elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This report is to cover [three] flights. All three flights; each time on approach when Flaps 1 was selected. A 'SLAT FAIL' message appeared on the EICAS. We completed SLAT FAIL QRH which leads to SLAT/FLAP FAIL QRH. Each time we were able to clear the message and land in normal landing configuration uneventfully. I called Maintenance Control on the ground each time. A logbook entry was made for all three flights. It seems that they were able to clear the issue and OK the Aircraft for service each time however the issue kept repeating itself. Preventative Maintenance. A SLAT FAIL message should not occur on three flights in a row after being 'cleared' and Ok'd for service by Maintenance Control.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported a SLAT FAIL EICAS message appeared each time flaps were selected on approach.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SVZM.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center SVZM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Frequency 127.95; used by Maiquetia from the southeast border near Vumpi and extending approximately 600 miles northwest; is basically unuseable and unsafe for Air Traffic Control. The 'squeal' transmitted with all ATC transmissions is so loud as to cause pain. Their instructions are unreadable at a safe volume. In the event we; or any aircraft; had to coordinate emergency actions; or receive emergency instructions from ATC; the likelihood of understanding their transmission is very minimal. The burden and frustration a crew might encounter in order to communicate with ATC at this point would only compound what might already be a task saturated situation. In summation; the existing 'squeal' on Maiquetia 127.95 is unsafe. This noise interference occurs every time I fly through their airspace.




Synopsis: Air Carrier reporter claims 127.95 utilized by Maiquetia is unusable for ATC in some locations due to a loud 'squeal' preventing communications.
Date: 201209
Location: DTS.Airport, FL
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Design
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was preparing for a trip to DTS and looking at the approach plates. The RNAV (GPS) Runway 32 approach has a lowest minimum listed of 420 FT. In looking at the plate on my computer screen it was listed as an 'LP category' minima. I figured that was a typo for Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) as I'd never heard of an Localizer Performance (LP) approach.I did a computer search and found some pertinent quotes from a navigation/data provider including: 'But even with the right hardware (WAAS supported GPS); you still can't fly an LP approach right now. That's because the [commercially provided] database does not support LP approaches. It's a completely new type of approach; and the provider is still working to integrate these into your normal update cycle. Their goal is to support LP approaches 'sometime soon;' so stay tuned.'I suspect very few active IFR pilots appreciate there are a significant number of published approaches that general aviation aircraft are incapable of flying. It sets up a situation where pilots could very easily bust minimums without knowing it.




Synopsis: While planning a future flight; a commercially rated pilot noted 'LP' minima on the RNAV/GPS approaches at his destination; an approach type with which he was unfamiliar and for which; a computer search revealed; his aircraft's commercially provided GPS database was unable to utilize.
Date: 201309
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Recently I was waiting at the cockpit door to receive a cup of coffee from the 'A' Flight Attendant. I reached up to check the manual cockpit door lock. I was surprised to find that I could not lock the cockpit door manually in the event of a lockdown. I tried pulling on the strap inward and still could not lock the door manually. When we got on the ground; I called Maintenance to the cockpit. The Mechanic tried to push on the upper part of the door from the forward galley. Even with his outside pressure; the deadbolt would not penetrate the door frame receiver. Eventually; the Mechanic had to adjust the door frame receiver to allow the deadbolt in.Since then (approximately 30 days ago) I have found four other aircraft with basically the same problem. Two of them I was able to get the cockpit door locked enroute but had to pull very hard on the strap. Would I have the time or the forethought to do this in an actual emergency? My thoughts: I think over the past 12 years; the cockpit doors are prone to shifting based on temperature changes and twisting movements from the aircraft. This might be causing some deadbolts to align offset causing the problem. This worries me.  Hopefully a check can be performed by Maintenance while on the ground and one in the air to adjust everything to allow a quick lockdown should one be needed.




