elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BHM.Airport, AL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C BHM
ATC / advisory: TRACON BHM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Going into BHM I was the Pilot Monitoring. Weather conditions were clear; but winds were gusty; making for a bumpy ride in the descent. After I obtained the ATIS; the Captain and I planned and briefed for the Visual 24; backed up with the ILS. Winds were 320@11 and runways 24 and 36 were in use at the airport. The altimeter setting was 30.18.Upon contacting Approach; we found out the current winds were 330@16 with gusts of 28 kts. We discussed the winds and determined we were getting close; but still within limits of landing Runway 24. Around leveling off at 3000 ft.; Approach informed us that the winds had shifted to 350@15 G25 and that they were now landing runways 06 and 36. We opted for the Visual 36 since the winds were favoring that runway and we already had the landing data.We briefed and discussed the particular threats for the Visual 36; which was going to be backed up with the RNAV 36. Along with it being a night landing; we recognized we would not have a GS and PAPI; and we were aware that BHM has surrounding terrain which can pose a hazard. When Approach offered to give us vectors for a 10 mile final for 36; we gladly accepted to help eliminate the terrain risk and set up for a stabilized approach.We were vectored in to intercept the final prior to IMOBY. Once cleared for the Visual 36; we descended to the crossing altitude of 2800 ft. The next waypoint on the approach was BERFY; which was the FAF and had a crossing altitude of 2300 ft. We crossed that waypoint on profile; set the DDA altitude; and continued down at 800fpm. Right after the 1;000 ft. call out; the GRD PROX switch light illuminated. We might have been slightly below snowflake; but seemed on profile. We did not get any aural warnings. Around the same time; Tower informed us of a low altitude alert. At that point the Captain initiated a go-around. Once stabilized; we set up the approach; and landed Runway 06 with no further issues.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported executing a go-around after receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a night visual approach to BHM.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BDR.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: DA20-A1 Katana
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While at 4000 ft we just passed BDR VOR headed northwest to RYMES intersection and had to make evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision with a Katana aircraft headed southwest bound also at 4000 ft. The meteorological conditions were 5 mi visibility and a scattered to broken layer at 3000 ft. The Katana was white without its transponder operating and no radio communications with ATC. ATC didn't have any target appear on their screen either. TCAS didn't show a target nor did it alert us to the aircraft. A turn was employed to keep us away from the Katana as it passed within 100 ft of our wing.




Synopsis: HS125 Captain reported an NMAC with a DA20 in the vicinity of BDR.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: An A320 was enroute on course to KU45Q when I; the ZLC R46 Controller took the hand off from ZLA R33. The A320 made an unexpected turn right of course. I called ZDV R23 to make a point out prior to the aircraft violating ZDV's airspace. ZDV Sector 23 Controller called RADAR Contact. I then asked the A320 what fix he was navigating to when I think the pilot responded with KU45S (KU54S was the next fix in the Airbus' flight plan). I called ZDV Sector 23 and coordinated that the Airbus was direct KU54S. After talking to several controllers I discovered this has happened several times before. The two fixes KU45S and KU54S are only 100 miles apart; but are too easily mis-entered and misheard on a read back/coordination call.  When KU54S is the fix in the NAS flight plan after KU45Q; and the aircraft has KU45S entered into autopilot; the flight plan will not auto flash to ZDV Sector 23 and the controller only has 60 seconds to realize that the aircraft is off course (and that the issue is not related to 'vector wobble' ERAM discrepancies) before violating ZDV's airspace. The 'K' fix naming convention needs to be changed. It is too dangerous having two fixes with such a similar naming convention in such close proximity.




