elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Today I was contacted by my Chief Pilot and notified that there had been an IOR (Internal Occurrence Report) written about a flight I flew about a week ago. According to the IOR; 'DG/HM (Dangerous Goods/HazMat) COMAT (Company Materials) loaded on aircraft form received in ZZZ1 with no PIC (Pilot-in-Command) signature or flight information'. Prior to departure I (PIC) was not notified of any DG/HM onboard the aircraft. I am positive that I did not receive a DG/HM PNF (Pilot Notification Form). I am sure that I would have remembered seeing it since it is typically not common to receive them and they are designed to stand out with their chevron red border and bright yellow pilot instructions. In addition; whenever I receive these forms I keep my copy in my flight bag for quite some time and I don't have one for this flight. I am assuming the cause of this error was that the DG/HM was loaded onto the aircraft and then for some reason someone forgot to notify or provide me with the PNF. I feel that in the past the DG/HM procedures we use have worked well. The PNF stands out and requires us to send a spec command through ACARS which serves as confirmation of receiving the form. It also helps that typically the CLR will have comments that there is DG/HM on board. I guess if I had any suggestion it would be that whoever loads the COMAT should then come directly to the flight deck with the form so that there is no middle man; or no time to get distracted or forget about it.


Second narrative: The Captain and I performed a routine revenue flight. The ramp personnel loaded some COMAT [Company Materials] cargo without our knowing and we did not receive the proper paperwork for it. No negative outcomes from the flight or the cargo. Forgetting to bring paperwork to flight crew and making them aware of any COMAT cargo that we needed to sign for. Just remembering to bring the proper paperwork to the crew so we know about it.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported being notified that he neglected to sign required Hazmat documents while operating as PIC during the previous week. Reporter stated he did not receive any information or documents that DG cargo was loaded onboard.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Distribution System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We leveled off at cruise altitude of FL390; and noticed that we had a large fuel imbalance; 5.88 LBS on the left tank; 7.08 on the right tank. Checked positions of all fuel switches and try to crossfeed. The light for the crossfeed would not illuminate but would test as operative (light only). Checked the breaker panel and found the circuit breaker for the crossfeed valve popped. [We] referred to the QRH. By turning off left tank pumps; the fuel slowly began to balance. After reviewing the weather at our destination (less than 1 SM with snow) we decided to return to the departure airport. After coordinating with ATC and company; we started a turn toward that airport. After the fuel balance got to closer tolerances we turned all main tank pumps back on. Fuel continued to burn from the right tank only. At that time I declared an emergency and requested vectors for landing an en route airport. Continued to the divert airport; notified company and landed without further incidence. We landed with 5.63 on the left tank and 4.80 on the right tank. Maintenance told us that the fuel valve on the fueling panel had been left open causing the fuel cross feed breaker to pop and fuel to be drawn unevenly.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Fueling Panel crossfeed valve was left open after fueling which removed control from the cockpit crossfeed valve so after a fuel imbalance developed an emergency was declared and the flight diverted.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: During the crew briefing prior to commencing descent we discussed runway turnoff closures as listed in the NOTAMS and on the JFK ATIS. During the landing roll we noted that the green turnoff lights were illuminated for Taxiway WW; which was closed. After clearing the runway at Taxiway V we asked the Ground Controller if this was normal and she stated they had no control over individual turnoff lights. At other airports I have seen the taxiway lights turned off for closed exits and feel that pilots are expecting to see turnoff lights illuminated only for available taxiways. Since we had briefed the closures we had no issues exiting at the proper turnoff. I could see fatigue; poor visibility; and/or snow obstructed signs causing an incident. I feel that instituting individual runway lighting controls for the controllers at JFK would enhance safety.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported green turnoff lights were illuminated to a closed taxiway resulted in a pilot report to ATC.  Captain expressed a safety concern for possibility of confusion.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other all phases
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Drinkable/Waste Water Syst
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I worked two flights on tail Aircraft X with one AFT LAV sink inoperable. Although the sink in the other AFT LAV worked; neither LAVs had soap for crew and/or passengers to wash their hands. When we asked for soap; I was only provided with one extra bottle of alcohol-free hand sanitizer and SANI-COM wipes. Given the current Coronavirus pandemic; being able to properly wash hands for both crew and passengers is imperative. Being we had a five hour rolling delay due to a mechanical issue; soap easily could have been provided.Provide crew and passengers with soap and working LAVs to wash their hands.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported one lavatory sink inoperative and no hand soap available on multiple flights.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CZQX.ARTCC, NF
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center CZQX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the flying pilot. The Captain was on break. The FO was the NFP. We were level at FL370. The oceanic clearance stated SUPRY/XA43 MNTN F390 M83. I took that to mean we were to cross SUPRY at 390 and initiated a climb approaching the fix. The Gander Controller questioned our altitude and said we should have ask for climb clearance. He said we could remain at 390. There was no conflicts with other aircraft and initially there was no problem. Later we were informed by the controller he would have to file a report.


