elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 and were on speed by 9;600. I (PM) was looking at weather and the STAR and when I went to monitor the aircraft displays I noticed we were doing 300 knots at about 9;760 feet. I said check speed and the PF disengaged the autopilot; reduced power; deployed speed brakes; and leveled off. He had the speed window open and we both failed to monitor the speed window. He is very good about VVM (Verbalize; Verify; Monitor) and not doing something without informing the PM; so I feel I'm just as much responsible for the incident. I believe the speed window was open from a previous instruction from a Controller.


Second narrative: On the ZZZZZX south of ZZZZZ [Intersection]; we exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet.ATC had originally asked us to cross ZZZZZ at 15;000 feet leaving us high for the next restriction (ZZZZZ1 at 8;000 feet and 250 knots). I was using speed intervene (300 knots) and flight spoilers to make the anticipated restrictions at ZZZZZ1 while descending from 15;000 feet. The FMA switched from VNAV SPD to VNAV PATH at approximately 12;500 feet. At this point; I began focusing more attention on small build-ups and ensuring the flight attendants were seated. Upon crossing 10;000 feet; the PM called out 'speed' and we quickly corrected to 250 knots by 9;650 feet. ATC passed us off to Approach without commenting about the speed deviation.The FO did a great job as the PM. However; we did debrief that; despite verbalizing the use of speed intervene; we ended up below 10;000 feet above 250 knots. The error is mine and I own that; but recency of experience may have been contributory as well.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a speed violation below 10;000 feet.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-8
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On landing roll out my tail wheel aircraft swerved right on [the] runway. I repeatedly tried to correct with taps of the left rudder pedal to no avail. I applied left brake to correct and pushed harder as this did not stop the swerve. The plane went over on its nose and slid to a stop. No injuries occurred. I shut down all systems and exited the plane. Bystanders helped me lower the tail and we pushed the plane off the runway and to my hangar. Damage was to the prop; spinner and wheel pants.




Synopsis: RV8 pilot reported loss of control on landing roll that resulted in the aircraft tipping onto its nose.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were instructed to descend via the [CLT] CHSLY2 RNAV arrival landing 18L. Prior to the top of descent; we completed an arrival verification per SOPs. It correctly depicted the appropriate restrictions found on the chart. At some point during the managed descent; at an altitude above FL270; 280kts; and with the autopilot on; the MCDU and PFD displayed the incorrect crossing at BURRZ. It had us leveling off below FL240. I manually made BURRZ a hard altitude of FL240. The airplane then leveled off as planned and we both again verified the arrival. We intervened; [employed the CAMI (Confirm; Activate; Monitor; Intervene) procedure] and did not bust any restrictions. This is a known Airbus anomaly. This is a result of the S7A software glitch. I was aware of this because of a previous fleet bulletin and was familiar with what to watch for. However; not all crews are aware of this. We remained alert and CAMI allowed us to intervene. It is my suggestion that [our airline] discontinues use of the CHSLY2 RNAV arrival until a permanent solution is achieved. In my opinion; with regards to safety; it's not worth the risk of a possible deviation.


