elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Completely normal events leading to takeoff. A couple of maintenance issues at the gate but never pressed for time. After the push; I accomplished the after start flow and did not note any abnormalities with the flight control check. Normal taxi out. Cleared for takeoff and I reached up and set our departure heading of 350. On the takeoff roll shortly after setting takeoff thrust; the Captain noted the flight controls were not responding normally and elected to reject the takeoff. As we were braking to a stop from approximately 80 knots; I noted on the scoreboard that Pitch and Roll were in CWS. After exiting the runway; we ran the QRH and computed our braking energy. After discussing what happened; we called Dispatch. Initially they told us to wait for the recommended cooling time and reattempt the takeoff. After about 15 minutes; we were told to return to the gate by Maintenance Control. I am unsure how CWS was activated. It was not on with the control check. The only explanation is that the CWS button was somehow inadvertently pressed on taxi.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain rejected the takeoff because the flight controls did not respond normally. It was discovered that Control Wheel Steering (CWS) had mistakenly been selected ON sometime during taxi.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RJJJ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center RJJJ
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: In cruise at FL380; 37nm northeast of TUNTO (on A590) we passed below an opposite direction B-747 at FL390. Shortly after passing; we encountered wake turbulence of a moderate degree. The airplane shuddered and then rapidly rolled approximately 20 degrees right. The autopilot commanded a left roll to counteract; but then kicked off. The Captain assumed control and steered us away from the wake. There was no altitude deviation or loss of separation. Dispatch; Maintenance Control and ATC all notified of event after we returned on course. AML entry was made as a precaution; even though no limitation exceedence of any kind was observed. [The cause was the ] 1;000 foot RVSM separation and the direct tailwind that washed the wake directly over us.


Second narrative: Opposite direction B-747 1;000 feet above us created wake turbulence that caused moderate turbulance and our aircraft to roll 15-20 degrees to the right. The autopilot then began to correct back to level when it disconnected causing no more than a 50 foot gain or loss of altitude. The event lasted 15-30 seconds before re-engaging the autopilot and entering smooth air.We had crossed under several other aircraft prior to this on our route and had not even a nibble of turbulence however; in this location the winds aloft were precisely on our tail which allowed the wake to drift down directly into our path at full strength.Also; we did reference the 'Severe Turbulence and or Heavy Rain Ingestion' QRH procedure.When observing winds aloft that are either calm or directly along our track[;] requesting a Lateral Offset as I did in this case after the fact[;] would reduce the chance of a like encounter.


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence that resulted in a 'rapid roll' from opposite direction B747 1;000 ft above their altitude of FL380.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X reported that he has missed a small experimental aircraft by 100 FT. I never saw the Aircraft on radar until after the report and the pilot did not see the Aircraft on TCAS till the last minute but was able to avoid the aircraft. The aircraft had no mode C and Conflict alert never went off. Conflict alert on ERAM does not seem as affective as Conflict Alert on HOST. VFR aircraft without an ALT readout should be subject to conflict alert.




Synopsis: Controller reports that pilot responded to traffic that he did not see until the pilot reported it. Pilot did not see traffic until TCAS alerted him at the last minute. Controller suggests ERAM vs. Host problem.
Date: 201511
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground PHX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZZZ Ground gave us the following taxi instructions. (Call sign) taxi Runway 8 via C and A. As we started to taxi from C to A; the Captain wanted to cut the corner from C to A through the ramp area. I stated 'do you want me to get clearance to cut through the mid ramp'; the Captain replied 'I don't care' and continued. Through the flight; the Captain was focused on getting to PHX. I told him repeatedly throughout this flight and the three-day trip; there is no reason to hurry or rush. It's more important to do things right rather than fast.Once we landed in PHX we were cleared to taxi off Runway 8 via B13 taxi R and contact South Ground (132.55) crossing the bridge. The Ground frequency was busy and we couldn't get through. The Captain became impatient and stated 'I'm just going to go' without clearance to the gate. At this point I had exhausted all of my resources and was forced to use some strong language to get him to stop the aircraft. He stopped. We were able to contact PHX Ground; received clearance to the gate and we complied with the clearance.In an effort to foster a positive discussion over the course of this trip I used examples from numerous courses discussing CRM models; specific events throughout my career and post flight briefs with the Captain.




