elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CYTZ.Airport, ON
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: During the LOC 26 Approach into CYTZ; while at 1;300 feet inbound on the approach; the aircraft detected a tower that was in close proximity; but was visually seen by the crew and deemed a non-factor. The approach was continued to a safe landing and no further action was required. If flying the approach accordingly; as we were; the Terrain Proximity Warning would need to be disabled in order to avoid this advisory. If in IMC conditions; this could lead to a missed approach.




Synopsis: Small Transport aircraft Captain reported while established on a localizer approach to CYTZ airport reported receiving a terrain warning for a Tower; which they had in sight and was not a factor.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: De-Icing Fluid
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot; Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While in cruise; pilot conducted brief mandatory weekly TKS operation. Heater on; vents closed; noted TKS odor in cockpit; quickly noted headache; tightness in chest; nausea; and throat irritation with cough; all symptoms noted as warnings on TKS chemical MSDS. Turned off TKS. On post flight TKS still dripping from aircraft and overhead wings. While grabbing tie down straps; TKS fluid (Hazmat) dripped from lower corner of door into pilots mouth causing accidental ingestion. Ramper also walked under wings and had TKS fluid drip into his eye; burning his eye immediately and causing a red mark in the corner of his eye. Pilot instructed ramper to wash his eye immediately. 10 hours after flight; pilot still has cough from TKS operation.




Synopsis: A C208 pilot reported physical reactions to TKS vapor exposure in flight and during post flight; pilot and ramp personnel exposure to liquid dripping from the aircraft surfaces.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flying on a IFR flight plan on V229 about 17NM northeast of JFK; I had a near miss with a quad-copter style drone which seemed to by flying a parallel course on the airway about 200 feet below me. We passed very quickly but it was clearly a drone and it wasn't all white; had some coloring. I reported it to NY Approach Control and they thanked me for the report. Second time in 2 1/2 years I've had a near miss with a drone in the NY area.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reported a NMAC with a drone.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff after we raised the gear we got a Green system engine driven pump ECAM; followed immediately by a loss of green system quantity ECAM. I called 'my aircraft; my radios'. We then got out the QRH to determine if we had an immediate action item or an ECAM exception item. We did not. The First Officer then called for ECAM actions. While the First Officer flew I handled the ECAM; briefed the Flight Attendants and advised Dispatch via ACARS. After about an hour to plan and prepare we advised ATC we were ready to land. With all emergency equipment standing by and the cabin prepared I assumed PF duties and we were vectored for a 30 mile final and landed using alternate brakes; number two reverser and no nose wheel steering. After an inspection by emergency crews we were towed back to the gate for maintenance.




Synopsis: An A319 Flight Crew suffered the loss of their Green Hydraulic System; ran the appropriate checklists; declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport where they were towed off the runway and to their gate for maintenance.
Date: 201904
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cargo Restraint/Tie Down
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Ramp loaded item containing dangerous goods without securing it with the required number of bags.




Synopsis: Air carrier ramp personnel reported dangerous goods cargo incorrectly configured for air transport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had a rejected takeoff for improper flaps setting. It was only my second trip of the month; and I have not had a flight with flaps 8 in over a month. In my opinion this was just human error.


Second narrative: The First Officer who was also the pilot flying stated that the flaps were in the wrong position while on the takeoff roll at about 110 KTS. I called for the abort; took control of the aircraft and carried out the rejected takeoff procedures. We advised the Tower; exited the runway; ran the QRH for aborted takeoff; notified the Flight Attendant and made a PA to the passengers. We discovered that the flaps were set at 20 and they should have been set at 8. While taxiing back we notified Dispatch and Maintenance. Maintenance informed us that a brake/wheel inspection was not required in accordance to the AMM [Aircraft Maintenance Manual] because the BTMS [Brake Temperature Monitoring System] was operative. We waited the required 15 minutes and had to compute a new V1/V1MBE [Maximum Brake Energy] because the right outboard BTMS was reading 06. The computation was within limits and the flight was continued.The flaps should have been set to 8 during the Taxi Checklist. It was on the Takeoff Card but the First Officer could not remember if he briefed a flaps 8 or 20 takeoff. It was day three and we were accustomed to making all flaps 20 takeoffs. My recommendation is to change one word on the Taxi Checklist just to remind the Captain to confirm the planned setting. By changing the word 'SET' to 'VERIFY' when the First Officer challenges 'FLAPS'; it will remind the Captain to once again verify that the flap setting is as planned. Thus: 'FLAPS.......VERIFY______INDICATING_______for RWY_______.'


Synopsis: A CL65 flight crew rejected their takeoff at high speed when the First Officer noted the flap setting was not as briefed.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-23-250 Aztec
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch; Taxi
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: VHF
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Was unable to [reach] Ground or Tower. Assumed Tower closed without confirming; departed using CTAF and procedures. Departed runway and pattern and when tuning to Myrtle Beach Approach to activate flight plan I realized the volume knob had been knocked to off position. Activated flight plan and was advised to call Tower upon landing. There are no excuses and I don't know why I jumped to a conclusion without confirming other than that on my last departure at that field the Tower was closed and I departed using CTAF.