Synopsis: A B737 pilot discovered that he was unable to lock down the flight station door using the manual cockpit door lock while in-flight. Maintenance adjusted that door frame receiver but the reporter later found several other aircraft with same problem.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were at level cruise in the last 1/3rd of our flight when we noticed a variance of 150 feet between the Captain's and the Copilot's altimeters. We were discussing the problem and comparing the CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer) side with the STBY instruments when the variance increased to over 200 feet triggering an ALT DISAGREE message. We followed the QRH procedure and notified ATC that we are unable RVSM. The variance between the CA and FO pitot static system slowly increased and we soon got an IAS DISAGREE message. The FO and STBY instruments were in close agreement. The IAS DISAGREE QRH lead us to the AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE checklist and we began to run that procedure. The Captain transferred control of the aircraft to me because I had the reliable instruments. At this point; there was a 400 foot difference in altitude between the FO/STBY instruments and the CA instruments. We switched the transponder to my side which triggered a query from ATC because Mode C now showed us 400 feet high. I descended smoothly back down to the assigned altitude. We were in a heavy rain shower with high winds prior to departing. Therefore; we suspected ice in the Captain's pitot static system. The Captain requested a lower altitude. Air traffic control was not immediately able to accommodate our request due to traffic and coordination. The Captain [advised ATC]. During the descent; the Captain's instruments showed air speeds as low as 40 knots and altitude errors of thousands of feet. This triggered one airspeed low aural warning. Once we descended to an altitude that yielded a TAT of plus 5 deg C; the Captain's instruments returned to normal indications. The Captain canceled the emergency with ATC. I flew a normal approach and landing [at the destination airport] without using the auto throttles. The Captain communicated with Maintenance and Dispatch after we arrived at the gate.




Synopsis: B737 pilot reported a significant discrepancy between the Captain's and First Officer's airspeed and altitude indications; possibly due to ice contamination in the pitot-static system.
Date: 201912
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Flight planned to operate an aircraft with APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) inoperative. ZZZ WX was moderate to severe icing; wind; snow. Night flight. ZZZ1 (an airport in mountainous terrain) was forecasting wind; snow; freezing precipitation; icing. I decided that this environment was not the time to be flying around without an APU. I called Dispatch; conferenced with [maintenance]; and refused the aircraft. I then contacted ZZZ [operations] and advised of the refusal; and suggested we start looking for an alternate aircraft. One was coordinated- we flight planned; loaded the pax (Passengers); and departed. Arrived ZZZ1 about 1 hour late. FO (First Officer) was included in my decision making process. I followed proper established procedure/ protocol for the refusal. I utilized company procedures to achieve a successful - and safe - resolution to the issue.




Synopsis: Flight Crew reported refusing an aircraft with an inoperative Auxiliary Power Unit due to anticipated severe weather.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SHN.Airport, WA
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student and I were flying a simulated engine out right traffic pattern to runway 5 at SHN. The student did call his downwind; but not base or final. I heard a partial radio call from another aircraft during our approach; but it was not clear. I did not make any calls. On short final we were lined up for runway 5; about .4 miles out; all of a sudden; the student (left seat) saw the other aircraft on our left in front; which was apparently taking off from the opposite direction runway 23. The wind was from direction 120. We didn't hear their call for takeoff. Both planes banked right and narrowly avoided collision; with the other plane passing just under us (100-200 feet vertical). Even though we were lined up with the runway from about .75 nm out; and looking at the runway; on centerline; we did not see the other aircraft until the last second. What caused this incident is lack of sufficient radio calls in pattern while executing a simulated emergency. Also learned that teaching simulated emergencies near a non-towered airport requires extra vigilance from instructor in making sure that traffic calls are made and there is situational awareness of traffic around the airport. Do not assume other aircraft will use the same runway that the wind seems to be indicating. Always clear for opposite direction traffic in the pattern; especially on final.




Synopsis: C172 instructor pilot reported NMAC on approach to SHN.
Date: 201708
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Two TCAS Resolution Advisories (RA) were received while at cruise altitude with no traffic observed or reported in the vicinity. The first incident occurred at [an] altitude [of] FL370. The TCAS system momentarily displayed amber traffic advisory symbols with the 'Traffic; Traffic' aural warning; followed immediately by the RA directing a climb. The RA continued until the aircraft was flown to approximately FL374. Prior to the event; the TCAS system was not displaying traffic in the vicinity; nor was traffic observed. The RA was immediately reported to ATC. ATC advised that there was no traffic in the immediate vicinity. The second incident occurred [an hour later] while at FL390. Once again there was no traffic observed or displayed by TCAS near the aircraft. During this incident the TCAS again displayed traffic symbology and aural warning; followed by the RA directing a descent. The RA guidance remained until the aircraft descended to FL386. The RA was reported to ATC. ATC advised the nearest traffic was 40NM from our position. During both incidents; transponder #2 was in use. Suspecting an equipment malfunction; the #1 transponder was utilized for the remainder of the flight. A logbook entry was made providing the details. Maintenance elected to defer the #2 transponder for the subsequent flight.