Second narrative: When I returned from my break I was informed that the Oceanic clearance was received and part of the clearance was to maintain fl390 and .83 Mach. The FB was the pilot flying in the left seat and FO was the Pilot monitoring. The FO assumed he was cleared to climb to 390 by SUPRY. Approaching the entry point SUPRY he initiated the climb. Gander told him he climbed without clearance. Initially the controller didn't think it was a problem but his supervisor said they needed to report it because it has been a reoccurring problem.


Synopsis: A widebody transport flight crew received their oceanic track clearance which included a cruising level of FL390.  They were level at FL370.  The Flying Pilot climbed to FL390 without clearance from Gander Center.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAT.TRACON, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SAT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SAT
Second aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I had 4 TCAS/ Traffic Alerts in a 20 minute period from aircraft departing off of 5C1 and one VFR that flew through my final.Number 1 Aircraft X; VFR 1200 code was at 036 descending from north to south across SAT final headed to 8T8; Aircraft X was a on base turn to SAT descending out of 040 to 030. Traffic issued; closest proximity 1 mile 1/2 and 300 feet.Number 2 Aircraft Y was on a base turn to SAT at 040; VFR 1200 code off of 5C1 climbed right into Aircraft Y on base; closest proximity; merged and 600 feet; traffic issued.Number 3 Aircraft Z was on a turn to final descending to 030. VFR 1200 code departing 5C1 climbed right into final with Aircraft Z; Aircraft Z was stopped at 035; traffic alert issued; closest proximity; merged and 400 feet.Number 4 Aircraft A was level flight at 060 on the downwind for SAT. VFR 1200 code departed 5C1 and climbed through SAT final and north downwind towards Aircraft A. Traffic Issued; closest proximity 1/2 mile and 800 feet.All of these 1200 code aircraft never called Approach to receive service; they stayed 1200 in a very critical part of SAT airspace.The amount of gliders and VFR 1200 codes that routinely fly through our final; base; and downwind is alarming. SAT needs an airspace change to either extend the Class C; or go to Class B airspace to protect our final on all flows. Our final is not protected; I am a member the local safety council at SAT; we have talked to 5C1; and many of the VFR pilots in the area numerous times. The talks are not enough; the VFR 1200 code aircraft continue to compromise safety and something needs to be done before there is a major accident. These examples above happened within 20 minutes of single session I worked today; this is unacceptable. Something tragic will happen if we do not step up and do something about this safety issue; sending us to talk to these pilots and schools is not fixing the problem.




Synopsis: SAT TRACON Controller reported numerous airborne conflicts with various IFR and VFR aircraft the Controller attributes to a needed Airspace Class Change.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flaps 1 max speed was briefly exceeded by 1 knot (241) for approximately 1 second and max altitude for flap extension was exceeded by approximately 6;000 feet (FL260). We discovered the error due to the FMC limiting aircraft speed to 230 kts. Flaps were retracted at the time of discovery. The ACMS (Aircraft Condition Monitoring System) flaps report recorded a speed of 241 kts; but we don't recall the aircraft approaching that speed due to the FMC restriction. During initial climb ATC cleared us to ZZZZZ waypoint around the time of flap retraction. Due to the distraction and other ATC communication chatter; we neglected to retract the flaps.


