corrected as per checklist. Remained at 10;000 for a few minutes to confirm cabin pressurizing normally and then requested higher and continued to destination. Primary cause is that my originating flow was inadequate. Contributing causes were my expectation bias; my distraction due to pride; and condition we found the aircraft in. We found the aircraft in a state in which an instructor might put a training device to check preflight and originating flows proficiency - aircraft obviously powered down without being terminated and random switches out of place. The first clue was the external nose gear safety lock protruding. I showed the First Officer (FO) how to return it to flush and secure it. Things out of place continued on the flight deck. I briefed the FO that we each needed to be extra vigilant in our pre flights and originating flows. At some point I silently congratulated myself on catching every out of place item including that we had caught what would have prevented the nose and main landing gear from retracting on takeoff. They did not get me this time. At this point; my vigilance went to zero. Climbing through 10;000 feet I discovered that they did; in fact; get me - my expectation bias; my pride leading to distraction; and the apparent failure of those having the aircraft before me to refrain from screwing with random things or to follow a checklist of any kind.




Synopsis: A Q400 Captain reported finding a number of switches incorrectly positioned during preflight. One was missed; resulting in the aircraft failing to pressurize during climb.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Engine lost 50% power. Declared emergency and turned towards best suitable airport. Landed without incident and was able to clear all active runways and shutdown engine on taxiway due to extreme vibration/noise. upon reporting clear to tower; they asked me to contact ground. At this point I was in process of getting passenger out of plane; and when I transmitted; it went on tower frequency. I called via telephone after exiting aircraft. In an effort to prevent a recurrence; should be taking the time to make sure the right frequency is set when transmitting.




Synopsis: PA32 pilot reports a rough running engine and power loss at 3;500 feet. An emergency is declared and the flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport; 11 miles away where upon taxiing to ramp he forgets to change to Ground frequency.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MAF.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C MAF
ATC / advisory: Tower MAF
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When taking the active Runway 34L at Midland airport; my FO and I cleared the approach and departure end of the runway visually before entering. Cleared for takeoff; we started our takeoff roll and initiated rotation at the proper airspeeds. Within seconds after rotation ATC advised us of a helicopter that turned into our path. At about the same time we received a TA and less than a second later an RA. I had visual on the brown helicopter at the same time ATC initially notified us. At the time I continued the climb out because I could see that we would out climb his path into us. The RA stated the same. I had the helicopter visually the entire time. At no time did I see the helicopter take any action and Midland was not talking to him. He apparently violated their airspace. We passed approximately 300 feet above and a hundred yards or so in front of him. Once we cleared the conflict ATC apologized and we gave a description of the helicopter to them. The rest of the flight was uneventful.I don't know about the ATC side; but on the flight crew side I don't think there is anything differently we could have done.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC with a helicopter shortly after takeoff from MAF airport.