elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Airport; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were on the visual approach to 18L in MCO. We were cleared to descend to 2;500 FT. We were slowing to configure for landing while descending. ATC told us again to descend to 2;500 FT and pointed out traffic ahead. I explained that we had to slow while descending to ATC. I had a visual on the Cessna traffic to our right; and also a twin that appeared to be climbing directly ahead I told the Captain to turn right and climb shortly after that; TCAS commanded a climb.The main cause of this was poor communication between flight crew and ATC. I do not believe any other company operates its fleet like our airline; requiring us to slow to within 10 KTS of clean maneuver or minimum flap speed before selecting our next flap position. I say this because when we are away from airports that handle lots of our flights ATC seems perplexed by our need to slow so much to configure. Also this causes a greatly reduced descent rate that ATC does not anticipate.




Synopsis: When cleared for a visual approach to Runway 18L at MCO; a B737NG experienced traffic conflicts and a TCAS RA with respect to traffic ahead of them. The reporter cited a company policy requiring crews to slow within 10K of minimum KIAS for the existing flap setting before extending greater deflection. He believes this policy results in the company's aircraft following significantly different vertical descent tracks from those of most carriers which do not utilize the same vertical planning regimen.
Date: 201809
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; MEL
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I am concerned that Placard XXXXX does not accurately describe the flight planning restrictions associated with a single GPS inoperative on the Airbus. It appears to me that neither RNAV (GPS) nor RNAV (RNP) approaches may be conducted in this condition; but the placard only prohibits RNAV (RNP) approaches (which are not authorized on the Airbus fleet anyway). I discovered this discrepancy prior to the point of dispatch; and my flight is dispatched safely and legally.Per the Flight Manual 'RNAV (GPS) and RNAV (RNP) approach procedures require WGS-84 coordinates and GPS PRIMARY.';Per the Flight Manual 'GPS PRIMARY requires the following: (2) operational FMGCs; (2) operational GPS systems; and GPS PRIMARY displayed on both MCDUs on PROG page.'Per these guidelines; we do not have GPS primary due to only (1) operational GPS system. Since we don't have GPS primary; we can no longer conduct RNAV (GPS) nor RNAV (RNP) approaches. This is further supported in the ICAO 2012 QRG which states 'RNAV (GPS) approaches require both GPS'.This is a safety concern due to the fact that without doing the additional research a flight could be unsafely and illegally dispatched to a station based on an RNAV (GPS) approach. Alternatively; if the placard is correct and RNAV (GPS) approaches may still be conducted; then the Flight Manual and ICAO 2012 QRG references should be clarified in order to prevent further confusion.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported the MEL restriction for a single GPS inoperative does not accurately describe the flight planning restrictions.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 60
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The weather was reported as VFR scattered clouds at 7;000 feet and wind as calm according to the most recent ATIS. Both pilots identified the runway in use 10 miles out and cleared for the visual approach. Fully configured and a stable approach. Touchdown on center right main left main and nose wheel during roll out attempted to activate thrust reversers (TR) but neither unlocked. Attempted again First Officer (FO) stated one unlock; aircraft came off the center line to the right. I started correcting with left rudder control to get back to the center line FO stated 2 unlock; right deployed. The aircraft continued to the right side of the runway and I thought there may be a TR issue. I stowed both impacted runway light and continued controlling the aircraft back to the center line. Following Tower instruction a remained on the runway and communicated with airport operations that came out to inspect the outside of the plane. I didn't notice any adverse problems with steering tires or control. The Tower asked if I was able to taxi back and I said I could; and continued to taxi back to the FBO on my own power. Upon shutting down; the passengers departed and I inspected the aircraft and noted damage to the flap due to impact with runway light. I spoke with the Airport Manager; and notified my Chief pilot and Director of Operations.




