elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While calling for our taxi clearance out of ZZZ. Captain began to power up to begin our taxi. He started adding more power than normal but we were heavy with 6 passengers; lot of bags and fuel; not moving he added more power. I was about to say 'I think we might have a chock in' in when he finally pulled the power back some and realized he had the parking brake on. The lineman marshaling us out seemed concerned about something going on behind us but after briefly stopping he continued to Marshall us out of the ramp. I told the Captain 'I think you had too much power in'. On the taxi out I could see behind us the hangar door was open and there were a few people inside. We later found out a flight attendant had fallen over from our jet blast. Obviously the issue could have been solved by taking the parking brake off before adding power. It might be a good idea for them not to marshall planes out while people are walking in the hangar; though that may be unavoidable at [FBO] due to the ramp configuration.




Synopsis: C680 flight crew failed to release parking brake before taxi; resulting in excess power applied that knocked a person over.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Compressed and reduced crew show times along with remote and unfamiliar locations with higher workloads from reduced staff along with airline uncertainties sets the stage of additional threats prior to aircraft boarding.First Officer seat swap with Relief Pilot to maintain currency along with a reduced arrival time at the remote aircraft parking further complicates and influences unexpected changes to proven habit patterns that often catches mistakes or details that unintentionally fall through the cracks.  Crew situational awareness broke down.  After all the extenuating circumstances; reasons and deflections of blame are reviewed and scrutinized I take full responsibility for an unintentional safe departure with missing printed takeoff data.Had I followed my normal crosschecks including a simple marking of all pre-departure printed paperwork highlighted by green sharpie marker; I feel 'THE CREW' would have easily caught this blunder and broken the chain of events that caused this error.Through this extreme humbling experience learning has definitely occurred.I hope other crews learn from this mistake for which I offer no excuses.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported departing without proper takeoff data; citing high workload and career uncertainties related to COVID-19 cutbacks as contributing.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Immediately after landing DFW Runway 17C; the tower controller began giving us a complicated set of taxi instructions based on his belief we would clear the runway at Taxiway M4.  However we did not exit the runway until Taxiway M6; which elicited another set of instructions including the requirement for us to hold short of Runway 17R at Taxiway EM.  I mention this because I was trying to follow the controller's taxi instructions on my tablet and was possibly distracted from my duties as pilot monitoring.  I noticed a moment too late that it didn't appear the Captain was stopping short of the Runway 17R hold short line.  I told the Captain to stop; which he immediately did.  We stopped short of the runway; but beyond the hold short line.




Synopsis: A pilot reports of getting complicated instructions to exit the runway while still moving at a high speed. They missed the exit and the controller then gave more instructions. The pilot was looking at his tablet to find out where to go and told the Captain to stop the aircraft so they would not compromise the runway; but ended up crossing the hold short line of a parallel runway.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was released off of the airport. I had to vector the aircraft and keep them at 2;000 ft. for longer than usual to be able to have an arrival go over the top on the ILS. Once Aircraft X was clear of the other IFR traffic I climbed them to 5;000 ft. I did this in what I believed was ample time to be able to comply with terrain avoidance rules. The aircraft did not climb as expected and entered a 3;900 ft. Minimum vectoring Altitude at 2;800 ft. I issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X and had them expedite their climb through 4;000 ft.




Synopsis: Approach Controller reported they vectored a departing aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working R40 during a push. The word came down that Sector 42 was to be opened; which increases my workload immensely due to point outs now needing to be made. I reported that I needed a D-Side. Everyone on position in the control room was needed where they were. The CIC was then relieved by the FLM and told to open R42. I saw him sit down; and repeated that I needed a D-Side to the FLM and OM who were now chatting at the front desk. I continued to do work and heard the briefing starting next to me to open R42. I then loudly exclaimed that I needed a D-Side in hopes of breaking through the chit-chat barrier up front. When a D-Side did come; it was at the initiative of a fellow controller who left a sector that also needed a D-Side; just not as imminently. A D-Side was never assigned to help me; despite the exuberant call I made. Just to clarify: Sector 42 was allowed to continue to open as safety was compromised on Sector 40; thus also putting Sector 30/31 at risk because of the given-up D-Side. We had the staffing; Management simply decided to misuse it. First of all; I'm sure all 3 aircraft in the confines of Sector 42 needed special handling and their own R-Side. Opening Sector 42 in Area D has become the habitual staple of all supervisors. Opening this sector increases workload for Sector 40. Opening this sector during a SLC departure push is shortsighted; unsafe; and completely unnecessary. Supervisors need to have a handle on their area. Why else are they there? Three calls for a D-Side is ludicrous. Ignoring a call for a D-Side is unsafe; and I can't cite a rule off the top of my head; but it seems like it should be written somewhere. The OM's decision (baseless and without any experience; I will add) was held above the safety of the NAS. I forget rule number one of Air Traffic Control; and apparently so has everyone else forced to wear a tie to work here. Sectors 42 and 43 both have increased workloads with a split.  Sectors 41; 45; and 47 all have increased workload with this split. Oakland Center has an increased workload with this split. Seattle Center has increased workload with this split. Unless the split is needed for traffic; really needed; not just for a seat to fill the roster; it should not be opened. It is a overall increase in workload which is fine if it makes the airspace safer; but unacceptable for any other reason.




Synopsis: ZLC Controller described an unsafe condition concerning sector splits and failure to open D-Sides; noting that even attempts to 'split' sectors can sometimes increase workloads significantly due to coordination requirements.
Date: 201902
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was at a stop mark facing west next to the gate waiting for a gate food truck to pass me. Driver did not see me and turned right into my path. 15 feet away from me he hit the brakes and swerved out of the way; missing me by a foot.




