Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Do 328 TJ (Turbojet)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATIS showed the weather to be VMC with strong winds from the northwest. ILS and Visual Approaches were being conducted simultaneously to Runway's 1R/1C/1L; departing Runway 30. Local Controller launched 4 aircraft in succession off Runway 30. The first; a PA31; was assigned runway heading. The third aircraft; a Dornier Jet; was also assigned runway heading; launched about 4 miles behind PA31. Both aircraft were cleared on the same route; departing our airspace. The Departure Controller climbed each aircraft to 4;000 FT on initial contact. Unfortunately; Local Controller did not account for the difference in performance between the two in-trail aircraft. Dornier Jet's ground speed was twice that of PA31 and since departure had climbed both to 4;000 FT; a loss of separation occurred within a short time. The Departure Controller turned [the] Dornier Jet northbound and tried to employ visual separation; but by that time separation had already been lost. The last aircraft launched in this scenario was a Challenger Jet which Local Controller put on a 340 heading. This loss of separation occurred because the RADAR Departure Controller failed to recognize the overtake situation. Local Controller was contributory by not recognizing the difference in performance between the PA31 and the trailing Dornier Jet on the same route. Had Local Controller delayed Dornier Jet's departure or coordinated a different heading with Departure; this event would not have occurred. Even the best of RADAR controllers would have had difficulty with separation given the poor feed from Tower. 1.) The Departure Controller should learn to listen to what information is given by the pilot on check in (runway heading); scan the track and flight progress strip (type aircraft/route) before saying RADAR contact and climbing the aircraft out of 3;000 FT. 2.) There was no requirement for Tower to release [the] Dornier Jet so closely behind the much slower PA31. More experienced local controllers (those with a RADAR background) would have either delayed releasing Dornier Jet or coordinated their game plan with the receiving RADAR Controller. Local Controller needs refresher training on providing separation for successive departures on same route; with special emphasis on recognizing differences in aircraft performance. Spending a day at the local TRACON watching Departure Control would also help. 3.) This particular Local Controller does not have a RADAR background. A review of event reports out of this facility will show that the majority point to lack of RADAR experience of those involved. The FAA must give better RADAR training to their local controllers. You cannot hold them responsible for RADAR separation in Class B airspace and only require them to study RADAR in Local academics; pass a qualification written exam; and then get the rest via OJT.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described a developing conflict event reportedly caused by the Local Controller's lack of aircraft performance awareness along with minimal RADAR procedural awareness.