Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 1/2
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Non-tower operations at our destination. Weather obtained from Company and ASOS deteriorated at our destination from BKN 400 with 4sm vis at takeoff to OVC 200 with 1/2 SM vis with fog and mist at time of first approach. NOTAM at our destination stated coupled approaches to RWY XX NA discussed preflight and in flight. We as a crew; after looking at the ILS to RWY XX; concluded that the NOTAM applied to the lower than normal published CAT 1 mins. We concluded to use autopilot to begin the approach and disconnect while descending on glidepath. Center provided approach services on first two approaches. Center had little situational awareness of weather conditions at and asked if we would like the visual approach to runway XX. We requested and received vectors for the ILS XX. With autopilot engaged on the approach; shortly after intercepting glideslope; we received an EICAS glideslope msg and lost vertical flight director information with GS lined out on our FMAs. We still had raw ILS glideslope info. Initiated go-around at approximately 2;600ft MSL. We elected; with ASOS weather still reporting at CAT1 minimums and plenty of fuel remaining; to re-attempt the ILS RWY XX. On second approach with autopilot on; received same EICAS msg and lined-out GS FMAs (as described on first approach). After go around; we discussed NOTAM again and queried Center on the specifics of said NOTAM. Center attempted to contact approach (still not open) and read the NOTAM back to us. As a crew we concluded that the entire approach had to be hand flown. A couple minutes later; Approach control opened. Approach control confirmed that the entire approach must be hand-flown and also was able to provide accurate timely weather information. Third approach was hand flown to minimums with a go-around executed due to no approach lights in sight at CAT 1 minimums. On go-around; flaps 20 maximum airspeed was exceeded by 5 knots due to FO (myself-pilot monitoring) task saturation and not hearing call for flaps 5. Discrepancy was recorded in AML. Following this go-around; approach was able to provide timely information that weather was improving slightly; specifically toward RWY XX approach end. With plenty of fuel remaining for approaches and divert to alternate; we executed hand-flown ILS to RWY XX breaking out approach lights at minimums; continuing; and observing the runway environment at 100 ft AGL to a full stop landing.A multitude of factors contributed to this series of events including:1) We as a Flight Crew misunderstanding the specifics of RWY XX ILS NOTAM 2) Deteriorating weather conditions and low visibility and ceilings at uncontrolled field.3) Both pilots were hub turning into this flight event and operating at end of duty day during circadian low hours4) Poor procedures and crew coordination on the third go-around resulting in overspeed of flaps5) Center as the controlling agency had little situational awareness of rapidly changing weather conditions at and ILS NOTAM specifics.Suggestions:1) We as a flight crew should have confirmed specifics with Operations/ATC prior to flight of any NOTAM that could affect approach. 2) A note on the flight plan release specifying that all portions of ILS RWY XX at that airport must be 'hand-flown.'3) Flight schedule being adjusted 15-20 minutes later to allow our flight to arrive when destination approach and tower are open; as Center had little situational awareness of ILS operation and changing weather conditions at that airport.


Second narrative: During preflight study and enroute; we discussed the destination NOTAM that stated coupled ILS/LOC approaches to RNY 09 are not authorized:!FDC X/XXXX ZZZ;ILS OR LOC/DME RWY 9; AMDT 7A...AUTO COUPLED APPROACH NA.This is a long term NOTAM that turned out to mean something different to us as the operating crew. Knowing that the weather would be close to CAT1 mins and that we would be a circadian low; I desired to utilize the autopilot to that maximum extent practicable. The approach chart showed minimums to lower than normal CAT1 mins through the use of HUD; FD or Autopilot. For some reason; I believed the NOTAM to apply to the lower than standard CAT1 mins. I knew the lower minima was not authorized for us; so my plan was to use the autopilot to begin the approach and disconnect it while descending on GS because of the weather that was right at minimums. In retrospect; I see that what was required from the very beginning was a hand flown approach.What occurred was an EICAS message for GS and GS FMA indication with a horizontal line through it at around 2600 feet. A valid raw data GS was present though. We discontinued the approach and reattempted another. The weather remained at 1/2 mile; which is the CAT1 minimum. We came down the GS a little further the next time but received the same EICAS message and another GA was performed. We as a crew discussed the NOTAM again and then queried the Center controller. He telephoned Tower ATC (not open yet) and repeated the NOTAM to us. At this point we concluded correctly that this approach needed to be flown entirely as a hand flown approach. Tower opened soon after.The third approach was hand flown and the approach lights were not in sight at minimums; so we went around again. I as the PF called for flaps 5 but did not confirm they were positioned correctly. This resulted in a 5 knot overspeed in the flaps 20 position. This was entered in the AML. Approach called improving visibility; so we conducted the fourth and final approach. It was straight out of the sim: we saw the approach lights right at 200 ft AGL; I called continue and then called landing when I saw the runway environment at 100 ft AGL. I used the HUD (w/o EFVS) to great affect and was glad to have it. Weather at minimums at an uncontrolled field in concert with arrival during a circadian low clouded my cognitive abilities. Compounding this was I was flying a 757; which is a rare event since 767s are what I typically fly. In my attempt to utilize all the tools allowed/required by our directives; I did not properly apply to what now seems to be a plain language NOTAM. Perhaps a note such as 'hand flown approach required' would have assisted me during a period of low alertness level. I was attempting to operate the aircraft in the safest and most stable manner possible and created two self-induced go arounds as a result. The weather really was a major factor as seen with a go around on the third approach attempt as a result of the approach lights not being visible at 200 AGL. We thankfully preceded judiciously at all times and choose conservative options which lead to successful approach and landing at absolute CAT1 minimums. Also; the dispatcher in his planning had provided us with enough fuel to manage this to a successful conclusion.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported being dispatched to an airport before the Tower opened with weather near CAT I minima and automated approaches NOTAMed not applicable. After Tower opened; weather improved and the flight landed following the fourth approach. With poor weather; the flight should have been dispatched to arrive after the Tower opened.