Synopsis: Ramp agent reported a near miss in the gate envelope between himself and another ground vehicle.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOI.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower BOI
Second aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Anomaly: Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback we were given clearance by BOI Ground Control to taxi to Runway 10L via Taxiway A and then Taxiway W. As we taxied out we did not receive the final weight manifest from Load Planning in the normal time frame so we performed the before takeoff checklist 'down to' the Manifest Changes line. As we continued to wait for the final weights from load planning we began approaching the intersection of Taxiway A and Taxiway W. As we approached the above intersection I went 'heads down' to switch the aircraft radio to Tower frequency and to enter the 'address' for Load Planning into ACARS in regards to not receiving the final weights. After performing the two above tasks; I looked up and noticed that we were passing over the hold short line to Runway 10L at Taxiway A and Taxiway J. We traveled a short distance past the line and then the Captain stopped the airplane. We then advised BOI Tower that we had passed the hold short line for Runway 10L.


Second narrative: The A320 stopped well past the hold line. As a result a Cessna on approach was sent around to avoid landing over the top of the Airbus. I was CIC and noticed the event simultaneously with the Controller who was being relieved at the time and prompted the assuming Controller at Local Control to send the Cessna around.


Synopsis: When an A320 flight crew was distracted by receiving their final weight and balance numbers from their company they inadvertently crossed the hold short line of the runway to which they had been cleared. ATC directed a Cessna on final approach to go around due to the incursion.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Light
Component problem: Design
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Night landings at uncontrolled fields in the Phenom 300 is a very risky landing. Forward visibility using the lights is 20 to 30 yards and does not allow the pilot proper reaction time if wildlife (deer; coyote; cows) or any other obstacle (car; mower; unlit runway x) is on the runway. Landing light location must be changed or light output must be increased.




Synopsis: EMB-505 Captain reported the EMB-505 landing light output is insufficient to identify unexpected runway conditions during night operations.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Received my clearance to fly the WLKKR 3 RNAV Departure from VNY airport. The departure requires to be at or below 1750 ft 1.5 DME south and then the clearance was to 4000 ft. As I was leveling off at 1700 ft and switching to Departure; I reported in to Departure Control my altitude and climbing to 4000; the Controller stated low altitude warning. The frequency was very busy and the Controller again stated low altitude warning; I turned to a heading of 240 as I had all the terrain in sight and was climbing. The terrain warning system was never activated or any GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) warnings; no RA (Resolution Advisory)/TA (Traffic Advisory) TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) alerts. I was then cleared to an intersection and higher along the route.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a low altitude report from ATC while on published SID.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After lowering the gear on final to Runway XXR in ZZZ; we received an ECAM stating that the auto brake system was inoperative. We accomplished the ECAM procedure and consulted the QRH; which stated that the normal brakes were inoperative also. I chose to go around because of the short runway and immediately asked for a diversion to ZZZ; which was our designated alternate. Passing through 2;000 feet; a Flight Attendant notified us that a passenger was having a seizure. We notified Dispatch and coordinated with ATC and ZZZ1 Operations; requesting paramedics to meet us at the gate. Things were very hectic during the 10 minute flight; but the First Officer and I worked well together.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported that a brake system failure and a passenger medical emergency resulted in a diversion.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JNU.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower JNU
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I; the Captain and my First Officer began our trip from JNU. Conditions outside; Raining; Windy; and overcast sky. We were given taxi instructions 'XXX taxi to Runway 8 using B2' we read back instructions; briefed the taxi route 'b2 to A to B hold short 8' by mistake; and began our taxi. We had briefed the NOTAMS but for whatever reason didn't put it together to brief the taxi route differently. The brief of taxi should have been 'taxi B2 hold short 8 at B2'. NOTAMS on the field said runway 8 was closed and taxiway A was now being used as runway 8. B2 on the taxi diagram comes to a 'T' and then a right turn on 'A' to 'B' hold short runway 8. As I started out on B2 I noticed runway markings in front of me on 'A' taxiway; I immediately stopped and called ground because something didn't seem right. I cannot recall seeing any taxiway markings or hold short lines. I did not see any runway flashing lights. It was then that I remembered that 8 had been closed and taxiway 'A' was now the runway. We get used to seeing certain identifiers as runway/ taxiways; it truly seemed like a taxiway (because it was). Ground asked me where I was and I told them then they replied I had crossed the hold short line and to call them. Looking back on the incident; I would say we overlooked the taxi instructions and were too focused on the takeoff and complicated 'SID' we were about to undertake. We spent a longer than normal time briefing the departure and emergency procedures because of the terrain and overlooked the current NOTAMS and simple taxi instructions that was in front of us. I also believe that the rain and wet taxiways made it harder to pick out the taxiway markings.




Synopsis: A corporate crew was cleared to taxi B2 to Runway 8 at JNU; but incurred the Runway at B2 since they forgot Taxiway A was being used as Runway 8.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: M03.TRACON, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was doing a practice RNAV approach. I was at 3;000 ft. and was cleared to the IAF and told to descend to 2;000 ft. I noticed a plane on my ADS-B in that was 500 ft. below and was going to be about the halfway point when we converged. I tried to radio the Controller; but he was busy continuously on the radio with other planes. I continued at 3;000 ft. until the plane passed under me. I took a picture of my G1000 screen that shows right after he was this happened. It shows the planes [tail number]. It was a very dangerous situation. Please contact me for details.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC during approach.