elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We are supposed to run our [specific equipment] to reduce COVID exposure; yet I was flight planned with [specific equipment] inoperative. When I queried the Dispatcher why it was dispatched that way; his response was 'I don't know.'  I refused the aircraft.After refusing the airplane the Dispatcher stated [I] was to speak to Flight Operations. The Dispatcher also had me talk to Maintenance to confirm I 'understood the nature of the MEL.' This sounds a lot like pilot pushing to me.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain refused the aircraft due to a specific equipment MELed inoperative; which is reportedly used to reduce COVID exposure.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Integrated Audio System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This covers two flights in the same airplane.I was doing a Captain OE flight with a Check Airman for both legs.The airplane had come from the hangar to try to address an MEL. The FO's audio control panel inoperative.The procedure in the MEL was used to recover the audio channel on the affected side.However; doing this rendered the following systems inoperative.The FO's side stick Push To Talk (PTT) would not work.The ACARS would not work.We failed to write up the above items since we knew the cause was the audio switching panel issue.If we had written up the ACARS as not working; we would have seen MEL #### which has some Dispatch procedures and operational procedures on our part. One of which is to monitor company communications thru SELCAL or voice on appropriate VHF/HF frequencies.However; the FOM enroute/communications section states that flights will continuously monitor ACARS; SELCAL; and/or appropriate VHF/HF frequencies (121.5 does not transmit SELCAL). Although ACARS is the primary means of maintaining this watch domestically; foreign coverage is limited. If ACARS is inoperative or in an area without ACARS coverage; establish a SELCAL or monitor the appropriate voice frequency. The Company must be able to immediately communicate with the aircraft at all times.We both failed to do this on both legs of the day.Although I finished training on Date; my first OE trip started approximately 3 weeks later. This was my second OE trip. There have been huge time gaps in my training and I was still feeling very much in the yellow on this airplane. My inexperience with the airplane and domestic flying kept me very firmly in the yellow while flying those legs. It wasn't until I was able to decompress from those flights the next morning that it occurred to me that we didn't adhere to the above referenced FOM.Even though I am flying with a Check Airman and said Check Airman has signed for the airplane; I still need to be in command and take my time to check all of my available references. Even if this means the flight goes out late or we refuse the airplane.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported not following company communication procedures and cited lack of flight time between training and actual OE flight as a contributing factor.
Date: 201811
Location: TSP.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G TSP
ATC / advisory: CTAF TSP
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: TSP Runway 11 straight-in approach crosses a 4;251 foot elevation ridge about 6;400 feet from runway threshold (4;000 MSL). The ridge has a single steady red obstruction beacon that is located on the ridge crest at the intersection with the extended runway centerline. TSP had a PAPI installation for the runway that was deactivated after local pilots flew the PAPI in daylight and noted that the approach angle barely cleared the ridge- by about 25 feet.This night approach was flown with that awareness: the runway lighting was turned to maximum which includes REIL. As part of the visual approach method; the approach area west of the REIL was kept in constant sight. Touchdown point objective was about 20 feet past the numbers.During the approach the red obstruction beacon was difficult to see with low contrast to other lights in the area.Approach planning was flawed- basically the PAPI angle approach (noted above) was flown; uneventfully; but terrain was visible in the beacon flash to the left and above the aircraft and the ridge was visible for about .25 sec as the landing light swept across. The sudden very close proximity to the terrain was not anticipated.With higher winds; a significant downdraft and turbulence develop on the lee side of the ridge; potentially increasing the CFIT hazard for a low performance aircraft or an inadequately responsive pilot.Facility recommendations: the beacon is dim and needs to be replaced with a brighter light; and an additional light needs to be placed at the higher ridge top to the north. PAPI needs to be re-activated with an approach angle that provides at least 100 feet of vertical clearance.From an approach planning perspective: a right pattern staying inside of the hill would reduce the risk. But the straight-in risk would remain for the pilot with some operational requirement for a more immediate landing; or a pilot unfamiliar with the area. Garmin terrain warning activate immediately after clearing the ridge.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported the PAPI angle in use at TSP narrowly clears a ridge on approach to the runway.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the Sutro Sector. Aircraft X was being vectored on a left downwind leg for the GPS RY12 Approach into HAF at 4;000 FT. SFO was on the 28L/R Shoreline configuration due to the runway construction. Aircraft Y departed RWY 28 on the Eugene Departure and was stopped initially at 3;000 FT; for Aircraft X. After Aircraft X passed; I climbed Aircraft Y to 4;000 FT because I had VFR traffic transitioning at 4;500 FT. I turned Aircraft X to heading 290; for base leg. I had intended to turn Aircraft Y to the southwest but I had [another aircraft] climbing out slowly ahead so I had to delay the turn. About this time; traffic became busy and complex when SFO sent two aircraft around simultaneously. Aircraft Z was sent around on 265 heading climbing to 3;100 FT. Aircraft A was sent around off the right on a 350 heading climbing to 3;000 FT. I was focused on dealing with the two go-arounds and was not aware that I didn't have enough lateral separation with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Proximity was 1.81 miles; on parallel headings. The 350 heading for go-around is not standard operating procedure. The turn put Aircraft A turning towards a departure off Oakland; so my focus was to turn him out of the way.I should have turned Aircraft X to 310 heading and I would have had divergence. I don't have any recommendations for preventing [another] occurrence of this event. Just be vigilant.




