Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RDU.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON RDU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: RDU ATIS showed visual approaches for Runways 23 L/R in use; but our clearance was for the ALDAN 2 (SBV.ALDAN2) arrival; for which the current chart; numbered 10-2; dated 21SEP18; states the following routing for Runway 23R: '...From over ALDAN on track 153 to GAZER; then on track 153 to HARSH; then on track 153 to BUTTS. Expect RNAV (RNP) approach.' For these reasons and because it is the only RNAV (RNP) approach serving runway 23R with BUTTS for an IF; I briefed and set up to fly the FMS for the RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 23R. However; in the vicinity of (but after passing) ALDAN; and with no other remark or indication to expect any other procedure; ATC cleared us to a fix neither on that STAR; nor on the BUTTS transition for the RNP Z approach: PRSTN. Having incurred some delays in our descent before this; and still affected by a strong tailwind; I knew already that we were above the typical 3:1 descent profile; and was devoting significant attention to depleting energy to preclude the need for re-sequencing. I could also see the runway by now; and confirmed that we were (recoverable) high. At this time; we were fewer than 15 NM from the threshold; just under 6;000 feet MSL and 210 KIAS; and had yet to be told for which approach we could expect to be cleared. Acknowledging that we are well advised and trained to generally/philosophically; if not in every single case; to resist the temptation to 'build' charted portions of charted procedures (like transitions to; or segments of; approaches); the FO (First Officer) sought to re-select the RNAV RNP Z approach with the PAINS transition; so that he could then truncate it by selecting 'direct to' PRSTN; to which we'd just been cleared. This clearance further reinforced our expectation (sadly still only inferred!) to be cleared to fly the RNP Z to 23R. The FMS was not having whatever he was inputting; however; and while the PAINS transition appeared on the FMS screen and ND; the FMS was having some designed-in logic conflict and wouldn't allow him to select PRSTN as the active waypoint. Nevertheless; I was able to see PRSTN on the ND; and used Heading Select to point the aircraft at PRSTN. Almost immediately; ATC asked us if we had RDU in sight; we replied in the affirmative; and we were cleared for the visual approach to 23R. At this point; since the FO was not yet able to get the FMS to accept the change he was trying to make under intense time pressure; and since we had (fortunately) kept the ILS for 23R tuned on our VHF navigation radios; I disengaged the autopilot; armed APP on the MCP; and flew a raw-data-ILS-supported visual approach to an uneventful landing. In my post-arrival conversation with [an] RDU TRACON Specialist; it was brought to my attention that the RNAV RNP Z 23R was NOTAMed NA at the time of our arrival. This fact escaped my attention; and calls me to review my NOTAMs more carefully in the future! The chart for the ALDAN 2 STAR states; unequivocally and in two different places that pilots flying this arrival and landing 23R should 'EXPECT RNAV (RNP) approach.' Since the setup and briefing required for non-ILS and especially RNP approaches is somewhat lengthier and more involved than an ILS; we set up for the RNP Z to 23R; but acknowledged that we could also be cleared for an ILS or visual approach. We were never told by ATC what to expect; and thus were expecting to fly what the STAR stated we should expect; literally until the instant we were cleared for...the visual. However; ATC took the complexity and confusion levels into 'the red' when they cleared us to PRSTN; a fix on NEITHER the BUTTS transition of the RNP Z NOR the ILS to 23R. This game; which could easily be titled 'I have a secret;' is played masterfully by ATC in foreign countries in which I fly and have flown; to huge detriment of safety and efficiency there; but it has been fairly rare here in the USA in my experience. Keeping expectations/sequence from crews makes it difficult or impossible for them toeffectively manage their aircraft's energy state; at best. I don't believe I'm the only pilot who; told by a STAR chart to expect a certain transition/approach at the end of the STAR; would naively expect that; and only that approach; regardless of whatever is on the ATIS. ATIS broadcasts are; in my experience; notoriously unreliable for creating accurate expectations for visual vs. instrument approaches; and/or for which specific instrument procedure to expect. Few crews having accurate clearance expectations thus concealed from them; followed by having vectors omitted in favor of having clearances to otherwise irrelevant or in some cases even mysterious fixes (like PRSTN) 'sprung' on them while in the terminal area and in a relatively uncomfortably high energy state while maneuvering for a landing; are going to consistently rise to the occasion and be able to comply with both their training/best practice/habit patterns AND the timeliness ATC rightfully expects. Likewise; fomenting such confusing and chaotic situations is; with less-experienced pilots and/or in more-challenging weather; a reliable recipe for the ubiquitous 'heads-down' loss-of-SA accident/incident scenario against which we are all trained to be on guard. It is also my opinion that; in days gone by; when airmanship was emphasized more and procedural adherence was not so much; and the exhausting/exhaustive briefing; selection; programming; and verification of the correct instrument procedure wasn't considered a necessary precursor to even the simplest visual approach in the best weather; this type of situation would actually have been more if not completely safe; as my FO would have been able to fully focus only upon and better assist with my conduct of the visual approach; and I would not have been as susceptible to distraction from it by his attempts to bring the an FMS; which had become all but irrelevant to it; into agreement with the visual approach we'd been surprised to have been cleared to fly.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain expressed concern that ATC often delayed runway and arrival assignment information to flight crews; increasing workload in the terminal area.