elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMU.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D MMU
ATC / advisory: Tower MMU
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on a VFR flight to Morristown Municipal (MMU); my GPS showed I was 8 miles out at 1500 feet from Morristown Municipal Airport when I radio the Tower Control to announce my intentions to land full stop; ATC cleared me for left downwind Runway 31 and report mid field downwind then asked me to ident. After I idented ATC indicated I was 5 miles south; which still puts me outside of the Class D airspace at the time I checked in with ATC since the Class D airspace at Morristown Municipal is within 4.1 NM radius of the airport according to FAA Order JO 7400.9Y date August 06; 2014 page 223.I feel the GPS was misleading me and want to make sure this information is documented in case there is a bad GPS signal in the area and other pilots report the same situation in the area in the future.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reports checking in with MMU Tower 8 NM out; according to his GPS; then told to ident. The Tower indicates that he is 5 NM south and the reporter believes that there may be a bad GPS signal in this area.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The aircraft had filed to fly over TIJ; then UJ7 PPE. TIJ is just outside my airspace by about 2 miles on the Mexican side of the border. This routing that Aircraft X had filed is unusual routing since it turns sharply to the East for 50 miles. Normally in this situation; the MMZT Center controller will issue alternate routing instructions to let the aircraft to fly a more direct route. Since they almost always adjust unusual routing; I did not check what the aircraft had filed past TIJ and thought it was clear of all US airspace. Once the aircraft had crossed the border into Mexico; my D-side dropped the data tag. The aircraft then turned east along his route; flying along the boundary of Sector 31's airspace without an approved Point-Out. The Sector 31 controller noticed the limited data block flying along his boundary; and brought it to my attention.I need to be sure to double check the routing after the first fix outside my airspace to ensure that I make all proper point-outs before dropping the data tag.




Synopsis: ZLA Controller reported an aircraft they assumed would continue on a southbound heading and turn after leaving the US. The aircraft was not pointed out to the adjacent sector causing an airspace deviation.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: E60.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAB
ATC / advisory: CTAF E60
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a routine instrument rating training flight with a student; we were practicing flying on victor airways from NAVAIDS. We were on V94 from TFD; which crosses E60. I tuned into E60 CTAF 122.80 and asked for an airport advisory; and if any jump operations were in progress. I continued to monitor E60's frequency as I transitioned over the field at 6500. 5 minutes later; with no jump calls; I spotted two jumpers with patrons strapped to them off my wing. I immediately took evasive action to distance myself from them; and to scan for additional jumpers. Major parachute jump operations in a student intensive practice area (the PHX southeast practice area) is a rising issue.




Synopsis: C172 Flight Instructor with student on V94 at 6;500 FT; reports a NMAC with skydivers over E60 airport. The reporter had been monitoring the CTAF for E60 and heard no calls for jumpers away.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OMA.Airport, NE
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C OMA
ATC / advisory: TRACON OMA
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During a visual approach to runway 14R at Omaha; my First Officer and I had to perform an evasive maneuver in order to avoid colliding with a glider.  The weather at Omaha was VMC. We were initially cleared to intercept the ILS approach to 14R at the CIVRA waypoint and cleared to an altitude of 4000 MSL.  As we got closer to the airport; the approach controller vectored us to a 050 heading for traffic and cleared us down to 3000 MSL.  This vector took us an estimated half mile south of the Blair; NE (BTA) airport.  Approaching Blair; I noticed what appeared to be a general aviation airplane flying over Blair airport and headed toward the south.  Initially it looked like it was higher than us and further away.  This turned out to be an illusion due to the size and speed of the glider.  A couple seconds later my First Officer and I realized we were on a collision course and we made an immediate right turn and descended to avoid colliding.  I would estimate we missed the glider at 200 FT or less both vertically and laterally.A review of the VFR sectional shows that we were operating in class G airspace at the time of the incident.  The sectional also shows glider activity at Blair airport.  We were not told by the controller to watch for gliders however.  It also appears the glider did not have a transponder as we did not get a TCAS RA or advisory. Since both the glider and our flight were being operated legally all I can to is suggest the company make pilots aware of the possibility of glider traffic while flying approaches to the south/southeast at Omaha.This event could have been prevented [if] the controller had alerted us to possible glider activity.  The company should make the pilot group aware of possible glider activity near the 14R localizer and glide slope to runway 14R in Omaha.




