elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201810
Aircraft: B757-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This is my first time working this aircraft; a B757-300. When giving the pilots a break I deployed the cart since there is no gate. When deploying the cart across the aisle I noticed that it does not rest against the wall as it does in all the other aircraft in the fleet. The B757-300 has a wider aisle where the galley meets the door cross-aisle. As such the cart is not 'stable' and I truly believe that it is a security threat. An assailant would easily be able to topple the cart as such.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the galley cart cannot be secured to block the flight deck for pilot breaks.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Design; Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Inspector; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pressurized brakes...It did it again. It was not even X years ago that I landed a Piper Malibu on a short runway only to notice upon touchdown that one complete side of the brake system was completely inoperative. Now; just last week; it happened again. Here's the story; and Piper needs to fix to the design problem...The Malibu has inverted master brake cylinders on the rudder pedals like many Pipers. Normally; the brakes work and there are no problems. Yet an insidious problem will develop. There are 3 O-rings on each master cylinder and these O-rings will leak. Yet; they will not leak brake fluid out of the system; they will and do let air into the system. The Malibu is pressurized; and when flown with a differential cabin pressure; the pressure is pushing air in to the brakes system thru the brake master cylinders. The cabin air which is under pressure is flowing to any opening in the cabin which to escape. When the O-rings in the brake system allows the cabin air to enter the braking system; the brakes stop working. If allowed to persist; the air in the system renders the brakes on the affected side or both sides ineffective...or even non-existent.Upside-down brake master cylinders...As you would expect; the air migrates upwards and enters the brake lines even so insidiously and it doesn`t take much air to make the brakes disabled. Here's the issue; Malibu brake failures are common on flights where the brakes worked perfectly on run-up and pre flight checks. The problem does not reveal itself until the brakes are used on landing.Although the checklist in the Malibu clearly states to check the brakes prior to takeoff. How do you check the brakes in flight prior to landing?If either side of the braking system is weak or non-existent; perform a go-around and consider your options. Pilot might want to fly to an airport with a longer runway if they have fuel. They may want to fly an approach a little slower and maybe plan to touch down as early as practicable on the runway. They might want to call for safety vehicles to be ready in case there is a landing over run issue and notify the FAA. In any case; you do not want to touch down on the runway and then realize you've got a brake problem. Many Piper pilots and passengers are in danger when this occurs.




Synopsis: PA-46 Malibu pilot reported brake failure during landing rollout; citing a possible design flaw in the braking system.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: Climbing out; Autopilot/Flight Director would indicate an overspeed and the plane would pitch up violently. Disconnected Autopilot and reestablish. 5 minutes later same thing. Happened 50-60 times during flight. Aircraft would not capture NAV. Flight Level Change (FLCH) would not engage. Could only fly in Heading (HDG) mode and Flight Path Angle (FPA). FADEC never shifted from TO mode with the Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System (ATTCS) armed. Checked Emergency Procedure Checklist (EPC) but could not find a checklist that would pertain to us. Decided to return to ZZZ. At decision time it indicated we would be 3000 lbs over landing weight so we initiated procedures to minimize overweight landing and returned to ZZZ. Landed approximately 750lbs over weight. Aircraft landed fine and there were no additional issues. Upon return I wrote the airplane up. Priority handling was not requested as the aircraft was still controllable with no Autopilot or Flight Director.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported malfunctioning autoflight system which resulted in a return to departure airport.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDPC.Airport, FO
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This incident started about 5-10 minutes after the last passenger deplaned. Doors 1L and 2L were both open; ostensibly for deplaning and boarding. There were many cleaners on aircraft from the front to the back. The situation was busy at best; frantic at worst. I was standing on the front air stairs when a Flight Attendant asked me if I could supervise her opening door 2R. The cleaners were beating on the door to have it opened so that the trash could be emptied. I agreed to supervise as no other crew members were available. I followed her to the back of the airplane where various ramp personnel were in aft galley conducting their work. She proceeded to arm the door as it had been disarmed from deplaning. It was at this point that I became confused. Before I could intervene; she pulled up on the handle; the door opened and the slide blew. She looked back at me in shock and said; 'Oh my god; I am so fired!' She was visibly shaken and in shock as was I.I should have done a better job confirming what was actually going on and trying to slow the process down. This included finding another flight attendant; pulling out manuals or rechecking door disarm indications in the cockpit. The overall issue for me was being distracted; rushed and uncertain of my supervision objective. I also believe she was trying to do the right thing; especially as a new employee. She was rushed and getting pressure from the cleaners. In retrospect; I think she was operating on muscle memory. Since she had already disarmed the door; the next event was to arm it. Additionally; she has a great attitude and was just trying to help others do their job. Procedurally; this might be avoided if aircraft crew deplanes immediately and gets out of the way of outstation cleaners. Or a procedure needs to be implemented as it relates to who is authorized to open and close doors during cleaning.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reports being asked by a new Flight Attendant to monitor her actions while she disarms and opens an aft galley door. The door is already disarmed but is rearmed and opened before the reporter can react; blowing the slide.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZPH.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-34-200 Seneca I
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZPH
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Seneca was on short final to runway 23 had to break out to avoid collision with glider on base or final to runway 19.  Both aircraft took evasive action to avoid collision. Weather was clear with unlimited visibility; ASOS winds 280/08. Multiple glider tow traffic was departing north (runway 1) then using a right hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Additional traffic was parachute-jump Otters departing north (runway 1) and using a left hand traffic pattern to land south (midfield runway 19). Local traffic was using right hand traffic to runway 23 (the wind favored runway). I believe that simultaneous up-wind takeoffs; downwind landings; both right and left hand traffic patterns on runway 1/19 are a collision hazard when combined with heavy local and transient traffic.




