elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: SR22
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Second aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Aircraft Y requested departure from an airport and also requested a VFR climb. I gave Aircraft Y a clearance as filed and climb instructions to filed altitude of 28000 feet. I never issued a VFR climb as the pilot requested. There was enroute traffic; Aircraft X that was in conflict with Aircraft Y after the departure. I asked Aircraft Y if they could accept a VFR climb through 16000 feet. They replied 'yes'. I issued Aircraft Yan instruction to climb VFR below 16000 feet then climb and maintain 28000 feet. I then proceeded to call the traffic to both aircraft and 'suggested' to the Aircraft Y to level at 12000 feet until clear of the traffic. Both aircraft reported the other in sight. I replied 'roger' with no further instruction. Aircraft Y started his climb once clear of Aircraft X. By the 3 mile separation in that area; I believe the 2 aircraft got within 2.8 miles and 800 feet of each other.I was informed that this was an error due to the solicitation of a VFR climb. Per the 7110.65 there is no verbiage to state that ATC cannot solicit a VFR climb; just that the pilot must request it. If the error is due to controller soliciting a VFR climb even though the pilot requested it earlier; then the 7110.65 needs to be changed back to the verbiage of 'no solicitation.'




Synopsis: ZLC Controller reported he was informed he had a procedural error because he solicited a VFR climb from an IFR aircraft.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Aircraft: Airliner 99
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon loading the aircraft for the pm run; pilot noted that the Cabin Door annunciator wasn't illuminated during Before Start flow. After shutting off power; the pilot re-opened and closed the door; after which the annunciator extinguished. During normal startup; taxi; and takeoff; the annunciator remained off. The pilot initiated a left turn southbound during initial climb to a heading of 130; at which point there was a loud bang and rushing wind noise heard from the cockpit. Looking back; the pilot could see the air-stair portion of the cabin door was open. The pilot immediately reduced power to slow the aircraft and prevent further potential damage to the aircraft. He entered a left pattern for runway XX and proceeded to land; extending flaps and gear cautiously to prevent shifts in airflow changing the existing flight characteristics. The plane landed without further incident. During flair the pilot landed slightly flat to prevent the door from striking the ground. Upon shutting down; no visible damage was noted to the airframe.During climb out; a loud bang and wind noise in the cockpit alerted me to the issue.Faulty door sensor incorrectly indicating whether the door was locked or not.Executed an immediate shortened pattern and slowed the aircraft to land on the departure runway.Check the aircraft door inside and outside if an issue with the annunciator is detected. Confirm position of interior and exterior handles; lock buttons; and check internal door latch indicator.




Synopsis: Pilot flying C99 aircraft encountered passenger door opening inflight.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; I raised the landing gear handle and the left main landing gear failed to retract; followed by a 'GEAR DISAGREE' message. The First Officer continued to fly while I notified ATC and the relief pilot retrieved the checklist. The relief pilot and I accomplished the GEAR DISAGREE checklist. We held and contacted dispatch and [maintenance]. After reviewing our situation; we all agreed that our flight could not continue to [our international destination]. I [advised ATC]; proceeded to obtain vectors over the ocean and dumped fuel. After dumping was complete; we continued to fly around and burn fuel to get below max landing weight. Once below our max landing weight; we headed back toward [departure airport]. Even though our landing gear indicated down and locked I called for emergency vehicles standing by as a precaution. An uneventful landing followed.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported returning to departure airport after receiving a GEAR DISAGREE warning light after takeoff.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EC145
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A snowplow drove onto the runway while our helicopter was on short final. The pilot at the controls announced on CTAF we were inbound to runway 17; then announced we were on a right base to runway 17. At his point the road-grader type snowplow was driving north; clearing the west side of runway 17. The pilot announced we would enter a left 360-degree turn; then initiated the maneuver. During the turn the snowplow had exited the runway and was working on taxiway A1. When we turned back onto the final approach the snowplow was still clearing the taxiway; but working back toward the runway. As we passed below 200 feet AGL the snowplow entered the runway in front of us. We side-stepped to the parallel taxiway and continued the approach to landing on the taxiway. It appeared the snowplow did not have a radio and was unaware of our approach until after he entered the runway in front of us.




