Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PSP.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: Tower PSP
Second aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Trainee; Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was training on LC1. We had been training approximately 25 minutes. Southern California TRACON (SCT) transferred communications of Aircraft X. SCT is supposed to transfer communications of an aircraft per our LOA with them between 6-12 flying miles. Aircraft X checked on while 15 miles ENE of the airport at roughly 5000 feet MSL on a visual approach to RWY 31L with roughly 19 flying miles to go. [Developmental] issued landing clearance on initial call up. When Aircraft X was about 8 miles east of the airport; southwest-bound; the SCT controller called via the shout-line and tells us 'Call traffic to Aircraft X; reference my traffic; he's stopped at 4.' I see traffic; a BE58 (Aircraft Y) descending over the Class Delta southeast-bound at roughly 4200 about 5 miles west of Aircraft X; and realize that must be the traffic SCT is referring to. [Developmental] realizes the same thing. [Developmental] issues the traffic; 'Aircraft X; traffic 12 o'clock; 5 miles; southeast bound; a Kingair; below you stopped at 4.' ([Developmental] incorrectly interpreted the traffic as a Kingair). This was a miscommunication between SCT; [Developmental]; and Aircraft X. SCT should have said; restricted at or above 4000. [Developmental] should have given an altitude of the traffic; and also stated to Aircraft X that the traffic was restricted at or above 4000. Aircraft X interpreted the traffic as being restricted at or below 4000. Aircraft X responds by saying they will stop at 4000. While Aircraft X is telling us this; SCT calls on the shout-line again and tells us their traffic (Aircraft Y) has Aircraft X in sight. [Developmental] tells Aircraft X that the traffic has them in sight and is maintaining visual separation. [Developmental] and I view Aircraft X's tag to assure he is continuing his descent. We see him descend to 3900 and then 3800 on another sweep. I interpret this observation as a sign that Aircraft X is now descending below 4000. At this point; the aircraft are two miles apart; with Aircraft X at 3800 and Aircraft Y at 4000. As Aircraft X gets closer to the BE58; I see Aircraft Y descending below 4000 and all of a sudden watch Aircraft X climbing above 4300 and continuing a climb. I realize they must be responding to an RA. [Developmental] calls traffic to Aircraft X once more; and they report the traffic in sight while climbing. A few seconds later; [Developmental] tells Aircraft X 'Traffic no factor'.After maneuvering for descent; Aircraft X landed without any further incident. It was found the two aircraft were as close as 0.91 miles from each other with 400 feet vertical separation (Aircraft X at 4300; Aircraft Y at 3900).To prevent the re-occurrence of this event:1. Existing procedures should be followed. All conflicts must be resolved before clearing an aircraft for a visual approach. This failed to be adhered to.2. Existing LOAs should be followed. Transfer of communication of IFR arrivals to Palm Springs should occur between 6-12 flying miles of the airport. This failed to be adhered to.3. Phraseology of point outs and inter-phone communication was poorly executed. Through all the shout-line communication; we were never able to respond to SCT because we were busy calling traffic for Aircraft X and other traffic. Additionally the BE58 was not initially referenced; and traffic location was never referenced.4. [Developmental] is a developmental with a history and long lasting problem in training to where [there is] difficulty expressing to the pilots what is going on; and what [needs to be done]. This problem is phraseology based; but also a problem with a difficulty on [Developmental's] part to describe a situation to someone.


Second narrative: I was the developmental on Local. SOCAL transferred communications early of Aircraft X; Aircraft X checks on with me 14.5 miles NE of PSP. I cleared Aircraft X to land on initial call up. SOCAL calls approximately one minute later and asks for me to give traffic on the BE58 (Aircraft Y) to Aircraft X and SOCAL tells me the BE58 is stopped at 4000. At this time; Aircraft X is descending through 4000; while the BE58 has descended to 4000. I immediately give Aircraft X the traffic and let them know the traffic is restricted below them at 4000. Aircraft X responds with; we'll stop at 4000. SOCAL calls back and tells me the BE58 traffic has Aircraft X in sight. I go back to Aircraft X and tell them the BE58 traffic has them in sight and will maintain visual separation from them. Aircraft X responds with roger. I watch Aircraft X to ensure they are continuing their descent and it appears they are. A moment later; it appears they started to climb up and I give an additional traffic call and Aircraft X responds with traffic in sight. At this time the traffic is no longer a factor and Aircraft X has climbed due to the RA.I believe this event occurred because the controller at SOCAL did not see this potential conflict. Also; the BE58 is on the radar scope at least 10 miles NW of PSP; SE bound at 5300 descending above the airspace; and was not pointed out. The Controller at SOCAL should have followed the LOA. First; resolving all potential conflicts before transferring communications and transferring communications within 8-12 flying miles of the airport.In this specific case after it was already done; she should have stopped the descent sooner on the BE58 or at least turned the aircraft left to go behind above and behind the Aircraft X.


Synopsis: PSP Local Instructor and Developmental both reported of an unsafe situation where SCT TRACON did not follow correct procedures which led to a loss of separation between two aircraft.