elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Lifevest/Jacket
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: During preflight checks; discovered one of the two Infant life vest kits unserviceable.  It contained (2) adult/child vests mixed with the remaining three correct Infant life vests.  Advised Captain who contacted Line Maintenance.  The Line Maintenance Technician (LMT) brought two other kits; each containing a mixture of both types of vests.  One of the kits appeared to be the older Aircraft kit which contained only adult/child vests.  I explained to the LMT that neither of the kits were serviceable for this type of aircraft.  However; to prevent a further delay; I instructed him to remove the two incorrect Adult/Child vests for the aircraft's kit and replace them with two of the Infant vests from each of the 'replacement' kits.  It is important to note; an average flight attendant is not provided with training to advise LMTs on the correct method to resolve issues related to cabin safety equipment.  Had my assistance not been available; most likely another non serviceable kit would have been swapped with the current incorrect kit.  This problem was first reported over 3.5 years ago; yet another event to indicate the risk is systemic and current mitigation barriers remain inadequate.  This event reveals yet another risk since it is the first time that an LMT has attempted to restock with replacement kits that were non-serviceable. As previously reported; this risk also continues to reinforce that flight attendants are either not accomplishing checks; or still unaware of the correct method to pre-flight this piece of equipment.The company has been made aware of this issue for an extraordinary length of time; yet customers continue to be exposed to an avoidable hazard; and the company remains at risk of regulatory enforcement.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that life vest installed on an in-service aircraft were from a retired aircraft type and not approved for installation on this aircraft.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: When passengers were deplaning they were complaining that the rear of the cabin was hot. Captain checked temperature and noted it to be 85 degrees. Captain came to aft to check controls and removed the flight attendant's control of temperature gauge. Passengers boarded the aircraft and Captain had called Maintenance. Captain again came back to aft to check if the temperature was better and noted one side of the air vent was blowing cold air while the other was blowing hot air. Maintenance came on board to address the heating issue. Passengers that boarded were now complaining of the heat. Flight Attendant A asked the Captain who was on the jet bridge speaking with the gate agent; if we would be deplaning or should we open the aft doors for ventilation. The Captain gave permission to open aft doors. Flight Attendant A came back and went to the L2 door. Due to the forward doors being open still; the aft doors were disarmed. Flight Attendant B (me) watched as Flight Attendant A cross checked the L2 door; looking to make sure all indicators were clear and it was disarmed and the girt bar indicator was clear and she then opened the L2 door and put the safety strap across. Flight Attendant A then came and before I touched anything on the R2 door we both cross checked the door to make sure that all indicators were ok. The vent flap and lock handles were up so the indicators were clear; disarmed (green) and the girt bar indicator was clear. We both checked and then I grasped the assist handle and opened the door. Upon getting the handle up there was a loud hissing and as the manual door assist took over the slide started to deploy. It unfurled all the way out. I put the safety strap across. Flight Attendant A went forward to inform the Captain that the slide had deployed and I stayed in the back. After the Captain was informed; the Customer Service Agent came onto the aircraft and announced that the flight had been canceled and the passengers deplaned.




