Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After deicing we begin our taxi with flaps up per the checklist. We received bad taxi instructions from ground and had to clarify. We then were told to line up and wait. ATC cleared us with the wrong departure. I believe the de-ice checklist is the main root cause. Change the de-ice checklist back to bringing flaps down with the post deice checklist. Also; see deicing as a real threat. It's not routine and can change quickly.


Second narrative: RTO configuration warning-flaps. Complied with immediate action items; QRH; and company procedures.  After deicing we were given a taxi clearance from SLC ground which was impossible to comply with from our location; after requesting clarification we were cleared to 16R via A. With approx. 2000 feet of taxiway A remaining we switched to tower and we were asked to expedite our taxi in order to beat arriving traffic. At that time I called for flaps 20; take off check to the line. the FO went off frequency to complete his duties. Just as he was switching back the tower cleared us for takeoff. The problem was that we were cleared to RNAV to some fix that was on a different departure. I caught that mistake during the read back from my first officer but didn't correct it at that moment because the tower was already talking to someone else; and my FO went directly from read back; to reading the checklist. At the T/O config portion of the check list I remember noting that I had 3 green messages on my stack; but I did not pause and verify the correct message as I normally do because I was focused on the fact that I still had a garbage take off clearance; and only a few feet to the hold line. I quickly explained the clearance situation to my FO; he quickly requested and received a good clearance; we crossed the line and initiated a rolling take off; and were met with a triple chime and CONFIG FLAPS. Let me first say that I fully understand that configuration of my A/C prior to T/O is purely my responsibility as is everything else that happens on a plane that I'm in command of. Those are responsibilities that I take very seriously; and I have a long record that confirms the care and professionalism with which I run my ship; including many years of service with no config warnings. Further; I realize that there was a point where I could have; or perhaps should have bagged the take off and waited for the next slot (upon realizing that we had received and read back a bad clearance).With all that in mind; I believe this event highlights one of about a dozen glairing deficiencies in our new SOP and checklists. Setting flaps at different times and locations based upon weather conditions is a horrible plan for many reasons. The current incarnation of the SOP has us initiate flaps just prior to take off after deicing; but after push back if not deicing. Further; whether or not deice is required; we still confirm take off data and flap setting before taxi and call 'set' left and right; even though when deicing; we are not set; and depending on what airport we're at we may not be 'set' for an hour or more. I'm no scientist; but I don't think you need to be one to see that this is a bad program that was initiated with very little or no practical testing and foresight. It sets us up for failure; takes us out of our normal / majority of operations rhythm; and it flows like cold molasses. In my opinion a major revision to the SOP rewrite will go a long way toward avoiding a recurrence of this event. In the mean time; after my experience I will operate with increased vigilance during deice operations.


Synopsis: CRJ200 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff after deicing due to the flaps not being set for takeoff. ATC miscues helped precipitate the chain of events that led up to this RTO; but the current requirement to keep the flaps up after deicing until takeoff clearance is received was the final straw.