Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Aerofoil Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While descending we entered IMC and icing conditions. I estimate we were 50 miles from the airport. Upon entering these conditions we turned on our cowl and wing anti-ice. Shortly thereafter the EICAS indicated a master warning immediately followed by a master caution anti-ice duct fail message. We then received master caution left and right wing anti-ice fail messages. The First Officer (FO) and I complied with the appropriate QRH items and informed Approach that we were having issues with our icing system and requested an expedited ILS into ZZZ and a lower altitude. Shortly thereafter we began leaving icing conditions and mutually decided an emergency did not need to be declared. At this point we were out of icing conditions and would have full use of flaps 45; normal approach speeds; and no increase in runway landing distance. We landed; taxied to the gate and contacted dispatch to initiate a write-up with maintenance. The FO and I taxied out to a run-up area with contract maintenance to do several tests on the system. We then did a subsequent test at the gate with new textual information from our maintenance to contract maintenance that was more precise/correct for testing the system. Although the system checked out on the ground the FO and I agreed that while it was legal to depart it still might not be safe. The reasons were several. The icing conditions from ZZZ all the way down to a large area were calling for icing 3;000 feet -23;000 feet. Since we were limited to FL250 due to single pack operations; this was a serious consideration. It was also night time and a considerable portion of the flight would be over mountainous/remote terrain. While on the ground the aircraft experienced an Ice Detect 2 Fail status message. Simply resetting the system and having the messages disappear from the EICAS did not inspire confidence to return to destination under these conditions. During a conference call with the company we explained our rationale. We fully understood this would inconvenience holiday passengers and that certain entities with non-aviation backgrounds might not understand why we did not depart in a plane that was legally signed off. Ultimately we were told that it was solely our decision. We offered to do it the next day during daylight and vastly better weather. The following day we did depart the airport to destination. During flight we had a Master Warning immediately followed by a Master Caution Anti-Ice Duct Fail. Thankfully better conditions allowed us to quickly exit icing conditions.


Second narrative: The manager provided his unsolicited opinion that; 'as a pilot; I would do the flight.' He did not even ask me what my concerns; thoughts; or observations were. He said that 'many people will be looking at this cancellation and judging your actions; both pilots and non-pilots. They will be looking at you refusing to fly a 'legally signed off airplane'.' I told him that 'WE are the ones that were flying; that WE picked up the ice; that OUR wing anti-ice system failed; and that WE were lucky to be in the airport terminal area. We were able to rapidly descend and request immediate vectors to final. Let them judge us; but they need to factor in our actual experience during the flight.'He said that 'ice will not make the airplane fall out of the sky.'I said that our ground school talks about risk prevention and uses the 'Swiss cheese model' as an example of how to manage risk. It just seems like there are too many things stacking up against us and it is just the safest option to not do the flight. He said that 'I got the wrong message in ground school and if we followed that model; we would never fly an airplane.'I told him that I refused to fly the airplane that evening; that I would be more than happy to attempt the flight in the next day when we have daylight and warmer temps in our favor. The Icing Severity chart indicated moderate to heavy icing with solid threats along the first 100NM of our route. Freezing levels began at 3;000 to 5;000 feet for the same area.Our decision not to fly was correct; safe; and right in line with the guidelines set forth by the FAA. I am disappointed in management's attempt to dissuade us from a clearly prudent decision.


Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew experienced a 'left and right wing anti-ice fail' EICAS message on approach in icing conditions; descended below icing and landed without incident. After system checked OK on the ground by Contract Maintenance; despite company pressure to continue; flight crew elected to delay departure until the following day due to forecast icing conditions enroute to final destination.