elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At approximately 30 minutes before landing; and while in cruise at 9500 feet; myself and the captain observed smoke entering the cockpit through the avionics cooling bay exhaust port on top of the glare shield.  The captain immediately turned off all switches and electronics in the cockpit. I read the emergency checklist for ELECTRICAL FIRE and together we completed all of the actions.  After completing the checklist the captain turned on electrical items one at a time to see if we could determine the source of the smoke.  The smoke did not return after turning on the essential equipment we would need to continue the flight. We notified ATC of the problem but elected to not declare an emergency or divert to an alternate airport because we felt we had eliminated the source of the smoke and the essential equipment was functioning properly; also we were within 25 minutes of our intended airport by this time.




Synopsis: C208 First Officer reports observing smoke entering the cockpit through the avionics bay cooling exhaust port on top of the glareshield. All switches are turned off; and then turned on one at a time until essential equipment is repowered with no smoke and the flight continues to destination.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Weather Radar
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out while deviating for weather; WX WEAK displayed on both Captain and First Officer HSI screens which soon changed to WX FAIL.  Because of night conditions with scattered to broken thunderstorms enroute; we declared an emergency and returned to [departure airport].  Normal landing weight.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: B757-200 crewmember reported WX radar failed during climb out. Since thunderstorms were forecast enroute the flight declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PNS.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower PNS
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cleared to takeoff on Runway 17; after the 80 kts call out; [we] noticed a small aircraft entering the runway to cross at C2. Aborted takeoff. Complied with immediate action items and QRH. Checked with FA to make sure all passengers were good. Next takeoff was uneventful.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a rejected takeoff at PNS airport due to traffic crossing their runway.
Date: 201901
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: [Maintenance Facility] tooling calibration lab high pressure nitrogen system plant installation does not provide adequate protection for the hazard of 10;000 PSI lines from being inadvertently damaged causing a leak with the potential of serious injury or death. There is also a potential hazard of a nitrogen gas release into confined area in the event of a loss of integrity of the system due to earth quake or accidental damage. A high priority needs to be placed on the request for the installation of an adequate barrier that protects the integrity of the lines but also allows for visual inspection. A request has been submitted and remains open. There needs to be an alarm system installed that will detect a leak in the system both at the plant and in the work shop area. A system has been purchased (Beacon 800 Gas Monitor) but has not been installed due to internal logistical reasons and funding. We should also have a single point shut off to the system that is accessible to workers that will isolate and stop release of gas in the event of an emergency. Lastly once this is done we need awareness training campaign for all workers in the area so they know what to do in the event of an emergency coupled with appropriate signage and safety procedures in our manual.




Synopsis: Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported a hazardous condition at a maintenance facility which could result in injury or death.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DAL
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft was on the TRYST1 arrival (new RNAV).  I descended the aircraft to 6;000 and switched him to Dallas South.  They were busy and by the time they started him down; the aircraft clipped the corner of DR1's airspace (or maybe was 1/2 mile away).  This aircraft was left on the newly designed arrival.  I did not know that the arrival would end up in an airspace violation if I did not turn it off of the arrival.  I understand that I have 'pre-arranged coordination' through that area; but since I did not expect him to go through there; I did not display it to DR1 nor did I display DR1's aircraft as is required for 'Pre-arranged'.This arrival should be changed as to not go through someone else's airspace if I leave him on it.  It should be designed to go from Dallas East airspace to Dallas South's airspace.  An arrival should never be designed to require me to use 'Pre-Arranged Coodination' airspace since that would also require me to make other steps such as displaying the aircraft to DR1 and also to watch all of DR1's tracks while going through this area.  It should also not require me to vector off of the newly designed arrival as the 7110.65 states that we should leave the aircraft on an RNAV Procedure to the extent possible.  In this instance if I could not ensure that the aircraft would be descended; then I would vector off from now on to ensure that it misses DR1's airspace.




