elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E S56
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We departed 16L and tower was fairly busy. However; we had to ask for a frequency change since it was not given at about the normal time on the LEETZ departure. This is not inherently a big deal. We continued on the departure and were given a; 'delete the speed' clearance. Shortly after; another clearance; climb and maintain FL230 came as well. At about ZEETA intersection; we were given the clearance 'cleared direct UPJAR' intersection. We agreed that this would be in conflict with our drift down since we were only about 6000 feet above the terrain and we would have to take responsibility for terrain clearance. So; we requested to stay on route since that is the safest and most conservative. We were approved to stay on course. We were then handed over to another controller. This controller; the second departure controller on the LEETZ departure issued the clearance 'Direct EKR (MEEKR).' There was an exchange back and forth between us and the controller in which we attempted to communicate we wanted to stay on the route for drift down alternate planning. We were not far from the original course. But; the end result of the conversation was what seemed to be a very strong-willed controller not taking into consideration what we were trying to convey in our radio communications. This being that our route is most conservatively flown in this aircraft using the drift down procedures dispatched with us. The controllers should be educated on exactly why drift down is important to our operations. Also; this communication should include the importance of not clearing us to fixes directly; taking us off our route. It is equally important for controllers to listen to the pilots and planes they are monitoring. Our reasoning may be in conflict with their need to expedite traffic out of their sectors; but safety is always in mind.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being given direct routings in mountainous terrain and repeatedly having to explain to ATC controllers that he wanted to remain on his filed route due to drift down considerations.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise RT SYS QTY EICAS. Ran checklist which called to turn OFF electric and engine pumps. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance. Continued to our filed destination which shutdown for weather and diverted to an enroute airport. Turned on both pumps before landing. Rest of flight uneventful.




Synopsis: A B757 EICAS alerted RT SYS QTY so the QRH was completed and the flight continued with both RT system pumps OFF. After the destination airport close; the flight diverted and turned the pumps on prior to landing.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to OAK; we asked for the RNAV Z 29.  ATC said they would check on the request. They told us then to descend on the PXN 3 Arrival. They then asked if we were doing the BUSHY transition.  BUSHY is on the PXN 3 Arrival prior to SUNOL so we said yes (no mention of any clearance on the RNAV Z 29).  We then switched controllers and they again asked us if we were on the BUSHY transition.  We said yes.  They cleared us for the visual and we responded; 'Are we cleared for the visual RNAV Z 29?' and then they said 'Cleared RNAV Z 29.'   At this point; we were past BUSHY and almost to SUNOL and they said; 'Oh; I thought you were on the BUSHY transition' and we said; 'We were never really cleared the RNAV Z.'  They said 'no problem' and they gave us a short vector for traffic and cleared us for the visual. ATC needed to clarify the Approach instead of assuming.  And; we needed to also clarify and ask when there are misunderstandings.


Second narrative: BUSHY is not a transition and should never have been referred to as such. It is an initial approach fix. The term transition refers to a point on a STAR from which an approach can start and it is published on the STAR. All LAX STARs and approaches are a good points of reference. When clearing an aircraft for an approach say; 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.' Revise the PANOCHE Three Arrival to indicate BUSHY as a transition point! Never issue partial or vague clearances. Never ask an aircraft to fly a transition that is not published on the STAR! Instead; say 'Proceed direct BUSHY. At BUSHY cleared the RNAV Z 29.'