Synopsis: PA-27 pilot reported wrongly assuming that Tower was closed; taxiing and taking off without clearance; and using CTAF procedures; all due to the volume knob on the com radio being in the off position.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X entered a terrain area at 7;200 ft. with a Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) of 7;400 ft. Aircraft X was cleared for the RNAV [Runway] XX approach. Aircraft X executed the missed approach. Aircraft X requested vectors for the RNAV [Runway] XX Approach. I issued a turn 30 degrees left when able direct to the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) and notify me when he was direct. Aircraft X reported they were ready for the approach clearance. I issued '[Aircraft X] maintain seven thousand until established. Cleared RNAV approach Runway XX at ZZZ.' Aircraft X read back the correct clearance.Aircraft X continued on their heading past the IAF without beginning a procedure turn for the approach. I was busy with multiple requests from other aircraft and fighters departing a military base for active Warning Areas. And didn't notice Aircraft X missed the fix. I was giving a relief briefing and noticed Aircraft X was not on his cleared route. I asked him where he was heading. Aircraft X stated he was waiting for vectors to the approach. I pulled up the MIA's and noticed he was about to enter a 7;400 ft. MIA block. I issued a safety alert for the terrain and climbed Aircraft X to 8;000 ft.In my scan I knew that Aircraft X was out of position but assumed he was unfamiliar with how to execute the procedure turn at the IAF and was going to get back on a correct course soon. Every time I checked back in my scan he was a bit further off course. The workload was high. Frequency congestion was causing a lot of missed and stepped on clearances further increasing workload. I had requested help from the Controller-in-Charge twice prior to this happening. I needed assistance with a flight break up flight plan and to notify the surrounding facilities the Special Use Airspace went cold. A dedicated D-side (Radar Assist) would have helped notice the aircraft off course.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported frequency congestion and a high workload caused them to not detect an erroneous altitude read back and an aircraft flew below the Minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 202109
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Load Planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There was a possible revision made on the flight's Departure Staging Guide (DSTG) in which I was not made aware of. So the flight was finalized with the assumption that the load was unchanged.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported 'a possible DSTG' revision during preflight load planning. Aircraft departed 'with the assumption' of no change to cargo.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MPR.Airport, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a flight from ZZZ to MPR; I flew a practice approach into MPR (RNAV 18) visually in VFR conditions with no view limiting device. As I was touching down on Runway 18 at MPR; I observed another aircraft taking off from the grass Runway 8. The other aircraft crossed in front of me about 400 feet ahead of me and was about 100 feet above me and climbing. I had made a number of radio calls including a 10 mile straight-in final; 5 mile final; 2 mile final and short final. I never heard the other aircraft make any calls. Upon landing; I realized that although I had plugged the MPR CTAF frequency into my radio; I never flipped that frequency to active. Therefore; I had been transmitting on and listening to the incorrect frequency (departure Tower frequency). I take full responsibility for not having the correct frequency active in my radio and will use this as a learning opportunity and a reminder to be more vigilant about confirming proper frequencies. I am surprised that the ZZZ Tower did not hear my 10 mile; 5 mile; 2 mile and short final calls and inform me that I was on the incorrect frequency.




Synopsis: Pilot reported landing after broadcasting on the wrong CTAF frequency for MPR airport resulting in a conflict with another aircraft taking off on a crossing runway.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This is not a single incident but a recurring situation that is counterintuitive to safe practices. With multiple reroutes given to aircrews starting 200 miles from IAH as a destination; our computers become more of a hindrance the closer we get to IAH and the descent profile is abandoned to recalculate both vertical and horizontal connections to aircraft position. It is not uncommon to experience at least 5 arrival and runway changes at any point during the arrival. This is complicated by some arrivals having different bottom 'Cleared to' altitudes depending on which runway will be used when ATC has NO IDEA which runway it will end up flying us to. When asking the Controller which transition to expect; I was told to just guess. When referencing the ZEEKK arrival and told to descend via; we should not be cleared past BLUUZ while we are given no guidance beforehand on which transition to expect but have already been given the 'Descend Via' clearance. All points past BLUUZ should not be tangled with the arrival in our FMC but instead be attached to the approach to be flown because when the reroute occurs; it takes too long for the programming to occur and affect the current position of the aircraft in reference to the arrival. There is NO legal way that ATC can assign a 'Descend Via' clearance with the current setup.Now let's digest the actual operation we now fly from transition to touch down that is counterintuitive to our SAFE practices and training. These arrivals ending at altitudes above the missed approach altitude for any approach; leads us to IGNORE the ALTITUDE WARNINGS on the glideslope and consequently TRAINS the aircrew to pause; ignore/confuse; proper guidance from past practices. We should not have any normal procedures that train us to ignore warnings; but we now encounter this on every IFR or VFR approach when we abide by our ILS procedures that have us select the missed approach altitude in the altitude window on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) at or below our intercepting altitude. Each of our fleets have varying software generations that preclude us from treating them all the same; yet our current practice is to fit square pegs into round holes when trying to force all fleets to have the same standard practices.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported safety concern with the current ATC procedures regarding 'Descend Via' clearances without transition; approach or runway information.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [I] was operating as First Officer. On climb; we experienced a loss in cabin pressure. During initial climb after the transfer of the bleeds it was noticed that the air was not producing the usual amount. The left pack was losing temperature and gaining pressure while the right pack was working fine. The L PACK HI Press QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) was performed and the left pack was turned off. We notified ATC that our final altitude would have to be FL250 and we continued on. About ten minutes later we suddenly lost our right pack and there was a rise in cabin altitude. We donned our oxygen masks [and requested priority handling] with ATC and initiated a descent down to 11;000 ft. The oxygen masks in the cabin never dropped. We chose [the diversion airport] because it was the nearest suitable airport for landing. ATC vectored us for landing [and] we contacted [the] company over ACARS to tell them the situation. We prepared for landing and I entered the new airport and runways into the landing performance with the weight shown on my MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) and it checked out as good. On approach the Captain stated that the plane felt heavy. We landed without incident and taxied to the gate. Later I would find out that we had landed overweight.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported a pressurization problem resulting in an overweight landing at diversion airport.