Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Fatigue; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This narrative is the First Officer's sequence of events occurring during a two day period. The events leading up to this flight operation are discussed in my previous report and involved separate maintenance discrepancies. At the conclusion of my previous report; all pertinent maintenance discrepancies were resolved. The Captain and I reported for duty mid-morning. We departed and proceeded on course. Our planned cruise altitude was FL240; due to MEL 21-51-XX-XX RH Air Conditioning Pack. Approximately 5-10 minutes after reaching cruise; we received multiple EICAS master caution messages. I was pilot monitoring (PM) and the Captain was pilot flying (PF). The first EICAS message I observed was 'GEN 2 OFF' master caution; followed by the autopilot disconnect chime and a flash of our PFD and MFD screens. Within 5-10 seconds after that message; the second EICAS message I observed was IDG 2. This IDG 2 message posted and cleared several times; then became steady. I looked on the overhead panel and observed that the IDG 2 switch-light indicated 'FAULT.' The Captain took the controls and began hand-flying; and asked me what the problem was. I explained to the Captain that GEN 2 had switched off; and we had an IDG 2 fault. I told the Captain I felt that the IDG malfunction most likely tripped the generator offline. We also had several other EICAS messages; including STAB/MACH TRIM and R WSHLD and R WINDOW HEAT messages. We then re-engaged the autopilot.The Captain called for the IDG 2 QRH checklist. I completed the checklist; which directed me set GEN 2 to RESET/OFF; to confirm and disconnect IDG 2; and then to start the APU and turn on the APU GEN. I completed the checklist and reported the pertinent checklist notes to the Captain. At this point; we then ran the QRH checklists for trim and window/windshield heat messages; which all were resolved (I felt these messages all came from the momentary power interruption when the IDG/GEN failed). The Captain and I then discussed the scenario and felt we had completed all of the QRH checklists properly. The QRH did not advise any flight deviations; so we decided it was safe to continue our flight to our filed destination. We were in the process of contacting dispatch to ensure we could account for the APU fuel burn when we were interrupted. Approximately 5 minutes after the IDG event; we received an APU OIL TEMP master caution message. The Captain called for the APU OIL TEMP QRH checklist. I ran the checklist; which first directed me to transfer the packs (one was deferred) to the engines (which had already been accomplished during climb; per the MEL procedure). The QRH then asked if the APU was required. I answered 'YES' to this question; as our APU GEN was required to be operating per the IDG 2 QRH checklist. The Captain agreed with this. I followed the QRH; which directed us to monitor the APU indications and land at the nearest suitable airport. I discussed this with the Captain; and we both acknowledged that if the APU failed; we would be down to one operating electric generator. The Captain told me we would divert; and we began to split up duties in the flight deck. The Captain asked if I knew of any nearby airports; and I quickly referenced my EFB and the 'AIRPORTS' option of the FMS MFD display. I observed an airport directly east; within 5-10 miles; of the aircraft. The Captain quickly made a search of all airports within our nearest airport cone. We checked the distance to our departure airport and noted it was approximately 75 miles. Thus; the Captain made the decision that the nearby airport would be our best diversion point. He began to coordinate with ATC; and I completed all necessary diversion tasks. I obtained the ATIS; conducted a landing distance assessment; modified our FMS destination and flight plan; and loaded/briefed the instrument approach. The Captain continued flying and coordinated with ATC. The Captain also momentarily asked me to help him send an ACARS to our Dispatcher; in which we said the aircraft had multiple maintenance problems and we were diverting. The dispatcher replied and agreed; and she amended our dispatch release to reflect the diversion. The Captain and I then briefed the landing; discussed any additional threats and our mitigation plan; and finally completed the normal checklists and flows. The remainder of the flight was operated without incident and within all our company procedures. Due to time constraints; I did not make a PA to the cabin; but we did give our passengers the 10;000 ft sterile cockpit bells. Please note the only passengers on-board were a company flight attendant and two company mechanics. Thus; we felt that they would be adequately understanding of the situation; and that our flight attendant would ensure the cabin was ready for landing. The Captain and I did discuss declaring an emergency; but we felt the flight conditions were safe and under control. We did agree that if the APU and APU GEN failed; we would declare an emergency. Upon landing; we coordinated with ATC and another air carrier's station and obtained a parking location. We also sent our dispatcher another ACARS message detailing the problems. Once we parked the aircraft at the gate; the Captain and I shut the aircraft down and completed all relevant checklists. The Captain made a telephone call to dispatch; and I walked back into the cabin and explained the situation to our flight attendant and mechanics.The Captain made two logbook entries: 'IDG 2 master caution in cruise flight. Complied with QRH.' and 'APU OIL TEMP master caution while on one [engine] generator due to IDG 2 caution. Complied with QRH.' The mechanics consulted with Maintenance Control and began inspecting the aircraft on the ramp. One of the mechanics relayed to me the status of the aircraft when I walked out to observe their work. He