elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201310
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Fatigue; Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were flying the all-nighter from the West Coast to JFK. JFK was configured for the ILS TO Runway 4L. Winds all night were 050/12. As we started our descent along the Lindy arrival; JFK swapped runways to the VOR 13L Canarsie. I asked the Controller on 125.7 on three separate occasions to shoot an ILS to Runway 31L as international carriers were landing on it still; so I asked for ILS to Runway 4L and that was denied!We were both tired from the all-nighter and wanted an ILS. There was weather; wind and rain. As we passed DMYHL at 800 FT the winds were northwest at 18 KTS. I instructed my First Officer to tell me to go-around if the FMS PROG 2 page showed more than 10 KTS at 200 FT AGL. As it turned out; the winds diminished and we were able to land with no incident. We were very close to the stable approach criteria.I called JFK Tower by phone and expressed my concerns. The Controller told me that the arrival is generated by EWR/LGA arrivals. I told him about the winds at DMYHL and he commiserated; but offered no relief for the future!I have been flying into and out of JFK for 27 years and I am tired of flying a STUPID visual approach when there are ILS approaches available; winds are marginal; AND WHEN WE ARE EXHAUSTED FROM FLYING AN ALL-NIGHTER! There is absolutely NO REASON for us having to fly the Canarsie VOR 13L at that hour of the day! I will use my emergency authority to get my ILS AND; I will divert if this happens again! I'm really getting tired of this!




Synopsis: A fatigued Air Carrier Captain complained that after an all-night flight; JFK controllers issued a VOR 13L Canarsie approach and would not relent to the crew's request for a Runway 4L because of more favorable winds.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew of Flight X reported Number 4 main tire had cord showing after arrival. Main Tire/Wheel Assembly was subsequently changed by myself at the gate. I had the departing crew for Flight Y hold [passenger] boarding until such time as I had the wheel assembly removed and replaced (R/R). In an effort to speed the boarding process and minimize delay; once I had the main wheel assembly installed on the aircraft; I decided to service the tire with nitrogen; let the aircraft down off the jack; and then finish up with the installation/safety of the wheel cap. I proceeded with this plan of action after I placed the wheel cap on the wheel and had installed the bolts securing the wheel cap on finger tight. I serviced the tire; let the aircraft down off the jack; told the crew to proceed with boarding; and then I finished the paper work. Approximately 45-minutes later while I was eating lunch; I had the realization that I had most likely not finished installing the wheel cap bolts; nor had I secured them with safety wire. Was eating lunch when I was struck by the realization that I could not recall applying a final torque or securing the bolts to the wheel cap. In an effort to minimize the delay at the gate; I let myself get out of sequence with the maintenance procedure and I'm relatively sure that I missed the last procedures of installation to torque and safety the bolts for the Number 4 Wheel Dust/Anti-Skid Transducer cap. As soon as I realized I might have missed securing the cap; I went to the gate where the aircraft had been to find it was gone. I immediately called the Manager of Quality and Maintenance Control to have the aircraft looked at upon arrival in ZZZ1; and the Manager of Maintenance. As of the time of this writing I am not aware of any subsequent actions. I will not; in the future; deviate from established procedures as laid out in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports he let himself get out of sequence during a removal/replacement of Number 4 Main Tire wheel assembly by temporarily installing the Wheel Dust/Anti-Skid Transducer cap bolts only finger tight until he had down-jacked a CRJ-200 aircraft. He was attempting to help speed up passenger boarding and minimize a delay.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; MEL; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Airbus aircraft had CF6-80A3 engines and I referenced MEL 36-11-03 that referenced CF6-90C2 engines for High Pressure (HP) Valve inoperative (inop). If the aircraft had CF6-80C2 engines; the MEL would apply. However; it did not have CF6-80C2 engines; which would not require a lock-out of the Thrust Reverser (T/R). Because of this error; the Thrust Reverser was locked-out when it was not required; nor documented as such. Pilot tried to use the T/R when landing and the Number 2 T/R was locked-out with no documentation. When I looked up the Engine type for this aircraft under Aircraft Component Control; I [had] looked at the engine type incorrectly by two letters; so an error was made. [Recommend] slow down and double check the documents.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports an incorrect MEL had been applied to an Airbus aircraft with CF6-80A3 engines. Number Two Engine Thrust Reverser (T/R) had been locked out when it was not required and was not documented. Pilot had tried to use the T/R on landing.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Second aircraft: A330
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Descending through FL280 in VFR conditions on the Hiley 7 Joray transition into MIA; we encountered wake turbulence. Aircraft rolled left about 20-30 degrees. Autopilot remained on. We advised ATC and were told we were 17 miles in trail of an Airbus A330.  Second encounter was just after we started to descend from 16;000 ft. Again; the aircraft rolled left to almost 45 degrees and I disconnected the autopilot to roll wings level. I stopped the descent and once again advised ATC. At this point they vectored us off the STAR with no further encounters. No injuries or damage.




