elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working all positions combined on my early shift. The RVR was dropping and I had a B737 on a base. I took a look at the RVR and was late on the turn to final from the north. I tried to turn him left on 040 to rejoin; thought I had time but it was to close to the approach gate. I went further left to 010 so I could get more space. I noticed it was too close; advised the aircraft that I would re-sequence him so turned him left to 250 heading. It appeared he started to turn right with out me instructing him to join the localizer; so I told him it appears you turned right; continue right heading 250. He then told me he was already turning left; so I went back and said continue left turn heading 250. At this time; I noticed we had a departure coming off Runway 33; so I instructed the B737 to expedite turn and told Tower to put the departure on a 360 heading. They might have gotten to close with no ensured separation; although I might have had divergence. Many things I could have done better. I was a bit tired from waking up early in the morning but that is not an excuse. I could have verified the B737 heading before assigning new turns. I could have climbed him to a safer altitude and stop the departure below him. The first time he went through final; I should have just re-sequenced him; instead of trying to correct in an IFR day. But the major one was verify his turn before assigning a new one. Not just get stuck in trying to help continue his turn; and just ask.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when traffic issued a heading initially turned the wrong direction; the reporter acknowledging several oversights on his part during the event.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Light: Night
Aircraft: Learjet 40
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During engine start; the SIC (Second In Command) did not complete the Parking Brake item in the Engine Start checklist. During the After Start check; the aircraft began rolling; uncommanded. The crew noticed this simultaneously and applied the brakes to stop the airplane and set the parking brake. Contributing to this was my failure to supervise the SIC properly during engine start and being focused on other tasks including reviewing the route and setting the takeoff speeds. Once it was noticed that we were moving we stopped the aircraft immediately. We were far enough back from the taxiway that at no time did we violate a movement area and we only rolled straight ahead where there was nothing to hit. Additionally; neither crewmember instructed the lineman to remove the chocks; which had they still been in; would have allowed us to stay parked until we were ready for them to be removed. Work with vendors to improve training on removal of chocks. Continue campaign among IOE Captains to push for utilization of checklist during engine start. Personally; I intend to focus more on supervision of duties during IOE to ensure checklists are being utilized and items are not missed.




Synopsis: Learjet 40 Captain reported that the aircraft rolled during engine start after the SIC failed to set the parking brake.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Redeye arrival to LAX Runway 6R. ATC cleared us to 'descend via.' We had leveled off for an extended segment at 10;000 FT as charted; when ATC cleared us 'after SMO descend to 4;000 FT.' Both of us interpreted this to supersede other altitude restrictions on the arrival and ILS 6R; including SMO at 8;000 FT; and WAKER at 5;100 FT. Accordingly; we crossed SMO at 10;000 FT; set 4;000 FT in the ALT window and began descent. Shortly thereafter we were cleared for a visual approach to 6R. All concluded with no complaints from ATC. However; I am now wondering. 1) Should we have crossed SMO at 10;000 FT - altitude at the time of revised clearance -- or 8;000 FT as published?  Did the revised clearance supersede the previous 'descend via?' 2) Should we have stopped descent at 5;100 FT until passing WAKER then descended to 4;000 FT?  The circumstances render these questions somewhat academic; since we were just dropping in on a visual approach with no conflicting traffic. A simple addition to the clearance by ATC would have helped; i.e. 'cross SMO at 10;000 FT; then descend to 4;000 FT' or 'cross SMO at 8;000 FT; then descend to 4;000 FT.'




