elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution Relay
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Avionics
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Paperwork Review
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Given an assignment with parts ordered and on hold to replace the R48 [Relay]. Deferral was updated with parts needed. It [Relay] looks different than the other three [relays] installed; but match R48. Upon checking the online Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 28-22-51-006a under Item-25 with company Part Numbers (P/N) and Sub-section-25 with Manufacturer's (MFG) Parts Number that do not cross to company Part Numbers; [I] was not aware that replacement relay is a non-stock part. Since Pre and Post-Service Bulletin (S/B) Part Numbers (P/N) are both under the same company Part Number item at the moment; I believed I was installing the correct part.

Callback: Reporter stated there are four relays; each identified with an 'R' and a two digit number; such as R-46; R47; R48. The relays are located in the 414 Power Panel in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) on B747-400 aircraft. One relay for each Main wing tank boost pump. The deferral involved a right wing Main fuel tank boost pump and the associated R48 Relay. The R48 Relay had been upgraded to a Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) design as a result of a Service Bulletin (S/B); but was still listed under their company's Parts Numbering System with the same P/N as the older Non-GFI Relay. Reporter stated the Aircraft Wiring Diagram Manual still refers to the upgraded relays as R46; R47; R48; but their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and IPC item Sub-section did not have a new company P/N to identify the upgraded R48 GFI-type Relays. They were both listed under one Part Number even though the Manufacturer's part numbers were different. His company has since revised their IPC Manual to reflect the Pre and Post Service Bulletin Relays.



Synopsis: Inadequate information in the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) led to installing a Pre-Service Bulletin R48 Relay in the 414 Power Panel of a B747-400 aircraft. A Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) type R48 Relay associated with the right wing Main fuel tank boost pump was required.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff from ZZZ we received this ICAS message 'C HYD PRESS'. Initially we thought that the APU may not have been providing enough air for the ADP to work properly since we were operating with a deferred maintenance item on the right-side bleed system which required the right side to be off. We waited until flaps were retracted to see if message and light would go off. It did not and in addition to the ICAS and ADP Pressure lights we got the System light and both the Left and Right main pump low pressure lights on.We proceeded to execute the QRH procedure and stopped the climb at 15;000 ft. to work the checklist. After completing the checklist; we were faced with operating the aircraft without a center hydraulic system which will call for a flaps 20 landing using the alternate method of extension for the flaps and gear.After receiving weather for ZZZ1; we elected to divert to ZZZ1 because it offered an instrument approach; a longer runway and less mountainous terrain than ZZZ. We were going to land overweight; may need assistance getting off the runway and elected to [request priority handling] and have equipment standing by.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported a hydraulic system failure that resulted in a diversion.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: Tower BWI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was the first time either of us would fly the TERPZ4 Departure.  We briefed the new TERPZ4 departure. We even emphasized the new waypoint; PIRCH. We were in a -300; so we could not arm LNAV on the ground. We were cleared for takeoff from 15R with the simple phrase 'cleared for takeoff.'At 400 Feet AGL; we continued on runway heading. This was the old TERPZ procedure.  At approximately 1;200 Feet AGL; we realized we needed to begin our turn to PIRCH. This turn should have been started at 667 Feet MSL (524 Feet AGL). We engaged LNAV to begin the turn.   At this time Tower 'reminded' us to turn to PIRCH. We acknowledged their call and continued our turn to follow the departure.   The rest of the flight was uneventful. The new departure procedure is significantly different from the old SID; which was in place for many years.


Second narrative: The TERPZ Departure had just changed from 3 to 4. We briefed up the new departure highlighting all the new points and verified them in the FMC. We failed to notice that it was no longer a; 'fly heading 155 and expect vectors.' I saw the 155 heading and the line but didn't pick up on the fact that it was an RNAV track requiring a turn at 667 Feet. As we were passing 1;200 Feet MSL; Tower came up and mentioned that we were turning towards PIRCH (a friendly reminder). We began the turn and the rest of the departure and flight were uneventful.We have been flying runway heading for so long; I just assumed the departure was asking for the same thing. Obviously; read the whole thing in detail; especially after a change. What I'd recommend to fix this has already taken place; and that would be to put a note on the weather release about this change. I suspect a lot of flights did the same thing and when we came back to BWI later in the trip; this note was there.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports a track deviation flying the new TERPZ4 departure from Runway 15R at BWI. The TERPZ3 had required runway heading after takeoff while the TERPZ4 requires a turn direct PIRCH. ATC issues a reminder.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was leaving the building and noticed the Castle Sector position was not being manned/worked by anyone. I noted the person shown working the position was in the center of the control room outside of hearing range of the position. No one in the area knew the Controller stepped away; so they weren't even monitoring the position while he was away. I went and called him back to the position and asked why he left; he stated the Supervisor required him to leave position even though he said he indicated he was working. Recommendation; Don't leave a position unattended without someone monitoring the traffic and frequencies; especially during a point in time when there is still traffic in the airspace and surrounding airspace.