Second narrative: Climb/Descend via clearances are semantically challenging; labor intensive; and often do not work. I think they should be discontinued or at least make them easier to fly. There is a history of repeated failures on every [CLT] STAR arriving from the northeast.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported they had to intervene manually to avoid an altitude deviation on the CHSLY2 arrival into CLT. Crew stated this was a known Airbus anomaly.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: This is a pilot pushing issue.  Due to fog and visibility below minimums we could not get into [planned destination] last night. It was unforecasted and we did not have an alternate and/or fuel to try again so we diverted to [an alternate]. Shortly after arriving; as I was on the phone with Dispatch; someone walked in the cockpit and starts talking even though I was on the phone. I told him to hold on. I finish my call and he said; '[another air carrier] just landed in ZZZ1; so I was wondering when you were going to head back there. I was honestly taken aback. I told him; 'I don't know; the F/O and I have to look at the weather again'; and I would let him know. I conferred with the F/O (First Officer) who was comfortable trying again as was I; as well as the flight attendants (although one was going to run into a legality issue if the delay was any longer). However; I wanted to speak to the OPS guy. I called OPS and asked him to come back. At first he wanted to just talk on the radio; but I asked him to come to the cockpit. When he arrived; I let him have it. I told him that the weather was below legal landing minimums; and that flight landing after us was probably done illegally. The RVR when we went missed had dropped to 800 after we passed the FAF (Minimum RVR for landing on Runway X is 1800). I can assure you when we got to minimums we saw nothing. So the fact that Name1 comes up and tells me to essentially continue an illegal operation because another airline did it is pure and simple pilot pushing and unprofessional on so many levels.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported he was put under pressure by operations personnel to operate a flight into a below-minimums airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-88
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: A maintenance change order was applied to aircraft five days before this event. It was a 3 day exemption and was two days expired. Both the copilot and I should have caught this error. The Dispatcher and our Maintenance Department should have caught this error. But it slipped through partly because the Mechanic didn't get the change order into the computer which would have flagged the change order as expired. We also had contributing factors. We were originally scheduled to fly a different aircraft on this flight. At pushback the APU had an oil leak which caused the cabin to fill with smoke. We did not need to evacuate the passengers but it was a bit stressful for the passenger; flight attendants and us. We then were changed to an aircraft arriving at the gate next to us. Of course now we were late and were trying to get everything done quickly yet safely. We did not notice the maintenance change order was beyond the expiration period. End result; did not get the job done correctly!




Synopsis: A MD-88 APU developed an oil leak during pushback which filled the cabin with smoke so the aircraft was returned to the gate where the crew were assigned another aircraft and departed with an open maintenance item.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: First flight after 6.5 months for new avionics modification; paint; interior; and phase 1 through 4 inspection. All preflight and run-up was completed. The owner (pilot) was in the left seat. On climb out using the checklist we verified that we were pressurizing. Climbing through FL270 we received a 'Cabin Altitude Advisory' and a notice a 5.0 PSI and a cabin altitude of 10;000 FT. I then placed the environmental control from low to normal and noticed a little movement of the needles. I then asked Center for a lower altitude and started a descent. The oxygen masks in the passenger compartment deployed and I noticed a 'CABIN ALT HI' warning light and we lost pressurization at about FL250. I then grabbed my oxygen mask and could not put it on due to my headset. I took off the headset; put on my mask; turned on the mic switch and told Center that we needed to take it down to 10;000 FT. Not hearing a reply because I could not find the speaker switch on the new avionics panel; I put back on my headset and holding my mask; I started flying the plane. Still trying to focus on procedures I then turned on the passenger oxygen. I was instructed to contact Approach at or about FL187 and they asked if we needed any assistance. We asked to return to the departure airport and the rest of the flight was uneventful. Back at our base I was told that one of the Mechanics passed out; but once oxygen was given came around quickly. The maintenance facility found two lines crossed at the controller. The flight the next day was normal.




Synopsis: A BE300 on a test flight lost pressurization at FL270 because two sense lines on the pressure controller had been reversed during extended maintenance. The pilot had communications problems because of headset/oxygen mask incompatability.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: SR22
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A GLEX was at 11;000 FT on the CEEME1 Arrival. I asked the GLEX if he had the NOTAM to depart FIM VOR on the 136 radial to TOAKS. He replied 'yes'. I instructed the GLEX to descend via the CEEME1 Arrival. He read the clearance back. I issued the GLEX a frequency change to the Woodland Sector. The GLEX reported with Woodland RADAR level at 11;000 FT; when he should have been descending to 7;000 FT. This is yet another situation where the CEEME1 Arrival is obviously confusing to each pilot; leaving the controllers with no idea what to expect from each aircraft. Turn off the CEEME1 Arrival until it can be fixed and every flight crew and controller can be properly trained.A SR22; departed VNY airport on the NEWHALL6 departure; which calls for a turn to heading 110 and a climb to 4;000 FT. This procedurally separates VNY departures from BUR arrivals. The SR22; for some unknown reason; turned northbound at the GLEX. The Valley Sector Controller and the Woodland Sector Controller recognized the abnormal departure simultaneously. The Valley Radar Controller issued an immediate right turn to the SR22 away from the GLEX. The SR22 and the GLEX were at the same altitude seconds from a NMAC if not a collision. This is not the first time a VNY IFR departure has misapplied the Newhall 6 departure and took a left turn into the BUR localizer. The Newhall 6 departure needs to be looked into; and each pilot who thinks they should turn beyond H110 should be asked what they read into the SID that made them think they should turn northbound. We need to find out where the deficiency in this SID lies.




