elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: AJZ.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: CTAF AJZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On a VFR flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 our filed flight plan took us near Delta-Blake uncontrolled airport (AJZ).  Within 5 to 10 miles of the airport; I dialed in the CTAF frequency for AJZ and announced intentions to overfly the field at 9;000 feet MSL.  Field elevation at AJZ is 5;193 feet MSL.  Another person on the CTAF frequency then announced there was parachute jump activity over the airport; so we must deviate from our present course.  We acknowledged over the radio our intention to deviate; and we did so to the west.  No further communication was attempted.  No parachute jumpers or jump aircraft were seen visually. Upon return to ZZZ; further review showed a posted NOTAM for jump activity at AJZ during our flight time.  However; review of our flight service briefing did not show this NOTAM.  Also; no parachute jump legend was depicted on the VFR sectional chart. We had filed a VFR flight plan; and received a briefing; both via ForeFlight.  NOTAMs were reviewed prior to the flight. Our route of flight was somewhat north of Delta-Blake field.  This could account for the discrepancy.  A review of uncontrolled airport near route of flight might be necessary to avoid parachute jump activity.  However; on sectional charts where parachute jump activity is frequent; a parachute symbol is typically shown on the VFR sectional chart. Recommend updates to briefing software; to better notify of parachute NOTAMs for fields near our route of flight.  Update sectional chart to show parachute jump symbol.




Synopsis: Pilot deviated around AJZ to avoid parachute jumping activity. The NOTAM for this activity; which was discovered after the flight; had not been included in the both electronic and flight service briefings received before the flight.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BDL.TRACON, CT
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E BDL
ATC / advisory: TRACON BDL
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were cleared to proceed directly to 'Bradley.' We entered 'BDL;' the identifier of the Bradley VOR(T); into the FMC. The BDL terminal VOR is still depicted on some of the charts for BDL. We received a 'Not in NAV database' message. We queried the Controller about whether or not the BDL VOR was in service. He said it had been decommissioned eight months ago and re-cleared us to the Bradley Airport. Update BDL approach charts to reflect that the VOR has been removed from service.




Synopsis: A Captain was unable to select BDL VORTAC in the FMS and after querying ATC learned that the BDL VORTAC had been decommissioned; but not yet removed from some commercial airway and approach charts.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: DC Battery
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After landing; we taxied and held short on taxiway S. Operations were backed up on the taxiways and ramp due to weather complications and traffic congestion. We received a Master Warning and BATT 1 OVERTEMP EICAS Warning. We confirmed the battery to be overtemping (70 C at this time) and completed the immediate action items and I instructed the First Officer (FO) to run the Battery Overtemp QRH. As he retrieved that; I informed ATC that we may need assistance and noticed the temperature to continue increasing. After the Immediate Action Items and QRH were completed; the temperature continued to runaway so we asked for priority handling and had Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) dispatched should the battery ignite or a fire situation start. We were given said priority handling to return to the gate promptly and ARFF met us at the gate. ATC relayed our situation to the company and I briefed the flight attendant using the TEST items. We were able to deplane expeditiously rather than evacuate; and ARFF confirmed there was no fire but the Battery temperature was extremely hot. The last temperature we saw on the EICAS was 80 C; but a ground person or firefighter (can't remember who) told us after the event it had reached 100. The plane was written up after giving Dispatch the information necessary for their report.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a battery overheat during taxi to the gate.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SYR.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SYR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: My First Officer received ATIS information 'V' and called for our clearance. After a bit of a delay due to operations issues we closed the cabin doors; I called Dispatch momentarily and then we started the engines; ran our checklist and called for a taxi clearance. We were issued 'Taxi Runway 10; E and A'. As I was beginning the right turn out of the gate Ground Control told us to use caution for company to our right. I saw our company aircraft to our immediate right (with little room to spare and jet bridge congestion) and continued our taxi straight ahead onto D. As soon as I did this I realized my error. Our instructions were to take E and A.Before I could call Ground Control he contacted us and told us we had taxied onto a closed taxiway. I was not aware of the closure because the ATIS or NOTAMs did not state the taxiway was closed nor did the Controller alert us to a new ATIS issuance when we requested taxi. The only taxi closures listed on the ATIS V and that were briefed on the flight deck were 'F north of A; A between G and C; and Taxiway C'. There was no way our aircraft could have entered onto E with our company aircraft and jet bridge congestion on E as well. We were issued new taxi instructions which were 'M; B; A to Runway 10.' Better ATC Communications; including updated ATIS and NOTAMs would have helped avoid this event. With a closure on a taxiway that is frequently used for our company's outbound aircraft (typically we are told to exit D and proceed on M; B and A) perhaps a verbal reminder from Ground or some markings; cones; lights; etc. indicating a closure would have been helpful and alerted me prior to committing my error. In closing I recognize my mistake and in the future will exercise more vigilance.