Synopsis: A B737 First Officer describes an impatient Captain who is not willing to taxi via the cleared taxi route and does not want to wait for clearance after landing when the ground control frequency is congested.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: A PIC called Maintenance with two issues. The connection was not very good.  He started out with wanting to know if his #1 heading bug could be deferred and his #2 IRS panel was flashing 'ON BATT.'  It took me a few minutes to find my Citation X cockpit chart so I could see what he was seeing.  The first item I went after was the IRS and asked him to switch his #2 Norm/Emer bus switch to EMER for 30 seconds then switch it back.  At that time he explained it was no longer flashing and he was good to go with that issue.  We then discussed his heading bug and the fact that the left heading knob on the pedestal was not working.  I started looking through the MEL and found nothing so I discussed the issue with an Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) and he found nothing either.  I returned to my call with the PIC and explained to the we found no relief for the heading knob.  He again brought up the #2 IRS ON BATT flashing at which time I told him to send in the squawks as AOG items and we would get maintenance to work it.  It was only at this time the PIC asked 'you know we're in flight; don't you?'  I told him 'NO'; if I had I could only tell you to follow your checklist and are supposed to contact your ACP for inflight issues. I then entered a tracking stating that the aircraft will AOG when it arrives at destination.  I do not believe the PIC switched his #2 bus from NORM to EMER and Back; but by not explaining to me he was calling from inflight he put me (and himself) in an unacceptable/dangerous situation.  The PIC should have followed his FOM; CH. 3 Non-Normal. Suggestions: The PIC did not follow his FOM. Crews need more training on procedures and need to follow them.  Why is a crewmember calling Maintenance in flight asking if an item can be deferred?




Synopsis: A Technician reported a CE-750 pilot called while inflight about a Navigation System malfunction; which should have been handled by his Chief Pilot.
Date: 201812
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Load Planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp finalized flight with only 14 bags around Dangerous Goods. 15 Bags is the requirement.




Synopsis: Load Planner reported Hazmat shipment incorrectly secured in cargo compartment.
Date: 201203
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: The CE560XL MEL allows for flight with the main CABIN DOOR light illuminated as a three day MEL. The MEL requires confirmation of the correct door pin alignment as well as other issues; prior to flight. The MEL allows flight with passengers as long as the aircraft remains below 25;000 FT and; this is the important part; seat belt sing remains illuminated. The Company now is using this MEL to perform passenger flights. No passenger; especially in a Part 91(k) or 135 flights; will remain safely seated for the entire flight just because the seat belt sign is on. In smooth air; most passengers assume the crew forgot to turn the seat belt off. Now; from the front of the aircraft; we leave the seat belt sign on for pure safety due to the door MEL; but the passengers will walk around anyway due to catering self service; physiological needs; etc. Although a customer service issue; telling the passengers they have to remain seated because of a problem with the door is also ineffective as they would likely be very concerned as to why we are flying at all. There are two choices to solve this dilemma: 1. This MEL should ALSO restrict the aircraft to non revenue flights to avoid possible injury or2. The requirement to leave the seat belt sign on should be eliminated from the MEL if technical experts determine there is no threat to passengers. I favor the first choice; either one will align the MEL with reality and allow the intended safety factors to dominate.




