elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MBB-BK 117 All Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Aircraft component: Service/Access Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a 2 hour four legged patient flight on approach back to [the medical center]; the inspection side of the hydraulic cowling came open and struck the blades. Two flight crew members were on board. I can only assume my initial and subsequent pre-flight walk arounds were deficient. Do not allow other pre-flight factors to distract one from security of cowlings inspection.




Synopsis: The Captain of a medevac helicopter flight reported that an external inspection access door opened in flight and struck the rotor blades. The flight landed safely and there were no injuries reported.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We operated flight XXX FM ZZZ to ZZZZ. I was IRO during this flight. We Taxied out and departed with no abnormality. Flight conditions at time of departure was IMC with heavy precipitation in some quadrants. sometime after 4;000 ft; there was a flash of light and a loud noise outside; similar to that of lightning. Captain was flying and FO was non-flying pilot at this point. Immediately following we received two messages on ECIAS '(l) Primary fwd window heat inop and primary (r) side window inop'. We continued to climb and the FO completed the checklist for the window heat l/r at which time I was delegated the task to contact Dispatch and Maintenance Control. I also contact the lead flight attendant to make sure the crew and passengers were ok and no further incident in the man cabin was reported. They remained seated. Once on the phone with maintenance control I noted to him the message we received on the ECIAS and he stated that he was aware and could see all the items that were listed. He was aware that this flight was international; operating to ZZZZ and ETOPS. The Captain at that time noted that he was going to continue the conversation with Maintenance. Maintenance Control and the Captain agreed to continue the flight to ZZZZ following company procedures. No further messages at that time occurred. We landed in ZZZZ and completed the parking; terminating checklists and debrief at the gate.


Second narrative: On climbout on Departure; encountered a lightning strike at approximately 16;000 ft. Conditions were VFR; with rain showers on departure. Various window heaters were effected; as were various circuit breakers. Upon conferring with Maintenance Control and Dispatcher; flight was deemed safe to continue. Upon landing; it was verified that we were stuck by lightning on the left forward side of aircraft. The flight ended uneventfully in ZZZZ.


Synopsis: B787 flight crew reported experiencing a lighting strike on departure.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival into the DCA area; we were told to expect the river visual 19. As PM; I loaded the LDA 19 into the FMS as backup to the river visual. We were vectored to final approach and asked if we had the river in sight. While we were VMC; patchy fog was beginning to obscure the surface. ATC asked if we would like the LDA instead. We accepted the approach clearance and began the step downs. Upon crossing the FAF we mistakenly set in MDA instead of the intermediate step down. We descended to MDA with the airport in sight most of the way down. Nearing MDA; and in night VMC with the surface and the airport in sight; ATC issued a low altitude alert and the GPWS alerted us to an obstacle. I had the obstacle in sight and it was below our altitude. However; as the flight conditions were night VMC; I took the controls from the PF and executed the GPWS escape maneuver. I advanced the thrust levers slowly due to not wanting to over speed the engines as the speed controls were MEL'ed under 76-11-1. The stick shaker came on momentarily during the pitch up. When the GPWS no longer indicated the presence of an obstacle; we were still in a position to land the airplane safely so we continued to landing.Factors leading to the missing the intermediate step down was the last minute change in approach as both pilots became task saturated. I should have asked for delay vectors.  Also; the implementation of the planned change to constant descents during non precision approaches would prevent any further events due to missed step down fixes that are not in the FMS data bases on the older airplanes.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported being cleared for the River Visual Runway 19 with the Captain flying. The LDA Z was selected in the FMC for backup then became primary when fog began to obscure the surface. Crossing BESSE; the MDA was set in instead of the step down altitude at WEVPU; resulting in a GPWS obstacle warning and a low altitude alert from the Tower. The First Officer took the controls and began the escape maneuver. When the GPWS went silent; the aircraft was still in position to land and the landing was completed.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Documentation
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Due to a large amount of work loading medical supplies; got in a bit of a rush to block out on time; and read BOW (Basic Operating Weight) placard wrong as XX;XXX. Was really XY;XXX. Due to COVID cockpit procedures; placard [was] very distorted; blotchy and worn. Corrected using adjusted weight column on weight and balance form. Error did NOT affect speed cards used for takeoff or landing. However; error was caught after trip during post flight paperwork checking before turning in.Do not rush; even if medical supplies. More vigilance on possible flight deck alterations or damage due to COVID cleaning. Did read and was aware of email regarding placards; just didn't stare at it long enough to discern the Number X instead of Number Y.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain misread the BOW (Basic Operating Weight) placard which resulted in a weight and balance miscalculation. The placard had become distorted and worn due to COVID-19 cockpit cleaning procedures.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHX.Tower, AZ
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: Tower PHX
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While working Clearance Delivery; I was functioning as a Tower team member by helping to scan the airspace and runways. I watched Aircraft X make multiple S-turns on final for Runway 8 due to compression with the aircraft ahead of it (Aircraft Y). On one of the S-turns; the aircraft went through the final approach corridor for Runway 8 and partially into Runway 7R's final approach corridor; trying to build spacing between it and the aircraft ahead within a 5 mile final. The aircraft was performing low level maneuvers and was operating outside of a stabilized approach for such a low altitude.The controller; rather than initiate a go around; allowed the aircraft to cross the Runway 8 threshold with Aircraft Y still on the runway. ASDE-X did not alarm. I observed the aircraft to be in a 10 degree bank to the right just prior to touchdown in its last ditch effort to avoid going around. The controller working Local North has had multiple occurrences of not issuing go around instructions; not wanting to 'Penalize' aircraft. Controller is under the impression that because the data block indicates the aircraft has visual separation with the aircraft ahead of it; that all responsibility for remaining in safe flight conditions rests with the pilot. I feel this is an extremely unsafe situation that keeps occurring.




