elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was cleared by Tower to depart Runway XX runway heading. As I rolled onto the runway I noticed an aircraft on final and I told Tower I would expedite. At this time they told me to hold short; I was already on the runway and rolling for departure and I relayed this to Tower. I heard them tell a regional jet to go-around and canceled landing clearance. I was already airborne; 75-100 feet on runway heading when they came back to me and told me to continue ground roll and exit the runway when able. I again relayed that I was already airborne and could not comply.I watched on G1000 ADS-B as the regional jet approached me from behind and left. I remained at a low altitude and watched them visually as it passed me high and to the left. Once it was well clear I continued my climb and was handed off to Departure. From there I was given on course and continued the short flight. I was the sole occupant of the aircraft. I use this airport frequently and have been instructed to depart with varied aircraft on final on many occasions.




Synopsis: Baron single pilot reported a communication breakdown and ATC error that resulted in a NMAC.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Denver Special! Denver attempted to hand two aircraft off on collision courses within 30 miles inside our airspace at the same altitude. When the sector 42 side called the Denver 8 sector to arrange some sort of separation the Denver 'controller' asked; 'What do you want us to do?' After some consideration the Denver 'controller' suggested taking Aircraft Y up to FL380 (wrong altitude for direction of flight). Even though 42 had opposite direction traffic we approved it for safety.Perhaps Denver center needs to be less complacent in their separation responsibilities.




Synopsis: One facility handed two aircraft on converging courses at the same altitude off to another facility without initiating any action to ensure separation.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Wind
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Oil Scavenge Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working on my Aircraft X on [Date]; when I started my work the day was windy above 40 knots so my  screen inspection was postponed. I was then helping my partner on the service check inspection assigned to him. Later on in the night around the wind slowed down. I had already picked up my job packings (seals) and a tire pressure gauge. When I started to set up to do my job card my partner went to stores to get me a torque wrench. I completed the TGB (Transfer Gear Box) inspection screens for both Engine 1 and Engine 2. Two coworkers [Name] and [Name1] preformed both 1 and 2 engine run. I preformed leak check inspections on both engines; I found no leaks. I heard that the aircraft I was working on had an oil leak. I don't know if the oil leak had anything to do with the work I preformed on the engines. I don't believe I properly documented the inspection for Engine 1 scavenge screen. This is my first time doing this job; I believe my work was preformed good; although my paper work was not documented properly; at the time it seamed that I needed to preform both engine inspections.


Second narrative: Assigned chip detector card for #2 Engine. Later that night AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) came to me for leak check of both engines. I question as to why are we leak checking both engines when only #2 Engine was assigned. AMT inform me he also did the #1 Engine. He leaked check both engines and I informed him of documenting #1 Engine's work. Work card changed to work card and does not indicate on the card left or right engine; making it confusing for the AMT. I did not follow up with the AMT to verified #1 Engine's chip detector was done.On paperwork specifically state which engine requires the work to be accomplished.


Synopsis: Technicians reported an oil leak after routine engine service and determined that both engines had work done when only one engine had documentation for the work.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The cause of this event was high pilot workload due to deferred on-board equipment and distraction. We had a deferred ACARS and FMS system. As a result; we were unable to use the normal RNAV procedures in the Houston area. Instead we were navigating point-to-point using VOR's. This caused some confusion for controllers and we dealt with multiple re-routes throughout the day. Communicating our situation to ATC; finding correct frequencies for new navaids; and determining appropriate radials was very distracting.Additionally; before; during and after the 10;000 foot flow we received multiple radio calls from Center. These included speed; heading; and altitude changes. As pilot monitoring; I was answering the radio during the 10;000 foot flow and missed the change from APU bleed to engine bleed air supply to the packs. I accept full responsibility for my part in this event. In the future I intend to always double check my flow patterns. As we were climbing through 16;500 feet to FL230 we received a 'CABIN' aural warning due to the cabin altitude increasing over 10;000 feet. We immediately deployed oxygen masks and informed ATC we had a pressurization issue and needed to descend to 10;000 feet. Upon reaching 10;000 we ran the QRH and discovered we had not changed from APU bleed to engine bleeds. We changed to the engine bleeds; determined that the pressurization system was fully functional; and continued to our destination after climbing to 320.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: When an EMB-145 was dispatched with both the FMS and ACARS inoperative the resulting increased workload contributed to their failure to switch pressurization from APU to engine bleeds.  They received a cabin altitude warning climbing through about 16;000 and descended to 10;000 where they discovered their error.  After reconfiguring the bleeds they continued to their destination.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ATC instructed us to accelerate to 280 kts as soon as possible on FIXIT departure off of 24L at LAX (straight west ground track). We are not sure whether or not we were outside the 12 NM national airspace buffer prior to accelerating above 250 kts.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported SCT requested their flight accelerate to 280 kts as soon as possible after departing on the LAX FIXIT RNAV. The crew was uncertain if they were outside the 12 NM US airspace buffer and legal to exceed 250 kts below 10;000 FT.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Post flight inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The rental company I operate under had asked myself and another flight instructor to return the crew car back to ZZZ and in the process of doing so; fly back the Cessna 182 that had stayed there over night. A few days ago; that C182 had a runway excursion under a renter and instructor that had resulted in the aircraft going off the end of the runway in to the dirt; stopping short of the fence at the end. This was due to a failure in the left brake. The mechanic in ZZZ had worked on the airplane over X days to inspect the condition and replace the left side brakes. Myself and another instructor were asked to fly the C182 back home to ZZZ1. Upon arriving to ZZZ; the mechanic had informed us that the C182 is good to go with no damage to the firewall and engine and had us do a static check on the ground before taxiing. This resulted in us using full brakes and full power to make sure the airplane wasn't going anywhere. After our preflight inspection and the 'OK' from the mechanic; we deemed it safe to fly back to ZZZ1. I had no issues upon landing and made the safe 20 minute maintenance flight home. Upon us returning the keys of the C182 to the office; we had asked for the airplane to be grounded regardless; for our own maintenance personnel to inspect the airplane. Our maintenance had let us know that the bottom of the fuselage appeared slightly bent and that the left brake that had been replaced still needed some work. Seeing as that we had flown an aircraft that had the potential to be unairworthy; I will be much more careful next time I take a maintenance flight and see if I can get a double check on aircraft that need to flown; with other mechanics. I do not do many maintenance flights for this reason and will be much more thorough about what airplanes I fly.




