elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While performing the preflight walk around; the First Officer became aware of a spill in the aft cargo compartment and a Ramp Service Agent was complaining of a burning sensation in his lungs when the rear cargo bin was opened upon arrival of the previous flight from ZZZ1. We were originating in ZZZ. I was on the flight deck and when the First Officer informed me of the situation. We had already started boarding. I went up to the Gate Agent and told him to stop boarding. On my way back down the jetway; there was a Ramp Agent and she informed me that everything thing was okay and we could continue boarding. Shortly after making my way back to the flight deck the deice man came into the flight deck and informed me that ramp personnel had told him to stay away from the aircraft due to the spill. I then went outside to the aft cargo bin and there were several ramp service agents and a Dangerous Goods Specialist. The suspect container was outside the aircraft. The Specialist stated that there were no dangerous goods on the manifest for the inbound flight; and they were unsure of what the liquid was. Eventually; the DG Specialist was able to locate info about the spilled cargo. This info stated that it was 'harmless pharma.' The labels on the container itself did not support this. Eventually the DG Specialist stated that it was acetone. (Our FOM uses acetone as an example of DG) I made an ELB entry that there was a Hazmat spill in the aft cargo bin. I called the [Chief Pilot] to get him in the loop on this.  When Maintenance made it to the aircraft; the technician was understandably uncomfortable with cleaning up the spill. When other technicians arrived; they could not determine if there was any accumulation under the magic carpet without taking it apart. Without a thorough inspection of the aft cargo bin; I was not comfortable with the aircraft. Maintenance did not release the aircraft. We got a swap after 3 hours. There was substantial confusion between Ops and Maintenance during the entire process.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported undocumented Hazmat liquid cargo spill resulting in aircraft swap after a three hour delay due to disagreement between flight crew; Operations; and Maintenance.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: FCC (Flight Control Computer)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise at FL290; about 2 hours into flight; got stick shaker; and level 1 'SEL LSAS rib off' and 'SEL yaw UPR B off.' Stick shaker continued for about a minute and then stopped. Pitch; airspeed; and angle of attack were all normal and stable. Additionally level 1 alerts 'SEL LSAS lob off' and 'SEL yaw UPR A off' cycled on and off about every 15 seconds. Turned upper yaw b and right inbd LSAS switches off; and they showed fail in the switch. Turned upper yaw A and left outbd switches off (fail light in switch went off) and then back on; and cycling alerts stopped. Also got autopilot single and single land. Autopilot 1 and flight director 1 only were available. FO (First Officer) switched flight director to number one. Once the situation seemed under control; called IRO2 (International Relief Officer) to the cockpit and briefed him on the situation. Communicated with [Dispatch] and [Maintenance] through SATCOM. Just as [operations manager; Chief Pilot; and flight engineer] were joining the call; SATCOM failed and remained inop for the remainder of flight. FO and IRO2 researched problem while captain continued communication with [Dispatch] through ACARS and HF phone patch. [Dispatch] advised nearest divert was ZZZZ; nearest [company] maintenance was ZZZ. Worked through decision making process and crew's assessment was a single channel failure of the number 2 FCC (Flight Control Computer.) Captain decided that it was safe; legal; and reliable to continue to destination. FO and IRO2 were both comfortable with decision. [Dispatch] was advised of decision and sent [estimated time] information. About 6 hours into flight; got 'SEL LSAS lob off' and 'SEL yaw UPR A off' alerts. Turned switches off and fail light in switches went away. Left the switches off and continued to destination with no additional problems.This aircraft had a history of FCC problems; and has had FCC problems since. It appears more in depth troubleshooting is appropriate.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported continuous aircraft flight control computer problems.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZGZU.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: GPS jamming received UUWV sector airway T561 between INBAL and UBONA. GPS jamming in Russian airspace.




Synopsis: A Pilot flying in foreign airspace reported GPS jamming.
Date: 202105
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had just finished pushing back Aircraft X and as I was backing up a [ground service truck] sped by despite my wing walkers telling them to stop. He was going over the speed limit and was paying no attention to his environment. He was traveling at a very high dangerous speed. I had to slam on my brakes to prevent collision.




