elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight at DTW; our flight plan route was as follows 'DUNKS.J70.PMM...' our PDC said cleared PALACE 7 Departure; so we loaded the PALACE 7. When doing the Route/Legs check; I noticed that the waypoint 'ALPHE' was not in the box but it was on the flight plan Legs page as a point between DUNKS and PMM. Crosschecking the PALACE 7 Departure also did not show a point called ALPHE; but instead showed a point called 'LESSY.' We called Clearance Delivery to clarify; and he indicated that he had come across this issue before; that LESSY and ALPHE were about 1.5 miles apart; both along J70; but that if we removed the PALACE 7 Departure; that ALPHE would no longer be displayed in our legs page. Since we were cleared for the PALACE 7; we elected to leave it in the box and I just entered LESSY in the fix page.After takeoff; ATC eventually cleared us direct ALPHE; on course. To summarize: the flight plan showed 'DUNKS - J70 - PMM' the PALACE 7 shows 'DUNKS - LESSY - PMM' along J709. The legs page after entering the PALACE 7 showed 'DUNKS - ALPHE - PMM.' The High Chart said 'DUNKS - J709 - PMM' with no waypoints between DUNKS and PMM. The Low Chart showed DUNKS - LESSY - etc. - PMM' along V170; with no 'ALPHE.' So; we could not find the fix 'ALPHE' on the PALACE 7; High or Low charts; but it is in the FMS database as well as a fix that ATC cleared us to. How are supposed to navigate to an uncharted fix? This was very confusing and I don't think it is a good idea to have ATC assign a fix or have a fix on the flight plan legs that we cannot find on a chart. Perhaps Jeppesen or ATC can add the fix to the charts if they are going to use them; or a note on a 10-7 page would help alleviate the confusion?




Synopsis: A B737NG pilot discovered after entering the PALACE 7 Departure during preflight; that departure waypoint LESSY was replaced by high altitude airway waypoint ALPHE; approximately 1.8 NM prior it. Both waypoints are on J70 but LESSY is a departure waypoint while ALPHE is a J70/J34 intersection.
Date: 201509
Location: MMV.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E P80
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I'm a CFII and was instructing an IFR lesson; we were holding at LUSEY on the missed approach out of ILS 22 MMV and on our outbound leg we were hit by a green laser. I reported the incident to ATC and idented the transponder; then I turned off the taxi/landing/strobe lights and over flew the laser. Upon turning off the lights the laser lost us but I could still see where it was coming from. I over flew it; reported to Portland Approach then turned back all of the lights. Upon turning on the lights; the laser found us again. ATC asked for me to copy the phone number for the Port of Portland Police and to call them. I called them and made a report; then Portland TRACON called me back; we spoke and they asked me to call the Sheriff in McMinnville; I did and gave them the best description that I could of where the laser could have come from. I realized after the fact that I may have broken a rule in turning off my taxi/landing/strobe lights while flying at night. That was not my intention; my intention was solely to remove myself as a visible target for the laser. I was in Radar contact and knew that I was the only aircraft in the area; so I didn't think that there was a hazard in me turning my taxi/landing/strobe lights off; but while it made me harder for the laser operator to see; it made me harder for other aircraft to see. I realize that what I should have done was just immediately vacated the area and put the laser on my tail which is how I plan to conduct myself henceforth.




Synopsis: C172 instructor pilot reports being illuminated by a green laser during a night training flight. All exterior lights are turned off to evade the laser operator and the incident is reported to ATC and the local police.
Date: 201702
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were assigned to perform an air-start for an aircraft with an inoperative APU. The staffing program run by local management assigned this task to completely unqualified personnel. This caused major confusion and extreme risk to the agents and equipment involved. The standard operating procedure is to start aircraft engine Number 1. The flight deck started aircraft engine Number 2. The airstart unit was connected from the Number 2 engine side; causing the agent unhooking the unit to be dangerously close to a running engine.




