elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After receiving clearance to takeoff; we were taxiing into position and the First Officer completed the Before Takeoff Checklist below the line. As he was finishing the control check and I was lining up with the runway; the #1 'Hyd Iso' bulb caution light and the 'Roll Splr' HUD caution lights came on. We looked at the hydraulic gauges and the quantity of #1 was showing below 1 quart. We contacted Tower and said we were taxiing off the runway for maintenance. I brought the plane to a stop on the taxiway; stopped the plane and ran the checklist. I also called our Dispatcher and spoke to Maintenance. We determined we needed to get towed back to the gate; so I taxied the aircraft onto the ramp to expedite that process. Once at the gate Maintenance determined that the plane needed to be ferried; and we were swapped onto another aircraft to finish the flight. The inboard hydraulic actuator failed and was leaking; causing the loss of fluid.




Synopsis: While lining up for take-off; the crew of a DHC-8-102 noticed warning indications alerting them to a hydraulic system malfunction. Declining his take-off clearance; the Captain taxied clear of the runway onto the taxiway; and then to the ramp for inspection by Maintenance.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: At night; during very windy conditions; we were cleared for the RIVER Visual 19 into DCA. The approach was uneventful until we were crossing one of the last bridges and making one of our last turns. The Captain was the pilot flying and made significant crosswind corrections in order to stay over the river and not get blown into prohibited airspace. During the last phase of the approach; he made too much of a crosswind correction and drifted towards the right side of the river; where there are a cluster of buildings. I felt at that time that we were slightly too low and not over the river. I spoke up and said 'we are too low' approximately at the same time the GPWS alerted us 'caution obstacle'. The Captain immediately made a flight path correction; the caution went away. Both of us were very focused on getting the runway in sight and making the necessary turns. It was busy; windy and at night. It crossed my mind that we should have done a go-around. I couldn't remember if it was mandatory at night; or what and/or statements were in the QRH. Everything happened very fast and I felt that due to the intensity of the approach; the busy ATC conditions; and the windy conditions; that neither of us had time to think. We landed uneventfully and after getting to the gate; discussed the event. One of the items mentioned was that a go-around at that point was unnerving. It is a complicated go-around in that airspace under those conditions; at that point. Nevertheless; both of us agreed that we deviated from SOP and were required to go around. We looked it up in the QRH and that confirmed that we had made an error on that approach.Follow SOP. We could have also briefed what we would do in the event of a go-around at any point on the approach.




Synopsis: A B737-700 flight crew flying the River Visual approach to DCA at night in high winds and gusty conditions over-corrected for the winds as they approached the turn to final and triggered EGPWS obstacle warnings.  They corrected and landed safely but questioned their failure to go-around during a post landing debrief.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Airspace: Class A ZJX; Special Use R2914/15/17/18/19
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Restricted Areas R2914/15/17/18/19 overlying the VPS complex are active FL240 to FL350. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) issued a restriction earlier in the shift for no traffic south of J2 which would clear this airspace.  Shortly after the airspace went active the TMU restriction dropped off our board. I went to TMU to ask if this was going to be reissued.  Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) said they removed it and questioned why it was necessary to issue it in the first place.  I stated that it now went active almost every day during the week up to FL400; just like the Warning Area's and flow needed to be issued around it.  Weather was building northwest of these restricted areas and with no flow out ZHU would allow aircraft to be routed into these hot areas with very little time to catch the route.  This is an unsafe situation that is being allowed to happen.When the VPS complex goes active issue flow around it.




