elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: WSJC.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center WSJC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: VEPLI1B RNAV arrival into WSSS. The STAR has several altitude and speed restrictions and First Officer began the descent on VNAV to comply with the restrictions on the arrival procedure. ATC clearance was to FL240. Descending through FL300; the aircraft began to accelerate above the FMS commanded descent speed of 290 KTS. When the aircraft continued to accelerate in the descent through 320 knots; and the First Officer reacted by opening the speed window and speed intervened by selecting a speed again of 290 KTS. The aircraft did not respond to the commanded speed; in fact it continued to lower the nose and accelerate; at which time I verbalized that the aircraft might overspeed. First Officer dialed in a further speed reduction in the window of 250 KTS; but the airspeed did not slow as it should; it continued to accelerate. Overspeed warning occurred and First Officer disengaged the autopilot and leveled the aircraft off at FL250 and then continued the descent to FL240. During the recovery the airspeed reached approximately 340 KTS (about 15 KTS above Vmo).Once the speed was again under control; First Officer reengaged the autopilot; but did not reengage VNAV and used FLCH and vertical speed for the remainder of the arrival. This exceedance was inadvertent. Opening the airspeed window and reducing commanded airspeed in VNAV should have pitched the nose further up thereby reducing airspeed; but did not for some explainable reason. Regardless; in the future; I will be more vigilant in actually verbalizing that the autopilot should be disengaged sooner so as to prevent/minimize overspeed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew experienced increasing airspeed while descending on the VEPLI1 RNAV arrival to WSSS. Speed intervene had no apparent effect; but the autopilot was not disengaged until the overspeed warning sounded ultimately being exceeded by 15 knots before slowing.
Date: 201512
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E L30
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching the FUZZY intersection on the SUNST3 Arrival; we were told to maintain current heading for vectors to Runway 1L. I centered up the heading bug and selected HDG SEL and immediately began to fumble with the EFB as we had not briefed this approach (as we were expecting Runway 25L). As we began to brief the new approach and the First Officer was looking at the landing numbers on the OPC; the aircraft began to turn slightly to the left as apparently LNAV was still engaged as we passed over FUZZY. Just about then ATC gave us heading to fly further to the right.Task saturation was definitely a factor in this case as there were many things that needed to be done on short notice. I was also concerned about high terrain at night and staying in the Class B airspace surrounding it. The Class B was of particular concern as ATC was pushing hard for a visual approach; the DME on the LAS VOR was out of service and we were in a 737 with no map mode or any way to clearly define the airspace boundaries! Next time I think I'll just request the runway we had already briefed as it was favorable for the winds and was advertised as the landing runway on the ATIS.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a track deviation on approach to LAS as a result of high workload related to a late runway change.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MKY.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Rain; Turbulence; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E RSW
ATC / advisory: TRACON RSW
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a very busy approach I inadvertently descended to a lower altitude too soon. After holding for approximately 40 minutes our flight was being vectored for an approach to [our original destination]; for the second time we were given a different heading and told all approaches to our airport and some surrounding airports were not available. We were in rough air due to significant rain at approximately 3;000 MSL; the approach controller suggested KMKY and we agreed; however the First Officer was unable to program a new destination in the box (FMS). We were close to the airport with wind shifts on the ground; we accepted the VOR DME 17 due to the winds and it was a raw data approach that we could do without programming the FMS. I descended to 1;500 MSL according to our clearance we both setup the VOR and inbound course and due to the rough ride and the aircraft not responding quickly to autopilot commands I disconnected the autopilot. I did not want to look away from the instrument panel so I asked the First Officer when I could continue my descent; he replied I could go down now to minimums. We broke out of the clouds with an obstacle slightly left of our course; I deviated around it. We both saw the runway at approximately 4 miles and landed without incident. After landing and shutdown I looked at the approach plate and saw the crossing restriction and the obstacle. My FO stated he completely missed it when I asked. We were very rushed and surrounded by heavy precipitation after holding and being vectored to destination only to be broken off we should have either taken more time or gone to a different airport or made sure we were not so rushed. We both learned a valuable lesson that day and spent some time reviewing the programming of the FMS and the approach plate.




