elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ANP.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Arrived for the day's flight and found the master switch had been left (could still hear turn coordinator.) We; thus; used a battery cart to start the aircraft and all indications were normal during a 10 minute ground run.Later; in VFR cruise flight; I first noticed I couldn't hear the PNF and suspected the headset but shortly heard ATC communications. I then started to troubleshoot when the avionics displays started flashing. I immediately advised ATC of a possible electrical failure; and stated my plan to continue east; out of the SFRA; and land at a nearby airport. I then secured all electrical loads except the transponder and one radio (now blank; but still receiving) and made calls; apparently in the blind; to ATC. Approximately five miles from landing I attempted to contact ATC via cell phone but was unsuccessful.I then concentrated on making a NORDO visual approach to my diversion airport; landed without incident and immediately cell-phoned ATC to give a 'safe on deck' report. I was met later by a sheriff's deputy sent by ATC to confirm my safe on deck report. I then called the Command Center to ensure there were no issues due to loss of communications in the SFRA.Maintenance inspection found fault with the alternator's field wire as the battery was fully charged. The aircraft was returned to service with no further issues.




Synopsis: PA-28R pilot began to lose communications while within the Washington SFRA; he advised ATC in the blind and exited the SFRA to land at a nearby diversion airport.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZUA.ARTCC, GU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: The staffing continues to be an issue here. 3 Full Performance Level (FPL) controllers are necessary for the shift. At times the developmentals/Certified Professional Controller In Training (CPC-IT) are counted for staffing and at other times; they are not.The recent guidance on shift rest begs the question of how long a good recuperative break on a shift is applicable. It's awesome that they said we need to get 7-9 hours of rest; but that's not really possible with an 8:30 between the shifts; a drive to and from work; family; etc. A 2 hour nap before my shift is doing pretty well considering I have a family and I have to drive to and from work in 8 and a half hours.It's great that they put guidance out; but local management seems to take this to affirm that we aren't supposed to split the shift (which I understand); but does not address how long is an applicable recuperative break.Would someone not on Guam please take a look at our traffic counts here and see that we get a quite a lot of traffic on a shift here and staff accordingly? Can we also address how 17 CPCs when fully staffed; are supposed to staff a 24 hour facility with at least 3 CPCs for all shifts?If management is going to tell me that we need to keep the D side open from XA:00 until XP:00 regardless of the amount of traffic; then D side should also be open for the shift. Additionally; R6 needs to be split from about XG:30 until about XI:00 every day. The operations manager has even directed this to occur; but it rarely does.Please look at our staffing and traffic count (and when in the day they occur) to address how this place is staffed? Both in terms of overall staffing and when these people are deployed throughout the day?




Synopsis: Guam Center Controller reported staffing issues at their facility.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 10 minutes prior to Top of Descent while en route to ZZZZ; the FWD CARGO FIRE (red annunciation) illuminated. Pilot in Command and I accomplished the non-normal for the condition; and [advise] with ATC. Per QRH non-normal; we diverted to the nearest suitable airport. We made an uneventful approach and landing.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767-300 First Officer reported FWD CARGO FIRE (red annunciation) illuminated resulting in advising ATC and diverting to nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was returning from a pleasure flight with two 10 year old children taking an airplane ride. I descended to pattern altitude 2 miles from the airport. I made clear radio announcements entering on a 45 for runway 21; left downwind and base. These were heard by other pilots at the airport. The Cessna Caravan is the jump plane operating out of this airport. He announced a straight in approach from 4;000 feet stating he would be at 2;000 feet 1 mile out. When I was on base almost ready to turn final he told me he was on short final in front of me. I was able to see him moments later as he descended into my view about 1;000 feet or less in front of me. I told him that there are procedures that are in place for right of way and pattern entry. He radioed back his intentions to land anyway and 'we can talk on the ground'. I was forced to make a go around. I have spoken with several other pilots at this airport and this is a common occurrence with this pilot and aircraft. This is dangerous behavior and and accident is likely to happen.




