elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RST.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D RST
ATC / advisory: Tower RST
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff from the hold short line as Aircraft Y was exiting the runway downrange. I was the Pilot Flying and I lined up on the runway and initiated the takeoff roll. I then realized Aircraft Y had stopped on the perpendicular taxiway upon exiting. The tail of the aircraft seemed close to the runway safety area but it was impossible to know for sure from a distance whether it was encroaching in it. Since I convinced myself that the aircraft was close but clear of the runway; I elected to continue the takeoff. After liftoff and upon passing abeam the stopped Aircraft Y; it was noted that its tail cone was about 5-6 ft. on the runway side of the hold short line (more if you consider the vertical stabilizer/rudder angle).The main cause of this incident is the early takeoff clearance given to us by the Tower before the inbound aircraft was fully clear of the runway. A contributing factor was the inability of the flight crew to judge whether any part of the aircraft was encroaching the runway safety area and their decision to continue the takeoff roll regardless of their concern. 1) The Tower should not have cleared the outbound aircraft for takeoff until it was verified that the inbound aircraft was clear of the runway 2) The flight crew should have aborted the takeoff roll as a precaution when the concern surfaced.




Synopsis: CRJ Captain reported receiving clearance for takeoff while previous arrival was not clear of the runway safety area.
Date: 201704
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival from my flight; I was notified by Scheduling of an additional assignment to work another turn to ZZZ. I had 2 hours ground time before boarding. After arriving at the gate in ZZZ; I made the Disarm doors PA; turn around briefly and saw the B disarm hers; turned back around; looked out the window to see if the Ops Agent was approaching the door; was about to start disarming my door; was distracted with the thought of 'it would nice to rest on the DH flight.' The Ops Agent approached the door and I started to open the door; without realizing I had not disarmed it. When the door opened (not much); I immediately realized what had happened. The slide started to come out of the bustle; but did not deploy. The Captain was notified and Maintenance was called. I made a PA and apologized to the passengers there was going to be a delay in deplaning. The passengers were able to deplane within 10 minutes (after the door was fully opened). Maintenance repacked the slide back into the bustle.During my 2 hour ground time; I was thinking how tired I was; how long my duty day was going to be; and thought if I could just make it through the 1 worked leg. Focus on the steps of disarming a door. Wait until both FA say 'Cross checked'. Do not think of anything else besides disarming the door.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight attendants reported the slide on the forward entry door nearly deployed the Flight Attendant opened the door before the slide was disarmed.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLE.Airport, OH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival after flight from CLE; the FO (First Officer) spotted 6 boxes; 5 of which contained dry ice; being off-loaded from the plane. None of these items were listed on the cargo manifest from the CLE ground operations. All of these; the dry ice especially; should have been noted on the bag sheet; but none were. The ground crew were made aware after the fact; but the CLE crew were the ones who made the error.Have the CLE ground operations go through retraining of filling out of cargo forms and be aware of hazardous materials.




Synopsis: EMB-170 Captain discovered after arrival that six boxes had been transported; five of which contained dry ice; without being included on the cargo manifest.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I got off the land line and heard the radar controller issue a turn to the right for Aircraft X that was descending to 140 and about to enter an MIA polygon of 158. I saw what was going on and told the controller to also climb the aircraft; in which the Controller then climbed the aircraft to 158. The aircraft did appear to enter the 158 polygon before being level at 158.The aircrafts' routing showed QUIRT; DIJ. The R-side controller mentioned that the route was checked against the MIA polygons (prior to the aircraft checking in) and that the R-side controller thought 140 was a safe altitude to assign. Traffic volume was extremely high for this sector; including DIJ; IDA; AFO; RXE; 46U; PIH and BPI airports. During this busy session of traffic we had numerous instances in which the controllers on Sector 16 changed routes of aircraft after hand off without coordination. I'm not sure if this is something that happened with Aircraft X; but it makes me wonder since my R-side controller thought the original route was clear of the 158 polygon.It would help during high traffic volume times such as this for the solar eclipse to have standard routes for DIN arrivals so that we can have a smoother and more efficient operation. It would also be helpful to put all of the departures on the LAMON departure procedure to keep aircraft clear of JAC arrivals.




