elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Aircraft X was on the ZZZZZ departure climbing out of ZZZ.  The [Sector X] Controller climbed the aircraft to FL330 and flashed the aircraft to [Sector Y] who followed the AIT and flashed it on to me working [Sector XY].  I recognized a limited aircraft at FL360 so I waited until there were no longer a factor and I looked over and did not see a [Sector Z] Controller at the other end of the room.  I called [Sector X D side] and APPREQed control for climb for Aircraft X.  The Controller said approved as requested.  I climbed the aircraft to FL390 and violated Sector Z without a point out.I made several mistakes in this situation.  I had known that [sector] Z was open since I had shipped multiple aircraft to that sector but when I looked over at the sector I did not see a Controller at [Sector Z].  The view of the [Sector Z Controller was blocked by the Sector X Controller.  I did not see the Controller sitting behind the Sector X Controller.Another big contributing factor in this situation is that since Month during the COVID pandemic and the reduced traffic; we almost never opened sector Z.  Now that traffic has been picking up and we have been utilizing the sector more often I have made this mistake.  During the COVID posture we typically gave sector A control to climb on the ZZZ departures.  That could also create a problem once sector XY opens.I needed to pay more attention to the current sector configurations.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported an airspace violation and cited COVID-19 staffing and work environment configurations as contributing factors.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Crossing the Front Range eastbound at FL370; we encountered severe mountain wave with occasionally light wave. Our mach went from .82 to .857; about 5 KT overspeed with the overspeed warning horn on and the throttles closed. There were no hurt crewmembers or guests. The over speed lasted for about 5 seconds; later in the flight my PFD; ND and FMC screens went completely dark and got the warning beeper along with an uncommanded roll to the left of about 10 degrees. I called and discussed all with Dispatch and Maintenance. All agreed ok to continue. No further issues. I understand that there was an issue with the left AC bus.




Synopsis: A B757 encountered severe mountain wave activity over the Front Range at FL370 which resulted in a 5 second; 5 KT overspeed and later the Captain's PFD; ND and FMC blanked along with an uncommanded 10 degree roll. The Left AC Bus may have had a problem.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream III (G1159A)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was PF in the left seat and we were cleared for take off on Rwy XL.  As we were lining up on the runway; I heard the Tower clear a helicopter for an eastbound departure from the ramp; but I did not visually see the helicopter yet.  Once we were on the takeoff roll; I saw the helicopter lifting off from the ramp (ahead and to our left); but it appeared to be turning parallel to our runway to I diverted my attention back to the runway.  Right after initiating rotation; I saw the helicopter begin to cross over our runway; left to right; at approximately 200 feet AGL.  Because we were past V1 and already rotating on a short runway; I quickly determined an aborted takeoff was not an option so I continued our rotation.  During these few seconds; there were some communications between the Tower and the helicopter; but I did not comprehend them due to my focus on avoiding hitting the helicopter.  Shortly after liftoff (~100 feet AGL); I had to make an evasive maneuver to our left and reduce our climb rate for a few seconds to avoid hitting the helicopter.  Luckily; there was no terrain or obstacles to the left of our runway heading.  Once the helicopter passed off our right at what I estimate was 200-300 feet; I resumed a normal climb rate and a right turn back to our departure heading.  The Tower controller apologized and then handed us off to Departure.  Looking back on the scenario; I believe continuing the takeoff roll as we did was the right call; as we certainly would have had a runway excursion if we had attempted an abort at that point in the roll - passed V1 and already rotating.  Additionally; I am not sure how I could have anticipated the impending conflict earlier because helicopters maneuver on a dime and it was hard to tell its intending heading after liftoff.  After the event; I listened to the ATC recording on a publicly available website and it seems the controller tried to tell the helicopter pilot to remain north of the runway at all times; but that transmission was not acknowledged.




