elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Flight was] second leg of IOE. I (in left seat on Captain IOE) was flying as Pilot Flying. After departure; EICAS 'HYD QTY R' warning illuminated. Secured right hydraulic system according to QRH. Verbally conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance and continued flight. Received ACARS message that this issue had occurred on this jet 5 times recently; and it was a suspected bad sensor. Normal descent and visual approach to ZZZ ILS XXL. On approach; I called for the QRH Deferred Items Landing Checklist. Pilot Monitoring reestablished right hydraulic system per QRH. Right hydraulic quantity began to decrease from 0.44 to the low 0.30s on landing. Crew noticed acrid smell immediately after the right hydraulic system was pressurized. Smell dissipated after 10-15 seconds. Approach was briefed and flown as Flaps 25; Autobrakes 1; and stable. Flare was initiated at 30 feet and power was reduced to idle; speed within limits. Flare was not aggressive enough leading to firm touchdown and no bounce. Jumpseater noticed the autobrakes kicked off and called out 'No Autobrakes' immediately on touchdown. I was concerned that the R system hydraulic loss contributed to this; and then considered that the right engine reverser might also be inoperative. After spoiler deployment; nose pitched up rapidly to approximately 12 degrees. The Pilot Monitoring (Line Check Airman) and I pushed the nose back down to 10 degrees and then the Line Check Airman discontinued control inputs. I then gently lowered the nose to the runway. Landing roll and taxi-in both normal. On post flight inspection; pilots found hydraulic fluid leaking and puddling under left wing and Tail Scrape Damage Limiter worn down as evidence of tailskid contact and reported it to Maintenance Control and Chief Pilot.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a tailstrike during a firm landing following a Hydraulic System malfunction.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System - Indicating and Warning
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Prior to departure no MEL items were listed [as deferred]. We departed on schedule; pushed back; and upon left engine start I noticed an amber ENG BLEED L EICAS message was displayed. I queried the CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer); and the CA responded that the [Maintenance Release] now listed a MEL for a bleed pressure sensor Status Message. I was also busy coordinating with the flight attendants about the short taxi; so my attention was diverted among several issues. I fished out the [Maintenance Release]; read it as best I could in the dim light; and determined that there was a left engine bleed issue relating to a bleed pressure sensor; and that the message could be displayed as part of the MEL. We then departed. In cruise flight; and after I returned from my rest break; I again inquired about the bleed failure; and that there are usually some operational limitations that go along with that. In our case; there were none. I checked the AIR schematics page and saw that; in fact; we had no bleed air from the left engine; and were using the bleed air from the right engine only. I again read the MEL and it sounded like we might have been given the wrong MEL for the issue we were facing; or the issue we were originally MEL'ed for had become a larger issue. With what we were seeing; we should have been given MEL 361 rather than 362. The CA sent a message to [Maintenance Control] who agreed that the issue we had was different than was MEL 362 would have covered. [Maintenance Control] provided a 777 [flight manual] reference to this issue; and ultimately a reset of the bleed switch was performed; which allowed the left engine to again supply bleed air normally. The flight continued and landed at the intended destination without issue. The CA sent in an ELB message regarding the engine bleed.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer reported incorrect MEL assigned resulting in abnormal operational pneumatic configuration.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nacelle/Pylon Fairing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: There is a common condition on the 787-8 and 787-9 aircraft where Maintenance is finding and documenting heat damage to the engine pylon aft inboard fairings. The finish has been found deteriorated and/or missing from the carbon fiber fairing panel just above the heat shield. The normal interim repair for this condition per the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) 54-51-70-03b- 661a-a is to make a temporary seal on the panel per step 2e (1) with speed tape. The repair has a re-inspect interval of 400 hrs. to check the condition of the speed tape and reapply if necessary. These temporary repairs are not coming close to lasting the 400 hrs. between inspections; which could allow water ingression into the panel and eventual failure of the panel requiring replacement. [Three aircraft] had the speed tape re-applied per the SRM procedure on in ZZZ and when the aircraft returned the tape was missing and had to be re-applied. I believe this repair needs to be re-addressed and the procedure changed to address the exposure to extreme heat and air flow over the damaged area. Also; I believe the inspection interval should be lowered to match the general re-inspection requirement of 100 hours as required for speed tape re-inspection in AFMM 20-11-33.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports that interim repair to 787 engine pylon not working.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DAL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Received a runway change from 13L to 13R after taxi out. No hotspots for 13R; but due to construction; taxi out was a threat; so we kept our heads up until established on Taxiway A. After taxiing on Taxiway A; FO went heads down and I started to prepare for the departure plan briefing.I crosschecked my EFB with my taxi track and identified the hold short line as an ILS hold short line due to the position of the line. I went over; stopped; and we briefed the departure plan; did Before Takeoff Checklist; and subsequently looked for the hold short line. We saw one on the right/First Officer side and behind us.There was an aircraft on final during this; but due to the position of the hold short line; there was no conflict and the aircraft landed normally. Tower never said anything either; but we found it worth mentioning.We were both distracted due to yet another checklist to be accomplished. It would also have helped if I knew the runway symbology; difference between a runway hold short line vs ILS hold short line. I do now.


