elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CHS.Airport, SC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CHS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Our taxi out clearance from ATC was: Runway 21 via Bravo; Charlie; Alpha; and hold short of Runway 15.  While taxiing northeast on Taxiway Charlie; we were looking for signage or taxiway markings to indicate Taxiway Alpha.  None existed.  We were able to determine Taxiway Alpha by referencing the taxi diagram and counting taxiways.  We did not miss our turn.  This lack of proper signage and markings could be very hazardous at night or low visibility conditions.

Callback: The reporter reiterates that there are definitely no painted markings on the taxiway's and he is almost certain there are no vertical taxiway signs.



Synopsis: B737 Captain reports a lack of taxiway signs and markings at CHS.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: After pushback; we were given a clearance to taxi to Runway 33. We were told to taxi on the terminal ramp to spot S1 and hold short next to (other carrier). The Captain started to taxi and asked me where spot S1 was on the airport diagram. I started to look for it and told him I couldn't find it on the 10-9; so I next went to the 10-9b. As I was trying to find the spot; the Captain pulled up abeam the (other carrier) aircraft parked at a gate. Ground asked what we were doing and I said holding abeam (other carrier). He then notified us that we were past the hold line and had us circle back via Runway 33 and 8 to a spot that turned out to be S1. Spot 1 is a very small circle with very bad paint. By the time we were where we should be I was able to find a very good view of spot 1 in the [company] page with all the good warnings of a hot spot. This was the first time I had ever taken off from Runway 33; and I didn't realize how complicated the ramp was. We understood that we were to taxi on the ramp around the terminal and hold next to (other carrier) and what the Ground Controller meant was that we were to stop behind the (other carrier). Spot 1 is so small and so poorly painted that the Captain couldn't find it while looking outside; and I couldn't find it looking at the charts because I was looking at the Jepps instead of the [company page]. I think a better clearance would have been to taxi behind the (other carrier) and stop at the 33/15 hold short line.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a taxiway incursion at BUR airport occurred due to the spot 1 field marking being very small and in need of fresh paint. Spot 1 is called Hotspot 1 and RW33-15 Hold on airport diagrams.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During preflight in bitterly cold ZZZ; the FO (First Officer) completed the walk around as snow began to fall. The flaps were full down from the previous flight. She came to the cockpit and informed me that the flaps were clear of debris and asked if we should retract them for the deicing we would need after start. I agreed we should; and we did. Unbeknownst to us; the fueling of the aircraft began during this time and we didn't notice as we retracted the flaps. Just before pushback; ramp informed us that Maintenance was checking the refueling door on the wing; as it was damaged. This was our first indication that we may have damaged the door during flap retraction. Later on; maintenance personnel came to the flight deck and told us of the problem and that we would be swapping aircraft due to this.Cold weather operations; delayed fueling; miscommunication and worsening weather all contributed to this event.Don't touch the flap handle until all preflight items are complete before pushback regardless of weather conditions.




Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported fueling door damaged during flight retraction at gate.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp LAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: From the gate; our flight was cleared to push into the alley; with clearance to disconnect at the 'North' Spot. This is the alley between Terminals 7 and 8. The Tug Driver stopped us on the marked centerline and disconnected. The pushback was performed with proper communication verbiage and per SOP. We started both engines; anticipating the need for both engines at idle thrust to begin our taxi from the North spot.After taxi clearance was received from Ramp Control; the Captain released the parking brake and was unable to make the aircraft move under its own power at 40% N1 on both engines. Thinking that perhaps the brakes had not released properly; the Captain cycled the brake handle; but still was not able to get the aircraft to move forward at the breakaway thrust of 40% N1. The aircraft was definitely settled into a rut at the North spot. We coordinated with Ramp Control via radio to verify that there was no equipment or personnel congested behind the aircraft. We coordinated with Ramp Control the use of engine thrust above Breakaway (40% N1); while referencing guidance in Flight Manual. It took 52% N1 on both engines to get the aircraft to roll forward out of the rut. The remainder of our taxi and flight was uneventful. Just as the tug finished pushing us into our final position at the North spot it felt like the tug's driver made an abrupt stop. The jolt was noticeable throughout the cabin.  We now realize that what must have occurred was the aircraft settling into the rut in the asphalt just as the slack on the towbar pulled against the tug. I believe this hazard needs to be repaired and corrected. I recommend a repair to the rut; but in the short term I recommend advising the push crews to stop the pushback at a spot several feet prior to the rut; so as to avoid the problems we had.