Synopsis: ZLC Controller described an unexpected course change by an air carrier; the reporter expressing concern regarding the similar 'K' fix naming convention as problematic.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation Latitude (C680A)
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Inspection Authority
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We have been made aware of a potential safety issue on the CE-680A Latitude aircraft. We have discovered several discrepancies against the aircraft for the main cabin door will not unlock from the inside; when red button is pushed to release the handle lock solenoid. Identifying the cause was defects to the red switch solder joints and connections. After review of repairs we also noted that this potentially could be a design flaw because there is no alternate procedure to open the cabin door in an emergency evacuation if needed. Below is a list of what was found and ways we found to open the door if needed as an alternate procedure. We have advised Textron of this issue and they are investigating at this time.The main cabin door will not open from the inside under the following conditions:Cabin Door Handle Release Button malfunctions.Cabin Door Handle Release Button solder joints fail.Cabin Door Handle Release Button soft splices do not retain wiring.Cabin door handle lock solenoid internal clock spring breaks (this scenario has not been confirmed but is believed to be true).Any one of these latent failures prevents the locking solenoid pawl from retracting out of the interior cabin door handle recess and prevents the user from moving the interior door handle.In order to open the cabin door when one of the first three conditions exist:Battery power must be cycled off and back on to release the solenoidThere is a 4 - 5 second window to open the door before the locking solenoid activates again Door can be opened using the outside cabin door handleRemoving the Elcon battery connector from the LH batteryIn case of the fourth condition we believe the user would be required to utilize the emergency exit for egressWe believe a Risk Assessment needs to be raised; and a resolution from Textron to correct any design flaws that may be found.




Synopsis: Technician reported several problems with the design of the CE680 main cabin door and suggests a risk assessment be undertaken.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the pilot monitoring; we got vector for an ILS and prior for the FAF we began to configure the airplane and bug the approach speed; during that event the flying pilot did not scan his airspeed. I saw the airspeed began [to] drop and alerted the flying pilot; which resulted in a stick shaker and recovery. Altitude [during] that event was between 2;900 and 2;500 ft MSL.Flying pilot got distracted dealing with the anti-ice switches; meanwhile the trust levers were at idle; causing the airspeed to [drop]; which caused the stick shaker.Fly the airplane and not be distracted; use the pilot monitoring if needed. As a pilot monitoring I should have taken the controls when I saw the airspeed began to drop.


Second narrative: The cockpit was unsterile due to the Pilot Monitoring (PM) leading up to the event. On the ILS 12R in MSP we were assigned either 180 or 190 to the marker. I believe the PM was attempting to contact company as well as talk to ATC while on the approach. The plane needed to start being configured; and I remember not being able to call for changes due to ATC/ops communication by the PM. As we crossed the FAF I reduced the power significantly to decrease airspeed to allow for landing flaps. At the same time we broke out of the clouds. I looked up and reached to turn the anti-ice off. The PM then called out speed as my speed was on straight-in flaps 45 ref speed with the trend vector dropping 5-10 knots below. I advanced thrust 15-20%; however the speed continued to drop. I then added an additional ~30-40%. As I added thrust; the stick shaker activated briefly. Speed increased above straight-in ref speed during/immediately after the shaker. Thrust management then allowed the airspeed to return to the bugged ref speed and the approach continued to an uneventful landing.I attribute the cause of the slow speed event to an unsterile cockpit in the descent as well as distractions in the cockpit and lack of experience.This event could have been avoided by maintaining a sterile cockpit; ensuring the plane is properly set up for landing prior to the approach phase as well as better attention to the aircraft state by myself.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported receiving a stick shaker on approach to MSP.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing we were assigned 10;000 feet at 7;000 FMA said ALT due to the fast climb and turbulence. Passing 8;000 feet ATC reassigned to level off at 9;000 feet; but airplane  was slow to capture ALT of 9;000 feet due to high climb rate and turbulence; moderate; and after passing 9;300 feet I disconnected the A/P and A/T and stopped climb at 9;600 feet and was correcting back to 9;000 feet when ATC noticed we had passed 9;000 feet and issued climb to 10;000 feet. ATC was step climbing us due to aircraft in front. No TA or RA or ATC immediate commands were generated. Due to moderate turbulence and high v/s climb I did not feel the need to over aggressively correct the altitude back to 9;000 feet and risk injuring a FA or passenger; knowing clearly that the step climb was due to traffic ahead we were outperforming. Flight continued safely and uneventfully.