Synopsis: Air Carrier arrival into LAX posses a number of questions regarding ATC's clearance during an approach to Runway 6R.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I just opened LCK sector as the R-side without incident.  The sector was not busy at all.  About 5 minutes later W42 started handing me 2 aircraft both at FL360 (Aircraft X and Aircraft Y) that would collide in my airspace around HACKS.  HACKS is approximately 10 miles from the ZDC boundary.  When sector W42 called for a handoff I answered; 'Why on earth would I take a handoff from you when you are handing me a deal? I don't care what you do; fix it.' This happens all the time from ZDC.  W42/W03 consistently hands LCK/UNV deals.  Those ZDC sectors are truly remarkable and not in a good way.  Not long after that; they spun Aircraft Z at FL380 near the boundary.  When I asked them why they did that; they answered; 'I don't know.'  About 10 minutes later they called and told me it was for spacing to ORD even though they previously told me (pull the tapes) they don't have to space that aircraft because they were on different streams (untrue). The years I have been here; I have never once seen ZDC space anything! In fact; they are the anti-spacers.  They will short cut the back aircraft all day long. Long story short; ZDC sectors W42 and W03 are safety hazards. I will keep reporting their carelessness and negligence so there is a record for someone to ignore until something happens and it can no longer be ignored.Fun fact: ZDC gave Aircraft X the wrong frequency after everything was said and done.  I inquired about this in the past and I was told by ZDC that they never look who takes the handoff.  I recommend supplemental training for ZDC sectors W42 and W03.  ZDC and ZID controllers should tour each other facilities/airspace to get a better understanding of what we are doing to each other and how we operate.  Knowledge is power!




Synopsis: ZID Controller describes a situation where they were going to accept a handoff from ZDC but called the Controller to fix the problem; before they would accept it. A loss of separation would have occurred in the receiving Controller's airspace if they took the handoff.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had a heavy jet join the localizer at 5;000 feet and based Aircraft X behind it at 4;000 feet to keep him below the wake turbulence. I turned Aircraft X to join the localizer for the parallel runway. Instead of waiting until Aircraft X was established on the localizer I cleared the Heavy aircraft for the approach. I should have waited just a little bit longer or kept Aircraft X on a divergent heading. I also could have descended Aircraft X sooner and then cleared the Heavy.




Synopsis: S46 TRACON Controller turned an aircraft on to the final approach course with less than required wake turbulence separation behind the preceding Heavy aircraft.
Date: 201412
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Personal
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Concern about readability of STARS which have been condensed from easily readable foldouts to minimum single page. Example: HOUSTON; TX (HOU) KIDDZ ONE ARRIVAL. Due to extreme minimization; some fixes are unreadable. We were switched from another STAR to this one which has some unreadable fix names. You can barely discern some of the letters even with a 10x loupe that jewelers use. THIS IS UNSAFE! All charts should be able to be read quickly and easily. Maybe you can do something about this situation.




Synopsis: CL600 Captain believes that many STAR's have become unreadable as a standard paper chart due to the font size required by the size of the chart page.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LFPG.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LFPG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While on standard taxi route; missed turnoff from B to BD8 while going eastbound.  Almost immediately after; Ground told us we missed the turn and told us to take the next left.  We complied and continued taxi without further incident or query.  We thoroughly briefed the standard taxi route; were looking intently for the turn; bypassed BD8 believing it was the B5 as marked on the signage; and missed the turn.Dark area; unlit taxiway; unlit and unmarked taxiway turnoff. Add sign for BD8. Add better lighting in that section of airfield.




Synopsis: Captain reported lack of signage which caused flight crew to deviate from standard taxi instructions.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Passenger
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying northwest along California-Nevada border near 38;000 ft. Pilot executed evasive maneuver to the right several seconds before I saw a white-topped 2-engine airliner fly to our left on the heading opposite to ours. I was seated on the left side of the aircraft; three rows from the rear. The other aircraft was in my field of view approximately one second. I was looking down; following terrain at the time. Horizontal separation was not zero; but may have been less than one wingspan. Vertical separation appeared to be about 400 or 500 ft.; if I assume that the other aircraft was also a 737-800. I spoke to a pilot very briefly to a pilot at the end of the flight; saying 'that was a close one; ...'. He responded with a four or five syllable response which I don't remember; but which was not a denial. I neglected to read his name tag or notice the number of stripes on the shoulder tabs.




