elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D CHO
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: CHO ATIS was advertising visual approaches to runway 21. However; the wind was calm and the VASI for 21 was NOTAM'd unusable; so considering the 500 feet hill right about 2 miles off the approach end of the runway that is difficult to see at night; I requested runway 3 in the interests of greater safety. We were cleared for the visual to 3; and I performed a right downwind pattern. I had previously briefed all the obstacles on the plate; and we both agreed that 2;600 feet would provide an adequate margin of safety--about 1;500 feet above one tower; and 721 feet above the highest terrain. Prior to reaching a point abeam the final fix; in level flight; we received a TERRAIN PULL UP warning. I immediately called 'Max Power; Pulling Up' as I added power and climbed; up to about 3;400 feet. We did not see any real obstacle; and so continued direct to the runway without further GPWS alerts.This airport has fairly mountainous terrain in the area; which is a huge threat at night. I thought I was being proactive enough by briefing all the threats and planning mitigating strategies; but I now believe there is just too much terrain in the area to be able to conduct a visual approach safely at night; without being on an instrument approach. Even though it is possible the GPWS malfunctioned; I believe in the future it would be best to request vectors onto final; or even to perform the full instrument approach. In the future I will not accept a visual approach into CHO at night; without at least being vectored onto a portion of an instrument approach.  It's just too difficult to maintain visual separation from terrain I can't see!




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported receiving a terrain warning from the GPWS on a night visual approach to CHO.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SBA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SBA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Other LASER
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Coming beneath a low 600' deck on final approach to RWY 7 in SBA; we began getting lased with a bright green light at our 1-2 o'clock. I was flying and the F/O (First Officer) was the first to state we were being lased and when I first noticed it; I thought it was the airport beacon until remembering the beacon was at our 11 o'clock on final. The light was quite bright and seemed to have a few lesser lights of the same color around it so there may have been more than one perpetrator. The light never fully illuminated the cockpit or hit us in the eyes directly and we stopped looking at it almost immediately. The lasing lasted for maybe 10 seconds or so. There was no injury to us and the flight landed a few minutes later uneventfully. The F/O (First Officer) immediately reported the incident to LAX Center as we taxied in (SBA was uncontrolled at the time) and guessed the distance was within a mile or two; south to southeast of the airport. My guess was within a mile south to southeast of the airport. We later reported the incident to [Medlink Company] as well; per protocols; and they cleared us to fly without any issues.




Synopsis: Flight Captain reported being lasered on final approach to SBA.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During pushback and review of the load closeout; my FO (First Officer) briefed to me that the R/A [DG] column was labeled 'yes' and asked if we had received a NOTOC. We had not; so we queried the push crew about the NOTOC (Notice to Captain) and asked what was loaded on the airplane. He responded that a NOTOC had not been sent and that they had indeed loaded 'a box' in the forward cargo bin. We asked that they not disconnect the tow bar and we did not start engines. We contacted Dispatch via ACARS and ZZZ Ops to inquire on the NOTOC and cargo. Since no one was able to provide an answer as to where the NOTOC was or what the DG was; we elected to return to the gate. Upon return; the ground crew removed all DG from the cargo bin; re-input the weight and balance data; and we pushed back with no further anomalies. During push; the crew did inform us that it looked like the DG that was removed was dry ice; but there was no verification of that.




Synopsis: ERJ-190 Captain reported no flight crew DG documents [NOTOC] for Dangerous Goods loaded in cargo. Flight crew executed a ground gate return to remove DG; subsequently completed an uneventful flight.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am a flight instructor; my student is candidate for CFI-Instrument. The mission was for the candidate to fly the RNAV (GPS) approach while practicing as a flight instructor. An IFR flight plan was filed and we were cleared for the GPS approach. The weather was 3;000 Overcast with 10 SM visibility. The candidate intercepted the intermediate course; was cleared for the approach and initiated a descent to 2;000 MSL as required on the STAR to intercept the final approach fix. He leveled out at 2;000 MSL (we were VFR with 10 SM visibility) and initiated his Landing checklist. During this time he failed to maintain an effective cross check and he descended rapidly below his intermediate segment minimum altitude of 2;000 MSL. I immediately pointed out his altitude; instructed him to climb at full power back to minimum altitude. The candidate complied and Approach called with a low altitude warning. The key to prevention is continued emphasis on instrument scan; positional awareness and practice cockpit management. I have scheduled simulator time with the candidate to reinforce these techniques prior to another flight.