Synopsis: When confronted with congestion on their cleared taxi route for takeoff; the Captain of a DHC-8 reverted to a frequent taxi route usually provided by ATC when Taxiway Delta wasn't closed; however; today it was and an incursion ensued. Ground Control reminded them and provided an alternative clearance.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ILS to Runway 30 Miami. Weather was 900 foot ceiling with 3 miles vis. Two 747s were holding short of Runway 12/30 on Taxiway T and on Runway 09 (both were pointed east waiting to cross Runway 30; preparing to depart on Runway 27). As we passed 800 ft on the glideslope for Runway 30 with the runway in sight (100 ft below the ceiling) and the autopilot off; the glideslope began to dive for the ground. The glideslope interference was occurring from the two jumbo aircraft holding short of Runway 30. We reported the interference to Tower immediately. The jet behind us shortly reported the same anomaly after we landed. Had an autopilot been engaged; the aircraft would have commenced a dangerous dive beneath that PAPI visual path or ILS glideslope toward the ground. Glideslope interference from two large aircraft holding abeam the landing runway. Do not allow jumbo aircraft to hold short of Runway 30 when instrument condition are less than VFR conditions.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a glideslope anomaly on the ILS to Runway 30 at MIA apparently caused by B747 aircraft holding on the taxiway in the vicinity of the end of the runway.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Aircraft component: Flight Director
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot monitoring (PM). We were de-iced at the gate with Type 1 and Type 4. Prior to take off we ran the engines up to 70% N1 for 30 seconds. It was a flaps 15 26k max power take off with the engine anti ice on. PF Rotated normally and experienced normal full power acceleration and subsequent low level climb performance. At 1000 ft PF called for VNAV and then called for flaps 5 above the sharks tooth and accelerating. The power came back (CLIMB POWER 2 selected by PM) once VNAV was selected and the airspeed indicated a slight decrease with the min maneuver hook moving up normally as flaps moved from 15 to 5. At the same time; the FD called for a 10-12 degree pitch up in an exaggerated manner (quickly) as opposed to commanding a decrease in pitch to keep the jet on a normal climb and acceleration schedule. The PF did NOT follow the flight director's obviously incorrect pitch commands. Very shortly after this command; the aural 'airspeed low' call out was heard. PF moved the throttles to the full forward position and maintained the normal climb out pitch attitude. The airspeed recovered very quickly and the PF followed the FD/HUD through normal clean up and climb. The flight proceeded and no other abnormalities were noted. We discussed what we would do if this returned upon landing and talked about using/cross checking the AOA indicator. At this time; minus the FOQA data and Maint debrief on what they may have found with the pitot static system; I am unable to provide a COA that would prevent this from happening again. Looking back; I would have tried to get a quick scan of the AOA gauge to cross check.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer describes a low airspeed situation that develops after a full power flaps 15 takeoff with engine anti ice on. At 1;000 feet VNAV and flaps 5 are called for with thrust reducing to Climb 2. At the same time the flight director indicates a sharp pull up the airspeed is seen to be bleeding off and an aural 'airspeed low' call out is heard. The flying Captain lowers the nose and advances the thrust to maximum; quickly recovering the lost airspeed.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ONT.