Synopsis: Tug driver in the process of pushing back an air carrier aircraft was forced to slam on his brakes to avoid a collision with a ground service truck transiting the area.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace: Class A ZOB; Class E ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Fatigue; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Staffing; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Like almost every other [day] this summer our staffing numbers were short due to sick leave and no one answering for forced overtime outside of the building. As a previously documented problem transition staffing between shifts was very short and instead of being remedied by forced holdover overtime nothing was done. The supervisors were made aware of increased traffic and weather. So they allowed an [8 hour shift] to have an hour of leave on the front of their shift and let another controller go home early. This made the situation worse. My sector went red with traffic; I sat on the Radar Assist side and worked very hard to help my radar controller who was being overworked and put into a very dangerous situation. My sector and another sector were on position for over 2 hours without being offered a break. The Radar Controller commented to me that his brain had gone to 'mush' and thank you for telling him what to do towards the end. We stayed busy the rest of the night and lost another person on sick leave; forcing a person to get held over and 3 of us to stay on position until our go home time; which I don't have a problem with because it's safe and necessary. Supervisors should force holdover overtime. Make sure bodies are available.




Synopsis: ZOB Center Controller reported insufficient staffing resulted in controllers working long periods of time without a break.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working on a discrepancy generated off of an Inspection Work Card. The Inspection Work Card was signed-off. The discrepancy was for the Crew Oxygen System capillary line broken. I replaced the line 'In Accordance With' (IAW) the Maintenance Manual in September 2013. In November 2013; the 'Manager on Duty' informed me that there was an incorrectly installed capillary line; found during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) that had to be performed while the aircraft was at another maintenance facility being painted. When I was installing the new capillary line; the old line was temporarily installed with a few threads engaged and the end that attaches to the bottle was taped to the broken end of the line. The Manager on Duty has all of the names of people involved with this incident. I can only state what I did. I believe I had the line correctly installed. But the documentation trail showed to me; shows differently. [Recommend that] during emergency equipment installation; [that] at a minimum; a Confirmation Check should be performed with an Engineering Notice (E/N); or a Placard; showing the correct installation of the O2 Oxygen System connections at the O2 bottle. The work performed was done after a 24-hour Leak Check had been performed and signed-off. The line I installed was loosely threaded on and the broken end taped to bottle. Hangar C-Check. It was found at an aircraft Paint Shop after the EMB-145 had left ZZZ during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) to inspect the Oxygen System. Because I was not at the Paint Shop facility when problem was found; I do believe corrective action was taken.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed by the Manager on Duty that a Crew Oxygen bottle capillary line was found incorrectly installed on an EMB-145 aircraft. The discrepancy was noted during a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) inspection when the aircraft was at a Paint Shop facility.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We accepted an aircraft with a fuel gauge deferral. The requirements to meet the MEL for deferral appeared to be met. However; as we discovered through the flight; the error in the fuel system was around 1000 lbs and due to multiple factors we believe the actual fuel claimed to be onboard by maintenance was incorrect. We have no way of verifying drip stick measurements; and [Maintenance] basically made their numbers work. Additionally; during the flight while fuel monitoring; we discovered the center tank; which contained 6600 lbs at start; only showed 6200 lbs burned. It is likely the fudged figures from [Maintenance] and a tacit denial of a drip stick issue; combined with other fuel errors which didn't comply with the MEL; resulted in this flight operating in noncompliance.




