Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I cleared an A319 to Descend via IVANE5 arrival a few miles northeast of MSTRD intersection. The Airbus was level at FL220 and at approximately MSTRD started to descend. I stopped the aircraft at FL200 and coordinated with [the next] sector that the flight was not descending via and was level at FL200. This is a known and reported problem with the Airbus aircraft that; when they are established below the [charted crossing restriction] MSTRD or MAYOS windows they descend before the appropriate window (KIYEN [charted to be crossed] at [or above] FL220). Better training of the Airbus pilots [appears necessary] to prevent an early descent and Airbus needs to fix the software to prevent further occurrences. Fortunately there were no aircraft in the vicinity when the unexpected descent occurred. This procedure is going to cause an accident if it is not fixed.


Second narrative: Cruising to CLT given the 'descend via the Ivane5 landing south'. We had reviewed the arrival separately as per the new [revised] separate [briefing] procedures. However we did verbalize that we each had reviewed the fixes. We had also verbally review the approach for runway 36R. I think we were outside of MSTRD level at 220. The first descent restriction I remember as visible on map was ROYOS. I do not remember seeing a white arrow. Although we both verbalized an agreement to the 'bottom' being 6000; we did not verbalize a warning as to not beginning the descent before KIYEN and I do not remember even having the thought go through my head. We did both verbalize we need to pay attention--this IVANE will bite you--but other than that; no verbalization as when to engage NAV descent mode.As soon as clearance was received I engaged descent mode. When we had descended about 1000 feet the controller asked us to stop the descent at 200. Then we verbalized the fact that they were landing south instead so I entered Runway 18L and it popped up all the altitudes and restrictions that were not visible before. Even when they were higher than our current altitude. Then I wondered why the controller stopped our descent and looked again at the arrival plate. Then I realized what I had done wrong. We did ask controller if we had a problem. He said 'I didn't expect you to start down so soon'. The new verification procedures might have been a larger problem. If we had been going over it like before the person looking at the plate would have verbalized the higher restrictions and the other person would likely started a discussion about it. Then one of us would most probably have remembered earlier about the gotcha on starting down.

Second callback: The Captain clarified the references to the company's newly implemented 'separate' briefing procedures for RNAV STARs; a unique; required briefing introduced by the carrier when the new complex STARs began to generate deviations. The company's original procedure; which reporter preferred; was for one pilot to review the chart and its restrictions aloud using the applicable paper (and later iPad displayed) chart and the other pilot to confirm that data with the programmed but not yet activated moving map display. The recently introduced revision requires only that each pilot 'review' the procedure and merely advise one another they had done so.Reporter further discussed the fact that; when the aircraft is already at or below the lowest crossing altitude of any waypoint in a STAR; the altitude restrictions drop out entirely as the FMC considers them to have been satisfied. Unfortunately; this protocol is inappropriate when the altitude of the aircraft is 'at' the altitude that must be crossed 'at or above'; as in the case of KIYEN on the IVANE STAR. When the crossing restriction drops out of the FMC prior to the aircraft crossing the waypoint there is nothing to prevent the automation from descending prior to satisfying the 'at' requirement.The trigger for the potential deviation is the engagement of the Managed Descent mode prior to crossing the waypoint...such as might happen when a flight crew is cleared to 'descend via' the arrival which originally included the restriction. Per the Captain; when Managed descent is engaged in such a situation the aircraft will begin a 1000 FPM descent so as to cross the 'next' restricted fix at the most efficient point in a window or 'at' a single altitude restriction.

Synopsis: An A319 flight crew; level at FL220 near MSTRD and cleared via the IVANE RNAV STAR to CLT; was cleared to 'descend via' the arrival and the flight crew selected managed descent after confirming that each had reviewed the procedure; its restrictions and had determined and set the 'bottom altitude' for the procedure as 6;000 MSL. The aircraft then began a descent to cross ROYOS between FL230 and FL190 as charted; but failed to meet the requirement to cross the active waypoint; KIYEN; at or above FL220 as restricted.