elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: We where assigned holding while inbound to LGA on the KORRY arrival.  NFP sent a ACARS message from the enroute delay page stating 'holding' with all the pertinent information and requesting a bingo number and alt weather.  After approx ten minutes no response; I sent a second message this time using the misc report message function.  No responses came from Dispatch.   Since; our workload increased as we changed from one hold to another and ATC changed the EFC time  the Captain had a bingo fuel number planned which we agreed upon so we continued inbound to LGA.  If the hold would have continued ten minutes more a radio call was the next option.  Upon landing at LGA the Captain called Dispatch to query and they advised that they missed the messages and no alerts came through.  This is the second time in two weeks that I've personally ACARS'ed in-flight messages to Dispatch and received no response.  The past week was a gate related station not answering the radio message.  The Dispatcher in that case said; 'I didn't see your messages it went to a different Dispatcher...this thing is messed up'....




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer describes his inability to contact his Dispatcher via ACARS and relates a previous similar occurrence.  The Dispatcher advises that he never received the messages.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on the visual approach; Tower had cleared us to land. The autopilot was off and we were about 2;300 feet rolling out onto the final approach course with Flaps 9 extended. At this time we received the master warning with PTRIM BACKUP INOP and PTRIM MAIN INOP messages displayed on the EICAS. I pressed and held the autopilot disconnect button and instructed the PNF to ask for a heading and 3;000 feet because we had an issue to deal with. We maintained our flaps 9 configuration. We were handed back to Approach where we were given headings and eventually 3;000 feet. During this time; I commanded the PNF to get out the QRH to run the PTRIM MAIN/BACKUP INOP checklist. This is a longer checklist so ATC kept us in a box pattern in the area as we executed the checklist. After running the checklist; I concluded we would be without our main and backup pitch trim. We attempted to contact Dispatch and Maintenance Control; but were unable to initiate contact as we were at 3;000 feet and were on a frequency boundary. We elected to land on [the] longer [runway.] I made the decision to declare an emergency on the side of caution. I had previously called the Flight Attendant to inform her of our status. At this point I called her again to update her on our status and inform her that we were declaring an emergency. I told her that we would be on the ground in 5-10 minutes; there would be fire trucks along the runway as a precaution; to expect a normal landing; and no brace instructions would be given. I then made an announcement informing the passengers that we would be landing in the next 5-10 minutes and told them that we had an abnormal message on our display. I told them that there would be fire trucks on the ground only as a precaution but to expect a normal and uneventful landing. We set up for about an 8 mile final approach and I landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate. I called Dispatch to inform them of what had transpired and was transferred to Maintenance Control where I informed them of the write up and what had happened. A short while later Contract Maintenance arrived at the aircraft.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported EICAS annunciated PTRIM BACKUP INOP and PTRIM MAIN INOP on visual approach. They broke off the approach; ran the procedure; declared an emergency; and landed safely.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: EICAS/EAD/ECAM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: While performing other tasks; I noticed the 'Module Fault' fault ball tripped on a Rudder Ratio Changer Module (RRCM). Following the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM); a Step seems to be missing/not making sense; or possibly could use an additional decision block. Block-3 asks if fault ball is currently set after System Test (in this case; 'No'). Block-4 asks if fault ball was set prior to test; (in this case; 'Yes') and if 'Yes'; the FIM doesn't afford the ability to determine the system 'OK' via the previously performed test; but instead requires; regardless of subsequent decision; Block-56 (in this case; 'No'); further tests/troubleshooting even with no faults current on the [RRCM Module] box. This [RRCM] fault ball being set is fairly common on initial power-up of the B-767 fleet; (along with the 'STAB TRIM' EICAS message as well). Perhaps add a block to the Fault Isolation Tree to determine if the fault/fault ball has recurred in the last XX days/flights before mandating additional Checks/Tests? or a block; checking if the aircraft was just 'powered up'; and if so; the system is 'OK'.