Synopsis: Salt Lake Center Controller reported that an aircraft came close to descending below a Minimum IFR Altitude but did not.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Level at FL340 over Goodland VOR for the OZZZY4 star Denver Center gave us a descent just after passing a B767 on opposite course at FL330. We asked for a vector 15 degrees right to avoid his wake on the descent. No major wake event but Denver Center thought we were having a navigation problem and only asked to avoid his wake just below us. Next Controller asked again if we were having a navigation issue; said not at all. No further contact required.




Synopsis: HS-125 Captain reported asking for a heading to avoid potential wake turbulence; but ATC thought they were off course.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: First Officer FO is new. On Approach into SLC we were told to Go Around as Approach had lost their separation minimums. I read back the clearance but the FO was confused and not aware we were supposed to Go Around. I was making [the FOs] calls and my calls and telling [the FO] what to do. [The FO] continued the descent. I repeated the call to climb but [the FO] still continued the descent. I was glued to the VSI to make the positive rate call when [appropriate] but [the FO] just kept descending. I finally had to hit the Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) for [the FO]; and forcefully tell [the FO] to climb; at the same time trying to communicate and read back the ATC clearance. As soon as I noticed we had a positive rate of climb I called that out and in the process of coaching [the FO] and helping [the FO] out while trying to talk to ATC; I ended up retracting the gear at 215kts.After reading through this it seems as I painted a rather harsh picture of this FOs flying abilities. I want to reiterate that yes this particular issue happened as described; but this in no way reflects on [the FOs] overall piloting skills and abilities in general terms. [The FO] does a very good job overall; and for some reason this caught [the FO] very off guard. We talked at length about what should be said and done in a go around and [the FO] does understand and was very adamant about how not to Go Around in the future. As I said above [the FO] is still very new and I personally believe will do a very good job going forward. Everybody has their bad days!FO was not in the mind set of a Go Around and initially did not hear the clearance or was confused as to what to do.Always be ready for a Missed Approach and mentally fly it prior to every landing.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 Captain reported the new First Officer had some difficulty properly executing a missed approach.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Aircraft component: Altitude Alert
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I; the pilot flying; when cleared for a visual approach looked at the FMS to get the altitude to set in for the final approach. I accidentally looked at the wrong line on the FMS and set in the TDZE and descended below the FAF altitude. I noticed the VASI was all red lights and; upon reaching 1;000 FT AGL; stopped the descent and flew level until the glide path.


Second narrative: After being cleared the visual approach to [Runway] 16L; the First Officer intended to set the FAF altitude of 6;000 FT and instead set field elevation of 4;300 FT. I did not notice the improper altitude as we were looking at the runway. We noticed the VASI was showing low and then I mentioned the wrong altitude was set. We leveled off at 5;100 FT until back on glideslope. Soon after; Tower asked us to check our altitude. We soon regained normal glide path and landed uneventfully.


Synopsis: A B737 First Officer set the SLC field elevation in the MCP Altitude Window during a night visual approach then descended below the Final Approach Fix crossing altitude and at 1;000 FT realized the aircraft was low because of red VASI lights.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: EICAS message 'BLD 1 VLV FAILED' appeared during takeoff. Rejected takeoff. Speed less 50 kts. Master caution light and EICAS message.


Second narrative: I was the Pilot Flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We were taking off Runway 28 and got an engine 1 bleed fail message. It was below 80 kts and we rejected the takeoff.


