elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LMO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student pilot with CFI approaching Longmont from the south 4 miles out received AWOS wind 110 at 4Kts. We entered crosswind for runway 11 making and acknowledging radio calls. Other planes in the pattern; King Air elected to land runway 29 while we were on downwind for 11. Light sport aircraft holding at 29 acknowledged King Air and us and would hold. When base to final light sport aircraft entered 29 but taxied across for Bravo taxiway and stated would be taxiing for 11. We landed on 11 during landing rollout past Alpha 3; a Cessna 172 began its takeoff on 29. We made radio calls and planned to proceed off the runway for the grass. C172 aborted takeoff and acknowledged our presence on the runway.




Synopsis: Citabria pilot reported a ground conflict with a Cessna 172 at LMO airport.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My sector was combined with an R-side and training on the D-side.  I sat down and received two briefings; one from the R-side and one for the D-side as they immediately closed the position.  At no time was there any mention of GPS Jamming that affected my airspace.  A few minutes later; I read all the NOTAMs for my sector and found there was GPS Jamming occurring from XA00Z to XG00Z.  We have numerous GPS and RNAV approaches this could affect and that we must advise the pilots about. I looked over at my sectors SIA board and noticed they did not have GPS Jamming denoted on it.  They were conducting a certification check at R-44 with a supervisor and another controller plugged in since the supervisor was not certified there.  I told them there was GPS Jamming going on.  The controller gave a response of basically - no big deal.  I said it is a big deal; you have an aircraft holding about to be cleared into CXP on a GPS approach and you have not advised him about the possible GPS Jamming.  My area has a real problem with reading NOTAM's.  Half the time; the controllers have the monitors turned backward so they can't even read the screen.  Most controllers in my area never read NOTAM's unless they have an IFR aircraft requesting and approach.  And then they only check the particular airport for the NOTAM's which will not show GPS Jamming.  Most controllers will argue that management should put all the important info on the big SIA board in the area.  This would be nice but it is not realistic.  Things change quickly at times and ERIDS is the best place to find that information.Management needs to force us to read the NOTAM's every time we sit down at a low altitude sector.  Management needs to force all of us to put all important; pertinent information for the sector on the sector SIA board or on the scope.  All controllers who choose to ignore this should be disciplined.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller states that many controllers at his facility are lax in their knowledge of NOTAMs that pertain to the sectors that they are controlling; especially when it comes to GPS jamming NOTAMs.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RSW.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C RSW
ATC / advisory: TRACON RSW
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was on the SHFTY arrival to RSW and was descended to 4;000 feet; pilot reported coming within an estimated 300 feet of Aircraft Y. At the time that this occurred I was occupied with other aircraft; so the report from Aircraft X was received about 12 miles after the occurrence. I did observe a primary target that I believe was Aircraft Y at the time of the report but I do not recall seeing the primary target at the time of the occurrence; primary targets can be difficult to notice and workload distracted me to some degree. The problem here; in my opinion; is this occurs very frequently in this area and may be filtered out in the controllers mind. Many controllers that I have spoken to have confessed that because of the frequency of false primary targets throughout the airspace they often find themselves taking primary targets less seriously than they should. Additionally; having a STAR that routes aircraft directly through a NOTAMed area creates built in conflict. I have also learned since the occurrence that the Aircraft Y pilot actually had a transponder onboard; squawking 1202 and Mode C; this was however not seen by our radar nor the Aircraft X pilots TCAS. A briefing item has already been disseminated to controllers here to use extreme caution for primary targets in the airspace; specifically in the NOTAMed area; I think this will be helpful. I think the only other possible actions that could be taken would be 1.) Moving the area where the non controlled aircraft operate. 2.) Adjusting the radar to be more accurate as far as distinguishing between actual primary targets and false primary targets to avoid controllers possibly filtering out primary targets in their mind. 3.) Request transponders on the non-controlled and learn why Aircraft Y's transponder was not operating correctly. Not entirely sure how feasible any of these recommendations are.




