elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator ControlSystem
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll at approximately 90-100 KTS; the flight controls slammed aft in my hand and the aircraft shuddered with a jolt. I immediately aborted the takeoff. We cleared the runway; declined assistance from ATC but suggested that they check the runway prior to other aircraft using it which they did. We contacted the Operations for a gate and returned to the assigned gate. The Flight Attendant and passengers were briefed and I entered the aborted takeoff and the reason in the log book; contacted Maintenance Control and advised Dispatch. I'm not exactly sure now and wasn't then. At first I thought maybe we had taken a bird strike on the tail; but post flight inspection did not reveal anything. I just knew that it wasn't normal and that I had legitimate doubts as to the flight controls functionality and thought the better of having my concerns verified while airborne.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 control column move aft uncommanded and the aircraft shuttered during the takeoff roll at about 90-100 KTS so the Captain rejected the takeoff and returned to the gate.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight at FL230; we experienced a strong odor in the cockpit. The odor was present in the cabin also. We believe the odor originated in the cabin first. When we experienced the odor; we were in IMC and several lightning flashes occurred close by. We [Requested Priority Handling] with ATC; requested a diversion to ZZZ and performed an emergency descent. We advised ATC to have fire rescue standing by. We were vectored for the ILS XXL and performed a normal landing. Fire rescue inspected the aircraft then followed us to the gate. No injuries. Flight Attendant and flight deck crew as well as passengers detected the electrical odor. We immediately [Requested Priority Handling]; requested a diversion; and performed emergency descent.


Second narrative: Sulfur type fumes detected in cockpit at cruise altitude. Went away approximately. 10-15 seconds. Alerted Flight Attendant and she smelled it too. She reported no smoke from the lavatory or anywhere else. Although the flight deck smell went away but returned at approx. 2000-3000 ft.; the cabin smelled it the whole way down. They said it got stronger through the descent. Diverted to ZZZ; as this was the closest suitable airport in terms of time.


Synopsis: EMB-145LR flight crew reported strong odor in cockpit; also reported by Flight Attendants during cruise; and diverted to nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Clearance was 'Loupe3; as filed; climb via the SID; maintain FL190; expect FL390 5 min after departure...' Both pilots present and listened to the clearance on headsets. Reviewed and briefed SID. Both agreed no crossing restrictions; make the turn; stay below 200 knots under the Class B; and climb to FL190 as assigned in the clearance. Both pilots familiar with the airport; the SID; and previous deviations at SJC; so we reviewed thoroughly. Upon climbing through 7;000 or so; ATC advised us that we were supposed to have stopped our climb at 5;000 feet and stated no issue because there was no traffic that time of the morning but wanted us to be aware. Issued clearance to climb maintain 15;000. Rest of flight uneventful. I believe we complied with the clearance as issued. If the intent of ATC was for us to stop our climb at 5000; the clearance should have been either; 'climb via the SID;' or; 'maintain 5000.' The fact that we were cleared to 'climb via the SID; maintain FL190' tells me that I should climb to FL190 and comply with any published crossing restrictions on the SID. There were none. The only ambiguity I see is that the controller did not say 'EXCEPT maintain FL190;' so perhaps in that case we are supposed to stop at the top altitude of the SID? In that case; what is the purpose of even mentioning FL190? I believe a contributing factor is that the tower was closed and we received the clearance from approach. Maybe the phraseology was less clear because that facility is not normally the one issuing clearances out of SJC.




