elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Light: Night
Aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In the course of creating comparative weight and balance spreadsheets to determine the effect of the SX-5 on center of gravity (CG); I noticed that the CG of the aircraft moved aft when the SX-5 nightsun was deducted. This was obviously erroneous so I examined the weight and balance certifications and noticed that the arm was incorrectly entered as 19 instead of 190; leading to an incorrect moment. This resulted in our base flying an aircraft with incorrect W&B calculations since it has arrived. This error was undetectable in the normal course of pilot or lead pilot duties. This was a failure of Quality Assurance (QA) to execute their job properly.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reports discovering that the weight and balance charts for his company helicopter; are using an incorrect moment arm for the search light mounted on tail of the helicopter.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 0.125
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Left with planned arrival of 5.7 and no alternate listed or additional fuel added.  Forecast was no lower than six SM for time of arrival.  First Officer received oral ATIS for arrival calling 1/2 mile in fog (no digital ATIS). Sent ACARS message to Dispatch for amended Release and alternate airport. First Officer was doing work for weather; checks; and performance; formulated own plan for ZZZ1 as alternate and checked ZZZ2 as well. Through 18;000 FT got message from Dispatch; 'If you want to change to ZZZ1; it is 2000-pound burn and ZZZ1 weather.'  Sent ACARS to Dispatch; 'change from what?'   Descent for CAT III approach RVR 700 to 1400.  Formulated a plan for one approach and if missed; direct ZZZ1; which was VFR and we could see it 40 miles away.  Landed RVR about 1200. On rollout; received chime and additional information message from Dispatch.  5.4 at the gate in XXX.  Upon phone calls to Dispatch was told he had sent an amendment for ZZZ2 as alternate with burn and initials to us 50 miles west of ZZZ3.  I said we didn't get it.  He said he had sent it and had documentation to that effect. Also that not getting an ACARS MSG happens all the time to everyone. Dispatcher also said he was willing to 'take the hit on this one.' Have positive TWO-WAY communication. Maybe response required for Release change similar to diversion plan.  Or; since this thing happens all the time to everyone; if no response send message until you get one.




Synopsis: After updating destination weather which unexpectedly decreased to CAT III; the B737-800 crew requested an alternate but the ACARS with the release was not received until after landing at the filed destination.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Design; Failed
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: My student and I were doing pattern work in an Alarus. We had done 8 touch-and-go's without incident. On the 9th; which was to be a full stop; we touched down mains first; the nose wheel came down; struck the runway and the nose gear fork broke off the strut. The landing wasn't soft; but it wasn't really hard either. We rolled a little ways down the runway and then the nose came down on the strut post; which supported the airplane; but the clearance remaining allowed the prop to strike the surface. I believe the problem arose from metal fatigue between the nose gear strut and the fork. There have been similar reports that I've seen of this event occurring.




Synopsis: An Alarus instructor experiences a nose gear fork failure during landing. The fork with its wheel departed the aircraft allowing the the propeller to contact the ground.
Date: 202008
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Off Duty
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Other passenger boarding area
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was deadheading today ZZZ-ZZZ1 and was waiting to board with other deadheaders. The Captain joined us wearing this unorthodox face covering. It's a sheer veil that does not appear to conform with any of the most basic requirements for a face covering: it's open at the bottom and is sheer enough to see through (so small particles from breathing can escape) and does not offer any protections for those around the individual. It does not appear to do anything to arrest the spread of COVID-19. I didn't feel comfortable speaking with the Captain about the mask in the boarding area; since I don't know the individual personally.We all need to be on the same page in order to assure the traveling public that it's safe to fly with us.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the Captain's face mask probably did not conform to policy and in the FA's opinion did little to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was holding on Taxiway 1 for an outbound Airbus in taxi lane XX.  Aircraft X taxied to his gate without waiting for the outbound aircraft as instructed.  I made numerous attempts to get Aircraft X to stop; but he had left the frequency to talk with the Company Ramp Tower.  I could have had aircraft pushing off gates YY or ZZ.  I could have had any number of aircraft taxiing on Taxiway 2.  Though this did not happen; it does not diminish the potential for an accident in the future if these types of actions occur again.  After the Tower spoke with the Company Ramp they said they did not tell Aircraft X to taxi; but they did answer affirmative when the pilot of Aircraft X asked if the Airbus in XX was waiting for them.  Recommendation; these scenarios play out almost daily at LAX.  The ramp towers at LAX lost their usefulness after 9/11.  Soon LAX will be burdened with another position; Ground Control 3; at our critically; short-staffed facility.  To provide a modicum of work for this new position; all LAX ramp towers need to close and service must be returned to the tower before someone gets hurt.




Synopsis: LAX Controller voiced concern regarding a ground conflict resulting from the handling provided by 'Ramp Control;' The reporter suggested Ramp Controller operations be terminated for safety concerns.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On an instruction flight in a helicopter; my student was on the controls on final approach at 300 feet AGL to Taxiway B parallel Runway 35; a fixed wing aircraft executed a practice power-off 180 to Runway 35 (Taxiway B is to the west of Runway 35; the aircraft would be crossing our flight path to make it to Runway 35). Upon hearing his radio call; the other aircraft was at my 10 o'clock and descending into my flight path. I then took controls from my student; descended to 100 feet AGL while making a left turn to the west to avoid the path of the aircraft. I made a radio call to the other aircraft; 'I guess I'll get out of your way; helicopter Y is short final Bravo parallel 35.' I told the pilot of the other aircraft over the radio; 'You need to listen for us; I made a base and final radio call.' He replied; 'I'm sorry; I thought you were further on the approach.' While a midair was avoided in a controlled manner; it could have be a potential accident had I not taken evasive action to descend below the other aircraft's flight path as he was turning a tight base to final.To avoid these situations:Closer attention to position of traffic in the pattern; specifically helicopters on final as they land on Taxiway B parallel Runway 35 to avoid the flow of fixed wing traffic.Visual contact of the helicopter traffic should be made or radio contact with the helicopter to confirm the position of helicopter traffic prior to executing practice power-off 180 landings to Runway 35. Flying in the right pattern for Runway 35 while helicopters are in the pattern will greatly reduce the potential of overflight/mid-air collision.




