Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower SKBO
Second aircraft: A330
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After checking in with SKBO Approach; we were given clearance 'direct to GIDRI and Hold at GIDRI'. Our assigned altitude was above FL200. After checking all possible charts; we could not find a published holding pattern at GIDRI. We asked for a full holding clearance and were told to hold at our discretion. Due to multiple TS in the vicinity; we originally told ATC that we were going to hold on our present course inbound with left turns at GIDRI. As we were approaching GIRDI there was a TS cell near our hold; we requested a turn to the NE (actually reported the hdg needed) to divert around WX and then we would proceed to VULAM for a hold. ATC responded with 'approved'. After turning to the SSE to VULAM; we informed ATC that due to WX we were unable to hold as published. We were told to hold at our discretion; we informed ATC that we were going to hold with an inbound course of 170 and left turns. This was acknowledged and approved. There is a good possibility that we flew into SK (R)-10 due to these deviations. Our understanding is that ATC approval should have ensured clearance into SK (R)-10. ATC gave us no indication at any time nor do I believe there was any problem with our position. This restricted area is not depicted on any of the iPad charts for SKBO except for the enroute chart if the special airspace is turned on. The SK (P) - 31 is only depicted on the radar vector Area chart 10-1R. Situational awareness would be greatly improve if we could get the moving map function of the iPad turned on and authorized.Prior to our arrival; we briefed terrain considerations with MSA sectors and radar vector area chart. Although the chart didn't show terrain in our area; our turn took us outside 30 NM of the BOG VOR. From now on I will ensure that at least one pilot has the terrain mode selected regardless of WX while deviating. Even though we were well above the Grid MOA altitudes; the Grid MOA altitudes should have been restated once we were outside 30 nm from the BOG VOR in the event of further descent clearance. Although the fix pages were being used for our holding and approach situational awareness; once the deviations started we should have built a 30 NM ring around SKBO.After switching to final SKBO Approach; we were cleared to exit holding and cleared for the ILS 13R approach. We complied with all speed restrictions and assignments from app control between VULAM until landing at the airport. At 100 ft AFE we encountered some wake turbulence; I adjusted vertical path by momentarily leveling off. Continued descent to a normal landing and touchdown point. After landing; I noticed an A330 taxiing back after landing on our runway. I do not recall ever being informed that we were following a Heavy A/C. Additionally we were not given landing clearance until passing 800ft AFE due to the proceeding a/c clearing the runway. I do not believe that we were given adequate separation while on our IFR approach. We had a 1 kt tailwind. We questioned ground control after landing and were informed that it was an A330 that we followed on the ILS 13R approach. This already complicated arrival was exacerbated by multiple TS in the vicinity (which were not forecasted); extreme communication congestion; difficulties with language barriers (requiring multiple calls and readbacks); non-standard ATC clearances; a very limited amount of fuel for holding (max structural limit for T/O); all while keeping dispatch informed at night. This report should not be considered a complaint about our ATC controllers; overall their handling of us and their response to our request for WX deviations and our limited holding fuel were outstanding.Lesson learned:-Although I added 400lbs thinking that would take us to our structural limit for takeoff; we actually had 500lbs to spare. Next time; I might want to keep the fuel truck at the a/c until we have our final ZFW in order to top off.-This was a class 2 flight plan; we were cleared 4000ft below planned cruise altitude.-The forecast did not have this WX forecasted +/- 1 hour of our arrival time; but our alternate did. Had we needed to divert there are little to no other options available with the fuel on board. Although fuel was in excess of FARs required; I have found arrivals into SKBO are planned for arrival fuel much less than other system airports that have plenty of options and are much less terrain critical. Why is this the case? Consideration for more fuel will be considered for SKBO regardless of any payload and weight restrictions-Due to the forecast WX bust on this flight another thought has come to mind. As I understand it [Company] has forecasters that can override the original forecast. I'm not suggesting nor do I believe this occurred for our flight plan. However; if one of these forecasters gives a more favorable forecast than originally forecasted; will I be informed of this development (action)? I have not seen a message of this type in the past. The crew should be advised of these changes at all time for flight planning purposes. I personally would not like to plan for an optimistic situation when there has been a [company] generated forecast to the contrary. -Moving map would be nice-At least one pilot in terrain.-Depict the Prohibited area P-31 and Restricted area R-10 on arrival and approach charts-A mention of P-31 and R-10 on the 10-7-30nm fix ring around SKBOIn the future coming into SKBO; I will inquire type of a/c following and never assume it is a narrow body a/c. Had I known; I would have made and briefed the approach very differently. Additionally; I would have executed an immediate go-around with a wake turbulence encounter that close to the ground regardless of the intensity encountered. During the entire arrival; we ensured ATC knew what we were doing and that we had approval. Additional multiple radio calls were require to do this. Our intentions and time available were stated clearly and acknowledge from the very beginning of our arrival when delays and holding were issued. ATC did an outstanding job assisting us in this respect. I would not have done this any other way.


Second narrative: During arrival into SKBO Bogota Approach assigned holding at GIDRI. Approaching the fix we concluded it was not feasible due to scattered thunderstorms with sharp edges and steep gradient; I voiced 'concern' (CUS) and we immediately decided to request holding elsewhere. The communication frequency was extremely congested. We told Approach we were going over to VULAM to hold and that was approved with courses and turns at our discretion. We headed northeast adjacent to GIDRI before turning southeasterly for VULAM where we entered holding. After completing one circuit we were vectored uneventfully for the ILS. There is Special Use Airspace to the north west of VULAM controlled by Bogota Approach which do not believe was penetrated.


Synopsis: B737NG flight crew reported executing a challenging approach into SKBO that was complicated by weather; communication difficulties; and a wake vortex encounter on short final.