Synopsis: RSW Controller reports that an air carrier had a NMAC with an aircraft that the Controller did not see on the radar.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Took off [and] landing gear failed to retract; all gear lights remaining illuminated; with no red light in gear handle. Handle was recycled once and returned to the down position. I elected to continue on to [destination]. Approach and landing were normal; touching down at about the 1000 foot point. Shortly after touchdown; the red light in the gear handle illuminated and the left main gear apparently collapsed. Aircraft departed the paved surface; turning left to a southwesterly heading. I shut off the engines and all electrical switches and exited the aircraft with no injuries.




Synopsis: Beech 1900 pilot reported the left main gear collapsed upon landing.
Date: 201812
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Operated Aircraft X inbound and outbound in violation of [Company] Ops Spec and 14CFR 121.55. Ops Spec allows only for the B757 to be used as an [X] airport. At the time the 767 was listed in said Ops Specs as an [Y] airport; for the B767 ZZZ authorization was for use as an Alternate only. While it is my responsibility to be familiar with all aspects of the FOM and Ops Specs it is difficult to be cognizant of every airfield in [them]. The B757 is used frequently to service ZZZ. It would not have and did not raise a flag that the B767 was not authorized. Especially considering the company published the [dispatch packet] with this trip built prior to my operating. In [many] years with the company; I have never come across this situation. It was common practice to double check Alternates for authorization. It did not occur to me that an operational flight plan would be filed and subsequently accepted to an airfield not authorized for the B767. Especially a flight pairing published in a [dispatch packet] (built by the company) and an operational flight plan filed and subsequently accepted to an airfield not authorized for the B767. Due to this wrong assumption; I operated the flight inbound and outbound in violation. In the future; if I have not operated a flight previously into a gateway I will reference Ops Specs.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported having flown to destination that is not authorized in the company Ops Specs.
Date: 201506
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Squat Switch
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff had multiple failures on pilots PFD and Navigation Display (ND). FD inoperative; speed bug incorrect; radio altitude inaccurate; Predictive Wind Shear (PWS) fail; both FD's showed 'MA' on Mode Control Panel. Final straw was continuous warning horn (sounded like the gear horn) that was unsilencable. This horn created a distraction and made it difficult to communicate in the cockpit. We were only 15 miles north of the departure airport and decided to return. Made a normal approach and landing.The frustrating thing about this event was that there was significant repetitive log history with similar failures over the last several days that were signed off.




Synopsis: A B737 had multiple system anomaly indications after takeoff including the landing gear warning; PFD; ND and Predictive Windshear (PWS).
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SMN.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G SMN
ATC / advisory: CTAF SMN
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Sectional Chart that Lemhi County (SMN); Salmon; ID shows RP* for the airport which requires referencing the Airport Supplement. RP* for SMN means 'Right Pattern Runway 35 AT NIGHT'. If a pilot flies a right pattern for runway 35; even in the daytime they are faced with rising (in my opinion rapidly rising) terrain while descending on the downwind and base legs. This is worrisome even in daylight hours. At night; a pilot unfamiliar with the terrain could easily be put in jeopardy on this approach. However; they would be following the guidance of the Sectional Chart and Airport Supplement.I would like to know the rationale for a right pattern to runway 35; DAY or NIGHT. The terrain west of SMN is much more open and forgiving.

Callback: Informed pilot of findings.



