elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D01
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the ANCAR II Arrival to DEN while in the vicinity of FFFAT intersection on 124.95; the Captain and I had noticed the frequency became very quiet. I checked with ATC on 124.95 to make sure we were still on the correct frequency and did not receive a response. I tried once again with no response. Captain tried and did not receive a response either. We switched to a different Approach frequency of 120.8 and the new Controller told us 'no problem; turn left heading 170 degrees; descend to 10;000 FT and slow to 210 KTS.' After telling him that we lost communications with the previous Controller; the new Controller on 120.8 told us to switch back to 124.95. We switched back to our previous frequency and told the Controller we lost him. He told us that they had been trying to get in touch with us. Not sure if we had a brief interference with our radio; were in a cone of silence with terrain or if there was some other incident with our radio. Nevertheless; radio communication was lost only briefly and no conflicts occurred. While only brief; it was odd to have no communication whatsoever. There needs to be a check on the WiFi system to see if any interference could be coming from that system. There are numerous occurrences of static interference over the radio during no precipitation conditions. I have heard of other crews loosing communications briefly as well.

Callback: The reporter stated that his company's WiFi has been interfering with VHF communications by producing static. Sometimes changing from COM 1 to COM 2 will lessen the interference; other times not. In this case; he was not certain that WiFi was responsible; but both pilots thought it odd the manner in which the frequency dropped off. He said he and the Captain talked about the event for the next two days and were highly suspicious about the cause. In their minds; there was a slight possibility that ATC was responsible for the communication lapse; but given previous WiFi problems; the crew suspects internal interference.



Synopsis: A B737-700 lost communication with DEN TRACON on the ANCHR 2 Arrival and suspected internal WiFi interference after communication was re-established.
Date: 201812
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The taxi instructions from Ground were; 'Taxi to 1R via B; D; cross 26R.' We made an incorrect right turn on C. While on Charlie facing west a Company aircraft approached opposite direction at a fairly high rate of speed. The opposite direction aircraft would have made contact; wing to wing if he would have continued. We stopped immediately and set the parking brake and said something on frequency. The opposite direction aircraft turned hard left and avoided our wings contacting each other. As the First Officer; I should have been more proactive in monitoring the aircraft position during taxi out. I believe I was heads down on my 10-9 for a few seconds during this critical time.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported a near-collision occurred after turning onto the wrong taxiway.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Tower cleared us for take-off. I advanced the power-levers just past idle. At this time an engine fail annunciation and voice notified us of the Left Engine Fail. I returned the power levers to idle and stopped on the runway with 10;300 feet approximately of runway XXR remaining. We notified tower of a problem and requested to hold in our present position. Approved. After about 2 minutes I requested to taxi clear of the runway at Z and taxi back to the runway end. Approved. At this point I asked tower for approval to walk outside the aircraft. Approved. I did a general inspection of the aircraft and in particular the left engine nacelle looking for obvious signs of problems such as leaking fuel or small animal remains on or in the engine intake. None noted. I then called our [Operations Control] for discussion and advice. At the conclusion of this discussion and his call to the aviation mechanic on-call who suggested restarting the engine and doing a several full power engine run-ups and if there was no additional problem continue the flight return to our home base where the engine would be inspected. This was accomplished with no additional faults. [Operations Control] and I discussed the situation and I decided to continue. The additional 2 take-offs were normal. When an additional aviation mechanic was notified he was extremely critical of this decision. I failed to recognize the need to place a discrepancy in the maintenance logbook as I should have. This was not done intentionally but as an oversight. At engine inspection a sensor that compares power lever angle and N2 idle speed had a disagreement which caused the FADEC to shut down the engine in question.




