elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On takeoff roll; I set the throttles and asked for max power setting.  When I normally do this I usually put my (throttles) hand up on the glare shield to let the First Officer (FO) have access to the throttles; and when the FO announces 'Max/Standard power set' I put my hands back on the throttles.  On this takeoff I left my hand up on the glare shield (why; I couldn't tell you).  At approximately 100 knots the FO asked 'Do you want your hands there for the reject?' and all I heard was 'reject' and performed the reject at approximately 110 knots.  As we exited the runway and talked about it we realized what had happened.  I did not think it was prudent to start questioning a call like that when we were getting into a possible high speed reject.  Contacted maintenance; performed appropriate QRH procedures and maintenance write-up/checks; and continued on with a normal takeoff.


Second narrative: As we continued to accelerate; I noticed that the Captain still had his hand on the glare shied instead of the throttles. I tapped my left hand on top of the throttles; but he didn't see me do that. I then said 'Do you want your hands here for the reject' as I tapped my hand on the throttles again. The captain heard me say the word 'reject' and promptly initiated the rejected takeoff.


Synopsis: Air carrier Captain rejected takeoff at approximately 110 knots when the FO inquired if he wanted to place his hand (which was on the glareshield) back on the throttles 'for the reject.'
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft was reported to have a crack in the Captain's side storage container. Inspection of this container showed several repairs had been attempted on this container. I reapplied the previous repairs and secured the crack by drilling a hole through the container box and secured the crack with a tie wrap; then filling with a bead of silicone. Evidently without my knowledge; a wire was damaged during the process of drilling through the fiberglass. This damage caused an auto brake malfunction on the subsequent log page. During troubleshooting of the auto-brake MEL; Maintenance found the damaged wire. I was concerned with getting the aircraft out on time with no delay. This component had been damaged many times before and would have taken a long time to repair or replaced if the item was in stock. Remove aircraft from service regardless of consequences to flight schedule.




Synopsis: While attempting an interim repair to a fiberglass panel located in the flight deck; the Maintenance Technician inadvertently drilled into a wire bundle; causing an auto brake system malfunction.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Was notified by Maintenance Control to try and clear an MEL that was opened at an Outstation. The original write-up was: Left-2 (L-2) [door slide] Girt Bar Indication does not indicate 'engaged'. Outstation MEL'd this under MEL 53-02-55. Upon trying to identify the root cause; I noticed the Aft Service Door Girt Bar aft slide attach fitting was missing the bolt that holds this onto the girt bar. Bolt was assumed removed during Inspection and not reinstalled. Aircraft just came out of Basic # 2-Check.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Supervisor found; while troubleshooting the cause of a cabin door Girt Bar Indication not visually indicating the Girt Bar was engaged at the floor fittings; that the Aft Service Door Girt Bar slide attach fitting was missing a bolt.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B NYC
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While being vectored on the ILS 6 into TEB we were given a descent clearance to 3;000 feet. In the descent we were also given a traffic advisory report at our 2 to 3 o'clock. As we were looking for the traffic we received a GPWS [TCAS] 'TA'. About the time we received the GPWS warning we noticed our aircraft was 450 feet low. We immediately climbed back to 3;000 feet. We continued the ILS 6 with no further issues and landed safely at TEB. The reason the deviation occurred was due to a break down in CRM. Training SOP's are very clear that as a non-flying pilot sets a new altitude in the altitude selector the flying pilot then verbally verifies the new altitude. Both pilots then verbally verify the new altitude as 'armed'. In the heat of being vectored at a low altitude in turbulence into a busy airspace while looking for close proximity aircraft we both got distracted and did not verify the 'armed' portion of that SOP. Looking forward; following the training SOP's will be the main focus for every flight to keep this from ever happening again.




Synopsis: CL600 First Officer reports becoming distracted during vectors for the ILS6 at TEB; by turbulence and nearby traffic. During descent to 3;000 feet the new altitude is set in the alerter but not armed; resulting in a 450 foot deviation below 3;000 feet.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ISM.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ISM
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Other Unwanted situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The pavement markings indicating the intersection of Runway 6/24 and Taxiway Alpha are faded and difficult to see clearly. The information signs indicating a taxiway/runway intersection are placed too close to the pavement which makes them difficult to see when taxiing in a nose-high aircraft. Pavement markings need to be repainted and signs should be placed further from the pavement.




Synopsis: Small aircraft pilot reported the runway/taxiway surface markings at the intersection of Runway 6/24 and Taxiway A at ISM are faded and need to be repainted. The reporter also noted signage at that location is too close to the movement surfaces and difficult to see from an aircraft that sits in a nose high attitude.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Aerofoil Ice System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: TKS fluid (Hazmat) contamination of cockpit. In preflight noted TKS fluid from wing running down into cabin air intake on top of strut. While IFR in cruise; pilot operated TKS for 5 minutes. Captain and jumpseating pilot both immediately noted subtle chemical odor. Jumpseater immediately said his eyes were burning and he was beginning to get a bad headache. Captain noted his throat becoming irritated; dry; scratchy; and coughing. Jumpseater ran finger around inside of overhead vent in cockpit noted vent has sticky film. Aircraft has a film all over inside and out. Upon landing both pilots noted feeling dirty; like covered in a sticky film and having a strange bad taste on our lips and in our mouths. TKS MSDS lists major warnings about exposure to fluid and vapor. Both flammable and toxic results; such as effects such as symptoms of intoxication or narcotic use. Would like FAA to look into C208 TKS. Pilots very worried about experiencing effects of TKS contamination while trying to fly single pilot IFR; or even runway incursion possibilities. Please investigate C208 TKS crew contamination before someone gets hurt.




