Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A C750 was being worked by ZJX Center. It's Code was noticed over MAJIK at FL355 and had not been pointed out to HOBEE. I called ZJX on the land line to identify the MODE C intruder. Was advised it was the C750 and that he was being vectored back towards OMN by ZJX. The C750 had already hit the W497B Airspace and HOBEE airspace prior to receiving point out. Paperwork on W497 A and B did not have coordinates making it very difficult to accurately draw the airspace boundaries. ALL military airspace going active should be accompanied with paperwork CLEARLY defining the boundaries with coordinates.


Second narrative: Military airspace was active; W497B surface to unlimited. The northern portion of the airspace was not the published boundary of W497B. Another controller in the area brought to my attention the limited Data Block (intruder) approaching the depicted boundary of the launch airspace. I asked the R2 Controller if he had information on that aircraft and he said no. I instructed D2 to call ZJX and inquire and then he said 'point out approved'. I told him to call back and advise ZJX that the C750 appeared to have entered the launch airspace. I then observed them vector the aircraft along the boundary and instructed D2 to call ZJX again and have them issue a 270 heading to take the aircraft away from the launch airspace. The issue being that the launch packet with all the airspace and active times did not include lat/longs to ensure accurate depiction on the RADAR scope. Both Sectors (2 and 17) had 'eye balled' the points in order to draw it on the RADAR scope. The C750 entered what was depicted on the scope but cannot ensure that it actually entered the airspace since we did not have the specific points. Military/SUA airspace coordination at ZMA has been extremely lax!!! I recommend the following: 1. Include latitude/longitudes on the maps. Anytime there is a boundary that is not depicted on the map they must be included. It is understandable that the military liaisons or the TMU Controllers are not familiar with what is on the scopes in each area; therefore I recommend they ask a controllers; not the Supervisor and/or Operations Manager to see if any additional information is needed before the package gets published. 2. Clean up the maps. The maps associated with SUA are too cluttered and difficult to read. When putting together the maps for SUA; including only the fixes; navaids; Center boundaries; and latitude/longitudes will suffice. Currently the maps are being published with all the above mentioned and the shoreline; airways; and occasionally other unrelated airspace. 3. Highlight. There is a lot of information included in the launch package and all important information for the facility but very difficult for the controller to pick out the important information. I recommend an area specialist highlight the important information for the area before handing it to the sector; like relevant lat/longs; the re-routes and clear time; sounds trivial; but extremely helpful. 4. Include boundary on the map. When coordinating a launch; the northern boundary of the airspace will vary. This particular launch used the published boundary as depicted in our LOA. But this boundary is not shown on the scope. I would recommend the northern boundary be included on the RADAR map along with the rest of the boundaries.


Synopsis: ZMA Controller described an airspace incursion noting several internal coordination failures and suggested improvements.