elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD 900/901/902 Explorer
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Power Drive System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Rotorcraft
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After loading patient in the aircraft; I conducted walk around and got in the aircraft. Normal start up. Medical crew was having difficulty finding [one of their equipment] bags. Thinking it might be outside the aircraft a medic opened the cabin door to look and then re-closed the door. The cabin door light remained illuminated so I exited the aircraft and checked all the doors and then returned to the aircraft and got strapped back in. I did conduct the before takeoff check; visually checking the power knobs to fly; RPM no cautions or warnings etc. but must have missed the torques. As I lifted off; I got the RPM audio so I sat the aircraft down and rechecked everything. The number two power knob was not completely into the fly position so the engine was at idle. I now had the 'check exceedance log' illuminated on the IIDS [Integrated Instrument Display System]. I checked it and it was 'LT XMSN TQ OEI'. I pushed the CLR button and it cleared. I proceeded with the patient to the drop off hospital then returned to base. After returning to base I notified the Mechanic and at that point I realized what I had done and the mistake that I had made. This was purely my fault. I should have ensured that the power knob was completely [safe] to fly. Not just visually but actually felt the knob. We are on our 11th MEL extension on this IIDS. We get aircraft faults after each flight. We have to pull up the aircraft fault and clear it. If it clears; we are good to go. I didn't differentiate between 'aircraft fault' and 'exceedance fault' at the time. I just figured that it cleared as it always did so I was good to continue. It was after the fact that I made the distinction between the two but at that point it was too late.




Synopsis: When an MD900 helicopter pilot failed to insure the right engine power knob was in the 'fly' mode the left engine was overtorqued during the subsequent lift off and sit down. When the IIDS message 'check exceedance log' was able to be 'cleared' the reporter believed he was 'good to go' and completed the mission; only to learn that; unlike IIDS faults; exceedences must be resolved by Maintenance prior to further flight.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Preflight was normal.  Completed cockpit checks. There was a Blue CAS L ENG Maint 150. We looked it up in the QRH. The QRH stated; 'Dispatch permitted with this message active.' I believe we discussed doing an engine shut down and restart/reboot; but decided to depart with the message active and complete an aircraft shutdown at our destination. We departed shortly. The takeoff and initial climb was normal. Approximately 2 to 3 minutes into flight passing through 5;000 to 6;000 FT I heard a muffled thump. We experienced an aircraft yaw to the left at the same time. The Copilot stated we lost the left engine. We declared an emergency and started to level off and return to the airport. We decided no to try an engine restart as we were so close to the departure airport. We ran the appropriate checklist and we returned to the airport.




Synopsis: A G450 engine auto shutdown after takeoff for unknown reasons but a Blue CAS message L ENG MAINT 150 was displayed during preflight which the QRH stated was a dispatchable item.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft came from maintenance prior to our flight. The captain and I specifically said that we needed to be vigilant and really check for switches out of place or for popped circuit breakers. The takeoff warning horn did not work and; upon inspection; maintenance found the circuit breaker popped. I did not see it in my preflight; even though both the captain and I inspected them thoroughly. This particular circuit breaker is located behind the First Officers (FO) seat; right next to the fire extinguisher.We pushed back; started engines and taxied to hold short of [the runway] awaiting a wheels-up. We were cleared to taxi into position and hold. It was the FO's leg. Upon takeoff clearance; I advanced the throttles and we heard the cockpit door slam open. The flight attendant attempted to shut it but the kick panel fell out in the process. The captain chose to reject the takeoff at 65 knots. We taxied clear; ran the rejected takeoff QRH checklist; verified the brake cooling time and returned to the gate.Maintenance could not initially find the problem with the door. But after spending some time working the issue they found the circuit breaker pulled. It is located behind the captain's chair and is hidden behind a flange designed to prevent the captain's headrest from inadvertently popping a circuit breaker. They reset the breaker and signed off the aircraft. We were able to finish the flight after the delay with no further issues.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to the cockpit door coming open and the flight attendant unable to close it.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C IND
ATC / advisory: TRACON IND
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We were] cleared for the visual approach to Runway 23R at destination. Approach Control advised VFR traffic; 10 o'clock; 5 miles; 500 FT above you has you in sight and is maintaining visual separation. We reported that we had the traffic on TCAS but not visually. Approach responded that 'he has you in sight and is maintaining visual separation. He will pass above and behind your aircraft. Maintain best forward speed; you are number one'. Approaching the glide slope; the TCAS target started descending. I informed the First Officer (pilot flying) that it appeared the traffic was attempting to 'duck under' our flight path; rather than pass overhead; as instructed. I got a visual on the aircraft at the same time we received a TA from the aircraft. Within seconds; we received an RA to CLIMB. We leveled our approach; maintained visual with the traffic as he passed under us by approximately 200 FT.[Issue was due to] reliance of ATC to allow a VFR pilot to be the only one responsible for separation in Class Bravo airspace. If both aircraft cannot maintain visual separation; in this case we did not initially see the other aircraft; perhaps a vector away from the potential conflict could have been issued; even though the weather was VMC.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports a NMAC with VFR traffic during visual ILS approach. The traffic was pointed out and expected to maintain altitude 500 FT above the B737 but started descending causing a TCAS RA.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Tower ASE
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We left South America for Aspen with a Customs/fuel stop enroute. On arrival at Aspen our block time was 13:00 hours and our duty time was 16:00 hours. Aspen's weather was a concern as TAF showed possibilities of low ceilings and visibility and snow. We were scheduled for a tight maintenance inspection the same day. On arrival ATIS was 170/25G36 10 miles 80 BKN 6/-4 29.74. The ATIS remained for our departure; winds were stable from the south; not shifting as usual for Aspen; which made a northwest departure not possible. I proceeded to sign the waiver to be able to depart to the southeast as reported ceiling was 80 broken and we could see the tops of the mountains around Aspen. I decided to take off Runway 15 and climb visually straight ahead and turn to LINDZ as per clearance: Climb VFR direct LINDZ when able RV…. This was second or third wrong decision as I should have made a climbing left turn to LINDZ due to lower terrain to the east. At about 300 FT above the mountain tops and unable to remain VFR due terrain; we entered a solid cloud layer around 12;000 MSL and came out on top at around 14;500 MSL. Being the MSA in the quadrant 15;700 MSL and seeing yellow in the EGPWS about 4 miles ahead I became concerned those few seconds as to terrain clearance and unable to maintain VFR established on the IFR departure track. On hindsight I should have delayed departure till wind shifted or better still delayed arrival for maintenance for a day or two.




