elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MLI.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C MLI
ATC / advisory: TRACON MLI
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Today Maintenance wanted to do a re-boot of the ARTS system. A CRJ2 departed MLI for DTW; was climbing out of 5;000 MSL when he was shipped to ZAU; and then maintenance re-booted the ARTS. But before we got the ARTS back; ZAU called to notify us that the CRJ2 had a TCAS RA and had to descend to miss a VFR Cessna squawking 1200 and not talking to anyone. The only reason we know it was a Cessna was because the CRJ2 pilot saw it when he just missed it. We were very lucky again! For years I have been complaining about maintenance taking equipment that we are using for SAFETY; Maintenance will take it out of service for maintenance. When it should be taking out of service at night when the tower is closed. But the Maintenance Manager refuses to have SAFETY as priority #1; instead saving money is his first priority; and saving lives is his last priority. Once again I strongly recommend doing as much maintenance and service as possible on the equipment at night time when the tower is closed; and the equipment is not being used; and safety is not compromised.




Synopsis: MLI Controller voiced concern regarding a recent maintenance re-boot during normal working hours alleging these types of maintenance activities should be performed during Tower closure hours.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Second aircraft: Global 6000 (Bombardier)
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landed Runway XX ZZZ; I was the PIC in the left seat. As we taxied off the runway; Ground Control told us to enter ramp. A Lineman stood on the ramp and directed us to enter at taxiway. As I was making the 90 degrees turn to the right; I saw that a Global 6000 was parked on the ramp in front of us. Not wanting to go wing tip to wing tip; both myself and the pilot in the right seat thought we had enough room to turn the additional 90 degrees to the right; and proceed the 100 yards to the waiting lineman. As we rounded the turn; the aircraft came to a stop on its own. Thinking we were clear; but not knowing why we stopped; I shut down the engines and exited the aircraft with the passengers. Passengers got in their car and departed. I then saw that the plane's right main wheel went off the corner of the taxiway and ramp by 2 feet into the dirt.


Second narrative: Upon taxi in at ZZZ was directed to taxi. Line personnel directed us to parking. I was in the right seat and no obstacles were present on right side of aircraft. The PIC and I both observed an aircraft on the left of our aircraft that was too close to get by without a taxi director. We had a Director on the left side but she was not watching our aircraft; but another aircraft taxing out. The PIC turned to enter the ramp and the right main went off the pavement into the dirt. PIC stopped aircraft and shutdown the engines. He informed the passenger; called the Company and coordinated the situation. Have more skilled taxi directors when ramp parking is congested. If a competent taxi director had been available and on site; this would have not happened.


Synopsis: G550 flight crew reported a taxiway excursion during taxi in.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Was doing unusual attitudes with student; I noticed aircraft when I was alerted by Approach about a target -400 ft. directly below me. I took controls and took evasive maneuvers. I believe problem could be solved by asking for flight following for maneuvers from Approach.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor Pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft while doing unusual attitude maneuvers.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X called level at 10;000. I had no full data block nor paired LDB (Limited Data Block). I looked up the call sign and saw an IFR flight plan. The aircraft was on the wrong code and had; I suspected traversed MYNN airspace and not been handed off to me. We had no strip posted; contrary to facility directive. Since we have been using ERAM (Enroute Automation Modernization) no strips print. I'm not sure if the aircraft traversed my whole sector from sector 60 or went through MYNN approach first. In any event; I failed to notice the Mode C intruder. The aircraft was in 41 airspace by the time I identified him. He may have been outside my airspace when I took over the sector. Compounding the situation the aircraft was not on the computer assigned code. He departed MYEF and was on a XXXX code. I looked up that code and saw it was assigned to another aircraft that departed MYEF at about the same time. I have no idea if the aircraft was even handed off to MYNN approach; or if he got together with anyone. Also compounding the situation was numerous VFR aircraft that are told not to squawk 1200 so as to penetrate the ADIZ on a 'discrete' 1200 series code; i.e. 1241;1253;etc.Sector 60 constantly routes aircraft through MYNN airspace that exit into 61's airspace through an inbound gate. Aircraft routed through MYNN airspace should depart on either BR49V; BR22-57V; or BR54V as appropriate. Also automated hand-offs with MYNN approach is an absolute necessity due to the volume of traffic into and out of the Bahamas!!! The letter of agreement with MYNN has a paragraph that says if they can't call with a handoff; the final resolution is to put the aircraft on us. They should keep the aircraft within their airspace. This aircraft called me over 40 miles outside their airspace. Unacceptable!