Synopsis: ERJ170 Flight Attendant describes an inadvertent slide deployment at the R2 door when the door is opened for aircraft cooling.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: In regards to the ILS 12 @ OAK dated 18JUL14; the Morse code that represents the alpha/numeric characters that identify the approach in the ILS facility box is not printed. Be prepared to locate and use a morse code chart to identify the approach.  OAK ATIS:  06007KT 10SM -RA FEW008 SCT44 OVC100 13/12 A2984 (TWO NINER EIGHT FOUR). ISL  APPROACHES RUNWAY ONE TWO; RNAV GPS APPROACHES RUNWAY ONE ZERO LEFT. FLOW TO LAX. RWY 10R CLSD. CAUTION; BIRDS NEAR AIRPORT. ...ADVS YOU HAVE INFO. Have Morse code data printed in the ILS facility box on JEPPESEN approach plate for ILS 12 @  OAK dated 18JUL14 the way it is for for all ILS approach plate facility boxes.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier crew report that the frequency box on Jeppesen approach plate for the ILS 12 at OAK lacks the morse code for the identifier (IAAZ).
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On final for Runway 28C in Chicago; at approximately 1700 feet and 5 DME from the localizer; we came in close proximity to a drone just south of the approach course. Drone appeared to be within about 200 feet of the aircraft. We did not have to take evasive action and landed without incident. Reported the drone to Tower who we then contacted via phone after arrival at the gate.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported a UAV in close proximity to the aircraft.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Rain; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-500
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had tried to land but were unable due to gust front and dust; wind gust to 65 and 3/4 mile in dust. We held for about 20 minutes and Dispatch decided to have us divert. We were cleared back to our departure airport to climb to FL350. I was pilot flying but had given the aircraft to the First Officer so I could talk to ATC; Dispatch; flight attendants and passengers. Climbing out of 30;000 FT we got the Cabin Altitude Warning and noticed the cabin slowly climbing through 10;000 FT. Masks were put on and lower was requested from ATC. We started a decent to FL240 and then to 16;000 FT. The Altitude Warning Checklist was run; and after selecting MAN AC full closed; we got about 3;000 FPM descent on the cabin. I went back to Auto and got a 600 FPM descent. The cabin reached about 12;000 FT but the masks did not drop. We were descending into moderate rain with moderate turbulence and moderate rime ice; and the flight attendants had just asked to get up to do a water service. The First Officer was doing a great job flying while I talked to ATC and ran checklists and ATC was very helpful. We did not declare an emergency; probably should have; but they gave us lower right away and we got the cabin back under control. We never got a pack or bleed trip or controller fail. After we got the cabin below 10;000 FT; we continued with a normal arrival and landing. Maintenance was contacted and a logbook entry was made and the aircraft was taken out of service for inspection. I did learn that Maintenance needs to know the duct pressure from the packs which I did look at and we had pressure but I don't remember how much.


Second narrative: On arrival; I talked to a Chief Pilot and he mentioned a similar pressurization incident occurred in another B737 aircraft a few months back also on a divert.


Synopsis: While climbing through FL300 and returning to the departure airport after a missed approach; a B737-500 pressurization failed but during the descent was recovered using MAN AC so the cabin did not exceed 12;000 FT.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; Icing; 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While returning to base from an operational mission; aircraft encountered high cloud tops; and heavy precipitation in very low temps. Before reaching the clouds formation; crew ran the icing checklist and asked for higher because they could not determine cloud base. ARTCC approved a climb from FL240 to FL280. However; despite attempts to avoid the icing conditions; the aircraft began to accumulate ice and the aircraft lost almost 4;000 feet. Center inquired if crew needed assistance and offered an altitude block once crew explained they were having difficulty maintaining altitude due to the icing conditions on the aircraft. Center approved and the crew maintained FL210B240 until clear of the weather. Once clear of weather; crew continued on without further incident.




Synopsis: Pilot of an MQ-9 Aircraft (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) reported that due to weather conditions and icing they needed to change altitude in order to maintain flight.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I'm writing this with the hopes of getting clarification regarding GPS Approach Procedures. When loading a GPS Approach from the FMS database; sometimes certain fixes do not load with the approach. We are allowed to [manually] add these fixes [unless] they fall between 2.0 NM outside the FAF to the MAP; or we can identify these fixes using Along Track Distance if it is displayed as such on the chart. For example; when loading the RNAV GPS Y 18C at CLT; HAGUL does not load with the approach. Since HAGUL is 3.2 NM from the FAF; we can add it to the legs page. The problem arises when doing an approach such as the RNAV GPS Y 36C at CLT. NIVSE does not load with the approach. We can't add it to the legs page because it is 1.6 NM from the FAF. The mileage depicted on the profile view is NOT depicted as Along Track Distance. Therefore; one would deduce that we cannot legally shoot this approach because we have no legal means to identify NIVSE. We come across this issue frequently in the training department. We can't seem to get a firm answer regarding the legality of shooting this approach.