Synopsis: Falcon 2000 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on descent into MIA 17 miles in trail of an A330.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ABQ.Airport, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ABQ
ATC / advisory: Tower ABQ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Visual approach Runway 26 at ABQ.  Weather was clear; wind from the west.  As First Officer; I was flying the approach.  Had high terrain either side of the aircraft.  Was flying through a saddle setting up for the visual approach.  Had terrain in sight.  Got terrain warning and corrected flight path.  Prior to starting the approach; we discussed the terrain and agreed on a heading to intercept final to Runway 26.Runway 26 at ABQ is a runway used quite often.  There should be a published instrument approach to Runway 26 at ABQ.


Second narrative: During descent; which I believe was approximately 1;000-1;500 FPM; EGPWS advised 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up;' descent rate was adjusted and advisory silenced. EGPWS advisory announced again. Flight path and descent were adjusted again. Advisory ended. Terrain was in sight at all times. Approach and landing completed. It is my opinion that the safety of the aircraft was never compromised.I would suggest putting the RNAV approach to 26 at ABQ back in our JEPP revisions.


Synopsis: An air carrier crew on flying a visual approach to ABQ Runway 26 in day VMC responded to an EGPWS TERRAIN; PULL UP by reducing the rate of descent but the crew did not feel safety was compromised at any time.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LNK.Airport, NE
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C LNK
ATC / advisory: Tower LNK
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was cleared for landing and on final visual approach to LNK Runway 35 and was aware of ATIS broadcast Sierra issued at XA:54Z reporting a 21KT wind from 360.  Gusty winds were anticipated due to my experience in the region throughout the morning. The approach to Runway 35 was stabilized with a steady airspeed of 85MPH maintained with two notches of flaps on final. On approach; there was a fairly substantial amount of turbulence when crossing over Interstate 80. When crossing over the threshold for 35; left rudder and right aileron was needed and applied to correct for a gusty crosswind to the runway heading. This correction was one that I have experienced before in this location; as well as other airports in the region throughout the morning; and was not unexpected. Due to the gusting nature of the winds; an increased airspeed was chosen to account for a possible loss of wind during landing. After rounding out; the flare was controlled and typical until a gust of wind caused the right wing of the airplane to dip and the left wing to lift. With the left rudder correction in place; this caused the aircraft to leave the left side of the runway and touch down in the grass; rolling onto the threshold of runway 32 where the plane's brakes were applied and the aircraft came to a stop. After coming to a stop; I followed the tower's instructions to taxi onto Runway 32 and exit onto taxiway K. No damage to the aircraft or airport equipment was observed.




Synopsis: Student Pilot reported a runway excursion at LNK airport upon landing due to winds.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight Attendant (F/A) called us about a burning rubber smell coming from row 12 aircraft left.  No visible smoke or haze was present.  The First Officer (FO) and I discussed what could be in that area and concluded to isolate the video system.  Did so by turning of the Aft Avionics Power via the overhead panel push button.  #1 FA called and the odor had already started to dissipate and was completely gone in a matter of minutes.  We also turned off the power to the outlets via the Comm/SIDS panel.  The FO and I reviewed the QRH. At the gate; inflight informed us that the middle under seat video module was warmer than the other two until we removed electrical power. Via SATCOM we called Dispatch and Maintenance.  Discussed what we had and what we had done.  Also; the fact that the odor was no longer present.  We collectively decided to continue the flight to ZZZ1.  It was about an hour and a half to ZZZ1 at that point. Rest of flight uneventful.   We never smelled the odor in the cockpit.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a fumes event during cruise. After troubleshooting; the fumes dissipated which enabled the flight crew to continue to their destination.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: AMA.Airport, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C AMA
ATC / advisory: TRACON AMA
Second aircraft: Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying while on the descent and flying a heading. ATC notified us that there would be an opposite direction Embraer flying through our altitude; and asked if we had it in sight at 12 o'clock. The Captain and I noticed a bright light in the distance; but it appeared to not be moving. So; we called negative on the traffic. Monitoring TCAS; we began to watch for traffic climbing towards our route of flight. ATC frantically asked us if we had the traffic. At that time we had the traffic in sight and began a right turn and received a 'Climb; Climb' RA. I notified ATC of the RA and that we were turning right of course. The other aircraft stated on the radio that they had an RA as well and were descending. Per the TCAS the closest we got was about 800 FT vertically and something less than a mile horizontally. ATC then assigned us a heading again and said to continue the descent to 8;000 and to contact Approach.