Synopsis: An A319 captain reported experiencing an NMAC with a glider in the vicinity of 3NO (Blair) while being vectored for a visual approach to Runway 14R at OMA.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: MEL 38-02; Galley Drains; and MEL 38-04F; lavatory water line/faucet/sink; both MEL's have verbiage that state no leaks allowed. In the past Maintenance Control personnel have had changing and conflicting guidance from Maintenance Control Management about how to use/interpret this verbiage. Most personnel interpret the MEL as 'No Leakage Allowed' and refuse to issue a placard if drain line is confirmed to be leaking.Management; in the past; has used two different approaches: taken Aircraft Out of Service (OTS) once the drain line was troubleshot as leaking; and also at times instructed Maintenance Control personnel to MEL the water supply as a remedy to cover the leaking drain lines. Maintenance Control personnel need clear and consistent guidance on the correct use of MEL 38-02 and 38-04F; when known leakage exist in the drain lines from the sinks. Is it correct usage of the MEL to also issue an MEL to turn-off the water supply and ignore the leakage verbiage in the drain MELs? If this is a correct usage; then put a statement as such under MEL 38-02 and 38-04F to issue additional MEL to turn-off water supply. If this is incorrect usage of the MEL; Management needs to issue a clear; concise statement of such; and insure all pertinent Management and Fleet Engineering personnel understand and follow the guidance.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller describes the need for clear and consistent guidance from their Management on the use of MEL 38-02 Galley Drains and MEL 38-04F lavatory water line/faucet sink. Both MELs have verbiage that state 'No leaks allowed'. But Controllers are instructed to issue an MEL to turn-off the water supply and ignore leakage verbiage in the drain MEL.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Second reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On a training flight with my instructor we were preforming a short field takeoff. This was my first flight in a multiengine plane after six hours in the simulator. With my feet on the brakes I applied full power and then released the brakes. We rolled forward about a foot before the plane made a sharp yaw to the left and stopped. I reduced power. The brakes were locked up. At this point we did a positive exchange of controls and my instructor took over since he was PIC. He called the tower to alert them to our aborted takeoff. We checked the parking brake but that wasn't the problem. He called the tower to let him know that we were going to shut down and need to be towed to the ramp. Suddenly the brakes unlocked and we were able to taxi back to the ramp.


Second narrative: First multiengine flight for my student. Everything was running smoothly thru the run up. Cleared to takeoff. I told my student the takeoff was supposed to be a short field take off. When the student released the brakes the plane turned left due to the left brake being locked. On the runway for a minute trying to unlock brakes. Aborted takeoff and after realizing the parking brake had come on and took it off taxied to the ramp. We assigned the aircraft to maintenance due to the fact that the parking brake had come on without our doing.


Synopsis: PA-44 student pilot and flight instructor reported an aborted takeoff due to a brake system malfunction.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Stall Warning System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: There were showers in the area with the ATIS reporting windshear advisories in effect. We had shifting winds down to about 500 ft. Although the winds we experienced during our landing flare were fairly steady; indicating a left quartering head wind of less than 15 knots. Turbulence varied from light to none throughout the approach below 2000 ft. On short final below approximately 500 ft the indicated airspeed was on target and steady. At approximately 150 feet or so; the airspeed remained steady and on target; but the stick shaker activated. Immediately and concurrently the Pilot Flying (F/O) and I reached for the thrust levers and called go-around thrust. The stick shaker silenced immediately as we climbed into a rain shaft ahead. I had the F/O continue to fly the aircraft while we were vectored around visually for another landing attempt. The cockpit was busy during the ensuing five minute pattern. At some point on base leg; during the second approach; I believe we were at flaps 5 and approximately 190 knots (?) We received an 'AIRSPEED LOW' audio warning that was (as far as I can tell) also erroneous. The ensuing landing was uneventful with no further warnings. I wrote up the aircraft using the words: possible erroneous stall warning and possible erroneous airspeed low warning. My gut feeling is that this aircraft was nowhere near a stall as I specifically remember seeing steady airspeed on target. And while in our base turn for our configuration; we should not have received the 'AIRSPEED LOW' warning. However; because of the weather conditions in the area; and how short-lived the whole event was; I am not certain of this. Thus my use of the words 'possible erroneous.'