Synopsis: A Passenger reported they observed an opposite direction aircraft in conflict with their flight.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B N90
ATC / advisory: CTAF LDJ; TRACON N90; Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Flying into KLDJ is a real challenge on a VFR day as they run you right up to the airport on the GPS A and it's very hard to cancel and stay out of the Class B airspace (800 feet on the airport and 500 east of it).  Unicom (No tower) is no help to find out what's happening and Approach doesn't want you to leave them to call unless you cancel.  All this time departures at KEWR are shut down till you cancel IFR and you still don't know who is in the pattern or what runway is in use.  Somebody is going to get hurt here trying to stay out of the airspace.  I tried calling KEWR Tower and Approach on the phone to gain local knowledge but that was no help as they didn't know or were too busy.  The problem here is the transition from IFR to VFR is done too late.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of busy and confusing airspace while landing at KLDJ.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PNS.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Super King Air 350
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E P31
ATC / advisory: TRACON P31
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training and had two departures off Runway 08 at PNS. The first departure was a B350. I climbed him to 100 on a 60 heading. The next departure was a MD90. I turned the MD90 heading 360 and climbed to 100. I APREQ higher for the MD90 reference the B350 with ZJX; they gave me 150 and I climbed the MD90 to 150. I turned the B350 on a 360 heading and turned the MD90 to a 030 heading and switched him to ZJX. I then switched the B350 to ZJX. About 30 seconds later; Eglin Approach called me with a point out. It was westbound climbing high with ZJX. The aircraft was already encroaching on my airspace 3 west of CEW climbing out of 095. I asked the Controller if ZJX already had the aircraft. They said yes and I approved the point out. A couple seconds later I noticed the aircraft were both level at 100 headed to each other. I called ZJX and asked them if they were talking to the B350. The Controller said no; at which point my trainer tried to turn the B350 southbound to avoid the traffic. As she was talking the ZJX Controller said we have him and we are climbing him. About 30 seconds later the B350 finally began a climb. I believe the aircraft were less than 2 miles apart when the B350 began his climb. After the session; I talked with my supervisor about the incident. He informed me that Eglin had only given RADAR to the westbound traffic but still had communications. When I asked the Eglin Controller if Center had the aircraft they meant yes they have RADAR and I took that as yes Center had communications. If our Coordination had been more clear and precise we may have been able to prevent the situation. However ZJX did have communications with one of the aircraft and RADAR on both and should have been making calls and/or coordination with us or Eglin to resolve the situation.




Synopsis: P31 Controller described a likely loss of separation event involving three ATC facility's. The report indicated that miss communications was the primary causal factor.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I am writing this over my concern for a 3rd party maintenance vendor. During my preflight I found numerous discrepancies after a [maintenance] check was performed. One of them; however; I thought was legitimate I found out later wasn't. The situation was during preflight I noticed 3 of the 6 cabin aisle lights would not work. At the time I thought that all 6 needed to be functioning when the Aisle light switch is engaged. Therefore; I placed this in MEL under cabin interior lights and due to the other discrepancies that grounded the airplane we left it. The next day we were assigned this same airplane again so I reviewed the maintenance record. I noticed that the Aisle light MEL was signed off stating that the bulbs were replaced. Therefore; I was happy to see that it was fixed. However; later in the day; in-flight I turned them on and noticed the same lights were inoperable. Therefore; I placed them in MEL and labeled it a 'Repeat Write Up'. The next day I was assigned to another airplane. Therefore; I went to the manager and under maintenance noticed for the first aircraft that in the notes it stated that this was a non-LED airplane and that this was normal. I then called Maintenance Control and found out that this was true. This was somewhat surprising to me as then why did the previous corrective action have the bulbs replaced; and if they were; would they not be operational checked to confirm they worked? To me this seemed as the initial write-up was 'pencil whipped' to sign of my MEL. The reason I bring this up as I also had a hydraulic leak that was signed off as over serviced after flying the airplane on the 7th. This most likely came from the same third party vendor as they had worked a hydraulic leak and signed off the airplane before my arrival. On top of that; after they did a [maintenance] checklist; I wrote up 12 discrepancies that were either placed in MEL; maintenance completed; or aircraft on ground. When correcting inoperative lights and the bulbs are replaced; maintenance should function test to make sure they work rather than sign it off as bulbs replaced but no function test.




Synopsis: Captain reported that a third-party maintenance vendor had not been properly testing completed work.