Synopsis: ZMA Controller reported of an airspace incursion due to a procedure between two facilities. Aircraft flew into ZMA airspace without a handoff; a data block or proper transponder code.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Arriving in the DEN area; late afternoon; with many thunderstorms and build-ups to the west of DEN playing havoc with charted arrivals. We were assigned three different RNAV arrivals in the space of 15 minutes when each became untenable due to weather. In one instance when we told the Controller we needed to deviate for weather; his initial response was 'UNABLE.' That was not the response [I] was looking for and was ready to declare and emergency but before I could do that he came back and cleared us for the right deviation. While these new arrivals may serve someone's purpose; they are complicated; cumbersome; have too many restrictions; altitude limitations; and are cluttered beyond belief. Throw in a few thunderstorms on the arrival and they become impossible. Just assigning another arrival does NOT help the situation in a cockpit that is already up to its ears attempting to avoid weather.




Synopsis: In a fifteen minute period; an air carrier crew was issued three different RNAV arrivals from the West because of weather and was prepared to declare an emergency to avoid a thunderstorm just as ATC issued an acceptable vector.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CNI.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF CNI
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While departing RWY 5 @ CNI we made the radio calls to announce taxing to the runway; taking the runway; and departing the runway. As we accelerated through 60 kts a small aircraft was observed coming the opposite direction on RWY 23. We immediately aborted the takeoff and taxied off the runway. The other aircraft took-off and immediately turned to the right upon seeing us on the runway. The other aircraft made a takeoff call only after he had started his takeoff roll and had made no other calls that we were able to hear. He claimed to not hear our radio at all although the operator of the FBO stated that he had heard us make all of our calls. The other aircraft appeared to have a very weak radioDue to the slope of the runway; neither end is visible from the other. The incident could have been avoided through proper communication by the other aircraft announcing their intentions before taking the runway. I would suggest that signage or electronic monitoring be added to both runways announcing that the opposite end is not visible and to make sure to announce intentions before continuing out to the runway. The wind sock showed a direct crosswind so either runway was able to be used. When the opposite side of the runway cannot be viewed at a non-towered airport increased emphasis must be place on proper communication and awareness of aircraft operating in the nearby vicinity.




Synopsis: Corporate Jet Captain reported an aborted takeoff from CNI Runway 05 due to a single engine aircraft departing Runway 23. The Captain reported that due to the slope of the runway; neither end is visible from the other.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The aircraft was climbing off of STP. I climbed him to FL410 and he read back FL410. I shipped him to ZAU while he was still climbing. ZAU called asking if the aircraft was supposed to be climbing to FL430. I saw his limited climbing above FL410. I told him that he was given FL410. I believe it was pilot error.




Synopsis: A ZAU Controller questioned a ZMP Controller after an aircraft just handed off overshot its cleared altitude of FL410 and leveled at FL430.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOI.TRACON, ID
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was an overflight via LVM and WYS. The flight progress strip in front of me; left by the previous controller had a giant 'V' on it; which I interpreted to mean he was VFR. WYS is not displayed on our radar maps (though it should be) and I looked at the VFR sectional to determine where it was in relation to ENNIS; which is in my airspace. I projected that the flight path from LVM to WYS would be through my 11;000 and 12;000 MVA's. At a point where the 11; 12; and 13;000 MVA's meet; I realized that Aircraft X was just dragging through the corner so I turned him on a 250 heading into the 11;000 MVA; climbed him to 13;000; for the higher MVA's ahead and coordinated it with ZLC sector 6.We get enough people going to and by WYS and enough TFR's and NOTAMs for it that we should at least display that on our radar map.This happened because I was complacent and thought: 1.) The plane was VFR; even though level at FL120. So many pilots fly VFR at other than right for flight VFR altitudes; I was tricked by the giant 'V' on the strip. The data block did not indicate VFR or have a (*) splat indicating MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) not processed. 2.) The direct line from LVM to WYS was clear of the 13;000 MVA area.