Synopsis: Stinson pilot reports being cut off on short final by a C208 jump plane. Both pilots were communicating on the CTAF. The Stinson pilot went around.
Date: 201810
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Received email concerning the crew oxygen cylinder on this flight. Prior to our flight there had been maintanace on the oxygen cylinder. It was relayed to me that the oxygen cylinder valve was not in the full open position during our flight. During my preflight 2 jumpseat riders came in and introduced themselves and I must have missed the long 10 count check during my pre-flight checks. I have gone back and reviewed the oxygen preflight procedures in the AOM to refresh myself. Plus; I know that if I get distracted I should start at a known completion point and continue with my tasks at hand.




Synopsis: B757 pilot reported missing an improperly positioned oxygen valve following a distraction during preflight.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-34-200 Seneca I
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was Local Control and Controller in Charge (CIC) 1 and the Flight Data/Ground Controller put an IFR aircraft exiting our airspace on a local IFR code. When I told them that they needed to put the flight plan in the National Airspace System (NAS) so that the RADAR Controller would be able to hand the aircraft off to the next facility; the response I got was 'I did.' When I explained that our Automated Radar Terminal System (ARTS) codes were not NAS codes and this would create work for the RADAR Controller to call and manually hand the aircraft off or put the flight plan in themselves; I got several excuses. I asked them to just put the flight plan in the NAS so the aircraft would get the proper service; they proceeded to try and make ARTS amendments. When I saw what they were doing; I told them that what they were trying to do was not going to work and they needed to enter the flight plan on the Flight Data Input/Output (FDIO) to actually get into the NAS. They finally got this accomplished well after the aircraft had called for departure. [We need] more supervision in the workforce and more stringent checkrides. For a supervisor to sit with someone for one hour once a month; and then certify them in one hour does not mean that the person is capable of doing the job. We have too many people who need more than just general supervision. That supervision always comes from the CIC's because management is not often in the operation. There have been many certifications that have NOT gotten anyone on the training team's say as to whether the person was ready or not; even though that is required by our local training order. There is too much reliance on the senior workforce to make on the spot corrections to the junior workforce. The junior workforce does not respond well to being corrected and always gets irritated when they are told they did something wrong; no matter how nicely it is put.




Synopsis: Tower Controller expressed frustration regarding the lack of understanding exhibited by fellow controllers regarding beacon code assignments and the ARTS interface with the overall NAS system.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I flew through SAN during daylight hours. During taxi out on Taxiway B and B1 to Runway 27; I noticed there were cones and barricades separating Taxiway B1 (east/west) as it leads to Runway 27. I don't remember seeing anything in the ATIS regarding a partial closure of a taxiway. (That miscue was due to poor briefing discipline as it relates to NOTAMs. The First Officer (FO) and I discussed that and intend to focus our efforts to improve in the future). The next day I went through SAN at night. The same barricades and cones were still there separating Taxiway B1 from the usable and unusable sections. However at night the cones are unlit and can easily be missed or lost in the background lighting as you approach B1 on Taxiway B. I again reviewed the ATIS to determine what exactly was going on and was only more confused by the lack of information regarding Taxiway B1 partial closure. I would recommend an update to the ATIS to clearly describe the cones and barricades lining the east side of Taxiway B1; and that the cones are unlit.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported an unsafe situation at SAN concerning unlit cones marking construction areas and insufficient ATIS information.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On departure from an airport in Afghanistan. We were being jammed electronically on departure frequency during the whole departure. We initially were given a straight out climb; finally followed by a right 90 degree turn and I think a climb to FL 200. The pilot flying dialed in FL210 that I did not catch. I questioned the altitude both of the Pilot Flying and ATC. I saw FL205 before we started down to FL 200. This is the best that I recall.