Second narrative: While stopping to read the Departure Checklist because of a runway change; we crossed the hold short line for 13R in DAL. Do away with so many checklists. I feel my attention is sometimes diverted with all the briefs and checklists.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported crossing the hold line for Runway 13R in DAL due to the Captain believing it was an ILS hold line and not the runway hold line.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B NYC
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Utilizing Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) out of LaGuardia; our manual suggests writing the clearance on the flight plan. I mention this to all the First Officers. Many of them do not know this. With CPDLC there's no way to print the clearance. We were cleared to LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure Coney transition. Since we are unable to print I mentioned we should write it on the flight plan; [but] the First Officer did not. We went to the FMC; pulled up the LAGUARDIA FIVE Departure; [but] there were no transitions and no way to select Runway 13. We were both puzzled so I suggested we'll just double check with Tower or they will tell us what to do. Because 30 minutes had elapsed; we did not double check with Tower on the clearance; they just cleared us for takeoff. Once airborne Departure said 'were you given the Coney departure?' I said no. My mistake; they gave us another heading [and] never mentioned anything else. My mistake for being nice; in the future I will demand the First Officers write the clearance on the flight plans. However we are going paperless so where are you going to write these clearances?Because of CPDLC on the 737 and the inability to print the clearance; there's not a directive outlined in our manual directing us what to do. Some First Officers will take a picture on their phone of the clearance page on the CPDLC FMC. I suggest to most of the First Officer's our [manual] requires us to write the clearance on the international flight plan and a domestic flight plan. Many of them doubt me on this; I usually have to pull out the manual and show them.This was my mistake for not catching the Coney on the FMC; and [not] thoroughly reading the departure SID. Even though I asked the First Officer to write the clearance on the flight plan; in the future I will demand the First Officers do this! And failure to follow up with Tower on departure instructions. Part of this is because we don't have said guidance on the new procedure of CPDLC clearances.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when they misinterpreted the Controller Pilot Data link Communications (CPDLC) departure clearance.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Las Vegas Ground assigned us Runway 26R.  We were cleared for takeoff; provided we had visual separation with an A321 and we did have visual separation.  Our takeoff data called for a Flaps 1 takeoff; which requires a slightly longer takeoff roll.  After the takeoff roll on [Runway] 26R; I was hand flying the aircraft during the initial climb.  At about 500 ft. AGL; we encountered wake turbulence from the A321.  This is what caused the stick shaker to activate.  I immediately stated; 'Stall'; and pitched the nose of the aircraft down; announced 'Max Thrust' and applied Max Thrust by pushing the thrust levers past their detents.  We regained speed almost immediately but due to the nose down pitch to recover from the stall; we received an EGPWS warning.  We received this EGPWS warning as I was pitching back up to continue our climb after the stall recovery.  The EGPWS warning did not last more than one auditory message and it was gone.  We advised Las Vegas Tower of the situation and were then transferred to Las Vegas Approach; where we continued the remainder of the flight without incident.  In the end; we believe we only lost about 100 feet from the stall recovery before continuing our climb on the departure.  After looking back; there are two things in my mind that possibly could have helped.  One would be to have re-sent for the takeoff data to get a flaps 2 takeoff; which would have allowed us to have a shorter takeoff roll.  However; there was no way of knowing we would encounter the wake of another aircraft and had no reason to believe a flaps 1 takeoff would not suffice.  The second thing I think that could have helped was to delay our takeoff roll slightly for about 15-30 more seconds to have a bit more separation from the other aircraft.  At the end of the day the stall recovery procedure was performed by the standards it is trained and the flight was completed without injury or incident.