Synopsis: Twin Engine Jet Pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter during takeoff.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CAE.Airport, SC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CAE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: CAE was experiencing fog with RVR's around 1200 when we called for initial taxi from the gate. ATC said to taxi to Runway 11 and to pull over to the right side to await our wheels-up time. ATC also wanted us to notify them when we were holding short of Runway 11. We complied by taxiing to Runway 11 and pulling into the right side of what appeared to be a holding pad. In an effort to be as accurate as possible about our holding position; I looked at my chart page and told ATC that we were holding short of Runway 11 on Taxiway A1. ATC acknowledged. Only later did I realize that Taxiway A1 was NOTAMed closed. However; there was no visual indication that the associated pavement was unserviceable. Also; that was the only pavement that we could have used to comply with our initial taxi clearance. We subsequently noticed that the signage for Taxiway A1 at Runway 11 was purposely obscured. And the grassy area depicted on the commercial airport diagram does not exist. The entire A1/A2 area is paved with no island in-between. I believe that we put our aircraft on the pavement that ATC intended. However; I don't understand why that pavement was NOTAMed closed. Also; the airport diagram could better depict the Taxiway A1/A2 area by removing the island/grass feature because it does not exist.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reports taxiing to Runway 11 at Taxiway A1 and learning later that Taxiway A1 was closed by NOTAM. It is also noted that Taxiways A1 and A2 appear to be separated by turf or dirt which does not actually exist.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Orion (P3)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A P-3 Orion was in route; he flew through Sector X and into Sector Y. I asked what his approach request was for [their destination]. He indicated vectors to the ILS26. I declined vectors due to potential traffic volume that was occurring throughout the day because of the terrain in the vicinity of [their destination] vectors to final approach are difficult and time consuming. I offered him approach via IAF [at the VOR] and PT or via IAF [at the intersection] and the DME ARC. He elected to do the ARC. I cleared him to [their destination] via [the intersection] and to cross [the intersection] at or above 060 and cleared ILS Runway 26 Approach. About 6 minutes later I noticed he had crossed [the intersection] and descended to 055 and was heading approximately 180 off course. I called out that he was off route and say intentions; no answer. Repeated and no answer. He was now about 1 minute from a 060 MIA and increasing to 084 eventually. I called on Guard. No response. I issued a low altitude alert on regular frequency and on Guard. No response. I realized that he may be on an adjacent sector frequency still so I enlisted another aircraft to relay a change to the correct frequency. He came up 30 seconds later. I issued a climb and heading to lower terrain and re established his intentions and assigned an ILS approach via PT and the VOR. I was in error in forgetting to switch the aircraft to the correct control frequency. That would have speed up communications when I discovered the navigational error. However; the main issue was poor navigation by the pilot who was in deviation to his clearance and flying the approach incorrectly.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a loss of terrain separation event when traffic cleared via conventional navigation failed to navigate properly and was off course causing the terrain issue.
Date: 201505
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Fatigue
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were forced by [operations] to work a duty day of more than the FAR Duty Max of 20 hours.We were informed by the flight deck that we were going to remain at the gate due to weather in the area.  That delay lasted until [late that night] when we finally departed.  While holding at the gate with passengers onboard for 7 hours 13 minutes; we were contacted by the Crew Desk that we were going to be going over the international on duty max of 16 hours 30 minutes.  The crew desk informed us that if we extended our duty and continued with our assignment that we would receive [premium pay].  However; if we didn't accept the [premium] pay that the crew desk was prepared to reassign us each new trips no matter our present duty since they were short staffed flight attendants.  We decided to stay on our present trip.Upon our arrival; we were aware that our duty was now going to be over the extended duty max FAR of 20 hours.  We contacted [company] and spoke to Crew Scheduling.  He instructed us that they was no such FAR duty max and that if we didn't continue on that our previous agreement of [premium] pay would be removed as penalty.  We felt that we had no choice but to continue on and go over 20 hours of duty.  With that; our cabin crew had been up for 23 hours upon our arrival.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight attendants reported they feel they were coerced to work beyond the FAA mandated 20 hour duty day maximum.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E P80
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the HHOOD 2 RNAV Arrival to PDX; the FMS was correctly set up and had already captured the VNAV on the descent from cruise; making several crossing restrictions on target. However; it calculated the 'at or below FL240' restriction at BAYYR as an 'at FL240'; which made it impossible to meet the 'Between 15;000 [and] 10;000' restriction at HHOOD. After passing BAYYR; the V-Bars abruptly went from a normal pitch attitude to a steep dive with increasing airspeed and excessive rate of descent. I intervened and disengaged the autopilot. Shortly after; ATC vectored us off the STAR with a heading for the localizer and a lower altitude. On the avionics side of the problem -- fix the FMS VNAV issues! On the navigation publication side of the problem; descent profiles on STARS are becoming more and more complicated with far too many 'cross between' altitude restrictions. It seems that there are so many parameters that the FMS is unable to calculate them correctly or in a way that makes for a smooth descent on a 'descend via' clearance.