Synopsis: C172 instrument instructor experiences an altitude deviation by his CFII student during a GPS approach. ATC also takes note of the deviation.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Controller 1] was on LC1; I was Controller In Charge (CIC). [Controller 1] told Aircraft X that he was going to try and [get] him in on 12L when he has been on RWY 12R pattern work. Aircraft X said they were fine on 12R because they were doing single engine landings. [Controller 1] told him that he was going to RWY 12L and cleared him. When Aircraft X was on a tight base; about .5 base; he cleared asked the Cessna [Aircraft Y] if they could do an immediate takeoff. Cessna said yes and was cleared. I told [controller 1] to send Aircraft X around. Got no response. He waited till he was on less than a 1/4 mile final and less than 100 feet up if they could change runways to the south one. Aircraft X did and landed on the south runway. The Cessna was not more than 1000 feet down the runway when Aircraft X landed on the south runway. This is the second time in two days he has ignored me on CIC in a dangerous situation. This is also the same situation where he had changed a plane on short final to a different runway. That time the aircraft went off the runway. He stated that the Front Line Manager pressured him into it. I was up there when this happened and why I said do a go around. He didn't do it just because I said so and he did not learn from the past event. Again this is the 2nd time in two day there has been a dangerous situation due to him.The only recommendation I have is to remove him from the boards until some type of training is complete.




Synopsis: Controller in Charge reported that another Controller operated in an unsafe way by letting an aircraft land when it should have been sent around.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: First Officer flying; received PTRIM MAIN INOP EICAS Warning as we leveled off.  He was hand flying at the time we got the message.  He said his trim was not working so I took over the aircraft and noticed my main trim was not working either.  We ran the QRH and I decided to continue as Pilot Flying for the rest of the flight.  We landed in ZZZ using the backup trim without issue.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a pitch trim failure during flight.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Departure
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were departing LAX 24L and had just been handed off to Departure at approximately 500 ft. As the FO checked on with SOCAL I noticed a traffic target ahead of us by less than a mile. We were IMC so I did not have visual contact. As soon as communication was established; SOCAL told the intruding aircraft ahead of us to 'turn left immediately' and then told us to 'Stop your climb; stop your climb.' We were just above 1000 ft and I did not have the autopilot on yet so I leveled off. After we leveled off we were told to turn right to 270. During this  maneuvering we got a 'Don't sink' GPWS. We never did get a TCAS warning but the target was close. I believe [the other aircraft] was a foreign carrier that had turned the wrong way and was right in front of us on departure. Not sure all traffic events can be avoided but had I focused more on flying the airplane and not watching the TCAS target on my ND (Navigation Display) I would  not have got the 'Don't sink' warning.


Second narrative: I observed Aircraft Y depart RWY 25 complex and saw the aircraft was turning right unexpectedly. Simultaneously; I observed a target departing the RWY 24 complex. I reached out to Aircraft Y; radar identified the aircraft; said traffic alert turn right heading 180 immediately and to climb immediately. Then I reached out to Aircraft X; radar identified the aircraft and said stop climb immediately; traffic alert; issued the traffic advisory and turned Aircraft X right heading 270.


Synopsis: An Air Carrier Captain and a Departure Controller reported on a traffic conflict between two aircraft departing LAX in IMC.
Date: 201409
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Narrative: Currently there is signage on the Alpha and Bravo bridges at ORD in one direction only for aircraft to 'not stop on the bridge.' The signage appears for aircraft southbound on the Bravo Bridge and northbound on the Alpha Bridge only. I understand that the normal taxi assignments are to taxi in those directions; south on Alpha and north on Bravo Bridge; but I assume there are situations where normal taxi instructions are not possible. Snow plowing comes to mind; where the opposite direction taxiing may be assigned. If that is the case should the 'Taxiing Aircraft Do Not Stop on the Bridge' signage be visible in both directions on both Alpha and Bravo bridges.




