elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I noticed a 'hot' smell after departure -- I then thought it must be a dirty or moldy 'sock' [smell] from the ACM (Air Cycle Machine) and continued flight. When descending; the cabin became incredibly hot like hot bleed air was entering the cabin. Upon landing and exiting the aircraft equipped with air-conditioning; the cabin was hotter than the outside air temperature. I then contacted the company; which contacted outstation maintenance and was determined that he could not fix the hot rubber smell entering into the cabin during a high power run-up. The table in the cabin was so hot that I could not touch the metal hinges; and I was NOT going to put passengers on that aircraft without proper maintenance.The company asked me NOT to write the malfunction so the aircraft could be worked on [at home base]. [Another crew] flew a replacement aircraft for us to continue. The [other crew] flew the [aircraft] back to [home base] with the confirmed 'hot air' entering into the cabin so it could be fixed at the home base. I felt pressured to not write up the malfunction.




Synopsis: BE-400 Captain reported feeling pressure from the company to not write up an air conditioning malfunction.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Climbing out at approximately 4;000 feet we experienced multiple bird strikes. We [notified ATC] and started a return to [departure airport]. The number 2 engine had extremely high vibration and was compressor stalling. The engine stall checklist was accomplished. The remainder of the flight was accomplished with the #2 engine at idle in order to prevent further compressor stalls. Dispatch was contacted and landing data requested for a north landing. The Captain advised the flight attendants and passengers of the situation. We requested and flew a visual approach to runway 34R where we rolled to the end; exited and secured the right engine. We requested airport fire and rescue examine the aircraft before proceeding to the gate to deplane normally.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: After departing; the crew experienced multiple bird strikes which resulted in high vibration and compressor stalls in the number two engine. They accomplished the checklist and were able to operate the engine at idle while returning to land at departure airport.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel

Narrative: Ramp supervisor gave me and members of my crew a directive to throw the used spill absorbent into the large general refuse containers on the ramp. We were unsure of what kinds of spills were in each bag of used materials and were told to put them all in the trash. I later found out that we are not supposed to dump them all together because of the dangers of mixing chemicals. After dumping all of the used absorbents in the trash bins and cleaning out the spill carts; supervisor insisted we go to the fuel porter and empty the containers over there. Supervisor had my crewmembers stick their hands in the full trash can of unknown objects with no protection but thin rubber gloves. He also had them dump unbagged; spent hazardous materials (spill absorbent) in a large general trash receptacle. I suggested we find out if we were allowed to do these things before we do them. Supervisor ignored my suggestions. I believe that my crew and I should have the proper PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) for this type of task; and were unprepared; as we are not trained in how to handle and dispose of such waste; and what type of PPE we should be using. I am also concerned about the safety of those who will further handle the spent absorbent because it was not discarded in a hazardous waste receptacle. These are not typical ramp duties so we were not knowledgeable about how to perform these tasks.




Synopsis: Ramp person reported receiving orders from a supervisor to dispose of Hazardous material improperly.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FNT.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C FNT
ATC / advisory: TRACON FNT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: IOE event for PF..Me.. Inbound to FNT; RNAV GPS RWY 36; had planned for ILS 27 switched to RNAV approach with Flint Approach.  Received late vectors to join approach at Cokin Intersection; high and fast to begin approach; selected flight level change; speedbrakes fully deployed; speed 240kts; started approach; missed LAVS procedure on selecting VNAV; dialed down to 800 feet; LNAV; speed; very busy monitoring radios and course; aircraft intercepted lateral course in a turn to final.  Level change took us low; by 200 feet; we recognized it and went autopilot off; added power; speed brake retracted; leveled off and climbed back to altitude.  At the same time; Flint approach issued a 'low Altitude Alert'.  During this whole event we were in VMC conditions and had the field in sight at 10 miles. Continued visually and executed a normal landing.We were rushed getting everything done for the approach.  I also have a total of 15 hours in type; so this approach change at 0500 was difficult. We should had continued with our original plan of ILS 27 and not asked for the RNAV approach.  We made ourselves rush into a mistake.