Synopsis: A Gulfstream V pilot departed ASE south and the EGPWS terrain warning activated after the aircraft entered IMC around 12;000 FT with mountains top around 14;500 FT and a 15;700 FT MSA.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Weather elements / visibility: Clear
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Other unknown
Operating under: Other unknown
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other unknown
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Other unknown
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: ATC direct failure to advise hold short of RWY 9C in the initial clearance. After the switch from ground to another tower frequency no instruction was given to HOLD SHORT 9C. We were given clearance to Taxi M1; M; right onto RWY 22R HOLD SHORT OF ECHO. Aircraft Y was ahead of us given the same clearance HOLD SHORT ECHO monitor tower.Aircraft Y encroached RWY 9C as Aircraft Z was on its takeoff roll on 9C. ATC Controller YELLED  AIRCRAFT Y STOP! Immediately after Aircraft Z cancel takeoff clearance STOP! The commercial jet appeared from behind the hangars with the nose wheel off the ground in a slight right bank as the controller says DO YOU SEE THAT PLANE?!Aircraft Y was given a number to contact the tower.There are no 'wig wags' installed at any intersections along this runway. There are no stop bars installed. There are multiple obstructions to visibility. Taxiing into the sun is a factor.Runway markings and signage is unacceptable for the size and scope of the runway; and it's intended use.New construction all around the airport with pilots returning to work from furlough; and layoffs or leave of absence. Trust bias that ATC Is correct in the instructions given.Attempting to move aircraft with expedience rather than a structured taxi route. No designation of any 'hot spots ' on aeronautical charts.Cease and desist using RWY 22R as a taxi way!The use of this RWY as a taxi way is the inevitable set up for a mass casualty accident!

Callback: Reporter stated that ORD is no longer using standard taxi routes and that pilots are often being told to taxi in a direction opposite from what they are used to. Reporter observed that when instructions are issued to hold short of taxiways it causes confusion for pilots.



