elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BDN.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G BDN
ATC / advisory: CTAF BDN
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As I was approaching BDN I announced my intentions to cross over the airfield from the east and enter a right downwind for Runway 16 as the winds were calm. At approximately less than 10 miles out; traffic on frequency asked if anyone was using Runway 34; someone replied the calm wind runway was Runway 16; then someone mentioned that gliders were using Runway 34. At this point the airport was 5 miles or less from my present position and decided to inform traffic that I was switching to Runway 34 (since others were using Runway 34); planning to enter on a left downwind. I misinterpreted my position from the moving map on the iPad and mistakenly entered a right downwind for Runway 34 instead of a left downwind. As I turned right downwind Runway 34; I recognized something didn't look right; I maintained altitude of 5;000-5;200 feet MSL and made a radio call but believe to have announced an erroneous position; I saw a Cessna on left base Runway 34 pass approximately 500 feet below. Another aircraft on left downwind said he had a visual on me but didn't know what I was doing. I apologize and said I wasn't familiar with the area; and that was going to intercept the 45 left downwind Runway 34. I continued heading west and then entered the 45 left downwind Runway 34; this time being on the correct pattern side; and continued.This was my first time at BDN; and although I had done my homework and knew Runway 16 was right pattern and Runway 34 left pattern; I only planned for Runway 16 since it is the designated calm wind Runway and the winds were calling light or calm. I should have planned also for Runway 34; for an instance like this or I also could have overflown the airfield and given myself time to re-plan my entry and comeback; especially since my entry plan had to change pretty close to the destination once I knew other aircraft were using Runway 34. I also could have use other resources such as my heading indicator and double check my position in relation to the Runway and proper traffic pattern.




Synopsis: PC-12 pilot reported they made an incorrect pattern entry to a non-towered airport resulting in a near miss.
Date: 202012
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
When detected: Other at gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Employee was seen multiple times on gates X and Y around other employees not wearing a mask; violating the company's mask policy. On multiple occasions; he was well within 6 feet in distance from other employees talking to them. Management has briefed everyone of said company policy. Employee continues to violate said mask policy. Multiple employees have tested positive for COVID; and he has previously had to quarantine for being in contact with those employees; yet continues to violate said policy.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported a fellow co-worker is not complying with face mask policy nor properly social distancing when around other personnel.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Pax
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: Other Unknown
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing a Mechanic came up to the flight deck to ask if we had any knowledge about a piece of tape over an oxygen panel in row 13 DEF in the cabin. This was the first time we had heard anything about it. Apparently a passenger had taken a picture or video of a piece of tape on a passenger oxygen panel and posted it online with a message stating something to the effect of 'I hope I don't need oxygen'. There were no MEL's on the maintenance log or the flight release. If there had been; the seat row would have been blocked. The First Officer and I went through all logbooks on the flight deck and found no write ups for anything to do with the passenger oxygen system. Apparently; Maintenance did not put the tape there. Concerns: Why were the flight attendants not notified by this passenger about the tape if he was concerned about it enough to take a picture and post it to the Internet? How did this passenger know that this was an oxygen panel? It is not labeled as such. The tape used had an FAA stamp on it. According to second or third hand information; the picture was posted to a Facebook account and forwarded to some friends; one of which happened to be the Vice President of Maintenance. Maintenance personnel removed the tape; placed an MEL on the system and blocked that row just to be safe. We continued the next series of flights. Is possible to track the person down by their Internet posting; or by checking the passenger manifest and checking for airline experience? Sounds suspicious to me.




Synopsis: A319 Captain is informed after gate arrival of a piece of tape over a passenger oxygen panel in the cabin. Maintenance became aware of the issue due to an Internet posting of a photo taken by a passenger. No write ups or MEL's could be found concerning this panel.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SJC
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Captain taxied into position for takeoff at the very end of the approach end of 30L. As he turned to line up on centerline; he was positioned significantly southeast of the yellow line leading from A1 Taxiway to the centerline 30L. This position seemed close to the blast fence for the approach end of 30L. Too close for my comfort; and I stated my preference was to be on the yellow line; not as close as we were to the blast fence.I have seen this technique in the past which I have assumed is used to maximize the amount of runway in front of the aircraft when takeoff power is applied. The Captain stated to me later that he does use this technique to give him more available runway and he thought that our performance data is always calculated from '90 feet from the end of the runway.' Based on visual factors; I thought we got too close to the blast fence on the approach end of 30L just prior to takeoff.My safety suggestion would be to survey the distance of that fence from the end of 30L and examine the use of the technique of taxiing very close to the end of a runway before takeoff.