Second narrative: Flap over speed on climbout was exceeded Flaps 1 by 1 knot; for 1 second; according to ACMS Flap Report. Flap extension altitude was exceeded by approximately 6;000 feet.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported exceeding Flaps 1 max speed and max altitude for flap extension.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival onto the ramp; Captain informed me that the preflight was completed; clearance and ATIS received and that he was heading back to the FBO to print our flight plan. For this particular flight; I was the PF and [he] was the PNF. The passengers boarded. I performed my last exterior check only to find that the lav was still being serviced. Immediately afterwards; I completed the exterior check prior to closing the aircraft door. The taxi process was uneventful. [On] takeoff the [Pilot Monitoring] called out '80 kts cross check' and 'you have no speed'. ATC also warned us of traffic at about our 11 o'clock so my focus as Pilot Flying was outside. By the time I glanced at my instruments; V1 and VR had already been called. We proceeded to continue because we were heavy; max fuel and verified no annunciator panel light. I then transferred the copilot's ADC (Air Data Computer) data to my side. We continued the departure making a left turn climbing to 4000 ft. ATC vectored us to heading 320 degrees and asked us to climb to 6000 ft. At this point; the gear audio started ('gear gear') and we couldn't silence it. [Pilot Monitoring] made a comment to the effect of 'I hope I didn't forget the pitot cover'. We also turned off the left pitot heat to avoid any damage in case it was still covered. We requested a vector back for a visual. We landed at a weight of 35;000 lbs (500 lbs over MLW) however; our descent upon touchdown was less than 200 FPM. No inspection was required. Upon reaching the ramp I got out of the aircraft and sure enough; the pitot cover was still on. Needless to say; even I missed this. The cover had been missing its red flag. I removed it; and proceeded with our departure.




Synopsis: Falcon 2000 Captain reported that a failure to remove a pitot cover on preflight resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff the aircraft yawed abruptly to the right; the First Officer was flying and was able to control the aircraft with rudder pressure; but it was hard for him to maintain a steady heading; so we declared an emergency and were and asked for immediate return. While on downwind vectors we regained yaw trim and landed normally.


Second narrative: During takeoff at about 500 FT the airplane yawed hard to the right and I applied left rudder to get the airplane under control. We saw the yaw trim went all the way full right and would not come back to the center position. We declared an emergency and requested an immediate return for landing. As we were getting vectors the Captain was looking for the checklist and during that time we tried the yaw trim one more time and it worked and we were able to center it normally and we landed.


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew experiences runaway rudder trim shortly after takeoff. Initially the full right rudder trim cannot be removed and an emergency is declared for immediate return. On downwind the trim becomes operable and is centered for landing.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While making a normal landing; at touch down the right landing gear collapsed and I skidded off the runway into a grass area. No one was injured. The only damage was 2 antennas and some skin damage on the tail empennage. The aircraft was moved to the FBO by the Director of Maintenance.




Synopsis: C210 pilot reported the right landing gear collapsed on landing followed by a runway excursion.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Gate agents were in violation of FAR 121.309. Per my In-flight Manual; 'a preflight inspection is required (which includes the verification of emergency equipment) and MUST be completed.....every time you change to a different aircraft...'   Unfortunately these agents are under so much pressure to 'close the door 10 minutes early'; that they didn't understand as the working outbound crew; we would need 5 minutes to stow our bags and complete our preflight checks. In all their excitement asking how soon they could board; we specifically said we would need five minutes.  They disregarded our request and began boarding before we had our bags stowed. As the #4 I had emergency equipment checks to do which I was not able to accomplish. Because all the agents can focus on is 'closing the door' 10 minutes early and of course their 'on-time' departure; losing any regard/respect for their co-workers/other departments;ie; pilots/flight attendants that also have responsibilities/pressures that are required to achieve the ultimate goal. I wish greatly that I had a suggestion; but since it's such a problem at so many stations; I feel the station managers should be more understanding; and proactive. Unfortunately; they are the ones putting SO much pressure on their agents; and from my experience; most station managers have absolutely no idea of our job responsibilities; and quite frankly; could care less.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Flight Attendant reports that gate agent pressure for early departures is getting in the way of proper cabin preflights.