elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to Runway XX in ZZZ; I was the Pilot Flying. We were set up and configuring for the LNAV/VNAV approach with Flaps 2 and gear down a few miles from the FAF. ATC called us and said 'Aircraft X in the event you go missed; fly heading 090 and maintain 4;000' due to weather being over the published missed approach. I was monitoring the AC; but distinctly heard 'in the event of a missed'. Suddenly; the AC went into HDG mode while making a sharp right turn to heading 090. Being the Pilot Flying and not having touched the guidance panel myself; nor been told anything by the Pilot Monitoring; I immediately grabbed the yoke; disconnected autopilot; and attempted to return to the approach path. The Pilot Monitoring then said 'fly 090 and climb 4;000!' I asked 'Are we going missed? Why?' His response was 'Yes were going missed; I don't know why; ATC told us to'. Having distinctly heard 'in the event'; I voiced my opinion that we should not be turning and climbing. The Pilot Monitoring insisted I was wrong and we must immediately turn. Sometime later; he then queried ATC whose response was 'no- I said in the event. I did not tell you to go missed; but go ahead and fly 090 and climb 4;000.' During this time; I was calling for the AC to be cleaned up and speeds set; the Pilot Monitoring was busy elsewhere and we spent quite a bit longer in a dirty configuration than we should have. We had a major heading deviation as well as altitude deviation as a result of mishearing/interpreting ATC instructions.With so much emphasis put on not questioning a missed approach/go-around call; I believe we should also emphasize the proper verbiage which will be used by ATC. A major clue for me was knowledge that ATC will not use the term 'go missed'; they will say 'go around'; and they will add the reason for the go around on the initial call. There also needs to be more emphasis on confirming with the other pilot about initiating a missed approach or go-around.




Synopsis: First Officer [PF] reported a communication breakdown with Captain [PM] during approach resulting in an unnecessary 'Go-Around.'
Date: 201408
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B DCA; Special Use DCA; TFR DCA
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT; Tower DCA
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We received an IFR clearance from Washington Clearance delivery for a direct flight from DCA direct via radar vectors with an initial altitude of 4000ft.  Upon reaching the runway for takeoff; Washington tower stated 'cleared for takeoff' without any type of departure instructions; i.e. a heading to avoiding the prohibited area north of DCA.  We knew we could not continue straight ahead without going into prohibited airspace.  We queried again as we were taking off.  Washington tower replied; 'follow the river and intercept the 328 radial; contact Potomac approach'.  We made a left turn to follow the river and intercept the 328 radial.  While following the river and intercepting the 328 radial off of DCA (VOR); we contacted Potomac approach and were told to turn west to a heading of 320 degrees; and then 270 degrees to avoid a prohibited area.  Not sure if we entered the southwestern edge of the prohibited area north of DCA or not; but would like to have had more timely instructions from tower; be given a SID; a departure procedure of some type before we were given a takeoff clearance; or a heading to follow immediately upon departure.




Synopsis: IFR departure voiced concern regarding the lack of initial departure instructions departing DCA; especially considering the multiple restricted areas in the vicinity.
Date: 201206
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C MDW
ATC / advisory: Tower MDW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: On a visual approach to Runway 22L at MDW; one of the PAPI lights (second from the left) does not show up nearly as well as the other three lights in the system. It is difficult to tell if the light is red or white and therefore it is difficult to determine if the aircraft is on the proper glide path to the runway. Since there is no electronic glide path information for 22L (glide slope); the PAPI is that much more important to the Pilots on approach to this short runway. The PAPI needs to be fixed so all four lights provide the proper glide path guidance to the runway. A properly functioning PAPI system will enhance safety for Runway 22L operations at MDW.

Callback: The Reporter stated that this past winter he called ATC to notify them that snow appeared to be blocking that specific PAPI light. Since the snow is no longer present; it appears that the light itself is simply weaker than others in the array and because of its importance for night visual approaches it needs to be addressed.



