elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MRI.Tower, AK
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MRI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Local Control landed Aircraft X on Runway 34 with a long landing and instructed him to cross Runway 7/25 to Taxiway Alpha. I was working Ground Control and observed the aircraft taxiing through the grass north of Runway 7 between Taxiways B [and] C. I notified the CIC who said 'no you didn't.' The aircraft then stopped on Taxiway A and notified the Local Controller that they 'may have hit a taxiway light.' Using binoculars I observed a light that had been hit and notified the CIC. As the aircraft was close to reaching their parking area I asked the CIC if they wanted me to issue a brasher warning and they said 'no; that's FSDO's job.'Local Control did not issue clear instructions on which taxiway to exit to on the north side which may have caused pilot confusion (there is no taxiway straight north of Runway 34; a slight left turn must be made to Taxiway B; or a slight right to Taxiway C). The CIC also did not recognize this as a deviation/reportable event given multiple opportunities.




Synopsis: MRI Ground Control observes after landing an aircraft taxiing on the grass between the landing runway and another he was told to cross. The pilot reported they hit something while taxiing; which was a taxiway light. Aircraft continued to parking.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSN.Airport, WI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C MSN
ATC / advisory: Tower MSN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X requested to go direct to the final approach fix for the RNAV Runway 21 at MSN. I cleared the aircraft to maintain at or above the MVA until crossing the FAF and they were cleared for the approach. The Local Controller said the aircraft is not allowed to be cleared to the FAF and broke off the approach before the aircraft was established on anything and before it went below the MVA. The data person and I were questioning whether this was ok from the start but could not find a clear answer in the 7110.65 on whether this can be done if the pilot requests it. It may be in there; but is not in an easily accessible area.Briefing that was received at least a year ago on changes to GPS approach procedures do not seem to be in the current 7110.65. If it is; it is not in an obvious area; like a section called 'GPS Approach Clearances.'




Synopsis: Controller is advised by local control that a procedure is not authorized and local breaks off aircraft from the approach.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON MMMX
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was [advised by management] to give my account of a recent flight and approach into MEX. We started  a little over two hours late due to a battery charger problem maintenance delay. I was flying with [a first officer] who had not been to MEX airport in a long time. She said she watched the [special airports] video and reviewed the NOTAMS so she was aware of the FMS dead reckoning problem and that SMO VOR was out. I told her that I had been in there several times lately and once en route we talked about the arrival into there and she asked great questions. I told her how they have a tendency to keep you high on descent and that it's important to be at 160 kts inside SMO and that we would need a vector to intercept 5R LOC since the FMS goes to dead reckoning inside SMO. Since we were so late; 5R was closed and we were given the VOR/DME 5L approach. We were asked by approach if we could do the approach on our own and we told them we would need a vector to intercept. On intercept heading the FMS went to dead reckoning followed shortly by a NAV fail warning. We continued and intercepted the MEX VOR 053 course inbound in raw data. Shortly after starting down from PLAZA FAF we picked up the runway and landed. If I could give any advice to crews flying into MEX; especially someone who has not been there before or not in a long time [it would be] to talk about the arrival en route and be prepared for almost anything. Visibility on even good days is usually marginal and language can be an issue. Whenever possible it would be good to have FMS planes that don't have the dead reckoning problem. Hope this was of some help.


Second narrative: On final about 400-500' [AGL] we got the LOUD 'pull up terrain' warnings. The runway had been in sight for some time. We continued VFR to land 5R for a normal landing. The #1 flight attendant said she heard the warnings as did some or the forward first class pax.