Synopsis: Boise TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude [MVA] area.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The passenger in seat X1 kept pulling his mask down; he did comply but kept doing it. He was also agitated when we told him we needed his mask to cover his nose and mouth. We were kind about it too. At one point he claimed to have a health condition. It did not say anything in the paper work of mask/face covering exemptions. I informed the other Flight Attendant and she agreed to let the flight deck know. The flight deck asked if he had been verbally aggressive towards us. He had not. The flight deck had a [CSR] meet the plane. We talked to [CSR] because the passenger told them we were rude and we were not. [CSR] told us we handled it perfectly.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out between 10;000 and 12;000 feet I felt an impact from the Captain's side of the flight deck with a loud boom. Assuming that we hit a bird at approximately 260 KIAS; I advised ATC turned on the autopilot; and returned. We smoothly landed over weight and returned to the gate without incident.


Second narrative: During climb at approximately 10;500 we both heard and felt a loud bang noise coming from the captain's left side; below the window. We thought it was a possible bird strike. We decided to turn back and advised ATC. We ran all normal checklist and the QRH for off scheduled descent. We notice low air flow output from air vents. We requested ILS and accomplished an overweight landing (over by 10;000 lbs). Returned to the gate uneventfully. Maintenance found an issue on the Captain's side window when they pressurized the aircraft to approximately 2.5 PSI. They mentioned this had been previously reported on other aircraft but were never able to duplicate except this time. They recorded video of it popping and flexing.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported a loud bang climbing through 10;000 feet. Assuming a bird strike the crew elected to return to the departure airport. Maintenance found an issue on the Captain's side window when they pressurized the aircraft to approximately 2.5 PSI which caused popping and flexing.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While preparing for the flight; the gate had a large amount of FOD in and around the Safety Zone. The aircraft had arrived early; and the previous crew had shut down. When we arrived at the aircraft; the ground air was not connected; and it was apparent that a FOD walkdown had not been done for awhile. I went down to the flight line to check on the air when I noticed lots of FOD in and around the Safety Zone. It looked as if no attempt had been made prior to the arrival or after our aircraft had arrived to clean FOD from the flight line. I found the following: 1 Transfer Tag; 1 paper bag tag; 2 strips of paper; 1 round red bag tag; 1 American Touristor bag tag; 1 blue tag; 1 bar code tag; 1 six pack top; 3 metal bag emblems; 5 zipper pulls; 1 lock; 1 lock with bag tag pull; 1 metal figure 8; 1 T bar; 1 Rayovac battery; 1 cigarette butt; 1 plastic razor attachment; 1 red plastic piece; 13 pieces of black plastic; 2 pieces of red stir sticks; 1 clear plastic piece; 1 red combination lock; 2 baggage feet; 1 dime; 2 metal washers; 1 rubber O-Ring; 1 tire valve insert; 1 orange ear plug; 1 blue string; and 1 black twist tie. There was no effort on the part of the Ground Operations personnel to pick up any of the more than 50 pieces of FOD. Since the jet arrived so early; there was plenty of time for Ground Operations personnel to conduct a good FOD walkdown. There was no excuse not to clean up the flight line of the large amount of FOD. There may be a belief that FOD walkdowns are being consistently done on the flight line; but they are not. The current habit pattern of not consistently doing a FOD walkdown before a flight arrives and before a flight departs needs to be replaced with the habit pattern of consistently doing a FOD walkdown. The Station Manager needs to take responsibility and active Leadership role in ensuring a FOD free environment on the flight line. In order to complete a proper FOD walkdown; Ramp agents need to physically walk through the Safety Zone with eyes on the ground to see and retrieve the FOD. I respectfully request some help with FOD awareness so we do not FOD one or more of our engines.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain laments the large amount of FOD found under an near his aircraft during preflight.