elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fire Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On preflight; reviewed [release] and noted two discrepancies. First was 32-XX-XX; #3 TIRE PRESSURE INDICATION MISSING ON 'CONFIG' SYNOPTIC PAGE. Noted that configuration page unexpectedly had all data displayed. Investigated and found F-07 circuit breaker on lower main panel BTM/TPI (Brake Temperature Monitor/Tire Pressure Indicator) was not pulled and collared per MEL (Minimum Equipment List) MX (Maintenance) Procedures. Second was 26-XX-XX CGR FIRE TEST FAIL ON PREFLIGHT. I was performing the manual cargo fire test per MEL and noted that #11 smoke detector was operational. The MEL requires the smoke detector to be disconnected. See: MELRELEASED FOR SERVICE PER MEL: 26-XX-XX CATEGORY: C EXPIRATION: [date] 'MEL 26-XX-XX: #11 MAIN DECK CENTERLINE SMOKE DETECTORS - INOP.' SMOKE DETECTOR STILL REQUIRES TO BE DISCONNECTED;CAPPED; AND STOWED PER STEP 5 OF MEL WITHIN THREE FLIGHT LEGS.UPDT [9 days prior to date]COMPLIED WITH MAINTENANCE STEP 5 OF MEL 26-XX-XX; ONCE AIRCRAFT WAS OFFLOADED. It was not disconnected even though it was specifically stated in the AML (Airplane Maintenance Log) entry because it tested good and did not have an amber boxed F as it should have if it had actually been disconnected.Unknown what caused two MELs to be applied incorrectly; most likely at ZZZ.Greater attention to detail. Although; for the #11 smoke detector; the writeup specifically referenced step 5 as still needing complied with and then the next entry was that step 5 had been done. Very odd to have a direct entry and not have it done. I've seen log pages before 'pre loaded' with the expected entry with work yet to be performed (for example on fuel stick tests; verification of MEL; etc) and perhaps this is what occurred in this case?[3 days prior to date]Note; that we contacted Dispatcher about these two discrepancies and patched to [Maintenance Control]. Maintenance at the aircraft cleared the smoke detector MEL for #11 and corrected the MEL application by pulling and collaring the circuit breaker. We were then correct for departure.




Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported discrepancies in the MEL deferral paperwork.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the flying pilot.  CA was the pilot monitoring.  Uneventful landing and transition from pilot monitoring to pilot flying at 80 knots.  Between 80 knots and 60 knots the Number 1 engine failed. Immediately after; there was a strong odor in the cockpit of something burning. CA continued the landing rollout and exited the runway via the highspeed exit at taxiway Delta and brought the aircraft to a stop at the intersection of Delta and Lima.  We ran the QRH and let ATC know that we had an engine fail on landing.  The FA said that she also had an odor in the front of the cabin; but not in the rest of the cabin.  She said the smell was only evident to her and possibly the passengers in the first 2 rows. Since we were unsure if we had an active fire; CA requested that the tower send the fire trucks to inspect the airplane.  In case of a potential evacuation; CA elected to pull the airplane forward onto the open ramp area; so there would be access to the airplane from all sides.  CA made an announcement to the passengers.  The fire trucks came and inspected the airplane and told us that there were no outward signs of fire or damage.  We then proceeded to the gate and deplaned without incident.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported the number one engine failed on landing rollout.
Date: 201910
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Other Gate arrival for deplaning
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After aircraft parked at gate upon arrival into ZZZ; a strong smell of kerosene like fumes came into cabin. Passengers sitting near my jumpsuit 2R commented and even asked what the 'smell of fumes' was. I had already called the Captain and advised we were being 'fumed' in the cabin and that there was a strong kerosene smell. He said 'Oh OK'. Suggestions: turn both engines off before hooking up air to cabin i.e. APU suggestion.