Synopsis: A CE-560XLS First Officer reported ATC advised them they climbed through the 'top altitude' of 5;000 feet on the LOUPE3 departure after they were cleared to 'climb via' the SID and maintain FL190.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SBA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The latest version of Charts+ (v18.7.24) has been released with out-of-date information and in some cases missing altitude restrictions and other pertinent safety information all together. Charts+ should never be approved as a stand-alone EFB with incomplete information. The pilot group will suffer an increase in violations. The format of the Charts+ seems to be geared for a European market and is not geared for our theater of operations; this in itself slows Pilots ability to quick reference information in the event of a go-around or Runway change therefore during a critical phase of flight; situational awareness; Safety; and CRM will be reduced to NIL.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew reported navigation charts had incorrect and out-of-date information.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Pushback
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During pushback from gate; we were given the ATC instruction clear to push back; tail North on Whiskey. As the Pushback Crew pushed the aircraft; they started pushing the aircraft tail South on Whiskey. When we got the air he had already started to swing the tail so we had him stop the aircraft while we coordinated with ATC to see if that would be a problem. They said it shouldn't be a problem and they had no worries about any conflict. This also placed the right wing tip fairly close to the service road. The First Officer looked out his window and did confirm that the wing walker was watching the spacing. We paused without moving giving the vehicles that were In line on the service road a chance to go around the wing. When the vehicles cleared we finished the pushback with the tail South on Whiskey. Everything was uneventful from then on. When the First Officer was starting the engines; I called Operations to tell them they should have a Ramp Supervisor meet with that crew to discuss what went wrong. Due to the error of the Pushback Crew; The aircraft was pushed back with tail South on Whiskey; instead of the issued clearance to push tail north on Whiskey.Watching this problem unfold I was struck with the thought; why do the wing walkers not have instant communication with the Pushback Crew? If they would've had wireless headsets they might've discovered the error and push back before I did. That could've resulted in getting the correct pushback direction instead of what we ended up with. I recommend that wing walkers have wireless headsets so they always have a back up communication with their tug driver. Relying on just wants to communicate properly is not adequate. I think a wireless headset that allows instant talking to the Pushback Driver is the right way to go. Both verbal communication from the wing walkers as well as wands should be used together. That would improve safety and be a better way to do it than what we currently do.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported Pushback Crew deviated from pushback clearance instructions.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This event occurred just as we were cleared to 'line up and wait' on runway 1R SFO at the intersection of A and B taxiway at the approach end of Runway 1L. The First Officer who has less than 100 hours in type; was finishing the second engine start configuration; changing the departure in the box per ATC; starting the before takeoff checklist; updating the takeoff data and was of course unable to assist me with taxi verification and Situational Awareness. At the time of our clearance to line up and wait on Runway 1R our position was near Runway 1L which caused confusion on my part as to where I was on the taxiway. A significant factor is the poor signage and lighting in this area and the new configuration constructed this year. I erred by not stopping and assessing the situation with the First Officer before proceeding on the wrong taxiway; letting the First Officer catch up and finish the checklist; thus we both misidentified our runway verification as we taxied onto 1L. Once I realized my error I immediately informed the tower and received a new clearance for Runway 1L. We were late for a multitude of factors; tired from a long day of flying that started in the late afternoon; had been delayed by ATC and a maintenance issue while trying to perform a 20 minute turn with an airplane change. I allowed a rushed situation with a very new First Officer to allow for this error and my performance was below normal due to fatigue.




Synopsis: When cleared to 'line-up and wait' on Runway 1R at SFO an air carrier Captain inadvertently entered Runway 1L; admitted his error and was eventually re-cleared to depart via 1L.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X departed ZZZ; and I re-routed them to 'FGHRN; then direct FAH; then as filed.'  The company filed ZZZ1..FAH.MADII1.KORD.  They flew the ERNNY2 arrival instead.  That is the way the company filed; the pilot never had to read back the arrival name.  They weren't required to.  When ZMP passed the flight plan to ZZZ tower; the controller would normally say; 'Cleared to ORD via ZZZ1; then as filed.'  So the pilot/aircraft/FMS flew the ERNNY2 STAR instead; which MKE approach was not expecting.There is no safety in this plan.  Two STARS; the MADII1 and the ERNNY2; are built right on top of each other; with similar fixes; so unless we ask the pilot every time; we have no way to know which arrival is programmed in the FMS.  Additionally; the pilot; when programming; could see the first fix (ZZZ1 or FGHRN) and push that button prematurely; without verifying the entire arrival.This situation is unsafe; and needs to be changed ASAP.  They need to have one STAR here; with different transition way-points instead of two STARS built on top of each other.




