elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb out; leveling at 5;000 ft; we received an AUTO FLT RUD TRV LIM SYS ECAM. I was hand flying and the Captain completed the ECAM. [Since] it was an auto flight ECAM; we elected to have me continue to hand fly for the time being while the Captain was completing the ECAM. We communicated the problem to ATC and after receiving an instruction to climb; we requested 10;000 ft. while troubleshooting. I selected autopilot 1 on once level and the ECAM complete. Once level with the ECAM complete screens normal we elected to continue to [destination]. Upon initiating the next climb and turn we received another of the same ECAM. We elected to return to [departure airport] due to the subsequent ECAM; even with the ECAM complete we didn't feel comfortable to continue with the forecast turbulence continual rain; bad weather; shorter runways. The Captain managed the ECAM and communications with company and the flight attendants. I flew the airplane and communicated with ATC. ATC [gave us priority handling] while I was giving them the information for the return to field. I requested the emergency vehicles to be ready and for the ILS Runway XXC as it was the longest runway. Once communications were complete and the Captain and I briefed on current position and readiness for the return for the approach; the Captain and I briefed the approach; I completed the descent checklist and the Captain completed the approach and landing in the event we had another system failure with the gusts and crosswinds. We landed without incident and taxied back to the gate.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reported a malfunction with the rudder control system that resulted in a return to departure airport for a precautionary landing.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ELP.Airport, TX
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class C ELP
ATC / advisory: Tower ELP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Assigned to taxi from Gate X to Runway 22 via K; hold short Runway 8R approach area. Holding short of 8R Approach on K; I saw the painted 'X' and raised blue edge lights that block taxiing across 8R approach area to continue taxi via K; which is what we understood. Before clearance to cross; we asked about K being closed north of 8R; and then Ground clarified to join J to Runway 22. I re-checked NOTAMs; and found ELP 07/031; which states 'ELP TWY K BTN APCH END 08R AND TWYR CLSD 1907101434-PERM.' Looking at JEPPS release date for the 10-9; 26 Jul 19; it seems like a mistake on 10-9 not to show this permanent closure.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a Jeppesen 10-9 Chart for ELP was incorrect.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BTV.Airport, VT
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BTV
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had a completely full flight including a jump seater. As a result; we had approximately 300 lbs of fuel to burn to accommodate the jump seater. After push back; we told Ground Control that we needed to run up the engines to burn the fuel and we were ready for taxi. Ground Control cleared us to taxi to Runway 33 via Taxiway A; C; short of Runway 1. After an airplane landed on Runway 1; we were cleared to cross and taxi via Taxiway C; K; J and hold short of Runway 33. About half way down Taxiway C; Ground Control asked us to hold short of Runway 33 at Taxiway C and we could do our run up there. After sitting there with the engines powered up (75% N2) for approximately 5 minutes; Ground Control cleared a General Aviation airplane to taxi to Runway 33 holding short of Runway 33 at intersection J. I looked to the west at the General Aviation ramp and did not see an airplane taxi from that direction. There is another General Aviation ramp further east of Taxiway J. Since it was clear from the west; I assumed it was coming from the east taxiway and left the engines powered up. About 3 minutes later; Ground Control asked me to reduce the power to idle until further advised. We sat short of the runway for approximately 7 minutes more as we waited for EDCT (Expect Departure Clearance Time) time. We were then cleared to takeoff; and Tower told us to use minimal thrust when taking the runway as there was a disabled aircraft behind us. I do not know if the aircraft taxied into our jet blast or whether that was what caused the aircraft to become disabled.Looking back on the situation; Ground Control should have been contacted to determine the location of where the aircraft was taxing from and asked if I needed to reduce thrust to accommodate their taxi path. I don't know if there was an event but there should not have been an aircraft behind us.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported that a general aviation aircraft may have taxied into their jet blast during an engine run-up.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We pushed back from gate at SEA using a towbar-less tug. After the pushback procedure was completed; we taxied out and flew to [destination]. Upon arrival; we were informed by the agent that we were waiting for Maintenance. I knew nothing about a Maintenance issue; so I queried our Dispatcher and was told that during our pushback in SEA; the driver exceeded the nose wheel steering limit. Again; we knew nothing about it because we were never told about it. Also; if they knew about it in SEA; then why didn't anyone tell us? We should have been told immediately and had the aircraft inspected by Maintenance before we departed and flew a revenue flight; not after.Here's why I think this was a safety issue.1. If there were steering issues caused by damage to the nose wheel; it would be more difficult to analyze and take the appropriate action.2. Even if we were notified after departure; I would be extra gentle while taxiing the aircraft upon arrival.3. Structural damage.We should be informed of any mishap that is known to have occurred.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported that upon arrival they were notified of a deviation during pushback at departure airport. They felt they should have been notified right when it happened.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Clean Packs.