Synopsis: Air carrier Ground Operations employee reported that unqualified personnel were assigned to air-start an aircraft resulting in extreme risk to personnel and equipment.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: DA62
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was on the ILS XX into ZZZ during a night flight on an IFR flight plan in VMC conditions. When I put the gear handle down; I heard the gear lower but I did not get 3 green light indication. I quickly referenced and executed the failed gear check list and [notified ATC] on tower frequency when the gear lights still failed to illuminate. I asked to do a low pass by the tower for a visual check on the gear; and was granted permission. Tower said that it appeared my gear was down. I asked tower to send a truck to the approach end of XX to tell me if they could see my gear when I got to short final; and they agreed to do that. I was handed back to Approach and was vectored back around to the ILS XX. While on short final the truck said they could see my gear down. I made a normal landing and taxied back to my hangar without incident.I later learned that there is a bug in the DA62 that is not described in the AFM. If you dim the G1000 screens at all then the 3 green landing lights do not illuminate when the gear is lowered. I had the screens dimmed slightly; which apparently prevented the landing [gear] lights from illuminating. I was unaware of this glitch; now I know.




Synopsis: DA62 pilot reported a design deficiency in the aircraft lighting dimmer system resulted in an erroneous gear indication.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working final for LGA. LGA was on the LOC 31 approach and departing 31 due to high winds. CRJ 200 was crossing over the localizer on a 060 heading. I descended CRJ 200 to 3;000 feet. I then issued instructions to other planes. Then I instructed CRJ 200 to 'reduce speed to 180 then descend and maintain 2;000 feet.' The pilot read back '180 then 2;000.' I then issued other instruction to other aircraft. And I notice CRJ 200 turning Southbound and heading directly to another air carrier on the final which was at 1;700 feet. Since there was another plane left of CRJ 200 at 2;000 feet on a parallel heading; I decided to climb CRJ 200 and have the plane turn to the right putting the aircraft over the other air carrier. Separation was reduced to about .5 miles and several hundred feet. One disturbing aspect to the event was that the aural Conflict Alert did not sound. There was only a visual Conflict Alert on my scope. I believe this is due to the fact that the separation event was happening within 7 miles of the LGA airport. I believe that the aural alarms are disabled in the TRACON within 7 miles of the airport. If this is the case; I strongly suggest that this procedure should be stopped immediately. Enable the aural alarms with no restriction of DME from the airport. I strongly suggest that this procedure should be stopped immediately.




Synopsis: N90 Controller described a conflict event involving LGA landing aircraft when an aircraft apparently confused the instructions to reduce speed to 180 KTS; turning to 180 instead; the Controller noting the aural CA did not activate.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Second aircraft: Widebody Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Momentary loss of control during takeoff. ORD ATIS indicated winds at 180/11 for our Runway 28R (full length) takeoff. Just prior to our takeoff ATC had cleared Aircraft Y to cross our runway and hold short of 28C; somewhere near mid-runway; if I recall correctly. While initial takeoff roll was uneventful; we had a sudden and aggressive yaw to the left which had me (as pilot flying) suspect we had an engine failure; but there was no loss of thrust. Aircraft responded well to corrective rudder inputs; but was destabilized by the event. Within second of the event we strongly suspected that the engine thrust of the freighter was causal to our sudden yaw to the left. Advised ATC upon being asked to switch to Departure frequency that we had concern over this event; but did not advise we would be submitting a report. However; given the possibility of far more negative consequences had the event occurred at a lower airspeed (such as if we had had an intersection departure); I now feel that a report is warranted to investigate the specific details of this event; and prevent a future loss of control on takeoff event which could lead to a hull loss and/or fatalities. Hold all heavy and larger aircraft facing runway so as to prevent engine thrust impact on landing and departing aircraft.