Synopsis: EMB-175 First Officer reported a wake turbulence encounter climbing out of 500 feet AGL departing LAS in trail of an A321 that resulted in a stick shaker and an uncommanded descent that triggered an EGPWS warning.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On arrival...; ATC assigned 5;000 feet & and slow to 160 kts.  Our next Clearence was to maintain 5;000 feet until [FIX] cleared ILS 36L. The First Officer was still a low time first officer and wanted to slow to landing configuration on schedule; so we did.  After contacting tower; they asked our speed and we replied we were at our Vref.  They said we were supposed to fly last assigned speed. So we sped up to 160 kts.  However we were cleared for the approach and neither of us recalled a speed restriction nor did I recall reading back one to ATC. Tower turned us off the approach and we were vectored around to try it again.  No further issues were encountered.




Synopsis: Flight crew; initially cleared to 5;000 feet and 160 knots; slowed to Vref after being cleared for an ILS Approach. When switched to Tower frequency; Tower advised that the flight was supposed to maintain 160 knots. Aircraft was vectored around for another ILS Approach.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise portion of [flight]; the helicopter began to lose power. Manifold pressure climbed; RPMs climbed and oil temperature climbed into the red. I decided to divert to [a suitable alternate] to avoid a possible engine failure and possible emergency landing where a mechanic could diagnose the problem (still ongoing).




Synopsis: Robinson R44 pilot reported he diverted to an alternate airport for a precautionary landing when he began to lose power.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: AVL.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E AVL
ATC / advisory: TRACON AVL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Going in to Asheville airport (AVL) we were cleared for the visual approach runway 35 on a perpendicular course to the south at 8;000 feet. We had to rush down to make the speed and configuration changes needed to get on the approach. We were using the ILS frequency as backup. We were intercepting the localizer from the south and were slightly below glideslope at UMUXE when we got a ground proximity warning from the aircraft. I (being pilot flying) immediately stopped the descent and leveled off as we had visual references to the ground. The warning went away and we continued the approach without incident.


Second narrative: A more thorough brief of the approach plate; even though it was only backup; could have prevented the GPWS. Also asking ATC for vectors to the final would have prevented the warning as well. The hill that set the warning off is small on the plate and easy to look over.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach at dusk to AVL airport.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Nine hours into shift; volunteered to go on a 'road-trip' to another airport to remove and replace a faulty component. I hurried to grab my tools; references etc. I was given a part; and got on the road. Drove 3.5 hours; removed and replaced part; no fault messages. Aircraft is fixed and I completed a successful road trip. Or so I thought...  What I did not realize is the part I was given was not 'effective' for the aircraft. I did not request the part myself; it was requested by our Maintenance Controller. This individual is not at fault however; because he requested the correct part. The Parts System we use to request parts recognized the part I was given as 'Interchangeable With' the correct part. Unfortunately it may be interchangeable; but it is not 'effective' for the aircraft I was working on. But once again the blame rests solely on me. Had I double checked the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) to verify the difference between the two parts I would've been able to extinguish this whole situation. So as you can see; many factors came into effect: never dealing with these two different parts; I was given a part instead of requesting it myself; rushing out the door; long drive; and high hours on the job. But I consider none of these factors in any way as an excuse. I enjoy going on road trips; I have always considered them a great learning experience. And I don't consider this any differently. I have learned from the mistake I made and intend to be much more careful about part effectivity in the future. [Contributing factor was] not double checking/verifying the 'Effectivity' of the part given to me. [Recommend] not trusting the system we use to request parts. Aircraft overnighting at ZZZ1 gate. Complacency.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports replacing a faulty component on an EMB-135 aircraft with a part identified by their Parts Computer System as being 'Interchangeable with' the part he removed. The new part was interchangeable; but not 'Effective' for the aircraft. Mechanic noted the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) had the correct information; but was not used to verify.