Synopsis: A single MDW Runway 22L PAPI light; second from the left; does not illuminate as brightly as the other three array lights making glide path accuracy difficult to determine.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was sitting behind the Captain in the #4 seat. The Captain was the Pilot Flying on this first leg of OE with his student. During vectors for the approach and level at 4;000 ft. at 180kts; we heard a few loud bangs. I called out the engine stall. The Captain called for the Immediate Action Items. I pointed the [First Officer] to the correct checklist; and it was accomplished with the #3 engine being shut down and the QRH completed. As a side note; all engines were in ALTN EEC Mode due to the #3 engine write up that it didn't stay in NORMAL. The Captain accomplished a normal landing; and did the logbook write up. This was a good example of CRM in which we accomplished a safe flight.




Synopsis: A 747-400 pilot reported a #3 engine compressor stall; resulting in an engine shutdown.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HSD.Airport, OK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Travelair 95
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G HSD
ATC / advisory: CTAF HSD
Second aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a 1.5-2 mile final; after flying a standard right pattern for 17; with radio calls announcing position; first from the west; then joining downwind; subsequent turning base; subsequently my final distance to land (twice) following a Citation jet that had just landed and Citation was clearing the runway at Sundance airpark (HSD); I was cut off by [an] Experimental aircraft. I was forced to do a late go around; after I had gear and flaps fully deployed.The plane that cut me off flew in from the east; and flew a non standard pattern with a left base (airport is RIGHT pattern for 17 so as to avoid the approaches to Wiley Post-PWA). The airplane had no position/navigation lights or landing lights on but it did bank hard and dive steeply so as to take advantage of a below standard pattern altitude and abuse the rule of lower airplane having right of way priority. Pilot was rude and abusive to the startled cutoff pilot and claimed he flew a standard pattern; which he did not as sectional and AFD clearly show. After landing (both landed safely) he offered no explanation.




Synopsis: BE95 pilot reported an NMAC on final approach at HSD.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At coordinates; 60.04.9N; 151.32.3 W; our Number 1 Garmin 530 GPS completely powered off. It restarted within about one minute. This Garmin unit contains our radio frequency; NAV frequency as well as GPS navigation. This is approximately the 10th time this has happened to me. It is always the same location; approximately 30 DME north of the Homer VOR coming direct from ANC.




Synopsis: Lear jet Captain reports that on at least ten separate occasions his Number 1 Garmin 530 GPS completely powered off and restarted at roughly the same geographic location 30 NM north of HOM.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-18/19 Super Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departed a marina for ZZZ for prop servicing. On descent to land at ZZZ float gear would not extend. Performed emergency extension but gear would only go to an intermediate position before all hydraulic pressure was lost. Unable to contact anyone at ZZZ; declared urgency on Guard and with Approach. Diverted to ZZZ1 for low level approach to check gear configuration confirming only left nose gear down. Circling nearby used steep bank to recover some hydraulic fluid to pump and rapid pitch movements to lower gear. All but front right nose gear showed green and locked. Executed full flap soft field landing to Runway XXR. On contact with mains; front gear locked in place and gently pitched forward to gently place weight on nose gear. Aircraft was able to taxi short distance to FBO for inspection. On inspection; the primary gear hydraulic line had made contact with the lower cowling wearing a hole in the cowling. The rough edges of the hole in the cowling cut into the stainless steel jacked hydraulic line causing catastrophic loss of hydraulic fluid. Hydraulic line was replaced with new; line verified for proper clearance from cowling; gear cycled 5 times and aircraft returned to service.