Synopsis: A Jacksonville Center (ZJX) Controller questions why a restricted area that goes hot every day was removed from the Information Display System (IDS) in the area. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) removed the information and questioned the Controller as to why they needed it on the information page. The Controller was concerned that the area was going to go hot without any flow control for it.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on the ANCHR 4 Arrival into Denver. We originally briefed and set up for the ILS 35R Approach. As we were descending through FL180 ATC informed us to expect the RNAV approach to Runway 35R. I was the monitoring pilot and I loaded the approach into the FMC. I noticed that there were two possible transitions for the approach but did not load one at that time. My thought process was that we would get cleared the approach via fix and altitude and we would have plenty of time to load the proper transition into the FMC for the approach. The First Officer briefed the RNAV 35R Approach and referenced the approach briefing guide for RNAV approaches. We were flying the arrival and we were at 11000 ft. We passed the initial fix DOGGG which is on the arrival but also one of the initial fixes for the approach without an approach clearance. Since there was not a transition selected in the FMC the active waypoint in the FMC was DONTT on the ANCHR 4 Arrival. Just prior MSIMS we were cleared for the approach. Right after ATC cleared us for the approach; he informed me that there is a lot of background noise when I key the mic to respond to clearance. I selected the approach and transition to proceed on the approach. I was not able to get the legs page sequenced before passing MSIMS. Right after passing MSIMS we noticed the aircraft was not descending on the VNAV path and it was not turning. I tried to sequence the legs page to keep us on the approach while the First Officer tried to keep us on the VNAV path for the approach. ATC then said that we missed the turn and asked if our FMC is engaged. I responded that yes it is engaged and we have fixed the issue and we are in the turn. He then gave us a heading and cleared us for the ILS Runway 35R. I loaded the ILS 35R into the FMC and we flew that approach. We taxied to the gate and debriefed.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a track deviation occurred following a late clearance to fly the RNAV approach to DEN RWY 35R.
Date: 201703
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Feel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The FO (First Officer) and I reviewed the maintenance history which had several instances of problems with the elevator feel system. The latest write up had been several days prior when LM (Line Maintenance) replaced the Elevator Feel computer. My FO flew the first leg and did not complain about the elevator feel. On this leg; I was the pilot flying. When I did the flight control check; I noticed that the elevator feel was heavy; but not enough to make me come back to the gate. On takeoff; I noticed that when I pushed the yoke forward at the beginning of the takeoff roll; that it took a large force to move the yoke. I mistakenly thought that my FO had held the yoke so that it could not be pushed forward. After discussing that later; he said that he had not touched the yoke. It was my misunderstanding. In flight; during the climb; the aircraft felt like it was almost in manual reversion (in pitch) during the climb; but it was fully controllable. The autopilot engaged with no issues. On the descent; I turned off the autopilot so I could get a feel for what to expect. There were no controllability issues; but I did notice that there was minimal elevator displacement regardless of the amount of yoke forward or back input. I was able to put in nearly full nose down and full nose up inputs on the yoke. The airplane responded in the proper direction; but with minimal movement in that direction. I felt that despite the non-normal response from the airplane; it was always in complete control. Therefore; I did not declare an emergency. I had a similar situation flying the DC-10 20 years ago where the elevator feel system failed in high speed mode and resulted in the same minimal elevator displacement mode. I was confident that this was a similar failure.I landed with no further issues. [Maintenance] met us and I debriefed them. The next day; I followed up and they told me that they had found a significant amount of water in the elevator feel pitot tubes on the vertical stabilizer. They signed off the airplane and it flew out last night.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported an elevator feel malfunction. Post flight maintenance inspection revealed a significant amount of water in the elevator feel pitot tubes on the vertical stabilizer.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I encountered severe to extreme turbulence near the BREWS GPS waypoint. There were no injuries. The contents of the aircraft hit the ceiling multiple times and uncontrollable banks up to 70 degrees were encountered. Before encountering the turbulence the air was smooth and the patient and rider were wearing their seatbelts; the crew was unbelted and getting things from the bags in the back of the aircraft. Both crewmembers were able to hold onto secure objects for the duration but were unable to get back to their seats. I issued a PIREP for severe to extreme turbulence to ATC. Upon landing the aircraft was written up for mx to do an inspection for damages.