Second narrative: When we crossed Cokin we inserted HAT (Height Above Touchdown) of 800 FT into the ALT window. Passing 2200 we realized we were low and were making a correction when ATC called use concerning the low alt alert. We climbed back up to VNAV path and continued approach to an uneventful landing. When trying to figure out how we got below VNAV path; that is when PF told me about switching to FLCH. It was debriefed.


Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew reported getting a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to FNT and realized they were in FLCH mode and had descended below procedure altitude.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The exact same thing happened with this aircraft; only on a different arrival. Aircraft was landing LAX. Level at FL240. Tonight; the altitude restriction busted was GLESN; which is charted 240B300. Aircraft was level at FL240; was issued the descend via instructions; and immediately started to descend for the 2nd altitude constraint. While I have not yet spoken to the PIC of this flight; the situation is exactly the same as referenced above; and as I found out last night; is a known issue with Airbus aircraft. Descend via/Climb via arrivals have been around for ages. We had the CIVET profile arrival 15-20 years ago. This is nothing new; which is why I am completely and utterly shocked that this issue has not been brought up before; and has not been resolved. While the two events I have witnessed (in less than 24 hours; mind you) have not caused specific safety issues; in relation to smashing into other aircraft or airspace; the possibility of this happening is very real. This is a major safety concern; as far as I'm concerned; and needs to be resolved before something bad happens.1) Disallow these Airbus aircraft from flying in the NAS.2) Since I know #1 isn't going to happen; have them fix their airplane so this doesn't occur over and over again. This is not acceptable.


Second narrative: With LAX Center and approaching the ANJLL arrival we were vectored several times off course for spacing and given several speed assignments for spacing. It was very busy with multiple instructions. Our cruise altitude to LAX was FL280. Eventually we were cleared direct SALYY intersection to descend via the ANJLL arrival. Unfortunately; we had long since reviewed the ANJLL arrival constraints; and didn't notice that the GLESN altitude constraints had dropped out (I believe due to our lower altitude than the GLESN window). My FO was PF and had set an appropriate floor and initiated a managed descent; but we were below the GLESN constraint window. Crew will not accept a 'Descend Via' clearance until time to re-review arrival constraints.


Synopsis: ZLA Controller and the A320 flight crew involved reported problems associated with the Airbus computer that does not comply with descend via clearances correctly.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Avionics
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; MEL; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Went out [during] pre departure to load a Navigation (NAV) Database update and loaded XX5-0006 and should have loaded XX3-0006. [Approximately] four hours later; flight crew noticed there was a problem loading the ZZZ1 identifier into the flight plan. I was dispatched to the aircraft and placed the NAV Database on MEL. After completing the database load; checked the Control Display Unit (CDU) for the current software load. I was looking for the -0006 in the software code as documented in the Maintenance item and it was there for both Flight Management Computers (FMCs).Recommend: 1) They need to state the whole number of the NAV Database software: example XX3-0006 on the Maintenance item. 2) The software disks XX3-0006 and the XX5-0006 were in the same drawer and were the same color.  NOTE* since this mistake happened; a divider has been incorporated to separate XX3-0006 and XX5-0006 disks from each other. Also; on the divider it is clearly labeled 'FMS FERRY'. This label helps identify what is in the divider drawer. The Lead and I decided to take these corrective actions to prevent future mistakes.




Synopsis: An Avionics Technician reports that he mistakenly loaded incorrect Navigation (NAV) Database software into the FMCs on an A300 aircraft.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Pre-Departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was loading the rear pit of a flight and the belt loader I was using for this task was a fixed-rail belt loader. With the belt loader positioned correctly; I went to grab a bag off of the belt. Some free-floating portion of the bag became caught in the wheels of the belt right as I grabbed it; pulling the bag and my hand into the wheels that rotate the belt. I went to disrupt the laser sensor underneath the belt with my free hand; only to find out that the fixed-rail belt loaders; with the yellow bumpers remove this vital safety feature. Right as my hand was on the threshold of being crushed inside the belt; the piece of the bag that was originally caught broke free; freeing my hand as well. This was entirely too close of a call for me to ever feel comfortable using a piece of equipment that purposely removes a vital safety feature.




