elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The marshaler twice during our approach to the gate clearly looked away from us; turning his head 90 degrees to converse with another individual in the ramp area while continuing to motion us in. The second time when we were considerably closer to the gate; I stopped the aircraft and waited for him to give us back his attention.When he noticed we were stopped; he made motions that said to me 'what are you stopping for?' Upon close arrival to the gate; the wands were also brought together signifying closeness to stopping; that is to say less than 4 inches separation; which lasted for at least 4 ft of travel.I do not fly into Newark often; but this is the second time out of perhaps 10 visits that the marshaling at the gate has been so far below standard that as an LCA (Line Check Airman) if I were conducting a check would result in a 'Fail'.It is obvious to me that something is seriously wrong with either the personnel attitude toward their safety related duties or there is an abysmal lack of training and checking at this station.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Check Airman reported non-standard marshalling procedures and a lack of attention by the ground crew at the gate.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D LGB; Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X departed on the RNAV departure. Aircraft X checked in on the route climbing to 3;000 ft. I observed an untagged VFR target just north of the Aircraft X flight path; left him at 3;000 ft. and issued traffic. The pilot responded shortly thereafter that he had the traffic in sight. I still did not want to issue him a climb until he passed by the target to avoid them receiving an RA. Moments later; I observed the VFR target start a quick descent. I turned Aircraft X to a 240 heading to avoid the target. The pilot informed me that the target was turning southbound now into them and descending rapidly. I advised them to maintain visual separation and climb to 15;000 ft. Targets came within 1 nm and 0 lateral. I queried the pilot; after they were clear of traffic and climbing; if they received an RA. They did not but the pilot said he was not comfortable at all with the situation.Events like this are becoming more and more common with this airport departures. There needs to be Class C airspace. VFR aircraft continually fly West and South of the field in extremely close proximity to IFR departures without talking to ATC. I know our facility was working on developing a Class C for this airport several years ago but got a ton of pushback from AOPA. It needs to happen now; there is going to be a fatal accident.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported a traffic conflict between an air carrier and a VFR aircraft.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing Roll
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We] had MEL on Auto Speedbrake Deploy; so I had to manually deploy on landing. It was my landing; I pulled thrust levers to idle; deployed speedbrakes; and delayed thrust reverse due to brain dump. Not my normal flow.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain manually deployed the speed brake because of an Auto Speedbrake Deploy MEL (SPEED BRAKE DO NOT ARM) and on landing then forgot to deploy the thrust reversers.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: DG (Dangerous Goods) aid states no 6.1 toxic/poisons may be loaded on a pallet in position 1L if food aboard. Operations Manual states that 6.1 toxic/poisons may not be loaded on pallet in position 1 L if adjacent to crew meals/food. DG manual presented by DG agent stated that revision to DG manual allowed 6.1 on pallet adjacent to for foodstuffs. Supervisory pilot conferred with DG specialist and left message stating it was ok and that our crew manuals had not been updated to reflect the change. We flew with the 6.1 toxic/poisons in position 1L on a pallet with food aboard based on the duty officer's ok; though it was in violation of our current crew manuals.




