elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Door
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Maintenance alerts 19-XXXX and 19-XXXY have been issued. The process of lowering the main gear doors on the Airbus fleet to prevent overheating faults and alerts; bleed leak faults and alerts has been occurring for years. However; it is rare to see the required gear door safety collars installed. My concern is that this alert reinforces bad behavior. Some AMT's (Aviation Maintenance Technician) will insist on complying with the AMM (Airplane Maintenance Manual) and install collars. Other AMT's will continue or begin to 'just drop the doors until block out time'. The AMT's that comply will be ostracized by those who do not comply. There is already a lot of non- compliance; confusion and stress related to this specific issue.Recommend that the issuers of Maintenance Alerts 19-XXXX and 19-XXXY familiarize themselves with A300 AMM 32-XX-XX-XX-X. These safety collars are not readily available in the Line Maintenance Centers. The requirement to install these safety collars every time the main gear doors are lowered is not standard/ observed. The requirement to document the installation of the collars (AML/EAML) is not standard/ observed on the line. It is clear that the intent of the alert is to reduce delays associated with overheating during the summer. Also; the installation; removal and documentation of anything during preflight/ block out time is ripe with opportunity for errors. Additionally; we have personnel involved with pushbacks that pose another major; major safety concern.




Synopsis: Aviation Maintenance Technician reported that the required gear door safety collars are not installed when working on the A300.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I'm not sure this is an ASAP; but I feel the dissemination of the information to crews may be critical. The First Officer brought to my attention that we were being loaded with several hundred gallons (if not > 1000 gallons) of a compound listed as glufosinate ammonium. I verified with ZZZZ ops the material was not a hazmat and I confirmed with the Emergency Response Guide (ERG) that the compound was not listed as a hazardous material. I am a certified HAZMAT operations level technician and I started to do more research after we were well into the flight. The hairs on the back of my neck were still bugging me. I do not know if this fluid was a problem; but I felt further research into the matter was appropriate. I am familiar with most ammonium compounds and know that there can be some issues. I felt that an ASAP was appropriate to determine if this compound may or may not have been left off of the 'list' for hazmat. If not needed to be on the list; I feel an info to crews might be appropriate based on the sheer volume of material we carried. As a side note; the weight of the material put us at max weight for takeoff-at balanced field length. Just thought that might be of interest. I just feel that if we are going to carry this volume of material; that a message to the crew verifying the type of material might be appropriate.


Second narrative: I was advised that [flight number] had hazardous materials loaded that was in question by the Captain I was unaware of this as it was brought to the dispatcher that relieved me and I was not on Duty.


Synopsis: Air carrier pilot questions the classification of glufosinate ammonium that was loaded as cargo on the flight; as non-hazmat.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CMA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E NTD
ATC / advisory: TRACON NTD
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was flying on a VFR flight plan to CMA. I was in VFR conditions with unlimited ceiling and visibility. I was at 4000 feet approaching JUREX intersection. I was given a hand-off with SOCAL to Point Mugu approach. I changed frequency at which time I saw a Florescent Orange flash go by the aircraft off my right wing at my altitude. I saw the flash of color probably less than one second and was not able to focus on the object. It was not an aircraft and was small in size. The flash I saw was a narrow horizontal shape. There was no traffic advisory by ATC. This near miss occurred just prior to my right turn onto the final approach to Runway 26 at CMA. I thought about advising Approach of the near miss with a drone but didn't due to my work load at the time of the approach and the threat had passed. Frankly at the time I couldn't think of the word drone. I am now not a fan of drones which could be catastrophic to aircraft.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone while on a visual approach to CMA at 4000 ft.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence; 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had just descended through IMC and was worried about the potential icing and high winds. I hand flew the approach and due in part to lack of recent experience (rustiness due to 2020/COVID); I inadvertently descended to ~2;100 feet MSL between ZZZZZ (IF) and ZZZZZ1 (FAF) on the RNAV XX approach into ZZZ; about 200 feet lower than the 2;300 feet minimums. I recognized my error and climbed back to 2;300 feet by ZZZZZ1 then continued to an uneventful landing. I should not have hand flown the approach given my rustiness--despite having done well in an IPC (Instrument Proficiency Check) a week or so ago--as I was preoccupied with studying wings for evidence of icing in the fast approaching twilight/dusk; and I was fighting strong winds that had me watching airspeed more than altitude.  All in all; it was 100% my fault and reemphasized to me that currency does not equal proficiency.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an altitude excursion during approach and cited lack of recent flying as a contributing factor.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: S56.TRACON, UT
Aircraft: Challenger 300
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E Y
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed ZZZ IFR. I climbed the aircraft to be able to turn him on course and to top arrival traffic to SLC from the south. I thought that I was further north than I was. I thought that I was in a 124 MVA; but I was in the 135 MVA. Aircraft X entered the 135 MVA level at 13;000 ft.




