Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: The following is a list of concerns and questions regarding ZZZ Center's decision to go ATC Zero in the middle of the day as well as the process by which it occurred. I'm going to divide the report into three major issues with details below. I'm not sure how many of my colleagues will file individual reports; but this is a combination of many of our concerns as discussed during and after the event. The three major places we believer safety was jeopardized were: 1) The decision to close in the middle of the day on short notice. 2) Confusion between the published contingency plan and the COVID contingency plan.  3) The decision to not transition into ATC Zero procedures until only 30 minutes prior to the event.1) Why close in the middle of the day?ZZZ Center has had multiple COVID positives since the beginning of the pandemic; and cleaning was always delayed until the mid-shift; when traffic is greatly reduced. In fact; in early Month 1; we had a Controller from the X Area report to work and leave in the middle of the shift because he was feeling sick. He took a test on his way home from work and reported back to the facility that he was indeed COVID positive. His crew finished their shift; the night crew worked their entire shift; and then cleaning occurred on the mid. This is after a confirmed COVID was in the building; working traffic that very day.Yesterday; management became aware of the COVID positive the day before and the person hadn't been in the building since Month 1. However; the decision was made that cleaning had to be done immediately. Why the urgency this time? Closing airspace on a very busy travel day on short notice introduced innumerable safety risks to the system; not to mention greatly impacted the efficiency of the NAS nationwide.2) Confusion regarding contingency plan.ZZZ Center has a published contingency plan; which we review at least annually. Procedures and routes have been developed to allow traffic to continue through the facility should it need to close unexpectedly. Apparently; a separate COVID contingency plan was developed outside of these procedures. There was quite a bit of confusion among the workforce regarding this discrepancy - including a NOTAM being published with the frequency from the existing contingency plan; which was actually not going to be used in this COVID plan.Additional issues from the Controller standpoint included a lack of understanding about what was actually happening to ZZZ Center airspace at XA:X0 local [time] when ATC Zero was declared. The contingency plan seems to indicate that ZZZ Center airspace is to be assumed by ZZZ1 Center and ZZZ2 Center; however ZZZ1 Center was under the assumption that ZZZ Center airspace was to be non-radar. To this end; approximately 25 minutes before ATC zero; an aircraft from ZZZ entered [Sector Y] airspace without a hand off. I called [Sector Z] to call radar on the aircraft; assuming that they were busy changing flight plans and forgot to initiate a hand off. The Controller told me on the line they had 'terminated' the aircraft and they were monitoring ZZZ2 frequency. ZZZ1 Center was in contact with ZZZ2 Center and passing ZZZZZ [Intersection] estimates to the controllers there. I told ZZZ1 we were still open until XA:X0 and Controller told me they were informed we were closed 30 minutes before XA:X0 local.Finally; the COVID route into ZZZ2 ended at ZZZZZ1 at which point we were supposed to issue 'rest of route unchanged.' First of all; most of these aircraft did not have ZZZZZ1 on their route; so rest of route clearance doesn't make sense. Second; any aircraft headed to a northeast airport that got tied back into their route with a direct after ZZZZZ1 went right back into ZZZ Center east area airspace. Once again; the question of who owns that airspace; is it radar on non-radar communications into play. We asked for clarification; which didn't come so we started to issue ZZZZZ1…ZZZ…next fix to go further north and around ZZZ Center.We were never adequately briefed on this new COVID contingency; neither when it was developed; nor on the day it was to be implemented. It seemed every time someone came down from TMU (Traffic Management Unit) or the watch desk; we were being told something different. There was a general feeling among the workforce that this was being made up on the fly.3) Too short of a time frame for implementing contingency plan.When airspace is blocked for special operations; routes are put out hours in advance. There are 'all aircraft must be out of the area by xxxxZ' notes sent to surrounding facilities and published in NOTAMs. These special operations have become fairly routine at ZZZ Center and we still get procedures started early.ATC Zero in the middle of the day is a much more complicated issue affecting a much larger piece of airspace and many more routes. Regardless; the decision was made to operate essentially as normal until the ATC limited at 30 minutes before XA:X0 local. Beginning with the fact that it takes significantly more than 30 minutes to traverse ZZZ airspace; this was not nearly enough time to sterilize the airspace and ensure all remaining aircraft were established on the only acceptable routes through ZZZ when ATC Zero (COVID procedure) has been declared. Below is a small list of the issues this created:- As late as 50 minutes prior to XA:X0; aircraft were still departing ZZZ3 and airborne from airports with 'bad routes.' This created increased workload for sectors ZZ and YY as they tried to get aircraft established on good routing prior to the XA:X0 local ATC Zero.