Synopsis: LR60 Captain experiences a runway excursion during landing in calm wind when the thrust reversers do not deploy symmetrically. A runway light is hit causing damage to the flaps.
Date: 202006
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The covid crisis and schedule reduction has caused many pilots to become non-current. In the previous six weeks I have flown with numerous FOs who have not flown in more than 75 days. Two were current because their 9 month recurrent training counted as the 3 required landings in 90 days.The additional workload that this places on the other pilot due to increased awareness and vigilance is unsustainable. Landings in particular are mostly unsatisfactory and in one instance unsafe. I recommend that every pilot that has not made a landing in the actual aircraft in more than 75 days be required to fly with a line check airmen. The lack of proficiency is not the pilot's fault; but due to the current environment of reduced flight time.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that many of the first officers he flies with are not current; especially in the landing environment.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAD.Tower, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower IAD
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Weather was VMC. North Operation. Aircraft X; called southeast of the airport requesting clearance through the Class B airspace en-route toward Manassas Tower's airspace. IAD TWR Local Control 1 (LC1); radar identified the aircraft and gave him a clearance to enter the Class B airspace. As Aircraft X proceeded westbound toward the IAD Runway 1R final; LC1 issued traffic to Aircraft X - - Aircraft Y; descending on final to RY1R. Aircraft X subsequently reported the aircraft in sight and told LC1 that he'd pass behind the aircraft. LC1 approved the operation and gave a wake turbulence advisory to Aircraft X; but did not tell Aircraft X to maintain visual separation from the aircraft. Aircraft X then passed directly behind the jet only 900 FT below and .49 mile behind the aircraft. The separation standard is 5 miles behind and 1;000 FT below [this type] jet. By not using the correct phraseology prescribed in 7110.65; 7-2-1 Visual Separation; LC1 then failed to provide the required radar wake turbulence separation; small behind a heavy; as described in 7110.65; 5-5-4. LC1 also did not advise Aircraft Y about Aircraft X converging and crossing underneath him. A manually written flight progress strip for Aircraft X; required by SOP; was not found. The LC1 Controller does not have a radar background and received no RTF type training. Had he had the proper training; he probably would have provided the correct radar separation until having Aircraft X maintain visual separation behind the jet. He also would have probably exchanged traffic; as most radar controllers know to do. This loss of separation is directly attributable to the LC1's lack of radar training. Please review the attached Camtasia video.1. IPM for the LC1 controller.2. Safety Assurance Alert Bulletin on application of visual separation.3. Inclusion of a sanitized version of the video in academics.4. Simulator scenarios that emphasize the Class B separation requirements prior to proper application of visual separation.5. Most important - - RTF type training for local controllers at towers with radar/Class B airspace.




Synopsis: Reporter describes situation where a Local Controller does not use the prescribed separation between two aircraft and has an operational error.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Inbound DEN had failure of ADSB and GPS.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported failure of GPS and ADSB inbound to DEN.
Date: 201809
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Air Data Computer
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cascading systems failure in which QRH does not address. Also iPad QRH did not operate. No Altimeter and Airspeed VVI indicators were reliable with over 200+ knots difference. VNAV inoperative. ENG light illuminated. Flight Control lights illuminated. IMC at night with severe thunderstorms in all phases of flight path. Unable to land on primary runways in use due to GPS/RNAV only approaches without VNAV. Unable to land at alternate airport due to intermittent loss of electrical power for raw data approach and runway lights. Landed with tailwinds exceeding 20 knots; [and] only option on a raw data approach with ground based ATC Radar assisting with airspeed and altitude callouts every minute until touchdown. Maintenance BITE test indicated dual Air Data computer failure. I experienced the same exact scenario on a different aircraft with [reports] filed.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported cascading system failures and intermittent electrical failures.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Passenger A; seat 7C; boarded the AC (Aircraft) after arriving on a collapsible electric scooter. He insisted the scooter be accommodated in a passenger seat as [the company] had destroyed previous scooter and had not only agreed to this process but had purchased him his current scooter. FA (Flight Attendant) expressed her concern and stated it was not allowed in the [Flight Attendant Manual]. After searching the FOM (Flight Operations Manual); I could find no guidance. The [Flight Manager] was contacted and after a search of the FOM and shares; determined the [scooter] was not allowed in the cabin but asked for time to confer with the [Operations Control Manager]. After a short time I received an ACARS explaining the [scooter] would have to go into the cargo area. I contacted the [Flight Manager] by phone to ensure that 'the [scooter] in the pit' was the desired outcome and was asked to standby. The [Flight Manager] again contacted me via ACARS stating it was OK to place the scooter in a passenger seat. After another phone conversation; I was told that 'Social Media' was involved and was directed to take the scooter in the cabin… regardless of [company] Policy and Procedures dictating otherwise.The FAs did their best to secure the scooter into seat 7B with the use of the regular seat belt and seat belt extenders.Upon landing; even after their best efforts; the scooter slid forward; falling partially out of the seat.A placard on the scooter stated it weighed 200 pounds.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a passenger who wants to bring an electric scooter in the cabin rather than the cargo hold.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SF 340B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Taxing north on taxiway hotel the HYDR light flashed on followed by a struggling sound from our hydraulic pump. Shortly there after the hydraulic pump went silent. Almost instantly we lost steering and braking. We put the hydraulic pump to override and nothing. At this point the aircraft was moving slowly to the left of the centerline towards the taxiway edge. With reverse thrust I was almost able to bring the aircraft to a complete stop. I immediately shut down the engines going straight to fuel off and the aircraft rolled about 6 FT off the edge of the taxiway. The Flight Attendant was notified of the situation and operations were called. Airport operations quickly had a bus to take our passengers back to the terminal. We were towed back to the gate. There was no aircraft damage and no complaints from passengers.




