elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While on descent on the SILCN1 RNAV Arrival; ATC informed us he thought we were coming in high. We rechecked our position/altitude and replied we showed that we were on the descent profile.  We were cleared to 'descend via; landing west;' but had no further instructions (e.g.; 'join the 30L Localizer.')On the SILCN1 RNAV Arrival; all points after VLLEY are 'At or Above.'  Since we don't close the arrival/approach discontinuity until cleared for the approach; the FMC thinks we're flying to KLIDE (on the arrival); then back to GILRO (on the approach); then again to KLIDE. ATC stated it this way: 'Company builds in an extra 20 miles;' which would be alleviated if (1) we had queried their intended follow-on clearance; or (2) ATC gave us 'join 30L Localizer' early in the process.


Second narrative: We were cleared to descend via the SILCN1 RNAV Arrival into SJC; landing north after comparing FMS and Jeppesen Plate. We selected 4000 feet in the control panel and verified VNAV was selected. We met the restrictions at SILCN and VLLEY; but after crossing VLLEY Approach called and asked us if we were going to make the descent. We thought we would; but he said we were 3000 feet high. He also said that Company always puts in an extra 20 miles into the arrival and keeps us high.All of the crossing restrictions from there were 'At or Above'; so we didn't violate any altitudes; but after checking our distance to the runway; we agreed that we needed a vector to lose the altitude. We got back on path and landed uneventfully.Close the discontinuity in our flight plan on our own; or ask ATC earlier for a clearance past our present limit.


Synopsis: A B737 on the SJC SILCN1 RNAV appeared high on profile to NCT but the crew explained late ATC clearance to 'join the 30L Localizer' prevents the FMS from calculating distances correctly. The FMC calculates the altitude to KLIDE; back to GILRO and the return to KLIDE and causes a high approach. Crew managed the error manually.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TUL.Airport, OK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C TUL
ATC / advisory: Tower TUL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was shooting a night; VMC visual to runway 36R at TUL. We were cleared for the visual approach while on a wide downwind. I turned final outside the marker and was angling towards the marker. I discerned at some point that I was low and intended to shallow my descent to stay above 1400 feet; when we received a single 'obstacle' alert and immediately executed the go around. We returned for another visual approach and landing; both of which were uneventful. This was my first night visual approach as PF since a 3 month period out of the cockpit. I flew a sloppy approach; what I should have done was fly this approach like it was IMC. I did a poor job of using the RNAV information for backup.


Second narrative: Was cleared for the Visual to 36R backed up with the RNAV at TUL while we were abeam the airport on a right downwind. Co-pilot was flying. We extended downwind to about the FAF and then started the turn to base. We descended down to the FAF altitude and then continued down to 1000 feet AFL prior to intercepting the final approach course. While on the right base to runway 36R we got an EGPWS warning of an obstacle. We executed and immediate go-around. Came back around and landed uneventfully. I didn't like the short downwind but the co-pilot has over 4000 hours in the airplane and I didn't say anything. Clearly I should have been more proactive and told him to extended the downwind and intercept final outside of the FAF.