Synopsis: PA34 pilot reports a NMAC with a glider during approach to Runway 23 at ZPH; while the glider was apparently on approach to Runway 19. Runway 23 was the wind favored runway while Runway 19/1 was being used by jump aircraft and gliders and both left and right hand traffic patterns.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were conducting the RNAV 27 approach in Day VMC conditions to SAN with a Tailwind during most of the Arrival and initial Approach phase. The Captain was the Pilot Flying. When Cleared for the approach he followed the typical routine of arming Approach Mode which quickly captured lateral and vertical guidance and began descending on the glideslope. At the time we were at flaps one with about 10-15 kts buffer under the Flaps 1 redline of 235. Because of the tailwind and the somewhat steeper than normal approach angle; the aircraft started to accelerate after capturing the glideslope and quickly oversped the flaps by approximately 5-10 kts. The Captain began to intervene immediately with use of the speedbrakes but the acceleration trend carried us into the red line. After removing the aircraft from approach mode and taking us off the glideslope; the aircraft slowed below the red line and we continued configuring and landed normally. We wrote up the overspeed at the Gate in SAN.I believe that the core reason for this was a misunderstanding on the part of the PF (Pilot Flying) about what the aircraft would do once approach was armed. The PF said repeatedly that he thought the aircraft wouldn't overspeed with the automation set up with a selected speed and Approach Captured. Because of the tailwind and the aircraft's priority to follow the glideslope without regard to selected speed; an overspeed was possible. He may have been thinking of flight envelope protections in normal mode which would have protected an extreme overspeed but will allow the aircraft into the redline before they intervene.As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I should have spoken up when approach mode was about to capture the glideslope to caution that an overspeed was possible. We had briefed during the approach briefing that a threat in SAN was the likelihood of being fast and high but I will add in the future that flap overspeeds; especially on the initial stage of the approach are possible. Additional emphasis in training about automation priorities where the aircraft will follow vertical guidance without regard to airspeeds may also be beneficial.




Synopsis: A321 First Officer reported flap overspeed during a coupled approach with a tailwind.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JAX.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: SR22
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON JAX
Second aircraft: S-70/UH-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Pavehawk/Knighthawk
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Aircraft X from the southwest for an ILS to CRG. I asked NRB RADAR who was working Aircraft Y; to keep the pattern tight so I could follow with my approach to CRG. I asked the pilot to reduce his speed for sequence. Both CRG and NRB airports were VFR with low ceilings. Our Letter of Agreement states that CRG Tower will provide visual separation when the field is VFR; unless the Tower states otherwise. The final to NRB crosses over CRG Tower; and in this case the aircraft was vectored out a little further than I anticipated. I knew it was going [to] get close; but I figured that NRB would point-out the helicopter to CRG Tower; in turn CRG Tower would be talking to Aircraft X on final to Runway 32 to circle to Runway 5. My instinct was to verify with CRG that they could provide visual separation; and the Tower's response was that they were both above the bases of the clouds and they could not see them. I immediately called CRG Tower back and told him to break the aircraft out. I assigned a heading of 210 and 3;000 FT altitude. By the time CRG Tower got the aircraft turned; they seemed to have gotten close. NRB aircraft doing a GCA approach to Runway 5 is a conflict with aircraft doing practically any approach at CRG. The airports are just in close proximity to each other; and it's always a hand-full. Also; be more mindful of the bases in the future; and realize that CRG Tower might not be able to give the visual separation they are required due to weather.




