elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out we received an EICAS Cyan message stating the following. PRESN AUTO FAULT [FAIL] followed by cyan PACK 1 & PACK 2 OFF. I had my F/O (First Officer) continue to fly while observing the cabin not climbing. I search for immediate action items and subsequently guidance from the QRH. The F/O asked to level off at 5;000 ft. The QRH offered no guidance. I reverted to knowledge of aircraft systems. A fault indicating a system failure of one system/channel/computer versus a failure where both system/channel/computers fail. I found a way to revert to the secondary cabin pressure controller system by selected the CPCS (Cabin Pressure Control System) knob from AUTO to MAN and back to AUTO. I had heard of a check airman having the same issue during training and pulled my recollection of his experience to help aid me in solving my issue. The CPCS returned to normal utilizing the second computer and the flight was continued without incident. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified and logged accordingly. Because the issue was identified; isolated and rectified immediately we were able to avoid any major pressurization issues. Where there is no guidance; procedures; checklist etc.; we must use prudent judgment and skill to overcome the unexpected and unknown to deal with what is presented. A fault in automated systems without immediate automatic reversion to the backup source. I feel that without a strong knowledge base the flight might have been unnecessarily diverted or returned to the field. I feel that the QRH should have provided more guidance.


Second narrative: After takeoff we received a blue pressurization auto fault message and pack 1 and 2 off messages. There was no QRH guidance but Captain was able to regain pressurization by cycling pressurization mode selector to manual and back to auto to use the other pressurization controller. Procedure; guidance and training on this method should be available to other pilots on this issue.


Synopsis: EMB190 Flight Crew reported a PRESN AUTO FAULT EICAS message during initial climb. The Captain could not find a pertinent QRH procedure and used system knowledge to switch the CPCS to manual and back to auto restoring normal operation.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After checking-in with Washington Center (it was either Washington or Potomac) we were hearing of many deviations on the PHLBO arrival into EWR due to building storms along the arrival. After a few minutes of being on frequency we were given instructions to fly direct to the BESSE intersection; then direct a fix north of DQO; I believe it was DYLIN. As the controller was issuing the instruction; he spelled the intersection. As he did; I typed it into the FMS scratch pad and confirmed with the Captain that it was the correct fix. He wrote the intersection down as the instruction was issued; and we both agreed it was correct. The BESSE fix took us further west than our original flight plan; but seemed to keep us clear of the weather so we did not question it. We were handed off to; and checked in with Potomac and heard nothing after the check-in for probably ten minutes or so. The controller then asked which fix we were going to; and seemed confused as to why we were going that direction for BESSE. After having us spell the fix; controller discovered that we were going to another BESSE; and that we should have been going to BESSI; much further north. Controller issued us a heading to get on course while we programmed the FMS; and explained no being aware of the existence of a BESSE intersection. After getting on course we were handed off to the next sector and thanked for our help. The flight continued without further issue or complication. In this case the two fixes were spelled the same with the exception of one letter. I believe the Captain did read back the spelling of the fix; so it is hard to tell if the error was detectable. Being that the two fixes were relatively close together (BESSE and BESSI are both in the northeast) it did not trigger a mental flag to question the assignment. In other cases of duplicate fixes; one fix may be on a totally different continent and the FMS will prompt the crew accordingly; but this not being the case made the threat more prominent.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer reported a track deviation after being cleared direct to BESSI during arrival to EWR. The crew entered BESSE into the FMC and ATC detected the error.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Mechanic] and myself were working on Aircraft X. We were doing an initial evaluation on the right wing inboard spoiler actuator leaking at return line b-nut; we did not know what we had so we raised the spoilers and placed a rubber chock under the spoiler. We didn't know if the spoilers would lose pressure because of the leak; we did not want the spoiler to close while we were tightening the b-nut. I went up to the flight deck to turn off the hydraulics. Out of habit; I put the speed brake handle down; and then turned off the hydraulics. The damage was done.