Synopsis: Eyewitness Pilot reported observing a critical ground conflict during taxi when an aircraft taxiied onto a runway while another aircraft was on takeoff roll at ORD airport.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aileron
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: January 2015. While performing the preliminary inspection on a Cessna CE560EP aircraft; I found the inboard end of the L/H aileron contacting the wing rib directly inboard of the aileron. The rivets and screws retaining the balance weight cover were gouging into the rib. I notified Maintenance Control. I recorded the damage and contact between the aileron and structure. The aircraft was outside in -8 degree temperatures and snow. The initial response for Maintenance Control was to grind the aileron to get clearance; because it was the busy season and our operator really needed the aircraft. That was not even an option in my opinion. Maintenance Control had a Contract Engineering company draft an Engineering Order (E/O) in which we were to grind down the rivet contacting the rib; and grant the aircraft 300 hours flight time before the repair was made. I forwarded the information to our company Safety Representative Mr. X. I also discussed this E/O with a senior inspector and we both agreed that this was not a safe option. The later E/O was to grind the rivet down; and fly the aircraft under Ferry permit to get repaired properly. Two days later we performed the repair per the E/O to ensure the rivet could not impede the movement of the aileron and performed a Ferry Flight inspection. Three days after that; I was notified by Safety Representative Mr. X that the aircraft had flown to our Base Station for repairs and the aileron was found to be the wrong part number installed three years prior. The CE-560 Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) has had many changes over time with the 560 series aircraft. I don't understand how the paperwork was missed during initial install of the aileron. Are the pre-flight checklist procedures incomplete? How was this missed? Excessive cold. Aircraft damage. Flight cancelled.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding the inboard end of a left aileron contacting a wing rib directly inboard of the aileron on a Cessna CE-560EP aircraft. Rivets and screws retaining the balance weight cover were gouging into the rib. Aileron had been installed three years earlier; but was found to be incorrect for the aircraft.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BHM.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: PC-12
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON BHM; Tower BHM
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the pilot flying the BHM RNAV (GPS) Runway 36 approach. We were cleared direct to GOTBY (IAF) at or above 3;000 FT for the GPS Runway 36. At GOTBY we stepped down to 2;800 FT to IMOBY; then down to 2;300 FT to BERFY (FAF). We were handed off and checked in with Tower outside BERFY. The Tower cleared us number 1 to land Runway 36. Two minutes later the Tower issued us a 'Low Altitude Alert' and advised us to check our altitude immediately. At that time we were slightly above the MDA of 1;480 FT. I continued for a few more seconds until the aircraft issued an 'OBSTACLE; OBSTACLE' alert and the MFD indicated a yellow shaded circle directly in front of the aircraft. I again noted my altitude was correct at 1;500 FT however executed an immediate missed approach as we were solid IMC and there was no way to visually verify the situation outside the aircraft. We were issued a climb to 4;000 FT and vectored instead for the BHM ILS 24 approach to a landing. Perhaps of some relevance was that the aircraft that was following us on the BHM RNAV (GPS) Runway 36 approach; a Cessna Sovereign; was also issued a 'Low Altitude Alert' two minutes after mine; and advised to check their altitude immediately. As it's not clear why the TAWS indicated 'OBSTACLE; OBSTACLE' during this approach I cannot suggest how to avoid this in the future. We are required at night to utilize the TAWS screen on the MFD at night; but given the variety of airports we fly to in less than VFR conditions; it may be advisable to utilize the TAWS screen at all times in the terminal area at night or when IMC exist.




Synopsis: Turboprop pilot reports being issued a low altitude warning by the BHM Tower while at minimums on the RNAV (GPS) Runway 36. Within a few seconds the aircraft TAWS system issued 'OBSTACLE' alert and the MFD indicated a yellow shaded circle directly in front of the aircraft. A go-around is initiated; followed by an approach to a different runway. It was reported that the following CE680 was issued the same warning by the Tower.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: Y90.TRACON, CT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C BDL
ATC / advisory: TRACON Y90
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was being vectored for an ILS runway 6 approach at BDL and Aircraft Y was receiving VFR advisories while conducting survey work.  Aircraft X was left on the arrival route and descended to 4;000 feet because it was the lowest usable altitude due to multiple unknown VFR's indicating lower altitudes.  The plan was to leave Aircraft X on the route until they passed the unknown VFR's then descend below Aircraft Y while there was still plenty of lateral separation.  I had to turn Aircraft X early to avoid an unknown VFR that started climbing.  That turn created conflict with Aircraft Y.  Aircraft X was instructed to expedite descent to 2;500 feet to get below Aircraft Y.  Aircraft X was slow to descend so additional turns were given and Aircraft Y was instructed to climb.  Separation was maintained but it was an ugly operation.  The event happened because uncontrolled VFR's are unpredictable and allowed too much freedom close to busy airports; Aircraft Y was allowed to operate at an IFR altitude; and I made a poor decision to place Aircraft X on the approach to runway 6 when an approach to runway 33 would have been easier. The Class C airspace does not protect the airspace surrounding Bradley airport enough.  The final approach courses are vulnerable to uncontrolled VFR aircraft.  Uncontrolled VFR aircraft can circumnavigate the Class C airspace and legally cross the instrument approach final approach fixes at the same altitudes as the IFR airplanes about to land.  I recommend the airspace around BDL be changed to Class B to force VFR airplanes to be controlled by air traffic control and ensure the safety of IFR airplanes during their final and most volatile phase of flight.




Synopsis: A Yankee TRACON (Y90) controller describes an airborne conflict due to VFR aircraft being in the vicinity of the airport and the final approach course. Controller recommends changing the airspace from a Class Charlie to a Class Bravo to offer better protection from the VFR traffic.