Synopsis: A helicopter instructor took control of the aircraft to take evasive action during a near miss with a fixed wing aircraft whose pilot was performing an emergency return training maneuver.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Just prior to push another air carrier's pilot came into the cockpit asking for a jumpseat ride. She had a jumpseat authorization form; but it had the wrong name on it. We called Operations and asked about the jumpseater and the wrong name etc.; and were told that it was OK; she was entered in the system; and it will show up on the final weight manifest which it did. Her company ID and pilot credentials were OK. All the cabin seats were full. We were informed later in the flight that the jumpseater should not have been allowed jumpseat access.


Second narrative: We took another carrier's pilot jumpseater at gate. She came into cockpit about 3 minutes prior to pushback. We verified her airline ID; her pilot's license and medical certificate. We then noticed her jumpseat form had the wrong name on it. So we called it into operations. They verified they had her correct name in the computer; that she was C.A.S.S. certified and by her showing up on our weight manifest; we had proper documentation and were good to leave. Approximately 1 1/2 hours into flight we received an ACARS message that she should not have been given access to jumpseat. This information is incorrect. We verified everything. The pilot had been cleared by gate agent; by boarding agent; by operations and then we were told she was OK specifically by ZZZ Operations. I believe this is strictly a problem of our carrier's new computer reservation system. The gate agents are having so many problems that we often can't even board our own employees. I want to stress that we verified this pilot extensively and even personally know her from her commuting from ZZZ.


Synopsis: A jumpseating air carrier pilot was C.A.S.S. verified; as were the pilot's credentials; but after departure the flight crew was told via ACARS that the jumpseater should not have been given access because her name was not correct on the jumpseat form.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 2
Aircraft: Airliner 99
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: With the Weather at 2 SM (Statue Miles) and snowing; as part of my pre-takeoff brief I acknowledged the low visibility and set the ILS Runway XXR frequencies in Nav1 and Nav2. Takeoff roll began and rotation went as normal; around 700 ft. AGL I started to notice a hot smell. Climbing out of about 1500-2000 ft. AGL. It was at this time I stared to see smoke coming out of the fuel gauges; I reacted by turning off the Master Light switch on the overhead panel. And then I ran the checklist for smoke in the cockpit. I [Requested Priority Handling] and requested the ILS Runway XXR which was given to me. I received vectors to the final approach course and came back and landed Runway XXR without any additional incident. Noticed a smell shortly after takeoff; and then saw smoke.Looked to be little water that got behind the fuel gauge. Turning off the electric load to the fuel gauges; and running the checklist.Preventing water from getting in the crew door as much as possible.




Synopsis: Pilot flying C-99 Aircraft encountered smoke in the cockpit after takeoff.
Date: 201712
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Second aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Some non-pilot friends were flown into a backcountry private airstrip; which we have permission from the owner to use and land. I routinely fly formation in the air and on the water daily. The non-pilot friends wanted to see a simulated water assisted landing; which I have trained for and done many times before. The pre-brief contained the information that all observers were to remain on the field so they were 500 feet from the aircraft at all times as per 91.119. I made sure the river was clear by flying up-river and completed the maneuver without incident. [A few] days later the observers posted a video on [online] which enraged a rafter group on the internet. To be clear; the rafters were not at the site during the maneuver. Due to the radical comments by the rafters I realized they were going to call the FAA and do everything in their power to get me in trouble. I am both extremely proficient with my plane and have a high regard for the rules. I watched the video very closely and noticed that the observers did not stay where I wanted them to stay; and potentially were closer than 500 feet from the aircraft during the touch and go simulated water assist landing. While 91.119 does not come into play in a landing or takeoff I realize this maneuver is not a clear cut takeoff or landing. I only became aware of this after watching the video; during the maneuver neither of us noticed people close to the bank of the river; and if I would have; I would have knocked off the maneuver immediately. My personal corrective action is going to potentially be to not do this type of maneuver for non-pilots; or to stress harder that there are rules for a reason and if I break them I can have action taken against me.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Two pilots reported they may have inadvertently flown less than 500 feet over a populated area.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I noticed a very strong fishy smell when I walked into airplane. I didn't think anything of it because airplanes always seem to have a funky smell; especially near the lavatories. We boarded the airplane. Since I was the C; I was prepping the galley and watching the aft doors because catering came while we were boarding. The B said passengers were commenting on smells; but I couldn't smell anything in the aft galley area. The next thing I know there was an announcement from pilots saying we were deplaning because of the odor. We deplaned; and when I went up front I didn't notice the smell. Only once we were in the jetway for a while and reentered the plane could I smell it again. I don't have a good sense of smell; but again; it smelled like rotten fish. I need to be more in tune with smells and notice these things before boarding. I honestly just thought it was the forward lavatory when I walked into plane.




Synopsis: A320 Flight Attendant reported strong fish smell during preflight. Subsequently; Captain ordered passengers to deplane.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SKBO
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: URGENT: the Dec 2014 SKBO Special Engine Failure procedure page incorrectly displays the same procedure text for 13 L/R as for 31 L/R in the 'PROCEED TOWARD' box. The graphic map is correct.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain advised the latest revision of the SKBO tailored Special Engine Failure on Takeoff aero chart includes the same textual description for runways 13L&R and 31L&R; although the graphic depictions are different and correct.