- Sector YY needed a D-side and had (estimated) 15+ tracks as late as 35 minutes prior to XA:X0 local ATC Zero. At a time when we should be well into the transition into ATC Zero procedures; we were still working hard to separate aircraft and resolve conflicts.- Sector YX/ZX took hand offs on two slower moving aircraft near ZZZ4 at approximately 15 minutes prior to filed to ZZZ4 and ZZZ5. There was absolutely no way these aircraft could have been established on the legal contingency routes by XA:X0. We wound up negotiating with ZZZZ1 Center [named] sector to take radar on these aircraft after we issued routes southeast towards their airspace. When we were forced to leave by management at XA:X0 (due to 10 hour shift limitations); these aircraft were switched to ZZZ1 Center; but well into ZZZ Center airspace and not on the established COVID routes. While it is still unclear if ZZZ Center was officially non-radar airspace or not; these aircraft were not on legal non-radar routes. Several controllers were very uncomfortable leaving the airspace in the configuration it was at XA:X0 (myself included). We felt there was more to be done before each of the aircraft we were responsible for was in a safe and legal place.There was a feeling that getting us out before we hit 10 hours was more important than having the procedures fully running properly. Of course; both could have easily occurred if the transition to ATC Zero procedures started earlier.1) Closing in the middle of the day.In the future; short notice ATC Zero procedures should be reserved for immediate; dire emergencies and not be used for cleaning especially days after a positive person was in the building. The decision to go ATC Zero should not be taken lightly and the risks should be carefully measured before the decision is made.2) Confusion regarding contingency plan.A complete; thorough contingency plan needs to be developed and properly briefed to all involved - from OM down to controllers. There should be no confusion about what is going to happen and what each individual facility and sector's responsibilities are to be.3) Too short of a timeframe for ATC Zero implementation.When it is absolutely necessary to go to ATC Zero; the procedures must be implemented earlier. At a minimum; aircraft forecast to be in the affected airspace need to be given routing off of the ground.ATC Zero cannot be declared until each and every single aircraft in the affected airspace is accounted for and on an established contingency route.


Second narrative: ZZZ Center went ATC Zero for a mid-day for COVID cleaning. This had not been conducted before during the day shift at ZZZ Center; only on the mid shift. The COVID cleaners were slightly delayed for their cleaning resulting in the airspace being closed longer than Command Center and Management had anticipated. The Operation Manager and all of the Front Line Managers were told that the cleaning was completed in the control room. They all came into the building to see and smell how the environment was inside the control room. Within minutes most of management came back outside dry heaving and coughing severely and said that the areas (Control Room) needed more time for the chemical to settle. After approximately 15 minutes; Management told us to come back into the building. We all initially thought the smell was bad. It was truly hard to breath. After a short amount of time; I was experiencing confusion; headache; sore throat; shortness of breath; nausea and could taste the chemical with my mask on. The taste of the chemical today has still not gone away. It smells and tastes like insecticide. My throat is still a bit sore. Several controllers went home on sick leave because they could not breathe and were coughing. The Operations Manager and all of the Front Line Managers left the control room multiple times because the fumes were so bad. They needed fresh air.There was not enough time between when the COVID cleaning taking place and when we were told to come back into the building. I want to know what chemical I was breathing in for over 5 hours. I believe this harmed me. Tech Operations stated that everything was saturated in the control room. What we were breathing in was not safe.


Synopsis: Five Center controllers and two air carrier captains (different flights) reported safety concerns relating to the closure of an ATC Center during the middle of the day for COVID-19 cleaning.