elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: Tower BWI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Winds were 280 at 22 gusting 34. Previous aircraft reported loss of 10 kts. at 100 ft. Skies were clear; visibility was unrestricted. Visual approach Runway 33L. Captain was PF (Pilot Flying). I was PM (Pilot Monitoring) and was calling out all of the gains and losses I observed. We got a wind shear caution. I did not notice any significant change in airspeed or altitude with the caution; but I still called out 'wind shear caution.' Captain called 'continue.' A few seconds later we got a wind shear warning. I called 'Go-around.' The Captain immediately pushed the throttles up and said; 'go-around; set thrust.' I set go-around thrust. Captain called 'flaps 8.' Noticing we were out of the wind shear condition and climbing significantly; I set flaps 8. Me: 'positive rate.' Captain: 'gear up; speed mode.' My memory of the order of the following events is opaque; but in any case the order is trivial. In summary; Tower told us to climb to 8;000 ft.; turn left to a heading; and contact Potomac Approach. I also engaged heading mode; engaged autopilot; and set flaps zero once commanded by the PF. We changed to Runway 28; took vectors for the visual approach; landed; and taxied to the gate uneventfully. I do not know how long the wind shear warning remained displayed on the PFD. As I recall; I only looked for increasing airspeed and altitude trends when I changed aircraft configuration; I did not look to see if the message went away or not; so it may have still been there when I changed configuration. In hindsight; I should have paid more attention to the existence of the wind shear message; to ensure it went away prior to any configuration changes. Next time I go-around due to wind shear; I will pay more attention to the wind shear warning message; and ensure that I do not change the flap configuration if it is still displayed on my PFD.




Synopsis: CRJ200 First Officer reported wind shear on approach that resulted in a go around.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On final to [hospital] a helicopter flew right in front of us flying NW. I do not believe they were on the radio. We were talking to ZZZ Approach; Medcom on FM; and our ZZZ Operations (air-evac). We were less than 1 mile from landing. We had been handed off from approach to advisory but remained on ZZZ approach to monitor traffic. We think they lifted from within the surface area but are not sure of that because we didn't see them till they were right in front of us between us and our landing area. We deviated left and down to avoid and after landing on the helipad called ZZZ approach/tower on the phone to discuss.




Synopsis: BH206 pilot reported an NMAC on final to a hospital helicopter pad.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BWI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During taxi in to the gate after landing on Runway 33L; Ground Control instructed us to taxi via P and H to the gate. I usually stay on the taxi lines; and this event was no different. However; as we were taxiing on H; I was watching the light poles next to the taxi line to ensure clearance. There is a vehicle road next to the taxiway also. As we were about half way down on H; I saw a traffic sign on a movable mount next to a construction trailer. As we got closer to the sign; it looked like our wingtip would go over the sign; or even hit it. I maneuvered the aircraft away from the taxi line toward the terminal to get further away from the sign. As I looked back as we passed it; it looked like our wingtip would have gone over the sign had I not moved the aircraft. It also looked like the sign was tall enough that an aircraft with scimitar wingtips would probably have hit it; although our blended winglet would have gone over the sign. This sign is a taxi hazard. If they insist on keeping the sign in place; then Taxiway H needs to be relocated.

Callback: The Reporter stated that his only option accessing the gate on Taxiway H was to deviate from the centerline. His Company called Airport Operations were told that both the trailer and sign would be moved.