Synopsis: B737NG flight crew reported getting low during a night visual approach to Runway 36R at TUL. A single EGPWS 'obstacle' alert was annunciated and the flying First Officer executed a go around.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On an instrument currency flight under the hood with a safety pilot. After holding; I reported established on the inbound course. Then; I was authorized to change frequency to the CTAF at which time we were 10 miles out and I made an initial call of our location and intention to do a low pass over Runway XX. Hearing no response; I commented we should be good with no conflicts. I made a position report at the FAF as I started my descent. At a waypoint which is 2.9 miles from the runway threshold; I made a final call with our intentions. We heard no activity on the radio; which led me to believe we had no conflicts. At that time my safety pilot told me to turn left as there was an aircraft that had just departed on Runway XY. I turned left as he did also.I believe we were on the correct frequency as I had confirmed the frequency when issued the authorization to change to the CTAF frequency. The aircraft is equipped with a Garmin GTN 650Xi as Com1 and a Garmin GNC 225 on Com 2. I was using the GNC 225 to transmit our locations and intentions. The GNC 225 shows an identification of the frequency. Both my safety pilot and I recall that the correct frequency was showing. I used the same radio to obtain the ATIS at ZZZ2 and for ground communication after landing and it worked correctly. I believe the radio was working at the time of the incident. I understand the pilot contacted the FBO where I rent the plane and commented that he made announcements of his intentions for departure Runway XY. We did not hear any transmissions.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported a communication breakdown with the other aircraft that was taking off resulted in evasive action to avoid a near midair collision while on approach to landing.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SUA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SUA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While departing SUA on an IFR flight plan; I was instructed to Runway 12. Taxiway A is roughly parallel to Runway 12; but has a slight 'bend' mid-span; as such; the taxiway sign attempts to reflect this bend with an angular depiction that doesn't directly mimic the actual taxiway layout. Further; the taxiway signage is set at an angle to the intersection of taxiways C & A; so that the layout depicted is further skewed to the actual layout of Taxiway A. This intersection is not indicated as a 'hotspot' on airport diagrams.During taxi; I was distracted by the momentary illumination of an annunciator light ('HYD'); while viewing this light; and while attempting to comply with the taxi instructions; I was confused by the taxiway signage and inadvertently crossed the hold short line for Runway 12. This was confirmed by radio communication from the Ground Controller; and I was instructed to taxi clear of the runway.Contributing to my confusion was my unfamiliarity with the airport (which I indicated to the Tower Controller upon arrival - I believe this was the same Controller who was acting as Ground Controller during my taxi outbound); and the layout of the aircraft's instrumentation following after-market modification (this was my third flight in this updated aircraft; and I had some difficulty in changing the scale of an airport taxi diagram depicted).




Synopsis: Small transport pilot reported a runway incursion due to a minor equipment problem creating a distraction; unfamiliar airport and confusing airport taxiway signage.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had just relieved a controller and sat down. There were some complex traffic situations brewing. The control room was very busy. It was during a mass exodus to get as many aircraft out of the state as possible due to Hurricane Dorian approaching. The area needed to be slowed down. I was shouting for a D-side to help me take care of coordination (D-side was supplied after this event took place); as I was working on fixing all the traffic scenarios that were brewing (including climbing/descending aircraft and multiple aircraft deviations due to precipitation around the state). All morning the Greencove/Keystone sectors (J75/J76) were extremely slow taking hand offs and point outs. We were having to call them on just about every hand off or point out. I came around on my scan and noticed that J76 had not taken the hand-off on Aircraft X yet; and they were already inside of J76's airspace. At this point (still no D-side); I get on the line and have to call 3 times before J76 picks up very nonchalantly and says 'Oh; he's radar; sorry we are training over here'. J76 then took the hand-off and I told the Aircraft X to contact Jacksonville Center. The controllers at Greencove/Keystone are notorious for waiting till the last minute to take hand offs and point outs. They are also notorious for going on the shout lines with snarky comments. This is a prime example of a controller asking for help and not receiving it. No D-side; no slowing down the area. It always seems like it is more important to pump as many aircraft as they can with safety coming last. Supervisors and Flow should listen to what controllers have to say. If we are asking for more in-trail off the airports; it's because we need it. Otherwise events like this happen. Also just because training is happening at the receiving sector doesn't mean it's an excuse to ignore hand-offs/point-outs. I think my area and the area at ZJX (Jacksonville) that we have constant issues with need to sit down and have a mediation. It adds an extra level of stress to an already stressful job.