Synopsis: A B737 First Officer reported that after two TCAS advisories with no confirmed traffic in the area; they determined it was an equipment malfunction.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HTS.TRACON, WV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Special Use HTS
ATC / advisory: TRACON HTS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On approach (downwind) 2 in VMC conditions; while monitoring the Terrain page on the MFD; encountered a 'Terrain Terrain Pull UP' message from the GPWS system. We were at an altitude of 2;300 feet MSL with the current ALT setting. We did have a strong tail wind that was pushing us towards the final approach fix and a tower is depicted not far off the approach end of 12. The Terrain page did not indicate any obstacles and in fact was not painting anything. Although we did not see anything in front of us we complied with the GPWS warning. The flight finished without incident. We did report the GPWS warning to ATC.We received an aural warning from the GPWS system.GPWS detected that we were to close to terrain and instructed us to Pull up. The only thing we can think that caused this was the Close proximity of a tower to the airport that it might have sensed we got to close to. We were less that 1;500 feet above the target.When doing a downwind for HTS maintain 3;000 feet until established inbound as to avoid any warnings from terrain and obstacles in the vicinity of HTS.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported receiving a GPWS warning while being vectored to land.
Date: 201404
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Human factors: Fatigue; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Reported for [a 13 hour flight] anticipating standard crew rest break- relief pilots take first half and flying pilots the second half. This requires showing up tired so you can sleep through the break since you'll be in the seat for seven hours; dodging dry-top thunderstorms and managing high threat weather and fuel constraints. Captain declared that we were going to split the breaks so he and flying First Officer would get the middle six hours of sleep. This meant the relief pilots got about 3.5 hours to start and then the last 3 hours. I told the Captain that I was exhausted and had planned on sleeping for the first entire break. He declared that he was changing the breaks to accommodate his rest needs. I acquiesced to his authority and did my best to get some sleep in the poorly designed; cramped; loud bunk. This unanticipated break schedule woke me at the bottom of my rest cycle and put me squarely in the WOCL of 2-6 am. I was absolutely exhausted since the standard and anticipated rest break was callously changed to accommodate the Captain's desires.




Synopsis: B777 Relief Pilot reports showing up for a flight fatigued expecting the first six hour break but the Captain elects to break the relief pilots' rest period into two three hour periods; with the flying crew taking a six hour break in the middle.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: Other Landing Roll
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I start the day with a flight to be sure the student is proficient to make a solo flight in the pattern. We went to make the flight 3 touch and go and the student maintained the correct speed and altitude along the pattern. The whole landing the student landed on the centerline with safe operation of the aircraft. After that I found proficient the student and signed the endorsement. Student went solo and made his takeoff departing Runway 9 wind was 120 at 4 KTS. While supervising the solo I saw the student landing in the centerline about the aiming points. After landing I saw the airplane moving to the right and then to the left; after that the airplane went again to the right ending out of the runway. ATC talk with the pilot and he decided to turn off the engine and wait to be removed from the area. Rescue arrive and a tow cart to help to remove the airplane from the area and get back to the apron.


Second narrative: I started the plane to fly solo. Normal takeoff; flew the pattern in an altitude of 1;000 FT; communicated with the Tower saying 'reporting capitol building for a full stop.' 'ATC cleared to land.' Lower the RPM put 10 degrees of flap and turned base leg. In base leg I put 25 degrees of flap; lowered the RPM descending to final. Descending to final have a normal landing when I touch down I putted a little more break than needed and the airplane started sliding. I tried to fix it and it become worst ended sliding out of the runway. Airport authority rescue came and helped me get the airplane back to the ramp.


Synopsis: A student pilot on his first solo landing; with his instructor observing on the ramp; applied too much rudder correction and brake which resulted in the aircraft departing the runway without damage or injury.