Synopsis: An air carrier Captain reported deviating from a taxiway centerline; so that his blended winglet wingtip would clear a movable traffic sign adjacent to a BWI Taxiway. Reporter stated an aircraft with scimitar wingtips would probably hit the sign.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We were in] cruise flight; 100 to 150 miles east of ELP at FL360 in clear air. [We had] exited weather approximately 10 to 15 minutes earlier. Aircraft rolled to left 25 to 30 degrees. Autopilot was turned off; leveled wings and turned autopilot back on. FO (First Officer) asked if there were any planes around us; [we were] told a heavy was 10 miles ahead of us at our altitude - [a] B767. FA (Flight Attendant) called us [to] ask if everything was OK. [I] told her it was wake turbulence or clear air turbulence. [I] made a PA.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported encountering turbulence at FL360; probably either wake or clear air turbulence related.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I understand that safety third is sometimes part of our occupation; however clearing us legally as opposed to safely was grossly misused in this scenario. I see these situations frequently and believe it is primarily due to a generation of ATC who have not been freely allowed access to the cockpit operations in real-time; as they were prior to the events of 9-11. Why are helicopters and airliners in the same space and altitude? This is ridiculous and I have had many TA alerts on approach and a couple of RA alerts due to this conflict. ATC often asks for things that will obviously effect the stability of an approach. I sincerely believe that there is a bit of disconnect between ATC and pilots; each not knowing just what the other is required and/or able to do. Ride alongs would be nice again; and not what is currently in place. Something more along the lines of ATC having the access to jumpseat in our cockpits on their time off. I feel that some administrators made the decision to 'tie their hands' and only allow structured jumpseating and only during paid shifts because they didn't like the idea of controllers having access to run off to the beach on their time off. I would love for them to run off to the beach. I don't care where they jumpseat to or why; I care that they observe and pass along what they see to their peers. The more access; the better understanding for both sides. The ATC/pilot relationship was much more in sync when they had that freedom.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported being issued a visual approach while ATC left them unreasonably high.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EC135
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: RPM/N1/N2/Etc Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on final to the hospital helipad; triple tachometer failure of Engine Number 2 N1 was observed; crosscheck of the VEMD confirmed engine was indeed operational and landing was uneventful. Upon shut down triple tachometer recycled and when a test; by the pilot; was done by energizing the systems the triple tachometer failed in the self test procedure. A phone call was made to the base Mechanic advising of the failed instrument. The pilot on the phone with the base Mechanic attempted to recycle the tachometer by sequencing a self test. The gauge was failing 50% to 75% to complete the self test mode. After cycling the system and having the triple tachometer complete a successful self test. The aircraft was started; the gauge was monitored and cross checked against values displayed by the VEMD for several minutes. The aircraft was then re-positioned to home base from the hospital pad to base without any further incident of the gauge. When base Mechanic inspected the tachometer with the pilot; self test fail was noted by engine needle. A replacement triple tachometer was then ordered; the aircraft was taken out of service pending the arrival of the replacement tachometer. (It should be noted that the tachometer was indicating NR function at all times and was intermittent with Engine Number 1 & Number 2 RPM needle function)If such were to occur again in the future I would either MEL the gauge (if MEL is allowed for such gauge) if not a MEL allowed item I would ground the aircraft have maintenance out to inspect.




Synopsis: An EC-135 triple tachometer failed on approach with the engine functioning normally. After several successful self tests the aircraft was flown to its home base where the tachometer failed during testing; so the aircraft was removed from service.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the initial segment of the transition for the approach; after being cleared for the X transition for the ILS 28R; I became fixated on the glide slope indication and used the vertical speed mode to remain one dot below the glide path to allow a short segment to decelerate. In doing so we descended approximately 1000 feet below the published profile; upon which time the pilot monitoring called out the deviation and the descent rate was arrested and the published profile was regained. Lesson was to treat the initial part of this type of approach; although cleared for an ILS; like an RNAV (Area navigation) approach; flying in LNAV/VNAV (Lateral Navigation/Vertical Navigation) using the LAVS procedure until established on final. The above factors in addition to being unfamiliar with RNAV with vertical guidance transitions to ILS final. It seems in training we do either RNAV approaches; or we do ILS approaches (usually with vectors and a descent given to an intercept altitude). This was a blend of both; and my addled mind was used to being in a descent for an ILS approach and the need to remain below glide path to intercept the glidepath from below. Clearly this was not that type of approach clearance/transition.




Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew descended below glideslope during approach.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While climbing through 18;000 feet; I noticed the STD button to reset the baro to 29.92 was missing. It is at that time when I realized that also the aircraft slip indicator was missing. Then; ask the Captain (CA) if he knew anything about it. He responded that Maintenance had just recently remove and replaced the #2 Primary Flight Display (PFD) bezel. In my comments to him I mention that it appears that the part they had used for replacement is not the correct or similar part; as the slip indicator was missing. He proceed to look for the Maintenance and MEL books. We quickly concluded that we had probably taken this airplane without a #2 slip indicator. Dispatch and maintenance control were 'ACARS'd'.During pre-flight we were targeting an issue with the ACARS and the weight and balance. This issue may or may not have been a contributing factor to miss the lack of a slip indicator. Also; the location of the slip indicator is a contributing factor or thread since it is directly behind the aircraft control column. In short; the lack of a slip indicator was missed due to its location and lack of extra attention on my part during pre-flight. Perhaps leaning closer to the display board and PFD may have helped mitigate the view obstruction. Also; if I would have looked at the Maintenance log I would have noticed the write up and Maintenance action. Maybe then I would have taken a second look at my PFD and hopefully caught the missing slip indicator.




Synopsis: Passing FL180 in the climb; an EMB145 First Officer notices that his altimeter STD/local reset button is missing from the Primary Flight Display (PFD) control panel; along with the slip indicator. The First Officer's PFD bezel had recently been removed and replaced by Maintenance.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Oceanic
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Merida center coordinated Aircraft X at IPSEV at XA:00 at 100 and Aircraft Y at IPSEV at XB:01 at 140. No radio [communication] is available at those altitudes. Subsequently; Aircraft Z relays a non-radar position report for Aircraft X; crossed IPSEV at XB:10 at 140. He was coordinated at 100. I double verified the info. Thinking Merida had gotten the altitudes switched; I waited for a position report on Aircraft Y; with none coming. I asked Merida if they still had their coordination info on these planes and he said no. I then got Aircraft A to relay through Aircraft X to get a report from Aircraft Y; and got a position report of IPSEV at XB:06 at 140. I had Aircraft A relay to Aircraft X to descend to 120; Aircraft X said he wanted to stay at 140 due to advantageous winds. I said we can't do that in non-radar; and he had to descend. He requested 100; and I had him descend to 100. (All of this relayed back and forth through Aircraft A). I was working the Ocean West airspace by myself during this; so there were some minutes of delays between the steps; the total elapsed time being 17 minutes. In short; Aircraft X was supposed to be at 100; but showed up at 140. I theorize that he climbed on his own to get in better winds and didn't tell us. He was later told 'possible pilot deviation' and told to contact us.I recommend that pilots get a clearance before they change altitudes.




Synopsis: A ZHU Center Controller reported of having an aircraft at the wrong altitude. The aircraft climbed to an altitude it was not supposed to and a conflict arose with another aircraft. The reporter called the other center for information but they did not have any. The controller had to relay through a third aircraft to get things straightened out.
Date: 201910
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person
When detected: Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While working as an Operations Agent in operations; ramp lead informed me that a Hazmat shipment staged for outbound needed 15 bags to secure the shipment on board aircraft. This [original aircraft] plane left ZZZ1 with zero payload which required the shipment to be held off till the next departure to ZZZ2. I moved the shipment [from original aircraft to a later departure] manually not knowing the Hazmat shipment needed to be rebooked by cargo. On the final closeout for the flight we could not show Hazmat [however; the] crew did receive the information properly through ACARS [NOTOC; of Hazmat loaded on later flight]. I had to get dispatch involved they tried to show the Hazmat code [on computerized load report] but couldn't do it either. I closed the flight out with the correct weights and was advised to file a report.

Callback: Person 1 provided additional information to clarify that Hazmat cargo removed from first aircraft; which could not be correctly configured Hazmat in cargo bay. Hazmat cargo loaded on a later aircraft correctly and notified the flight crew.

Second narrative: Dangerous Goods (DG) manually enter by [Load Program] from previous flight that it was not loaded onto. By doing this the code for [Dry] Ice was removed. Cargo staged Dry Ice this item was held off because it would not allow them to close out due to not enough bags [on originally assigned aircraft]. Station manually updated bag count from 12 to 15 [on later aircraft] which had the 2 Dry Ice QPKs but code was not in so it allowed them to final. DG is not secured because there are 13 bags and 2 QPKs in pit 4.


Synopsis: Airline personnel reported removing Hazmat cargo from one aircraft on to a later flight in order to correctly configure in aircraft cargo bay.