elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Cabin Crew Seat
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: My first time working on the Airbus 321 at [Company]. There are typically 3 flight attendants working the main cabin. We hit turbulence and had to immediately strap in and guess what? There are only 2 single jumpseats with seatbelts and harnesses in the rear of the aircraft. The 3rd flight attendant is out of luck. They can't get to 3L because we are trying not to kiss the ceiling. This situation MUST BE IMMMEDIATELY addressed. There needs to be double jumpseats with 4 seatbelts and harnesses available for working crew to keep them safe. All [Company] Airbus aircraft need to be retrofitted with these.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported airline's A321s are inadequately configured with jumpseats; seatbelts; and shoulder harnesses to provide safety for three flight attendants working in the aft of the aircraft during turbulence.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MBB-BK 117 All Series
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Aircraft component: Main Rotor Blade
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the track and balance of A/C S/N XXXX; there were issues getting the blades to fly together; blade swapping took place as well as blade replacements.  I was doing the paperwork portion and trusted that the information given to me was correct.  When I was told which S/N's were swapped and which were replaced.  Logbook entries were made and signed off reflecting those actions.  Fast forward a few weeks I was sent an RO (Repair Order) to get unserviceable blades sent out for repair.  I printed out the RO's placed them in the blade boxes and got the blades sent out.  Nowhere in this process did I physically check the S/N's of the blades.  I trusted the mechanics to give me the correct information which was a huge mistake and I should have physically verified the P/N's and S/N's as outlined in our procedures.  This is the end of my statement.Do not rely on others to verify P/N's S/N's. Physically Verify P/N's and S/N's. Double-check other mechanic work to ensure completeness and that what was said was done was actually done. Follow published guidance; policies; and procedures.




Synopsis: Technician reported not verifying part numbers and serial numbers prior to shipping main rotor blades out for repair.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Falcon 900
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Jeppesen KRITR 1 RNAV SID at KCLT has a 'Speed Restriction' box. The speed restriction box states 'Upon reaching 10;000 feet accelerate to and MAINTAIN 280 KIAS; if unable advise ATC.' It then in the same box states next 'CHARLOTTE/DOUGLAS INTL only; Accelerate to 250 KIAS; if unable; advise ATC.' This is confusing. Prior to reaching 10;000 feet we asked Charlotte Departure what airspeed they were expecting us to maintain above 10;000 feet to clarify. The Air Traffic Controller stated '280 knots' we maintained the correct speed of 280 KIAS. Problem solved for us; but this ambiguous statement could cause someone else to make an error.




Synopsis: Falcon 900 Captain reported some confusion of airspeed requirements on the KRITR1 RNAV SID and the statement 'Upon reaching 10;000 ft.' and 'Prior to reaching 10;000 ft.'
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MRI.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D MRI
ATC / advisory: Tower MRI
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching Merrill Field from the northeast from the highway; we were instructed to enter the left downwind for Runway 7 and report Clark Middle School. Upon reporting we were at traffic pattern altitude of 900 FT. Tower instructed us to extend left downwind because of landing traffic at 1;800 FT. We had traffic in sight and turned left base over the downtown shoreline. We took a wide base turn because my student was flying. We were then set up for a long final approach. Landing traffic was clear the runway and we were cleared to land on Runway 7. Upon flying over the Sheraton Hotel (a notable landmark for its location to the traffic patterns of Merrill Field) we were approximately 500 FT MSL when my student called out traffic abeam to our right at our altitude. I saw the pilot of the other plane and it was close; maybe 200 FT by my perception. We immediately dove to the left. The [other aircraft] immediately banked away and to the right.Upon landing; I called the Merrill Field Tower to complain. They indicated that we were not at fault at all. The other aircraft did not listen to three instructions to follow behind us. Apparently the [other aircraft] claimed they were mistakenly following a military aircraft at Elmendorf AFB; which I think is a complete bunch of BS. I told the Tower Controller I wanted to pursue this with the FAA because I was not pleased at the other pilot's lack of situational awareness; attention on the radio; and overall flying abilities that I have never had anything like this happen before.The Tower Manager called me back; after having pulled the radar and radio tapes. He told me that the other aircraft did not listen to instruction; and that it was 1/20th of a mile (250 FT) from us on a T-Bone 90 degree intercept. I cannot believe how close this was. Assuming that plane was flying 70 KTS; we had 2 seconds before impact. I can't believe that pilot's poor attention to let something like this happen.