Synopsis: Baggage handler reports nearly being injured when a bag strap gets caught in the drive wheels of a belt loader and the laser beam that is commonly used to stop the belt loader is not installed on this fixed rail loader.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Cleared to take off from LAX RWY 25R. [The preceding A321] had not even lifted off. After liftoff flew into their wake turbulence at approximately 700 ft and then 1300 ft. Full left aileron deflection [was required] to keep control of the aircraft. LAX Tower procedures are extremely dangerous. Because we are a Class D aircraft they are allowed to anticipate the preceding aircrafts liftoff and cleared us to takeoff. They are legal because [the A321] was not a heavy. Additionally; we were doing the ORCKA 3 and [the A321] was doing the LAX 1 departures. Their initial turn over the shoreline was 221 and ours was 236. Conveniently we were 15 degrees apart which also allows them to clear us to takeoff as the preceding aircraft is lifting off. We flew into their wake as we entered the overcast at 700 ft. It rolled us uncontrollably to the right and took full left deflection to regain control. It happens again at approximately 1200 feet. We regained control and continued our climb out. This is a bad procedure to allow aircraft to take off while the preceding aircraft has yet to lift off. Go back to the old separation rules.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence at low altitude departing LAX in trail of an A321. Reporter expressed concern about the procedure allowing ATC to clear an aircraft for takeoff when the preceding aircraft is still on the takeoff roll.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MSY.TRACON, LA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E MSY
ATC / advisory: TRACON MSY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The RYTHM 3 STAR to MSY requires flights to cross RYTHM at 250 KTS and to expect clearance to cross it at 11;000 MSL. This altitude is too high when executing the LOC 19 or the RNAV 19 approach. The descent plan without the restriction is greater than 3;000 feet lower; we were given the restriction.  I had planned to be lower before the fix; leveled five miles outside of the fix and slowed to 250 knots; as required. Lower was not available until we were switched to Approach. I managed the speed and slowed to 210 knots. Once over the fix and handed to Approach; we were given 4;000 FT and a left turn to intercept the LOC 19. I descended with full boards and continued to slow. Initially we were 3;000 FT high. Once slowed; I stowed the speedbrakes; asked for Flaps 5 then landing gear down and Flaps 15; and continued configuring for landing. I was on profile by 1;000 feet but it took a lot of effort and planning to do so. If [an IMC] approach had been required and I had to be configured and slowed at the FAF; it would have been even more difficult.This approach worked out OK; but it would be better if ATC could adjust the altitude and speed at RYTHM. I am not aware of what restrictions Houston Center and New Orleans Approach have in this area but a review of this arrival is a good idea. It is setting us up to be in an unstable condition and behind the aircraft.




Synopsis: A B737-700 First Officer reported the restrictions at RYTHM '...at 250 KTS; expect clearance to cross at 11;000 FT...' on the RYTHM STAR to MSY are excessively demanding when landing to the south.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ALB.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Chancellor 414A / C414
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ALB
ATC / advisory: TRACON ALB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I fly for the person who owns the aircraft and although he doesn't even have a student license; he wants to sit in the left seat. I don't have a problem with that; because I am licensed multi-engine and instrument flight instructor. I have flown a number of hours; (more than 100) with this gentleman; and he was really getting to know the airplane and IFR system. I became complacent in that I split the radios so that I could listen to the ATIS and he could listen to ATC. While I listening to the ATIS; he started to leave our assign altitude; and I assisted him because we needed to descend quickly. I asked what our new assigned altitude was and he said he didn't know. I then ask ATC what our altitude was; and he replied that we should be at 11000. I stopped the descent and tried to get back to 11000; we already were @ 9300 when ATC assigned 10000. Our only saving grace was that there was very little traffic and it was in VFR conditions. ATC didn't ask any questions so I don't know if this was reported or not. I do know that I will never allow myself to become complacent again. If the pilot in the left seat cannot be pilot in-command then all changes must be verified before action can be taken. It is the moral duty of the flight instructor.




Synopsis: A Flight Instructor described how his non-pilot aircraft owner began a descent without clearance.