elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other push back
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An incident occurred during pushback; resulting in the towbar damaging a fitting on the bottom of the nose gear strut. The fitting is used to service the strut with hydraulic fluid and compressed nitrogen gas. As a result; the strut lost both fluid and nitrogen gas which caused the strut to compress. Maintenance was required to replace the fitting and service the strut.The initial pushback proceeded normally. After a short pushback; I was told to set the brakes. I didn't set the brakes and I told the Pushback Crew to push us back farther. The Crew told me that this is where they stop the pushback. I told the Crew we needed to be pushed back farther back. The Pushback Crew said something about pushing back any farther and we would be on a taxiway. We were in a non-movement area; but we called Ground Control and were told push wherever we needed to. I told the Pushback Crew that we were fine and to push us back farther. We were pushed back and came to a stop. I asked about setting the brakes. We stopped briefly and then the aircraft started moving forward. No communication had come from the Pushback Crew regarding pushback complete or set the brakes. I stopped the aircraft with the aircraft's brakes and asked the Pushback Crew what was going on. They told me the towbar had disconnected from the nose gear; hit the nose gear when the aircraft rolled forward; and now fluid was coming from the nose gear. I told them we would be returning to the gate. We called DAL Ops and told them we were returning to the gate. We returned to Gate where Maintenance repaired and serviced the nose gear strut.I have had the towbar disconnect on one other occasion during pushback. It occurred at the same time as this incident; just as the tug was bringing the aircraft to a stop. The aircraft came to a brief stop; the towbar disconnected; and the aircraft started rolling forward. That Pushback Crew told me the handle on the towbar that locks the towbar to the nose gear did not have the safety pin properly installed. The result was the handle floated up and released the towbar from the nose gear. I am very thankful that our Pushback Crew was not injured during this incident.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported the nose gear was damaged when it was struck by the pushback tug.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X called airborne looking to pick up his flight plan.  I gave him a code and received a track and proceeded to clear him.  I then gave him the altimeter and thought nothing of it.  My d-side and I then realized that he was actually below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) and that I had messed up.  At this point he was crossing into an area of lower MIAs and I felt that the damage had already been done and that there was no need to climb the aircraft.  This was a complete lack of focus on my part.  I should have noticed this sooner and cleared him to a higher altitude when issuing the clearance.  This is all my fault.  I would like to point out that in my opinion; the lack of traffic and complexity played a part in this.  We were chatting and just not engaged enough.Focus on combining sectors more to keep work force engaged.  I am not sure if anything could have been combined up or not in this instance.  I am commonly watching a small number of aircraft and losing focus on the sector because I have way too much time on my hands between transmissions.




Synopsis: ZDV Controller reports of discovering an aircraft that he was working; was below the MIA.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight

Narrative: On approach to Runway XX at ZZZ. Pilot flying had just called for landing gear extension. We were just outside ZZZZZ intersection at exactly 2;500 ft MSL descending; a drone went right under us; illuminated by the landing light. I estimate that the drone was no more than 20 feet below our altitude; directly in-line with our flight path horizontally. The first officer caught a glimpse of it; I saw it for a fraction of a second. I would not have had time to avoid the drone. The drone was white; with something red; either paint or a dim light. The drone was reported to ZZZ tower.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew was on approach to a Class B airport and came within 20 feet of a UAV while on final approach.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was assigned the APU perf. [work card] and my partner had a couple of air related [work cards] to complete also. Being the Number 2 Tail dock was installed I asked one of the mechanics that was assigned to the Number 2 Eng (Engine) if it was ok to run the APU while they went on break; he said sure. Another mechanic asked me to motor Number 1 and Number 3 engines for leak check and that it was ok to put the fire handles to the normal position. I asked another mechanic if I could put the flaps up; he cleared me to put the flaps up so as I entered the flt (Flight) deck I scanned all the lockout tags and noticed a couple on a fuel pump. I and the normal ones we put on every weekend. I put the Number 1 and Number 3 fire handles to normal and was trying to clear the interface message in CFDS (Centralized Fault Display System) my partner suggested to put the Number 2 fire handle up so I looked at the lockout tag on it and on one side it was labeled Number 1 and Number 3 eng serv (Engine Service). On the opposite side it said Number 2 hydraulic manifold so since no other hydraulics were locked out I figured it was completed also we had no issues when putting the flaps up so I removed it and put the Number 2 fire handle to normal. At this time I proceeded to start the APU; as I was 1 minute into the start we heard people yelling turn it off so my partner pulled the APU fire handle and started to walk out of the flight deck to see the issue then he said pull the fire handle which I did. I immediately turned off the battery and secured the flight deck then went down to help contain the spill as were a few other mechanics. After talking to the other mechanics I found out the fuel control (pump) was removed from the engine and the fuel line capped and stowed. On the side of the engine this line was the origin of the leak.




