Date: 201301
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Several contributing factors. Before departure from gate; de-ice representative was unclear of what needed to be de-iced. Upon getting to hold short of runway; the de-ice vendor de-iced the wings as asked. I told the Captain that the de-ice truck did not do the tail section of the aircraft. The Captain responded that the de-ice manager said it was clear. After takeoff; we did the low altitude level off procedure. The proper commands were said but the pilot not flying did not enter the appropriate speed. Instead of setting Vref+80; as briefed; he entered Vref+50. The pilot flying accelerated the aircraft and cleaned up as he thought was the schedule. After flaps up; the stick shaker immediately started to go off. Since I knew we did not de-ice the tail; I immediately thought that was the problem. The Captain was having a hard time understanding the ATC controllers directions to climb to FL150 resulting in lack of situational awareness. He kept trying to figure out the stick shaker going off instead of making sure the aircraft was in a safe location. As I had flown in to the airport several times; I knew that there were mountains directly off the departure end. I leaned forward from the #4 jump seat to see half the screen was full of red terrain. I immediately said 'terrain; climb; terrain; turn.' The pilot flying executed the CFIT procedure and flew us away from the terrain and climbed to the altitude that ATC had been trying to give us. I believe that the initial problem of de-icing occurred due to improper briefing of the de-ice manager. Although not de-icing the tail was not a huge factor; it was the first thing that pilot #3 (sitting in the first observer seat) and I thought about when the stick shaker occurred. Also contributing was the Captain not listening to the fact we did not get de-iced. The next problem was that the pilot not flying did not set the appropriate speed as briefed; leading to the stick shaker. After that; the pilot not flying not understanding the climb directions due to the language barrier. Fortunately I was able to see the rapidly approaching terrain and the pilot flying executed the appropriate procedure. I would suggest that possibly a low altitude level off with a distraction in mountainous terrain be thought about as a training event. Also adding the presence of mountains in the area of airports be something we all take a little more time to brief.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain occupying a jumpseat describes the chain of events leading up to retracting the flaps after takeoff at Vref+50 or 220 KTS; causing the stick shaker to activate and confusing the Captain flying.