Synopsis: Signage on the Alpha and Bravo bridges at ORD is in one direction only for aircraft to 'not stop on the bridge.' Bridges are occasionally used in a nonstandard direction and no signage is available.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We got our IFR clearance from ZZZ Tower about 30 minutes prior to departure. We were surprised that ZZZ Tower closed shortly after getting our clearance; at XB:00 p.m. we taxied to the runway and made position announcements on the CTAF. After takeoff we contacted ZZZ Approach at about 1;500 feet AGL. Approach informed us that we should have gotten an IFR release from them on the ground.  We need to remember to get an IFR release for departure from Approach Control if the Tower closes after issuing our clearance.


Second narrative: In ZZZ; I called ZZZ Clearance and received our IFR clearance to ZZZ1 at approximately XA:30 p.m. local time. After a slight ramp delay; we pushed back around XB:10 p.m. The Tower at ZZZ closes at XB:00. We made all our CTAF calls and took off in clear VFR conditions. I checked in with departure at 1;400 feet. At that time Departure let us know we did not get our IFR release on the ground.I recommend once a Tower closes; even with a clearance received prior to closing; always contact Departure on the ground prior to departing and pick up your IFR release to destination. The cause was some confusion with already receiving the clearance and picking up the release after the Tower closed. Lesson learned is as described above; once Tower closes you need to pick up your clearance from Departure prior to taking off.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported obtaining an IFR clearance before Tower closed; however; they departed after Tower closed and did not obtain an IFR release for departure.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Drain
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was informed that the aircraft had been operating in an unairworthy condition for a week; when the damage was first observed. The damage was to a wi-fi antenna and fuel drain mast in the rear of the aircraft. The crew that initially [experienced] the tailstrike did not recognize the strike.The original cause of the event was a tailstrike that went unnoticed by the crew. The aircraft went 7 days in operation before the damage was noticed. Contributing factors might include cold weather operations leading to rushed pre and post flights; subtle damage which was difficult to notice; and post flight inspection complacency.Emphasis of pre and post flight diligence and duties during training. Tailstrike training and training focused on how to recognize the potential subtle cues and specific ways to identify antenna damage which could be a symptom of a tailstrike. Possible required inspections if the aircraft was flared during landing past a specific angle; where tailstrike possibility increases significantly.




Synopsis: EMB-175 First Officer reported the aircraft had been flown for a week with damage caused by a tailstrike event. Reportedly; the original flight crew involved in the tailstrike was not aware of the event.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: HF SSB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This report is being filed to document current long range HF communication challenges on the X area route system. On Aircraft X; Date; ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; and several others over late December and early January; the ZZZ1 AIRINC HF radio station in use has been overwhelmed at times. The radio operators are doing a good job; but the volume of aircraft trying to use the primary frequency is often excessive. The X area route HF frequency impacted is X (secondary Y). I believe that pre COVID ZZZ1 AIRINC was using two frequency pairs for X area flights to the X Islands (relief by using [frequency] Z and A to avoid saturation). It appears that they have cut back to a single frequency pair for the X area structure.The root problem however is not the AIRINC reduction; but rather the failure of Company Airlines to properly equip the [aircraft X type] fleet for this flying. The [aircraft X type] fleet has delayed installing SATCOM capability for mainland aircraft; and claims by the fleet to equip the [aircraft X type] fleet properly have not materialized. Report filed [month] 2019 documented an excessive delay of 47 minutes in getting critical medical information for an inflight medical emergency. The [aircraft X type] Fleet responded to the report by stating 'We are currently evaluating a solution for the [aircraft X type] fleet. It is currently installed on a [aircraft type] and will be in service in approximately 2-3 weeks. The intent is just as the report indicates; to provide better communications on our [Oceanic] routes.' Yet here we are today.As a result of the reduction in demand due to COVID; many airline flights operating to the X Islands are using the [aircraft X type]. All of these [aircraft X type] flights are limited to HF communications unlike the Company [aircraft X type] aircraft in [US territory] that have been using SATCOM; CPDLC and ADS for over X years. Operators like Airline Y; Airline Z and even Airline A are a few of the airlines currently using SATCOM and CPDLC. Company [aircraft X type] flights are often getting updated flight safety information relayed from these other aircraft as we do not have timely access to updated weather and turbulence information.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported problems associated with the HF equipment on specific oceanic flights.