Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent; Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At XA:28Z; Aircraft X checked on the frequency asking for VFR flight following in the vicinity of ZZZ. He was given a beacon code and I displayed a data block on the radar scope; waiting for it to track up. After a minute I told the pilot that I did not have radar contact; and I didn't have a target in the area he stated. I verified his code and location; and had him reset his transponder after another minute went by. At XA:31Z I told him it might be necessary for him to climb before I could establish radar contact. He reported that he was starting a climb to 7;000 feet.One minute after he started his climb; at XA:32Z; I picked up a primary target in the area the pilot reported. I tried to verify the position of the primary target; but the pilot just responded that he was showing zero oil pressure and having electrical issues. As he was saying this; the data block correlated to the code and I radar identified Aircraft X and verified his location. My standard practice; something that I did less than ten minutes prior; is to radar identify; verify location and altitude; and give altimeter. I do it every time; and in that order. When I radar identified Aircraft X; there was no Mode C data; so I asked him to report his altitude. He reported that he was climbing to 7;000 feet and asked for help to get into ZZZ; he was showing zero on his oil pressure. I didn't circle back to the altimeter at this time.I issued Aircraft X a heading to set him up for a pattern into ZZZ. If his engine was about to quit; I wanted him lined up for an airport; not guessing what was below him. I told the CIC I was working a special aircraft; and the OM was quickly in the area. I didn't feel it was in good judgement to add on to the pilot's stress level by pointing out that he was experiencing an urgent situation. It was being handled as such.He asked as he rolled out if he was on the correct heading. I advised that he was 20 degrees off course; and that he should correct. He told me he was using his backup compass; due to electrical failure. That information made a lot of sense at that moment. The backup compass is a magnetic compass. It's one that bounces around as you turn it. The magnetic compass will continue to turn past the heading and then bounce back and correct as the airplane levels off and the compass stabilizes. This is something that an IFR rated pilot would be more knowledgeable about. No gyro turns; or turns with only the backup compass were part of my IFR certificate training. Due to this; I decided to give him small turns that would create an arc to final; and help him maintain better control and orientation.I told him to descend to 5;000 ft. and that I should still have radar contact at that altitude. He responded that believed he'd be able to poke through. I knew it would be minimal conditions; I still believed getting the aircraft set up for a runway was the safest places. As I gave him a turn to the left he stated that he was going to get into the clouds. I asked if he and the aircraft were IFR qualified. He said they were not. I asked if he could maintain VFR conditions. It sounded like he was trying; but didn't seem sure that he would.I told Aircraft X that he could continue down to 4;000 feet and gave him a heading to get him turned more toward the airport. About that time at XA:39Z; just eleven minutes into the situation; an aircraft inbound for ZZZ1 checked on. I issued the ZZZ1 altimeter. This aircraft would end up being held out for the [situation]. I then told Aircraft X he could descend at his discretion to 3;900 feet; but that was the minimum enroute altitude in the area; and the lowest I was comfortable advising him. He said he was starting to poke through at 4;100 feet. I gave him the position and distance of ZZZ1. He responded that he could see some ground.I had him continue his gradual left turn but saw a much more aggressive turn on the radar. I asked if he was circling down to stay in VFR conditions. He said he saw bases at 3;800 feet and it was an unintentional 360. Based on what the radar showed; it was not a controlled maneuver; and probably resulted from an unusual attitude due to spatial disorientation. I asked him to regain level flight; as to maintain control of the aircraft and not get into another unusual attitude. I asked him his altitude; he responded 3;680 [feet]. Up until this uncontrolled maneuver; every report was that he was in marginal conditions; but always seemed to have some visual capabilities. At this point the inability to maintain VFR was imminent.The aircraft showed a northeast heading; I asked him to make a slow turn. Being an IFR rated pilot myself; and seeing how easily he became disoriented already; I wanted to avoid a stall; spin or turning over the aircraft. In the clouds a turn can make your body feel like you are descending; and a climb can make your body think you are turning. A more abrupt climb or turn only magnifies this effect. At XA:43Z as I maintained focus on keeping the pilot's wings level; I offered the option of climbing back up into VFR conditions. He was in favor of the idea. He added that the engine had been running fine; and believed the zero oil pressure reading to be due to electrical issue; not engine issues. With that information I immediately reassessed the IFR conditions to be the most hazardous conditions in the situation.I saw the aircraft again start a west turn that seemed to increase in rate. I gave the aircraft his location and his observed turn. I advised that he level off and focus on flying straight and level. He did not respond. The maneuver seemed unstable and I tried to relay that he needed to get wings level; then start climbing slowly. Anything aggressive would cause greater disorientation. He said the engine was running fine now; no longer a concern. I told him that we believed it to be clear in ZZZ2; ZZZ3; and ZZZ4. He said that sounds nice. I wanted to