elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft was operating with an inop FMS.  A route was diligently planned that used in-service NAVAIDs; approved routes and remained in-service volumes.  This however left little room to avoid weather enroute.  After the Captain and Dispatcher briefed on the route the Captain began to look at approaches available to land in CVG.  The weather in CVG was VMC and forecast to remain so for over 12 hours.  The Captain contends we were not authorized to conduct the flight with MEL on this city pair due to the following:  none of the instrument approaches in CVG have an IAF that can be identified with an inop FMS.  All approaches say 'radar required.'    The Dispatcher offered to add an alternate that had an approach that met the Captain's requirements but the Captain contends this would be a composite IFR/VFR flight plan.  With no resolution available to satisfy the Captain; the flight was swapped to an inbound aircraft; delayed and continued without incident. The FMS deferral adds more workload than our current staffing can handle.  This should only be able to be applied to move the aircraft to a Maintenance base for repair.  The National Airspace System is now being planned to only handle aircraft that have FMS capability.  This is especially true in the high density Washington DC and NYC areas.  Dispatch does not have training to understand if an aircraft can navigate with no radios and no FMS and still have procedures to safely operate a flight.




Synopsis: Regional jet Captain elects not to accept an aircraft for a flight to CVG due to the FMC being inoperative and all approaches at CVG requiring an FMS or Radar to identify the IAF. This event is related by the Dispatcher involved. An aircraft swap is accomplished to accommodate the Captain and the flight departs late.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On DFW Ramp on taxi-in we were turning in and a vendor van from left sped up trying to beat the aircraft rather than yield. I had to stop the aircraft abruptly to avoid collision. Upon restarting taxi into [the] gate; had to stop abruptly for a service vehicle from right.Such ramp conflicts with taxiing aircraft seem to be trending upward--had a similar problem with a semi tractor trailer rushing to 'beat us' at [a] gate last month.In all cases; we have reported the traffic problem to Ramp Control immediately--is there any follow-up? This problem seems worst at night when more vendor traffic is on ramp.Is there any on-ramp monitoring and enforcement? This problem is becoming severe and the likelihood of a collision is very high.Suggestions:On-ramp traffic monitoring and enforcement.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported a near collision on the ramp at DFW; and noted the number of ramp conflicts seems to be on the rise.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Exit
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In ZZZ at company hangar facility in January 2012; the Overwing Emergency Exits on an EMB-145 aircraft were installed on opposite sides. I; Maintenance Supervisor; cross-referenced effectivities to verify that the part numbers [Overwing Exit hatches] were applicable to both aircraft.

Callback: Reporter stated the Overwing Emergency Exit hatches are interchangeable with the left and right hatch positions in EMB-145 aircraft. The same Exits are also interchangeable with other EMB-145s provided the Part Numbers (P/N) on the exit hatches are effective for the aircraft that will be using them.Reporter stated the only difference in determining that; the correct Exit hatch has been installed at the left or right cabin positions; are the left or right placards installed on the liner of each Exit hatch. The placards instruct the person who removes the hatch what to do with the hatch in an emergency situation. Exit hatches weigh twenty-five pounds.Reporter stated the Exit hatches in his incident were robbed (cannibalized) from another EMB-145 that was in the hangar for a Maintenance Visit (M/V); which was effective for the EMB-145 aircraft that needed the hatches. A Flight Attendant noted during a cabin preflight; that the placards on the Exit hatches indicated they should have been installed on opposite sides of the cabin fuselage from where they were positioned.



