elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EGE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Going to EGE outside of RLG ATC cleared us for the LDA/DME RWY 25 approach and to cross RLG at 14;000 feet or above. We crossed RLG above 14;000 feet and then set the DA to 8400 feet before the altitude hold captured and we had not armed the approach yet. We were in VFR conditions and we could see the airport. Then the controller came on and said he had a low-altitude alert and we responded that we had the airport in sight and could we get a visual. The controller then cleared us for a visual to RWY 25.What caused the problem was setting the DH to 8400 before the altitude had captured and before arming the approach. Since it was VFR; we were looking outside more than inside at the panel.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Falcon 2000 flight crew reported they received a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach to EGE.
Date: 201509
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying over Decatur (LUD) and practicing approaches in VMC into the non-towered airport. I decided to climb up to 5;500 to practice changing speed during a climb and descent as I had just read in the Instrument Flying Handbook that this is a good exercise to develop skills. I believed that I was well clear to the west of Class B airspace as I spiraled into my climb. I was wearing a new pair of polarized popup tinted lenses over my prescription eyeglasses. I was focused on the G-1000 glass flight instruments displayed in the PFD and was practicing 'see and avoid'. I did not immediately realize that the MFD was substantially obscured by the polarized lenses. Interestingly; the first thing to be obscured on the MFD seemed to be the blue lines - the magenta and green were still visible. During my turn I spotted the jet approaching and glanced at the MFD for traffic and saw that it was almost black. At first I thought it was malfunctioning; but a slight tilt of my head at that moment showed me that the polarized lenses were the problem and had partially obscured the view of the MFD and that I had strayed into KDFW Class B airspace. I immediately began a left turning rapid descent. I was monitoring Regional Approach (118.1) and I heard the conversation about a possible incursion and realized that it was me. While the PFD display was clear; the MFD; (because of the angle of my polarized lenses?) was dim and almost black. I immediately removed the polarized lenses. I was horrified that I had breached Class B airspace. I have never been told that polarized lenses would black out the glass cockpit view. I take full responsibility for my actions; but I am surprised that I had not experienced this before. I have worn other sunglasses and have not experienced this problem. After the flight; I tried the popup shades on my car's GPS screen and did not experience this darkening of the screen. I wonder if there should be some type of advisory for pilots as to the effect of polarized lenses on glass instrument panels. Again; I take full responsibility for my actions and there is no excuse; but I would like to warn other pilots to be careful when flying a glass cockpit and wearing polarized sunshades.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an airspace incursion when his polarized sunglass lenses interfered with his G1000 display.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Second aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather; Company Policy
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: At 300 feet on the ILS 8L (IAH); the windshear alert and guidance system activated and we accomplished the escape maneuver. We were then vectored for the ILS 8R and the windshear system activated again at approximately 1;200 feet. At the same time; we were maintaining visual separation from an RJ on approach to 8L. When we initiated the escape; we were not able to safely continue straight ahead due to severe weather at 12 o'clock and we also began to encounter hail and had no choice but to turn left towards the RJ traffic. I maintained visual separation during the climbing windshear escape maneuver while crossing well above the traffic. The controller insisted that we fly runway heading but we could not safely comply. We maintained safe separation from the RJ while we turned in the only direction we could go. No TCAS alerts occurred. The controller then cleared us to climb and maintain 3;000 feet; but I was unable to get the aircraft leveled off before reaching 3;900 feet and then descended back to 3;000 feet.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air cargo crew executed two go-arounds at IAH due to windshear system activation with an approaching thunderstorm and then diverted.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: DA42 Twin Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other After Departure
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: The aircraft is a twin DIESEL engine Diamond DA42 which does NOT have the special adapter to indicate that it requires Jet A although it is placarded. Company had a disgruntled employee who despite the instructional aircraft being hangered at Company; placed AV Gas into the tanks. The school didn't have checks and balances on fueling and no new employee orientation. The tanks were 50/50 Jet A/Av Gas and we had burned approximately 1/2-2/3 of the Jet A when Company CSA noticed the 'wrong truck' number on the ticket; confirmed the lineman did indeed put the wrong fuel in and contacted Tower who told us we needed 'to return'. We were well outside Bravo and no communication reason was provided; nor that an [issue] existed. It was only by mistake that we had communication with anyone since we were well outside the Tower's airspace and the school has no flight following policy. Had ZZZ Tower communicated the [event]; we would have landed at ZZZ1 which was very close.  While enroute back; the Instructor used her cell phone to find out that AVGAS had been used to refuel the diesel engine tanks. Planning was then instituted for dual engine failure and potential off airport landing. At that point; ZZZ1 was the closest airport and the flight terminated without incident.  Diamond AC manufactures both diesel and AVgas singles and diesel twins with no gas intake modifications like turbines have to restrict or indicate type of fueling. This WILL happen again or the reverse with dire consequences eventually. Checks and balances on refueling on both the school and the FBO as well as US standards of fuel tank nozzles could also have prevented this. Sumping did nothing as AVGAS is lighter than diesel.