Synopsis: An air carrier aircraft was pushed back from LAX to the North Spot where its main gear tires settled into a rut which then required 52% N1 to break away for taxi.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAG.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E BUF
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Me and my flight instructor intended on circling Niagara Falls to take a few pictures. We did not have the plate for circling in front of us and we were circling counter-clockwise. We made a radio call to the traffic in the area and got no response. We had traffic in sight but originally we both perceived the motion of the other aircraft to be moving away from us and turning left; a few seconds later we both realized our traffic was headed towards us. We descended below the 3;500 ft altitude designated for the airspace in order to avoid traffic. We ended up at 3;200 ft and our traffic passed about 100 FT to our left. Contributing factors were us not having the circling pattern out and ready to use; as well as both of us misjudging the other aircraft's direction of flight.




Synopsis: PA44 student pilot reported an NMAC in the vicinity of Niagara Falls after failing to fly the published photo pattern.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff; received the following ECAM messages:F/CTL L AIL FAULTF/CTL R AIL FAULTF/CTL ATN LAWUpon completion of AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST; ATC was advised. Requested to level off at 12;000 feet to comply with sector MEA; ensure terrain clearance; and complete ECAM actions and COM procedures.  Due to the nature of the ECAMs; the decision was made to return to the departure airport. In an overabundance of caution; the decision was made to hold within 40NM northeast of the airport and burn fuel until reaching a landing weight below 150;000 lbs.  Dispatch; Maintenance; Operations; Cabin Crew and ATC were all involved in decision-making communications. In addition; dead heading Captain occupied the jumpseat and served as an additional crew member.  Passengers were briefed of situation and plan to return to the departure airport after decisions and planning/coordination were complete.  Once the desired landing weight was ensured; the overweight landing COM procedure was applied and a visual approach; backed up by the ILS; was conducted to [the] Runway. Emergency equipment was requested and standing by.A normal landing was conducted. Once the aircraft was stopped on the runway; emergency personnel verified that brake temperatures were normal; ensured no other external anomalies were present; and cleared the aircraft for taxi to the gate.After PARKING CHECKLIST was completed; all discrepancies were entered in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML).