Synopsis: Small aircraft instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another small aircraft in the pattern at MRI.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Once again the VRB RADAR was taken down for preventative maintenance in the middle of the day when it is needed most. We were very busy at sector three with numerous aircraft wanting to do practice instrument approaches. We had an aircraft that came from F11 wanting to do a practice approach at VRB and then return northward to SGJ. At some point we lost this aircraft on RADAR due to the RADAR outage. I was too busy to look closely; but it is quite possible that we had numerous non-RADAR deals with this aircraft as we had numerous aircraft on vectors at his altitude. There is no reason; other than the agency being to cheap; that this maintenance cannot be done on midnight shifts when there is no demand. Every time they take the RADAR during daylight hours it causes a severe degradation in safety and efficiency. That they continue to perform these operations during times of peak demand just shows that all the agencies talk of concern for safety is just that; talk. The VRB and MLB RADAR should never be taken offline for preventive maintenance during daylight hours.




Synopsis: VRB RADAR was taken down for maintenance during a busy traffic period. A ZMA Controller suggests; as a safety issue; this type of elective maintenance should be completed during late night operations.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked; Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight departed the gate showing dangerous goods unsecured. The ramp lead tried to final multiple times without the required 15 bags and this is the alert that populated in my [Software] bar.[Error Message] The flight was already showing off the gate and had been off the gate for some time before the ramp attempted to final and they attempted to final the flight 4 times without the required bags. The lead realizing the issue then went into [Load Planning Software] and manually changed the bag count which of course allowed them to final the flight.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported Hazmat Dangerous Goods transported without required Hazmat cargo configuration.
Date: 201810
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Strong burning dust odor/fumes upon climb out; near level off. Unknown passenger injury; most cabin crew had reaction to fumes. Coughing; bloody sinus discharge; headaches; dizzy; burning eyes. This event did not seem to affect me physically.




Synopsis: A330 Flight Attendant reported most of the cabin crew and an unknown number of passengers experienced physical effects from fumes in the cabin during climb.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon receiving three B787 oxygen bottles. I; Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) in ZZZ inspected these bottles before putting them in service. This is normal practice in ZZZ. It was at this time I noticed one bottle was low; one was empty and the other was at 2000 psi (normal). My investigation revealed that all three bottles had damaged (bent) Gauges. ALL three is alarming to me. I have attached photos of all three bottles along with the Non-Rotable Parts tags. There needs to be an investigation to determine where the damage is occurring. And we need to check all B787s to determine if they are flying around with damaged bottles. Flight Deck Crew. Component.