Synopsis: S56 controller reported a CL30 was turned into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach to ATL Runway 26R outside of AJAAY was told cleared the Visual 26R behind Aircraft Y maintain 160 knots to AJAAY. Outside of AJAAY we noticed that the separation between Aircraft Y and our aircraft was 3 miles and decreasing. At 160 kts we were overrunning Aircraft Y in front of us. We decided to slow down as we felt this was the safest course of action! Inside of AJAAY; Tower asked why we slowed I replied over running traffic in front of us. After exiting the runway we were instructed to contact TRACON. In my conversation with xxx (TRACON) I reiterated our concern for safety and closing in on traffic. He specifically stated that Atlanta runs 2 miles separation on visuals. I was not aware of this nor have I been able to find reference of this in either the 10-1B or 10-7 pages for ATL.




Synopsis: Pilot reported being on a visual approach into Atlanta; slowing for separation; and then after landing being told by TRACON that they should not have slowed.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RJAA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Center RJTG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Entered hold at KETAR and told to expect 2 turns in pattern. Expect Further Clearance (EFC) then extended 20 minutes. After 3rd turn declared minimum fuel and was given clearance to next fix VEPOX. Then told to hold at VEPOX for 1 hour. We had now 50 minutes of fuel. Replied twice with 'unable'. ATC Reiterated one hour EFC then asked if we were declaring minimum fuel. We replied affirmative and were given vectors to ILS 16R at RJAA. At 1000 feet AGL encounter reactive wind shear alert. Performed wind shear escape maneuver leveled at 4000 feet and requested and were given vectors to our alternate. Landed at our alternate without further incident. Fuel at touchdown approximately 10;000 LBS block in fuel 8800.




Synopsis: B777 Captain encountered wind shear at 1000 feet during approach; with minimum fuel and went around. Flight diverted to a nearby alternate and landed with approximately 10000 pounds of fuel.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Embraer Phenom 100
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LAX
Second aircraft: Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While exiting runway 25L at LAX; tower told us to exit Golf turn right on Alpha and taxi west on Alpha and contact ground control on taxi. After I turned right on Alpha; the First Officer contacted ground and once we switched over ground told us to 'STOP.' I stopped the aircraft and noticed a Gulfstream had just turned on Alpha out of [the FBO] and we were now facing each other on the taxiway. Ground queried why we were taxiing without having contacted him first. We told him that we were instructed to taxi westbound from tower frequency. Ground told us to make a 180 on the taxiway and due to the poor turning radius on the Phenom I was unsuccessful in my first attempt to turn around. Ground told Ops to call [the FBO] and get a tug to tow us to our ramp. I asked if I could try one more time and was successful in completing the turn. I was told to hold on another ramp then taxi after the Gulfstream to [the FBO]. In conclusion I am positive that we were told to taxi westbound on Alpha but there was obviously some confusion between ground and tower frequency on what we should have been doing.Better communication between ground and tower frequency.




Synopsis: Pilot reports after landing and complying with instructions to taxi from Local. Pilot switches to Ground Control and is asked why they did not contact him first and to stop. Pilot was told to make a 180 and taxi into another ramp area; wait for passing traffic; and then taxi as instructed. Pilot was confused as to what they should be doing.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control Unit
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On taxi out; all systems tested normally; specifically; the EFC's [Electronic Fuel Control's]. On takeoff roll; at approx 40-60 KTS or approximately 10-15 seconds; the master caution illuminated in conjunction with both 'EFC OFF' annunciators on the center annunciator panel. We aborted the takeoff and taxied clear of runway. Aircraft was operated in an EFC OFF configuration back to FBO.




