elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During landing I had some crosswind and some excess of speed on final. At touchdown the front wheel bounced a few times; then I jumped on the brakes; [which] pushed me to the left. I went off runway slightly and hit the taxi sign. No physical injuries for pilot and passenger. Left wing and left flap are scratched; no other visible damage. Full inspection [will be performed later].




Synopsis: SR20 pilot reported loss of directional control on the landing roll led to a runway excursion and slight damage from contact with a taxiway sign.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ1
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing Roll Out
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Landing with crosswind corrected for crosswind landed centerline; it was not a bad landing.Used aero dynamic breaking and aircraft brakes.The aircraft continued right I kept left aileron and left rudder to keep the aircraft straight.Aircraft exited the run way to the right and came to a stop.No damage to aircraft and no injuries. I taxied the aircraft back and exited Runway XXL and contacted Ground then parked the aircraft with no further incident.I inspected the aircraft and no damage had occurred.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a runway excursion caused by gusty winds.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was conducting a flight from ZZZ. The run-up before takeoff was done following the checklist without any issue. During the takeoff roll; I did the line-up check; advance throttle to full power and verify all engine gauges are in green. Just as the aircraft was reaching rotating speed; the RPM dropped from 2;500 to approximately 1;900. The engine was running rough and seemed to quit. I immediately cut the power back to idle and aborted the takeoff. After vacating the runway; I notified ATC that I would like to return to perform another run-up to try to duplicate the problem before returning to the FBO ramp; ATC granted me the request. During the second run-up; I applied full power to simulate the takeoff. After about five seconds in takeoff power; everything happened again. RPM dropped and unstable; and seemed to get worse as I left the throttle in full power. I then notified ATC and requested return to the FBO; where I shut down and secured the aircraft.The aircraft [had] recently been through the 100 hour inspection and had only about 2 hour Tach before the event occurred. I later learned that during the inspection; the new fuel tank was replaced. So we suspect that the probable cause of the event was debris from installing a new fuel tank partially blocking the fuel systems; which caused fuel starvation at a high power setting.




Synopsis: C172 pilot flying reported experiencing loss of engine power during takeoff roll.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.TRACON, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03; Tower MEM
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On vectors for approach 18R at Memphis we received continuous; erroneous; EGPWS warnings once we crossed the river on a 9 mile dogleg to final. These warnings continued to touchdown. 'RA' warning flag was on and off in the Captain and First Officer PFD. Both A/Ps were engaged. I suspect 5G interference.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported during approach that erroneous altitude and RA warnings continued until touchdown at MEM; citing possible 5G interference.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Reverser
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out of 13;000 feet we observed an ECAM message '1 ENG Thrust reverser unlocked' and also noted a REV amber warning in Number 1 ENG N1 gauge. We stopped climb and ran ECAM checklist procedures during which we reduced Number 1 ENG thrust lever to idle where it remained the rest of flight. We declared an emergency and requested a return to our departure airport; contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control for a return to field and an overweight landing. The Dispatcher concurred 'At Captains discretion' via ACARS. The jump seat rider contacted operations advising of our return and also advised the flight attendants and passengers of our intent to return to the airport and that we expected a normal landing. We treated the approach and landing as a single engine approach with engine Number 1 at idle thrust as per ECAM actions. Landing was made at 180;000 lbs with a vertical speed of 100 FPM at touchdown. We then taxied to the gate under own power.




Synopsis: An A321 returned to its departure airport uneventfully following receipt of a left engine reverser unlocked light during the initial climb to cruise.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; MEL; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Aircraft X had landed in ZZZ we had an inbound write up for ENG #1 abnormal bleed IP valve would not open. I had called Maintenance Control; told them the write up and they directed me to apply MEL 36-XX-XXX and MEL 36-XX-XXX. During the application of this MEL the flight crew was going with they're procedures for this MEL and had no issue with it. Note: HP bleed valve for same engine was already on MEL 36-XX-XXX; nowhere in the maintenance procedures for any of these MELs does it indicate that you can't have all of them applied. Flight crew took Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the next day I was notified by my supervisor that the wrong MEL had been applied. Mel 36-XX-XXX is the MEL that should have been applied not MEL 36-XX-XXX. This was discovered by the flight crew that was taking Aircraft X out of ZZZ1 and they had a conflict with the operation procedures. The maintenance procedures for the bleed system when multiple things are failing are not clear. There's nothing in the maintenance procedures to keep you from applying MELs that counter act each other.The maintenance procedures for the bleed system when multiple things are failing are not clear. There's nothing in the maintenance procedures to keep you from applying MELs that counter act each other.




