elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORF.Tower, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ORF
ATC / advisory: TRACON ORF
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X released off RWY 5 at ORF by Departure. Aircraft Y being vectored to the TACAN RWY 28 final at NGU. (Note: The 28 Final at NGU crosses the 5 Departure corridor at ORF.) As local control; I requested release from departure for Aircraft X. Departure released the aircraft on a heading of 300; which is different from the customary heading of 050. I assumed this was to keep the Aircraft X west of the Aircraft Y's course. As the Aircraft X made the left turn to 300; I instructed the Aircraft X to contact departure. Shortly after; I observed the Aircraft Y turning and joining the TACAN 28 final at NGU. This resulted in what I believe was a loss of standard separation. The departure controller then called upstairs and instructed me to say 'for the tapes' that I 'had visual.' I complied with the instruction and made a statement to that effect; only because the departure controller was a Front Line Manager. I consider this an appropriate application of the 2009 FAA/NATCA CBA-Article 65.1. I recommend that departure either (1) not release the Aircraft X off RWY 5 at ORF until the Aircraft Y is no longer a factor or (2) not turn the Aircraft Y onto the TACAN 28 final at NGU until the Aircraft X is no longer a factor.




Synopsis: ORF Local Controller requested release on a departure aircraft from the Departure Controller. Aircraft was released on an unusual heading; Local Controller thought this heading was to avoid traffic inbound.  Loss of separation occurred when inbound traffic turned inbound.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Robinson R22
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-23-250 Aztec
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A helicopter was on an IFR flight plan. He was at 6;000 and on a heading to join the ILS27 at his destination. A Piper was eastbound along the coastline to the east. He had been told to maintain at or above 3;500. I observed him at 4;400 FT and a short time later I saw him climbing through 5;300. I told him to stop at 5;500 and called the traffic. He then continued to climb; reaching 5;900 FT when the targets merged. My Trainee was calling traffic when I took over and turned the helicopter to the south. The pilot should have told us if he couldn't maintain his assigned altitude.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a conflict where a VFR traffic failed to adhere to assigned VFR altitude/s.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DVT.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D DVT
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After departure on the upwind the left engine began rapidly surging and lost power. I called the tower and reported a left engine failure and wanted to return to land. I was told to make left traffic. On the crosswind I elected to shut the engine down to stop the constant yawing for better landing control. On the downwind I elected to restart the left engine on the crossfeed. The engine appeared to run normally after that. We were cleared to land. On the downwind just prior to base I put the gear down. The left main gear indicator light did not illuminate but the gear unsafe light was off. I recycled the gear. Same issue noted. On final I asked the tower if the left main gear appeared down. The controller said it appeared so. I elected to land as the gear unsafe light was off; indicating that the squat switch had been closed. Nothing further occurred. I reported the entire incident.




Synopsis: A twin engine aircraft crew experienced left engine surging after takeoff. As a precaution they shut the engine down. They then restarted the engine while returning to land and it ran normally. However; when they lowered the landing gear the left main gear indicator did not light. Since the gear unsafe light did not illuminate; they continued to a normal landing.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GKY.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E GKY
ATC / advisory: Tower GKY
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We experienced a stall warning on final approach to Runway 34 at GKY. We immediately powered up and began the missed approach. After notifying ATC we were cleared to fly a 330 heading and to maintain an altitude of 2;000. As we reached 2;000; we began receiving Ground Proximity warnings and tried to stay on the high side of 2;000; but received a call from the Controller to maintain 2;000 and a heading of 330. We were soon given a left turn and the warning quit. We don't know what exactly caused the warning.Better planning of the missed would have reduced the tension in the cockpit during the procedure.