Synopsis: Cessna C525 Captain reported automatic engine shutdown on takeoff roll due to an engine sensor failing.
Date: 201507
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The loading of this flight was uneventful; we received the Final Weights and Takeoff Data in reasonable time and departed. To our surprise; 1:45 into the flight we received via ACARS; another Final Weights; with a different Takeoff Gross weight (TOG); Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW); CG and TRIM.Original  ZFW  197917                   Change   196486          TOG  253017                            251586          CG. 19.0                               17.6          TRIM  5.3                              5.5Consequently; the ZFW was changed in the FMC Performance page.I would like to note that no 'Invalid weights' message was ever received prior to the Takeoff Data.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported receiving a revision to his final weights 1:45 into the flight.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: [We were flight planned] to depart with 3;080 pounds of fuel. [Our] minimum takeoff fuel was 2;900 pounds. I requested an additional 800 pounds of fuel as a safety measure. Our planned fuel burn was indicated on the Flight Release as 180 pounds of taxi and 1;077 pounds for enroute burn off. Planned arrival fuel in ZZZ1 was stated as being 1;823 pounds. This is approximately 962 pounds per tank. The Amber Fuel quantity caution indication comes on at 880 pounds per tank. This was only a buffer of 82 pounds per side. Fuel was brought to 3;900 pounds (with the addition of 800 pounds). We ultimately departed and landed with 2;366 pounds; thus burning 1;544 pounds due to ATC vectoring and sequencing. IF this flight had departed with the original fuel load; we would have landed with only 1;566 pounds in the tanks (783 per side). Please see the above fuel quantity note. Also on the Flight Release was a hold fuel quantity of 512 pounds. We did no holding; so logic would seem that I should have that unused fuel in the tanks upon arrival. However; if you remove that hold fuel from the equation; my originally planned arrival fuel arriving would have been 1;311 pounds; solidly in the RED Warning range.The company is constantly shorting us on fuel. I don't know if there is an error in the fuel planning or no consideration considered for ATC contingencies. The [most optimistic] flight planned route is not always available. Often times; there is considerable vectoring; speed changes or sequencing issues given by ATC for flow control into major airports. These factors are not accounted for in the fuel burn calculations. It happens to me almost daily; sometimes twice a day. I am constantly requesting additional fuel increases to meet satisfy requirements and unplanned contingencies. At times; I do not have enough fuel for even a simple go-around; unless I add fuel before take-off. I am aware of this always; thus the reason for my request for additional fuel. I had to upload fuel at least 5 times this past week; and almost always on the shortest of trips. The company should re-evaluate the proposed fuel burn rates and add additional fuel as a buffer to all flights. The current policy is unsafe.




Synopsis: An ERJ-135 Captain provided a detailed example of what he believes to be routine overly optimistic fuel burns planned for flights using the methodology applied by his airline to determine the fuel required. The fuel burnouts thus proposed may result in planned arrivals with fuel quantity caution lights illuminated.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During cockpit set up for flight found only one QRH. First Officer mentioned that is new procedure.  This was my first flight with only one QRH.  This is an unsafe situation. From experience attempting to use iPad in any type of turbulence is challenging.  Add in an irregular or emergency situation and you are now creating a safety hazard that there is no reason for.  Only one QRH in the cockpit is unsafe; period.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported learning during preflight that company policy now only requires one paper QRH to be carried on the aircraft.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were descending out of approximately FL230 into PDX on the HHOOD 2 arrival; in VNAV; with all published crossing restrictions and speeds programmed into FMC. We were asked our airspeed by Seattle Center. I responded with 300 knots. The controller said we needed to be at 280 knots IAW the HHOOD 2 STAR. I had only shown YENTL at 270 KTS as our first speed restriction. ATC said there was a prior restriction from our Mach speed to 280 KTS. We eventually found this restriction on the chart. We were then told to slow to 250 KTS and switched to PDX approach and landed uneventfully. Prior to top of descent both the F/O and I separately checked the FMC and chart because of all the altitude and speed restrictions on this HHOOD arrival. We then briefed the chart and FMC together and neither one of us caught the 280 knot speed restriction on the chart. The placement of this 280 knot restriction on the chart is in a place that when viewed on the iPad when zoomed in a bit is out of view. Furthermore; this restriction is on the low altitude section of the chart not in the high altitude section where it's used and needs to be placed. Also I have never seen a speed restriction on any arrival stated as this one is stated. This arrival needs to have a point to be at 280 knots; or bolder; larger print of the restriction because this is not a standard speed reduction you would expect to see or be looking for on a STAR.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reports overlooking the 280 knot restriction on the HHOOD 2 RNAV arrival to PDX. This is pointed out by ATC.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout we were given a climb from 5;000 FT to FL190. Autothrottles armed; we commanded a climb to assigned altitude. At about 7;000 FT MSL; we both noticed a #2 engine N1 overspeed; flashing red dial and associated left yaw. First Officer (pilot flying) immediately retarded thrust levers to mid range level and maintained control of the aircraft. It appeared the number 2 engine rolled back due to the overspeed; but when the thrust levers were retarded; the #2 engine appeared to have auto relit. Both engines were now operating normally in the mid power ranges. We coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance about the occurrence and elected to divert. We did not declare an emergency. Approach and landing were uneventful. I had contacted the flight attendants as we were turning to a divert airport to keep them informed. I asked them if they noticed anything unusual; and they did not feel the yawing moment; only felt the aircraft was flying a little slower than normal. Made a PA and told the passengers that everything was fine; but we were making a precautionary landing just to be safe. On a side note: The previous flight on descent; we got a Master Caution light and an OVHD warning for about five seconds. We never did see anything abnormal on the overhead panel. The light went out and the remainder of the approach/landing was uneventful. In hindsight; I suspect it was an EEC on the verge of failing and it materialized on the next flight. Dispatch/Maintenance/ATC all worked seamlessly for us.


