Date: 201908
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After experiencing an inflight flight control malfunction on takeoff and throughout the flight; I [notified ATC] and returned to the departure airport for landing. Due to controllability issues; I elected to land as soon as possible and performed an overweight; but otherwise normal; landing. We spent 17 minutes in the air but 1:40 out of the blocks dealing with the flight control issue and hot brakes from the overweight landing. After blocking in and coordinating with the local Operations; Maintenance; flight attendants; passengers; etc; I spoke with the [Chief Pilot] and briefed him on the event. He performed the fatigue test on me and my 2 First Officers. We all scored low enough to continue with duty if we chose to do so. I had a meeting with my First Officers and we; as a crew; concluded that we felt comfortable continuing to a finite point in the future; as we knew we were running on adrenaline and would be flying for another 7-8 hours under the best conditions. We were aware of our limitations and had the best interest of ourselves; our customers and our airline in mind when making this decision. I relayed to my [area] Flight Manager and [Chief Piot] that we felt comfortable continuing until XA:00 off the blocks. This was approximately 1:45 in the future when I made the call. We coordinated with Dispatch for a new flight plan; proceeded to the new aircraft; and prepared the flight deck for departure. We were completely ready for pushback by XA45. I advised the gate agents; zone; flight attendants and passengers that we would time out at XB00; so to expedite the loading. They were unable to meet this time limit and at XB15; were still loading passengers and bags. At approximately XB20 we were replaced by another crew and we exited the aircraft. I asked the [Chief Pilot] for a hotel for my crew as my First Officers had commuted in that day and we assumed we would be on reserve for the next 2 days. We also had a thorough 1 hour debrief of the day's activities at the hotel. When we checked our schedule; it showed FTG [fatigue]; our pay was removed for the trip and our sick list debited. This was all completely unexpected by us; as we were given the option to continue or be removed from the trip immediately after the emergency was declared. I believe this was absolutely an operational fatigue issue and was throughout the evening led to believe this was the case. My First Officers and I were committed to completing the mission as long as we were fit for duty. We determined this would not be the case if the departure was delayed beyond a certain point - 2200hrs. We were also prepared for a reassignment over our next 2 AV days; but were instead placed on FTG with no pay and sick time deduction. This seems to be counter intuitive and would lead us in the future to possibly fly in a less than 'fit for duty' state - exactly the opposite of what this is designed to prevent. It is my hope and expectation that this will be resolved as an Operational Fatigue event due to the aircraft emergency situation that we successfully executed.


Second narrative: On arrival at Flight Operations; we were made aware that the previous crew on our aircraft had experienced an in-flight emergency having to do with a flight control malfunction. We arrived at the gate and engaged with aircraft Maintenance to troubleshoot the malfunction; learning that the spoiler system had malfunctioned inflight. Maintenance could not duplicate the malfunction and advised all systems were testing ok. The Captain conferred with the flight deck crew and decided to actuate the affected systems at the gate before accepting the aircraft; with all spoiler; flap; and flight control systems confirmed as operating correctly by Ground Maintenance personnel. Troubleshooting resulted in a 30 minute delay and pushback was uneventful. Taxi to the departure runway was normal for IAD. On takeoff and departure leg the Captain advised the other cockpit crew members that she was experiencing unusual control forces to keep the aircraft in level flight. As was noted in the previous crew's maintenance entry; the 'spoiler' EICAS message illuminated passing approximately 1800 feet MSL. The Captain directed the declaration of an emergency for the flight control malfunction and an immediate return to the departure airport. The Captain retained aircraft control while the 2 FO [First Officer's] accomplished all emergency checklists; coordinated with Dispatch and the cabin crew and prepared the aircraft for a safe landing back at the departure airport. An emergency return was executed culminating in a 25 flap full stop overweight landing at ZZZ. Emergency vehicles met the aircraft due to hot brakes on the right landing gear. Cool down and tow back to gate was uneventful taking approximately 45 additional minutes. The Captain coordinated with the [Chief Pilot] and ZZZ [OPS] and the crew was administered the fatigue test. All crew members passed and the crew determined we were able to continue the mission to completion within some reasonable restrictions from normal operations given the ETOPS flight to ZZZZ still remaining. In discussions with the ZZZ Asst Chief pilot and the crew; it was decided that the flight crew would continue with an aircraft swap and complete the flight to ZZZZ if the delay did not push the departure beyond XD:00 UTC due to the stress and induced fatigue of the inflight emergency. The tail swap and preflight were accomplished and the cockpit crew was ready for pushback at XC45 UTC; but passenger service and the cargo loading was still yet to be completed. At XD:20 UTC flight loading was still not complete and a crew swap was completed. The Captain requested and received hotel accommodations for the crew with the understanding that we would be available for assignment for the next two days of our trip ID. Upon reaching the hotel and during a debrief of the day's events; we noticed that our trip had been deleted from our schedule; we were placed in FTG fatigued status; and our sick bank had been charged for the trip pay time. This was surprising to the crew as all discussions with [Chief Pilot] and [OPS] were in reference to the operational fatigue elements of the emergency situation that the crew had successfully completed. The danger relevant to this outcome is that a future crew might accept a flying assignment following another emergency event when safety would dictate a more prudent course of action. We are trained to assess our fatigue given unusual events and make a safe and prudent 'Fit for Duty' assessment.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported after an in-flight emergency; air return; continuing ground delays and reaching an agreement with management regarding the crew timing out/fatigue; the crew was later placed on Fatigue status and compensated from their sick leave bank.