Synopsis: NCT Controller describes situation where he is concerned about separating 3 aircraft minimally by altitude and what he thinks is course divergence. He then has two go-arounds which takes his concentration off the other three aircraft resulting in a loss of separation.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; Snow; 1.25
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 35
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: DURING AN APPARENT SNOW SQUALL I WAS LANDING AFTER A SUCCESSFUL ILS APPROACH. AS THE AIRCRAFT FLARED; WIND GUSTS AND LLWS SENT THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF LANDING ATTITUDE. ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN CONTROL WERE UNSUCCESSFUL; AND PILOT FLYING INITIATED A GO AROUND/MISSED APPROACH. UNBEKNOWNST TO THE CREW WHILE EXECUTING THE GO AROUND OUR LEFT WING TIP TANK STRUCK THE GROUND (BASED ON DAMAGE FOUND LATER AFTER LANDING). CREW DIVERTED FOR BETTER WEATHER; AND MORE FAVORABLE WINDS. UNEVENTFUL APPROACH AND LANDING AT DIVERSION AIRPORT.




Synopsis: A LR-35 Captain reported initiating a go around at a non towered airport due to wind shear and diverting where they discovered their left wing tip tank had struck the ground.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PIT.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: FAA line check; FAA examiner states he's the office EFB 'Guru' checked iPad for currency and found my iPad TOC out of currency. FD-pro was okay; but I did not have the iPad TOC update from yesterday. The last update of iPad TOC was from the week prior. I had been working five days straight. I did a three day; two day combination. I stated I had an early check-in the day prior and that I thought we have been told NOT to attempt to update with hotel wifi. He states he's never heard of that and informed both me and the Captain (also out of date); that we were not in compliance with SOP's and that we must update iPad TOC with our personal 'hotspot' from cell phones.....in the cockpit; or we were not going anywhere! We complied and synced our iPad TOC apps during the pre-flight.I had/have no idea how long 'syncing' will take for each update I perform; and choose to do them at home or in ops when I have a long amount of time. On the morning of the early check-in; and unsure of the time requirement to update/sync I choose to report to the aircraft instead of starting an update for an unknown amount of time. We had a busy day and on the overnight I didn't want to trust the hotel wifi.My only suggestion to the iPad system is to have a data plan attached with each individual iPad so as to be able to update as needed at anytime; anywhere as required or necessary. I do not feel pilots personal cell phones and data plans should be expected to be utilized to comply with FAA/SOP update guidelines.


Second narrative: My iPad Table of Contents (TOC) was not current as noticed by the FAA inspector occupying the flight deck jumpseat. The FAA inspector showed me how to use the personal hotspot on my iPhone to update my iPad TOC while in the cockpit and still at the gate. The FAA inspector also explained the requirements necessary to keep the TOC current for flight. We departed the gate on schedule. I was unaware that my iPad TOC was not current when I began my flight sequence the day before.