Synopsis: Large Transport Captain reported a Widebody Transport crossed runway he was departing resulted in momentary loss of control due to the Widebody Transport's jet blast.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying in cruise and realized the radio had been quiet for too long. I tried to talk to Center; it may have been Fort Worth center at the time; I have forgotten which; but received no answer. I noticed my volts were not where they should have been. The volts were slowly decreasing and the amp meter read discharging. I assumed the volts were not powerful enough for me to transmit radio so I started trying multiple frequencies and trouble shooting. It was a beautiful flying day so as long as I didn't smell burning I wasn't concerned with the electrical enough for me to drastically change my current situation with nearby unfamiliar fields and inability to speak to anyone. I knew I could trouble shoot and be on the ground at an unpolished airport in 30 minutes; only slightly longer than any other quicker choice may have presented; but with more confidence in my plan and less time spent researching nearer options. Once I discovered the problem I descended to lowest safe altitude and landed without incident. I called [Flight Service] and told them that I had lost contact while under flight following with Center. The problem and issue were resolved and I continued on the next day.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported loss of communications due to possible alternator failure.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing on 27L at ORD; cleared the runway at A1 and joined Bravo. The unspoken rule in ORD is 'don't stop moving' unless Ground tells you to. I proceeded down B expecting to be cleared to [the] gate or to the holding block if not available. Ground Control was congested and I was approaching A3 with no contact yet. An Airbus was holding short of B on the west side of B; slightly beyond the hold bars; as he was probably told to hold short of B with late notice.(This will happen often when an aircraft clears at A1 such as we did). Proceeding past the Airbus required me to proceed very slowly to insure wingtip clearance with his nose. At this point ORD ground finally made contact (with a quip about me plowing right through); asked our gate; and cleared us to [that gate]. Ground did not seem to have a problem with my actions. Right after we acknowledged instructions to the gate; an unidentified comment came across 'he nearly clipped us'. I have to assume this was [the] Airbus referring to my passing. We proceeded past [the] Airbus with complete caution and had no doubt we were clear of his aircraft as we passed. This event only caused me concern due to the comment by [the] Airbus. I do not believe I deviated from 'normal' ORD procedures and did not receive any feedback from ORD ground.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported that; while taxiing to the gate at ORD; the pilot of another aircraft  expressed concern about the perceived insufficient separation.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flaps set incorrectly for takeoff. New First Officer; getting used to normal cockpit duties and flows; was given last-minute runway and ATIS change during taxi out.  We discussed the changes; reviewed the [computer] changes; programmed the FMS with [computer] changes; reviewed the departure instructions; and were given an immediate takeoff clearance. We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and I (Captain) ran a reference FATS check (Flaps; Fuel; Altitudes; Trim Settings; Airspeeds set) but failed to set the parking brake and rerun the Before Taxi Checklist as I usually do; and therefore missed reselecting the flaps to position 5.  We proceeded with our takeoff with a flap 1 setting for the previous runway selection; even though the FMC was programmed with flap 5 speeds.As Captain; I knew the new First Officer (FO) was burdened with a lot of last-minute changes and should have set the parking brake to allow time to complete the previous checklist.  Rushing has no favorable outcome. The flaps position could be rechecked on another pre-takeoff checklist if our airline would put it there. Selecting the flaps position prior to the taxi off the gate and never rechecking this critical setting always seemed strange to me.  This is not an excuse; however; for my errors as I should have stopped the jet on the taxiway or cancelled takeoff clearance to rerun the Before Taxi Checklist; which are my normal triggers for checking flap settings on the [computer]. Additive factors were: slight fatigue first flight of the day after a loud night at the hotel with Spring Break parties; the FO being new has no triggers to recheck the flap settings; and even my own trigger; the FATS check; which showed flaps set to something other than up; and the takeoff warning horn not sounding on the thrust lever burst during taxi checks.


Second narrative: Due to second ATIS request; I failed to have the takeoff INIT page up on my FMS when showing the Captain the [computer] to review the takeoff numbers. Thankfully; speeds only differed by one to two knots and stopping margin went from approximately 2;100 feet to 2;000 feet. I didn't realize the error until calling. 'set speed; flaps 1; climb thrust.'


Synopsis: A B737-700 flight crew reported they took off with flaps set incorrectly after a late change to departure runway.