elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 40
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-23-250 Aztec
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After completing maneuvers in the practice area; we went to shoot the RNAV Runway XX into ZZZ. This approach was done under the hood with the left engine throttle closed for a simulated engine out approach. This approach was done successfully with a few touch and goes done afterwards. After completing the touch and goes we contacted approach; and went back to the Practice Area. After the engines warmed up to ideal operating temperature; due to the warmer weather we decided we were going to shut down the right engine entirely and feather the engine. Pulling the mixture to idle cutoff; and prop lever to feather; we did just that. After 1-2 minutes we tried to restart the engine. After running the checklist the engine prop turned over a few times but did nothing more. As the prop was turning over the electrical system stopped working and we had no avionics; nor could my instructor and I hear each other in our headsets. We tried to start the engine several more times; but the prop wouldn't turn over; as the battery wasn't charging and what we assumed at the time; the electrical system had failed. We then squawked 7600; ran the engine failure checklist; and my instructor contacted Tower over his phone; for clearance back into the airport; and from there we squawked 7700. On the final approach my instructor and I could talk to each other once again; but after running the descent before landing checklist and turning on the left fuel pump; my instructor and I no longer could hear each other as the electrical system seemed to be overloaded. After landing; around 5-7 minutes our avionics came back on; and we could then talk to the controllers and was able to taxi back to the parking area of the flight school. During the incident the weather was clear; winds were calm; and pressure was roughly 30.35 inches.




Synopsis: PA-23 flight instructor reported electrical failure inflight.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DYB.Airport, SC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G DYB
ATC / advisory: UNICOM DYB
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Was already established in the pattern in the crosswind for right traffic. Immediately received a traffic ahead notification from the G-430 [Garmin 430]; immediately turned into the downwind with steep turn. The traffic was straight ahead about 400 feet above our aircraft. Did not hear anything on UNICOM; did not know if aircraft intended on entering the pattern or if they were flying too close to the airport. Established my downwind call for right traffic. Immediately heard on UNICOM; Aircraft Y entering the 45 right downwind 6. Was losing altitude and coming right for our aircraft. My student kept saying they are getting closer. I saw on the ADS-B they were our same altitude at 1;000 feet for traffic pattern. Aircraft Y continued to fly right towards us. I immediately dove down to get away; unfortunately Aircraft Y was also descending. I leveled off at 500 and made an immediate left turn about 90 degrees; started to climb once I was clear of the other aircraft. Heard on the comms left base for 6 by Aircraft Y; but it is right traffic pattern. They did a go-around and departed the pattern. I look back and wish I had said something on the comms to make sure we stayed clear of each other; but in the moment I was concerned about getting down and the safety of my student.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor with student reported an NMAC during approach to DYB non-towered airport.  The conflicting aircraft pilot was not appropriately communicating on UNICOM; which contributed to the event.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: PC-12
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While performing the noise abatement SNA departure; at 3;000 feet MSL; per FOM; we began to clean up the aircraft and accelerate. As the Pilot Monitoring; I responded to SoCal on initial contact and confirmed we were cleared to 5;000 feet MSL.  While the autopilot engaged; the Pilot Flying (Captain) flew the departure as per company FOM. At approximately 3;500 feet - 4;000 feet MSL; SoCal called traffic left eleven o'clock; five miles at 6;000 feet MSL converging on our position. SoCal was in contact with the traffic (Pilatus PC-12); as we heard their radio conversation. At approximately 4;100 feet MSL; our aircraft generated a TCAS RA. The Pilot Flying disengaged the autopilot and followed RA guidance. As Pilot Monitoring; I radioed SoCal and informed them we were reacting to a TCAS RA. SoCal acknowledged our radio call; and then directed us to contact LA Center on the prescribed frequency. At no time did SoCal indicate there was any question regarding our proper reaction to the TCAS RA.


Second narrative: Responded to a TCAS RA and climbed out of assigned altitude. Reported to SoCal that we were responding to an RA. SoCal had pointed out the Pilatus traffic to us.