Synopsis: DA42 flight crew reported aircraft was deliberately serviced with the incorrect fuel; causing an immediate diversion.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 300
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LAX
Second aircraft: A380
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi LAX Ground South issued instructions to me while on T taxiway North of 25L and 25R. To taxi 'T; T1; S; short of D; North Route'. There was an A380; South of T1 on S; pointing North. As I began the turn from T1 to S the A380 aircraft began to move forward. I continued to taxi to remain clear of the A380. As we changed frequency to LAX Ground North (121.65) the A380 was telling Ground Control that they had a Near Miss Collision with a turbo prop turning onto S taxiway. I had plenty of room before and after the turn onto taxiway S.Ground control continued to treat us as Normal and nothing was said to us about the incident. The A380 flight crew pushed the issue that it was a near miss collision. Ground control stated they would have a Tower Manager look into the issue. The South controller did not give any instructions to give way to any other aircraft. The 'North Route' has the frequency change at Check Point 1 which is on the S taxiway; North of T1.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: BE300 flight crew reported an A380 pilot communicated to Ground Control of a near collision on the taxiway.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Intake Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Wing and engine anti-ice NOT on for takeoff or departure. During climb out from #1 engine COWL ANTI-ICE light illuminated. #1 Engine ANTI-ICE switch confirmed OFF. #1 COWL VALVE OPEN light NOT illuminated. TAI (Thermal anti-ice indication) NOT displayed on Upper Display Unit. QRH actions completed. COWL ANTI-ICE light remained illuminated; even with #1 throttle reduced to idle. Aircraft leveled at 16000 ft MSL. Contacted [Maintenance Control]; who were unable to provide guidance beyond that contained in QRH. Coordinated with Dispatch for return to [departure airport]. Captain assumed PF (pilot flying) duties prior to top of descent. #1 engine thrust moderated throughout incident. Uneventful overweight landing at [departure airport].QRH procedure for this straight-forward malfunction seems incomplete. Procedure does not direct crew to confirm engine ANTI-ICE switch position; confirm illumination of COWL VALVE OPEN light; or confirm presence of TAI indication on Upper Display Unit. Lacking ANY secondary indications that bleed air is actually being routed to engine cowl; can engine COWL ANTI-ICE procedure be expected to extinguish light? Is accomplishing engine COWL ANTI-ICE procedure warranted with no secondary indications? What is the probability that multiple switch/sensor failures will occur and allow bleed air to enter engine cowl without engine ANTI-ICE switch positioned to ON? If the probability is statistically non-existent; might flight be safely continued with engine COWL ANTI-ICE illuminated while avoiding known icing conditions when no secondary indications are present?Air return to [the departure airport] deemed our safest and appropriate response to an engine COWL ANTI-ICE light that could not be extinguished after compliance with QRH procedure.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a persistent Engine Anti-Ice light on the climb out even after completing the QRH actions.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: YEG.Airport, AB
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower YEG
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We were] given an altitude clearance from 5;500 to 4;500 FT. At this point we called preceding aircraft (A320) and airport in sight. [We were] given 'cleared for the visual' Runway 12. As I turned onto final; I was below the glide slope [and] I felt the first signs of wake turbulence. My attempt was to level off and capture the glide slope [and] was also given instructions to slow to 170 KTS. The result was a climb from about 5;200 to 5;800 FT. When we were asked by Approach what our altitude was; we told them. At no time were we above the glide slope. Airport and aircraft remained in sight. [We were] asked to call Departure on the ground for an explanation. They informed me that another aircraft was above me being vectored for another Runway (20) and that my climb was a concern.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Q400 experienced wake turbulance from an A320 on approach to YEG.