elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Fatigue; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was quick called for a redeye turn. On 24 hour reserve call out; there is no way to prepare for this trip. It's almost 10 hours of flying through the night; with no crew rest. You would never let the pilots fly this trip; so why Flight Attendants? Should things go terribly wrong or we had a serious medical event; we are in no way rested to do our duties to the best of our abilities. The most dangerous part of the trip is my drive home; as I've been up for close to 24 hours. It is incredibly dangerous; and inhumane.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant; on 24 hour reserve callout; reports being assigned a red eye turn with no possibility of resting before the trip and no rest during the nearly 10 hours of flying.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had to de-ice before leaving. I sat down in the flight attendant jumpseat just minutes before the de-icing began. As we took off; a liquid fluid started running down on me through the Main Cabin Door. It fell on my right shoulder; splattered on my face (right side); my leg and right hand; and clothes. I also heard a loud noise that I never heard before. The noise lasted approximately 1 to 2 minutes. I was not sure where the noise came from. There was a strong smell. I started to itch and I had an unpleasant taste in my mouth. There was quite a bit of liquid on the floor. I almost fell as I got up to do my in flight beverage service. I assumed it was de-ice fluid and I put on gloves and wiped down the floor and myself. After landing I informed the Captain of everything and he called it in to the proper department and said he would make sure it was checked out before the aircraft flies again.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant was exposed to de-icing fluid that leaked through the cabin door seal during takeoff; prior to aircraft pressurization.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MPTO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON MPTO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approach Controller was moderately busy. Speaking to us in heavily accented English; and to all other aircraft on frequency in Spanish. Controller expected us to maintain 300 KTS below 10;000 FT descending for MPTO. Unsafe due to weather (thunderstorms) and bird strike potential. Communicated this clearly to the Controller; and slowed to 250 below 10;000 FT. Procedure required 210 KTS at fix we were cleared to; and slowed to 210; Controller then left us very high; and tried to keep us at 210 for too long. [We] had to slow to be able to descend smoothly and safely for a stabilized approach. After landing in moderate rain on wet runway in B757 using autobrakes 3; turned off at last high speed. Then the Ground Controller asked us to 'expedite clear of runway'; which we already were; and there was a B777 pushed to the point that it was almost blocking the ramp access from the high speed. Ground Controller also had heavy accent and was constantly chattering in Spanish to other aircraft. In moderate rain; at night; with moderate traffic; rushing taxi would have been foolish and unsafe. ATC at MPTO is an unmitigated disaster; and with the huge increase in traffic; it has become unsafe in my honest opinion. FAA and ICAO need to go down and clean that place up immediately. English with strong accents; Spanish to most of the traffic; and a rush; rush; rush MO are NOT conducive to safe operations.




Synopsis: B757 Captain describes and arrival and landing at MPTO that he believes was unsafe due to the Controller's instructions to keep speed up; the strong Spanish accents and the use of Spanish for most ATC instructions.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Nacelle/Pylon Fairing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: There is a common condition on the 787-8 and 787-9 aircraft where Maintenance is finding and documenting heat damage to the engine pylon aft inboard fairings. The finish has been found deteriorated and/or missing from the carbon fiber fairing panel just above the heat shield. The normal interim repair for this condition per the SRM (Structural Repair Manual) 54-51-70-03b- 661a-a is to make a temporary seal on the panel per step 2e (1) with speed tape. The repair has a re-inspect interval of 400 hrs. to check the condition of the speed tape and reapply if necessary. These temporary repairs are not coming close to lasting the 400 hrs. between inspections; which could allow water ingression into the panel and eventual failure of the panel requiring replacement. [Three aircraft] had the speed tape re-applied per the SRM procedure on in ZZZ and when the aircraft returned the tape was missing and had to be re-applied. I believe this repair needs to be re-addressed and the procedure changed to address the exposure to extreme heat and air flow over the damaged area. Also; I believe the inspection interval should be lowered to match the general re-inspection requirement of 100 hours as required for speed tape re-inspection in AFMM 20-11-33.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports 787 Pylon interim repair is not working.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Utility / Infrastructure
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On departure from ZZZ I looked at the wing and saw a stream of fuel pouring from the wing. Notified Tower of the need to return immediately. The Tower rolled the firetrucks in response. The problem most likely was an incorrect seating of the fuel cap due to a faulty rubber gasket. In order to prevent a re-occurrence of a similar incident; during 100 hour inspections the gasket in the fuel caps need to be thoroughly inspected. A more in depth preflight; including one that more thoroughly inspects the bottoms of the fuel caps need to be employed in the future with Aztecs. The gaskets on all 4 four tanks are currently being replaced in response to this incident.




Synopsis: A Piper Aztec pilot reported observing fuel streaming from the wing due to a suspected faulty fuel cap gasket.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Range Control called to let us know they no longer had aircraft in Restricted Airspace. He stated he may not have called us before they did it; but they were done now. I responded that we only showed two areas active; and questioned him again. We hung up the line and I reported to the supervisor what had happened and that there was a distinct possibility that we had run multiple aircraft through the active restricted area with airplanes within it. We checked previous controllers to see if they had called to activate the restricted area; Range Control had not called to advise us. The supervisor called to follow up; and they had logged that the area not called in as hot with aircraft that were active [for about two hours].We ran two aircraft through the active range. One at 7;000 feet and one at 8;000 feet that I am aware of. There may have been others.The procedure to notify us was changed several months ago; and I have had doubts that the personnel that are supposed to contact us know what we do and the importance of timely notifications. The Army should be advised of the danger they caused and the individual at Range Control should not be allowed to remain in that position. The individuals in that job need to be retrained; and until such time; the old procedure needs to be put in place.