Second narrative: Normal departure runway for SJC is 30R. 30R is under construction. 30L is an unfamiliar departure runway. The blast fence goes from a good distance from the end of the runway for 30R at A1 to a very short distance for 30L. Wingtip contact is possible if the turn is squared at A1 to line up on 30L. There is a note on the 10-7 page regarding MD-11 size aircraft and the runway end. There is no depiction of the fence on the 10-7 page. The closeness of the fence to the end of the runway can be seen on online maps.


Synopsis: A B737-700 Captain taxied to very end of SJC Runway 30L on Taxiway A1 at which point both pilots noted how close the wingtip passed by the blast fence. Runway 30R was closed for construction.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: TRACON MCO
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On VMC descent on the PIGLT6 Arrival just past JAFAR intersection at 12;000 feet; aircraft on autopilot started to bank left up to 20 degrees with associated turbulence. Shortly after aircraft stabilized level; aircraft rolled to the left again and started to go past 30 degrees in the roll without any corrective action by the autopilot. First Officer estimated our bank angle at its maximum was between 35-40 degrees. I disengaged the autopilot and went to manual control and took the sidestick to the right and the airplane responded immediately. We asked for an immediate turn off the arrival and we queried the controller about the target 7 miles in front of us (TCAS estimate) and it was a 767. We made a PIREP about the turbulence and continued to a safe landing. First Officer stated he was very close to stating 'upset recover' as part of our training. The downside to all of these satellite based RNAV arrivals is that it puts everybody on the exact same spot in the sky over a path and makes the trailing aircraft susceptible to upsets. The controller could have slowed us or spaced us out but it wasn't his fault that we are all tracking in line. This effort to get more aircraft throughput by ATC will end up in more of these incidents and could hurt somebody. We need to space out more on the arrivals and only ATC can make that happen. This isn't all their fault. It is the very design of these procedures by non-pilots that put pressure on our controllers.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B767 on descent into MCO.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 9
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Airport] emergency services arrived as I was running up for departure; I questioned over Unicom whether emergency services were on the active runway and received a reply from a pilot who departed a few moments before me stating that they were not on the active runway. Since I was not able to directly see if they were or were not there I proceeded to takeoff and announced my departure on Unicom. After applying power and beginning my take off roll the emergency personnel called in over the radio stating that they were on the runway. By that time I did not have the available distance to abort my takeoff and if I had it may have been more dangerous than continuing the takeoff. I rotated as soon as practical and made a sharp turn to the left to avoid overflying the cars/people on the runway. I made all reasonable attempts to ensure the runway was clear while emergency services made no attempt to announce their position.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported taking off over emergency services that were unknowingly on the runway.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: SEA Center controller assigned us to slow to .73 Mach. Got a frequency change to SEA Center 128.3. The 128.3 controller asked us our speed and we told her 310 kts. We had not intercepted 280 kts yet. She told us we were supposed to be at 280 kts. Note on Hawkz3 reads Speed restriction: Turbojet aircraft descend via Mach # until intersepting  280 kts. Maintain 280 until slowed by STAR. Flight continued without indicent.


Second narrative: We were assigned to descend 'via' the Hawker 3 arrival into SEA. There is a note on the Hawker 3 arrival which states '...max airspeed 280 kts when transitioning from Mach to IAS...' We were descending from cruise altitude on the Hawker 3 arrival north of BTG on an ASSIGNED speed of .73 Mach.


