elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Distraction; Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Flight arrives at approximately XA00. Pilots go to the hotel and the Flight Attendant have a sit time until their flight departs for the next destination at approximately XE00. 4 hour ground time.There is no place to rest. The customer service employees have a conference room with a table and hard chairs which they offer the Flight Attendants. Flight Attendants deserve a place to put up their feet and close their eyes in the middle of the night. The length of the sit time and the lack of a place to rest adds to fatigue and is not safe. Scheduling needs to rethink this pairing. Get rid of the sit time or provide a comfortable place for Flight Attendants to rest. Poor planning. Get rid of this crazy sit time.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported sitting between flights in an inhospitable company conference room in the middle of the night as part of a regular; fatiguing crew sequence with inadequate rest accommodations.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A Citation Excel was on departure roll. I overheard Local Control 3 clear a helicopter for departure off the non movement area just west of the departure end of Runway XXR. I then noticed the helicopter lift and head toward the Tower in front of the departing Citation. The ASDE-X alarmed for occupied runway. I asked the Citation if he had the helicopter in sight and an affirmative reply was given. I then switched the aircraft to Departure. It appeared the helicopter crossed with mere feet of lateral/vertical seperation. I'm not sure what instructions were given to the helicopter on departure. I would recommend the helicopter Controller to have aircraft stay away from active runways until seperation can be obtained then give routing instructions.


Second narrative: While working Local Control 3; a helicopter called me requesting a southeast departure. I looked at what traffic Local Control 2 and Local Control 1 [had]. I noticed that Local Control 2 had traffic inbound for [Runway] XXR; but didn't see that he also had traffic about to depart [Runway] XXR. I saw traffic taking the runway for YYR and thought that the Local Control 1 Controller was departing. With those observations; I cleared the helicopter into our Class B airspace at or below 3;000 FT. I also told him to remain north of the east-west runways and to proceed east across the north-south's. The Local Control 2 Controller noticed the helicopter crossing down field in front of his departure. The incident caused the ASDE-X to alarm. The pilot of the Citation stated that he saw the helicopter and that it wasn't a factor to him. Coordination with the Local Control controller should be used to cross the active runways.


Synopsis: Tower Controller described an ASDE-X alarm when uncoordinated helicopter traffic passed in front of a departing Citation; failed internal Tower coordination was listed as the causal factor.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was asked to reverse the securing of oxygen bottles on a B747-400 aircraft per Maintenance Manual (M/M) [Servicing Chapter] 12-00-98. The item was on Page 207; Item (5). The sidewall where the O2 oxygen bottles are located was taken down and left open. I preceded to open and safety the six bottles. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) does not mention whether the O2 bottles are for crew or passenger. I opened and safetied six passenger O2 bottles. Later; when the flight crew requested crew O2 service due to pressure of 1190 PSI; crew oxygen bottle was found to be closed and not safetied. I did not see an open panel with crew O2 bottles; they were not mentioned in the AMM; and [I] did not perform any maintenance on them. The crew oxygen was then serviced to full.




Synopsis: During maintenance on a B747-400 aircraft a Mechanic was directed to safety wire oxygen bottle manual shut-off valves in the 'Open' position. Mechanic was later informed the flight crew oxygen bottle was found in the 'Closed' position.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X had to be vectored in trail. Aircraft X was level at 29;000 feet and slowed to 270 knots. About 10 miles southwest was aircraft Y level at 27;000 feet. Aircraft X was given a clearance to descend to 27;000 feet and fly heading 020. Approximately a 15 degree turn to the left. Pilot read back 27;000 feet and heading 020. About a minute later aircraft X was given a clearance to turn direct to a fix; which is a turn back to the right. Aircraft X did not turn back to the right but instead tracked way left; much further than the 020 heading that was issued. I then descended aircraft Y to 25;000 feet; and when I noticed that aircraft X did not turn to a 020 heading; I turned aircraft Y to a 010 heading. I then turned aircraft X to a 100 heading; but the pilot said she was responding to a RA and had to climb. Loss of separation occurred with 4.2 miles and 900 feet. I believe the pilot mistakenly flew the wrong heading. The plane's track looked as if it was trying to fly a 320 heading instead of a 020 heading; a very wide turn that affected the ability to turn back to the right. After asking the pilot what heading she was issued she said heading 020.I would recommend perhaps a redundancy system for heading inputs to make sure the correct heading is applied.