Second narrative: No need to confirm three times that we have a medical.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported fume event enroute to destination.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushed back without weights. Multiple changes in taxi instructions. Single engine taxi. Radio congestion. Taxiway congestion. Runway change. Checklist interruption multiple times by ATC. Extremely busy operations.During taxi we missed the change in flap setting while completing checklist. We believe ATC called at the point of calling for flap configuration on 'before takeoff' checklist and it was missed. We set flaps correctly initially but failed to catch the change from 1 to 5 degrees. FMC was set up correctly but we missed changing flap position. Ramp said the right runway then changed by ATC to the left. On takeoff we noticed flaps were set wrong just before V1 and chose to continue by adding 10 knots to Vr and V2. Takeoff felt normal.


Second narrative: Pushed back without final weights. Person pushing us also confirmed that he had not [sent] in the numbers for final weights as we were pushing. Multiple changes in taxi instructions by Ramp and ATC. Told to hold short many times and also to keep a look out on traffic near us. Taxi out single-engine. Runway change while in the Ramp area on the move to the spot number. Multiple checklist interruptions by ATC. We set flaps initially at gate correctly for assumed runway per flight release. We failed to notice the flap change on the final takeoff request for the correct runway. We believe that the 'before takeoff' checklist was not clearly done correctly as we were interrupted by ATC. After airborne we both agreed that we failed to verify the flap setting for the correct runway. We noticed flaps were set wrong just prior to V1 and chose to continue by adding 10 knots to VR and V2. Take off was normal.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports taxiing without their final weights then receiving a runway change while doing single engine taxi. Very congested Ground Control frequency along with several hold instructions during taxi result in the before takeoff checklist not being completed. The result is a takeoff with the flaps set to 1 instead of 5 as required by the runway change.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: All SOPs were followed to the best of my ability and knowledge. Just west of TEB on a heading; speed; altitude of 5;000 [feet]; Approach issued a clearance of speed 180 then descend to 3;000 [feet]. The aircraft was on autopilot B. MCP speed 180 flaps to 5; speed 195 and slowing. I called for flaps 10 and level change; [extended the] speed brake and as aircraft started descent; ATC [assigned] speed 180 then descend. The aircraft was 185 to 180 when call answered. Clearance of a heading to intercept 22L and speed 170. ATC was very busy and no approach clearance was received as we flew past the FAF. The Captain stated for me to 'start down'. I stated we did not receive approach clearance. Captain switched to Tower and asked if we were cleared to land. Tower gave us clearance to land; because of the uncertainty but logical transfer of Tower giving us the clearance to land; I followed the Captain's demands. I uncoupled the autopilot; requested gear down; flaps 15; then 25 as I approached 1;500 [feet]; slowing aircraft on flaps schedule while assessing the traffic ahead. Flaps 30; [on] target; on path and speed at 1;300 feet. Because of the uncertainty I again requested a response [from] the Captain for landing clearance on short final. To make the 35 [feet] over the RWY I stated to the Captain I would bring the aircraft to three pink over the end. The preceding aircraft wake turbulence was evident but minimal. I was straight down the runway centerline; with 1 to 4 degrees of left; then right aileron etc; (no rudder) to compensate [for] the wake. The aircraft started to balloon once and was immediately smoothly arrested on profile. For no apparent reason; at approximately 20 feet the Captain abruptly called 'I have the aircraft' and commandeered the plane. I immediately took my left hand off the throttles but never saw the Captain cover the throttles until he hit the pavement. His command of the aircraft was no different in aileron control. While braking the Captain stated hold short of 22R. I did not hear any transmission from Tower until we were already holding at 22R and acknowledged to hold at 22R for the next two aircraft.