Synopsis: Light turbojet Captain reported diverting to MKY due to weather but the First Officer is unable to change the destination in the FMC. The Captain elects to fly the raw data VOR DME Runway 17 and hand flown due to the autopilot not handling the turbulence well. The First Officer was queried as to when to begin descent to MDA; and incorrectly stated now outside FIGOX.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During departure on XXL in ZZZZ had a loud bang right after rotation. We climbed to 4000 feet. All engines were still operating. We could smell a foul odor in cabin. Had a moderate vibration of unknown source. We suspected bird strike; but did not see any birds. I [requested priority handling]; notified Dispatch and ATC of intent to return to field. Engine indications were normal; but the vibration indicated either engine or other structural damage. We also had an [landing gear control] fault. We proceeded to fly ILS to XXR in VMC conditions. Upon landing we stopped on the runway and had emergency personnel look for any indications of fire or smoke. None was noticed. Proceeded to taxi back to gate. Upon inspection of aircraft the number 1 engine received significant damage to multiple fan blades. Also ground proximity switches were damaged during impact. Airport officials recover remains of 9 ducks at departure end of runway. No injuries to any passengers or flight crew.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a bird strike after takeoff and returned to departure airport.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Customer Service / Lobby
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post flight unload
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Did not have time to file due to work requirements. Dry ice must be loaded in a separate compartment from live animals regardless of the origin of the shipment.  There is an acceptance process when customers have dry ice in their check-in luggage.  That process has several failures that may contribute to safety failures as follows:1. Lack of customer awareness of the safety concern may prevent customers from being forthright in an effort to avoid having the luggage restricted.2. The acceptance process at the ticket counter does not coincide with hazardous material acceptance so requirements may fall through the cracks.  (I.e. packaging may not have the correct ventilation).3. The acceptance does not have a Unimatic or RDL so RSE do NOT have knowledge of dry ice through the scanning process.4. The special handling tag may come off the bag so this RSE awareness tool may fail.




Synopsis: Airline ramp personnel reported multiple deficiencies of the 'Hazmat Acceptance Procedures' of checked bags containing Dry Ice.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAV.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While working all Tower positions combined; airport vehicle; a regular on the airfield and having completed an excessive number of runway crossings; called to proceed from Taxiway A-2 to Taxiway Bravo and Echo. I asked vehicle to confirm he needed/wanted to cross Runway 19; and he acknowledged by starting his vehicle moving and reading back that he was crossing Runway 19. I corrected him; again advising him that I had not cleared or authorized him to cross Runway 19; but only asked if that was his intentions; vehicles regularly go around the approach end of Runway 19 to get from Taxiway Alpha to Taxiway Bravo. He advised that he did indeed desire to cross Runway 19; so I authorized the airport vehicle to cross Runway 19 at the approach end. I recommend that the Savannah Airport change; update or revise their AOA driving course to ensure that all vehicles specifically request to cross active runways. They are taught to require ATC to give them the crossing clearance; but do not actually request to cross the runway. Additionally; they seldom report crossing completed in accordance with the SAV/SAC Letter of Agreement. The current trend; and this is only very recently; has been to always make each transmission into a bunch of calls; further tying up the frequency and controllers. They begin every request with an obligatory initial call to 'wake us up' then once they have our attention; advise us where they are and where they want to go. ATC likes the part where they no longer tell us HOW they desire to go; which created bad scenarios; but by their vague or stealth requests to cross runways; combined with the unprecedented in-experience level at the SAV ATCT; makes the perfect combination for a series or serious runway incursion or incident. Active runways are sacred ground in our world; if the vehicles would specifically request the needed runway crossings at SAV like they do at most airports; we can ensure that runway safety is a priority once again at SAV. Bottom line: Aircraft call to cross runways; ATC clears them across active runways; airport vehicles should call to cross runways; so ATC can clear them across the active runways.




Synopsis: SAV Controller voiced concern regarding the airport vehicle operations with regard to crossing runways.  The reporter listed incomplete requests and failures to comply with LOA requirements.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Rockwell Aero Commander Single-Engine Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing; Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll out
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon roll out after landing nose tire deflated and started a fire causing minor damage to the nose gear area of the airplane. Tower was advised of the fire. Fire trucks were dispatched. Aircraft fire extinguisher was emptied on nose tire and extinguished fire. Fire trucks continued with foam to keep tire from reigniting. No injuries. Tires were inspected prior to flight. Tire was in good condition.