Synopsis: EC145 helicopter pilot reported abandoning his approach below 200 feet AGL when a snowplow drove onto the runway.
Date: 201812
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise the engine oil indications on the right engine were approximately half the pressure of the left engine and fluctuation erratically. As a precaution the QRH was consulted to see what action we may potentially have to take. While reviewing the QRH the oil indications began staying consistently red (25 PSI and below) and the EICAS warning message on ED1. Based on QRH procedures it was determined that it was necessary to shut down the right engine. After finishing the QRH procedure; we began to work on the approach and landing QRH abnormal checklist. During that checklist we received another caution message (HYD 2 LO PRESS) which was unrelated to the engine shut down. I then had to deviate from the Single Engine Approach QRH to address the new issue.At this point we were just past an airport that we could have landed at. However; dealing with the new hydraulic issue in addition to the engine failure; it was decided that continuing to our original destination was the least risky option to the flight due to the already complex nature of our situation. We were still in the low twenty thousand flight levels and had preparation prior to landing to accomplish that we needed extra time for. Flying to our destination allowed for a steady and straight decent and flight path into familiar airport to which we were already briefed and set up to fly. This was one less task to accomplish. As it turns out; we were set up just in time for the approach.The event was caused by an indication of the engine oil system that presented two of three elements the QRH requires the engine to be shut down for. Also; adding a second system failure caused the flight to become very complex as the crew and dispatch were evaluating our options.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported erratic oil pressure on the right engine and low pressure in the Number 2 hydraulic system.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were on arrival on the GEELA RNAV STAR for runway 25L. We were taken off the approach 3 or 4 times for traffic spacing. Additionally; there were several speed changes during the arrival. Our last clearance vectored us on a North heading and to descend to FL 190. Then we were cleared direct to GEELA and to join the arrival we began our descent to cross GEELA below 16;000 feet. I noted that The First Officer set the altitude to 7;000 feet on the MCP and the FMA indicated we were in managed descent. Passing 18;000 feet we began our descent checks; made the arrival PA and read the Descent Approach checklist. MNSTR is the arrival fix after GEELA and requires an altitude between 15;000 feet and 16;000 feet. I looked up and saw we were passing below that crossing altitude. The First Officer noticed it at the same time and made corrective action.I am not sure why the computer failed to capture the crossing altitude except that perhaps since these crossings were so close together and being so high on profile due to ATC spacing.I have noticed this trend and while it's not the prescribed way to descend on a managed descent I feel that selecting the lowest altitude for the arrival is part of the problem during these kinds of situations. I think it would be better to set the lowest crossing altitude for the next fix in the MCP when high workloads are expected in this case if 16;000 feet was set the MNSTR crossing would have been honored. Additionally; continued resetting of the MCP ALT window will keep the crew in the loop even in periods of low workloads on these arrivals.




Synopsis: An A320 crew failed to arrest their descent as required while utilizing Managed Descent to vertically navigate the GEELA RNAV SID to PHX. The reporter suggested setting each waypoint's lowest crossing restraint to ensure compliance rather than their current SOP of setting the ultimate lowest altitude and depending on Managed Descent to comply with intervening altitude and speed constraints.
Date: 201603
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was given an assignment to combine the two different Computer Base Systems (CBS) into one CBS of an ILS panel so that a process to in-source the repair of two company component can commence. One company's unit was found to have no CBS and was done per the Component Maintenance Manual (CMM). On the other hand; there existed a CBS for the other company that included two test methods; one being manual and the other semi-automated test that was acquired from a third party vendor. The shop mainly uses this semi-automated test method to certify units. I checked the program and compared with the latest revision of the CMM and concluded that there is a new test that is not captured in the program. It is a test feature that appeared to have been added in the revision after the test software was acquired. I implemented that additional requirement in the CBS; to be done prior to the automated test as part of; the unit return to service test; per the CMM requirement using a fabricated breaker box and a power supply unattached to the test program. The CBS went through the approval process and went for publication. I went to the test stand; the same day to see the test program again and noticed that the program was edited in such a way to incorporate the steps that I included in the CBS to be done using a hardware. I tried to locate if there was a different document in work to change the program and couldn't find one. I informed my manager immediately using an email about the incident.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician was given an assignment to incorporate two different test methods into one Computer Base System for an ILS panel.
Date: 201705
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was scheduled to meet a flight at IAD Gate XX. It was coming in late. The plane landed during a thunderstorm and the ramp was closed. The plane was sitting on the tarmac at the line waiting for the ramp to guide it in. I was called at the gate and instructed that the ramper was in a truck and was going to bring the plane in and then when it was parked I was to put the jet bridge up to the aircraft. I questioned the zone control if the ramp guys in the truck were going to chock the nose wheel before I approached the plane. He said yes. When the plane was parked; the ramp guy motioned for me to go to the plane. I motioned for him to chock the tires and he just waved and then started to drive away. Zone called and told me that the pilot had set the brake and to put the jet bridge on the airplane. I told him again that SOP was for the wheel to be chocked. The supervisor came to the jet bridge and told me to put it on the airplane. I told him if he was giving me a direct order; I would do it; but would not be responsible for any damage that was to occur from the wheels not being chocked. I was told by the area manager that this was SOP during weather. Calls were made confirm this and he was told that we do not do this. We also asked two different jet bridge trainers and they said we do not go to the plane until the wheels are chocked. Another issue is that the ramper had the chocks between the plane and the jet way and if they were driven over; it could cause the jet bridge to hit the plane while driving to it.