Synopsis: A320 pilot reported an ECAM alerted to multiple failures immediately after takeoff.
Date: 201406
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals; MEL
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I took a call from a crew [who had] pushed off the gate reporting an AFCS FAULT on the EICAS. I questioned the crew and found the fault to be intermittent. Having dealt with a similar problem earlier in the morning I proceeded to MEL the fault under the MEL 22-11-01; Guidance Panel Channels. I completed the MEL process and released the aircraft. The next day it was brought to my attention by my Manager that the MEL was possibly incorrect. We looked at a download that had been obtained earlier and verified that the fault was an AFCS FAULT. To use MEL 22-11-01-1 the fault should have been an AFCS PANEL FAULT. The aircraft was on the ground at the time so I stopped the aircraft and dispatched Maintenance. They found that the message was not present on the EICAS. They performed operational checks and cleared the MEL. I did not verify the cause of the AFCS FAULT or research the MEL properly before giving the MEL information to the crew and creating the MEL in the computer system. I was focused on speed and delays and not on facts and quality. I personally need to slow down and follow the procedures in place. Read through the MEL thoroughly and ask more questions of the crew. I believe that we are short staffed in the morning on busy days. On slow days we are OK but be were very busy on the day in question. There were 2 controllers and 1 coordinator for almost 100 aircraft.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller reported MEL'ing an autoflight discrepany for a crew who had pushed back from the gate and discovering the next day that an incorrect MEL was applied. When the MEL was issued he felt pressure to release the aircraft on time.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the Captain and Pilot Flying. We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 18L by the Local Controller. As we entered the runway an EMB-145 was just lifting off downfield and no other aircraft was observed. All aircraft exterior lights were illuminated as we started our takeoff roll. As the engines stabilized at 50% N1; [the] First Officer called out about the corporate jet aircraft that was starting to cross the runway downfield around the C8 taxiway. I immediately looked up and saw the aircraft starting to cross our runway. At this time; I initiated a rejected takeoff. About the same time the ATC Local Controller noticed the aircraft crossing the runway and told us to 'Hold position'. Our aircraft came to a complete stop on Runway 18L at the D8 taxiway. The corporate jet downfield continued to cross Runway 18L. I estimate our speed was around 40 kts. when the takeoff was rejected.At no time did I hear any Controllers talking to the corporate aircraft and can only assume that it must have been on another frequency. We cleared the runway at D8 taxiway and taxied to hold short of Runway 18L at D taxiway. After talking with the Flight Attendants and passengers we prepared the aircraft again for takeoff.Aircraft crossing the active runway should have been on Tower frequency not Ground frequency for better situational awareness.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported that a runway incursion by another aircraft resulted in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Second aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Trainee; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: My instructor took me out to practice S-Turns at 1000 feet. During a demonstration turn to the right; I spotted an aircraft to our left at the same altitude with 1000 feet horizontal separation. The other aircraft was on a heading almost perpendicular to us. We were located at his 1 o'clock. My CFI made a couple quick calls on the radio to Aircraft Y headed straight for us; before it became necessary for him to take evasive action. We lost altitude to avoid; looked behind us to spot Aircraft Y and watched him pull a severely steep bank and dive right at us. My CFI continued to lose altitude to avoid a second near miss collision; and Aircraft Y tailed us and was lost from view. My CFI continued to make radio calls to Aircraft Y on different frequencies with no identified response except for a loud 'YEEEHAWWW'. Due to the extremely low altitude and dangerous nature of the pilot behind us; we were unable to do clearing turns or anything other than straight and level until we landed nearby. We parked and watched the skies for 15 minutes with no sign of him. Luckily; my CFI was extremely cool-headed and capable or this situation might have had a much different ending. Unfortunately; we didn't get the N number of Aircraft Y.




Synopsis: Tecnam P92 Eaglet student pilot reported evasive action was required to avoid another aircraft making intentional aggressive maneuvers.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: COS.Tower, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower COS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was Pilot Monitoring and the Captain was Pilot Flying. We were cleared for a visual approach. Winds were reported calm. Below 1;000 ft. we started to lose airspeed and the Captain responded that he was adding power and did so. Within a couple seconds we got a wind shear warning. The Captain applied max thrust and followed the flight director. I called out trends that we were descending. The wind shear warning went away after several seconds. I forgot to tell the Captain 'clear of wind shear' and he asked me 'are we clear of wind shear?'. I responded with 'clear of wind shear'. The approach was then continued; but we were not stabilized since we were slightly high at this point so we floated long in the flare. I said 'we are floating' but did not call go around. We landed and taxied to the gate. After the flight the Captain and I debriefed. We talked about how it all happened quickly but we should have performed a go around in a wind shear situation on approach; not to mention if we are high or unstable for any reason. Wind shear caused this event. Neglecting to call for; and perform a go around led to an unstabilized approach. In a wind shear scenario on approach; a go around should be performed. The Captain and I did discuss how calling for a go around immediately when encountering wind shear can become a threat if the pilot monitoring were to raise the flaps as this should not be done (no configuration changes until clear of wind shear). Nonetheless; wind shear calls for a go around; just no configuration changes until clear of wind shear. Being more clear and direct; saying 'go around' instead of using less direct language like 'we are floating' is necessary. Also knowing your call outs in a wind shear situation is imperative; including 'clear of wind shear'.




Synopsis: First Officer reported continuing to a landing after receiving a wind shear warning.