Second narrative: While performing a hydraulic leak evaluation on Aircraft X RH IB (Right Hand Inboard) spoiler it was damaged. [Mechanic] and I were trying to determine if a B-nut on the spoiler actuator was the cause. We put a rubber chock under the spoiler to give an added security if the spoiler crept down when hydraulic pressure was removed. In my experience; this was a standard practice to prevent the spoiler from drooping and allow your hand to be in under the spoiler safely. During the process; the spoilers were retracted under hydraulic power inadvertently sandwiching the chock under the spoiler.The spoiler lever was inadvertently retracted; instead of the hydraulic power being removed and the lever remaining in the extended position.[Better procedure is to] extend the trailing edge flaps to full so that access is available from the underside of the wing from a safe position.


Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported inadvertently activating spoilers while a rubber chock was in place; damaging the spoiler.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passengers bag was too large to fit in overhead bin; I advised bag needed to be checked. I noticed the face mask was down and asked her to cover her nose and mouth. She said that her mask just fell down when she sat in her seat. I advised her that her mask had been down since she tried to stow the bag. She started yelling at me and ask if I was the mask police? I said no; but if your mask doesn't fit; I can provide you another mask; she declined. I told the Captain and forward Flight Attendant because the passenger would not comply. Forward Flight Attendant asked passenger if she needed another mask; she complied wearing her own mask. I had to ask the passenger to pull up her mask a second time.  When deplaning; passenger had mask down again.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger would not comply with face mask policy.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FTG.Airport, CO
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D FTG
ATC / advisory: Tower FTG
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Initiated takeoff roll; reaching 70+ KTS noted vibration on left main gear. Retarded throttles; assumed tire failure. On deceleration left main gear collapsed. Aircraft listed heavily to left and departed runway and came to stop. Notified tower and secured aircraft.




Synopsis: BE-55 pilot reported his left main gear collapsed on the takeoff roll.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At PHX there [are] two departure sectors; North Departures Navajo and South Departures Santan. All northbound departures go out to 9 miles on west flow and turn to a 360 heading and all fly the same departure on east flow until Departure Sectors separate them. The Tower launches most of our traffic visually without regard to aircraft type or aircraft characteristics. So a northbound can be visual with another northbound departure even though the courses do not diverge until the Departure Sector separates the two. In many cases there are over takes and situations where the trail aircraft out climbs the lead aircraft making it impossible to maintain visual separation with the lead aircraft. This is a rather big issue at PHX that never gets resolved. In this case an A321 was launched on a Silow2 departure and an A319 was launched on the SJN6 departure with less than one and a half miles between them. The A319 had a 20 KT overtake and was well out climbing the A321. At the 9 DME the A319 was 1;500 FT above and half mile in trail. Due to this I know there is no was they can still have visual separation with the A321. I stopped the A321 climb and turned the A319 to provide adequate and safe separation. We should not allow visual separation on same direction SIDs. No visual on two north or south bound departures. Visual should only be applied between a north and a south bound departure. Our Tower launches departures visually even when there is no need; there can be only 2 aircraft on the field and they will be launched visually.