Callback: Reporter stated flight crews have two oxygen bottles located in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) under the cockpit floor. Bottles are made of composite materials with a valve head on the bottle that is different from earlier composite bottles. Mechanics must shut off both bottles when servicing either bottle to prevent loss of oxygen from bottle not being serviced. Bottles have to be removed for oxygen servicing; requiring a two-person effort. No scratches or dents are allowed on any bottle.Reporter stated his air carrier went to an all metal box for transporting their oxygen bottles because they are shipped pressurized on aircraft with 2;000 pounds of pressure. The containers are designed to handle heat and bottle pressures. They recently identified the cause of the damaged oxygen gauges on the bottles to be from the plastic shipping containers that had previously been used to ship oxygen bottles by ground; but are still used for storing them. The B787 composite bottles were not secured in the plastic containers and would slide around inside. Damage to the bottle valve head and gauge was more likely to occur when the plastic box was stood up on one end. His air carrier has already accomplished a Fleet Campaign and found one bottle installed with the bent pressure gauge. Almost all of the bent; damaged bottle gauges were found to be leaking oxygen.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding three Crew Oxygen bottles with damaged (bent) pressure gauges during a Receiving Inspection procedure prior to putting the bottles in service. Concerns also raised as to where the damage had been occurring and whether other aircraft may be flying around with damaged bottles.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Stagger Wing 17
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Aircraft component: Carburetor
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying about 700 feet AGL; when the engine sputtered and quit (I believe it was caused by carburetor icing.) I pushed the throttle ahead full; pulled carb heat and pumped the hand pump with no results so I ended up landed in the only safe place to land that would also cause the least damage to the aircraft. I landed gear up on the snow in a swamp instead of the woods.




Synopsis: A Beechcraft Staggerwing pilot reported losing engine power around 700 feet and landing straight ahead with his gear up.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: A Cessna Caravan; not in radar coverage; was [getting] handed off to me from a Center Sector 10 [at] 11;000 feet direct to the KSGU airport on a random route. I attempted to contact the Center sector about the aircraft as they were going through several areas of high terrain and many active military use airspaces. There wasn't an answer. Eventually they contacted me. I told them I could not take the aircraft because he was non-RADAR on a random direct route where no points on his path were displayable on my scope.The controller became agitated and asked me how he could fix it. I didn't have an answer; at that point; the rule had already been broken and I wasn't sure how he could fix it. He then got even angrier that he didn't know that he should have read the FAAH 7110.65 before he started controlling traffic; instead of asking me to explain it to him over a shout line while I was busy. I finally got the aircraft; not in radar contact; and I knew the transferring sector wasn't going to fix it; so the safest course of action was to give the aircraft to me. I made sure the aircraft was level above the highest terrain in the area and cleared him direct to a VOR within NAVAID use limitations.




Synopsis: ZLC ARTCC Controller reported they were handed off an aircraft below their radar coverage on a random direct route instead of an approved non radar route.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BZN.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In the descent to BZN; we were given direct KICDO (IAF on ILS 12) and a descent to 10;000 MSL. Approximately 9-10 miles east of KICDO; we received a GPWS 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN' while IMC. I; as pilot flying; performed the GPWS escape maneuver and climbed up to 11;000 while the captain notified ATC and we were given a stop climb at 11k. The controller said he doesn't usually have anyone have any GPWS hits in that sector but also mentioned the MSA had recently changed in the past few months. We continued to fly the ILS to a full stop without any more incidents.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Airbus A320 series flight crew experienced a terrain warning descending to 10;000 feet approximately 9 NM east of KICDO during the ILS 12 at BZN. The aircraft was climbed to 11;000 feet and ATC confirmed that 10;000 feet was the correct altitude.
Date: 202106
Aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Flight plan: None
Reporter function: Remote PIC (UAS)
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person UAS Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am an ASEL and rotorcraft rated pilot and I teach Part 107 classes. I obtained my Remote Pilot certificate through the FAA Safety website and have had it for approximately X years. After two years; I renewed my certificate under the Part 61 Pilots Recurrent course. Since that renewal; my flight currency in manned aircraft has expired. I believe this means that I cannot use my 'Part 61 Pilot with Currency' certificate and have to take the Non-Part 61 recurrent course. I didn't realize this until I had been flying for approximately X months past my expiration of Part 61 currency. To aid in my Part 107 teaching; I decided to watch the 'Non-Part 61 Pilot Recurrent' training and saw that the intended audience included 'Part 61 Certificate Holders who do not have a current flight review'.  I am now taking the appropriate course.




Synopsis: UAS pilot reported not completing the correct recurrent Part 107 training at the time of their Part 61 currency expiration.