elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; Turbulence; Windshear; 4
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We took off in low IFR with the intent to reposition the aircraft to ZZZ. Enroute we were informed by ATC that the best course around a thunderstorm would be 200 miles north of our course. As we did not have enough fuel for that option the PIC decided to deviate and shoot an approach at ZZZ1. We were at 14;000 feet and only about 18 miles from the airport; in a rush to get set for the approach we descended through the altitude assigned by ATC to intercept the localizer. After 2 advisories of a low altitude alert by the controller we proceeded to go missed. Our climbout instructions were to maintain runway heading and climb to 3;000 feet. After the autopilot was kicked off the PIC became disoriented and we began a turn that developed into a 45 degree bank before it was corrected by the SIC. We then received vectors back to [departure airport] and successfully shot the ILS approach.




Synopsis: King Air flight crew received two low altitude alerts from ATC resulting in a missed approach.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I am suggesting that an investigation is launched into the possibility of contract aircraft cleaners unknowingly scratching aircraft windshields while performing their duties. After thinking more about the Tech Ops Update and a recent CBT (Computer Based Training) on 737 Windshield scratching I wonder if the uptick in B737 windshield replacements is from non-certificated individuals inadvertently imposing damage to the windshields. I am not sure what method the cleaners use; what cleaning agents; what type of cloth; etc. Do the materials conform to the Boeing Maintenance Manual? Not pointing a finger here; but just thinking that we may have an opportunity to reduce inadvertent damage to the windshields here if we initiate a change management process. Again; the cleaners are just doing what they believe is their job; but it may have been an oversight that we (company) requested them to clean the windshields; or didn't realize that they were cleaning the aircraft windshields; potentially using a damaging process; chemical or consumable item (rags; paper towels; etc.).




Synopsis: Aircraft Technician suggests a link between aircraft cleaning and windshield damage.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 310/T310C
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was on a downwind for Runway XX at ZZZ and issued a visual approach clearance with restriction maintain 3;000 feet until turning base and told to contact Tower.  I turned base and started the descent.  Upon contacting Tower; I was instructed to immediately climb to avoid a traffic conflict below me.  I then noticed the traffic alert on my ADS-B screen 400 feet below me and climbed to avoid while on base.  Shortly after I was issued cleared to land on Runway XX for ZZZ.




Synopsis: C310 pilot reported a NMAC on base leg during the approach to land.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Aircraft X checked on frequency out of climbing to 29;000 feet and stated that he was Non-RVSM.  There was nothing indicated in his flight plan that showed that Aircraft X was Non-RVSM.  There was also no coral colored box around the aircraft altitude.  Aircraft Y was in level flight at 30;000 feet on a course that I thought would clear Aircraft X.  I was still processing the fact that the Non-RVSM information from the plane and my display were at odds; so I failed to stop Aircraft X at 28;000 feet.  When I realized that the proximity was going to be too close; I turned Aircraft Y 20 degrees left.  During this time my Assist changed the equipment qualifier on Aircraft X to show he was Non-RVSM and conflict alert activated.  After separation was reestablished; Aircraft Y was cleared back on course. The pilot of Aircraft X stated that he had filed the same flight equipment numerous times and it kept showing that he was RVSM qualified when he wasn't.When a flight plan is filed it should give feedback to the pilot to show whether the altitude request is showing RVSM or NON-RVSM based on the equipment that is input.




Synopsis: An aircraft checked on to the Controller's frequency and advised they were Non-RVSM qualified. The aircraft flight plan suffix or radar data tag did not indicate they were Non-RVSM. The controller only used 1;000 feet vertical separation between this aircraft and another one.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The Captain and Flight Attendant deadheaded on the aircraft. During that flight the deadheading Captain and Flight Attendant along with crew working the flight observed a strange and extremely loud noise in the cabin throughout most of the flight. Maintenance was contacted about the problem and Contract Maintenance was sent to the aircraft to try and replicate the noise. The noise had been observed on this aircraft prior to this flight according to Maintenance; but they were unable to replicate it on the ground. The aircraft was signed off and after a delay we commenced the flight. The takeoff and initial climb portions of the flight were normal; but as we climbed through 10;000 feet the Flight Attendant informed us that the noise was back and even louder than before. According to the Flight Attendant the noise was throughout the cabin. All EICAS and pressurization indications were normal. After contacting Dispatch and Maintenance control the determination was made to divert instead of continuing to destination. ATC was contacted and we proceeded to divert. The noise persisted until landing.  Although we had no EICAS or instrumentation indications of the noise; the noise was loud and irregular enough that as a crew we decided it was prudent to divert and not continue to destination. A major threat during this flight was workload management; and communicating with Dispatch; ATC; Maintenance Control; and cabin crew and having to make decisions in a short amount of time. As a crew we delegated the duties and used CRM to resolve the issue. Because this issue was written up several times without being able to replicate the issue on the ground; it might have been a good idea to do a maintenance test flight in order to try and replicate the issue after several write ups prior to returning it to service.