Synopsis: P50 Controller expressed concern regarding the visual separation techniques used by PHX Tower and the resulting wake turbulence concerns.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Air return due to pirep telling us we had a 6 foot flame coming out of engine 2 on takeoff.Mid-way down the runway for takeoff; a regional aircraft 'other carrier flagged'; stated 'using the afterburners; huh?' Since we were empty (no Passengers; and not much fuel); we were accelerating quickly; and thus his comments made sense. Upon rotation; the Tower asked the regional aircraft; 'what was that you said'. To which he responded; 'looks like (Company) is using afterburners; a six-foot flame was coming out of the back of the #2 engine'. Upon reaching clean up altitude; we ran all the appropriate checklists; and returned back to ZZZ. The fire trucks were called by ATC; and they performed an inspection upon taxiing clear of the runway. We were cleared to taxi to the gate; and the event was entered in the logbook; and Maintenance and Dispatch; and the Chief Pilots were notified.The regional aircraft could have been more clear in his comments; and we could have aborted the takeoff at low speed.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported another carrier flight crew commented about flames exiting engine tailpipe during takeoff roll. Flight crew returned to departure airport.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed for LAS and cleared TYSSN Arrival and expected Runway 25L based on winds and ATIS. Approaching IGM; LAS changed to 19 L&R. So we prepped for RNAV Visual 19L. LA Center advised LAS had another plan for us and assigned a westbound heading. After another hand off we were cleared direct GFS and the KEPEC Arrival. This arrival transitioned us to 25L. We reviewed and prepared for that and finished about the time we were handed over to LAS approach. On initial contact the Controller advised us to expect Runway 7R. We reviewed the RNAV visual 7R and the note that said to expect it when LAS was using landing 7R. We were cleared to 7000 and heading 010. After reporting the airport in sight we were cleared for a visual approach to 7R (not the RNAV). We both had our Terrain PB's on and were aware of the terrain in the vicinity. I wanted to establish on the RNAV approach and our heading was putting us directly to JAMMD so we went direct and began a gradual descent. We received a ground Proximity warning 'Terrain; Pull Up' without the Caution Terrain warning or any terrain visible ahead on the ND; we did display terrain to our west above us. No altitude readout on the radar altimeter during the event.I was too focused on the RNAV visual approach and using it as a barrier for terrain that I missed the terrain right in front of us. I didn't specifically ask for the RNAV. Getting cleared to 7000 was a clue we weren't going to get it. Ask the Controllers to clear us automatically for the RNAV visual or at least leave us in a position to fly it.




Synopsis: A321 pilot reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to LAS Runway 7R.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC gave me closed traffic with the option with instructions to follow the Citabria ahead; also in the pattern. I took off on Runway XY.I turned right crosswind at about 500 feet; heading 040; and continued my climb to 800 feet; the pattern altitude. There was a fair amount of haze and I did not see the Citabria. As I reached 800 feet and was ready to turn right downwind I saw the yellow Citabria on my left closing fast. I immediately began a sharp descending turn and the Citabria likewise took evasive action. The Citabria landed without incident as did I. I believe the Citabria was slightly higher although not by much.I ascribe the near miss to my failure to query ATC where the Citabria was. Also; it was difficult to see because of the haze. A contributing factor was the Citabria's extended upwind before it turned to right downwind. I will ask ATC to call my crosswind turns in the future anytime I have a doubt about where the preceding traffic is.




Synopsis: A C-172 pilot reported a near-mid-air-collision with a Citabria after losing sight of it during climb in hazy conditions.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While working Aircraft X; I failed to see a DG (Dangerous Goods) [parcel] in A2 of Aircraft X. I put [in] front in A1 so I had a support person in the [cargo compartment] who I thought would have checked before getting out. I was on [Gate] XY with a XA:00 departure. I start at XZ:00 and have to scan my first bag by XZ:22. My support help was not at the gate at the start of my loading. I started with bags because I needed to make sure I met the 38 minute required by Local management.I was called into the office by the managers and they told me there was a DG (Dangerous Good) override [error] on my flight.The event occurred because the DG was never removed from the aircraft the night before. The support person who loaded the freight in A1 did not say anything about a PPS (Priority Package Service) in A2. I was focusing on my times for 1st bag scans and the support person was not part of the huddle before I started loading the flight because he wasn't at the gate.I had to go into a [meeting] and discuss what happened.[I should] not expect someone to do what I should have done. [I should] get verification. I need more time for first trips of the day because of the external security search I'm required to perform.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ramp Lead reported a Dangerous Goods loading error of a parcel inadvertently left in the cargo compartment from a previous flight. Reporter attributed the error due to time pressure; load team communication breakdown; and failure to complete external security check.