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported a stall warning on short final which was determined to be erroneous. The crew executed a go-around and the subsequent landing was uneventful.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Ryddr1 RNAV ArrivalWhile preparing for descent on the LAX RYDDR 1 arrival; we were given a crossing restriction 10 west of RYDDR intersection at 11;000 plus descent at 270 knots. GNZZO is crossed between 16;000 and 14;000 which leaves 4.8 miles to descend from 14;000 to 11;000. Even with full spoilers; this is beyond the aircraft performance ability (A321) and with all best forward planning; we crossed 500 feet high at 10 west of RYDDR. In retrospect; I should have not accepted the crossing restriction when given. Next; with the aircrafts flight management system once again fully engaged; the aircraft failed to level off at KEVVI intersection at 10;000 feet. As I manually selected the aircraft to climb back up to 10;000 feet; we had descended to 9600 feet before the correction. This is both due to my unfamiliarity of the management system; and the pitfalls of reengaging the system outside of the performance envelope. These RNAV arrivals are built into the box as published. Once we start modifying them with different crossing restrictions; altitudes and speeds; we may be setting ourselves up for failure. The pilots spend far too much heads down time when we really should be looking out the window for traffic as well. The original intent to RNAV arrivals was to make everything standard; reduce controller workload; and add to safety. In this particular arrival; that does not seem to be the case as the pilot workload is increased with multiple step-downs; speed changes; in some very short sequences. The pilots rely too much on the computer-operated flight management systems; as there is little room for recovery in case of error. This arrival needs to be simplified in order to reduce pilot workload and increase situational awareness.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported being given a modification to the RYDDR1 arrival to LAX that was beyond the aircraft performance capability.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FTW.Tower, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D FTW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10; Tower FTW
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff at FTW on Runway 34 to fly runway heading to 3;000 ft. MSL. At approximately 800 ft. were are advised of Aircraft Y off to our right and that Aircraft Y had us in sight. We received a TA at the same time we were issued the traffic from ATC.At the same time a second TA popped up on the TCAS at 12 O'clock on our flight path. This TA immediately turned into a red RA! I reduced power to slow our rate and started to level below our assigned altitude about 2;600 ft. to comply with the RA. The TCAS said to descend. When I looked out the window I viewed what appeared to be Aircraft Z making a hard left turn. I looked at the TCAS and it showed he was 400 ft. above us. As Aircraft Z was moving away the TCAS advised 'Clear of conflict' and we continued our climb to 3;000 ft. MSL. In my opinion this was a near miss!We were not advised before take-off of either of these airplanes. We fly in and out of FTW frequently and this happen several times a year. Either right after takeoff or just as we switch to DFW we are given traffic that is very close. This incident is the worst experience we have had. [I believe] there is a lack of communication between DFW and FTW Tower. All of the DFW and FTW controllers are excellent but this has to be addressed. Aircraft departing should be advised of traffic before takeoff and not while handling initial climb and after takeoff checklists.




Synopsis: Pilot reported not receiving a traffic alert from ATC regarding another aircraft on a similar departure.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi to the gate and holding short of runway; Tower cleared us to cross the runway and contact Ground. As I was taxiing across I heard another aircraft cleared to turn onto the same runway and to then contact Ground. As I was trying to clear the runway; the other aircraft continued to taxi without clearance towards the gate. I had to abruptly stop prior to crossing the hold short line; preventing me from clearing the runway. The other aircraft had (apparently?) every intention to continue their taxi. Ground had to order them to stop and allow my aircraft to clear an active runway. After that kerfuffle; we both taxied to our respective gates. Aircraft not following the rules is a real threat to me having a safe flight. The result was me having to use aggressive braking because our plane was closer than I would like it to be to another airplane.




Synopsis: CRJ flight crew has to make an abrupt stop during taxi due to conflict with another taxing aircraft.