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain was PF (Pilot Flying) and I was PM (Pilot Monitoring.) On the Eaglz2 RNAV arrival ATC gave us a heading off of the arrival and to descend and maintain 4;000 feet. I think this was when we were at about 8;000 feet. I activated the approach and sequenced it for the visual backed up ILS 26R. After that as we were descending I was looking out the window at the terrain and houses but did not think we were in danger but just how low we were as we crossed over that area. To me this was not unusual because once crossing the terrain you are usually high on the approach. So I didn't think it was off. I go to ONT maybe once every 9-12 months. Both the Captain and I had our terrain map up on the MFD.At about 6;400-6;500 feet ATC gave us a terrain alert and to climb to 8;000. I noticed the Captain did not react so I did and climbed the aircraft. On the way up I responded to ATC that we were in a climb to 8;000. ATC said I must have taken another aircraft's radio [call]. I do not agree; but I am human and do make mistakes so it is possible but I still don't think I did in this case. There was no evidence of stepping on anyone on the radio. The Captain and I both agree we heard our flight number and to fly present heading followed by a descent to 4;000 feet. I read back as such. Later we briefly discussed it with ATC. He claimed it was for another aircraft on the radio. I still believe ATC did tell us 4;000 feet. Either way I realize in the future when around terrain to look at the highest terrain altitude readout on my MFD map and reference that to where it is compared to what ATC gives us to be even more aware. We never got any GPWS alerts at all.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on descent into ONT after apparently taking a descent clearance meant for another aircraft.
Date: 201904
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD; Class C MDW
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were descending to 6;000 feet on the RNAV Arrival. During the descent; we got cleared to an intersection and to cross it at 3;000 feet. The First Officer selected 3;000 feet and hit LVL CHG. We then got cleared for the RNAV Approach. He verified 3;000 feet in FMC and set 1;500 feet in the altitude selector. ATC also wanted us to maintain 250 knots until advised. I was concerned with Class B airspace and the 210 restriction at a fix; so we discussed the airspeed issue and missed the fact that we were not in VNAV. The aircraft descended below 3;000 feet prior to the fix and ATC asked us about it. We immediately climbed back up to 3;000 feet and crossed the fix to comply with the clearance. We continued the approach with no further issues and landed safely.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported ATC assigned airspeed 250 kts below the ORD Class B airspace on an RNAV arrival into the ORD area.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We have a negotiated lighting level in the area and for the last few years a controller began hanging Holiday lights in the area. They are very bright and distracting and make viewing the scope and displays in the area very difficult for me. I have complained for years and continued to turn them off while I am in the area and trying to work. For this I receive some grief from some of the controllers and just get ignored by supervision.Today I turned them off again and was reprimanded by the FLM. This is the final straw and I am not going to risk the safety of my planes because of the bright lights distracting me and other controllers while trying to be professionals and keeping airplanes separated. I understand people want to celebrate the holidays and it is fine to put up a various decorations; but hanging extremely bright lights above all the sectors is distracting and causing me headaches when trying to work. I have voiced my opinion to the FLM and been reprimanded and now this is my only avenue to hopefully get a safe working environment again. Additionally; the numerous plugs and extension cords used for these lights all connected to one outlet surely creates a fire hazard and I fear for the safety of our controllers in case this causes some kind of fire.We need a professional and safe working environment so these lights need to be limited or removed in the control room areas.




Synopsis: Center Controller reports of Holiday lights that reflect onto scope and asks for them to be removed or turned off during work hours. Controller is reprimanded for expressing his opinion. Controller is also concerned for fire safety due to the amount of extension cords in the area.
Date: 202012
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The mechanic who was assigned to work Aircraft X by chance found that the hydraulic reservoirs and accumulators for the green and yellow systems still had danger tags stating 'do not pressurize hydraulics' still hanging from them. These tags were dated XX/Sep/2020 and were from another company.




Synopsis: Technician reported finding DANGER; Do Not Operate; tags still installed on hydraulic components on an in service aircraft.