Synopsis: A Maintenance Supervisor reports about two overwing emergency exit hatches that had been installed at opposite positions in the cabin of an EMB-145 aircraft. The hatches are interchangeable; only the placard on each hatch determines left and right positions.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the STAR; we were called by the flight attendants about 10 minutes prior to descent regarding a disturbance in the cabin. A female passenger had claimed a male passenger had assaulted her and would not stop touching her. They did not report injuries but requested the police to be at the gate upon arrival. We tried immediately after the call to reach Operations with no answer.At some point during this; ATC issued descend and maintain clearance to FL220. After initiating the descent; the captain resumed attempting to contact Operations. While on the radio with Operations; ATC issued another descend clearance to 17;000 with an expedite descent. I set open descent and read back the clearance. Just prior to returning from speaking with Operations; ATC issued another clearance; this time descend via the STAR. I input 3000 and continued the descent. The captain returned to state he had reached Operations and the police would be present. Shortly after this; ATC instructed us to maintain 13000. I realized we were below the crossing restriction and initiated a climb to 13000. We were in VMC conditions and ATC verified we had returned to descend via clearance and climbed to 13000. No further communication occurred and we thanked ATC for their help.The combination of flight attendants calling; multiple altitude clearances and a brief expedite clearance caused me to forget to set managed descent from open descent upon receiving the descend via clearance. I knew immediately when queried by ATC what had occurred. This was a combination of multiple distractions and varied clearances. Diligence when one pilot is handling a problem outside of normal flight is required. Perhaps once established on an arrival after initial descent expedited descents shouldn't be issued unless for immediate traffic avoidance.




Synopsis: A320 first officer reported that a disturbance in the cabin caused a distraction that resulted in a deviation from the descent profile clearance.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff and passing approximately 7;000 FT the 'Tail Compartment Temp High' light came on for a few seconds then went out and cycled on then off twice more.  Decided to declare an emergency and returned to departure airport for an uneventful landing. After landing the aircraft was checked by ARFF and cleared to the gate.  Maintenance found three air leaks in the tail compartment and an outside air temp of 42 degrees Celsius contributed to the situation.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The flight crew of an MD-82 received an intermittent 'Tail Compartment Temp High' warning during climb out; declared an emergency; and returned to the departure airport for maintenance action.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Communication Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Pushback tug attempts 4-5 times to contact Captain for pushback; carrier only no voice; a lot of static. Three minutes later tug driver loud and clear states having trouble with mic and headset but now hears Captain loud and clear. Tug driver states ready for push. Captain states standby. First Officer gets push clearance from rampant tells tug driver 'cleared to push disconnect abeam gate C-112.' Tug states roger cleared to push disconnect abeam gate C-112. Push initiates and during push Captain hears CLEARED with static and no voice. Three attempts by tug driver carrier only; no voice. Captain then clearly hears cleared to start. Replies cleared to start. Engine 1 started for single engine taxi and Captain attempts to contact tug to use hand signal but no reply. We stop abeam C-112 and hear carrier no voice. Marshaller at 12 o'clock position has wands crossed as Captain attempts hand signals. Captain hands open points to headset and gives thumbs down and hands wide open. Aircraft starts to move slowly forward; we think we are being towed abeam gate C-112 at which time we see a ramp agent at our 2 o'clock position running across the ramp with his fists closed signaling set brakes! Captain stopped aircraft. Marshaller at 12 o'clock position still standing with wands crossed. Shut down engine 1 and called Ramp for a Supervisor to hook up to the aircraft to speak to. Supervisor stated tow bar was disconnected and as tug pulled away from the aircraft; the aircraft started to roll toward tug. Aircraft was about 2 feet from tug and towbar and rolled about 10 feet. No damage to aircraft; tug; or personnel because there was no contact.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain reported intermittent communications with the pushback crew because of a faulty tug headset so no clear set brake command was heard and after the tow bar was disconnected the aircraft began rolling.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When cleared to land and on final approach; I requested a wind check from the Tower. (Which did not include information about the possibility of windshear/variable winds) I landed on the centerline of Runway 33 maintaining the needed control input; at which time the aircraft began to pull/hook to the left. I attempted correction using the right rudder pedal with negative results. I contemplated a balked landing; however given the current angled position of the aircraft and the lack of right rudder response; I deemed doing so unsafe. I; instead; elected to close the mixture; pull back on the yolk all while applying maximum safe breaking. The aircraft exited the left side of runway and came to a stop at which time the right wing dipped. I was unaware of any damage at this time; and felt it was safe to reposition the aircraft so ATC could resume normal operations. ATC requested I taxi off the runway and to a near-by-ramp. Inspection of the aircraft showed that the wingtip had contacted the grass causing damage; ATC was informed. Various aircraft types landing after me did report to the Tower; airspeed fluctuations with possible windshear. Given all information now known; I would have considered a different runway. (Although the crosswind component would have been greater; the runway is longer and wider).