Synopsis: A321 Flight Attendant reported sudden 'kerosene like fumes' in cabin during gate arrival. Deplaning passengers reported fumes to Flight Attendant who notified Captain.
Date: 201811
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying and the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring. On initial engine start the left engine driven generator failed to come on line; cycled the Generator Control switch and the left generator took the load and powered the left bus tie. Takeoff; departure and climb to cruise were uneventful. Approximately 1.5 hours into the flight; the autopilot and auto throttles disconnected the Captain's displays blanked and numerous EICAS message came up indicating loss of left Aircraft Bus Tie and Left Generator. The FO took over the controls and stabilized the aircraft and the Captain initiated the Aircraft BUS OFF-L in the QRH. Attempted one generator reset per the checklist; the generator failed to assume the load. Started the APU; cycled the BUS TIE switch and powered the left bus. Contacted ATC and requested a divert to ZZZ. ZZZ was chosen since ZZZ and ZZZ1 ETAs were within 2 minutes of each other; maintenance is readily available at both; but passenger issues could be better handled there. Also since we were on the southernmost track there would be less chance of a traffic conflict if we returned to ZZZ versus ZZZ1. The aircraft is not equipped with SATCOM; therefore consultation with dispatch was not immediately available. Initiated the Diversion procedures. Center cleared conflicting aircraft from our flight level and approved the return to ZZZ. Initiated a left 180 degree turn direct to ZZZZZ Intersection; once established setup a 2 mile right offset. Requested a lower altitude to increase fuel burn and reduce the aircraft landing weight; however due to conflicting opposite direction traffic we were unable to descend. Initiated a HF phone patch through with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Related to problem and our intentions; and requested ZZZ be alerted. Routing was via the ZZZZZ Intersection to [a] runway. Remainder of flight proceeded normally to an overweight but normal landing. The aircraft was approximately 14;000 pounds over weight on touchdown. Logbook entries were made for the generator failure and overweight landing.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a generator failure led to a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OME.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E OME
ATC / advisory: FSS FAI
Second aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Service
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were IFR with 500 FT ceiling and had a number of aircraft waiting with their IFR clearance with a hold for release. A PA31 requested an IFR clearance along with a C208. I requested the clearances from Sector 3 in the order they had been requested. The PA31 followed by the C208. Based on this; the PA31 taxied out and waited for his release on the runway. Sector 3 called back with a release. I was expecting to hear the PA31 was released. The strip showed I called the PA31 off to Sector 3; shortly after this Sector 3 called to tell me they had released the C208 and not the PA31 and to make sure the C208 was still on the ground. The wrong aircraft had been released.  This release for the C208 was something I was not expecting; based on past practices. Sector 3 would point out when the order of arrivals or departures were changed. This was not done this time. From my standpoint separation had been maintained. Point out when the order of arrivals or departures are changed. Releasing the C208 before the PA31 would have slowed traffic down because the PA31 was already on the runway while the C208 was still on the ramp. Don't expect to hear something. At times I will call an aircraft off at the same time I receive a release; I need to make sure I use the aircraft call sign as a double check that we are not both hearing what we expect to hear.