Synopsis: D10 controller describes a flight that he descends and ships to another sector. The aircraft clips the corner of a non pointed-out airspace. The Controller has pre-arraigned coordinated use of that airspace; but did not realize the aircraft was going to enter said airspace during the arrival.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: L30.TRACON, NV
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Approach; Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were filed on the GRNPA 1 RNAV arrival but given a clearance direct to the KSINO intersection and clearance to descend to FL 220. We had expected and briefed the RNAV visual approach to runway 19R. When we were cleared direct to KSINO were were told to expect an ILS to 25L. We were switched over to approach control without hearing or acknowledging any further descent clearance. When we switched over to approach control we were approaching the LUXOR intersection and were still at FL220.On initial contact the controller seemed a little confused and ask us if were were landing at LAS. We told her that we were and asked her why she was asking. She told us because we were crossing the LUXOR intersection at FL 220 when normally LAX center would have given us clearance to cross the intersection at 12;000 feet. We replied that were were never given a descend via or any other lower altitude.We were given a last minute runway change and were task saturated trying to set up and brief a new approach at the last minute. As a result we did not noticed that we were never given a lower altitude by LAX Center before approaching the LUXOR intersection. A contributing factor was that the First Officer (FO) was new to the Airplane; had about 100 hrs total time in type; and had never flown into LAS before.As has been said time and again concerning the descend via arrivals....'.if they just leave you on the route and give you a descend via from cruise altitude to the bottom altitude without any changes then things generally go smooth'. Once they give you directs and a descend to an intermediate altitude or take you off the route; that's when problems happen. Again; if we were given the assigned runway earlier were could have been less task saturated and noticed that we were approaching LUXOR without being given a lower altitude.




Synopsis: Crew of an A-319; inbound to LAS; was cleared by Center to descend to FL220 and to proceed direct to KSINO intersection; a fix on their filed arrival route. Approaching LUXOR intersection; which has a 12;000 feet crossing altitude restriction; crew was switched to Approach Control while still at FL220. Upon check-in with Approach Control; crew was informed that they were crossing LUXOR too high. Crew replied that they had not been given a lower altitude clearance.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PWM.Airport, ME
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower PWM
Aircraft component: Inverter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll; I noticed a yellow 'look up' light on the master warning panel. I looked up and the only light I noticed was an engine ignition light on the left side of the overhead panel. I looked back down and noticed the same 'look up' light was still on. I looked at the right side of the overhead panel and saw that another yellow light was on; indicating that the left inverter was offline. I pushed the rocker switch turning on the inverter; which activated a flashing red warning light. The pilot flying saw the red light and aborted the takeoff. We exited the runway; pushed the red light; which turned it off and taxied back to the beginning of the runway for takeoff. We could not duplicate the problem; it hasn't happened before and hasn't happened since. We took off without further incident for our destination. The only thing I would have done differently was to call for an abort of the takeoff; which happened anyway.