Synopsis: As a result of electronically compromised communications the flight crew of a B767 began a climb to FL210 before able to obtain a correction and returned to FL200 as cleared.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Aircraft X. He departed on the SID and was climbing via the SID. On initial contact; I instructed the pilot to climb and maintain his filed altitude. I then talked to 2 to 3 other contacts before returning to Aircraft X. The next instruction I gave Aircraft X was 'reaching 13;000 cleared direct destination.' The pilot read back; '13;000; direct destination.' I was fairly busy; and did not catch the fact that this was a somewhat incomplete read back. I again moved on to other duties. Working 2 frequencies and 6 transmitters; aircraft often step on each other; this happened many times during this session. The pilot of Aircraft X had 'a request'; but was covered by other aircraft. I told him to standby because I thought that he was climbing up and did not thing it was important; and moved on to other aircraft. He asked at least once more; and I when finally was able to respond and fully look at Aircraft X I realized that he was still at 13;000 feet in a 13;700 MIA(Minimum IFR Altitude). I gave him the instruction to climb; and told the pilot no delay through 13;700 feet to reach my MIA. I was worried that I gave the pilot a bad instruction; so immediately went and reviewed the playback. After listening to the audio; I realized that the pilot did not read back the instruction as precisely as he should have and I should have caught this inaccuracy. In the future I will change the way I give the instruction for an on course turn. Instead of 'reaching 13;000; cleared direct' I will try to say 'leaving 13;000; cleared direct'. I will also be very vigilant to watch aircraft climbing on the SID after that instruction is issued.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported they missed an incomplete readback of a clearance and an aircraft flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The purpose of this ASAP is to highlight a safety issue with SoCal during arrivals into LAX.  We all laugh; and expect changes in the arrival procedures into LAX.  This event illustrates the danger that we are faced with.  On our arrival; we had planned a 280 KT descent to comply with speed at KONZL.  During our descent; we were slowed from 280 to 260.  During a descent; it is difficult to slow and stay on descent path.  Our aircraft was heavy and not slowing very well.  After passing KONZL; we were given descent via; but sped up to 280 again.  Another programming requirement while complying with the various altitudes.  Shortly thereafter; we were slowed to 250.  After jumping through hoops with the FMC programming; were slowed to 230; then 170.  All with a 30 KT tailwind; attempting to maintain altitude restrictions as well as put the aircraft in a position to be stabilized on final approach.  During the arrival; the speed changes were so drastic; I went to the old school method of stepping to the next altitude and turned off the automation.  I can appreciate automation; but when confronted with the rapid speed change requirements on an LNAV/VNAV arrival; the task at hand becomes quite daunting and even confusing.  We were tired; but we both recognized the futility of trying to make automation work; so we reverted to old school procedures.  My point here is not to show my superiority; but to point out that the numerous speed changes we are frequently faced with are distracting and possibly dangerous.  I don't want to be the Crew that is too absorbed in making the automation work that they forget to fly the aircraft.  SoCal needs to pick a speed and go with it.  Multiple speed changes on an arrival lead to non-compliance with chart restrictions and could lead to a dangerous flight condition.  The situation doesn't sound that bad here on paper; but it is a concern; and I think that if we don't speak up to ATC; then to them it is tacit approval to continue with this dangerous practice.




Synopsis: B737 Captain laments the speed changes issued by ATC during the SEAVU 2 RNAV arrival to LAX.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Military
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: 1 NM north of DFW airport a radar track and data tag continually changes from a limited to full data block not associated with any airport traffic. The tag activates with a local code of 0716 and displays an altitude of 006 feet moving at zero knots. The problem is that the STARS equipment also identifies the track with a radar return. When the track shows up it blocks out the ability to read and verify altitude for IFR traffic continually departing from DFW in a north flow. This makes the workload even harder for the Departure position where the jets from DFW and DAL are departing towards the same area and climb rates and altitudes must be monitored to ensure standard separation. This tag could not be dropped; moved; suspended or identified. In a north flow configuration it poses a risk to cause a TCAS RA and it prevents the Departure Controller from effectively identifying the departing jets and safely working the position without the added distraction of constantly scanning this target in addition to the workload of the DR1 position in a north flow.The source of this target and code or equipment issue causing its existence should be investigated and identified so that it will not continue to occur.




Synopsis: Controller describes a flight data tag that appears 1 NM north of the airport that changes from limited to full data block; at 600 FT on a local discrete code.