Synopsis: PHX Controller observes local control having an operational error and states this person doesn't want to penalize the following aircraft; so they let them land.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Departing Runway 02 with winds 030 at 19 gusting 24 and moderate rain. ATIS; tower; and [Company] weather briefing made no mention of windshear; however we briefed and performed the 757 windshear takeoff profile just to be safe. Takeoff was normal until just above 1000 AGL. After the Captain called 'VNAV' and I selected it; we experienced an almost instantaneous drop in airspeed of 40 knots; from 169 to 129 knots. We did not receive a windshear warning; however; I called out 'windshear' because the airspeed was not recovering. The Captain executed the windshear profile and after approximately 5 seconds the airspeed jumped back into a normal range. No engine limitations were exceeded; so the Captain elected to continue to [destination].Environmental conditions caused the event. However; the Captain and I talked about and briefed windshear takeoff profile and escape maneuver before flight because of the weather conditions. It definitely came in handy tonight.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reported encountering windshear shortly after takeoff that resulted in an 'almost instantaneous' 40 knot drop in airspeed.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival; a Ramp Agent approached me in the jetway and showed me a picture of a cargo shipment that had just been taken off the plane. The box was labeled with stickers indicating lithium ion batteries inside; was explicitly labeled 'cargo aircraft only; forbidden in passenger aircraft.' A standard checked bag tag was attached to the box. It also had a Hazmat code sticker reading UN 3480. We were never made aware of the cargo being on board and received a 'no dangerous goods planned' message during initial preflight.




