elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Marginal VFR weather; Runway 31 was the active. There is no RADAR coverage from the surface to around 1;000 FT at the Tower; which uses the ZZZ1 RADAR site for the STARS display; and no RADAR coverage from the surface to around 2;500 FT for the Approach Control which uses the ZZZ2 RADAR site. The Tower uses different colored plastic chips to differentiate between IFR and VFR aircraft. The Ground Control/Flight Data position was conducting training and had received a Remove Strips on an arriving C172 and removed the red IFR chip from the Local Control board and replaced it with a clear VFR chip. Several minutes later; Approach verbally coordinated the C172 as an NDB approach to Runway 13 in accordance with the Letter of Agreement. Since many aircraft do practice approaches VFR I; as Local Controller; incorrectly assumed that the C172 was VFR on the approach. At the same time I was starting to recover several other aircraft that were having difficulty with lowering clouds to the north and west. Several minutes later Approach used automated methods to coordinate a King Air on a RNAV approach to Runway 31. As the aircraft got closer; it became necessary to circle the C172 to Runway 31; but as I assumed he was VFR; I failed to coordinate the circle with Approach. Since Approach has such poor RADAR coverage in the area they were not able to know the C172's position and had to break the King Air off his approach. Ideally we should have RADAR coverage to the surface. In the meantime; I would like more training on the STARS display; tailored to this particular situation; especially the data tags on IFR aircraft. An overall review of both STARS and FDIO information for all our controllers would not be amiss either. Additionally the facility SOP should be changed so that the Ground Control/Flight Data controller doesn't make changes to the Local Control chip board beyond handing the Local controller the chips for aircraft taxiing to the runway and let the Local controller handle his own inbound chips.




Synopsis: Local Controller described a loss of separation event when the IFR vs. VFR status of an aircraft was confused; the reporter recommending changes to local procedures to re-emphasize flight plan status to Local Control.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SYR.Tower, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SYR
ATC / advisory: Tower SYR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared for the visual approach 33 and the FO (First Officer) was hand flying. Initiated a descent to 2;700 ft. and a base leg turn. We got an obstacle caution aural on the base leg of the visual approach Runway 33 into SYR at 2;700 ft. Upon getting the obstacle alert; ATC told us MSA was 3;700 ft. and I initiated a climbing right turn to gain obstacle clearance; while keeping the obstacle in sight the entire time. I misread the approach plate for the RNAV33 SYR and thought that we were still clear of obstacles at 2;700 ft. coming from the west outside of the FAF. Be more thorough on briefing an approach; even if the conditions are for a visual approach to an airport you have been to before.


Second narrative: Landing Runway 33 in Syracuse. FO (First Officer) was hand flying in visual conditions. We got cleared for the visual 33 and started a descent down to 2;700 ft. and turned toward the final approach course. As we made our base turn we received an obstacle GPWS caution. We did a climbing right turn and had the obstacle in sight. Should have stayed at the MSA until closer to the final approach course; also referencing the approach plate better.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported GPWS warning on approach and flight crew complied with advisory.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LEX.TRACON, KY
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: TRACON LEX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I descended Aircraft X outside of the lateral boundary of my airspace.  The old LOA with ZID; gave LEX control of aircraft operating on the STAR into SDF.  The current (new) LOA does not give LEX control.Find out if the 'Control' was an honest omission from the new LOA.




Synopsis: A LEX Controller reported of descending an aircraft outside of the lateral boundary of his airspace. A new LOA does not give LEX control of the aircraft. The Controller wanted to find out if the 'Control' was left out of the new LOA.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Second aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Approach; Departure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I handed off Aircraft Y to Approach Control descending to 5;000 FT; took a handoff on Aircraft X level at 4;000 FT. [Approach Control] was working both aircraft; I noticed they descended Aircraft Y to 4;000 FT; then they switched Aircraft X to me with Aircraft Y opposite direction. I then called [Approach Control] on the land line to tell them about the conflict; their reply was we're watching it. The whole incident took place inside [Approach Control] airspace; I was completely surprised the switched Aircraft X to me with the G150 4;000 FT. I really thought [Approach Control] was going to 3;000 FT with G150 to go under BE35. I called [Approach Control] right away to make them aware of the situation. I really don't have any suggestions.


