elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SBGR.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON SBGR
Aircraft component: TCAS Equipment
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Working SBGR Approach Control during vectors for ILS 9R with descent clearance to 5;500 FT and passing approximately 6;500 FT a 'climb now' RA was received. The RA target indicated 200 FT below at 12 to 1 o'clock. The autopilot was disconnected and climb was initiated. ATC was advised that we were climbing and responding to an RA. ATC was very busy with much frequency congestion and did not acknowledge our transmission. Shortly after initiating the climb all TCAS information stopped. There was never any vertical speed guidance during the event other than a momentary indication on PFD and a clear of conflict message was never given. We were in visual conditions during the event and there was no visual contact with any aircraft traffic nor did we receive a TCAS TA advisory prior to the RA. After all TCAS warnings stopped a slow descent back to our original cleared altitude was started and we requested further descent from ATC and continued the approach to landing. Given the conflicting indications that we had I feel this RA was possibly a TCAS anomaly possibly from another aircraft transponder transmitting erroneous information.


Second narrative: During descent; we received a 'CLIMB NOW' TCAS RA which showed traffic on the NAV DISPLAY at 12 o'clock and 200 FT below. The Captain (at controls) disconnected the autopilot and initiated an immediate climb as SBGR Approach Control was advised by the First Officer that our aircraft was responding to a TCAS RA and climbing. No 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' annunciation was heard from the TCAS system and there was no visual indication of traffic at any time during the event. SBGR Approach Control never identified any traffic in our area. There was no TA Advisory prior to the 'CLIMB NOW' TCAS RA and all TCAS indications stopped after the initial RA warning.


Synopsis: A B777 Crew responded to a TCAS RA from traffic at 12 o'clock 200 FT low while on approach to SBGR but the warning was apparently false and may have been a null bus fault.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Cowling
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Outlet circuit breakers tripped overnight so the planes battery and engine was cold. I placed the heater duct under the RH cowling of the aircraft into the engine compartment to warm it up and left the engine cover over it to keep the heat in. Prior to departure; I decided that I was going to need an assisted start regardless so I moved the heater from the engine to the copilot door to heat the cabin (this is where I believe the latches were initially left unlatched). I left the engine cover on not noticing the latches and walked away. Prior to departure; I removed the engine cover from the pilot side and removed the tail stand and chocks and started up. There was no sign of anything wrong until I was on takeoff roll and the cowling caught wind and came up into my view. I immediately aborted the takeoff roll and taxi back to parking. I normally check the cowling during my preflight and ensure it is latched; but the heater event happened after I completed my preflight inspection. I think that many factors contributed; but the main reason for me was that I had never done what I did with the heater like that before so my preflight routine was off. I also failed to notice the latches on my walk around because the engine cover was on while I was on that side of the plane; which I normally take it off before I even go inside to get my final manifest. I will make sure that I stick to my routine when it comes to the pre-startup walk around and be very vigilant and aware when something non-routine happens. Having this event permanently in my brain will also help me never do this again.




Synopsis: Caravan pilot reported rejecting a takeoff due to a partially separated cowling.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SSI.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZJX
ATC / advisory: CTAF SSI
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing Rollout
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on landing roll out on Runway 4 at SSI; a light airplane flew directly over our aircraft making an approach to landing on Runway 16 at SSI. Most of the traffic was using Runway 4 at SSI; and it is unknown why this pilot chose to fly so close over our aircraft in order to make an approach and landing to Runway 16.




Synopsis: Small Transport Captain report a near miss by another aircraft during landing rollout.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I and [another Maintenance Technician] performed a non-routine job card for the reinstallation of removed seats to accommodate a First Class seat removal and installation. [We] installed the new seats per AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) 25-25-01 installation and seat location drawing. The initial seat location marks were still present on seat tracks and we measured to confirm correct station location per seat location drawing. We completed the job that evening and Inspection sampled the card. The IFE (In-Flight Entertainment) cables remained to be connected on another routine job card. [A few days later] a Flight Attendant noticed that seat 6DF location may inhibit door 2 right from opening and notified Maintenance. It was determined that seat 6DF was [installed with the] rear seat paws on mark instead of the front paws. It was determined mark was correct; seat was relocated to correct location.