Callback: Reporter stated the stab trim and rudder ratio changer are probably the most reliable systems on the B767 aircraft. Both modules however; have a common tendency to latch EICAS messages and set fault balls during initial power-up of the aircraft if hydraulics pumps are not running; due to the Stab Trim Control Module (STCM) and Rudder Ratio Changer Module (RRCM) sense low hydraulic pressure. He consistently uses the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for troubleshooting and wishes more Maintenance personnel would also. But his issue is with the procedure in the (FIM) for addressing EICAS Status Level Fault messages on the EICAS Maintenance Page that requires further tests and/or troubleshooting of the very faults he has already cleared. Reporter stated his Engineering Department agrees with him and has sent a suggested revision change request to Boeing for consideration after recognizing that unnecessary departure delays could have been avoided.



Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) suggests a revision that would add another Block Decision Step to Boeing's Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for B767 aircraft. The revision would reduce the required additional tests for Rudder Ratio Changer Module faults that commonly appear after initial aircraft power-up.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During takeoff and rotation speed of 102 kts; my First Officer went to rotate and it took full elevator and a higher rotation speed to get the aircraft airborne. The plane was within CG limits and proper fuel load. And under gross weight for takeoff. The elevator trim had recently been worked on and it appeared to us that the aircraft was out of rig with too much aft trim and NOT ENOUGH forward trim available. At higher speed the aircraft flew normally and we continued to ZZZ1 upon landing we notified the Operations and maintenance.




Synopsis: Commercial Fixed Wing Captain reported aircraft slow to rotate and surmised that aircraft was rigged improperly.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Coming in on the arrival we were vectored off at least a dozen times. After going south of the airport then on an extended downwind; we were finally given a heading to intercept the LOC. After we began to capture the LOC the controllers were giving us some speed tolerances and at around 25+ miles our plane began a severe right turn breaking off the LOC. At about the same time it became obvious the approach controller asked where we were going. I pulled the heading knob and began a left turn back. Once established on a heading I reengaged the LOC; at the same time the controller came on and told us to maintain 160 kts and the LOC broke off again; this time towards the left. Again I switched to heading mode and with the winds at altitude being out of the southwest at around 45 knots it took a great deal to get back on course. A final attempt was made to engage the approach again but again this time it started a hard right turn; I disengaged the auto pilot and began flying the plane and using raw data to regain the LOC and GS. I believe somewhere outside of [the FAF] we were completely established and unfortunately had a scud layer at about 1000 ft to go through before making visual contact with the runway. The raw data was working but the auto pilot was not responding correctly; and unfortunately due to the issues at hand we didn't get the opportunity to try the other AP.Because of the stress of the weather for the night and due to a long flight; combined with the constant vectoring and speed changes; I cannot completely say it was not an operator issue. I do know that any time the AP was engaged for the approach it vectored off and that when I hand flew it with the flight director it worked fine. Again I would like to have had the opportunity to try the other AP; I truly believe it was a mechanical malfunction. I'm not really sure how this could have been prevented beforehand but it certainly gets the attention in my book to kick off the auto pilot more often and just fly the plane.