Synopsis: After initiating a missed approach following receipt of a stall warning on final the flight crew of a Falcon 2000 received GPWS warnings while maintaining an assigned heading and altitude from ATC. The warning ceased when given a new heading.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Helicopter
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Second reporter function: Handoff / Assist
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Class C was open on Runways 18L/R. Right before the event; I was relieving the controller on West RADAR. During the oral briefing; a neighboring Class D called for an IFR release off of Runway 35. The Controller I was relieving put what he thought was the right strip in front of him and said the aircraft was released climbing to 4;000 FT MSL. I assumed the position and watched for the target to come off of the Class D. After I observed a target departing from the Class D; Local called to APREQ a downwind departure on a helicopter IFR. I said it was approved. Right after the Class D Tower called for a release on a C550; who we; I and the Associate Controller; thought had already been released since that was the strip with 4;000 written on it in front of me. The Associate Controller said he already had a release climbing to 4;000. At that time we realized the other aircraft that departed the Class D first was on the wrong code and had not tagged up yet. The Class D Tower called back and said it was a PA28 on the wrong code. I found the strip for the PA28 and when the pilot finally contacted me about 5 miles north of the Class D airport and I had him squawk the right code to identify him. The helicopter then came off Runway 18L heading 030 degrees climbing to 5;000 FT. Then the C550 came off of the Class D heading 350 degrees climbing to 4;000 FT. I immediately turned the helicopter to a 360 degree heading to turn him away from the C550 and turned the C550 to a 090 degree heading after I RADAR identified him.  Separation was lost at about 2.5 miles and 400 FT. When the Class D Tower calls for a release; make sure the correct strip is in front of the RADAR Controller.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: TRACON Controller working RADAR Associate position described a loss of separation event when the wrong IFR departure strip was placed in front of the RADAR Controller leading to confusion and the subsequent separation error.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In-flight; the Master Caution annunciation along with the 'ELEC' light on the system annunciator panel flickered. Upon further investigation; we discovered the number two Gen Drive oil temp was elevated. The 'High Oil Temp' light was not illuminated; even in the test mode. We checked all the circuit breakers and none were popped. We monitored the Constant Speed Drive temperature for the remainder of the flight and started the APU as a precaution. We landed at our destination uneventfully. Contract Maintenance met the aircraft and noted that the light bulbs were missing from the annunciator. The light bulbs were then replaced. We accomplished an 'engine run-up' to check the Generator Drive oil temp. As the temperature was still elevated; we accomplished the Generator Drive High Oil Temperature Checklist in the QRH. Maintenance deferred the item and we continued on our trip with the MEL restrictions.


Second narrative: Upon climb out; we received an intermittent Master Caution light with associated ELEC. No other lights were illuminated. On investigation we observed the number two Constant Speed Drive (CSD) oil temp noticeably higher than the number one. The 'High Oil Temp' light was not illuminated even in the test mode. Circuit breakers were all in. We continued to monitor and landed without any other issues. Contract Maintenance was notified and discovered that four light bulbs were missing from the number two 'High Oil Temp and Low Oil Pressure' annunciators associated with the CSD. We performed an engine run on the number two engine and observed the number two CSD oil temperature increasing at idle and disconnected the CSD drive per Contract Maintenance instructions and the QRH.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported observing a Master Caution 'ELEC' warning light. They noted that one of the generator drive units indicated an elevated temperature; but without the associated warning light. They landed uneventfully and discovered during post flight troubleshooting that several bulbs were missing from the annunciator panel.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing through FL230 the Left AC Pack INOP light came on then the Left Pack Temp EICAS message came on. We followed the QRH procedures and shut down the left AC pack. When level at FL340 we then got a Cabin Auto Inop warning on the pressurization controller. We were on the #2 and switched to the #1 but still had an inoperative light. An EICAS message showed auto 1 and auto 2 pressurization systems inoperative.We followed the QRH procedure and attempted to get control of the cabin pressurization system through use of the manual system. The outflow valve was full closed and cabin was still climbing at approximately 500 FPM. When the cabin got to around 8;000 FT and after a conversation with our Dispatcher and Maintenance Control we decided to return to our departure airport. We received ATC clearance and started a slow descent because every time we brought the throttles to idle the cabin started to climb at around 500 FPM or more. With the thrust slightly up the cabin stayed at 0 FPM. It wasn't until we were below 12;000 that we were able to get the cabin to start to descend. During approach and landing we were unable to get the outflow valve to move at all in the manual position and could not depressurize the aircraft as the procedure indicated. On the ground and clear of the runway we shut down the right AC pack and the cabin started to return to field elevation. Prior to parking we opened the First Officer's cockpit window to ensure the aircraft was depressurized prior to anyone attempting to open a door.