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Dispatching an aircraft with 5000 lbs remaining at destination is questionable at best. If we were to have a technical issue with the landing gear (for example); this would leave almost no time to troubleshoot before we were forced to land. The fact that; in reality; we landed with less than 4000 lbs while incurring no unforeseen delays would make such a flight not only ill advised; but downright dangerous. My suggestive corrective action is not to put minuscule fuel savings over the absolute safety of flight in everyday operations.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported concern regarding low amount of fuel on board per flight plan.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I showed up at the gate to a jet that was parked overnight with no visible signs of frost or ice on the wings or fuselage. the Captain and I talked about my walk around and if I saw any ice on the underside of the wings; fuselage and tail. The only ice was a small thin line of ice under the wing root of the right wing that when I touched it; it slid off as it was melting. The weather was overcast at about 3000 feet; visibility was greater than 10; winds out of the north and just above freezing. I did the walk around and told the Captain what I saw. We both agreed that since no ice was present on the wings fuselage or tail that we did not need to deice. We configured the aircraft and began to taxi. As we were taxing the Captain got a call from the cabin from a pilot that asked if we noticed the ice. He didn't say where; and we just assumed he was talking about what I saw earlier. We said we saw it and he didn't say another word and hung up. Takeoff cruise and landing were uneventful. After taxi in the deadheading pilot said the ice was under the slats and had some choice words about our decision to take off. The weather the day before was light snow; and the plane had sat for a few days. I had never considered there would be ice under the slats; so I didn't consider moving them prior to my walk around. There was no circumstantial evidence for me to even consider the above facts. Nor even deicing. In the future; if it is near or below freezing with known previous weather phenomena and a jet that has sat overnight or longer; I will drop the slats and do a further investigation prior to declining to deice. And once a Deadheading pilot says something; I should be more proactive in getting the data the that pilot has on hand. I do not think any additional training is needed; just another lesson learned.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a deadheading pilot advised that there was ice on the aircraft prior to departure; but the crew took off anyway.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While level at FL310; Center cleared us to descend to FL240. Pilot Monitoring (PM) read back FL240; and I set 24;000 in the altitude selector. After set; I verbalized the change and started the descent. The PM looked at it and questioned whether it was FL240 or FL230. While I was confident that it was FL240; the PM seemed uneasy about the selection; so I recommended that he verify the altitude with ATC. While I do not recall the exact response; it did sound like ATC told us to climb to FL340. At this point the PM became concerned that we were descending when; he assumed; we should be climbing. He immediately grabbed the controls and tried to override the autopilot. Realizing what he was doing; I also grabbed the controls; disengaged the autopilot (AP) and said; I have the aircraft. When I disengaged the AP; due to the control pressures that the PM had on the controls; it created a snap movement in the flight path. We climbed back up to FL310; having lost less than 200 feet. Once level; we reengaged the AP; received clarification from ATC with the statement; 'Aircraft X; descend; maintain FL240.' After re-establishing the descent; the PM called to the back to check on the passengers and flight attendants. It was at this time that the aft Flight Attendant (FA); briefly left the floor and banged her leg; which she believed would leave a bruise. On the ground; as soon as possible we checked with her again to make sure that she was ok and asked her what she wanted to do. She informed us that she was fine to continue; but would file a [report]. The confusion to ATC's response to our request for verification and the PMs valid concern of an altitude deviation led to a knee jerk reaction to a situation that; though timeliness was essential; a few extra seconds to assess the situation could have; at the very least; eliminated an injury; even a mild one.




Synopsis: CRJ900 First Officer reported a miscommunication with ATC and the Captain. Both pilots manipulated the flight controls causing a brief negative g flight maneuver causing injury to a flight attendant.