said the IDG on the right engine 'was most likely shot' and pointed out the oil filter was in pressure bypass mode. He said he felt it would be unsafe to try and service the IDG; but rather that it needed to be replaced. There was no oil leak observed by myself or the mechanics inside the engine cowling. The mechanic then reported to me that he checked the APU oil level; and that it was 'very low.' The mechanic reported there were no oil leaks observed inside the APU's titanium box. Upon further questioning by myself of how the low oil level occurred; the mechanic said he did not know. He remarked that APU oil levels should be regularly checked during CRJ-200 line/service checks. Ultimately; the mechanics deferred the IDG 2 and serviced and leak-checked the APU oil as the corrective actions for the two maintenance log entries. When I returned to the cockpit; the Captain informed me that Dispatch and Crew Scheduling had requested for us to take an FAR 117 flight duty period extension to complete the flight segment into our filed destination; to avoid it being cancelled. The Captain and I both agreed we were tired; and after a long sit at the previous airport and subsequent diversion; did not feel safe operating past the FDP limits. Thus; we rejected the extension. Crew Scheduling then provided all five of us (pilots; flight attendant; and mechanics) with hotel rooms. We were released from duty very late at night.Day TwoThe Captain and I reported for duty at mid-morning. We proceeded to the aircraft and began our pre-flight preparations. Two MELs had been applied - the IDG 2 (MEL 24-11-XX-XX) and APU OIL CHECK (related to IDG 2). The mechanics inspected the APU oil level and made an entry in the logbook. The Captain and I were satisfied with these entries and corrective actions; and the preflight inspection revealed no further abnormalities. We did also have an unrelated MEL - RH Air Conditioning Pack (MEL 21-51-XX-XX); which was also satisfactory. I was pilot flying (PF) for this leg; so I conducted the departure briefing. At the conclusion of the briefing; I read through each MEL with the Captain and discussed operational restrictions. I observed that we were limited to a minimum flight weight of 38;500 LBS per MEL 24-11-XX-XX. Since our aircraft was very light (3 passengers; 2 pilots); I told the Captain that we may have an issue with this limitation. We reviewed our weight numbers and confirmed that we would be landing well below this minimum flight weight for landing; as planned in our dispatch release. The Captain remarked this was a 'good catch;' and he made a phone call to Dispatch. Our dispatcher decided to add approximately 4;000 LBS of fuel; which would have us landing at just over 39;000 LBS. We found this to be an acceptable solution. We uplifted the additional fuel; and safely conducted the flight without incident and within all company SOPs.  I believe the biggest threat in this situation was the cascade of multiple system EICAS messages in a confined period of time. I feel that the Captain and I did a great job properly managing the workload and addressing the situation in a timely manner. Further; the Captain was quick to divide duties on the flight deck and ensure that one pilot was flying the aircraft and monitoring ATC; while the other pilot was able to perform troubleshooting and QRH duties. After the fact; I again reviewed the logbook for our aircraft. I was very surprised to find two entries a month earlier; which described almost word for word the scenario that we encountered. 'In climb IDG DISC status message on number 2 engine.' 'After APU start - APU OIL TEMP caution.' The aircraft appeared to have diverted following these issues; as both pages stated 'ZZZ' as the station. The corrective action for the IDG 2 DISC message was a reset/could not duplicate; while the corrective action for the APU OIL TEMP message was adding 3/4 qt of oil to the APU. Of note; the next logbook described a replacement of the IDG 2 with a new unit. Thus; it appears that this aircraft encountered a very similar event less than a month ago. The IDG 2 was replaced; but it seems the corrective action for the APU being low on oil was simply to fill up the oil and sign off the logbook. Again; this is indicative of a 'keep the airplane moving' mentality across our company. Given our APU was again low on oil; most likely there is a bigger problem with the APU on this specific aircraft that was never identified or purposefully ignored by our maintenance. Lastly; after the MEL 24-11-XX-XX was applied; there appears to be no 'check' in our system for dispatch to comply with the minimum flight weight of 38;500 LBS. If the Captain and I had not caught this error; we would have most likely been dispatched in a condition contrary to the MEL. Perhaps our Operations and dispatch need to develop some kind of performance check to ensure this limitation is automatically flagged on dispatch releases in the future.I think the biggest thing to learn from this event is that it is imperative for a Captain and First Officer to develop a positive working synergy on the flight deck. I feel that the Captain's CRM allowed for us to work together extremely well; and we quickly and easily completed the diversion. Further; I believe this report again shows the negative safety culture of 'keep the airplane moving' and 'controllable completion factor' at our carrier. I believe for a write-up like this; there needs to be some kind of 'big picture' troubleshooting; or at least a more comprehensive monitoring of the parts involved. If the APU had been placed on an oil watch; maintenance may have established why it was 3-4 qts low on oil a month earlier; and we would have never needed to go through the situation of diverting.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported diverting for IDG and APU problems. They discovered that a month earlier another crew had a similar experience with the exact same outcome.