Synopsis: A controller was vectoring an aircraft for in trail spacing to the next facility. The controller issued a 020 degree heading. The controller observed the aircraft turning much farther left than the 020 heading towards other traffic. The controller descended the other traffic and attempted to vector the first aircraft back to the correct direction. During the turns and descents the deviating aircraft received a TCAS/RA alert and responded accordingly.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B NYC
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Issue with FMS malfunction on the HAARP3 RNAV Arrival. FMS system missed BAYSE intersection by over 5 miles. I noticed that it was turning early and thought that it was 'smart turning' because of the winds. I did notice something different that day in the way the information was being displayed. It showed the aircraft not flying over BAYSE; it did make the 8;000 feet crossing restriction; however; the FMS was showing 2 active legs at the same time. It was showing BASYE and HAARP as active legs. Upon arrival; Ground Control said for us to contact approach control on the phone. I spoke to [the] manager at LGA Approach Control. I explained to him that we thought the FMS was compensating for the winds. [The manager] said that safety was not compromised; however; in the busy airspace over NY; 5 miles is way too much. I spoke to the mechanics in LGA. Since we had received no caution or fault messages on the MCDU nor EICAS; they suggested to shut down the plane and restart it. They checked the database of both FMS and it was all correct.However; on the ROBUC 1 Arrival in BOS; it did the same thing. As we passed PROVI intersection; the aircraft turned towards WINNI and bypassed JOODY. As in LGA; it showed two active way points in magenta. We ended up getting vectors to final. The FMS missed JOODY by 2.6 miles.I made an Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) entry with as much information as possible and spoke to the mechanic in BOS that showed up to do a daily inspection.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ-190 flight crew reported two track deviations resulted when the FMS did not perform as expected.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MDW
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On taxi out of MDW we were given instructions to taxi on F; turn left on K and hold short of 31L. The hold short line for 31L is immediately after the turn onto K and caught me off guard. Ground Control stated 'stop there'. The nose of aircraft stopped beyond the hold short line.Since the hold short for 31L is immediately after the turn on K; the instruction to 'turn left on K' leads one to believe the hold short is not so immediate. A clearance to hold short of K would avoid this in the future.




Synopsis: A CE-560XLS flight crew crossed the hold short line of Runway 31L at MDW when they were unaware the line was almost immediately after they turned left off the parallel Taxiway F.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X has had several Business seats inop electrically. Customer Service put customers in the seats with expectations that crew will manually deploy and move seats to the desired recline and bring them back up. It's one thing to have to manually adjust seats when they become inoperative in flight BUT when an aircraft leaves with known broken seats it is a lot to expect the crew to get on their hands and knees to adjust seats. Today several female crew refused to move the seats due to previous injury- bruises; cuts and sore muscles. As the make and purser it was left up to me- after this trip I have a painful neck and right shoulder from adjusting the seats manually.Company is asking for OJI's with this continued practice. How about fixing the seats?


Second narrative: Seats 10K/L in business class blocked because there is no electrical function; including no reading light or call button. Gate [personnel] and I had it all organized. Someone away from gate unblocked 10K and sold an upgrade to a coach passenger. Pax walks on a bit intoxicated and says that he can do his seat manually- I tell him no for safety reasons. You have to understand these seats - to reset you get on floor; under foot rest; release buttons and entire 50+ pound seat flies down- very unsafe. They felt seat was not 'inop enough' to placard it. They expected FAs (Flight Attendants) to lower and raise seat multiple times for pax. This is an unsafe condition. I have an OJI past from this! Pushing sideways to raise a 50 lb seat is not a safe thing to do. I am reporting that a broken seat should never be sold intentionally with the intent of crew operating it manually. We do that if it happens en-route at some risk to our backs; neck and shoulders. Never should it be offered as a routine service. This is specifically about the former business first seats.  You have to do it to understand what I am trying to convey.