Synopsis: A C208 pilot noted he and a jumpseating pilot developed burning eyes; irritated throats and headaches after TKS system activation inflight. A sticky film was detected in overhead vent; in the cockpit and on the occupants.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon taxi out the aircraft radios were working fine. I; (pilot not flying) spoke to Ground and Tower very clear and concise. We received clearance for takeoff and proceeded to 5;000 FT as assigned. When Tower told us to contact Departure; I tuned in the frequency to check in with Departure; and received no response. The Captain and I then tried numerous combinations between our Comm 1 and Comm 2. We tried talking back to Tower and a few other area frequencies that we looked up. After using CRM we both came to the conclusion to squawk 7600 on our transponder. While the Captain focused on flying the appropriate departure route as assigned; I continued to work with the radios and check all plugs and potential electrical issues. I was able to hear a vague voice clear us to 11;000 FT and direct our destination and that we were to respond with an IDENT. We picked up approach for a very short conversation that we were cleared to land through them on the Runway 13 at our destination but when Approach told us to try the Tower; we lost two way communications again. After we landed we proceeded to taxi via light gun signals to our FBO. After the aircraft was secured; the Captain and I reported the squawks regarding the two way radio failure to the aircraft manager. We then proceeded to call the Tower voluntarily and make sure everything was ok and that we were not trying to be contacted by Center; Approach; or anyone else.




Synopsis: CE550 First Officer experiences radio failure when attempting to contact Departure Control after takeoff. This was planned as a short flight and the crew elects to squawk 7600 and continue to destination.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On Salt Lake Center and level at 11;000. Thought I was told to contact Salt Lake Center and descend 10;000. I had previously requested 10;000 because I had reached more than 30 min above 10;000. So I swapped frequencies and began descending. At 10;500 Center advised of a low altitude warning; and I climbed back up to 11;000.




Synopsis: C402 pilot reported misunderstanding an altitude clearance; resulting in a descent toward terrain.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared into position and hold on Runway XL at ZZZ while downfield a B787 was cleared to cross XL and hold short of XR. We were subsequently cleared to takeoff from XL once the B787 cleared our runway. As we accelerated down the runway we passed behind the B787 as they were cleared to cross XR and increased their thrust. Our fairly light aircraft nearing rotation speed was rocked considerably by this thrust. Had we been going faster or weighed less; we might have had more significant control issues. The cause was the above idle thrust or even just the idle thrust of the large aircraft holding between the runways at or near the rotation point of our smaller aircraft's takeoff run. I don't know if they were cleared to cross XR as we passed behind them and they increased thrust or if this was just the idle thrust; but either way it was more than was appropriate for our operation. Either do not hold large aircraft between runways while clearing subsequent (smaller) aircraft for takeoff while passing behind them; or ensure that they do not increase thrust above idle while an aircraft is taking off behind them.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported the aircraft was rocked on the takeoff roll by jet blast from a taxiing B787.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E Y
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While descending on the ZZZ1 arrival we were cleared to FL290.  While passing FL300 ATC issued a pilot discretion descent clearance to 17;000 feet.  My PNF waited to set 17;000 feet until the autopilot went into ALT CAP and began to capture FL290.  Upon setting 17;000 feet I noticed the autopilot no longer holding FL290 and disconnected the autopilot and manually held altitude and then selected manual ALT to hold FL290.  At that point the autopilot was forgotten to be reengaged; and the aircraft slowly climbed to almost 29;800 feet before the PF noticed it and manually initiated descent to 17;000 feet.  ATC was notified of the correction and that we were beginning our discretion descent from current altitude to 17;000 feet.  ATC did not say anything about the brief climb and only verified we were beginning our descent to cross ZZZZZ [Intersection] at 17;000 feet.Human factors of disconnecting the automation while correcting for the unanticipated non capture; manually setting ALT hold without resetting the ALT selector caused no bug to appear on the altitude tape and the action of selecting ALT hold caused the PF to be the live autopilot; holding altitude; although only the FD was since the autopilot had not been reengaged.  Usually we would correct an autopilot behavior such as this while still engaged by resetting the ALT selector and using VS or Pitch mode; but that level of automation had been removed.  Problem was identified and quickly discussed and understood by the flight crew to ensure better communication and pilot automation interface in the future. A likely contributing factor is lack of flying hours in the recent 6 months for both crewmembers due to the COVID-19 pandemic.




Synopsis: Corporate Captain reported nonstandard procedures were used causing an attitude deviation. Captain stated lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic was a contributing factor.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were holding short of Runway XX ready for departure. We heard an aircraft check in with tower on the ILS YY. Tower cleared us to line up and wait Runway XY. We sat in position for approximately 3 minutes when tower cleared us for takeoff and they stated that aircraft was on a 2 mile final. Tower did not state immediate takeoff. Engines were spooling up and Tower asked if we were moving and I replied yes we're rolling. In about 5 seconds a transmission from tower was partially blocked. Approximately 20 feet from Runway YY Tower stated cancel takeoff clearance are you able to stop prior to Runway YY. I replied negative. There was no way to stop completely short of Runway YY at that time so we continued the takeoff roll. Tower told aircraft on ILS to go around. Rest of the departure was uneventful. I did not reject the takeoff at that point because I determined it was likely we would stop right in the middle of Runway YY instead of before or after it. The safest course of action was to continue.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew received a cancel takeoff clearance and hold short of intersecting runway for landing traffic. Captain did not reject and continued the takeoff because he determined the aircraft would stop in the middle of the intersecting runway. Landing aircraft was instructed to go-around.