Synopsis: Air carrier departure from SNA; on the noise abatement rapid climb; experienced a TCAS RA with traffic assigned above with minimal IFR separation.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Cruise; Climb; Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather; Staffing; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was vectoring when level 5 weather popped up near the west side of the airport. We were on west flow. I asked if we should really keep going into 3 full runways with weather like this. The response was 'the tower says it doesn't look that bad out the window'. Everyone started to go around. We had nowhere to go with all these planes with weather and so many in the airspace. No preemptive strike to help the situation. I believe part of the problem is that there were younger people; while all very skilled; were not sure what to do with the situation without getting in trouble or feeling they might. There were only CICs being utilized rather than a supervisor being in charge of the front line. There was an OM on duty; although; one; I'm not sure if he was in the room; and two; he has really no idea what's going on. There were so many go arounds and no instructions as to what to do with all of them; i.e. another runway; divert; etc. Many were minimum fuel. It was very frustrating and stressful. It seemed like survival of the fittest rather than any coordination or instruction being given. Also; monitors were never called for with extreme weather; even after everyone started going around.A supervisor should be in charge of the front line when there is only one in the room. Coordination should be done to lessen the arrivals with extreme weather in the area. CICs should be made aware that they can do what they need to for the safety of the aircraft coming rather than the 'who am I going to be in trouble with' rather than slowing fixes and holding or coming off a runway; or two for that matter; with extreme weather. CICs are put in a bad position because they are unsure of what they can and can't do. Same as unsupervised mid shifts.




Synopsis: C90 Approach Controller reported that their sectors became overloaded and unorganized due to numerous weather related go-arounds combined with a lack of experienced controllers and supervision.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Hydraulics
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Inflight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X came to the gate; originally a gate call for another employee who was timing out at XA:00pm.  I was asked by my lead to relieve him of his duties.  The pilots ran the system hydraulics # 2 motor and reported pressure was good but the low-pressure light continued to stay on.  Deferred low-pressure light for indication problems per MEL XX-X-XX Special Procedures (SP1 and SP3).  SP3 said I could either disconnect the cannon plug or leave it attached.  Crew wanted it disconnected; to do away with light in cockpit.  Proceeded to disconnect the plug.  After takeoff; flight crew called back on the radio and stated that the light was still on.  At that point I double checked myself with the MEL and maintenance manual and realized I disconnected the wrong cannon plug.  I was supposed to disconnect the one in the wheel well when I actually disconnected at the engine hydraulic pump.  I reported the mistake to maintenance control and they stated that it would be fixed by contract maintenance upon arrival in ZZZ.  [Recommend to] be more aware and not jump from one plane that was Out of Service (OTS) to take over something when your knee deep into another plane. Tell the lead to go to the next person. Evening shift.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was asked to take over the duties of another AMT who was leaving in the middle of an ongoing MEL Special Procedures task for deferral of a Low-Pressure Light hydraulics indication problem. The Relieving Technician finished the maintenance. A flight crew later reported that the light was still on. The Relieving Technician had disconnected a Canon Plug at the # 2 engine hydraulic pump instead of the # 2 electric pump in the wheel well.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground IAD
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Turning right onto Taxiway J from Ramp taxiway C; First Officer One is heads down retrieving now ATIS as instructed by Ground. First Officer Two yells to stop; just in time as aircraft is being pushed back and projects over Taxiway J; especially by its wing. Two Driver seems never to have seen us; Marshaller in front of the gate aircraft has back to us and never alters course (wide turn) of his plane. Our Captain stops abruptly. We notify Ground who queries Ramp; who claims there was never an issue. We state there was a VERY BIG issue (planes would have definitely hit and done major damage). Ground says they'll notify Supervisor.




Synopsis: A heavy jet Captain taxiing on IAD Taxiway J was alerted by the off duty First Officer to stop because of an impending collision with an aircraft pushing back.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician; Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On Date; around XA:00-XB:00; quick turn Aircraft X arrived at gate XX with a speed brake issue. I took upgrade lead that day. I assisted the mechanics dispatching those gates by MEL'ing the speed brakes due to history and no time to troubleshoot as it was a live flight. As I was lead that day and needed to understand what exactly was being done/MEL'd;  I flipped over looking at both MELs that would be required to make sure we had the correct MELs and were proceeding accordingly. As documented; I proceeded with MEL XX-YY-B; verifying manual speed brake system operated normally REF Step A. 1-4 per MEL CARD XXXXX (XX-YY-B). As another mechanic was creating/proceeding with the 2nd deferral; I mistakenly thought the breaker MEL XX-YY-B stated to open; and the breaker he was opening for MEL XX-YY-A were the same breaker. He collared the breaker; we installed placards; and the airplane left. Upon review of the MEL; I realized the MELs do not state to open the same breaker; and the breaker he had collared was not the breaker I thought was being collared. So Step B of MEL XX-YY-B did not get completed and the MEL was not in compliance.