Synopsis: A B737 crew on the OAK PNX 3 Arrival was cleared via the RNAV Z 29 but did not begin the approach at BUSHY because they did not believe that the BUSHY IAF should be termed a transition from the arrival.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While receiving vectors to land; ATC alerted us of a severe storm cell in our path. Our radar was not adequately depicting any weather in front of us. As such; we asked ATC to provide an initial heading to keep us away from the worst of the weather.  As we were starting the initial turn; we were struck by lightning; causing the number one engine to go out. Due to the circumstances of the failure and seeing a high ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) spike during the failure; we elected not to restart the engine since we were unsure of the state of the engine if we tried to restart it. We were quickly brought in to land single engine. Fire trucks verified there was no visible damage to the engine; and we proceeded to the gate. Identification: EICAS master caution for engine one out. Cause: inadequate time to react to severe weather in the vicinity before the lightning strike occurred. Response: we ran the appropriate QRH checklist for an engine out; and decided not to attempt an engine restart given the nature of the failure and the proximity to the airport. Suggestions: rely less on ATC when there is a time critical decision to make concerning weather. While snap decisions should not be made; sometimes a definitive decision is still needed.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a safe landing followed the loss of #1 engine due to a lightning strike.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Coalescer Bag
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon arriving at the gate in ZZZZ; the APU was started; bleed on with packs operating.  The flight crew conducted a walkaround.  As we climbed up the jet bridge; we were greeted by the flight attendants and the Station Manager advising us that the aircraft had a terrible odor; similar to smelly socks; burning crayons; and musty. A logbook writeup was made and the local maintenance started working on the writeup. After several hours they came up with the source being the number 1 air conditioning pack.  The next day we departed with Pack 1 on MEL. Sometimes you come across an aircraft that exhibits the distinct low odor of being 'old'. We must determine if this odor is embedded in the interior? Or is it slowly seeping through the vent system? I am aware our airline is at the forefront of addressing these odor issues and I understand they are in the preliminary stage of replacing the APU on the A320 fleet. [Captain recommends Company] should consider a safety campaign educating fight crews on the cause and types of odor events associated with air conditioning packs and APU.  I know several publications have addressed this issue in the past; but it keeps happening.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported a fume event during pre-flight resulting in flight cancellation for maintenance action.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: New SOP in effect requires right downwind traffic to San Francisco be vectored between two points depicted on video map only a few miles wide. This requirement never existed before. Vector off arrival route to remain between these points must be timed very precise and can be affected by wind; aircraft performance; workload etc; etc. I was sequence delay vectoring aircraft to SFO; picking up VFR aircraft; issuing approach clearances and coordinating a HAF GPS approach. My vector to the right downwind left the aircraft slightly south of the southern point now required in the SOP. Delete this unrealistic requirement in the SOP. There are too many variable factors and too busy a sector to keep aircraft between these points all the time. Concentrating on this vector to comply with the SOP will deter from other more important sector duties.




Synopsis: NCT Controller voiced concern regarding newly established vectoring points on the downwind to SFO; claiming the precise vectoring required is unrealistic given other position responsibilities.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CPR.Airport, WY
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pilot inbound write up for Left Engine Hydraulic on and Center Electric 1 Hydraulic lights on overhead panel extinguished in flight. Myself and the Local Technician applied MEL 33-11-01 to both of the above inbound write-ups considering the write-ups for both [were] for the background lighting for both of the switches per the B757 AMM [Aircraft Maintenance Manual] and wiring manual; but the above MEL mentions that in the remarks that the individual switches cannot be MEL'd. It must be noted that this light is controlled by the rheostat after it is pushed in and is only an info light for the crew. The MEL was updated and not given the proper consideration when updated for what is the function of each light.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician applied a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) reference to the pilot log write-ups for panel lighting but was confused by the restriction against using the MEL reference for individual switch lights.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Aircraft component: Communication Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I have noticed a significant and consistent increase of frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone. These events are occurring on final and departure; at various altitudes (including below 1;000 FT AFE) in various tail numbers. While it doesn't seem to affect comm transmissions or reception; it can significantly interfere with crew communication. Duration has lasted approximately 15 seconds or more on some occasions. It seems like interference issues which were encountered some time back; have resurfaced. It doesn't appear to be called out by other traffic or caused by someone's stuck mic. It also could be limited to our type of aircraft since the Q400 radios continue to be sub-par.