Second narrative: On arrival to PDX on the HHOOD 2 RNAV; the VNAV was armed and the aircraft was established on the descent profile. The aircraft had the FMS 2 MEL on the leg prior due to not capturing the VNAV properly with the PFD selected on the right side. During the descent I pointed out several discrepancies on the Vpath and VS calculations on both sides. We crossed BAYYR at FL 240; the published crossing altitude is at or below FL240 and the next crossing restriction was HHOOD between 15;000 FT and 10;000 FT and a speed of 270 knots. After crossing BAYYR the command bars abruptly pitched down. The Pilot Flying intervened and regain control of the aircraft but the crossing restriction was not met. ATC inquired of our altitude and if we were on the HHOOD 2 arrival. Shortly after we were vectored to the localizer.


Synopsis: CE750 flight crew reports missing the BAYYR crossing restriction on the HHOOD 2 arrival to PDX due to an FMC malfunction. FMC 2 was MEL'd and FMC 1 created a hard altitude of FL240 at HHOOD making the BAYYR crossing restriction impossible.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As has happened several times since I have been using our EFB; the Jepp program became unusable in flight. This has occurred when Jepp released a half-baked update that caused failures and required patches to be subsequently released. This failure; however; was unique in that it did not involve any major update; and it involved BOTH of our EFBs at the same time. We had both updated our program in the crew room; and shortly after takeoff; my FO's program started to get real slow. Then; as we prepared to brief the STAR and approach; both of our programs locked up and failed to function after numerous attempts to restart the program and reboot the EFB. It was IMC in LAX; but because my FO had a personal copy of Fore Flight; which is authorized to be used; we did not have to request a written description of the Star and approach (which is a joke and would probably yield a result which resembled not the STAR and approach; but a dog's breakfast) or divert. I think; and I'll bet the Department of Transportation would think; it is ridiculous that we do not have company-provided backup for the Jepp software in the form of ForeFlight or some other program. To make pilots have to bear the cost of a ForeFlight subscription if they want to operate a flight with a backup for the Jepp program which has proven to be less than robust; or choose not to and be placed in a less-than-safe scenario such as I found myself; is immoral; unjust; and flies in the face of any assertion that safety is their priority. I can't believe the FAA actually signed off on the practice to only back up the EFBs with a program we have to buy; or a written description sent by dispatch. Can you imagine texting dispatch for another approach because you went missed approach in IMC due to windshear and had to use another approach which the controller is already vectoring you from? Wouldn't happen for real; but it works on paper.Provide us with Foreflight for free.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported continuing problems with the reliability of their EFBs and recommended the company provide flight crews with a retail navigation program as a backup.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PWA.Airport, OK
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cardinal 177/177RG
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON OKC
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My student and I were enroute to PWA. We were in clouds on a radar vector to PWA when my student lost control and I [regained] control stabilized and then returned control to my student who then lost control again. This happened several times; but finally we got control of flight. Approach Control was very busy and advised us to follow his instructions. We were in clouds and this was a new experience for the student. I should have introduced him to this condition in a less busy area.




Synopsis: C177 instructor describes his instrument students' first attempt at flight in IMC which results in altitude and heading deviations much to the chagrin of the OKC Approach Controller.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Informed by Chief Pilot on Call that the Oxygen psi on Aircraft X dropped approximately 200 psi during a preflight check. Maintenance was notified and discovered the wheel well oxygen valve opened only 1/4 turn. I flew this aircraft two legs and do not recall any drop in oxygen psi during our preflight checks in ZZZ or ZZZ1. Maintenance discovered oxygen valve in wheel well only 1/4 turn open; 3-days after flight.




Synopsis: Captain was informed by his Chief Pilot that the crew oxygen on a B737 he had flown two legs on; had a 200 psi drop in oxygen mask pressure during a subsequent preflight check. Maintenance found the oxygen valve handle only 1/4 turn 'Open'.