Synopsis: CE560 Captain reports that the MEL allows flight with the main cabin door light illuminated if the aircraft remains below 25;000 FT and the seat belt sign remains illuminated. Since the passengers are unlikely to keep their seat belts fastened the reporter questions the advisability of using this MEL on passenger flights.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Control Valves
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb we observed a right wing anti-ice EICAS message which meant the right wing anti-ice valve was now open with the switch in the off position. As the Relief Pilot; I was asked by the Captain to run the checklist and get in touch with Maintenance. It was very difficult to get a good connection with Dispatch or Maintenance for some 10 minutes. The phone patch dropped several times; for instance. After some time I was able to have a productive communication with Maintenance Control and Dispatch. They agreed we needed to return.I informed the Captain; who then asked that I coordinate our return with local operations i.e. gates; passenger issues etc. While speaking to these various agencies I was not on active ATC frequency and was not aware of the routes or the arrival given to us.We landed safely and the plane was fixed overnight. We departed for Paris the next day.




Synopsis: After EICAS warned of a stuck open wing anti-ice valve a B767-300 Relief Pilot was tasked with communicating with Maintenance and Dispatch while the flying crew coordinated their return for maintenance attention. The Relief Pilot encountered some difficulty maintaining communications; but was able to complete his assigned tasks.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On my flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1; I received a HAZMAT NOTOC from the Operations Agent. I signed both copies and returned one to the agent. We were dealing with severe weather at the gate. After a third release and weather reroute; I noticed the NOTOC for HAZMAT was not annotated on the dispatch release. When I landed in ZZZ1; I contacted Dispatch and disclosed the information.




Synopsis: Captain reported notifying Dispatch at destination that the revised Departure Flight Release was missing required Hazmat cargo information.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the PF (Pilot Flying). At approximately 1;000 feet the 'SMOKE CREW REST' EICAS came on. We continued to fly the airplane while the DH (Dead heading) crew members onboard examined the crew rest area. The alarm was going off on the right side. About 3;000 feet the alarm and EICAS message was extinguished. There was no smell nor visible smoke. The DH crew member noted there was a musky smell. We continued on with the flight with no other problems.


Second narrative: Right after liftoff I began to smell a 'dirty sock' smell that I've associated with mildew buildup in the pack system. At less than 1;000 feet; we began to hear a smoke detector going off. Due to the volume it was hard to determine where it was coming from. We were also still at 15 degree plus pitch; so it was initially hard to get out of our seats in the back. FO came out of the cockpit and said it was in the bunk area. CA; FO and I immediately went into the bunk area. I went forward and grabbed a fire extinguisher off the wall to be ready to pass it forward if needed. The Smoke Detector in the right side was going off. No smoke was seen or smelled but the odor from before persisted. They checked for heat sources and found none. FO reported the findings up to the CA and the climbout continued. CA; FO and I continued to check the area. We inspected the areas behind the bunks through the blowout hatches; the linen closets and felt all the floors and walls again for heat. CA went below onto the main deck to inspect for any signs of smoke and found none. All this was passed up to the crew. The Smoke Detector had silenced after about a minute on its own and the Caution had extinguished as well. The crew elected to continue the flight since it appeared to be a false alarm. The smell from the initial climb also began to dissipate as time passed. The crew stated that they wrote up the issues for [destination] Maintenance to work. Suggestions: Aircraft packs and ducting need to be cleaned on a regular basis.


Synopsis: B747-400 flight crew reported SMOKE EICAS message accompanied Crew Rest Alarm activation. No evidence of smoke/fire; they proceeded on with the flight.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection; Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Ramp Lead loading flight XXXX called after the flight pushed to say he could not lock out the flight because the [load report] was telling him he had Dangerous Goods onboard; but he claimed he had no Dangerous Goods. Looking at the [load report] I asked him was item 1 onboard; he stated yes. I then told him item 1 was Dangerous Goods. Item 1 was UN3373 biologicals. After advising the Ramp Lead the aircraft would need to return to the blocks; the Lead calls back to advise he actually loaded item 3 in Pit 3; which on this particular A320 meant he loaded Dangerous Goods in the nesting system. I asked the Ramp Lead if the shipment had the white sticker with the black lettering and code UN3373 on the outside; he said yes. I then informed him again item 1 was Dangerous Goods.




Synopsis: Air carrier Load Planner reported advising Ramp Lead that aircraft must return to gate to correctly comply with required Hazmat loading configuration for air transport.