Synopsis: Pilot conducting a ferry flight of a C182 that may have been in unairworthy condition.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: All flight attendants were in forward cabin with the Captain while he was providing us with his safety briefing. Gate agents sent passengers down 2 minutes early. Crew noticed passengers were boarding the aircraft at Door 2L with no FAs at the door. This is a violation of FAR 121.394 flight attendant requirements during passenger boarding. It states: 'the flight attendants must be evenly distributed throughout the airplane cabin; in the vicinity of the floor-level exits to provide the most effective assistance in the event of an emergency.' This seems to be happening quite frequently. Evidently customer service agents have been given a directive to 'board 2 minutes early' regardless if the flight attendants are ready or agree with it (which we do not).




Synopsis: Passengers started boarding before the flight attendants were ready for them.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Travelair 95
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the afternoon of Date; I was on a routine training flight with one student training for their multi-engine add on.The entire flight was without any abnormalities; on our final approach all the normal pre-landing checks were made; gear was put down and I could feel the landing gear go down; I saw the green indicator light; and saw the red flag for the nose gear in the down position.A normal and smooth touchdown was made by the student; both mains touched down and he held the nose wheel off nicely. When the airspeed had decayed and the nose was let down it proceeded to fall all the way to the asphalt. I felt and heard the props striking the asphalt and pulled full elevator to take as much weight off the nose as I could. We pulled the mixtures on both engines.I knew there was nothing else to do but hold on and maintain centerline of the runway using rudder inputs.We came to a complete stop on the centerline of Runway XX and shut off both mags for each engine; shut off masters and generators; and made sure the mixtures were completely closed.We then exited the aircraft without any injuries.After further examination part number 002-820017-1 had [broken] causing the push/pull rod for the nose gear to not lock the nose gear into place.What I had learned from this was a more in depth inspection of the landing gear on preflight to potentially avoid this from happening again.




Synopsis: Flight Instructor on training flight in a BE-95 aircraft reported the Nose Landing Gear collapsed on landing.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out on the departure; we had the Tail Comp High Temp light come on. The QRH memory items were done and an emergency was declared with Departure Control. I requested to level at 18;000 FT and return to the departure station. Departure Control cleared us to turn to an arrival fix; descend to 12;000 FT and cleared ILS DME. The landing was normal at 134;400 LBS. Airfield Rescue and fire fighters inspected the aircraft and followed us to the hard stand.




Synopsis: During climb out an MD-80's TAIL COMP HIGH TEMP light alerted so the QRH was completed; an emergency declared; and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This narrative highlights two incorrect published crossing altitudes on two different arrivals that can lead to altitude deviations and aircraft overspeeds. The first is the PASLY 4 (10-2C) arrival to BNA at GROAT intersection. The crossing is depicted to cross GROAT at or below FL 230. It is always 1000 out of 1000 times given to cross GROAT at FL 220 usually by Memphis Center and has been for at least five years. Sometimes this occurs very late. This can lead to a situation where the aircraft was on the path; is now high; and the aircraft then pitches down at the last minute to meet the unpublished altitude of 22;000 ft. This pitchdown can lead to an overspeed and a situation that still does not meet the crossing. The second instance is on the ENDEE 6 Arrival into MDW (10-2). The fix in particular is KAMBL and the published crossing is between FL 270-FL 240. The unpublished crossing that is given; very late; is to cross KAMBL at 24;000 ft. Now the aircraft is in the same situation as the PASLY 4 Arrival; only you may have a 100 plus kt. tailwind to deal with as well. Both these situations persist but are preventable by simply changing the published altitude. Finally; there are several Pilots who are rusty from not flying; due to low utilization; whose situational awareness and lack of currency make this situation even more grave. Please fix these easy to remedy issues and trap the known errors. Thank you. We did not have a deviation. I am only reporting to highlight these issues.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported ATC consistently issues a crossing restriction at a specific fix different than what is published and programmed causing difficulty complying with the clearance.