Synopsis: An MD-82 flight crew operating into MEX received DR (Dead Reckoning) and NAV fail warnings while on a visual approach.  Because they had briefed the possibility of these issues they were on raw data VOR navigation.  The First Officer advised that inappropriate EGPWS warnings generated due to the loss of positional information were heard by the passengers and a flight attendant.
Date: 201712
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Syst Reservoir Tank
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The delays and confusion between pilots and mechanics is quite honestly; very unsafe. Recent email guidance dictates for 737 pilots to not accept any aircraft for flight with a hyd indication over 100%. In the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual); there is a warning that says if hyd systems are overserviced that hyd fluid will enter the pneumatic ducts and enter the cabin causing injury. Here is the discrepancy between pilot email guidance and [the maintenance task]; hydraulic reservoir servicing has the above mentioned WARNING about overfilling the reservoirs and also directs to fill the hyd reservoirs by the reservoir gauge; from between the ref mark and full; which is approx. 92%; to insure reservoirs are not over filled. [It further states] that 'if you must lower the hydraulic fluid level because it is too high (more than 100%); do these steps'; as in remove fluid; as per the email guidance I might add. This is very clear; directive and definitive as; I say again; per the APA guidance.Now for MX argument; which I disagree with; but I believe IS open for interpretation.MX on this [particular aircraft]; and the attending mechanic; would not sign off the aircraft per the above task for obvious reasons. His guidance from his managers; was to use the following task; which includes the above servicing task; thereby creating the following discrepancy:MX signed off the aircraft; incorrectly; in my honest opinion with the following task.Task Hydraulic fluid quantity transmitter/indicator inspection; which allows a reading of 100 (+/-9%).In my opinion; this is a roundabout way to allow an overservice situation that in my opinion has no bearing on servicing the hyd systems on an operational basis.




Synopsis: Boeing 737 Captain reported that the aircraft hydraulic system has been routinely overserviced.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ASE
ATC / advisory: TRACON ASE
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were approximately 5 miles east of DBL at 14;000 when approach control assigned us a heading and cleared us for the visual approach to RWY 15. The Captain asked me to sequence the FMS to the 9.9 nm runway extension as he began descending to 12;300 ft to intercept the final approach course. As we passed north of DBL; we received a terrain caution at approximately 13;800 ft. The Captain disconnected the autopilot; leveled momentarily; and we resumed the approach. The caution cleared immediately after the descent rate was reduced. We both had the terrain in sight and maintained visual separation before and during the event.The cause of the event was a misjudgment of our proximity to DBL. We both felt we were north and well above any hazardous terrain. Contributing factors were a hurried approach environment complicated by the need to configure; descend; and manage the FMS in a short time period. Another factor was an abnormally short vector that placed us further south than usual. In the future; I will be cognizant of a vector that places us in close proximity to DBL and suggest that we do not descend below 14;000 ft until passing its general vicinity.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to ASE airport.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On landing; I was the A Flight Attendant.  I landed in the X jump seat as opposed to the Y jump seat.  (This is the correct jumpseat position pre-COVID). This is a new procedure due to COVID because of social distancing.  The C Flight Attendant sits in the X row and I land in the X jump seat.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported sitting in the incorrect jump seat.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were at cruise [and] ZZZ Center told us to descend via ZZZZZ landing north.  We read it back and continued.  After the ZZZZZ1 turn they asked if we were on the ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZZ2 [transition].  We said the ZZZZZ1 [transition] and the Controller said it looked [like] we were cleared the ZZZZZ2 transition.  Controller said no problem and we continued to descend via while reviewing the fixes again and discussing how it could have happened.  After a few minutes there was a different Controller on the frequency and we could hear him talking to other aircraft.  So we queried him a few times to no avail.  I then input the approach frequency from the IAP and contacted them there since we had not heard a hand off.  They said they were trying us on guard for the last few minutes.  Since we were still at 9;000 instead of diving and spoilers etc.; we elected a box vector for the descent.  The flight continued with no further incident. [Cause was] improper FMS entry.  Still not sure when it changed as we briefed it properly; but we were given the ZZZZZ4 by ZZZ Tower. After push and an FMS change was made at which point the ZZZZZ1 transition could have been selected instead of ZZZZZ2.  First trip back after more than 2 months off and forgot to input guard into the standby like I do every other flight.  One of the small but beneficial habits that begin to fade without repetition and use.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported flying the wrong transition on a STAR due to a possible FMS entry error.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Terrain Clearance Arrival into SAN was night VFR. Approach procedure had changed several times. We had been filed for Shamu 1; were cleared the Bayvu 3 for a 27 localizer. We re-requested the Shamu 1 with an ILS to 9 approach. ILS to 9 was denied due to construction on the taxiway. We were then given vectors to a 27 LOC. We were on a right downwind to 27 and given a vector that would intercept the localizer just outside of the IAF (REEBO) on a diagonal intercept course. As we were passing abeam the runway; ATC inquired if we had the runway insight. We did and they cleared us for a visual approach. We were about 4000 feet (estimate) and descending. The REEBO intercept alt is 2000 feet and my plan was to square the base turn to arrive at REEBO wings level inbound at 2000 feet. In order to do this I had to turn left slightly in order to have enough separation to turn back into REEBO and be wings level for the crossing and descent. I started my descent to 2000 feet. There was terrain to the left of us; which we both saw and talked about. We passed the highest terrain to the right and turned base leg at 2000 feet. There was never a GPWS terrain warning in the cockpit; ATC never issued a terrain warning; nor was there ever a 1000 foot or 500 foot radar altimeter indication. At some point in the approach we did get the 2500 foot altitude radar call out. We had all terrain in sight; talked about it; did not feel uncomfortable and did not receive any cockpit or ATC warnings. This NASA report is timely. If I were to fly this flight again (night VFR); knowing what I do now; I would stay on the published arrival; with ATC control; until established on an approach segment.