Synopsis: NCT Controller voiced concern regarding the absence of a Castle Sector Controller present at the position even though one was assigned. The reporter noted positions should never be left unattended.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other Part 141
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Military Trainer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Toward the end of my hour and a half flight block at ZZZ; my student and I were transitioning back to ZZZ from a local airport (ZZZ1) where we conducted practice landings and maneuvers in our designated practice area in which we were ramped out by dispatch to. We called 10 NM northwest and told ATC our intentions. They instructed us to report back 4 NM northwest; we complied. Upon reaching approximately 7 NM northwest; after several broken radio calls that my student and I were unable to distinguish; we were instructed to fly NE in order to provide separation for a flight of military T6's that were on a long straight in final.I confirmed that ATC wanted us to fly northeast in order to avoid an aircraft that was on a straight in; they confirmed. Making a judgment call; I decided to instruct my student to fly straight north due to not wanting to cross over; under; or in front of the approaching aircraft that were seemingly on a straight in long final. Being out of the class D airspace; I was free to do as I pleased to ensure safety of flight. We called ATC and informed them we were doing so; unsure of what they wanted us to do; as we saw on our Multi-Function Display (MFD); the indication of an aircraft -2 (200 ft. below) moving toward us at a fast rate. ATC informed us that there was no traffic to the northwest; and that they were on a straight in. To which I responded they are incorrect because I have two military T6's in sight (visual; and on my MFD) and they were passing below us approximately 200 ft. below. We then turned to the left (west trending south/southeast) in order to keep the T'6s in sight and continue in to the airport.




Synopsis: Cessna 172 Flight Instructor reported an NMAC event that was caused by an ATC assigned heading. Flight Instructor executed an evasive maneuver to prevent a collision.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Second aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the 'A' Final position with normal traffic and visual approach weather conditions.  I am turning my aircraft onto the final at 4000 Ft. MSL in my airspace and the adjacent final controller brings their aircraft through my airspace without a point out or any coordination to let me know they would be in close proximity with my aircraft.  I was never informed if visual separation was being applied or even if traffic had been called.  I was under the impression by the rule 7110.65 7-4-4 two aircraft intercepting two different final approach courses could not join from the same side without standard separation being applied.  The other controller allowed the aircraft to come within about 600 Ft MSL vertically and 2.1 - 2.5 miles laterally. This has been an ongoing issue with this particular controller and it creates an environment of distrust and animosity.  If visual separation was applied I should have been informed so I could inform my adjacent aircraft of the situation and everything was in control.  I was in my airspace doing the necessary tasks to insure my aircraft were getting onto the final and to the tower at the appropriate time for safe landing.   Make sure you let the other person know what you are doing in their airspace prior to doing whatever you want.  Retraining or skill enhancement maybe necessary on the final positions to insure appropriate control instructions; airspace procedures; and communication skills are met.  Something as simple as saying 'maintain 5000 feet until established' would have prevented the entire issue as this person was turning at our outside the 5000 Ft fix on the ILS for a visual approach anyway.




Synopsis: CLT Controller reports of a loss of separation due to another controller turning an aircraft next to the reporter's aircraft with less than 1;000 feet and less than 3 miles.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Clear; 40
Aircraft: Travelair 95
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon entering a right turn to return to airport the left engine lost power and shut down. I feathered the engine and proceeded towards [the airport]. Landing was uneventful. No injuries or damage to the aircraft. The reason of the engine failure is probably fuel starvation due to me thinking fuel in the aux tank as part of main tank fuel; total fuel showed 6 gallons (40-45 minutes at cruise power) Had I changed tanks the engine probably would have restarted. I wasn't sure that that was absolutely the problem so I feathered and proceeded to [the airport].