Synopsis: BE400 First Officer experiences both 'EFC OFF' annunciators on the center annunciator panel during takeoff and rejects at 40-60 KTS. The aircraft was then operated in an EFC OFF configuration back to base.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cadet Mark 10
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Distribution
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Repairman; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This aircraft had the engine overhauled by a shop on our field; and was delivered to a second shop which installed the engine and propeller on the aircraft. The airplane was brought to me to complete the annual inspection. During the aircraft inspection the engine installation was evaluated; inspected with no defects observed. At the time of my inspection the throttle linkage was installed; bolted and cotter keyed. The aircraft went back to the shop which originally installed the engine for a new generator to be installed. This action would not have tampered with the throttle linkage. The plane arrived back at our shop where I completed final checks; and engine operations with no defects observed. Several people during this time frame witnessed the cotter key installed. The aircraft flew about 7 hours prior to throttle linkage disconnecting on takeoff. The aircraft completed an off field landing with no injuries or damage to the aircraft.The conclusion of myself and the other shop is that when the cotter key was installed it cracked allowing over time and engine vibration to fail. This caused the cotter key to fall out and the nut to back off from vibration. Also; the aircraft being worked on at several different shops could have effected quality assurance. In the future I will not have aircraft that are being worked on in several different shops at the same time. Also; more attention to detail may have caught the cotter key being cracked when the engine was installed. Tamper seal was applied to these bolts after installation; which may have allowed the damaged cotter key not to have been seen by me during my inspection.




Synopsis: Technician reported that seven hours after completing an annual inspection; a Mooney M-10 throttle disconnected resulting in an off field landing.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: EWR was landing Runway 22L. The First Officer briefed everything including our taxi route. We had ramp frequency set up in Comm 2. After landing we crossed Runway 22R at Taxiway N and contacted Ground. Ground Control told us taxi PA A. Before we started moving; ACARS sent us to a new gate. Ground frequency was busy so we waited. We told ground what our new gate was. Ground said taxi PA A. I looked at the chart and it didn't make sense to taxi away from the A gates. The last time I was in EWR we taxied B to RA due to construction. I flipped through the charts to see if I was missing something but couldn't find anything. Ground Control came on again '... PA A' and then Ground Control was talking to someone else. So now I was feeling rushed and panicked. So I started taxiing straight ahead but I didn't see PA and taxied to A and turned left. My First Officer finally found the Ramp frequency. Ramp said RA entry. According to the taxi chart; RA is closer to [the cargo ramps]. My First Officer tells me RA is right here next to RB. I looked out the window and yes; RA is next to RB. I then hear Ground tell us to turn into RA. I didn't like having a gate change at the last minute. I didn't think Ground Control understood the gate change after we told them. We sat there for a long time because I was trying to understand the taxi route. The EWR taxi chart doesn't match the new construction.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported the taxi chart at EWR is not accurate.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SDF.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SDF
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were expecting to taxi E - G - D and crossing Runways 35R and 29 to the departure end of 35R. Our taxi instructions were to taxi E and G hold short of 35R. A few minutes later we were then cleared to cross 35R on G left on D and cross 29. Holding short of Runway 35R and before continuing; we referenced the airport diagram again. The outside references such as lighting and markings were poor. We misinterpreted the plate by mistaking pavement shadowing as Taxiway G. We started to cross 35R and turned left looking for the other side of G then stopped before Runway 29. By this time ground was informing us of our position. We informed him that we were turning around and exiting the runway onto G. We then continued our taxi to Runway 35 right. On duty 10 hours. It was late at night. Had difficulty seeing the taxiway due to glare from the terminal across the field. On airport diagram the taxiway identifier is too close to the pavement shading causing it to appear as a taxiway. Relocate the G identifier on the plate. Have more information in the hotspot note.




Synopsis: CE650 First Officer reports a runway incursion at SDF while attempting to cross Runway 35R on taxiway G but veering left and incurring Runway 29.