elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On Aircraft X we received an ENOTOC (Electronic NOTOC) from Load Control. While we reviewed the ENOTOC   I noticed that there was no UN HAZMAT number and pointed it out to Captain as something I believed was supposed to be on the ENOTOC. Having flown cargo at multiple previous jobs I am very familiar with the HAZMAT paperwork requirements. However; as the ENOTOC is fairly new and the printout is overly confusing to read and decipher Captain contacted Load Control to get further clarification on the matter and to insure that we were in compliance with the procedure and regulations. Load Control assured us that everything was in order and correct for the flight. I do not recall whether we sent to NOTOC acknowledgment before or after we contacted Load Control for clarification. Apparently my initial intuition that something wasn't right with the paperwork was correct and we should have requested new paperwork be sent. Even today I have no idea what HAZMAT was actually on our aircraft. I believe the primary cause of this error is the cumbersome layout of the ENOTOC format to begin with. Every time we receive an ENOTOC it's like trying to decipher a sudoku puzzle. The columns (location; weight; UN number) don't seem to align with what is being listed for the HAZMAT. Even figuring out the location of the HAZMAT requires finding a number on the form and then referring to the bottom of the form for the actual position (at least I think that's what we do because it's a form that is in such disorder that I'm not even sure if I'm looking at a position number or a weight). To compound this ENOTOC issue was the fact that when we inquired with Load Control they assured us that the paperwork was correct and everything was in compliance with procedure. Where the error occurred is unknown; but more awareness from everybody involved could have easily prevented this error.  I [suggest] a reevaluation of the ENOTOC procedure and paperwork is in order. The ACARS printout needs to be simpler and easier to read. If it can't; then we should return to the previous procedure with a hard copy of the NOTOC paperwork.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported issues with Electronic NOTOC information format.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [We were] assigned the LAZIR1 RNAV departure off Runway 01 in DCA. After takeoff; pilot flying (PF) called for FMS NAV at 400 FT. He continued the course guidance; however; once reaching the river; it appeared as if continuing on the FMS guidance would take us into P56. I told the First Officer (PF) to turn immediately to the left and follow the river. I informed ATC we were deviating from the RNAV departure so as to remain clear of P56. He acknowledged and instructed us to intercept the DCA R328 and report established. We complied. Shortly thereafter; I commented to ATC that it appeared to us that if we continued on the LAZIR1 it would've taken us into P56. He said we weren't the first to complain of that and suggested we inform the company of the event. Another company aircraft followed us out of DCA and confirmed everything we experienced with the departure. The other event necessitating an ASAP was a speed limit exceedance on the departure. While setting the PF up to intercept the DCA R328 as instructed by ATC; he allowed the speed to increase to approximately 270 KTS at approximately 5;000 FT. I called out the deviation and he immediately corrected the situation.This departure (LAZIR1 RNAV) should be immediately suspended until it can be further reviewed and ensured that P56 will be avoided. It was a real eye-opener to us and according to ATC there have been many complaints from pilots that it takes aircraft way too close (or slightly into) P56. The speed limit violation occurred because of the distraction caused by the deviation from the RNAV departure.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain departing DCA on the LAZIR1 RNAV departure believes that the procedure takes aircraft too close or into P56.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GSO.Tower, NC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C GSO
ATC / advisory: Tower GSO
Aircraft component: Radio Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were taking off from GSO and upon departure we received an amber RA; APPR2 NOT AVAIL EICAS MESSAGE; and VA DOOM message on MFD MAP page. Once everything cleared we reported it to tower as a possible 5G interference. Weather was low IFR and during the takeoff phase of flight we got super busy. I accidentally forgot to write it up in the maintenance logbook. On Date I was advised by Name from flight ops about the 5G report and that the FAA investigated the incident and noticed that the report was not written in the maintenance logbook. Name then advised me to fill out a Report.Mitigation's to prevent me from forgetting to write up a 5G interference in the maintenance logbook is to keep up to date and review the 5G reports provided by the company on [the] app. If any questions arise use the available resources provided. For example; calling Operations or Maintenance for guidance.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving several MFD error messages during departure from GSO and cited possible 5G interference as contributing.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MQJ.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF MQJ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My student and I were holding short of runway 25 at MQJ; picking up our IFR release through clearance delivery. The clearance was given for immediate departure using an unfamiliar obstacle departure procedure. The void time for the clearance was less than five minutes. This caused us to rush to find the procedure and continue onto the runway for departure. We taxied forward toward the runway while tuning the CTAF frequency to make the takeoff call. As we taxied out; an aircraft that was on final and not seen by us landed in front of us. The aircraft crossed our path in front of us and did not overfly us. We stopped immediately before entering the takeoff portion of the runway. As PIC; I checked the approach and departure course briefly before rolling forward; but due to the proximity of the aircraft on final; the windshield/door frame blocked it from view. We opted to not takeoff and cancel our release to debrief with the arriving aircraft. The pilot of the aircraft on final advised us that he observed us approaching the runway and found that there was adequate spacing to continue to land and not conduct a go-around. This situation is a result of insufficient clearing of approach course. I believe that extremely short void times contribute to rushed procedures and could lead to smellier situations in the future with other pilots. Pilots are forced rush to gather the required data and get the aircraft airborne quickly if to make their void time. The void times add unnecessary pressure to a phase of flight that must be conducted extremely carefully. An increase in duration until clearance void times would allow pilots to conduct better CRM/SPRM and improve situational awareness.