get him into ZZZ3 if it was in fact clear. It was much closer; and based on his workload; fatigue due to stress; and equipment issues; I wanted him in the air the least amount of time possible. The CIC or the OM; I don't remember which; went up to the weather desk to get the most complete weather information available. Other controllers were also pulling weather at surrounding airports. I was focused on getting Aircraft X oriented and into VMC.I told him to fly his present heading and start a climb; advising that there was no traffic ahead. He responded that he was having trouble keeping his wings level. I advised back to straight and level and asked his altitude. The climb was giving him a sensation of turning and he was having trouble overcoming that. I should have advised him to focus on the instruments over his own sensations; but I did not think of it at the time.He said he was at 4;020 feet. I said give me level straight flight and then we'll start a slow climb. I wanted him to remain calm and know that we were going to work through it. He did not answer. Seeing what appeared to be straight flight on the radar scope I advised a shallow climb. He said he was trying to keep the wings level. At that point a VFR aircraft departing ZZZ1 was checking in. I called the traffic to that aircraft; advised the altitude was unknown; and asked Aircraft X to say his altitude. He did not immediately answer. Instead another aircraft keyed up; saying the other aircraft didn't look good on his TCAS and he needed to level his wings. Aircraft X then responded; he pulled into a stall; but was starting back up. I advised him to take it slow. At that point Aircraft Y verified ZZZ2 to be clear. I asked if Aircraft X was staying level. He said yes; 5;000 feet and seeing sunlight. I saw another turn on radar and had him level his wings once again. A minute later he reported on top of clouds and level. I told him maintain level flight; catch his breath; and if there were any airports he wanted to try to get to; we would get the weather for him. In my experience; it was best to remind him that he could exhale. He still needed to have the ability to fly the rest of his flight with electrical issues. I also offered him the opportunity to request an alternate airport. He had equipment that most likely needed to be repaired or replaced. I didn't want to send him somewhere that he'd get stuck. Aircraft X was maintaining a southeast heading and I asked him his altitude. He responded; 5;860 feet. I offered again; ZZZ2; ZZZ3; and ZZZ4. The pilot was happy with ZZZ2 because it was reported clear. I gave a heading for him to fly that would get him started turning more towards either airport as I waited for the weather information. I recommended going to ZZZ3 because it was the closest. The pilot agreed that ZZZ3 would be his first choice; then ZZZ2. Immediately as he said that; the information was back from the weather desk and I relayed it to the pilot. He said he wanted to shoot for ZZZ2 because it was clear and ZZZ3 was overcast. I gave a few more heading changes and turns to get him direct to ZZZ2. I also lost radar contact on him a minute later as well. I received another report that he should expect to be clear of the west edge of the moving weather some time before ZZZ2; and passed that along. I advised him that he appeared right on course; and I was relieved at XB:08Z.Ten minutes later; while talking to the relieving controller; the pilot thanked us all for the help he received and said he was feeling the love. He even asked to get a forwarding address to send me a bottle of good scotch. Additionally; when calling the facility from the ground; the pilot was very thankful for the services he received. He informed the OM that he had to change pants when he landed; and again wanted to send a thank you bottle for getting him to safety. It was not apparent at the beginning of the situation that the engine oil reading was due to an electrical issue. It was possible that it could have been a number of different factors; but I knew that he could lose his engine at any moment; and it may not sound rough right away. I wanted him to get lined up for a runway as safely and quickly as possible. I gave him the option to get down below the bases; but should have emphasized to maintain VFR; even though it is the pilot's responsibility. During a stressful [situation]; that would be a good reminder to give the pilot. Once the pilot gained confidence that the engine was running properly; I did everything in my power; and with all of my flight experience to keep the pilot focused on not getting into an unrecoverable condition; while maneuvering safely into VMC.During an imminent [hazard]; controllers have to make judgement calls on what is the most prudent and time critical course of action. Access to checklists during these situations would ensure that all services are provided. Controllers could check that they had provided all of the information possible without taking as much attention away from the imminent safety issue. An easier to use weather reporting system would ensure more weather reports are forwarded along from controllers. The current GI method can be tedious and the tie up keyboard use during busier sessions. ERIDS (En Route Information Display System) offers weather reporting by tapping on the information and hitting send. Using this system would increase the efficiency and result in more weather reports being available. Even just having paper weather slips that controllers can hand to a supervisor would improve efficiency.A working knowledge of flight instruments and factors of flight would allow better assistance to pilots in [hazardous] situations. Recurrent training that focuses on best practices during imminent situations would enhance controllers on seldom used skills.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported an aircraft that was having equipment problems; a VFR pilot in IMC and how the controller helped the aircraft get on the ground safely.