Synopsis: JAX TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event when anticipated visual separation could not be provided by CRG Tower.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On our return flight we were cleared the visual approach about 20 miles south of DEN for Runway 35R. Before being handed over to Tower we were assigned 170 kts until FRONZ and intercepted the LOC and GS well south of FRONZ. South of FRONZ we were given our landing clearance and I had a gradual intercept with the GS. I am not exactly sure what happened in the interim but I remember being just inside FRONZ on the LOC and GS and we got the gear horn in which we immediately lowered the gear; got fully configured; ran the landing checklist and continued to landing. In the moment where we were it just seemed so stable just not fully configured. The Captain said the approach looked fine and we were on speed; fully configured and had the before landing checklist completed so quickly at that moment it seemed like the best decision and we landed safely. I do not feel that I was fatigued but I do remember being pretty tired on our return; we descended on the arrival without incident around some weather and the approach just seemed so uneventful. 20/20 hindsight I thought I remember thinking that the gear horn went off at 1;500 feet but I don't think that was correct and realized that it may not have qualified for the stabilized approach minimums. I feel like in the future having a bit more situational awareness of the Final Approach Fix regardless of our visual status would have helped. Communicating a bit more and using more callouts for both the Non-flying pilot and myself to hear to help with that situational awareness would have helped as well. I normally am pretty good about being in managed speed before the final approach fix as well but today I was not so I will work on making sure that speed is managed to approach speed by that point in the future regardless of ATC requests for us to hustle on our arrival.




Synopsis: A321 First Officer reported unstabilized approach into DEN citing fatigue as a factor.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Ground MEM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Per our FOM; I reported a cruise altitude change of 4000 ft greater than flight planned to Dispatch and never received an acknowledgment that it was received at all. We also had the airport change from a South flow to a North flow and we were not notified; which is not mandatory but certainly nice to know. There are specific items listed in the FOM that require notification for change and acknowledgement. This is a constant recurring problem with a lack of support from Dispatch while we are enroute which I feel is not in compliance with the intent of Flag/Domestic Operations. Especially with the fuel loads that are on the aircraft with the Fuel Sense initiative.Lack of compliance with FAR 121 Flag Domestic Operations for 'reliable communications.' I feel our dispatchers handle too many flights at one time and do not have the Flight Planning System or automation to handle the number we require.Better Flight Planning Software to allow point by point updates to our flight plans and more training and compliance from Dispatch as true Dispatchers rather than flight followers.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported that due to staffing levels he felt he is not supported by Dispatch services to the extent required by FAR 121.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Musketeer 23
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying (by myself) my Beech Musketeer Super III. The sky was clear; but a tad hazy and somewhat turbulent. After flying for about an hour my radios started to make a cracking sound. At approximately fifteen miles from [my destination]; I keyed for the Tower.  At this time there was a crack sound and all electric; radio and GPS went out.  I checked all other instruments and only the electric was gone.I circled away from the airport pattern to consider my options; always surveying for traffic. The thought of looking for a non-towered airport close by was hindered by my GPS flashing on and off. I also was aware that the electric may not be my only problem; and I did not want to become a glider for an off field landing if I could prevent it.Having knowledge of the wind direction for the landing pattern; I made a decision to survey the total area several times and go for a short field landing and quick departure from the active runway. I had no way to contact the Tower; but surveyed the area several times before taxiing down the tarmac.At this point I stopped in the tie down area and a young woman in a golf cart came to me with a note to call the Tower; which I did. The repair was to fix two wires that had parted from the alternator during flight.




Synopsis: BE23-24 pilot experiences electrical failure and lands at his Tower controlled destination airport without communication.