Synopsis: There was an inconsistency in the various manuals related to carriage of poisonous Dangerous Goods loaded close to foodstuffs.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: I; as an Inspector; and Mechanic X were involved with the Left-hand Elevator Assembly that was removed for damage and a replacement Serviceable [Elevator]; according to the rotable tag; was installed on Aircraft X; a DHC-8-100 aircraft. During the installation the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Chapter 27-32-11 was used as the reference for the installation of the replacement of the elevator. Approximately two weeks later; it was discovered that a bushing was missing from the Inboard Arm Hinge Assembly. The aircraft was brought back to the Maintenance Base on the same day for inspection and we discovered that the bushing Part Number (P/N) XXXX42-101 was in fact missing from the assembly; so a new bushing was installed.  In the 'INSTALLATION Section' of the AMM 27-32-11; the bushing is not mentioned as part of the installation of the elevator to the aircraft. The bushing is part of the Elevator Assemblies from Stock [Parts]. While working on another elevator on a different DHC-8-100 aircraft; Aircraft Y; we noticed the difference between the two elevators; so it became questionable if the bushing P/N XXXX42-101 was present on Aircraft X's L/H Elevator. [Recommend] providing a Task Card (Job Card) specifically for the Removal and Installation of an Elevator and in this Task Card mention items that are part of the Elevator Assembly. Revision to the Manufacturer's Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). If you look carefully at the current Revision dated December 2004; AMM Chapter 27-32-11; pages 201 to 206; at the beginning of the Removal and Installation of the elevators it refers you to Figure-201. During the' Installation' procedures on Section-B and even the 'Removal' on Section-A; the bushing P/N XXXX42-101 is never mentioned. And if you look at Figure 201; Sheets-1 through -3; the bushing is not on the Diagrams.  Perhaps provide a Fleet Campaign Directive (FCD) to verify no other aircraft has this bushing P/N XXXX42-101 missing from both the L/H and R/H elevators.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports that he and an Aircraft Maintenance Technician had noticed there were differences in the parts installed at the Inboard Arm Hinge Assemblies on Elevator installations they had performed on two separate DHC-8-100 aircraft. Lack of adequate Diagrams and missing 'Installation' documentation in the Manufacturer's Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) were noted.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Maintenance truck; needed five minutes on Runway XXL and was granted this access while holding short of Runway XY on Runway XXL. Meanwhile; Aircraft X began taxiing to Runway XXL while an inbound was about 10 miles out for Runway XY. The South radar controller briefly called to coordinate something; but then hung up and this got the Trainee and I in a brief discussion about what APREQ [Approval Request] they may have been considering. We were using the correct memory aid to show that Runway XXL was occupied and unavailable; however; our scan broke down and Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff while taxiing on Taxiway D towards D1; as the Runway XY lander was already crossing the Runway XY/ XXL intersection. Maintenance Truck; then reported exiting Runway XXL as he heard our clearance and saw the A320 turning from D1 to begin taking the runway. I quickly verified that Maintenance Truck had exited Runway XXL; and he confirmed this immediately and then Aircraft X continue lining up on Runway XXL and he then commenced his takeoff roll. Training on local control was in progress and I was the OJT instructor.I could have refrained from discussing a theoretical APREQ and maybe this would helped the Trainee and I from having a degraded runway scan that is obviously much more important.


Second narrative: I was staffing a position while training was being conducted on LC and a Developmental worked GC/CD. The session had been fairly steady with crossing Runway ops and LUAW [Line Up And Wait] being utilized. As traffic died down; I went to the computer at the SUP position to reference ART [time and position tracker]. As I did this I heard the trainer on local make a call to verify that Maintenance Vehicle was holding short of Runway XXL. I looked back to the approach end of the runway and saw that Aircraft X was entering the runway environment. I then saw Maintenance Vehicle exiting Runway XXL at TWY A1. The vehicle had exited the runway environment prior to the aircraft starting takeoff roll. Continue vigilance while training is taking place. The busier traffic had been handled well; but as the perceived lull came; the error occurred.


Synopsis: Tower controllers reported a runway incursion with a departure and a vehicle.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Airport; Company Policy
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We taxied to our Gate on an icy ramp. The gate next door to ours; YYY; had a note in the [Company manual] about it being a gate on a sloped ramp; please leave the parking brake set while at the gate. Our gate; XXX had no such note in the [manual].After shutting down both engines and receiving the wheel chocks set signal from the ground Marshaler; I released the aircraft parking brake. The aircraft slid backwards approximately 13 FT before I set the parking brake again.




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported releasing the parking brake at the gate once the wheel chocks signal was received; then the aircraft slid back approximately 13 feet.
Date: 201911
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Here in ZZZ the company is replacing our PCA (Pre-conditioned Air) units on our jetbridges with a newer; more advanced model and it also includes a wireless remote control that you can apparently RETRACT and DEPLOY according to the remote on the jetbridge. SOP dictates that we must connect PCA within 5 minutes of aircraft arrival but how can this be possible if we are not trained in operating this new equipment/technology? Additionally; the remote is stored in a box on the jetbridge that has a wire connected to it that seems to charge the device. Some of us have no clue on how this works or what the procedures are regarding operating this new equipment. From what I have seen; the hose extends and retracts remotely and there is no emergency cutoff. Anyone not qualified or trained in this device can be injured; damage an aircraft; or worse or both.