Synopsis: B737NG First Officer reported the Captain took control of the aircraft on short final for unknown reasons.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff at about 200 AGL above the departure end of the Runway XX the engine had a partial loss of power. Unsure of the condition of the engine I elected to make an immediate right turn to land; to the east; in an open grass area adjacent to a nearby controlled airport.  In the turn; and sure that there was no conflicting traffic; I elected to not switch over to their Tower frequency to call them; and just concentrated on flying the plane. The landing was uneventful. I called the Tower to let them know what happened. It is very likely that they would not have been able to see the event due to my altitude and the trees between my flight path and the Tower.A diversion to this landing sight is a regularly practiced engine out safety training procedure for all of the pilots flying at this airport. This was not an engine out 180. The landing area can be reached in about a 90 degree heading change.As of this writing; Maintenance has found no reason for the partial power loss.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Glastar homebuilt elected to turn directly to a nearby open field where he landed safely after his engine lost substantial power shortly after takeoff.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Booster Pump
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; MEL; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were preflighting the flight and there was a MEL for one of the center fuel tank pumps being out of service. After reading the MEL; there was a bit of confusion in regards to documentation on the load sheet. While there was no safety of flight issue; we were unsure if the center tank fuel had to be incorporated into the zero fuel weight; 3;000 pounds of it for the actual flight. It was documented on the fuel sheet but not reflected in the zero fuel weight. We pushed on time even though we were still somewhat unsure and; only after we were flying; did we fully realize it should have been documented in the adjustments section of the load sheet and added to the load sheet. In the air; we were able to use the fuel out of the center tank using one fuel pump and the flight went without a problem.


Second narrative: Aircraft had left center fuel pump MEL'd. MEL says pilots must confirm center tank fuel has been included in the ZFW computation on the loading schedule. I mentioned this to the First Officer before getting the loading schedule and that I did not know what this would look like. When we got it; we talked about how we did not see any notation anywhere. We assumed that it had been accounted for elsewhere. Enroute; after reading through the MEL a few times; I realized either the MEL or the loadsheet had to be wrong. I called Dispatch on arrival and the load sheet was wrong. Lesson learned (AGAIN): slow down and call someone.As I mentioned; slow down and ask questions. The MEL could be [clearer] on how the loading schedule will appear to the pilots. The Agent's screen was supposed to be locked out so a conversation would occur with the Dispatcher.


Synopsis: A B737-700 crew and Dispatcher were confused about the proper preflight weight and balance fuel documentation procedure in accordance with the MEL when a single Center Tank fuel pump is inoperative.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Rain; Snow; Turbulence; Windshear; 2
Light: Night
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This morning a student and I decided to attempt a [cross country flight] to finish up the complex time needed for his single engine commercial initial. At the beginning of the flight; he needed 4 hours and wanted to finish the hours prior to going back to [base] due to aircraft availability. We had moved up our start time as well due to the fact he needed more hours than I had us scheduled for. We decided to file IFR since there was a cell moving through the beginning of our route and it would be hard to see and avoid the clouds at night. We had filed for 9000 FT where it was about 0 degrees on the winds aloft. We decided that altitude with that temp because we thought that we would have been between a layer for a little bit and completely on top of the cell. Once we were airborne; we were cleared direct; which had put us right in the middle of the cell. Once reaching 7500 I saw that the OAT was 0 and the rain started to stick to our windshield. I told Approach; and asked for 7000 which was at 2 degrees. So we maintained 7000 and was experiencing moderate precipitation. The temperature [then] dropped to 0 again and we asked for 6000 which was 4 degrees. [ATC] let us stay at 6000 until we needed to be vectored higher for terrain. We attempted to climb and once we were at 7000; we noticed that the rain had turned to snow and the outside temp was 0 degrees. At that point; the snow was not sticking to our aircraft but [we] decided it was best to divert to [a nearby alternate]. When looking at the ceiling forecast; fully expect it to be wrong. We should have taken a more in depth look at the situation and think about what we were trying to accomplish and how best to do that. I believe that the hazardous attitude of invulnerability and impulsiveness played a major role in our current situation. If we had taken our time instead of trying to rush to get his hours done; that would have been the best outcome.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported diverting to an alternate airport after encountering ice and snow enroute to the planned destination.