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff caused by EICAS message BLD 1 VLV FAILED illuminated.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other post flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying a parcel of contaminated blood. The box had the UN1845 on it as well as the Dangerous Goods Form. I thought about it and felt it was correct. Later that evening after signing off duty and the next day I was thinking that the parcel should have also had a UN3373 as well as a category B bio substance label. I only saw the Dangerous Goods Form and parcel that was labeled UN1845.I saw the parcel and inspected it and it's associated paperwork during preflight.Possible incomplete labeling of HAZMAT.At the time I looked the information up in the Dangerous Goods manual as well as online and determined in the short time we had that it only needed the UN1845 and nothing else. The more I thought about it however; I feel that it may should have had the UN3373 and cat B bio labels as well.[More correct procedure];verify with the manuals and if still not sure; discuss it with Dispatch or the Chief Pilot.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported the transport of Hazmat cargo with incomplete required Hazmat labeling.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: If I personally hadn't been on over 10 [specific type aircraft] flights with many different Operations Agents in the past several days; I would not be reporting this incident.Nineteen people were forced to sit between rows 4 through 10.I made my concerns know to the Captain; the working crew; the deadheading crew and the Operations Agent.  The Operations Agent said this was the only way the flight could go out because of weight and balance.Nineteen people forced into 12 rows (6 on right and 6 on left) some even sharing rows made this flight the unhealthiest flight I've been on during this COVID-19 pandemic.Do 19 people on a flight compromise the integrity of [this specific type] aircraft?  Could zones 1 and 2 be utilized for health and social distancing during this pandemic?!




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that due to aircraft weight and balance considerations; passengers were required to sit close together in specific rows. The crew member expressed concern that this was not conducive to health and social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Date: 201911
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This was a maintenance ferry flight. This flight was moved to my desk in the middle of my shift. Upon working up this flight I pulled up the Dispatch City Pair Guidance; to find out the phone number to the fuelers. Specifically; I wanted to know how much fuel was on board so that I could work up the flight plan. I called the company which was listed as the fuelers and asked to see if they could find out how much fuel was on board. They told me they would look and call me back. They called me back and indicated that the tanks were empty; and wanted to know how much fuel we desired. I told them I was requesting 14.0 of fuel. The fueler said that they would take care of it. A little while later; I got a phone call from somebody and said that they were topping it off at 14.0; and had transferred fuel from another aircraft; and asked if I was OK with it. At the time I did not think it was an issue; but that lead to another series of problems.I was on the phone with Medlink handling an inflight issue; when the station called. Since I was in the middle of an inflight issue; I asked a co-worker next to me to answer the call. I can't say verbatim what the conversation was; but the Dispatcher who assisted told the station that they cannot transfer fuel from one aircraft to another. So while handling the Medlink call; I was also trying to find out the details of the fueling situation of this flight. The dispatcher who assisted sent the call over to [Maintenance Control] assumingly to defuel the aircraft. When I completed the Medlink call; I then focused my time on this flight and confirmed with the chief; that station should not be transferring fuel from one aircraft to another (possible contamination issues; etc). What complicated the issue was this was going on just prior to shift change.  The Ops Manager had canceled the original flight and made it a different flight number because of a crew issue.  I had to redo a whole new release and ensure the oncoming Dispatcher knew what was going on.On the new release; I put the comments 'Verify FOB (Fuel on Board) was not transferred from another aircraft'.  I also briefed the oncoming Dispatcher that I had withheld the ATC filing to ensure that the flight does not leave until we verify the origin of the FOB. The oncoming Dispatcher took the briefing; and was going to follow up to ensure the aircraft was defueled and fueled properly.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported that an aircraft was fueled with fuel transferred from another aircraft; resulting in a policy violation.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DTW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D21
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On initial climb out we got a hard right roll [resulting in] more than 30 degrees bank. Brought back to wing level but hard to control; determined wake turbulence from A321 in front of us. [It] happened at clean up alt; [I] maintained max climb; got right turn from ATC to exit same route as other aircraft. No more roll problems. Wind was calm on ground and up to 10000 ft.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing DTW in trail of an A321.