Synopsis: SF340 Captain experiences a hydraulic pump failure while taxiing for takeoff; resulting in loss of steering and braking. Reverse thrust is used and the engines are shut down and the aircraft departs the taxiway a short distance before coming to a stop.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While flying the FRNCH 3 Arrival into DEN; Initial Approach assigned an airspeed of 210. Just prior to handing off to Final Approach; the airspeed was changed to maintain 190. Upon contact with the Final Approach Controller; the airspeed was reconfirmed to maintain 190. About five miles from HIMOM; the Final Approach Controller gave the following clearance. 'Maintain 190; at HIMOM; cleared the RNAV Z Approach to Runway 34R.' We continued flying 190 KIAS until reaching HIMOM where we closed the Speed Intervention window and confirmed we were LNAV and VNAV PATH commencing the approach. The aircraft began to slow as we began configuring for the landing. After MCMUL while arcing left towards KUGLN; our speed had decreased to approximately 160 KIAS when ATC queried our airspeed. Upon replying; ATC informed us we were assigned 190 KIAS. We were then assigned 'maintain 170 KIAS to CORDE and contact Tower.' We felt ATC failed to clarify their intentions for our airspeed once commencing the approach. Had the clearance stated an expected airspeed past HIMOM we would not have failed to maintain their desired airspeed for our flight. We felt ATC should have stated; 'At HIMOM cleared the RNAV Z 34R Approach; except maintain 170 to CORDE; contact Tower.' This type of communication would have prevented our slowing.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported deviating from an assigned airspeed on the RNAV (RNP) Z Approach to Runway 34R at DEN when they misunderstood the clearance.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LOM.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E PHL
ATC / advisory: CTAF LOM
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Near miss at Wings (LOM) corner of crosswind and downwind at 1500FT. I announced on 123.0; to Wings traffic; 6 miles out; inbound left downwind 24. I also announced on 123.0; to Wings traffic; 4 miles out; inbound left downwind 24. We were entering the downwind corner; and heard an announcement from someone crosswind. We looked to the left and could not find the traffic nor was it being displayed as traffic. We then noticed traffic to our right close above us past downwind turning right.I announced on 123.0 that I had the crosswind traffic; we continued on downwind maintaining the altitude. We could not see him and since he was not showing on our traffic display; we didn't know his position. I felt the safest move was to continue away from him. I continued to announce downwind; base; final and landed.He came into the terminal asking for me; I suggested we talk about it; he did not want to talk and departed. [A person] at Wings said she heard all my position calls clearly. I discussed Pattern Safety with my CFII. I also called AOPA (Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association) to talk Pattern Safety. It was perplexing that he did not show up on my traffic display; yet Wings is inside the Mode C veil.




Synopsis: Small airplane pilot reported a NMAC in the pattern at LOM airport.