Synopsis: BE-200 Captain reported extreme turbulence in the descent near BREWS.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Aircraft component: Positional / Directional Sensing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Pushed back from gate XX. While taxiing on taxiway A to RWY 15; got HDG flag. This is common when departing BUR. Something at the gate causes magnetic errors in heading indicators on almost every flight out of BUR; usually the FO (First Officer) side. We were cleared to line up and wait on RWY 15; so it was decided to set the heading of both DG's once we were on RWY and compare to chart (155 degrees). Captain's was correct; FO's was off 5-10 and was adjusted. Cleared to takeoff and fly SLAPP 1 RNAV departure; climb to 4000 feet (FO flying). Initial departure heading is 210 and FO called for NAV mode and autopilot. During initial climb; I noticed that the airplane was turning way past 210. I stated 'I have the controls'; canceled AP; and turned back to 210. Notified ATC that we were having FMS problems and asked for vectors. Asked for HDG mode and AP on. Aircraft again turned off selected HDG. Cancelled AP and leveled off at 4000 feet. Apparently we missed clearance to climb to 6000 feet and was asked again to climb. Aircraft control was less than smooth with AP being turned off and on and trying to return to correct HDG and maintain Altitude during heavy distraction and workload. Eventually realized that FO's HDG was the problem and switched FCP to Captain's side. Reset FO HDG several times during climb; eventually switching to DG mode. After 30 minutes; both MAG HDGs were holding correct headings. This too is common out of BUR in most aircraft.Provide note on every release out of BUR to be aware of this. Provide procedure and training to expect and deal with this issue. Suggest lining up on runway; check/set both HDG indicators; and switch to DG mode for takeoff and climb. Switch to MAG on one side at a time. Have Captain do every takeoff.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a magnetic anomaly at BUR airport led to a heading deviation during climb.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While working the mid shift; I had Aircraft X inbound to an airport. They requested direct to an IAF for the ILS Approach. I had the approach plate pulled up on our display; issued direct to the fix and gave the aircraft approach clearance with a restriction to cross a fix at or above 10;000 ft. The fix is in a 10;000 ft. Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) so that cleared the terrain. I missed on the approach that the fix has an altitude of 13;000 ft. in an MIA of 10;000 ft.; the next fix has an altitude of 12;000 ft. in an MIA of 11;000 ft.; and then the next fix has a crossing altitude of 8;200 ft. in a MIA of 9;000 ft. I misinterpreted the information on the approach plate and crossed the aircraft at 10;000 ft. to initiate the approach which was not a safe altitude according to the approach plate or my MIAs as the aircraft descended to 10;000 ft. and proceeded to enter an 11;000 ft. MIA. I believe at this point I had the aircraft switched over to CTAF or shortly after I had the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) alert flashing 11;000 ft. It did not occur to me to double check that the crossing restriction was ok; seeing as how I had cleared the aircraft on the approach.It is not often that we clear aircraft for the ILS from over that fix due to the fact that Approach works the airspace throughout the day and most of the aircraft arriving at this airport on the midshift come from the east; which we usually give them the arc for the approach. We have other approaches in our airspace that have an approach altitude higher than the terrain. This was an assumption on my part that the altitude was ok for the approach. This is not a system wide issue; but a lack of thoroughly reviewing the approach plate on my part to ensure altitudes given are safe for the approach and above the terrain.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported they issued an approach clearance with incorrect altitude restrictions that placed an aircraft below the Minimum IFR Altitude and activated the Center MSAW.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJU.Airport, PR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJU
ATC / advisory: Tower SJU
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I departed SIG airport on the River transition as per tower instruction. The river transition states: depart on a heading 070 climb 1500 ft until passing the shoreline then direct SJU tower fly overhead and 095 heading between the runways. I was cleared for takeoff and advised of traffic on the 'TANGO' transition (2000 ft overhead the tower until reaching the reef approximately 2 miles north and then enter downwind for SIG. Once airborne I checked in with SJU Tower and was again advised of the traffic. I observed the traffic on TCAS and saw that he had started his descent early and decided to fly closer to the shoreline than usual to avoid any issues. I then observed the traffic on TCAS turn north and turned on all of my exterior lights; SJU once again advises of traffic '12 o'clock same altitude' I then see the traffic at my altitude heading straight for me less than 500 ft and slightly left of the nose; I banked hard right and he banked left; I advised the traffic over the frequency that there is a procedure and that he should follow it; I also advised tower of the incident. Upon my arrival I called the Tower to not only complain about this operators continuous disregard for the rules; but also to thank them for trying to help as best they could and to see if there was anything I could do better or different in the future.




Synopsis: BE58 pilot departing SIG on the River transition experienced a NMAC with an aircraft arriving SIG; but not complying with published procedures.
Date: 201501
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While working a departing flight we received pushback clearance from Captain. As we were about to leave gate the jetbridge started moving towards the aircraft with no visible thumbs up from the ground crew that it was safe to approach aircraft. The Dispatcher informed Captain that the bridge was returning which he was unaware of. The Captain set brakes; apparently customer service wanted to put on one more customer. This practice was completely unsafe as the gate lead I have a radio and NO communication was made to inform me that the Service Director made this call. The heads up action to the aircraft dispatcher probably prevented serious damage to the aircraft.




Synopsis: After receiving clearance to commence pushback; the pushback lead notes the jetway moving toward the aircraft without any communication from the jetway operator. The pushback is halted so another passenger can be boarded.