Synopsis: Lead Technician reported non compliance with MEL procedures on a transit aircraft was noticed after records review and were corrected.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground JAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were taxiing out from gate for takeoff when a severe storm began at the airport. We had only taxied a short distance from the gate and were stopped along the grass line of the ramp to await our EDCT; on what used to be called Taxiway J. The storm was so severe the Control Tower could not see us from the Tower cab and since we were going to wait until the storm passed before continuing; Ground Control asked us our position. I replied that we were on Taxiway J. However; the airport diagram (10-9 page) no longer accurately depicts the taxiway configuration around the ramp area; as a result of additional taxiway concrete being laid outside the existing ramp in preparation for the construction of a replacement Terminal B in the future. As a result; the taxiway identifications no longer match the printed guidance available in the flight deck. This caused temporary confusion as Ground Control thought we had entered the new taxiway instead of staying on the ramp. They asked us for clarification; and we told them we had remained on the ramp; on what used to be called Taxiway J; the portion of the main ramp along its western edge between where Taxiway R hits the main ramp and Taxiway J appears to hit the main ramp on the 10-9 page (dated 4 Jan 13).For some reason; [commercial charting company] has not issued an update to its taxi diagram for JAX since the new taxiways have been opened (at least four months ago). In addition; JAX does not have access to modern taxiway monitoring tools such as ASDE-X. As a result; tower controllers must rely on the ability to see aircraft positions on the airport; or ask the aircraft for position reports in the event of fog or heavy rain. Aircraft have difficulty describing their location due to the airport diagram not matching the current actual taxiway configuration.I suggest updating the airport diagram to reflect the current actual taxiway configuration. In addition the airport might consider installing ASDE-X in the Control Tower.




Synopsis: An A320 First Officer advised the commercially provided airport page for JAX does not illustrate the revised taxiways not in use. Subsequent to this report a new page was published with the revised taxiways illustrated.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: It was the second flight of our four flight sequence today. The flight was off a quickturn and plane change in ZZZ. The flight through taxi in and the engine shutdown sequence was uneventful. I was the Pilot Flying on this flight. We parked the airplane while the ramp was shutdown due to lightning in the area. The Captain parked the airplane; and then we ran the engine shutdown checklist; and left the IRUs on; as the airplane was quickturning. I sent the in-report; and then packed up my equipment and got up to say goodbye to the passengers like I do on every flight. When the aircraft was deplaned approximately two-thirds of the way; all of sudden the jetway started to move from right to left and I immediately called for the Captain to ensure that the parking brake was set. I had no idea that he had released the parking brake; as it was set when I got out of the seat; and he never told me that he was thinking of releasing it. He told me after the fact that he thought the chocks had been put in place; but that was impossible since the ramp had been shutdown. The only thing I could have done; since the brakes were about 380 C when I got out of the seat would have been to remind the Captain not to release the brakes under any circumstances since there were no rampers working under the weather conditions. That is a crosscheck I will put in place in the future.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer standing at the entry door reports the aircraft rolling forward during passenger deplaning and immediately notifies the Captain who is still in his seat. No damage is reported. The aircraft had been parked without the aid of ramp workers due to lightning in the area and no chocks had been installed.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Everything with arming the door at departure was fine.  No issues with arming the door.  Upon arrival; the girt bar was extremely difficult to place into the door bracket.  When I was finally able to get it into the J-clips; I noticed that the bracket was too far to the left and would have caught on the fwd side of the aircraft door when opened by catering.  I bent down and re-positioned the girt bar onto the J-clip; which was extremely difficult. It seems that the plastic collars on the girt bar need to be adjusted; the plastic collar on the right side is butted up against the slide flap; which makes it extremely difficult to place the girt into the clip.  I asked the CA to look at it and explained my concern.  He took the girt bar out of the J-clips and then placed the girt bar back into the J-clips; and also found it difficult to do so.Have Maintenance check the collars on the girt bar.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported it was difficult to place the girt bar into the door bracket and suggested the plastic collars be adjusted fix the issue.