Second narrative: BE35 Aircraft X IFR westbound [at] 4;000 FT. He asked if he could precede direct his destination. I got approval from the adjacent facility and told him to proceed direct. Direct his destination was a 275 heading. G150 Aircraft Y was inbound to ZZZ descending to 5;000 FT. When Aircraft Y checked on I told him to continue his descent to 4;000 FT. Direct the airport is a 125 heading. I had an AA5 on the ILS 13 approach. I canceled his approach clearance and turned him southbound to box him back I'm at 3;000 FT VFR. I knew I had course divergence between my two aircraft and called traffic for them. When Aircraft X crossed Aircraft Y flight path I observed them at 3 miles apart. At this moment the adjacent facility yelled over the shout line about the two aircraft; as well as the CIC who was working Local. I turned the G150 to a 090 heading; and in reply he said I have the traffic. I then cleared him for the visual approach to 13. I don't really have a recommendation but I think there is a lot of confusion in regards to 5-5-7 in the 7110.65. While I was using this rule everyone around me made me second guess myself and distracted me.


Synopsis: TRACON Controller described an apparent loss of separation by an adjacent facility; the adjacent facility claiming diverging courses was applied.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On takeoff at 600 feet I was the pilot flying; the Captain was monitoring. We were watching the instruments to monitor the takeoff and watching for the 1000 foot mark. The Captain pointed to the right; which caught my attention; and I looked where he was pointing. There was a large bird 10 feet at 2 o'clock level apparent from a 12 degree climb. I banked maybe 10 degrees to the left and very quickly we heard a loud bang from the right rear and had indications that the right engine had be struck. The Captain pulled the right throttle to idle and I continued flying. As we continued the climb to 1000 feet (Captain gave me APR power and we accelerated to Vt); monitoring and analyzing; the Captain contacted ATC and [apprised them of the situation] as well as coordinated with the Flight Attendant. At 1000 feet we accelerated to 220 knots and continued our climb to 3000 feet. During that time we analyzed the situation.The controls felt normal for single engine thrust from the left engine. The [right] engine was performing normally at idle. The Captain pushed the throttle up on the right engine and found that we had usable thrust to 61% N1. We referenced the checklists and decided that we would leave the right engine at idle and return and land using the single engine descent and before landing checklists. The Captain coordinated with ATC for a couple 360 degree turns to run checklists; coordinate; brief and prepare. Then coordinated for a Visual Approach. We executed the approach with me flying and him monitoring to an uneventful landing and taxi back. We canceled our IFR with Radio on the ground; parked and deplaned normally.There appeared to be no reaction from emergency response agencies at the field. Although we did not end up needing them; if we had; I'm not sure they would have known and that we would have had a way to communicate with them.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ flight crew reported a birdstrike to right engine on departure.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OCH.Airport, TX
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Flight plan: None
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Due to poor cell service at the OCH airport and no remote radio link to ATC; I have witnessed several occasions that I felt were not safe. Recommend installing a remote VHF radio link to FSS/ATC facility to obtain IFR clearance on the ground and eliminate the possibility of midair in poor visibility. A little preventative measure is appropriate.




Synopsis: Pilot reported limited communication with ATC while on the ground leading to unsafe situations.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Tower, NV
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Local Control 1 (LC) had 2 aircraft in position ready for departure on Runway 25R; one of which had a flow time.  I (LC2); had Aircraft X on approach for Runway 19L.  I knew LC1 was trying to meet the required flow time for their aircraft; so I told Aircraft X to square his turn to final and reduce to final approach speed.  LC1 coordinated the runway intersection to me behind Aircraft Y.  Aircraft Y started take off roll late; I knew it was going to be close if Aircraft Y was able to clear the intersection before Aircraft X crossed the landing threshold.  The Supervisor was also aware of the situation; and the decision was made to let Aircraft X land. Aircraft Y was airborne passing Taxiway A7 (about 800'-900' before the runway intersection) when Aircraft X crossed the landing threshold.  Recommendation; ambitious flow times by TMU cause controllers to push aircraft out of tight departure holes when they normally would wait.  The layout of the airport causes a huge conflict at the runway intersection.  This will never go away and will continue to happen unless we can get the 'GAST tool' back; which allows this exact situation to become a legal operation.