Synopsis: Beech B95 pilot reported a safe landing followed an inflight engine failure related to fuel mismanagement.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Load Planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight; Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received 3 alerts the ramp was attempting to finalize the DSTG with unsecured Hazmat. [I received an error message in the load planning software.]The flight was already off the gate when the ramp lead attempted to finalize I then pulled up the DSTG and witnesses both the second and third attempt at finalization. It was then that the ramp lead noticed the DG was not secured. I called ZZZ operations to request a phone call from the ramp and while on the phone the lead moved the DG from pit 5 to pit 4 which had 40 bags and proceeded to finalize the flight. Around 8 minutes later the lead called and I inquired as to which pit the DG was actually loaded in and I told him I saw it was planned in pit 5 and a witness him try to finalize the flight 2 [times] then saw the DG move to pit 4 after the flight had departed. The lead responded he was told the DG had been loaded into pit 4. After that conversation I told my shift manager and released the final weights.




Synopsis: Load Planning personnel reported a communication breakdown between Load Planning and Ramp personnel regarding the Hazmat requirement to secure Hazmat cargo in cargo compartment with cargo pax bags. Flight completed an uneventful flight before error corrected.
Date: 201203
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I believe there is an error in our Company's ACARS Runway Data message system. The 4 of us have about 18 years experience on the 777 and have never seen T/O (takeoff) NOT POSSIBLE; let alone 10 or more times. We all checked that every single entry was correct with the FM page. We asked Dispatch for help and to get a 777 Flight Duty Manager involved. Dispatch sent nine different RWY DATA messages to us. The first was 38;400 LBS below actual final TOGW. I ACARS'ed back the large discrepancy error. He sent another for TOG of 627.6 and I had to inform him again that our real final weights were 9;300 LBS HIGHER!!!!! Then we got 3 more at 638.4 even though final weights were 636.9. BUT the big problem I told him is we are still getting T/O NOT POSSIBLE on our RWY DATA message and all of us agreed we needed to have ACARS RWY DATA agree with dispatch calculations so could he please find out why ACARS is still showing us for the 10th time T/O NOT POSSIBLE. Several minutes later ACARS RWY DATA finally came up and we were able to takeoff legally but after so many different GW numbers all claiming to be correct it's hard to believe they were but the plane handled normal and fuel burn was right on. IF THIS CARRIER HAS CHANGED SOME COMPUTER SYSTEM RECENTLY IN RELATION TO ACARS OR Dispatch RWY DATA THEN AN AUDIT NEEDS TO BE DONE because that many gross weight changes for no apparent reason is not right. I think I have most of the ACARS and Dispatch messages printed although I could not print our outgoing messages to Dispatch.




Synopsis: A B777 received nine T/O NOT POSSIBLE FMC messages because the gross weight takeoff data from Dispatch was incorrect and the Captain questioned whether a Company computer program had been modified.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working several aircraft inbound to ORD; including one routed from the north over the SHIKY arrival (a CRJ7) that needed to be sequenced with the aircraft inbound from the west. There was a fair amount of other traffic in the airspace at the time; several aircraft on frequency need to descend through the arrival traffic to destination airports in the vicinity. Also at the same time; parachute jumping was going on over the Beloit airport; [the jump plane] was circling up to 14;500 FT directly underneath the ORD arrival stream. A PC-12; an RYV arrival from the south; requested lower; I issued 14;000; attempting to keep that aircraft underneath the ORD arrivals. I thought The PC-12 would be laterally separated from the CRJ7; however; I must have misjudged the distance and standard separation was lost. The CRJ7 reported responding to an RA. I do not know if the RA was with [the jump plane] or the PC-12. I believe the parachute jump operation at the Beloit; WI airport is a safety risk at FARMM Sector. The jump aircraft are constantly in conflict with IFR traffic; particularly ORD arrivals; as the BULLZ and JVL STARs route arrivals right through the airspace the jump aircraft circle. Constantly issuing traffic advisories about the jump aircraft to IFR traffic during a rush distracts from other tasks at hand and adds significantly to what can be an already heavy workload. During the time period in question; I spent a fair amount of time/effort on the jump aircraft; attempting to plan for their climb; issuing traffic; etc. Without such a large distraction in play; it would've been significantly easier to realize and correct the error I made in regards to misjudging how much separation I had between the CRJ7 and the PC-12.




Synopsis: ZAU Controller experienced a loss of separation event listing parachute activity in the vicinity as work intensive and distracting from duties required of ORD arrivals.