Synopsis: SR20 instructor pilot reported feeling rushed by an ATC clearance with a short void time and missed seeing a C172 on short final at an uncontrolled airport. He felt that the short void time created an unnecessary hazard.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We; a C172S G1000; were flying to ZZZ under VFR radar vector with RNAV Y RWYXX for practice approach. While approaching to FAF; right after Approach told us to contact Tower; we found a Piper Cherokee on our 11 o'clock less than 500 feet horizontal above us and descending and approaching to us. We could not see them until last moment because they were above our wing 'blind spot.' Approach never mentioned about this traffic and our G1000 display never displayed its ADS-B location.  After I found the traffic; I took over the control from student who was under the hood and started descent in about 500-700 feet per minute. We reported to Approach after the traffic passed behind us. Approach responded that; it was showing 1;000 feet vertical separation with us so Approach did not mentioned that traffic. Also; that traffic was not talking to Approach; so Approach did not know their intention. After that; we continued the approach and landed at ZZZ.




Synopsis: C172 flight crew reported NMAC on approach.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Tower, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to IAH; just prior to FESTA on the Runway 27 ILS being flown in VFR conditions;  we were notified by IAH Approach Control of VFR / no com traffic as we were receiving a TA and almost immediately an RA for that traffic at 400 feet below our path.  As the controller was handing us off to the Tower; I advised him that we were responding to an RA.  Another voice acknowledged this; and we were then switched to IAH Tower.  The visual approach continued without further incident.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC during initial approach to IAH airport when an aircraft not in communication with ATC flew below them.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GGG.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON GGG
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Maintenance were looking into the DANTEL unit that passes information from the RADAR site to the control panel in the TRACON. At the request of the Technician; I gave 'control' of the panel to the panel located at the RADAR site. Immediately; the high voltage at the RADAR turned off and since we only have channel A RADAR while we wait for channel B to be fixed; I lost primary and secondary RADAR. I had no traffic at the time and I attempted to communicate with Maintenance what had occurred. Shortly after; a BE36 called after he departed a nearby airport to pick up his IFR clearance in the air. I informed him that I had no functioning RADAR and that I couldn't issue his clearance. Several minutes later; the BE36 called back and told me that he must have his clearance because he was in the clouds. I informed him that I still did not have working RADAR and he requested a vector. I told him that I couldn't vector him either and gave him a direction to fly generally that was away from taller obstructions. Soon after; the RADAR was restored; the aircraft received his clearance and proceeded on his flight. I don't have any recommendations because the VFR aircraft should not have climbed into the cloud layers.




Synopsis: GGG Departure Controller reports a Radar outage caused by maintenance. A request is received from an airborne BE36 to pick up an IFR clearance; which cannot be issued due to the outage. A few minutes later the BE36 pilot states that he must have the clearance because he is now in IMC. A few more minutes and the Radar becomes operational and the clearance is issued.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were conducting Instrument flight training. We had completed the approach and finished the published missed back to the VOR. We were completing the first turn back over the VOR when a [high wing aircraft] crossed our path at 2;000 feet MSL directly over the VOR. We were continually reporting our position on CTAF and after the near miss we tried unsuccessfully to contact the [high wing aircraft].At no time did [the other aircraft] make a position report. We had to pull up sharply to avoid an impacted with the [other aircraft] and we were close enough to clearly read their N number.