Second narrative: ...We then received a climb RA and advised the Controller of the RA. The Controller issued us a descent clearance. I initially followed the descent clearance and over the radio heard that Express Jet had received an RA and was also descending. I had disengaged the autopilot; began a climb to comply with the RA. It became apparent visually that we were very close and I turned the aircraft to the right away from the threat and our ATC assigned heading. We were within 800 FT vertically and less than 1 mile horizontally.The Controller attempted to climb the threat aircraft through our altitude with insufficient spacing. The Controller then attempted to place the Operational Error burden on the two flight crews by getting each crew to declare 'Visual Contact'.


Synopsis: An E140 flight crew on an inbound vector suffered a loss of separation with an outbound Embraer cleared to climb through their altitude.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was doing the Captain preflight duties as specified by the Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM). This was the first time in an actual MAX aircraft (not counting the MAX return to service training in the SIM) since the aircraft were grounded 2+ years ago. As I was completing the preflight duties; I neglected to set the autobrakes to RTO. I believe the cause of this was; the autobrake selector in the MAX is in a different position than the NexGen aircraft; specifically in the center console rather than next to the landing gear selector lever. Also; the flight paperwork was placed in such a position as to cover the autobrake selector knob. When we accomplished the Before Start Checklist; of course one of the items is 'AUTOBRAKE' with a response of 'RTO'. I responded with the appropriate call of 'RTO' purely by rote memory without actually looking at the autobrake selector. I recall looking towards the landing gear lever where I expected to see the autobrake selector and for some reason was convinced I saw it and it was set properly to RTO. We taxied out and departed uneventfully. It was only upon accomplishing the clean-up items after flap retraction that we noticed the autobrake selector was in the off position. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.




Synopsis: B737 MAX Captain reported not activating the auto brake system for RTO when completing the before takeoff checklist.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Wind was gusting to 15 knots at ZZZ; and the Citation seemed unsure on if they wanted to land at ZZZ or go somewhere else. They got all the way to about 3 minutes from the field before they stated that they had the field in sight and wanted the Visual Approach. They had been assigned present heading and to maintain 9 thousand; but then I cleared them for the Visual Approach. Shortly after the aircraft informed they were VMC and were just going to do local maneuvers while they 'come up with a plan'. They had not begun their descent; and I asked if they were cancelling IFR; and they said no. I told them 'approach clearance cancelled; maintained 9 thousand' and I neglected to give them routing. A hit (radar update) or two goes by and they make a slight left turn and I assign them a heading for terrain. A few hits later; they made a turn into the 9700 foot MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) at 9 thousand feet. The pilot was cleared for the Visual; and the last thing I expected them to do was to turn about 160 degrees away from the airfield. They're allowed to climb; descend; and turn; on a Visual Approach; but they're required to keep the field in sight; which they obviously can't do on that easterly heading; so I'm not sure why they turned that far east. Additionally; I don't think a Visual Approach clearance enables an aircraft to just hold and 'come up with a plan'. I get updates every 12 seconds; and I kept waiting; and hoping; that the pilot would fly their assigned heading. I'm not sure how long it took for him to be established on the turn; but if I had updates every second; I would have known he wasn't taking my turn; and climbed him. This airspace area needs an Approach Control. I believe that if there had been faster updates on the data block; I would have taken different action.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported a fractional jet deviated from their assigned heading and flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude after the Controller rescinded a Visual Approach clearance due to confusion of the crew's intentions.