Synopsis: EMB145 Captain reports diverting for maintenance when the aircraft he is flying begins to produce a loud noise in the cabin as it had on the previous flight and as reflected in the maintenance history.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Normal push and Number 1 engine start. As we began our taxi we got a call from the Flight Attendants (FA) that there was a smoke smell in the aft galley area noted by 2 FAs. We took the next taxiway and called for fire equipment. We taxied back to the gate and lined up to taxi in. At this point there were several ramp people that observed our return; but no one made any effort to marshal us in. On the taxi in we had attempted to call ramp without a response. Tower called local ramp and got a busy signal. After about 5 minutes and about 2 minutes after fire dept arrived someone marshaled us into the gate. Unfortunately there was no one to drive the jetway. We called dispatch and [operations] to try to get someone to move the jetway.  About 10 minutes after parking someone arrived to move the jetway. The ARFF people then boarded and found no sign of a fire.  The total time from arriving at the j- line to the door opening was 15 minutes. This is not safe.The people at the gate should not leave the area at least until the aircraft has become airborne.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported returning to the gate because of smoke in the cabin; but then having to wait ten to fifteen minutes for ramp personnel to get the aircraft parked.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 10-15 minutes after leveling off at FL300; I noticed the cabin altitude was at 8;700 ft and slowly climbing; 100 ft every 5-10 seconds.  We accomplished the cabin altitude hi checklist; [advised] ATC; and descended to 10;000 ft. At 10;000; the pressurization seemed to work fine. We never lost pressurization and the highest the cabin altitude got to was 10;100. After contacting dispatch; we decided to continue to [destination] at 10;000 ft. We told ATC we had the problem under control and that we would like to continue. We had no further problems. Pack 1 had been just deferred prior to this flight.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ-170 flight crew reported descending to an appropriate altitude when their pressurization system malfunctioned.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FXE.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Light Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departing FXE on the FLL7 Departure had leveled at 2;000. Controller gave a climb to 3;000; announced traffic and handed us off to the next Approach Controller. At this time the pilot flying announced less than 100 feet vertical separation from the traffic and we received a TA annunciation.  Pilot flying increased the rate of climb and we exceeded the cleared altitude by 300 feet avoiding the traffic.Suggestions - Pride [Provide] proper separation and don't hand off an aircraft to another Controller when there is a possible traffic conflict.




Synopsis: Light Transport aircraft First Officer reported an NMAC during departure from FXE airport and cited Controller handoff procedures as a contributing factor.
Date: 201808
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Ramp
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Flight] did not have 15 bags around HAZMAT. Called Operations and Ramp said they would move it to nesting system. I told them they had to leave the HAZMAT in Pit 2 and move bags to surround it. They finalized the flight without showing the move so I called again. They got it right the 3rd time.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported HAZMAT container improperly loaded. Error corrected on third request.
Date: 201404
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise; Initial Climb; Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Aerofoil Ice System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Training flights transitioning pilots to recent TKS conversion. TKS fluid has contaminated the cockpit vent system. Appears high outside air temperature may make TKS fluid (hazmat) contamination effect pilots very quick. Daily in training; I have watched multiple high time pilots; with lots of C208 experience announce they smell subtle TKS odor when they open the cockpit door in high temps; then have immediate effects from TKS fluid; headaches; coughing; throat irritation; bad taste in mouth; eye irritation. The scariest is I have watched two high time pilots complain of effects; then later are very confused and are unable to locate switches in aircraft; they don't even know where to start looking; and they have become confused as to what to do on a missed approach. Appears to be the symptoms of intoxication as the MSDS mentions when exposed to TKS. Aircraft is coated in a sticky film inside and out; so are pilots. Very dangerous effects on crew.




Synopsis: A C208 instructor reported that following TKS fluid exposure on a training flight; his very experienced student apparently became disoriented; unable to locate cockpit switches and confused about missed approach procedures.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Manuals; Weather; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During take off roll near rotation got antiskid light. Enroute; we performed antiskid inop QRH Checklist. The QRH showed no problem landing even wet. Reviewed MEL for any considerations. The MEL has a table that significantly reduces the allowable runway for landing calculations. MEL table showed that only XXR was acceptable and only dry; yet QRH showed no problems landing with antiskid inop. I am of course aware of no necessity to refer to the MEL in this case. I am afraid and concerned though that a runway is illegal to dispatch to; yet OK to land on when antiskid fails inflight.




Synopsis: A B737-800 antiskid failed during takeoff near rotation so enroute the QRH was completed and a landing calculation computed. The crew found the QRH stated they could land on any runway even wet; while the MEL increased landing distance so only 1 runway was available when wet.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Inspection Authority
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pa28-161 Piper Warrior. Total time in service is over 10;000 hours. The forward trim cable failed at the trim servo. The 1/16 inch cable to my knowledge is original and approximately 35 years old. This aircraft is in a high use and training environment and based close to the coast. The trim cable and servo is accessed behind the rear baggage panel and is visible for inspection. At the last 100 hour inspection I found no frayed cables. The trim cable in this area makes several full reversal turns through the trim servo pulleys and capstan. Following the incident; I found that the trim servo solenoid was not disengaging the motor in the manual trim mode which causes significant tension on the trim cable when the trim wheel is operated manually. I believe that the cable had a catastrophic failure which caused the 1/16 inch cable to break. The pilot made a safe return to the airport and no injury and no additional mechanical damage resulted from the incident.

Callback: The reporter indicated that following the cable replacement; the system would not run.  At that point he identified that the trim switch had failed.  When he opened the switch; he found a broken part that appeared to have caused a runaway condition.  He also added that this could have been the cause of the cable failure.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about a forward trim cable that had a catastrophic failure inflight at the trim servo motor on a Piper PA28-161 Warrior aircraft. The trim servo solenoid was not disengaging the motor in the manual trim mode; causing significant tension on the trim cable when the trim wheel is operated manually.