Synopsis: Helicopter crew reported experiencing a near collision with another aircraft while conducting a practice VOR approach.  Reporter maintains that the other aircraft never reported their position on CTAF.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B STL
ATC / advisory: Tower STL
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final for runway; fully configured for landing; at approximately 800 FT to 900 FT; the aircraft warning for windshear called for a go-around. It was day VFR with no clouds and a wind condition of nine knots. I asked Tower for a wind report and they called wind on the surface at 4 KTS. There was no associated turbulence and we had smooth conditions. I told the First Officer to continue for landing. [We] landed uneventfully with no change in wind conditions. I asked Maintenance about the situation and they claimed it was occurring regularly at STL.




Synopsis: A B737-300 Windshear Warning alerted at about 800 FT on final to STL in clear; calm weather conditions so the crew continued for a normal landing.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: Tower MSP
Second aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: An Airbus was a go-around from Runway 35. The Airbus was instructed to climb to 4;000 FT and fly heading 040. This is the standard go-around for Runway 35 at MSP; this puts the aircraft on a climbing turn directly over the top of MSP. At the same time I was working Runway 30L with a CRJ on about a 2 mile final with a second CRJ2 cleared for takeoff. The departing CRJ aircraft did not roll in a timely fashion. I cancelled the departing CRJ's takeoff and turned it off of the runway. The pilot acknowledge with 'blocked.' I again cancelled the departing CRJ's takeoff and turned them off the runway immediately. As the departing CRJ was turning and the landing CRJ was still on 1/2 to 1/4 mile final the ASDE-X alarmed and instructed me to go-around on Runway 30L. I instructed the landing CRJ to fly heading 290 and maintain 3;000 FT. This placed the Airbus and the landing CRJ both flying to the center of the airport; both climbing to altitudes. Today was VFR and we could see them and the landing CRJ and Airbus could see each other. The reason for this report is the strict adherence to the ASDE-X logic put those aircraft on a converging path when one of them should have been landing. The departing CRJ aircraft was off of the runway and clear of the hold lines when the ASDE-X alarmed. There are times when the ASDE-X alarms that it is correct to send an aircraft around. There are other times like this one when the cause of the alarm is known and visible to the controllers. Some one has to give the controller authority to override the logic of a computer when every one knows why it is going off and can see standard separation exist or will be when the arriving aircraft is over the threshold. If this would have been a low ceiling IFR day both of these aircraft would have been on a converging course in the clouds. Computer logic is a great tool but it is just that; live eyes and a brain will always be better.




Synopsis: MSP Controller described an ASDE-X go around command resulting in a potential conflict.  The Controller indicated that controllers should have alarm overriding authority when involved traffic is obviously not a factor.
Date: 201308
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft had been modified with the new (latching) audio selector panels. The note in the logbook cover indicated that the latching function of the yoke PTT switches had been deactivated. In fact; all interphone PTT function on both yoke switches were inoperative. Neither pilot could use the yoke switch to transmit on interphone because neither switch could be depressed down to the INT position. Both switches transmitted normally on the radio.We wrote up what we observed and briefed the oncoming crew. The Mechanic showed up; but we had to go to our next flight before there was any resolution from Maintenance. My read of MEL 23-16 is that with BOTH PTT switches in this state the aircraft can not be dispatched. This makes sense when considering that in a situation where both pilots must be on oxygen; their only option to communicate would be to latch the ASP switch to interphone; filling the interphone with the sound of both pilots breathing in their masks continuously. If it was; in fact; an error that Maintenance disabled not only the latching function but also the entire interphone PTT function of both yoke switches on that aircraft; then it may well be an error that has been repeated on multiple aircraft. Recommend that steps be taken to determine if this is; in fact; occurring when ASPs are upgraded and; if so; to re-enable the interphone PTT function of the yoke switches.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported possible maintenance non-compliance with MEL application to inoperative yoke PTT switches.