Synopsis: Ground Personnel reported that a lack of training on new jetbridge equipment created a ramp safety hazard.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Government
Mission: Other Flight Inspection
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Two separate events; similar in nature.A: A small transport aircraft was found to have several existing pilot holes through the exterior skin in a lap just below the window belt on the left hand side of the fuselage. The holes were in the exterior skin only; thus no leak. A work lead grabbed me to get my opinion and we may eventually work on the repair when Engineering comes back with a fix. While evaluating the identified aircraft; 3 others were in the hanger and we compared the nearest one and discovered the same exposed pilot holes. They all had them. We went to Engineering to request that the repair cover the fleet; a supervisor was in the room. He acknowledged that he knew about the other aircraft but didn't want to write them up because it may effect delivery schedule. I wrote up the 3 aircraft in question the next morning.B: A small transport aircraft was noted to have a small tear in the nacelle skin just aft of the lwr [lower] aft engine cowling o/b [outboard] side. I generated a non-routine and once I passed it to the supervisor for signature he was upset and told me that I need to stop. He told me that I must tell a supervisor prior to writing up any non-routines. I was told that my expectations are too high; the aircraft are old. A second supervisor told me to 'stop writing stuff up!' The first supervisor told me that we are getting carried away writing things up that are not 'Safety of Flight' too close to the delivery date of scheduled checks.I have Word Docs detailing specifics of both events in greater detail if requested.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports Management resistance to accomplish repair work due to aircraft schedule.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-34-200T Turbo Seneca II
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was asked to lease my Seneca II to a flight school for training ATP candidates. I learned the ATP curriculum insists on shutting down an engine in flight during the checkride. A senior flight instructor asked me if my Seneca was hard to restart in flight; because the one currently in use is difficult to restart. He made several comments to this effect.I have performed one airborne shut down and restart in this airplane with no difficulties; but that was nearly ten years ago during my commercial checkride. I decided it would be more prudent for me to attempt an air start; as opposed to allowing someone unfamiliar with the airplane to attempt it after such a long time. I used the checklist to shut down the left engine. Then; I used the checklist to attempt a restart. After three attempts; my radios flickered; suggesting an electrical problem. Also; on the third attempt; the starter would not turn the prop blades. I noted the prop blades did not unfeather during the attempts to restart.I contacted Tower and declared an emergency. On base I attempted to lower the gear; but the gear would not come down. I lowered the gear using the emergency gear extension procedure. Then; the electrical went out completely as I turned base to final. I turned the master switch off and landed the airplane uneventfully. I telephoned the Tower and thanked them. They advised they didn't need anything else from me since there had been no deviations.




Synopsis: Prior to leasing his PA34 to a flight school the owner attempted to test the inflight restart procedure to ensure its functionality. After shutting the left engine down the propeller failed to unfeather; the engine failed to restart and the electrical system failed; requiring the landing gear to be manually extended for the following safe landing.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BQN.Airport, PR
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower BQN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The 10-7 [airport briefing] page for BQN says that the tower is closed after 21:00 local time. During preflight and before descent I made note of this and briefed the FO on non tower ops. About 50 miles out we were cleared for the approach by San Juan center and told to contact BQN. We made a non tower position call and were told to report joining final. I thought this was the advisory service that is also mentioned in the 10-7. It was not until another plane used the word tower that I clued in that the tower was open. I asked the FO to verify with the tower that they were open. Tower responded yes. We were about 15 miles out at this point and safety was not compromised and nothing was violated. I'm simply writing this to make sure that the 10-7 page is changed to reflect that the tower may be open. If a crew thinks the tower is closed it might be possible to land without a clearance and this is a big safety issue. The parallel taxiways are also closed and landing flights on rwy 08 must back taxi also increasing the risk of landing on another plane.  Please update the 10-7.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain arriving BQN; expected the Tower to be closed according to the airport briefing page (10-7). A position report is made on the CTAF and the reporter determines that the Tower is in fact open after normal closing time.