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported being dispatched with less fuel than calculated.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GSO.TRACON, NC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E GSO
ATC / advisory: TRACON GSO
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Upon initial contact with GSO TRACON; the pilot not flying informed the Controller we were requesting a Visual Approach to Runway 24 at BUY. As we got closer to BUY; the cloud deck below us became more solid and a quick check with the AWOS now reported a 1;900 foot ceiling. Since 1;900 FT is below the MVA; the pilot not flying informed the Controller [that] we [were] requesting vectors for the RNAV (GPS) RWY 24 and direct to DALSY which is the IF/IAF. GSO TRACON issued a Right Turn direct DALSY. The pilot not flying informed the Controller DALSY is left of our aircraft position. The Controller stated direct DALSY is a right turn. The pilot not flying stated we have three independent GPS sources and they are showing DALSY on the left side of the aircraft. The Controller disagreed with our indications and restated DALSY is on our right side! Rather than disputing this any further and for the safety of the flight; I elected to execute the ILS Y RWY 6 approach and had the pilot not flying request vectors for the approach. The Controller vectored our aircraft to KAKLE the IF/IAF which was on the right side of the aircraft. I flew the ILS Y 6 approach and circled to Runway 24 due to the surface winds exceeding our maximum tailwind component for landing on Runway 6. The flight landed without incident. We confirmed with our passengers that all electronic devices were either OFF or in AIRPLANE MODE. The pilot not flying and I debriefed the approach scenario. We agreed that it appeared the information the GSO TRACON Controller was reading from his radar display was 180 degrees out of phase from our actual aircraft position.




Synopsis: BE20 Captain requests direct DALSY for the RNAV approach to BUY. ATC issues a right turn direct but the Captain sees the fix as to the left of the aircraft. ATC disagrees and the Captain requests the ILS to Runway 6 and circle to 24; which is accomplished without issue.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Descending through FL240 at 320 KTS. On autopilot; we experienced rudder movement (back and forth wagging) with no input from the flight crew. It was significant enough to hear a thumping noise on the flight deck and enough movement to cause a flight attendant in the rear of the aircraft to fall against the wall/bulkhead. I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft slowing it down to 270 KTS but the wagging continued intermittently.  I reconnected the autopilot at the slower speed and again could tell the aircraft seemed to be getting some cross control inputs but was flying the commanded course and profile.  Because all seemed under control although out of trim; we continued to a normal landing at our filed destination and contacted company Dispatch and Maintenance at the gate.I have no idea what caused this uncommanded rudder movement. We received no ECAM malfunction indications in flight and post flight maintenance reports indicated all normal.

Callback: The reporter stated that one of his thoughts during the early stages of this event was the B737 Pittsburgh uncommanded rudder movement accident and so he disconnected all automation to determine his level of control. Aircraft control was not diminished; however the rudder movements continued intermittently with the autopilot OFF until the aircraft was fully configured for landing. A maintenance log write up was made and Maintenance later reported that a 'control unit' was replaced. The exact 'control unit' component was not divulged.



Synopsis: An A319 developed an uncommanded rudder movement during descent through FL240 at 320 knots significant enough to be heard in the cockpit and cause an aft galley flight attendant imbalance. No ECAM alerts coincident with the event.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The flight was progressing normally until we updated weather prior to coast out. We were unable to maintain radio contact with Stockholm Radio to get a phone patch with the FOO. But we knew that the weather at our ETOPS alternate had deteriorated and was unusable as an alternate. The flight path was discontinued and we went into holding at the direction of Shanwick Radio before the RESNO intersection. After a while; we were able to establish contact with Iceland Radio and we got a clear phone patch to the FOO. After some discussion; it was determined that the flight could not continue and we were to turn back to ZZZZ. Clearance was obtained from Shanwick and we were heading towards ZZZZ. We needed to burn a lot of fuel in order to land under the maximum landing weight. So a lower altitude was obtained to aid in burning fuel. The First Officer needed to use the bathroom. Before the IRO could take the FO (First Officer) seat; the max airspeed warning sounded. I was very busy working with ATC to complete our route and program the FMC. During the programming sequence; the only speed in the FMC was the cruise altitude of M.80. The autopilot was engaged with LNAV and VNAV selected and the speed window closed. The FMA was indicating VNAV Speed and the speed bug and airspeed indication were both over the VMO (Maximum Operating Speed) by 3-5 knots. There was nothing in the descent page as the route and crossing altitudes were still being programmed. The VMO was exceeded by 3-5 knots at 20;000 ft. MSL. After a quick recovery from the overspeed; the remaining programing of the FMS was completed and the remainder of the flight progressed normally. The flight was completed and the overspeed was noted in the logbook.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported overspeed during descent.