Synopsis: Jet Bridge Operator at IAD reported being ordered to place the jet bridge on an aircraft that was not chocked in accordance with Standard Operating Procedure.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had total fuel exhaustion after three hours fifteen minutes in flight. Aircraft burns 12.2 GPH with 55 gallons total; 53 usable; for 4 hours 18 minutes of fuel. Flight computations showed max fuel burn would be 45 gallons for 3.7 hours of flight. I ran the plane 50 degrees rich of peak EGT. Subsequently I have learned the EGT gauge was out of calibration. I was burning nearly 15 GPH. Lesson learned; get familiar with any new aircraft. Aircraft was landed without incident and upon landing called FSS and had them call the Center with landing information.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported fuel exhaustion in flight when fuel was burned at a higher than normal rate due in part to an inaccurate EGT gauge.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During training; for the 737-MAX there was no mention that using the Altitude Intervention (ALT INTV) button would change the FMC altitude. However; when we entered a lower altitude from cruise altitude and selected the ALT INTV button; the MCP altitude was entered into the FMC. When we received a new lower altitude and entered it in the MCP and with VNAV selected the aircraft did not start a descent like previous NG aircraft.We noticed that the FMC had a new cruise altitude that we had not entered through the FMC. (The altitude had automatically been entered from the MCP.) We selected the ALT INTV button to allow the aircraft to descend again. This happened two or three times. This safety issue was unexpected and could lead to an altitude violation and safety hazard. 737-MAX FRM (Fault Reporting Manual) 4.1.3 item 10 Altitude Intervention switch: under 'push-(during VNAV cruise)' states: 'Lower FMC cruise altitude cannot be entered using ALT INTV switch.'  Our aircraft DID reset the FMC altitude with the ALT INTV switch.




Synopsis: Captain reported procedural issues with the FMS on the 737-MAX in reference to descent capabilities.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Beginning descent into JFK from 20;000 ft. we were cleared to cross CCC at 12;000 ft. Seat belt sign was off as we were in calm clear conditions; typically passing 18;000 ft. arrival PA to pax would be made and seatbelt sign illuminated. There was no traffic in our vicinity depicted on TCAS nor did ATC advise us of any. Suddenly the aircraft began to roll abruptly to the left and right as well as pitching (less abruptly) down. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and stabilized the aircraft's flight path; the pilot monitoring immediately illuminated the seatbelt sign and contacted ATC. He asked if they were 'Following anything heavy' to which ATC informed them they were more than 20 miles in trail of a Boeing 777.  The Pilot Monitoring informed ATC that they had experienced serious wake turbulence and asked for a vector off course to mitigate the situation. Once stable; the Captain made a PA to the passengers informing them of the cause of the disturbance and followed up with a call to the flight attendants to verify they and everyone else were OK.  The voice of a different Controller then came on the radio and asked if any injuries had been sustained of if assistance was needed; to which the Captain replied no.  After the situation was under control; the Captain advised that the aircraft could return to course and continue the flight as planned.  Unexpected wake turbulence with adequate spacing between aircraft.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into JFK more than 20 miles in trail of a B777.