Synopsis: ZMP Controller reports of confusion of two STARS that go to one airport with similar fixes.  Controllers do not know what STAR the pilots are actually flying until reporting in or questioned.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: HECA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B747-C/F
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground HECA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Engineer / Second Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After landing on Runway 5C; Tower instructed us to clear on the high speed taxiway Victor and contact Ground. We called Ground and our instructions were to taxi; Tango; Golf; Bypass 2; Alpha; and to parking. It was night and somewhat hazy. The green centerline lights were illuminated on the full length of the parallel Taxiway Tango. Looking down the length of Tango; there was another set of green centerline lights for a right turn taxiway. Taxiway Alpha between Tango and Bypass 3 is closed. There is a string of temporary red lights leading from the east corner through the green centerline lights and across the taxiway entry. There is a second string of temporary red lights from the north corner across Alpha at Bypass 3. The temporary lights are recognizable; but not as bright as the green centerline lights that lead through them or as bright as the blue edge lights.There was a noticeable thump as the tires deflated. A set of red lights was observed at Bypass 3 and we stopped. The Captain then had the Mechanic open the L1 door and look aft. I went down with the Mechanic and we verified a set of temporary lights behind us over the left wing. The verbal taxi directions were clear and not an issue. The cause of the incident was the crew's failure to follow the directions as given and note the presence of the string of temporary lights. Contributory was poor signage and illuminated green taxi lights leading from Tango through a closed section of a taxiway. We stopped and notified Ground of our situation. The mechanic exited the aircraft through the E&E hatch and confirmed that tires 13&15 were punctured and flat. We shut down there and Ground said they would send a tug to tow us to parking. With two flat tires; we requested and were approved to remain at our current location. We then removed and replaced both tires; refueled and pushback to Tango for departure. The green lights from Tango onto Alpha should not have been illuminated on a section of a closed taxiway and signage needs improvement.




Synopsis: B747 Flight Engineer describes a taxiway incursion at HECA; resulting in two flat tires and damage to temporary red barrier lights. Crew had followed green taxiway centerline lights from Taxiway T to Taxiway A (not the cleared route as A was closed). Lack of signage and very dim red lights were cited as factors.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff; set thrust to flex; and below 80 KTS Engine Number 2 failed. Performed rejected takeoff procedure [and] returned to gate. Attending Mechanic said turbine failed.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported losing Number 2 Engine on takeoff roll. Takeoff was rejected and the flight returned to the gate; where a Mechanic reported turbine failure.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SYR.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SYR
ATC / advisory: TRACON SYR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a practice FMS (Flight Management System) backed up visual approach to Runway 33 in Syracuse we received a terrain warning while descending on the base leg. We had been at 5;000 feet MSL on the downwind and started a turning descent to 2;000 feet MSL which was our planned crossing altitude for the 5 NM runway extension we had set up in the FMS. We misjudged the required descent and descended too much too soon. We had also prepared for a GPS to Runway 33 just in case the weather would not permit the visual; but we neglected to brief a tower on the base leg of the visual and whilst descending we got an obstacle warning. We initially used the AP (autopilot) to turn away from the Tower but subsequently disengaged and leveled off as we turned away from it.Failed to evaluate obstacles in vicinity of airport and descended too early. Took evasive action. Brief obstacles from an approach plate even if flying a FMS backed up visual.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported taking evasive action after receiving an obstacle warning from the GPWS on a visual approach to SYR.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I have experienced the airplane not recognizing the 3;600 FT crossing restriction at HUNDA the last two arrivals into LAX runway 25L both times the airplanes were with Honeywell MCDUs. The airplane was in DES/NAV mode while pressing the APPR after passing HUNDA so that G/S would not be captured. Each time the airplane ignored the restriction; crossing HUNDA at 3;550 FT the first time and 3;540 FT the second time. I also noticed we were on the glide slope at HUNDA which defeats the purpose.I don't see anything in the AIP pages except not to arm the approach until after HUNDA. Is this a problem with the airplane or how I'm flying the approach?




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported an issue with the FMS which did not comply with altitude restrictions during an ILS approach.