Synopsis: B-737 Captain reported being notified at destination gate by Ramp Agent of Hazmat cargo shipped with label 'cargo aircraft only...'. Captain further reported not notified of any Hazmat information planned on flight.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MDT.Airport, PA
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E MDT
ATC / advisory: TRACON MDT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared onto a visual approach to RWY 31. I had the RNAV 31 approach loaded into the box. I had the radar up on my screen and the FO (First Officer) up on terrain on his MFD. This was because we were [avoiding thunderstorms and heading] to an airport that is classified as a mountainous airport. The FAF was listed at 2200 feet so I selected 2200 feet and started a descent from 4000 feet on the downwind leg of our approach where we were cleared for the visual approach. I had briefed the approach and the largest obstacle was to the north. The listed MSA was 3500 feet. I did notice the towers depicted on the chart at 1865' close to our position. As I descended somewhere around 2400 feet we got a caution obstacle alert from the GPWS. I immediately clicked off the autopilot and turned to a base leg and stopped our descent. We visually saw the towers; after the alert; and landed without further issue. There is not much information listed on the company pages. There should be an alert added to these pages in regards to these towers.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS obstacle alert on a visual approach to MDT.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BBG.Tower, MO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D BBG
ATC / advisory: Tower BBG
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During two previous approaches; the Co-Captain and I had executed a missed approach due to a TAWS [Terrain Awareness Warning System] warning on ILS 32 into BBG.  We were completely stabilized and on profile with a normal descent rate.  Approximately 400 feet above minimums; we received the TAWS warning and executed the missed approach per the AFM and company policies and procedures.  After 3 previous aircraft had successfully negotiated the ILS approach to land under 1 SM and 500 feet OVC conditions; we elected to inhibit the TAWS terrain feature.  We landed safely and uneventfully at BBG on the third approach attempt. In hindsight; disabling the TAWS was not a prudent decision.  While we were confident that the database may have been out of date due to the relatively recent construction of the airport (2009); we had no way of ensuring it was not other equipment that was faulty or programmed incorrectly.




Synopsis: King Air flight crew experiences two consecutive TAWS alerts during two ILS 32 approaches into BBG resulting in go arounds. Other aircraft are successfully landing off the ILS 32 approach; so the TAWS is disabled and the third approach is successful.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff leg; Pilot Flying; F/O (First Officer) reported no electric trim. I tried my side to no avail. We continued the flight for the time being using manual trim. Since we were on a departure we delayed referring to the QRH so both pilots could concentrate on flying/monitoring aircraft performance. During climb we engaged the autopilot anticipating a 'Stab out of Trim' caution light if the autopilot trim was in fact inoperable also. The light illuminated so we disengaged the autopilot and continued with manual trim. After level off we referred to the QRH and complied. After discussing our situation we determined that in this day and age it would be wise and prudent to recover the trim system if possible. I cycled the trim circuit breaker and trim returned to normal.




Synopsis: Boeing 737 Captain reported that the stabilizer trim would not operate using the trim switches or the autopilot.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ASE.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ASE
ATC / advisory: TRACON ASE
Second aircraft: Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was providing On the Job Instruction during the event. I had previously cleared Aircraft X to 17;000 feet prior to the trainee taking position. Another aircraft; Aircraft Y; was also receiving vectors for the approach and was given a descent to 14000 feet and a speed reduction to 210 knots. Aircraft X read back the instructions and then immediately Aircraft Y read back the instructions. On position; I did not hear the call sign of Aircraft X and thought that Aircraft Y read back the instruction a second time. It was clearly a different voice so I just thought that the pilots were confused as to who was talking and who was flying. A few moments later the Developmental recognized that Aircraft X was at 15;200 feet in a 15;500 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) and issued a low altitude alert. The pilot responded that it was blocked and the trainee gave an immediate climb to 16;000 feet. I recognized the the trainee did not use the full proper phraseology by not saying the 'MVA in your area is XXX;' but decided at this point the solution had been acknowledge and it was not worth correcting the phraseology in a third transmission. The aircraft continued to descend to 14;400 feet until we observed a climb. During that time the aircraft crossed into a 14;900 foot MVA; but being in a climb I decided it was not necessary to issue another safety alert since we knew it was being corrected.There was a bit of frequency congestion due to confusion about the weather; and by the time I was ready to issue a brasher warning the aircraft was on a 10 mile final. I felt it was best to let the aircraft fly and have Local Control or Ground Control issue the brasher warning; so I coordinated that with Ground Control.




Synopsis: A TRACON Controller conducting on the job training reported they did not realize the wrong aircraft read back a descent clearance and the aircraft descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.