Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The flight began as any flight would normally. I met my First Officer on time and said hello. We discussed the fuel load which was generous. We discussed the MEL of an inoperative fuel number 1 gauge; thus requiring us to operate in Manual. Both of us had done this procedure recently and felt comfortable with the procedure. Normal preflight procedures were followed. The fuel was checked and verified. The MEL page was printed and in our possession on the pedestal. After closing the door and receiving final weight and balance paperwork I called for the Below The Line Checklist which [was] accomplished. We began our pushback and started engines. We had a start malfunction which left us in a position blocking many taxiing aircraft. We called ramp and were moved to [another location]. During this time we called Maintenance who directed another start attempt. This start was normal. We were then cleared to taxi with a wheels-up time in about five minutes. There was ample time for an unrushed taxi to the runway; but a few issues still remained. We had an ENG alert reminder which we thought was from the previous malfunction. We cycled through and reviewed the Consequences and Status pages to look for anything unaddressed. None were noted. However we noted that the APU was still running after ample time for it to have shut down. It had been selected to shut down on the After Start Checklist. Two more attempts were made to shut it down and it did then shut down. Then the ENG reminder went away at this time. All indications were now normal so we continued to taxi and had a normal takeoff. Climbing thru 15;000 FT; Number 2 Engine rolled back and we received a confirm engine out prompt. We ran the Engine Fire or Severe Damage Checklist and returned for an uneventful landing. I flew the plane throughout the event. First Officer ran the checklists and loaded the FMC as needed. It seemed to me that we simply had the bad luck of losing an engine on climbout followed by a successful return. Once on the ground we began to review what had happened. First Officer began to doubt if he had completed the Before Start Checklist as well as the After Takeoff Checklist; both of which had items pertaining to fuel pumps being turned on. I was hand flying the aircraft during the climbout phase. I questioned the checklist failure because I thought we would have noticed the pump switch lights being illuminated and perhaps other warnings. Plus the engine ran normally on takeoff which is the highest fuel demand.The lighting conditions in the cockpit were very bright due to afternoon sun; haze; glare and the wearing of sunglasses. Perhaps these lights were overlooked. I don't know. If not for First Officer's doubts; I would simply think we had an engine failure. As it is; upon reflection; we might have missed those items on the Before Start Checklist. Perhaps we will know after Maintenance does their research. If the cause of this engine failure was in fact pilot error; I know of two pilots who will not make that mistake again. The question is how do we impart our learning experience to the rest of the crew force. I hope others who read this report will get a heads up. Perhaps enough will be said that it will become like the pitot covers which are now checked and rechecked on every flight.


Second narrative: Upon reflection of the other instances I flew the DC-10 in Fuel Manual mode and any distinguishable differences; I believe the biggest threat on this leg was the following: not specifically including the fuel manual procedures as part of the briefing as done in the past; not physically positioning and using the QRH and/or MEL as a visual reminder of the manual procedures; and allowing time-consuming distractors to artificially create a sense we needed to make up for lost time - clearly something that is not conducive to catching any possible errors. Again; before flying fuel manual legs in the past; I think it was invaluable; for me personally; to have both the QRH open to the Fuel Manual Checklist/Normal Procedures section and sitting on the center pedestal or glare shield; as well as taking an extra minute for a last look at the MEL photocopy to ensure compliance with every detail of the procedure. Those two techniques; along with including it in the pre-departure briefing; would have greatly benefited me as the crewmember running this non-standard part of the checklist. I read about this happening recently to another crew and thought about how the above-mentioned techniques prevented me from making this mistake in the past. This is obviously the type of mistake you make only once; but it's alarming that it could occur when rested and focused. Based on the recent incident; and having talked to two individuals who ended up catching the same error both on taxi and climb out; it makes me wonder how many times the checklist error has actually occurred over the years and was caught before incident; especially prior to the reporting era.


Synopsis: DC-10 flight crew reported they lost an engine after takeoff that they feel was probably due to failure to complete checklist and mismanaged fuel pumps.