elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201404
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [We] had an emergency landing due to a loud noise then smoke in the cabin. Captain informed only had 5-6 minutes to land; we were diverted. While in my jumpseat reading planned emergency card when I got to the part of Flight Attendant will collect sharp objects; I stopped and realized that I was reading the CRJ emergency tab. I immediately changed to the EMB planned emergency with less then 10 minutes tab card and continued my planned emergency with less than 10 minutes. Due to the cockpit crew had their O2 masked on it was very hard for me hear them as static interference was very loud. I kept reading until I heard the words from cockpit computer 'Minimums; Minimums.' If the pilots said Flight Attendant prepare for landing I didn't hear it; maybe because of the static interference. I requested passengers to brace; which many did and we landed safely. No evacuation and opening of the doors was needed. The noise that was heard and smoke in the cabin was the cause. I should have taken a moment to realize that I had read the wrong plan emergency tab; but as stated I caught myself and read the correct one.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 Flight Attendant describes her confusion and hurried actions while incorrectly reading a CRJ Emergency Cabin Checklist during a diversion after smoke developed in the cabin. There was also lack of communications with the flight station because of the oxygen masks and static.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the Aircraft Inspector on B737. The aircraft had hail strikes that required replacement of leading edge slats 5;6;7; and 8. I was assigned the post installation inspection of these slats. I witnessed the torque of the upstops but overlooked the inspection of the cotter pins.  I was later notified that the aircraft had gone through an inspection in PHX and QC had discovered the missing safety devices.




Synopsis: Inspector reported that a step was omitted that required inspection of the cotter keys on the up stop attach bolts after torque.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SBA.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SBA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SBA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on departure; level at 8;000 feet on ATC Vectors. ATC called traffic at our 10 o'clock. We visually acquired the traffic and at about that time; we received a TCAS TRAFFIC DESCEND. The First Officer promptly disconnected the auto pilot and followed TCAS guidance and I reported 'Maneuvering TCAS RA' to ATC. The small aircraft target (high wing single engine) then began descending. Shortly thereafter; we received a TCAS CLIMB NOW command which the First Officer promptly complied with. At this point; the small aircraft also changed path and started climbing.  The small aircraft maneuvered laterally away from us finally. Once we were clear of conflict; I told ATC we wished to report a Near Mid Air Collision; we re-engaged the autopilot and continued our flight. I messaged Dispatch and I verbally briefed Flight Operations after we landed.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported NMAC on departure climb.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: My flying partner [FA Y] was told to walk sideways done the aisle or I'm not sure what.  There were 2 men about 400 pounds sitting at a 3 and 4 seat in back of plane.  She let them know that it isn't always possible to see everything and avoid hitting people; especially with the cart.  He wasn't having it.  I decided to work in the back and switch with FA Y to avoid escalation of the problem and remove her from any more contact.  We sat in our own jumpseats; but switched work positions to help avoid any problems.  I would like to stress that communication while masked is extremely difficult.  I'm confused that the pilots are allowed to communicate without masks; but we are not allowed to do the same.  I get extreme headaches every time that I am masked for long periods of time.  This last time was 6 days on with about 70 hours of a mask on my face.  It is starting to affect me as far as dizziness and sore throat.  Our trips seem to be longer days; most being 13 hour duty days; which is almost 14 and half hours with a mask on and on/off a plane.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns with communication and possible health issues resulting from wearing a face mask for so long.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1.  I was sitting in the right seat doing LCP (Line Check Pilot) training.  Mr. A was in the left seat doing CP (Check Pilot) training. The captains side airspeed and altitude became unreliable. We transferred controls to the first officers side. Mr. A ran the QRH.  The captains airspeed read 123 knots and we went down 500 feet. There was a 500 ft difference between the captains and FO's [First Officer] altitude. SPS (Shaker and Pusher System) Advance was displayed on the EICAS. The FO's airspeed was at 270. We descended immediately to FL240.  While in the descent we were given an altitude to descend to of FL220. We continued to ZZZ1 without incident. We elected to continue to ZZZ1 due to all the weather in the area. Around FL220 the captains airspeed seemed to return to match the FO's side. I still continued to fly and still proceeded as if the airspeed was unreliable. We landed with out incident .




Synopsis: Flight Crew reported airspeed and altimeter indication began to malfunction and elected to descend until indications matched on both Captain's and First Officer's instruments and elected to continue to destination airport.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft departed IFR into low IMC conditions with full tank of TKS fluid. Aircraft was IMC entire flight. TKS system was on; aircraft encountered light icing while enroute to my filed destination. Pilot noted several symptoms consistent with TKS exposure warnings on MSDS; such as a 'buzzed' feeling at the time of exiting the aircraft after landing. By end of flight; it took more concentration than normal to read back ATC instructions; complete approach in weather; and taxi around busy major airport; Aircraft landed with 5 gallons remaining of TKS fluid; enough for approximately 19 minutes of icing capabilities remaining at middle setting.  Pilot was coughing after flight; not before; and voice had become raspy during flightAircraft has no range in IMC conditions due to TKS quantity and middle setting having approximately a range of 1:20 minutes. TKS has already been confirmed inside TKS Caravan aircraft type.