Synopsis: AC90 pilot reported a nose gear tire failed after landing; resulting in a fire in the nose gear area.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: ACARS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I have noticed a change in the program of the ACARS; to the point that shortly after takeoff it seems to be running a communication schedule that makes it communicate many times after departure. Each time it sends or receives data it emits a loud squeal that can be heard in our headsets. The noise is similar to the noise that the old dial-up modems used to make while connecting. On multiple flights; this noise has been heard; it is not specific to any one tail number. I have not flown a 200 model CRJ recently but I have heard it on both the 700 and 900 models. This noise became of particular concern today when it blocked the communication of instructions from ATC during a very busy departure. It required us to ask ATC to repeat instructions twice. It even blocked discussions with myself and my First Officer. The interruption did not lead to any mistakes however it is very distracting. This is a new noise that I have not noticed prior to the changes to the ACARS that incorporated the new far 117 sign-in/verification procedures. There at least 6 different occasions per flight where this noise can be heard each burst lasts around 1-2 seconds; all occurring below 10;000 FT. I have considered turning off the data function of the ACARS until reached 10;000. I have not done this yet.




Synopsis: CRJ900 Captain reports ACARS interference with with VHF ATC communication right after takeoff on numerous occasions with different aircraft. The problem is new to the fleet and may have begin with ACARS software changes required by FAR 117.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Cirrus Aircraft Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Received a Traffic Alert and subsequent; but very brief; Resolution Advisory with associated 'Monitor Vertical Speed' command for close proximity general aviation cirrus aircraft while being vectored by Newark Approach control for an ILS 22L approach. The incident occurred in the vicinity of PHLBO at approximately 6000' at approximately and in conjunction with a frequency change from initial approach frequency of 128.55 to 120.15. The TCAS 'Traffic; Traffic' was quickly replaced by a red target and 'Monitor Vertical Speed' command and red Avoidance Area before finally receiving 'Clear of Conflict' aural alert. The autopilot was disconnected per maneuver SOP and the Pilot Flying was able to maintain outside the red avoidance area without deviating from ATC cleared heading or altitude while I changed TCAS radar scale and visually acquired the general aviation aircraft. I initially communicated we were maneuvering in accordance with RA to the approach controller on 120.15; but after the event; reported the event as a TA only. This was inadvertently erroneous as; while brief in time; we did in fact have an RA with the closest point of approach with the cirrus aircraft being +400' and approximately 2.5 miles. Contributing factors to the event were: A) Simultaneous approach operations for ILS11 and ILS 22L; B) Three approach control frequencies being utilized versus the normal two(128.55; 120.15; 120.55) and C) congested airspace.




Synopsis: A320 pilot reported erroneously notifying ATC of a TA instead of an RA encountered during an ILS approach into EWR.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HRT.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D HRT
ATC / advisory: TRACON VPS
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departed DTS with a clearance and VFR squawk from Eglin approach. Instructed to 'remain 1 mile south of the coast until airborne contact with Eglin'. At 400 feet and turning west south of the coast; contacted Eglin and they verified radar contact. Eglin then proceeded to get very busy and gave multiple instructions to multiple civilian and military aircraft; of which it was not possible to decipher which instructions were for whom. As I am flying along at 1000 feet westbound; I determine that Eglin is instructing me to contact Hurlburt tower as I am about to penetrate the boundary of Hurlburt class D while under positive control from Eglin. I am not sure if I established contact with HRT tower before penetrating their class D.  DTS absolutely needs a VFR departure procedure which does not require initial contact with Eglin (such as 'departure 14'; proceed east on 120 heading or west on heading 210 at or below 1200 MSL until contact with Eglin. If unable to establish two-way radio communication proceed...') although DTS is presently constructing a control tower; I believe in the absence of a VFR dep procedure; the tower will only create IFR-like flow control for all traffic regardless of VFR/IFR ops.




Synopsis: Pilot while under flight following is not sure if he penetrated a Class D airspace.  Pilot described a possible departure procedure to help with this problem.