Second narrative: We departed ZZZ on Runway XX climbing to 3;000 feet. The Departure Controller gave us a climb to 10;000 feet. The airplane was light 350;000 pounds and was climbing at over 3;000 FPM. Passing 7;000 feet the FMA changed to VNAV ALT to begin the level off at 10;000 feet. The Controller amended our altitude to 9;000 feet when we were passing about 7;500 feet. We input the 9;000 feet to the MCP but the Autopilot overshot 9;000 feet and I told the PF that the autopilot was not making the level off at 9;200 feet. We leveled off at 9;500 feet and started to correct to 9;000 feet. The Controller then told us to continue climb to 10;000 feet. We climbed to 10;000 feet and the rest of the flight was uneventful.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported over shooting an altitude during departure.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Heating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X encountered a smoke/odor/fume event during landing at ZZZ for smoke and a strong electrical burning smell in the aft galley. The aircraft flight crew requested airport emergency equipment assistance after landing. The aircraft was taken out of service for troubleshooting. Several items and components were evaluated including coffeemakers and galley lighting ballasts and wiring. Ultimately ZZZ aircraft Maintenance discovered that the aft door heater had overheated and tripped open circuit breaker X1234 (D7 on the P91 PDP-1 panel). The heater intake was found clogged with FOD and debris. The debris appeared to be tape from overhead air distribution ducting and gasper vent ducting. There also appeared to be material from overhead bin structure. Suspect that the air distribution duct and gasper ventilation ducts accumulated debris from years of operation. Some the debris also appeared to have been relatively new and may have been dislodged from recent Maintenance operations. These operations may have included reconfiguration of the cabin during modification; or displacement of the overhead bins and ventilation ducting during installation. If one aircraft experienced this event; there is a strong possibility that other aircraft maybe developing a condition of FOD and debris in the air distribution ducting. To proactively prevent similar events all B737NG aircraft should be examined and inspected for FOD and debris accumulation in the overhead air distribution ducting and gasper vent ducting.




Synopsis: B737NG Mechanic reported a fume event possibly caused by debris in air distribution ducting.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While I was in cockpit partner said there is a strange smell. I went back and agreed it was strong and was calling Maintenance and saw smoke coming from floor below lav sink. Then a 4 to 6 inch flame appeared. I yelled; 'fire turn off bleed air'. He did that grabbed the fire extinguisher and headed back. The smoke and flames stopped when the bleed was turned off so extinguisher was not used. We got off the aircraft and wrote it up. In hindsight I should have had the cabin interior switch turned off also to cut the most likely source of the fire. We would have been airborne in about 30 minutes glad it happened on the ground.




Synopsis: While preparing for departure the flight crew of a CE-680 reacted quickly to smoke and fire emanating from the cabin floor beneath the lavatory sink; apparently the result of a faulty pneumatic system.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Was on a flight from to ZZZ airport and was on frequency with regional and cleared their airspace to the south and never switched my frequencies over to ZZZ. About 5 miles north of ZZZ I called the tower to get clearance but the problem was I called [my origin airport].I was then cleared into their airspace and asked to report 2 miles north. 2 miles out I contacted wrong tower again and reported 2 miles north they then cleared me into land. Upon landing I looked at the radio and realized the mistake I had made and immediately called the other tower and told them what I had done. They said there were no issues and to be more aware next time. Upon shut down I then called the tower on the land line and talked the situation over with them again and apologized.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot did not change radio frequencies to the landing airport.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise the Captain (Pilot Flying) realized that we accepted the ATC assigned altitude of FL350 when we had been limited by a Pack 1 MEL to a cruise altitude of FL250.  We noted that aircraft pressurization was within limits and we then contacted ATC and requested a descent to FL250 and continued the flight without incident. Better coordination of MEL limitations and perhaps using a visual reminder of any non-standard requirements during the flight.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 Captain realized that FL350 was not an authorized cruise altitude with a pack inoperative so he descended to FL250 in compliance with the MEL.