Synopsis: A C208 pilot described his physiological 'buzzed' feeling after exposure to TKS anti-ice fluid in flight during freezing IMC conditions.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MOT.Airport, ND
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MOT
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We landed on Runway 8 in Minot and were given taxi instructions which were unclear to us at the time. The Captain was discussing during the approach brief that there were narrow taxiways on the turn back back to Runway 8. We landed and exited on the high speed which is marked D2 on airport signage and D1 on the airport diagram that we have.  ATC gave us the following instruction which we misinterpreted 'Exit D2 hold short of Runway 8 on D3' which I read back. I didn't catch the wrong turn because as soon as we exited we began the turn immediately and were asked to watch the engine for the tight turn. In addition I was also searching the airport diagram unsuccessfully for D3 which is noted as D2. Unable to find D3 I assumed the Captain knew where it was and where we were going since he brought up the taxiways in his brief. I was focused on the engine being clear which it was and missed the chance to catch and prevent the problem.   Also interestingly when we arrived at the gate another crew who landed the night before mentioned that the Tower told them they had to do a 180 at the end of Runway 8 and that they were strictly not allowed to do the loop at the end marked as D1 D2 on the diagram or D2 D3 on the airport signs.

Callback: The reporter stated that Taxiway now terminates at Taxiway D3 at the very end of Runway 8. The next taxiway heading West on D is D2 which is a high speed. The third taxiway west bound from Runway 8 end is D1. The current airport diagrams are misleading and incorrect.



Synopsis: A First Officer reported confusion after landing on MOT Runway 8 because the Taxiway D signage was incorrect. D1 exited the Runway first; D2 was a high speed and D3 at the runway end connected to a new Taxiway D extension.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon reaching ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ1X arrival; approach control issued clearance to descend to 6;000 feet. As PF; I selected 6;000 on the MCP and pressed level change to initiate descent. However; as I was referencing the iPad I noticed the aircraft banking left and immediately checked the MCP and realized I had accidentally pressed the heading select switch next to level change; with the bug displaced to the left; causing the aircraft to initiate a left turn. I immediately adjusted the bug to correct heading and maintain course to the next waypoint; however approach already noticed the slight deviation and issued a corrective heading. The time between our initial turn and corrective action was less than 5 seconds and the deviation was minimal; however we were in terminal environment with approach coordinating multiple arrivals and departures so it was not surprising that they immediately noticed.Proximity of heading and level change buttons require extra attention to ensure aircraft is correctly maneuvered.Normally I verify the selection of the mode control panel and verbalize the type descent as I check the FMA. Not exactly sure why that didn't happen this time. Perhaps a little rusty with the decreased flying over the last three months. In retrospect; I think disengagement of the autopilot as soon as I noticed would made it a quicker course correction with less deviation.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation after accidentally pressing the heading select switch.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Company route from ZZZ to DAL; two very similar sounding waypoints exist in close proximity (KRKEE and TURKI). When requesting a short cut; ABQ Center cleared us to TURKI; we repeated clearance; verified and executed the change in the FMC. Subsequent Controller showed us slightly right of course and when we asked for clarification recognized a conflict existed.Change either waypoint name to eliminate the high probability that these two points will be confused.


Second narrative: We requested a shortcut further down the flight planned route. We thought the Controller said cleared direct TURKI; which we read back and then commenced the turn. Approximately 200 miles down the road; the next Controller asked if we had a navigational issue and they were showing us 25 degrees right of course. We confirmed that we were cleared direct to TURKI from the previous Controller; and we read back the phonetic spelling. He gave us another point and then direct TURKI. When we went back to review the flight plan we saw that the point KRKEE was 2 points prior to TURKI in our route; and we suspect that she may have meant KRKEE and not TURKI.It seems unusual to have two point so close together that sounds so familiar; but if we had read back the phonetic spelling that could have helped.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported two waypoints with similar names in close proximity.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G650
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft was parked on ramp following a 10.9 hour flight. The PIC cleared customs with the passengers and returned to the aircraft to finish paperwork and prepare for a surface reposition to the FBO while SIC and Cabin Hostess cleared Customs. Upon our return; the door was closed and we began a normal engine start procedure. After start; PIC began taxiing by applying normal break-away thrust and then turning the nose-wheel to maneuver in a narrow ramp. Immediately after turning the nose-wheel; he noticed an unusual resistance on the tiller which was immediately followed by 'thump' sound and a 'Nose Wheel Steering Fail' CAS message. He immediately stopped the aircraft; shut down the engines; and exited the aircraft to investigate the situation. He then discovered that the nose-wheel had 'pushed' the small nose-wheel rubber chocks forward about 1 meter. When the nose-wheel was turned; the outboard nose-wheel 'lifted' onto the triangular chock and started to 'climb' the chock; resulting in an uncommanded nose- wheel deflection of approximately 90 degrees angle that exceeded limits. This exceedance triggered the red oversteer 'pop out' collar on the nose-wheel assembly.PIC immediately contacted Maintenance and the lead captain to explain the situation. In full cooperation with maintenance; he remained with the aircraft until an approved tow was arranged to a maintenance hangar. Assessment of aircraft condition determined that no aircraft damage occurred. Trip was completed with no equipment change.Suggest that a new SOP require that both pilots check wheel chock removal and/or 'final walk-around' prior to every aircraft ground movement.


Second narrative: Also the policy of having a 3 pilot crew if a flight is more than 10 hours should strictly be enforced. In this case we flew 10.9 hours with two pilots.


Synopsis: G650 flight crew starts up and attempts to taxi to the FBO. A bump is felt and a nose wheel steering fail CAS message appears. Nose chocks had been installed and caused the nose wheel steering to disconnect. Maintenance is called to reconnect the steering. Fatigue was cited as a factor in the incident.