Synopsis: Technician reported MEL procedures were unclear and allowed technician to defer multiple bleed valves on the same engine; causing a delay.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While taxing into parking; I was taxied over the elevator tie down rope to park into into the spot and the engine sucked the tie down rope through the spinner causing a sudden stoppage. I think what caused this was as I was trying to park in the spot; and an increase in thrust picked up the rope causing the engine to suck it in. I believe the wind could have always been a contributing factor to lift the rope.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reported during taxi-in the engine sucked in a tie down rope through the spinner resulting in a sudden stoppage.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Flight scheduled to depart as a live passenger flight with a Tech Stop Only. The operating crew was a 2 man crew with a flight time scheduled of 04:30.The flight crew was given an [automated] weight and balance with a Traffic Load of 76;178 LBS. which comprised a PAX count of 240 souls. The Zero Fuel Weight was calculated at 275;127 LBS. and Total Fuel of 65;200 was onboard. The flight crew ran the numbers using SOP and ACARS W/B and the total Take Off Weight was calculated to be 339;327 after taxi out burn. All indications were that this was a normally presented and calculated W/B. The ACARS W/B information was obtained and normal SOP's followed.The flight proceeded normally and we concluded the flight at the planned destination. Nothing out of the ordinary occurred during the flight. We did not see the receiving or outbound crew.Myself and the First Officer proceeded to a nearby airport via taxi for our respective commercial Dead Head flights.After my Dead Head flight I received information from the crew accepting the A/C that there had been some form of error on the [automated] W/B we received and that there was an error in the Traffic Load weight for the 240 PAX and that the weight 'should' have been much higher at approximately 84;156 LBS. The difference of some approximately 8;000 LBS. In essence we were given an incorrect W/B and the aircraft for our flight heavier.I ran the numbers after the fact with this new information and found that no structural or operational weights were exceeded in this case.The receiving crew only realized the error when their W/B coupled with the fuel placed on the aircraft put the aircraft in an overweight situation. This was told by the receiving crew.I was thankful for the information and the effort on their part to inform me.  There seems to be a break down in SOP procedures that lead into this situation. There may be a breakdown in the way the [automated] Passenger Weight and Balance is being administered and used to provide the required weight and balance information to the Flight Crew. This should be addressed so that a potential ill event does not occur.




Synopsis: A B767 Captain reported being informed after the flight that his automated computed weight was approximately 8;000 pounds below the as loaded weight.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Other Load Planner
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I planned this flight at the normal time. There was a stores item; 42 lbs. of flammable liquid in the bulk pit  . I planned this in the bulk pit; and added the BR item   of 15 bags as a reminder. The programmatic Remark item of 'Secure DG With At Least 15 bags' was added. I got the WB CHECK message when the Ramp Lead finalized the flight. I took a look at the closeout; and saw only 10 bags scanned in the bulk pit. I advised my Shift Manager. I also sent an ACARs message to the Captain. The flight showed 'out' in Flight Information. I invalidated the weights; and immediately contacted the Zone Controller. I advised him of the situation; and that the ramp would have to move 5 bags to the bulk pit; or remove the hazmat item. I don't think they had actually pushed the plane; so it didn't show as a Return to the Gate. The Ramp Lead moved the bags; and tried to final. He was having some difficulty re-finalizing the flight; so he called me. I helped him through his closeout. He advised me that he was aware of the 15 bag requirement; had intended to load 15 bags; but lost track of the number of bags loaded during rainy conditions on the ramp. With my help; he was able to re-final; and new final weights were sent.




Synopsis: Load Planner reported HAZMAT procedure discrepancies during preflight were resolved prior to departure.
Date: 201901
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: My immediate Supervisor gave me a directive to perform a preflight on the aircraft. [Supervisor] informed me the aircraft had not flown in over a week. Aircraft was out of service for sheet metal repair. I arrived at the aircraft at approximately XA:25 hours. Aircraft was slated for a XB:35 departure. Upon my arrival; the tow team was finishing up securing the aircraft. I met the last tow team man from aircraft on the jetway. I informed him I had the jet and he had nothing to worry about. I proceeded into the cockpit and started my pre departure checklist. Using card 29-XXXX-X-XXXX for reference before flight crew arrived. Tow team was complete with their mission and observed me in the cockpit from the ground. I finished bringing the cockpit to life and proceeded to the rear of the cabin. A few minutes after leaving; for reasons unknown the tow man came back to the cockpit and took it upon himself to deselect the battery off. Disrupting the electrical circuits and instruments on the aircraft. This was the same tow man I had met on jetway minutes before and I informed him I had control of the aircraft.When the company allows unlicensed personal to interfere with maintenance and pilot procedures its a dangerous situation and accident waiting to happen. In this case a unlicensed person failing to listen to the mechanic performing procedures on the aircraft. This person took it upon himself to disrupt the aircraft just 15 minutes before passenger boarding.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported during maintenance preflight a tow crew member went to the cockpit and turned off the battery power without authorization.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During work on the Number 3 Engine Thrust Reverser (T/R); I closed the T/R Control and T/R Lock Control Circuit Breakers (C/B). They had been opened for the deferral of the Reverser. When I opened the Circuit Breakers; they had red collars that I left attached to make finding them easier. When I re deferred the Thrust Reverser System; I pulled the circuit beakers with the red collars and flipped the collars back around. They were in the correct area and I didn't think to look at the labels. Possibly someone knocked off the circuit breaker collar and put it back in the wrong place; compounded by my not verifying the circuit breakers I was pulling for the deferral. [Recommend] properly identifying the circuit breakers being pulled; instead of depending on a marker being in the correct position. Dayshift.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports he did not verify Circuit Breakers (C/B) he had opened and attached red collars to; were the correct C/Bs for a re-deferral of Number 3 Engine Thrust Reverser on a McDonald Douglas widebody aircraft.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Descending into LGA with Approach Control; we requested RNAV approach and thought we would get the RNAV visual for 31 at LGA. They didn't confirm our request; but were busy; so we assumed we'd get what we requested. As we were descending from 7000' to 4000' on a vector; we felt we were very close to the approach and not on a downwind vector. Captain; Pilot Flying; decided to slow; so as to be stabilized; if we were then cleared for the approach. Approach Control had other ideas as we were vectored across the approach into a right downwind. Then ATC queried us about our speed and we stated 210 to which we were admonished and told; 'You can't slow down without telling us.' they then assigned us another speed and descent into the approach. We failed to let them know of desire to slow and our decision to do so. We should query ATC before slowing down and get clarification on what approach we were to receive so as to prevent getting bitten by the expectation bias.




Synopsis: B-737 First Officer reported slowing from assigned speed prior to receiving approach clearance from ATC.