Synopsis: HS125 pilot reports noticing a yellow 'look up' light on the master warning panel during takeoff. Another yellow light on the overhead panel indicated the left inverter was offline. When it is selected on the red master warning light begins flashing and the flying pilot rejects the takeoff.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We did our standard brief at the gate. We were in the middle of our before takeoff checklist when tower issued a new clearance. I read back his clearance correctly but was a bit confused at what I just read back because I was thinking about my other task of the checklist. I finished the checklist and the flying pilot asked tower for a clarification of a left or a right hand turn out after takeoff? The tower told us right turn after takeoff; direct ZZZ VOR; climb and maintain 15000. The flying pilot assumed that ZZZ VOR was to our left after takeoff and the tower wanted us to go the long way around for the direct (If you look at the SID; the VOR appears to be a left turn and that's where we went wrong). So the flying pilot said he would direct me up when we get turned back to it and just following the heading bug; which he spun around 90 degrees to the right to get us going in that direction. As we were in our initial turn ATC questioned us and said the fix was to our left and we told him the tower told us to take a right and then the controller said it was basically a direct after takeoff and that it might have been confusing when the tower gave us those instructions. He then amended our clearance and told us to continue our turn and when able direct ZZZ VOR; and that traffic was no factor and everything was okay.We should have told the tower to stand by and completed our checklist then received our changes in our clearance and reviewed it in the FMS and on the SID. We also should have had FMS selected and perhaps that would have alerted us that it was basically directly in front of us. So; the threat and error was our situational awareness. The other threat was how it looks depicted on the SID. If you look at the SID; it's clearly to the left of centerline of the runway; however when you look at it depicted on your screen it was slightly to the right; perhaps 5 degrees to the right. What I learned was to always question the controller when unsure of a clearance.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported their ATC clearance was to turn right after takeoff; but the VOR they needed to cross was actually just slightly to the left of runway heading.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: TRACON A90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight to BOS; with Check Airman on jumpseat giving me a line check; I was pilot flying. FO could not get arrival ATIS on ACARS so he went on radio number two to copy ATIS. He wrote 30.37 as BOS altimeter; did the performance calculations for landing and we did descent and approach checklists. When we checked-in with Approach; we all heard ATC say 'altimeter 30.36'; FO read back altimeter 30.36 so we set that. We didn't know we had the wrong altimeter; ATC did not correct us; and the Check Airman didn't notice it either. While on base; being vectored for the ILS 22L in VFR; Approach called 'Low altitude alert; say altitude'. FO read back; '3;000 feet; say current altimeter'. ATC said '30.06'; 'we show you at 2;700 feet.' I immediately corrected altitude to 3;000 feet; and set the correct altimeter. None of us on the flight deck ever knew it was anything different than 30.36; but ATC never corrected our read backs; so we did not realize we had a problem.When not getting ATIS on ACARS; we need to both verify altimeter setting; or verify it with ATC; not depend on ATC to correct us.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to BOS when their altimeter was mis-set because of a communication breakdown.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Descent
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared to 'descend via' the DIRTY Arrival and cleared for the ILS 27L.  We were working through staying on the snowflake during the descent.  Somehow when transitioning to the ILS we got below the glideslope; but still above the published altitudes that we needed to stay above.  I am not sure if it was a violation; however the ATC Controller told us if we were going to be below the glideslope that we needed to let him know.  We leveled out and recaptured the glideslope with no further incident.The transition between the descend via and the actual approach is always complicated since everybody does it a little different.  As far as I know there has not been a company policy on how to handle it.  We were so focused on the 'descend via' that we lost focus on the glideslope.Better briefing on the transition and how we planned to handle it and when we would clean it up.




Synopsis: A CRJ-700 crew flying the ATL DIRTY RNAV Arrival and cleared for the ILS 27L went below the glideslope but stayed above the minimum altitude crossing restrictions. ATC advised the confused crew that they should have alerted if flying below the glideslope.
Date: 202005
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Un-manifested D.G. (Dangerous Goods) Flight had two items of Dangerous Goods that were not properly manifested and did not make it on to the DSTG or the DHAZ in software. The un-manifested cargo were the following:-4 pcs. at 16 lbs. (all 4 pcs/ D.G.)-Class 9; 2.11 kg.-Class 2.1; 0.44 kg.-Class 3; 0.35484L X 2 pcs. -12 pcs. at 260lbs (4 pcs. D.G.)-Class 8; 3L and 5L-Class 8; 1L and 5L Only one item was properly manifested. As far as I am able to piece together at this time; the D.G. acceptance and capture took a long time; bouncing from one agent to another and came right up to lockout time for the flight. This was because of one agent not being familiar with the Dangerous Goods capture process. Cargo was the only Dangerous Goods that was actually manifested and loaded in Aircraft X; despite having cargo and cargo inside the unit. The two un-manifested D.G. shipments were manifested after the flight departed. In addition to this; when the manifesting agent asked to get the shipment removed from Aircraft X; she was told that it was too late and to let it go. In short; the Captain was never made aware of the two additional D.G. shipments on board. I am still waiting for individual accounts of what happened. I have asked the following individuals for a written statement all personnel involved.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported that several Dangerous Goods shipments were not documented correctly on the manifest.