Synopsis: MD-11 First Officer reported the autopilot failed to track the localizer on approach.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Crew Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: MEL
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: I was operating as First Officer and Pilot Monitoring on our flight. Upon arriving at the aircraft we noticed that the flight attendant jump seat was MELed. We reviewed the MEL which included reviewing a page from AOM 1 which outlined the procedure for running the weight and balance app with an MELed Flight Attendant jump seat. We followed the procedure and selected 'deferred' under Flight Attendant on the weight and balance app. We were then confused as to how we should count the Flight Attendant in zone A. We ran the app with the Flight Attendant counted in zone A which put our souls on board count to one more than it actually was. This lead us to believe that that weight and balance app had already accounted for the Flight Attendant sitting in seat 1A since the app is supposed to reflect MELed items. We then ran the app without her listed and this gave us an accurate souls on board count. I am confident that we ran this procedure correctly. This report is being filed because I personally found the MEL procedure confusing. I did not feel as though the procedure outlined in the AOM 1 weight and balance section for this situation did a good job explaining the procedure. If a crew was not paying attention to the souls on board it would be easy to miss this detail. The procedure in AOM 1 merely states to select 'deferred' however it should also specify whether the Flight Attendant should be counted in the zone A passenger count. The Captain and I discussed all of these points; ran the app; and continued the flight without delay. The plane was operated well within limits for the flight.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported confusion over Flight Attendant jumpseat MEL procedures.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: COE.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G COE
ATC / advisory: CTAF COE
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After we announced our takeoff for Runway 6 we taxied onto the runway and began the takeoff roll.  We heard no other aircraft moving on the airport.  Right after rotation we saw an Aircraft Y taxiing across the end of the runway.  We missed the other aircraft by 40 to 50 feet vertically and 0 feet horizontally.  Both crew members believe there are many radio dead spots on the airport that prevent effective communication between aircraft.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC during takeoff and while using the CTAF frequency at COE airport.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 35
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise; Descent; Landing
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at 38000 feet cruising altitude; 35 min into the flight; the LEFT GEN annunciator came on and simultaneously the autopilot disconnected and the MACH TRIM warning sounded. A Second or so after; electrical SMOKE began to pour out from behind the instrument panel. The amount of smoke was significant enough to fill the cabin and we immediately performed the CABIN/COCKPIT FIRE; SMOKE; OR FUMES memory item checklist. We donned our O2 masks and advised Center. We told them we would need to do an emergency descent and asked for vectors to the nearest suitable airport. We were cleared to descend to 4000 feet and given a heading of 030. We brought the throttles to idle extended spoilers and gear and did a rapid descent towards ZZZ airport. During the descent we turned off the LEFT GEN and reduced as much of the electrical load as possible. The smoke intensity appeared to decrease as we descended. We were asked if we needed assistance and we replied that we would like to have fire equipment standing by but there was no visible signs of fire. We were then handed over to Tower and cleared to land. We were able to complete a before landing checklist and the landing was normal. We exited the runway and the fire crews met us on the taxiway. After performing an emergency shutdown and exiting the aircraft we immediately disconnected the batteries to eliminate all electrical sources from the aircraft. The fire crews after making sure we were ok scanned the instrument panel with a thermal camera and detected two hot spots behind the panel. We both did have some discomfort and some burning/dryness in our mouths; throats and lungs from the smoke inhalation; but after some fresh air and some water we were feeling better.




Synopsis: LR35 Captain; cruising at FL380; experienced a left generator light along with autopilot disconnect and a Mach trim warning. Within seconds smoke began to pour from behind the instrument panel and oxygen masks were donned. An emergency descent was initiated using gear and spoilers. Vectors were received to the nearest suitable airport for a normal landing.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final flap retraction; received a LE Slat Disagree EICAS message.  Complied with all applicable checklists and procedures; burned off fuel in holding to comply with max landing gross weight.  Returned for alternate flap extension 20 landing per QRH procedures with slats locked between 1 and 0.  Declared an emergency shortly after indications; had emergency crew inspect our brakes for high temperatures after landing.




Synopsis: A B757-200 EICAS alerted LE SLAT DISAGREE during the final flap retraction; so the QRH was completed; the flaps returned to 20; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where a high brake temperature inspection was completed.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 10
Aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approximately 13 miles from destination; [I] experienced rapid engine RPM drop from 2400 to 1500. Called Tower to let them know of engine roughness. Applied carb heat; which lowered engine RPM even greater and it was difficult to maintain altitude. Flew on for a while and removed carb heat to gain additional RPM as I was searching for a field to land in. I was concerned that I would not be able to regain engine power and continued to slowly lose altitude and be out of good options for landing. I found and committed to a grass field and landed uphill without incident. Called Tower from phone to let them know of the safe landing. Checked fuel approximately 30 minutes after landing and noted fuel caps were hard to remove and required me to grab coat to help get a good enough grip to open. Right wing showed empty on dip stick and left wing showed 13 gallons.




Synopsis: Citabria pilot reported engine roughness occurred during cruise flight and landed safely off-airport. Post-flight; the pilot found that one fuel tank was empty and the other contained minimal fuel.