Synopsis: Maintenance technicians reinstalled a passenger seat row in the incorrect location due to confusion about the point of measurement on the seat structure. The rear seat legs were located in the position that should have been the front legs. The seat was repositioned.
Date: 201506
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Other N/A
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I have a concern that I feel can only be addressed with this [safety report]. I am aware that there is a training evaluation critique; but feel my concern would not be addressed as the training department does not see this as a safety issue. My goal in this [safety report] is not to condemn or accuse any one person or department but to bring light to a cultural issue that is leading to a degradation of safety and nonstandard operations.I attended training to complete my Line Operational Evaluation (LOE) and I had 3 different instructors who were all knowledgeable and professional but there is one safety concern I have. ALL 3 instructors said it was acceptable to call Flight Level Change 'FLITCH'. This is a deviation of our Flight Manual (FM). Our FM it demonstrates our V1 cut procedure and it calls for the PF to say 'Flight Level Change' upon reaching minimum maneuvering speed. The training department has an obligation to keep the operation safe and standard. This is the only switch that has 2 acceptable names in the flight deck. My 3 days of training were hindered when the instructors said 'FLITCH' and when my sim partner said it as well. When 'FLITCH' was called during my training it made me pause and become confused for a moment hindering me as an effective monitoring pilot. This is a safety issue when our training department gives line pilots the option to call functions of the MCP more than one thing. To finish I would like to state that each instructor acknowledged that this option of deviation was confusing for me because I am not used to hearing it and attempted not to say 'FLITCH'. This admission itself indicates this procedures should not be allowed. I would like our fleet training team to enforce 'flight level change' as the only acceptable call for this function as it is already in our FM.




Synopsis: The pilot reported that nonstandard phraseology for a critical flight management switch was being used by instructors in the training center environment. The phraseology used was a slang term; and does not comport with the airline's Flight Manual.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MFR.Airport, OR
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D MFR
ATC / advisory: TRACON EUG
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared to depart MFR on the Jackson 1 departure from Runway 14. This involves a climb on runway heading to 1800 feet; a right turn to heading 322 to join the OED R172 inbound to OED. Passing over OED at or above MEA/MCA one is to proceed on course. Our clearance was JKSN1.OED direct MLBEC which is a course reversal at OED of approximately 180 degrees. Upon joining the radial inbound to OED; the flight director will anticipate the turn extremely early for the next leg and directed a LEFT turn towards terrain out of approximately 4500 feet MSL. A brief moment of confusion occurred as to whether the FMS had been properly programmed before we realized why it was commanding this low turn that did not match up with the SID plate. As we continued TOWARD OED; Departure Control gave us a RIGHT turn to a heading of 110 and 'direct MLBEC when able.' Had this been in dark conditions or before we exited IMC and not been in communication with ATC this may have led us to fly towards terrain and experience EGPWS warnings or worse. The cause of this event is that the FMS is designed to anticipate a turn to the next waypoint and with large direction changes this turn could be well before the waypoint and in this case well too low. Additionally; I believe the SID is coded in our database incorrectly with no altitude limit before allowing a turn away from OED.The SID should be coded with either a flyover waypoint for OED; or a minimum altitude before allowing it to sequence to the next leg. Until that change is made; pilots should be directed to manually alter OED to be a flyover waypoint and not to diverge from that until directed by ATC that we are above any applicable MVA.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported ATC issued a turn to avoid terrain after the FMS started an early turn departing MFR.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [After takeoff] at acceleration height the Captain called 'flaps up; set climb power; climb checklist.' As I began to pull the condition levers back to 1;050 the aircraft experienced an unusual yaw and unusual engine noise. The #1 engine RPM was indicating the propeller had feathered and the #1 engine torque was indicating max torque. The captain and I agreed these signs indicated an unscheduled feather on the #1 side; and concluded the safest course of action was to secure the engine and return to [departure airport] to land. We [advised] ATC; notified dispatch; briefed the flight attendant; and informed the passengers. ATC gave us vectors while we completed all applicable checklists before returning to land. We landed safely with no further incident.