Synopsis: Restricted Airspace was in use. The military agency responsible for the use of airspace failed to notify the ATC facility. Aircraft were routed through Restricted Airspace while it was in use by the military.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Just prior to pushback; passenger notified Number 1 Flight Attendant that they had lithium batteries in 2 checked baggage. [One in] cargo; [and] iPad and laptop. Both bags removed and taken to TSA to inspect and separate devices from checked bags. Turns out; only one bag had a device and the other device was in one of the passenger group 6 bags checked. Now 6 bags removed and taken to TSA for same routine. Other passenger sitting around passenger that caused the delay were angry and saying that TSA website says lithium batteries can go in checked baggage if not separated from device. This is correct; but after communicating with manager [at airport]; and manager in Flight Ops; we confirmed [company] policy of removing device from checked bag.Passenger telling flight attendant they and lithium battery in their checked bags. Passenger late declaration of lithium battery in checked baggage.Agent accepting bags at counter maybe can make very clear [company] policy is more restrictive than TSA. Make clear how company wants to handle these situations in future. Can only TSA impact? Should bags just come off and go next flight avail? Will this cause passenger to not disclose Hazmat in checked bags? Our issue was no real time line for delay was foreseeable due to passenger. Please have inflight and Flight Ops come up with clear direction for crews in future. Please acknowledge [the] Flight Attendant Number 1 for her excellent handling of all parties including; passenger; flight crew; CSA; ground crew; etc. She did a fantastic job.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported passenger informed Flight Attendant of Lithium Ion battery powered electronic devices in checked baggage requiring re-inspection and departure delay.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Rotorcraft
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I entered a left downwind for rwy 32; and during final approach I was advised by an aircraft on downwind that there were skydivers in the air heading for the west side of the runway. I said no problem; I would stay East of the runway. Upon hover taxi he corrected himself saying the landing zone was West of the runway and south of the hangar. I expedited my taxi North of the hangar and to the East. Upon landing I had a man yelling at me telling me that I had crossed the drop zone and that the airport had a NOTAM. As far as I am concerned a NOTAM is not an airport closure! I had announced my intentions on the CTAF; and if there were any conflict; I should have been advised by the pilot of the jump plane.Prior to my departure I was advised by an individual on the ground that a jump was going to occur in a few minutes. I attempted to contact the pilot of the jump aircraft to no avail. As I was leaving the area he announced jumpers away. This issue could have been completely avoided if the pilot of the jump plane would talk to any and all traffic in the area. The pilot in the aircraft on downwind needs to learn situational awareness as to what direction East; West; North and South are.




Synopsis: A helicopter pilot reported being made aware of an active skydiving jump zone; but was provided incomplete and incorrect information in regard to the specific location and timing of the activity.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was climbing out of right downwind on departure from Runway XXR when the engine RPM suddenly dropped off. Applying carburetor heat had no effect. I [advised] the Tower and landed on Runway XXR.  I mistakenly told Tower that it was a partial engine failure; because the wind milling prop made more noise than I would have expected for a total engine failure. However; when I got slowed enough to exit the runway; the prop stopped.After I pushed the plane into a parking spot; I checked the oil and looked things over; and I discovered the fuel shutoff knob pulled out to the off position; and the cabin heat knob pushed in to the off position. I had tried to turn the heat on when I turned downwind; but I apparently had pulled the fuel shutoff knob by mistake. There was no apparent damage to the aircraft.Contributing factors are that the cabin heat knob is close to the fuel shutoff knob; and that I have relatively low time in type. Possible ways to prevent this in the future include the following:1. Avoid non-essential control changes during high-workload phases of flight; such as initial climb out and flight in the pattern.2. Be aware of the proximity of the cabin heat knob and the fuel shutoff knob.3. Anytime I touch a red control; double check that it is the right one.4. When I perform the memory items from my engine failure checklist; always check the fuel control immediately after applying carburetor heat.




Synopsis: A Cessna pilot reported an apparent loss of engine power while climbing out of the traffic pattern. After advising ATC and performing a successful return to the field; the pilot discovered that the fuel shutoff valve had been closed rather than the cabin heat valve opened as intended.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 4A7.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger CL604
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Other Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: ALERT: ATC/CHARTING/AIRPORT INFORMATION DISCONNECTWhile flying into 4A7 (Hampton/Clayton County-Tara Field) we experienced momentary in-flight confusion due to varying references to the actual name of the 4A7 airport between weather information/ATC clearances and charted materials:1) The AWOS at 4A7 identifies the airport as 'Atlanta South Regional Airport'. This name for the airport is not referenced in ANY charted materials that the crew could find (FAA or commercially provided sources).2) Atlanta Approach when referencing the name of the airport called it 'Tara Field'.3) FAA Sectional labels the airport 'Clayton Co-Tara'.4) FAA Approach chart labels the airport 'Hampton/Clayton County-Tara Field'.5) Our commercially provided Approach charts label the airport 'Hampton; GA - Clayton Co-Tara.'6) At least one other aircraft/ground radio operator was referring to the field as 'Clayton-County'.The largest disconnect was the AWOS being identified as 'Atlanta South Regional Airport Automated Weather'; which the flight crew could find no reference to in any official (or unofficial) publication  or flight information.




Synopsis: A CL604 pilot reported confusion regarding the correct name for 4A7 airport which is variously charted or referred to by ATC as: Hampton/Clayton County-Tara Field; Tara Field; Clayton County; Hampton; GA-Clayton Co-Tara. Most egregious is the fact the airport's AWOS advises the weather it provides is for Atlanta South Regional Airport; a name the reporter was unable to find associated with any US airport.