Synopsis: An A319 flight crew; descending via the HAWKZ RNAV STAR to SEA and maintaining assigned .73M; was criticized by Center for not being at 280 KTS when checking in with the next Controller. The chart; however; specifies flights are to descend via Mach number until 'intercepting' the required 280 KIAS until slowed by ATC.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 3
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The weather at ZZZ was forecast to be 1500 BKN and good visibility (VFR conditions; though marginal). I was VFR on top for the latter portion of my flight; and the weather conditions deteriorated to worse than forecast. As I got near my destination; the reported weather was 500 OVC and 3 miles visibility. At that time; I had legal VFR reserves of fuel; but I was not certain that I could safely make it to an airport with VFR conditions. Although I am instrument rated and current (ATP); the aircraft is not certified for IFR flight. I considered my alternatives; and decided to shoot the RNAV (GPS) XX approach into ZZZ; which I am very familiar with and have done many times in [a] Baron and in a King Air. The approach and landing were accomplished without incident; but nonetheless the aircraft is not certified for IFR flight.The primary cause was my decision to press on with the forecast for VFR weather at my destination. While there was never any hazard to me or anyone else; I put myself in a situation where I had to shoot an instrument approach in an aircraft that is not certified for it. Lesson learned!




Synopsis: GA pilot reported performing an instrument approach in a VFR-only aircraft.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had been written up by inbound flight crew for roll when flaps lowered from 15 to 30. Maintenance inspected the flaps; flap tracks; and spoilers and said they found no problems. Maintenance signed off the write-up. After a discussion with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Assistant Chief Pilot I decided to take the flight. On approach with flaps 30 I noticed the First Officer had made a right aileron correction to maintain wings level. I asked him if he was OK with this; and he said yes; so we continued the approach to an uneventful landing. Upon gate arrival; Maintenance was notified and a logbook write-up was made. I understand there was a flap spindle problem.




Synopsis: B737-400 Captain reports receiving an aircraft that has been written up by the previous crew for rolling during approach when the flaps are extended from 15 to 30 degrees. Maintenance can find no faults and the aircraft is dispatched; only to have the problem occur again on the next landing.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: When an aircraft experiences a maintenance issue at a location that does not staff aircraft mechanics; a field trip is dispatched from a Maintenance base. If the aircraft out of service requires an engine run-up or taxi; mechanics usually perform the task. Those mechanics in several cases are not being informed of the specific requirements of the airport they are visiting. They are not being told if they are authorized by the local airport authority to run-up or taxi; the taxiway locations; local frequencies; or any other information they need to perform a run-up/taxi in an unfamiliar location.Case in point; I was dispatched to ZZZ to perform maintenance on Aircraft X which ultimately would need an engine run at above idle power. Inquiries to local management; the Manager on duty at [ZZZ]; and a local contract maintenance provider could not provide any help as to whether I was authorized to taxi; or what the local taxi procedures were. Amazingly; the contractor suggested that if he rode along in the flight deck with me; since he had escort privileges; it would be okay.[Company] did not prepare this crew with necessary information to properly perform a run-up or taxi operation in an unfamiliar station. [Company needs to] provide departing field trip mechanics with the proper information including airport taxi authorization procedures; radio frequencies; airport maps; curfew hours; etc.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported not being given necessary information to work at unfamiliar airport not staffed with regular company maintenance.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SBA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C SBA
ATC / advisory: Tower SBA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We were on a left base to landing and we got the airport field in sight. The lights at the airport seem to be all on. When we were landing it seemed as if it was off; but still had complete sight of the runway. We continued and landed. Later as we were taxiing to the gate we advised tower and they said that something was wrong with the runway edge lights and did not come on during our landing. It was a great and safe landing and nothing happened. All the lights on the airport seemed to be working so it was hard to tell from our angle whether or not the runway edge lights were on.We could suggest to Tower to check their system to assure all lights are properly working.

Callback: The reporter stated that the flight crew asked SBA Tower if the runway edge light were ON; to which they responded in the affirmative. After landing ATC confirmed the lights were selected ON and indicated ON. They did however ask Airport Operations Personnel to check the lights and it was confirmed that the lights were in fact not operating.



Synopsis: The SBA runway edge lights were selected ON; but a flight crew questioned the light's status. After landing the crew was advised that the lights were selected and indicated ON; but in fact were not operational.