Synopsis: Pilot reported flying right pattern at SMN is unsafe; after misinterpreting chart symbology.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were following a 757 on the TYNEE2 into RSW. The 757 was approximately 12-15 miles in front of us. We were both given to cross OGGER at FL270. We were given a max speed of 300 kts. We started our descent before the 757. As we were coming through FL280 we started to feel some light turbulence; then all of a sudden the plane banked hard to the right; I'm approximating at least 30 degrees. The autopilot kicked off and [the other pilot] grabbed the yoke and brought the aircraft back to level/descent flight. We leveled off at FL270; turned the autopilot back on & notified ATC of the wake turbulence.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew member reported encountering wake turbulence descending into RSW 12-15 miles in trail of a B757.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon completion of work on the aircraft; we boxed up our three pieces of tooling with no HAZMAT to return with us on the first ZZZ1 flight.  We attached the SLI (Shipper's Letter of Instructions) labels as required and moved them to the far left of the baggage cart that we were provided. We then moved the three hard containers with visible HAZMAT labels and no return paperwork on them to the far right of the baggage cart. We then took our escort over to the baggage cart and showed her the form and explained to her that the three boxes on the left of the cart with our tools and the SLI labels needed to be sent on the first ZZZ1 flight in the morning; and the three hard containers on the right side of the cart were labeled HAZMAT and needed to be sent through the freight house for HAZMAT shipping.  We then asked her if we needed to move the cart to a secure area and she said to leave it where it was.  We again; reiterated the importance of making sure the HAZMAT items were not shipped with our tooling; and asked her to make sure and leave a turnover if she was not going to be available in the morning. We still had to scan paperwork to Maintenance Control; and I failed to give her a copy of step 3A after confirmation from Maintenance Control that they received all documents.  After going through security in the morning we asked the Operations Agent on the ZZZ1 flight to confirm that our three boxes of tooling and only our three boxes of tooling were on the plane.  Due to TSA requirements; we are unable to go down to the ramp to confirm or review shipping procedures once we have been screened.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Contract Maintenance person reported improper shipment of Hazmat material due to a communication breakdown between maintenance and the shipping personnel.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LHD.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LHD
Second aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During taxi on Lake Hood for takeoff; I was instructed to taxi in the slow lane and cross the North/South water lane at Airmen's Point. Then call when ready for a departure from the Southeast water lane. The winds that day had been increasing from near calm that morning to 15 kts steady with higher gusts [in the afternoon] and thereafter. As I approached Airmen's Point the winds increased as there is a natural 'choke point' there. I attempted to round the corner to cross the North/ South lane; however the winds would not allow me to maneuver the aircraft as instructed; and only pushed me into the southeast water lane (left quartering tailwind). I immediately informed Tower of my situation and that I was now entering the Southeast lane. Another aircraft that was on final for SE water lane was asked to 'go around' but he indicated that he would like to continue the landing as I was already clearing his water lane. Both he and I were eventually no conflict and no evasive maneuvers were required.




Synopsis: PA18 floatplane pilot reported being unable to comply with his taxi clearance on Lake Hood due to a strong quartering tailwind. He ended up drifting into a water lane causing a conflict with an aircraft on final approach.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I was working Sectors X/Y/Z combined up with no D-side. I had Aircraft Y; Aircraft Z; and Aircraft A to ZZZ descending via the ZZZZZ arrival.  Aircraft Y had been shipped to ZZZ Approach at the time of the incident.I was working a sequence into ZZZ1; giving a clearance off of ZZZ2; giving clearances off of ZZZ3; clearances into ZZZ4 and other overflights.  This sector configuration encompasses a lot of airspace and a small scale.I had Aircraft X check in at FL240 at the same time about 3 other aircraft call on other transmitters. One of them canceling at ZZZ1. I did not have the handoff on Aircraft X who was deviating into my ZZZ arrivals.  I immediately turned Aircraft X to a heading of 260 for traffic then to a 240 heading.  I told Aircraft Z to expedite their descent to through FL230. Aircraft A was already talking to Approach. The aircraft were about 11 miles head on when positive separation was achieved we had about 7.9 miles.Aircraft X was put on my frequency without a call or completed handoff. At that location there are also a lot of limited data blocks associated with Approach. Sector A had the handoff and told Aircraft X he was cleared to deviate left when able ZZZ5.  Sector A flashed Aircraft X to Sector B/C. Sector D/C flashed the aircraft onto me at Sector X.  Controllers are not following the rules.  They are waiting too long before calling for handoffs or pointouts.  It is too late when the aircraft is in the other person's airspace.  There is zero accountability any more.The Controller on Sector B really needs to be talked to and put on some kind of a plan.  He does not comply with the rules and procedures.  I had previously talked with the Supervisor after a very busy session on Sector B which he was on my D-side and did absolutely nothing to help.  Now he was the Controller on B/C who flashed through the Aircraft X to me and did not ensure a handoff.We need [to] return all controllers to work.  We need to have a lot of refresher training because controllers are not following procedures.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working combined sectors and cited handoff related issues contributed to the event.