Synopsis: A CL65 Captain reported that company SOP will not allow manual entry of waypoints on RNAV approaches unless they are located more than 2.0 NM outside the FAF. He cites CLT RNAV GPS Y Runway 36C as an example. Waypoint NIVSE is only 1.6 NM from the FAF (GLASI) and cannot; per SOP; be manually entered when flying the approach. The procedure requires that NIVSE be crossed at 3;000 MSL and GLASI at 2;500; thus; NIVSE must be displayed and its restrictions complied with.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On visual approach into ZZZ Runway XX during day VMC with unrestricted visibility; we received a GPWS caution at 2;300 ft. MSL while flying to ZZZZZ to follow GPS guidance. We did not see any obstacles which posed an immediate threat but we climbed to 2600 ft. to stop the GPWS. There are numerous towers in the area along with rising terrain that could have triggered the GPWS. Once assured clear of obstacles; on course/glideslope and configured; we continued the approach with no further incident. Upon debriefing; the crew agreed the safest course of action would be to join the course farther out from a safe altitude. Other factors that may have contributed were the good weather contributing to confidence/overconfidence in terrain clearance.




Synopsis: CRJ200 First Officer reported triggering a GPWS caution alarm while on approach due to rising terrain.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X checked in on a visual approach to runway 31L. I advised the aircraft of the wind; and the parallel runway traffic; and cleared Aircraft X to land runway 31L shortened. I was busy working both finals; Class B Airspace; and departures and at some point; Aircraft Y asked 'which runway [is] Aircraft X going to?'.. (SIC). I observed Aircraft X cutting across Aircraft Y enroute to runway 31R. I called traffic; and ensured that Aircraft Y had traffic and was able to maintain visual separation with Aircraft X. I then asked Aircraft X if he intended to land on runway 31R; he advised he was going back to runway 31L. Both aircraft landed their respective runways. All concerned notified. I retain the right to amend all or any of this statement as information and recall come forth.I have no recommendations; however; I am confused as to why the 'conflict alert' did not deploy.




Synopsis: JFK Controller reported being asked by a pilot which runway another aircraft was going to land. The pilot stated the runway as assigned but had cut through the other aircraft's path and looked as though it was going to land on the same runway. Controller insured visual separation was being applied and had preceding aircraft go to the correct runway. Both aircraft landed their assigned runways.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MRF.Airport, TX
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The runway lights at this airport have been off for an unreasonably long time. This was a facility maintenance issue that has now been elevated to a safety issue. We accept that there will be occasional infrastructure failures but that is normally restricted to short term events; and events that may not involve safety.In the case of the runway lights at MRF [airport] Marfa; Texas; the lack of runway lights; especially as the days get shorter is becoming a real issue. Two nights ago; I saw an aircraft depart here at 9:30pm with no runway lights. Dark night; little moon.  Pilots are desperate to use the runway and will do what is needed to come and go. They are tired of the lack of attention to the lighting problem so they 'work around the problem'. I have had to change my plan or cancel because of the lack of lighting. Last night I watched an airplane arrive at night; circle around then divert. Yes; it's in the NOTAMs; but frankly that is not helping. Besides; it is widely known that NOTAMs are so voluminous; vital things like this are being overlooked. I have seen this (aircraft arrive with no runway lights; then divert); many times now. We are in a remote area and one day a pilot is going to arrive low on gas and end up having a fuel exhaustion accident. I know a pilot who tried to land recently; lined up on the neighboring greenhouses before discovering the lack of actual runway lighting! This is no longer a facility maintenance issue. It has been neglected by the local authorities so long that it has obviously become a serious safety issue which will need intervention by higher authority to resolve; hence my safety reporting action. If the airport has already put in a request for a repair company; that is inadequate; they need to find one that is more responsive.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported the runway lighting does not work and has not worked for a long time at MRF airport.