Synopsis: LAS Controller described a near runway intersection error; involving traffic landing Runway 19L and a departure from Runway 25R; the reporter alleging flow time pressure contributed to the event.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: TRACON CRP
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given descent from 12;000 feet to 4;000 feet. As we approached 9;700 feet; ATC amended the altitude to 7;000 feet for traffic. A minute later they advised us of traffic climbing to 6;500 feet VFR. At this point we were still at about 9;000 feet and descending. The TCAS popped up and an unknown traffic was spotted approaching us; we could not locate it; and it was not the traffic ATC advised us of. Moments before the RA; ATC advised us of unknown traffic approaching us and to turn to a right heading of 310 as we were currently on a west heading of 270. As ATC was talking TCAS yelled 'traffic traffic' as we were in the right turn. The First Officer immediately disengaged autopilot and continued turning right; added max thrust and began climbing. I caught the traffic on TCAS as close as 300 feet and approaching and we were at about 8;500 feet and descending. After we were clear of conflict we were told to descend to 4;000 feet on heading 270 and continue for Visual [Runway] 13. At this point I refused any visual responsibility and requested the ILS. The aircraft was way; way; way too close! Way too close!




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC with a VFR aircraft on descent into CRP.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Reverser
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: At approximately mid-morning; February 2013; I performed a Safety Check on a Hyster Boom Lift; which included a walk around for general condition; and fluid checks. I then got on to the vehicle; started it and moved all controls to make sure they worked. I moved the Hyster Lift from the north end of the hangar ramp to position the Hyster Lift at the Thrust Reverser (T/R) cowl in front of the hangar. Satisfied that the lift was in good working condition I signed-off the Daily User Check. After lunch I lowered the hoist by hand and attached the T/R sling. With the aid of other team members we moved sling in position over T/R cowl; I drove while team members guided. Once sling was attached to T/R cowl we started the process of moving it from the pallet to a chair cart [flatbed]; again I was driving while team members guided and steadied the cowl. Without warning the cowl fell to the ground with a loud thud; and I saw an object fly across the Hangar floor approximately 15 to 20 FT. I put the lift in park; set the parking brake and turned lift 'Off'. I then retrieved the object which turned out to be the clevis attach bolt; which connects the hoist to the boom which is a threaded bolt.


Second narrative: Myself and other Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were transfering a Thrust Reverser half from a shipping crate to a [flatbed] cart when the reverser and sling separated.


Synopsis: Three Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report about a B757 Thrust Reverser (T/R) half that separated and fell from a sling and chain pulley assembly attached to a boom on a forklift. AMTs were attempting to move T/R from shipping crate to a flatbed chair cart.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A message from the Dispatch Operations was sent out about the workload distribution.  The Continent X operation is being pushed to its limit.  The message specified this is happening on weekday 1 and weekday 2 nights (PM and midnight shift) when the workload is actually typically over the agreed upon limit of XX flights per desk to release.  On the other nights the workload is; indeed; 'pushed to its limit' with Y-XX flights per desk to release.We are currently only utilizing Continent X desks.  With Y-XX flights to release that means I also have Y-XX or so already airborne to monitor.  Those need to be kept apprised of current weather; turbulence; SIGMETs/FPGs; arrival issues; etc.  This is if everything is 'normal.'  In the event of a passenger or crew medical issue; gate return; or diversion another level of complexity and busyness is introduced.  By having so many flights to monitor and release I can be of little help to the other desk if they experience any issues and need help.  In recurrent classes we are required to learn about the barriers put in place to maintain a safe operation.  Management admits they are willfully and continually choosing to remove those barriers not only by creating a heavy workload; but also by not staffing Dispatcher Y position some nights.  The Dispatcher Y is a Dispatcher whom we can go to if any issues arise; they able to help us by looking up information; making calls; etc. in the capacity of a licensed Dispatcher and they often act as the go-between for us and the Sector Managers.Additional desks need to be opened.  There is no cost to the company to open a third (or fourth) Continent X desk.  X desks were bid for the year and only X-2 are being utilized currently; people are being paid to stay home.  Instead of opening the desks needed for the amount of flights management continues to diminish our barriers to safety by leaving the X Dispatcher position unmanned on midnights while increasing the Continent X workload.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported that too many flights are being assigned to each desk; leading to heavy workload and safety concerns.