Synopsis: B737 Captain describes a night visual approach to SAN arriving from the north and believes that only a full instrument approach with ATC control should be flown to this runway at night due to terrain considerations.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The FBO personnel informed the crew that there was frost on the wings after fueling; and that they had deicing equipment available. The Captain declined to receive deicing and stated that the frost was very light and that 'the jet will fly just fine'. I felt uncertain about this and while standing next to him in front of the left wing; I ran my finger over the frost and told him I thought we should deice. He again rejected this and told me to 'sit my butt down in my seat; cause we are leaving'. I felt intimidated by him (due to previous issues) and did as he told me to. The Captain closed the door behind me and got ready to start the engines. Before engine start; I expressed my concerns again and received a snappy response. 'What do you know?! You barely have any time in this jet! I have thousands of hours! She will fly just FINE!'The Captain then started the engines and started taxiing in a rush without completing the required checklists; or acknowledging my concerns. During taxi; I expressed my concerns and received another snappy response. In the months prior; I had tried to convey to him my safety-related concerns and often feeling uncomfortable when flying with this particular Captain. I was scared to conduct the flight with frost on the wings; but it seemed that the Captain just wanted to get home (as soon as possible). He wouldn't listen to me; and he conducted the takeoff for our flight. I felt horrible; scared; unsafe; belittled; and powerless. Nothing I said to him in a professional manner got through to him. I felt hijacked and taken along for a ride I did not want to be on. I felt intimidated by the Captain.




Synopsis: Corporate First Officer reported the Captain ignored several procedures including refusing to deice the aircraft when frost was identified on the wings prior to engine start.
Date: 202101
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Lead Flight Attendant had apparently talked to the Captain or First Officer about masks.  They said something to me about it after my break along the lines that she was upset and combative. I was surprised; as I wore my mask (a KN95 on the ground and a solid multi-layer cloth one in the air) all times outside of the flight deck and in the flight deck if a Flight Attendant was present.  Additionally; the other First Officer did as well. The Captain wears glasses that fog easily with a mask on. He wore a mask on the ground; he did not airborne because it would greatly interfere with his duties both because he wouldn't be able to see and could not communicate. This was our 4th leg together and we had no issues with masks among ourselves or other flight attendants.  Additionally; both the Captain and other First Officer already had COVID which they had gotten from people they knew at home; not in the workplace. Before our next rest room break I got out a new unused N95 mask for the Flight Attendant that would be in the flight deck while I was in the bathroom. When I called back and ask for the break she ordered me that the pilot remaining in the flight deck should wear the crew oxygen mask.  I said that was not something that we did anymore-the practice stopped months ago because of COVID.   I offered her the N95 for extra protection because the Captain can't wear a mask and do his job.  She refused it.  Instead continuing to wear what appeared to be a single layer stretchy black cloth mask. Additionally the flight attendant blocking the cart was wearing a KN95 but the Lead FA did not send her into the flight deck. I found the flight attendant to not be willing to exercise self-help and any wearing of an N95 and apparent multiple complaints to be a distraction from my flight duties. This was not good for crew CRM. While the single pilot on the flight deck; I was distracted from monitoring the airplane by her distress and complaints.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported poor CRM with the Lead FA regarding the company face mask policy on the Flight Deck.