Synopsis: Miami Center Controller reported Jacksonville Center not accepting a hand-off of an aircraft.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Transponder
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the second half of our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 while in the cruise portion of the flight; the FO pointed out the transponder was still in ALT On and not TA/RA. We switched it to TA/RA and continued the flight. My mistake for not visually confirming during the 'Before Takeoff' Flow and Checklist and my recommendation is to remind crews to really take their time and visually identify items are completed because a lot of us are going weeks or might go a month or longer without flying since COVID lessened our customers desire to travel. Best case I would recommend rotating people through scheduled trips to try to get people to fly at least every other week to maintain everyone's proficiency; but I understand that may be a tough wish.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported not recognizing until cruise that the transponder was set incorrectly. Captain recommended that crews visually confirm checklist items since many pilots are flying infrequently due to COVID-19 reductions in travel demands.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given a 110 degree intercept to the 25L final approach course at LAX for the visual approach. The First Officer candidate did not turn the aircraft early enough to avoid a TA following by RA to 'descend; descend now' due to traffic on the parallel final approach course (24L). I was trying to coach him to start the turn from our 360 heading to about 270 to intercept the 25L localizer but he was task saturated on trying to slow the aircraft and start our descent. At the time of the TA and RA we were already on about a 280 degree heading and still in a turn to final but the turn was started too late to avoid the TA and RA. We were still slightly above the glideslope and about 3000 feet AGL when 'clear of conflict' was announced so we continued the approach and were stable well prior to 1000 feet above TDZE (Touchdown Zone Elevation). I should have been telling the First Officer to start the turn at the first sign of his failure to do so.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported his First Officer failed to turn early enough on the visual approach to 25L at LAX and triggered a TCAS alert and a following resolution advisory.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Descending into ZZZ; I was given a hold due to congestion at the airport. While entering the hold at 23;000 feet and 250 knots; we thought we hit somebody's wake. It was a quick chop then it happened two more times. The third time we noticed ITT left engine suddenly fluctuate; and we felt a chop in the aircraft. We put on continuous ignition thinking maybe a compressor stall. We tried to find a check list for it but there was none; so we went to compressor stall in the non-normal check list and there was nothing pertaining to our situation. We were 35 miles from ZZZ1; weather was 5 miles and haze; winds out of the SW. ZZZ was 50 miles; but we were pointed that way; so I decided to [advise ATC] and head for ZZZ. I also advised ATC to request Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF). The engine parameters were never exceeded. The engine fan was LE 0.0; right engine 0.2. ITT was 656; LE 610; RE N1 was 73.9 both engines. Coming into ZZZ I moved the thrust levers to idle and up to 80% for normal arrival power settings; also the flight attendants reported loud bangs on the side of the aircraft. Inbound to ZZZ it did not do it again. The weather was clear and no icing. It seems when the ITT on the left engine went to 50 degrees more than the right engine; it would do it again. We were concerned it might shut down.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported that after a wake vortex encounter in a holding pattern; the left engine ITT increased abnormally; perhaps due to a compressor stall.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commander 112/A/B/TC
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon landing in a crosswind and gust of 15 knots from around 310 degree directional control was temporarily compromised right after the touchdown. The maximum left rudder was applied but the direction was not adjusted enough to follow the straight line. The airplane veered to the right. Instead of applying heavy braking; due to a doubt of sufficient braking action; the airplane was directed to the unpaved area between the runway and taxiway. The airplane was slowed and stopped on the taxiway. After a short explanation was given to the tower the airplane was taxied to the fuel pump. Visual inspections gave no indication of any kind of damages to the airplane. After refueling; return flight was made normally. One possible contributor was the rudder trim; which was trimmed to the left during the flight and was not returned to the neutral position. During the landing; the rudder authority was not as good as expected although the crosswind component was within the limit specified in the operation manual. Secondary; the gust in the cross wind might have been exceeded the limit together with the steady component of the wind.




Synopsis: A Commander 112 pilot reported a runway excursion while landing in a crosswind.
Date: 201304
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The FAOM states 'carts should not restrict access to jump seats.'  The Company's procedure for the primary meal service in our Business/First Class cabin parks carts in front of 3 jump seats.  There are 6 jump seats in that cabin.  Four flight attendants work the cabin.  If we have turbulence one flight attendant would not have a seat available.




Synopsis: B767-300 Flight Attendant reports that although the FAOM requires that carts not block access to jump seats; the standard First/Business Class service does just that.