Synopsis: Dash 8-300 FO reported shortly after takeoff #1 engine entered an unscheduled feather condition. Engine was secured and flight returned to departure airport.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon receiving clearance to proceed and descend via the ANJLL 4 RNAV arrival; we were given multiple changes from ATC. We were cleared after HACKMN to OTOOLE for the ANJLLL 4 Arrival except to maintain 12;500' for Military Airspace. He then cleared us direct OTOOLE after verification of the original clearance. We were then cleared direct to CAANN and maintain 300 knots. This put the aircraft in a high energy state and high. The Captain tried to use speedbrakes and Level Change to dissipate energy. We were then given 280 knots. That changed our energy state. We were then told to maintain 14;000'. The Controller then queried us why we went through the CAANN restriction of at or above 17;000' and said we left his airspace. There was just a lot of confusion on what altitude; what fix; and what airspeed we were given from SoCal in such a short span that we ended up just complying with the remaining instructions and came in for an uneventful landing.There should not be so many clearance changes to altitude; entry fix; proceeding direct off the arrival; and airspeed changes in such a busy airspace.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported overshooting an altitude restriction on arrival into LAX; citing multiple changes to their clearance as contributing.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When the Captain pushed the power up and asked me to set power [I] began to adjust the power. During the final power adjustment the Captain called for an abort due to inability to control the aircraft. He had full left rudder and that wasn't enough to keep the airplane centered. We rejected the takeoff; I notified ATC; the Captain called for the Rejected Takeoff [Checklist] upon clearing the runway; and then he made a PA as directed by the QRH. We contacted Dispatch and agreed we needed to return to the gate for maintenance. While watching a maintenance test done by the mechanics we found that the tiller did not center itself when released from the right. With the tiller released it would hold about 10 degrees right deflection.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported the Captain rejected a takeoff attempt because of directional control issues related to the nose wheel steering tiller not centering.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Wheel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I removed and replaced the Number 1 Main Landing Gear (MLG) wheel and tire assembly on Aircraft X. Upon installing the new tire I noticed a small portion of the strut was more visual than normal. I backed the assembly off and reset it again when I still noticed something strange. I called my lead mechanic over to inspect the wheel. He agreed with me that everything looked to be normal. I proceeded with the Removal and installation per the [maintenance] task. Nothing else seemed out of the ordinary. I was notified later that there was no bearing present in the wheel and tire assembly and that damage had been caused to the aircraft.Was detected later that day by flight crew on taxi. The bearing was found in the hangar on the hub caps used to enclose the tires. Someone had moved the hubcaps for me since I was very busy working all night. No one found or noticed the bearing until after the incident. There was no bearing present in the wheel and tire assembly. Work overload on our night shifts. I have changed dozen of MLG wheel and tire assemblies the bearings have never been an issue for me. It must have come out when I was removing the hubcap from the Wheel and Tire assembly. The bearings are held in by rubber and do not normally just fall out they are held securely in the assembly unless pushed or pulled out. The rod used on the blue hubcaps must have pulled the bearing out of the assembly without me noticing.I would suggest placing placards on the tire and making the bearing more visible in the wheel assembly. I believe the rod holding the hubcap on the tire is not a sufficient way of holding it on and find a new method could prevent like this in the future. Mainly making the bearing more visible after installation would help significantly.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Maintenance Technician reported a Main Landing Gear wheel assembly was installed without a bearing.