Synopsis: Piper pilot reported that float gear would not extend; causing a diversion and precautionary emergency landing.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence; Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given a radar vector for the XX ILS with a clearance to expect ZZZZZ. Due to weather in the area I requested deviation from the radar vector. When sequencing the FMS; I could not find ZZZZZ on the FMS ILS DME XX. I found ZZZZZ1 on the FMS ILS XX. The fixes are similar; but not the same. I verified the fix to expect with ATC and was again given ZZZZZ. Thinking I made an error loading the FMS; I reviewed a few approaches in the FMS. Still I could not find ZZZZZ. Around this time; I heard the autopilot disengage. I asked; 'did you disengage the autopilot.' The answer was no. I immediately thought the yaw damp disengaged. I noticed the airspeed was low. I stated something like; 'your airspeed is slow.' [First Officer] responded; and added full thrust. Although the airspeed was increasing we lost altitude. The airspeed was passing through 200 knots and I mentioned to climb to 12000 feet. The airspeed continued to increase but no change in pitch. I took the controls to return to 12000 feet. ATC gave us a vector to join the approach. I realize I spent too much time fiddling around with the FMS with my head down away from a scan.In the FMS ILS XX; ZZZZZ does not exist. ZZZZZ only exist in the FMS RNAV XX.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported becoming distracted with a confusing clearance then noticing the autopilot disconnected due to low airspeed.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Dispatch
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Narrative: Five minutes prior to departure; the ramp crew informed us that they were adding a live animal to the cargo and two pieces of cargo totaling 98 pounds.  We waiting for the updated cargo load manifest to load via the acars.  After a few minutes we switched to manual mode and selected the new cargo load report.  Everything came back good; so we pushed off the gate and proceeded to taxi the runway.We were number 3 for departure when the Tower called us and said that the company wanted us to return to the gate.  At this point I called operations to make sure that this was correct.  They confirmed they wanted us to return to the gate because a live animal and dry ice had been loaded into the forward cargo together.  I informed operations that we never received a notification via acars or any other method that we were transporting dry ice; as required by regulations.We proceeded to return to the gate; where the ramp manager then attempted to move the dry ice to the aft cargo; at which time I said both the live animal and the dry ice can only be carried in the forward cargo; so he would have to choose which one we would take.  They then completely removed the dry ice and we continued to ZZZ with only the live animal in the forward cargo without further incident. We initially did all of this without reopening the main cabin door; however operations then insisted that the main cabin door be opened so that a representative could come on board and apologized to the passengers for the inconvenience and delay.




Synopsis: E175 Captain reported a live animal and dry ice were loaded into the same cargo compartment; contrary to company policy.
Date: 201910
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the [load plan] was listed 5 Hazmat items; dry ice; for the manual pit; pit 51. As per regulation; I had loaded 15 bags with the Hazmat items to surround them. Also; in the manual pit was an AOG shipment for a total of 21 items. The scanner I was using was showing 21 items in pit 51. I was not able to finalize the [Load Plan] and kept getting error messages. I called [Load Planning] and talked to [a Load Planner] and she was telling me that I did not have enough bags in the manual pit to secure the Hazmat items. I explained that my scanner is showing 21 items scanned into the manual pit. There are 15 bags plus the 5 [packages] plus 1 AOG for a total of 21. She kept insisting that there are not enough bags there. I then asked help from [a Ramp Agent] and he had called [Load Planning] and was also being told by her the same problem. He was telling her that the count for the [packages] are not included for the bag count that is listed in the [Load Plan]. They are listed under the Remarks as [package] 5:5. Meaning 5 items for a total weight of 5 lbs. Because they were checked in as cargo; they are not being counted as bags. That is why they are not added to the total bag count into the manual pit. She kept insisting there are not enough bags in the manual pit and would not do anything to help finalize the [Load Plan]. He had also said there must be a computer program issue; but she said no. I then went to the [Ramp] Supervisor; and he had called [Load Planning] and was being told the same thing. [The Load Planner] kept insisting that the flight needs to be finalized. She then wanted [the Ramp Supervisor] to change the number of bag and increase it so the [Load Plan] can be finalized. To complete the issue; the [Load Plan] was changed to 24 bags in pit 51 and was finalized.




Synopsis: Airline Ground Personnel reported a communication breakdown with Load Planning regarding final departure documents required for aircraft departure. Specific issue was the interpretation of bag count for the load plan.