Synopsis: A B767 flight crew returned to their departure airport when they lost control of the pressurization system.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival; I opened the aft cargo door and put on the belt loader; but I noticed that there was a QuickPak in Pit 5; which was supposed to be empty; according to the [load report]. The QuickPak in Pit 5 contains dry ice and was not surrounded by 15 bags; but [was] rather by itself in the pit. I immediately notified my Lead and she immediately notified the on duty Ramp Supervisor.




Synopsis: Air carrier ramp personnel reported arrival Hazmat cargo incorrectly configured for air transport.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PGD.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D PGD
ATC / advisory: Tower PGD
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to Punta Gorda KPGD using the RNAV 15 cross the IAF at 2500 with airport in site. Looking at the plate miss read the FAF to be 1000 instead of 1600. Upon crossing the FAF the tower queried altitude informing me that Fort Meyer approach had received a low altitude report. Tower then informed the IFR crossing altitude was 1600 and there are obstacles in the area. Lesson learned need to brief approach fully and carefully beforehand even if VFR conditions are encountered.




Synopsis: While conducting the RNAV (GPS) Runway 15 approach to PGD the pilot of a BE35 misread the FAF crossing of 1;600 FT MSL as 1;000 FT MSL. A low altitude alert from ATC prompted a correction.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was climbing to my assigned altitude of 10;000; to expect 15;000 FT. As I was passing through 9;600 I applied left roll trim; at which point the heading servo of the autopilot disconnected abruptly; the aircraft rolled to a bank angle of 30 degrees to the left and started a left turn. Simultaneously; the altitude servo on the autopilot disconnected and the aircraft abruptly climbed.The autopilot servos on the Dynon System are designed to be overridden at 32 PSI. During autopilot operation; and while engaged; the PFD (Primary Flight Display) will display either a yellow cautionary advisory to adjust the altitude or heading trim to decrease the load [on] the autopilot [servos]. In this situation I can only surmise that the application of the roll trim (the yellow caution warning on the autopilot displayed 'slip' simultaneously with the disconnect) placed additional pressure on the heading servo; exceeding the 32 PSI; and causing a disconnect; which then caused the altitude hold servo to disconnect as well. While arresting the bank angle; heading; and altitude deviations; I noted an altimeter readout of 11;100. Upon getting the aircraft restabilized; Approach queried the deviation and I explained in abbreviated terms; apologized and stated that I had 'been busy'. I was then handed off to Center and subsequentially instructed to climb to 15;000 FT. The Turbine Legend is a relatively high performance aircraft with a high wing loading and is extremely responsive to control input. By the autopilot apparently being overridden; the aircraft responded to prior; established; trim settings.




Synopsis: As he was climbing to his cleared altitude of 10;000 MSL on autopilot; the pilot of a Turbine Legend Experimental aircraft was adjusting the aileron trim when the autopilot pitch and roll servos disconnected and the aircraft abruptly climbed to 11;100; rolled into a 30 degree left bank turn. The pilot recovered control and returned to his clearance.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying [to] ZZZ with 3 passengers including 1 company pilot. Owner is very familiar with visual approach into ZZZ and gets as low as possible to prevent being high on glide path. Mountain is last terrain on straight in visual at 9;339 feet. As we approached mountain; Pilot Flying continued descending through 10;500 [feet]. I queried how low he was planning on getting and that I believe us to be below normal approach altitude. Pilot Flying stated that we'd be perfect and probably get a TAWS [Terrain Avoidance Warning] warning. We received a TAWS warning at about 500 RA and crossed mountain at 160 RA. Pilot Flying paid no attention to TAWS warning. Owner is a very experienced pilot; but has a high amount of complacency. He tends to disregard advice from company pilots. This is known by most company pilots that have flown with him




Synopsis: The Pilot Not Flying on a corporate jet into a mountainous airport reported the Pilot Flying disregarded aircraft TAWS warnings on the approach.