Synopsis: MD-11 Maintenance Technician reported overlooking the lockout tags on cockpit fuel pump switch and started the APU causing fuel leak.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MSLP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class A MHTG
ATC / advisory: Center MHTG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approach into El Salvador; failed to follow VOR DME Y approach course. Mountainous terrain at night with Spanish controller; runway changed from what was expected; Captain had not flown into MSLP in over 10 years; First Officer had never flown into field; high terrain in area; iPad in night mode. Instructed to proceed direct to fix; not on filed arrival or approach. (After landing; we discovered the fix was on a RNAV approach; which [company] said we were not approved to fly; so those approaches were not reviewed)Approach did not have heavy line from VOR thru arc; only the final approach course. Controller said; we thought; to fly over VOR and then join VOR DME Y final. We even asked again to confirm. It was unclear to the crew that he intended us to fly a published approach course. The plan view of the approach did not show an arc segment; only the final approach course.Crew flew over VOR and then self-vectored to downwind. Controller asked if we were familiar with the VOR DME Y; we replied no. We then requested vectors to final approach course and made an uneventful landing at MSLP.(Additional distraction; crew tracking gave crew unclear reassignment. Departing 4 hours earlier than original flight; with a deadhead to (original destination) with additional instructions that we would pick up our normal sequence. Once we reviewed what we thought was the plan for the following day; it appeared that they were attempting to schedule us for a 14+ hour days; when our FAR 117 legal flight duty period was 10 hours. This lead to a distraction in flight; but not to the missed approach instructions.)




Synopsis: First Officer reported a track deviation on approach to MSLP; citing crew unfamiliarity with the airport and poor ATC communication as factors.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BJC.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear; Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Other Flight School
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D BJC
ATC / advisory: Tower BJC
Second aircraft: Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Other Flight school
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While doing pattern work on Runway 30L; we requested a full-stop on Runway 3. Tower instructed us to 'make left downwind.' My student and I turned left to enter the left downwind Runway 3; at this time; Aircraft Y traffic was mid-field downwind Runway 30L. Traffic was cleared touch-and-go Runway 30L. Without further instruction; my student and I proceeded with a standard left pattern Runway 3. On 0.25 nm final; I see the traffic landing the parallel is still rolling on the runway; and I did not anticipate them being clear of my runway by the time my student and I crossed the threshold Runway 3; so I instructed my student to execute a go-around. This resulted in our Aircraft X directly overflying the Aircraft Y right as they rolled across Runway 3 on Runway 30L. They were not yet airborne.In hindsight; I believe Tower's instruction to make left downwind may have been intended as extend downwind; or they would call my base. Since this instruction was not given; we made a normal pattern and did not anticipate a conflict until short final.Earlier on the same flight; we had been doing full-stop-taxi-backs; and we landed Runway 30L; and exited left onto Taxiway B. The same controller gave us taxi instructions 'Runway 30L taxi via Delta' and I asked if I needed 'cross Runway 3.' During this same flight; I had prompted the previous controller a couple of times; and gotten the instruction to cross each time; but only after prompting for it. The next controller volunteered; 'we don't normally do that.' She did give me the crossing; but I am wondering why we do not volunteer that crossing since it is necessary to cross the full-hold bar for Runway 3 in order to turn left onto Taxiway D from Taxiway B; or the other way to turn right onto Taxiway B from Taxiway D.