Second narrative: Was climbing out of 5;000 FT to FL190; selected Level Change at 5;000 FT with autothrottles engaged and pushed throttles up slightly to reduce time for engines to reach climb thrust. Shortly after the aircraft yawed to the right and overspeed warning light on; engine instrument panel alerted. Pulled the throttles back; engine #2 recovered. [We] diverted as a precaution. No emergency declared.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew experienced an over speeding engine during climbout. The thrust levers are retarded and the engine returns to normal operation but the crew elects to divert to a suitable alternate.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BOS
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cleared; 'F; H; hold short of RWY 4R'. Once on H realized there is no hold short line in front of us ergo we are on the runway even though not passed the runway edge markings. I was slowing to stop to clarify with Ground; frequency was packed with voices. PIC said 'clear this runway' so I went across and held on C behind another aircraft. About 60 seconds later Ground said 'you went further than you were supposed to go but its ok.' Even though the RWY was NOTAMed out of service we both had that sinking feeling maybe the NOTAM was misread and we're on an active runway. No air traffic approaching. No ground conflict. We should have held on F short of H where there is a hold short line. But instructions were F; H hold short of 4R. Technically we are on the runway after we pass the hold short line on F.




Synopsis: First Officer reported flight crew failed to follow ATC instructions and entered Runway 4R when  instructed to hold short.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Thrust Reverser Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This event occurred during preflight at the gate. The aircraft arrived at ZZZ gate XX from the maintenance hanger eight minutes before boarding time. After review of the AML; I confirmed the aircraft had a couple of MEL items including a #2 engine thrust reverser inoperative. We contacted maintenance for three additional items; including excessively high wheel brake temperatures on wheels three and four.  Those temperatures were 340 degrees C and 270 degrees C; respectively. When the mechanic arrived at the aircraft; I asked him for the reason the brakes were so hot after a tow or taxi delivery from the hanger. He inspected the brakes and found them to be 'very warm.'  He also ran a few diagnostic tests. Unfortunately the mechanic could not give an adequate explanation for the high wheel brake temperatures; nor could he verify the proper functioning of the wheel brakes on the right main gear. I refused the aircraft on the basis of safety-of-flight because I felt the aircraft was unsafe to operate with an unknown wheel brake issue coupled with an inoperative thrust reverser.The primary causal factor for refusing the aircraft was the unknown reason for the hot brakes. This issue was not resolved to my satisfaction. The risk of operating the aircraft with both a brake issue and inoperative reverser was too high to warrant continuation of the flight.Maintenance personnel should resolve obvious aircraft issues before releasing the aircraft to the flight crew.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported refusing the aircraft due to a deferred thrust reverser and high brake temperatures that maintenance could not explain.
Date: 201912
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Arrival Unloading
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 2 boxes of firelogs arrived on a flight. They were shipped via the US Postal Service. I'm not sure if these are allowed to be shipped on aircraft due to the nature that they are made to be easily lit and made to burn for long periods of time. This makes me highly suspicious of the safety of transporting these on aircraft. If they were to ignite inflight; would the fire suppression system be adequate to safely extinguish cases of these in the cargo hold? Are these allowed on our planes?




Synopsis: Airline Ramp Personnel reported 'firelogs' (flammable solids) shipped via USPS were transported in cargo compartment leaving reporter wondering if they are authorized to carry them.