Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Door Warning System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise at FL430 and 1:10 minutes into flight a red doors warning light illuminated. Abnormal checklist was accomplished and a diversion was conducted. While descending through FL290 the red doors light extinguished. Cabin pressurization functioned normally but passenger and Flight Attendant commented that they felt a rapid pressure change in their ears which was more than likely associated with a 4000 fpm descent rate and the cabin controller rating higher due to the descent. This is the fourth known event for the same issue. The company indicated they have an agreement with Dassault to MEL the door warning light system which is totally bogus. The system can be MEL'ed IF the doors light does not illuminate with a door open. The MEL is poorly worded and is subject to interpretation and needs to be revised. In our situation the system was functioning as designed. In the past the issue was MEL'ed; a switch cleaned signoff only for the issue to be repeated. A trend has been established here to inappropriately MEL the system solely to keep the aircraft generating revenue. I received push back from Maintenance Control as well as the Assistant Chief Pilot and was able to reach an agreement to down the aircraft.Due to the fact this was a passenger leg with a recovery aircraft enroute and a crew swap compounded by company pushback; there was unnecessary tremendous operation pressures placed on myself and my crew. This is a paramount safety issue both with maintenance and scheduling; and is an indication of the management dysfunction currently residing within our operation.The FAA needs to conduct a thorough investigation regarding the unsafe practices currently exercised within the company. Although the company boast an industry leading SMS level 4 certification the bottom line is the decisions are dictated by cost. Moral is at an all-time low; the entire company is overworked; the empowerment the employees once had has been stripped and controlled by the few that have shown a propensity to push the limits.As a crew member the operational pressures placed on me on a daily basis are extreme. Something has to give before the final link in the error chain is completed.


Second narrative: The day before; my crew and I picked up this aircraft from another crew who had the same issue that we were going to have the next day at FL430. The 'Doors' Master Warning light illuminated at cruise with eight passengers onboard. We followed all guidance recommended in the abnormal checklist; descended the cabin and aircraft altitude while we diverted where the warning light extinguished at FL290 and remained off through the remainder of the flight. We were unable to contact the company by phone due to Wi-Fi issues. We were successful by AFIS however too late to divert as recommended by dispatch for recovery options. That request would NOT have followed the guidance of 'land as soon as possible' directed by the abnormal checklist. The crew after shutdown walked and postflighted the aircraft to observe no damage nor ajar doors. When the PIC contacted company Maintenance to start the notification processes he was told to defer the light and warning system under 52-1-0. The crew disagreed with that statement and refused to defer the system as it worked correctly throughout the flight; landing and after shutdown. I; SIC; tested the doors listed in the MEL and found all of the doors to function normally by turning on the light when opened and off when closed. The PIC and I was briefed by the previous Captain and crew on their flight the day before when the (red) 'Doors' light illuminated inflight at FL430. The crew followed the Abnormal Checklist and made a descent as soon as possible. The Captain under order of Company Maintenance deferred the 'Doors' light under 52-1-0 of the Falcon 2000 MEL. The crew then flew the aircraft to destination where both crewmembers further discussed the MEL and determined that the MEL did not apply to that situation as the door light functioned correctly. Maintenance performed a quick repair by lubricating the baggage door switch and released the aircraft for flight after removing the write-up and maintenance action for the aircraft logbook. The Captain informed us that he had to rundown the maintenance tech to get the write-up or a copy for his records to be told that he was to remove the entry from the logbook. Unknown to the crew; this aircraft; had experienced this same issue several times prior to their flight and both of those crews argued with the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) and maintenance on whether or not you could defer the issue under 52-1-0. The MEL only provides relief if the system is NOT working correctly and you can ensure that all of the listed doors are secured closed and 'locked'. There is no way to lock the main cabin door nor the emergency exit prior to flight. In addition our SOP's require you to abort for any 'MASTER WARNING' light prior to V1. Maintenance would say that deferring the system does allow you to take off with a (RED) Master Warning Light as nowhere in the MEL does it disable the system. Furthermore the abnormal checklist has you 'Land as soon as possible' ANYTIME the light is on. The Falcon 2000 MEL 52-1-0 needs revision to better advise the exact situation that is deferrable as well as give relief to the SOP's for departure with an illuminated or possible illuminated Master Warning light. Or guidance on how to disable the light for takeoff. Also; guidance on how to check each door prior to flight to absolutely ensure that the door switch is at fault rather than a door bowing affect that will ultimately cause metal fatigue and possible major substantial damage to the door and airframe.Also; I feel that the ACP and Maintenance are not following FOM guidance that the PIC has the ultimate determination as to the airworthiness of the aircraft. We were not as pressured to defer the system as previous crews; however; we were told that this situation was absolutely deferrable and not deferring the problem could cause the issue to be escalated upwards into management. Why is maintenance and the company continually allowing this aircraft to fly with aknown maintenance issue. Spraying only one door switch with lubrication when the light functions correctly on the ground is NOT a correct fix. After 3 events with passengers why was this aircraft not fixed per Falcon's recommended procedures or specific guidance sought from Dassault on the issue?


Synopsis: DA2000 flight crew reports diverting for a door warning light at FL430 in an aircraft that had a history of apparently false door warnings. The crew does not believe that MEL 52-1-0; used to defer an inoperative warning light; is applicable.