Synopsis: A-321 flight crew is informed by an FAA examiner that their iPad electronic table of contents is out of date and must be updated prior to gate departure. This is accomplished using iPhone personnel hotspots at the examiners direction.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Parked pre-departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At gate; pre-departure; was given dangerous good summary showing 'miscellaneous hazmat' loaded on aircraft. I was curious to know exactly what the miscellaneous hazmat was; and call Dispatch for clarification. Dispatch called Load Planning and Load Planning was unable to provide further description. Dispatch was busy working several issues with other flights so I offered to call dangerous goods hot-line at. Dangerous Goods Specialist was unable to give further description of shipment. When I ask what drill code '9L' represented; Dangerous Goods Specialist said 'You'll have to look that up in your pilot manual' and was able to provide any further assistance. I called Dispatch back as well as Station Operations trying to find out what exactly the hazardous material shipment was. At some time in this process; somebody offered they thought the shipment was 'airline parts' but had no further information as to what that might be; or what made this a hazardous goods shipment. Batteries; flammability; toxic fumes; etc. At some point in this process; it was decided; not by me; that the shipment would be pulled from the aircraft.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a communications breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch regarding the substance of Hazmat on board. Ultimately Hazmat was removed prior to departure.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Failed to notify Dispatch concerning Dangerous Goods Form prior to push. Notified and added to Release once airborne; en route.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported gate departure without required Dangerous Good Form. Captain notified Dispatch en route and received document airborne.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: It is becoming all-too-common to see the ground crew member fail to follow safety protocols. Today was the latest occurrence. The sprayer neglected to tell us he was starting his process even though we were both in the cockpit with the door open. This is the second time in two weeks I've seen this. I've only been in the area two other times when spraying was underway recently.Another issue with today's event was how the spraying was done. I haven't been trained on it; so there may have been nothing wrong; but the sprayer did little more than march rapidly down the aisle waving the spray machine back and forth like he was swatting at flies. He did not pause to spray into a single row or overhead bin.I would like to think this is something that could be better trained on several levels.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported ground crews are not properly spraying the inside of the aircraft.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: 150;000 pounds at pushback. Pushed straight back off Gate XX. Started both engines. Did checklist and released brakes for taxi. Plane wouldn't move. Added power; no movement. Increased N1 to 40%; plane would not move. Figured we were chocked or brake stuck. Had Ramp Agents come out and check if we were chocked. They believed mains were below the lip of ramp. They suggested to add more power. I shut both motors down and had them go get a Tug. They discovered both mains were in storm drains. We pushed plane back 10 more feet. Started up and taxied out.Suggestion - Have ramp in ZZZ be aware of storm drains.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that after pushback both main wheels became stuck in storm drains requiring a tug to free the aircraft.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Other Glider
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Total engine failure occurred at 12;000 feet MSL. Reported forced landing to ATC. Landed Runway XX at ZZZ.




Synopsis: Pilot reported engine failure occurred and performed a forced landing at an airport.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System - Indicating and Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were starting to level at FL360 when the Cass announced 'Duct 2 Overtemp'. Following the checklist required us to go to ECS 1. Then we got 'Duct 1 Overtemp'. You could deduct that there is a possibility of fire.  We have later discovered that it may have been a Ram Air Mixing Valve error that could have caused both to show failure indications.  When this happens it becomes extremely hot in the cockpit (130 degrees estimated) because you cannot control the temperature any longer. We landed without incident and when I reached 11000 ft I turned off both bleed valves which extinguished the annunciations at around 6000ft.I would suggest that at least a memo on dual duct failure could be devised ... I had a very good First Officer (FO) and we were able to keep cool during the event but this could lead to confusion as to whether we have a fire or not.


Second narrative: [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]


Synopsis: EMB 505 flight crew reported an overheat warning for both ducts without a published procedure in the QRH to addressed the situation.