Synopsis: Q400 Captain experiences frequency interference (loud static) over 123.77 (PDX Tower) that is hard to talk over via the interphone.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As I was returning to the control room after my lunch break; I was asked by a Technician about what caused Sector X to power down. He indicated that it might have been caused by the Controller working the sector. The Technician told me that the power button to the VSCS had been turned off and he wasn't sure why the Controller had done it. So I asked the Controller why he turned the power off; and he replied; 'Because I was bored. I thought if I just pushed it once; it would reset and not shut off completely.' The result of his actions caused the sector's frequencies and land lines to be inoperable for 24 minutes while the system had to be reset by the Tech Ops. The Controller did not notify management right away and simply moved to another sector; compromising the safety of the operation. Once the CIC became aware of the situation; he notified the technicians; but did not notify myself or the OM.More training on the equipment to prevent occurrences so controllers have better knowledge of how to operate and handle the VSCS; particularly the consequences of what will happen if they are not handled with care.




Synopsis: Front Line Manager reports a Controller while bored turns off the VSCS; causing the frequencies and land lines to be inoperable.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the taxi out the First Officer informed me that the detent on the start/stop knob might not have been functioning 100%.  I thought about the night before (as we had brought in the same airplane) and when I shut down the Number 1 engine. The detent was functioning (albeit maybe slightly loose); but it seemed to be functioning correctly and preventing the knob from traveling on its own.  I thought this was what the First Officer was alluding to and decided to continue with the taxi out.  After thinking about it further enroute and in the interest of safety I decided to inform Dispatch that the start/stop detents might not be functioning 100% and perhaps it would be wise to have them looked at by Maintenance.  When we arrived at the gate I confirmed that the detents were in fact not functioning 100% and warranted a write up.  It should be noted the situation may have been aggravated further on the ground when I attempted move the selectors to stop without first pulling them up to confirm they were not functioning properly.  I believe this made the difference between them being slightly loose; and being inoperative.  Although the knobs were functioning correctly at departure; it might have been prudent to try and force them to stop without lifting them before we left to confirm that a little bit of looseness in the travel would not cause a problem.  Perhaps put more of an emphasis on safety than on-time performance.  A comment from the Mechanic that showed up to our airplane 'THANKS FOR GROUNDING THE AIRPLANE' does not help in the argument of whats more important.




Synopsis: EMB170 Captain is informed by the First Officer during taxi out that the detent for the engine start/stop knob may not be functioning correctly.  Upon arrival a quick test indicates that the knob should be written up.  The Mechanic who shows up chastises the Captain for grounding the aircraft.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While waiting to take off from Runway 04L in EWR; the Captain and I noticed that we were directly behind a 757. We both talked about having had wake turbulence upsets (from which we'd recovered; but were still unexpected and potentially dangerous) behind 757s in the past after receiving takeoff clearances with minimum separation; and agreed that we would ask for some extra time if ATC tried to have us takeoff too soon after the 757. I started a timer when the 757 started its roll (before lining up on Runway 4L as directed); and sure enough; 56 seconds later; we were cleared for takeoff. We asked for extra time for wake turbulence separation; so Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance. We called back after two minutes after the departure of the 757; and; after an aircraft crossed the runway downfield; Tower then granted our clearance. After takeoff; Tower suggested that we ask for extra time sooner; as he would have to fill out paperwork for the rejected clearance.The major threat is unusual attitudes resulting from being in the wake of a near-heavy aircraft. Because we waited to take off; we did not experience this Unusual Attitude Scenario today. From a safety perspective; I think we made the best choice for the situation. From a procedures perspective; we could have asked Tower for extra spacing when we were first told to line up on the runway; instead of after getting the takeoff clearance. We suspected Tower might clear us more quickly than we'd like; but we did not know for sure; and we didn't know this would cause them any hassle.If wake turbulence separation seems insufficient; in the future; I could ask for extra spacing earlier; before getting the takeoff clearance - while receiving the line up and wait clearance seems ideal. However; based on my prior experience of an upset behind a 757; I think we made the right call; and it might behoove the company or even the FAA to increase spacing minimums between near-heavies and trailing RJs.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported that requesting additional wait time prior to departure behind a B757 resulted in a canceled takeoff clearance.