Synopsis: SCT Controller voiced concern regarding the continued confusion experienced by pilots with regard to the altitude restrictions on the CEEME1 STAR as well as potential conflicts with VNY NEWHALL SID traffic.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working Departure sector. Gorgeous VMC. The SOP allows ATCT to launch successive departures utilizing pilot provided visual separation. The ATCT must modify the secondary scratchpad in the STARS data-tag to advise the TRACON that pilot provided visual separation is being used. However; in this case the first aircraft is [a specific airbus model] and that type of aircraft is notorious for climbing out much slower than most other aircraft.According to the FALCON replay; the trailing [B737] is 1.55NM behind the [airbus] with a 60 knot overtake. I restricted the [B737] to 230 knots and requested the [airbus] increase to 250 knots as soon as possible. Despite those efforts the situation continued to compress. While I was aware pilot provided visual separation was being utilized; in my judgement the situation had become unsafe and I decided to break our noise abatement procedures and initiate an early eastbound turn for the [B737]. After initiating the turn I made the supervisor aware of the situation. Both aircraft subsequently continued their departures without further incident.This is a common problem that we experience with the [airbus type] departures. I do not know why this specific aircraft type climbs out so differently; but it is common knowledge at the TRACON. I would propose that this situation could be corrected by changing the LOA to exclude [this aircraft type] departures from the provision allowing the use of pilot provided visual separation between successive departures. If ATCT had utilized the standard 3-5 mile in-trail spacing that would have been required during; this event would have been avoided.




Synopsis: An Airbus aircraft climbing out at much slower speeds than other similar aircraft could cause a loss of required separation.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to the Atlanta airport we received a speed assignment that we thought was 200 knots. Sometime during the approach a separate voice in the same facility but not the assigning controller asked what speed we were assigned. The copilot replied 200 knots.  The controller asked which speed we were assigned; and we replied we thought we heard 200 knots; we tried to mitigate the situation by asking 'which speed would you like'. The reply was 'your assigned speed'. A remark like that from the controller does not help anybody. Generally we would like to comply with the instructions but remarks like this don't allow us to adequately mitigate the situation. The controller indicated that he would review the tape; we thought that was a good idea; that way we could find which party may have been in error; but we never received any results. We were hoping they would let us know whether the misunderstanding was possibly on our end or possibly their end.Since pilots and air traffic controllers work together; we hope that the air traffic controller don't have the attitude that we are not willing to comply with their instructions; but rather willing within the limitations of our aircraft. If instructions were misunderstood or not complied with as previously assigned; we would prefer that the best resolution moving forward be assigned or possibly a phone number be issued so that we may contact the controller to discuss possibly where the misunderstanding may have occurred so that future events are less likely to occur. It's my understanding that most pilots want to follow air traffic controller instructions but if a misunderstanding occurs; most pilots may want to clarify instructions.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported communication difficulties with ATC that were complicated by what he felt was an antagonistic attitude on the part of the Controller.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon getting takeoff clearance from Runway 22; we taxied on to the runway. As the pilot flying I added power and called out 'Set power'. Before the airspeed came alive; the L HI PACK PRES caution message appeared. The Captain decided to pull the power back to idle and exit the runway to analyze the situation. Once we exited the runway; we quickly discovered the reason for the caution message was misconfigured bleeds. Since the RIGHT [air conditioning] pack had been deferred we were supposed to takeoff with BLEEDS CLOSED. I swapped the bleeds to the engine by mistake before takeoff and the caution message appeared.




Synopsis: When the flight crew of a CRJ-200 forgot to correctly position the bleed valves to comply with an MEL item they received a L HI PACK PRESS caution message as they advance power for takeoff. They rejected the takeoff; configured the valves correctly and completed the flight.