Synopsis: Flight Attendants report injuries resulted from manually adjusting seats in business class in flight.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LOU.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SDF
ATC / advisory: TRACON SDF
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had planned to fly to an airport 60 miles to the east from the airport I departed from. I called ground; and requested flight following. He gave me information; and I was given taxi instructions. When I was almost to the assigned runway; I was told I needed to give on course heading to my destination. I gave him one; but later changed it because of confusion. Another change request; and the controller got confused and asked if I just wanted to cancel flight following; and I did.The airport was a class D; underlying a Class C. My instructions I had received were to remain clear of class C; climb to 2500; and to the east. While almost out of the veil; departure said 'verify 2500 feet.' I confirmed this. I was told to change frequencies and squawk VFR; and later made it to my destination. I had done training at the airport before; so a friend of mine told me ATC had gotten angry over someone who had busted class C airspace. I realized class C started at 2200 feet; and a misunderstanding had occurred. I should have been more aware of the airspace dimensions; but I hadn't flown at the airport in two years; and assumed what I was given in my clearance would suffice for separation from it. On the other hand; the confusion on the ground and a misunderstanding during clearance relay was another cause of this incident I suppose. The airspace was not busy; so nothing came of it but frustration; but I surely do not want this to ever happen because it could be very dangerous.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an airspace violation due to confusion and miscommunication with ATC.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Operating flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After landing on Runway XX; exited on Taxiway A and turned left on Taxiway C; and believing that Tower had actually cleared us to taxi to the gate; we started to slowly taxi; when Tower called us and asked that we call Ground. We called Ground and he stated 'You started to taxi without calling us; and crossed Runway XX; which is an active runway'. We had barely started to taxi on C. We had read the NOTAMs; and in fact; Runway XX was 'NOTAMed CLOSED'; so it could not be an 'Active' at all. Regardless; we asked Ground for taxi clearance to the gate; and received clearance to the gate via 'C.' We did not want to argue with the Ground Controller; but we do know that Runway XX is Closed at ZZZ1; so it's not Active in any way. We asked the Ground Controller if we should 'expect any paperwork'; and he said 'no'. I do not believe we did anything wrong; but it's better to be safe and proactive; and learn from our possible mistakes.We had flown into ZZZ1 previously (a few days before) and due to controller shortages or consolidation of ATC positions (During COVID-19 times); the Tower normally gives us the taxi instruction after we cleared the landing runway. This time; we cleared the runway and thought we had heard the Tower tell us to 'taxi to the gate' (as they have been doing recently). We started to slowly taxi on Taxiway C and that's when Tower asked us to 'call ground for taxi;' something they had not done in the past 3-6 times we had landed there recently. So; probably I was expecting the same ATC procedures to happen; but regardless; in the future; will come to a stop on the taxiway and not move until further taxi clearance is received.I would suggest to avoid being complacent; and instead of expecting the same type of ATC handling from small airports as we may be getting every day during COVID-19 (combined controller positions; where there is perhaps combined Tower and Ground; or even Approach/Tower/Ground Controller); and instead treat it just like a busy airport.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a taxiway/runway incursion and cited ATC staffing; local ATC procedure change and confusion over a NOTAM contributed to the deviation.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on a normal approach to ZZZZ we put the landing gear down and did not get a GREEN down indication on the left main landing gear. We tested the light with no success. I took [control of] the aircraft and initiated a go-around. We were given radar vectors back for the approach. While on downwind the First Officer tried replacing the bulbs unsuccessfully. We declared an emergency; requested Aircraft Rescue and Fire [support] and had [station] operations notified. I gave the flight attendants their [preparation] items and made a [public address announcement] to the passenger notifying them we would be on the ground in 5 to 10 minutes. On approach we configured and asked Tower to see in our main landing gear was down and we briefed if we got any landing proximity warning we would do another go-around to further evaluate the problem. The Tower reported the main landing gear down; we had NO landing proximity warning and landed normally.




Synopsis: The pilots of a B767 identified a landing gear indication problem during approach and initiated a go around. After testing the light and attempting to replace the bulb; the crew began another approach. The crew requested visual verification from the Tower that the gear was down; and performed a normal landing.