Synopsis: The pilot of a C206 lost control of the aircraft on landing exited the runway and damaged the right wingtip. The reporter believes windshear may have been a contributing factor.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground STL
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi on an IFR flight plan; I was cleared to taxi Foxtrot to Sierra to [Runway] 12L at STL.  I had the taxi diagram displayed on the MFD of the G1000 and was using it for reference while taxiing.  I became fixated on Runway 12R on the taxi diagram and was mistakenly thinking I was taxiing to [Runway] 12L but in fact was heading towards [Runway]12R.  After the turn to taxiway Sierra; I informed Ground that I would need a 1 minute run-up prior to departure.  During this exchange; ATC asked what I was doing and when I looked back to the taxi diagram; I realized that I had just crossed the departure end of [Runway] 12L.  Ground asked me to taxi past [Runway] 12L and then stop; which I did.  I apologized for my mistake and asked ATC for further instructions and was instructed to do a 180 back towards [Runway] 12L and hold.I've flown into many Class B airports without an issue but feel that at least one contributing factor was my infrequent flying since COVID.  In a normal year; I fly 300+ hrs but in the past year have logged only ~60 hours.I spoke with my flight instructor and FAA examiner about the incident including factors that led to the incursion and thoughts about how to avoid repeating the incident in the future.




Synopsis: Light aircraft pilot reported a runway incursion during taxi and cited lack of current flying experience due to COVID restrictions as a contributing factor.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot monitoring (PM) and shortly after departure; the Pilot Flying told me that he was unable to trim the plane. He was struggling to keep the nose down with the takeoff power setting. I took the flight controls and confirmed that the elevator trim was stuck. I tried multiple times to trim the plane with both the electric and manual trim. The trim would not move. The PM declared an emergency and asked to return to [departure airport] as soon as possible. During the approach; it took extreme force to control the aircraft. Adding and taking away power was the only way to neutralize the controls. The PM ran the appropriate checklists for the conditions. Once I felt comfortable flying the aircraft; the PM went back and briefed the passengers. We broke out of the clouds at 1;100 FT and a normal landing was made.


Second narrative: I was the pilot flying and while climbing through approximately 1;000 FT MSL I realized that the elevator trim system was not responding to control inputs. As the control pressure required to maintain intended pitch attitude continued to increase I attempted to manually trim the elevator using the manual system. The attempt was unsuccessful; and it was apparent the control wheel would not move in the nose down direction.


Synopsis: BAE-125-850XP flight crew reported they were unable to trim the elevator after takeoff. They declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Before gate departure the aircraft had placards on the Thrust Limit Indicator; autothrottle; and right pack. After takeoff we were unable to pressurize the aircraft. After running the checklist we came to the conclusion the left pack had failed (right pack placarded inoperative). We declared an emergency due to an overweight landing and air return. Before gate departure I felt like we were right on the limit for the number/combination of placarded items; especially after reviewing the aircraft maintenance history. After gate arrival I felt like the entire event would have been much safer had the autothrottle been functioning. There were no pilot deviations from accepted procedures that I am aware of.




Synopsis: MD83 pilot reports being dispatched with the right pack inoperative and discovering airborne that the left pack has also failed. Flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORF.Airport, VA
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: TRACON ORF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We received an ATC clearance out of ORF that I think was 10 [times] harder than it had to be; and we spent several minutes before push sorting it out. We complied with the clearance and there was no violation of any sort. My intent is to highlight the clearance to better improve safety and operations.Our dispatch release said 'DCT HPW DCT FAK J24...' The clearance we received from ATC was 'KISSR3 to WAIKS; then outbound on the ORF 290 radial to KELLE; then intercept the MOL 130 radial inbound to MOL; J24 as filed.' In reality; 'KISSR3 to WAIKS; direct KELLE; direct MOL; J24 as filed' is almost exactly the same and would have greatly lowered the workload. No datalink at this facility increased the workload since we had to manually enter the new route into the FMC.Perhaps the dispatchers and ATC weren't on the same page about how we should depart; which meant that ATC issued us something entirely different that also happened to be confusing and unnecessarily complex. Relook at how [Company] aircraft should depart this airport.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported ATC issued an extremely confusing and unnecessarily complex clearance entirely different from the route filed by the company.