Synopsis: Flight Instructor reported a NMAC during go-around on a training flight.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were inbound to LGA; level at 18;000 ft in smooth air; no clouds at 300 knots indicated with the autopilot on. No traffic was observed visually; on TCAS or on frequency. Suddenly we hit what I'm convinced was wake turbulence. We snap-rolled violently and in a second or two were out of the wake turbulence. Thankfully we had the seat belt sign on; and the flight attendant was ok; I'm not sure how they didn't get hurt. If a passenger had been up and or an overhead bin open; I think someone would have been hurt. I've been flying here for going on six years; and I've only experienced this once before. That incident was almost identical to this one except we were at about 11;000 ft and nearly the same geographic location. From now on flying into NYC I think I'm going to have the seatbelt sign on and flight attendant seated when we are 30 minutes out.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported the aircraft 'snap-rolled violently' when they encountered wake turbulence inbound to LGA.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Up Lock
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; with the First Officer flying; the gear was raised. When gear handle was lowered to off position the nose gear came back down to the down and locked position. The main gear remained up. QRH was referenced and the gear handle was raised. Nose gear retracted and remained up and locked. The gear handle was left in the up position per procedure and the flight was continued to destination. All indications at this time were normal. As the flight progressed the System A hydraulic fluid slowly began to decrease below what would normally be expected at altitude. As we neared destination and began our descent Center informed us that we could expect holding. I said we could not accept any delays. Our hydraulic quantity was now at 62%. Center asked us what our divert was and gave us steering for a nearby airport. I declared an emergency and was given immediate clearance direct to a larger Class B. Our System A quantity was now at 51%. We were cleared for the RNAV approach. All checklist were completed and the gear came down and locked normally. First Officer flew a flawless approach. Touchdown and roll out were normal. ARFF checked the aircraft after we cleared the runway and followed us to the gate. Taxi and shut down were normal. Maintenance met us at the gate and told us that there was hydraulic fluid in the wheel well. I think that declaring an emergency in this situation was the correct decision. The only thing in hind sight I might do differently is to have the gear pinned after clearing the runway. I also saw that Center will do the right thing when you declare and emergency and can not accept a delay. Don't hesitate to use your authority as Captain.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports the nose gear failed to remain retracted when the gear handle is placed to the up position after takeoff. The gear handle is placed in the up position for the remainder of the flight; but results in a slow loss of hydraulic fluid. An emergency is declared at destination to avoid holding or diverting.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EGE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Tower EGE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While executing the LDA DME 25 into EGE in CAVOK weather conditions; we received a low altitude warning from the ATC tower controller. We were descending on the RNAV arrival in managed mode on the Airbus and was coming from 'VOAXA intersection' to 'AQULA intersection' descending from 13;800 feet to 12;900 feet that is charted. The aircraft did start a little higher descent rate out of 13;800 feet to 12;900 feet to cross 'AQULA intersection' at 12;900 feet but was right on path at that fix {AQULA} . Speed was coming from I believe 180 knots down to 160 knots at that same time. That is when ATC showed an Altitude Alert and to check altitude and altimeter setting {30.48 I believe}. Ridge line was in plain sight and no other issues after that.


Second narrative: We were about 170 knots above or at all altitudes on the approach. The altimeter settings were correct with the latest tower call about 2 min earlier. We were in very clear VFR conditions and there was no indication from the cockpit there was any issue with terrain.


Synopsis: ATC called an Airbus crew with a low altitude alert while the aircraft was on the LDA DME RWY 25 to EGE descending at slightly higher than normal rate but on profile with the terrain in sight.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Texan T6/Harvard (Antique)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While doing pattern work; I was number two to land following a Citabria; I believe; which was doing a touch and go; and the spacing was close; but I was certain there was enough spacing for the Citabria to take off prior to my landing; but the tower issued a go around to me. When I reached down to retract the flaps I lost sight of the Citabria momentarily and when I reacquired it I was closing on it very fast; just left of my course. I immediately made a right climbing turn to avoid the Citabria.The tower gave me traffic that was in the right pattern; I had originally been using the left pattern; and I acquired that traffic and was instructed to follow it; and completed a touch and go. After the event; my passenger said he thought he had heard the controller instruct me to turn left on the go around. It's possible; but my passenger had just said something to me as the controller was issuing instructions and I missed that.It appeared the primary tower controller was a trainee; we could hear someone in the background instructing him to correct instructions to aircraft in the pattern and approaches. This whole event could have been avoided had the controller not instructed me to go around when there was enough spacing to avoid a conflict with the departing aircraft.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that after being directed to go around; they had a near miss with a Citabria.