Synopsis: FAI FSS Controller described a confused release event when the sequence was reversed and the wrong aircraft was released.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Have more of a warning from ATC of the turbulence expected to encounter. We did not know of the severity of the turbulence until we were in it ourselves. Experienced continuous moderate turbulence between 8;000 feet to 3;000 feet on descent on the RNAV arrival. We landed without incident.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported unexpected moderate turbulence during descent.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Arriving in gusty crosswind conditions. VMC. I was hand flying the ILS. At runway threshold; I inadvertently descended below the glide slope during transition to outside and received a glide slope warning. As we were in the flare over the runway landing was the safest option. [Identified by] GPWS warning; glide slope. Began transition to outside too early preoccupation with winds. Failed to continue cross checking indications. I heard the annunciation in the landing flare and completed a normal landing. The flight director indications guide the airplane to the touchdown zone use this information in combination with outside.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported receiving a glide slope warning on an ILS approach; citing weather distractions as contributing.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was at 5;500 feet MSL and on flight following. Opposing aircraft (low wing; type unknown) appeared on ADSB-IN at my 7:00 position and less than 5 miles showing +300 feet and was closing. I purposely descended to 5;300 feet as I was trying to visually locate the other aircraft. I visually located the other aircraft in front of my right wing as it passed on approximately the same heading as me and a few hundred feet above me. As it was coming through my 2:00; the other aircraft made an approximately 0 degree turn to the left and crossed just in front and above me. I identified it as a low wing about the same size as a Cirrus SR22; though I do not know what it was. At this time the controller asked me what my altitude was. I responded '5;300 feet for 5;500 feet.' He asked me if I had the traffic in sight and I replied yes. We briefly discussed the other aircraft and the conflict. The other aircraft was not as in contact with ATC and continued to the northwest. I continued my flight with no other abnormalities.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an NMAC during cruise.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Inbound flight pilot write-up for elevator feel EICAS message in flight. My Partner said he saw something on a pitot tube on right side of aircraft. Kind of put two and two together and figured cover was accidentally left on tube causing a pitot difference for the elevator feel system. Followed B757 trouble shooting guide and inspected tube. Tube was totally clear with no damage. After following manual instructions and test; signed off item and aircraft left without delay. I would think the AMT (Aircraft Maintenance Technician) pulled the cover off by the string attached to it and it might have torn off making him think the cover came off. Stop installing covers on pitot tube if the aircraft are going to take another flight the same day. Cover should be installed on a long layover. Spent 10 years at another airline and I can't remember them putting covers on pitot tube for a overnight.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports being assigned to an aircraft with an elevator feel EICAS message in flight. Reporter suspects that a pitot cover was left on the right pitot tube and mostly disintegrated in flight.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: B737-800
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: LGA advertised LDA-A approach. A B737-800 vectored across LDA-A final approach course and then cleared for a visual approach (VAP) to Runway 22. A CRJ-200 on downwind being vectored to follow the B737-800. Instead of proceeding visually direct to the runway with weather not a factor; the B737-800 unexpectedly turned away from the runway back towards the LDA-A final approach course. Separation was lost with the CRJ-200 who was being vectored downwind to the expected VAP flight path. Recommendation; when cleared for a visual approach; aircraft should be required to fly the most direct route to the runway when practical. When unable to do so; pilot should inform ATC of their intentions.




Synopsis: N90 TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event between two air carrier arrivals when the first; cleared for a visual approach; made an unexpected turn causing the event.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain called to advise that because there are both live animal and dry ice on board they must run air conditioning pack which is a 1.1 % drag/overburn. He advised same issue happened out of ZZZ and delay incurred on both flights. I advised him I would report this issue; since there is no alert generated from weight/balance system to flight planning like there would be in dry [ice] supplemental procedures and/or carp messages. This scenario will continue to occur. I advised him I have to recalculate flight plan with 1.1 % over burn and changed payload since it is lighter than original plan. Sent mini flight plan. The cause is no alert program within weight/balance system to notify dispatcher in advance. I suggested to have the it people with weight/balance and flight planning create a fix (similar to dry ice supplemental procedures and captain report).




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported Captain requested additional fuel and updated Weight & Balance data due to dry ice and live animal in cargo compartment. Dry Ice and live animal in cargo requires the operation of cargo AC Pack during flight.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While on a trip it began to flurry. I advised the Captain and we watched the snow intensify. It was decided to return to the airport and start the aircraft to see if we could get the dry accumulation to depart the airframe. The snow was not forecasted and appeared to be ocean effect show. There was 1.5 to two inches on the aircraft and engine start had little effect to remove the snow from the critical areas of the aircraft. There is no deicing capability at the field and a call to our offices revealed there was no way of getting a deicing truck to the field. Brooms and a ladder were summoned by the PIC to get rid of the snow. I explained that the preferred method was to apply deicing fluid. But with no chance of that happening; while there was a lull in the precipitation the snow was removed and although it was my leg; the PIC elected to perform the flight.He said they have had the same problem in the past and were successful in departing the airfield successfully. I pointed out the 'clean aircraft theory' as I've done 135 and 121 operations in the past. The normalcy of deviation was something we discussed on the return trip. Had we been unable remove the snow; or the intensity of the precipitation were to continue or worsen; I would have refused the fly in the aircraft.Our company; in order to keep the client happy; places pressure on the crews to use this airfield in the winter; knowing full well that there is no deice capability. Any attempts to use other fields; so equipped are frowned upon. This is the first and last time I will be party to this.




Synopsis: Aircrew used non-standard methods to clean wing surfaces of snow.