elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Cooling System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While preparing for takeoff; the First Officer; Relief Pilot; and myself noticed a smell in the cockpit. It had an electrical burning nature to it and we stopped the aircraft to investigate. Shortly thereafter the smell dissipated and we could find nothing abnormal in the cabin or in the cockpit. The flight attendants from both the front and rear smelled nothing abnormal and the ovens were off. No circuit popped circuit breakers were found. After takeoff; approximately 22 minutes into the flight I noticed the electrical burning smell again and it seemed to come from under the glare shield. It was not a strong odor; however I turned off the florescent lighting and asked the First Officer and Relief Pilot if they smelled it and even switched seats with the Relief Pilot to verify if he smelled it. They both acknowledged that while not strong; there was a distinct odor of something electrical burning. Out of caution; we made the decision to return to the departure airport to have Maintenance investigate. We declared an emergency and we received ATC clearance to return directly to the airport. I notified the flight attendants of our return and; while expecting a normal landing; I let them know the reason for the return. We ran the overweight landing procedure in the QRH and with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) equipment standing by we made an overweight landing. Touchdown at less than 300 FT/minutes; at 326;000 LBS; braking was not required until turn off. We had the ARFF follow us to the gate as a precaution. Maintenance found the forward EE Equipment Cooling fan seized with a popped circuit breaker. After compliance with all the maintenance procedures we were re-released and on our way.




Synopsis: A B767 crew detected an electrical burning odor taxing out but could not verify it. After leveling at cruise; the odor returned so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where Maintenance found the Forward EE Compartment fan had failed.
Date: 202102
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The single-engine taxi restriction from EWR Taxiway RG began around [Date] and I have observed minimal awareness and compliance since then. I believe a significant contributing factor to this un-intentional non-compliance is that the caution is located on the EWR  10-9D at the bottom in plain text. The ORD 10-7 for the same caution is significantly more visible immediately after the Safety Alert boxes and is in bold type.




Synopsis: Captain reported violating the single engine taxi restriction due to the inconspicuous location of cautionary note as well as the plain text instead of bold type.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Conducting Captain IOE (Initial Operating Experience) 4 Pilots while in the middle of my briefing with the Captain student 2 agents barged into the flight deck. Began asking who extra pilot was. I indicated it was me. They informed me I needed to bring my bags to the podium to get additional screening and I should not have boarded with the crew? I informed that I am not a passenger rather the PIC (Pilot in Command) and acting Captain. There was questions why I was in flight deck and if the Captain why was I in right seat. I got a bit frustrated at the interruption and asked him to leave the flight deck and not to interrupt me again. I stressed that I am not a passenger rather a required crew member. NOTE I have been through this routine before with the same exact agent. I do not have a name. He told me that he didn't like the way I was talking to him and he felt offended.




Synopsis: B767 IOE Captain reported being summoned to additional screening during crew briefing.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This does not involve any deviation; but is a comment on SLC SIDs. The WEVIC 3 and EDETH 2 RNAV departures both have numerous airspeed and altitude restrictions which are always countermanded by ATC Controllers shortly after takeoff. This takes one pilot out of the game either typing in or deleting altitudes and/or airspeeds. If the procedure does not work for ATC flow; please redesign it so it does.Published SIDs routinely modified causing high workload for monitoring pilot.




Synopsis: A B737 pilot comments that after takeoff SLC Departure frequently issues altitude and/or airspeed alterations to already complex WEVIC 3 and EDETH 3 RNAV departures which removes one pilot from monitoring traffic and aircraft systems.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: Balloon
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was conducting OJTI on the R-Side of Sector 34. This is the Developmental's first R-Side. Sector 34 primarily provides final sequence of arrivals to SFO from the East coast. As the morning arrival push began we were abruptly interrupted by a coast target that had been PVD'ed to our scope. At the same time; the FLM came to us while we were training/working the sector and told us; 'That coast target is an unmanned balloon and the coast target was an approximated position and altitude gathered from [internet] maps.' When I asked the FLM for more information and why; the response was; 'There's nothing we can do; the balloon belongs to [a company] and they can do whatever they want.' The coast target indicated the balloon was right in the arrival path of aircraft descending over MOD for SFO. Approximately 30 plus aircraft were scheduled within the next hour. While we continued to work the sector; we also researched the phraseology to alert aircraft of the balloon. Once we were relieved from the position; I approached the OM on duty to ask more questions and gather more information. I was met with defensive posture by the OM that indicated I should take my complaints and safety concerns elsewhere. The is an extremely dangerous situation. The explanation I finally got was that [the company] was in compliance with FAR's. The balloon does not have a transponder therefore I don't think TCAS would alert the flight crew of a collision course; and we don't get a RADAR target on the balloon so we have no way of separating from the balloon. Furthermore; its position; in the middle of our busy arrival path leads to a high potential for a catastrophic event with loss of life. Recommendation; Amend FAR's; bring [the company] here to see what type of hazard they are creating. Stop the balloons; period. At a bare minimum; add a transponder to the balloon. Management needs to relay this type event information more timely with less distraction.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller voiced concern regarding a balloon operation in the vicinity of the MOD air carrier arrival flow into SFO; the reporter suggesting the balloon should be equipped with improved identification gear.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC cleared us to cross MUNKY Intersection on the POLAR3 arrival into DTW at the expected; planned; and standard FL230. Our altitude was FL270. The Captain and I were talking. MUNKY fix started flashing indicating station passage. I recorded the fuel on the dispatch release. I then realized I had not begun descending. I told the Captain I had forgotten to descend and selected power idle; full spoilers; vertical speed down 3;500 FPM. As I began descending; ATC told us to change to Cleveland Center. We leveled at FL230 5 to 6 miles after MUNKY fix. The threats were the crossing restriction on a quiet morning and the conversation in the flight deck to keep our minds active. My error as the flying pilot was not initiating the descent when assigned by ATC; not perceiving the snow flake or 3 degree guidance in my scan; and the Captain not catching my error in his monitoring cross check. The undesired aircraft state was being 4;000 FT too high above our crossing fix.I should; as I usually do; begin descending immediately when assigned crossing fixes. I should; if planning a 3 degree descent; ask the Captain to remind me if he sees me not acting at the 3 degree descent point. I should be aware that conversation; though good in keeping the mind active; also leads to distraction from flying responsibilities especially during low levels of activity; such as at cruise.




Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew failed to initiate descent in time to make assigned crossing restriction on the POLAR3 arrival into DTW.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Case
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other During Paperwork Audit
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My partner and I (Mechanic Y) were assigned a Maintenance Check [on a B737-700 aircraft]. Through normal inspection we found we needed to change two main tires and two nose tires and other various items. A third guy (Mechanic Z) came over to help us. I decided to work the Abradable Shroud on [the] # 1 Engine. Per the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM); it says remove sufficient number of [fan] blades to access repair area [of Abradable Shroud].  I told my Supervisor to pull the Maintenance Task [Jobcard] for Fan Blade Removal. Mechanic Z told me he could do the repair without removing fan blades. He put the putty compound in the repair area. After he was finished; he went to his airplane and I agreed to finish the repair; which involved curing the repair with heat lamps; freeing the fan blades if they were stuck and cleaning up associated mess; which I did. This process took a total of five hours. Through consultation with my Lead Mechanic and three other mechanics; I determined that the repair was acceptable. I later found out that the FAA decided it was not acceptable; it was not smooth enough; thus leading to an investigation. I was unaware that there was a problem with the repair until after my days off. I found out our Maintenance Manager pulled the airplane from service before revenue flight to correct the problem; thus leading to a fact finding meeting.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic was informed the Abradable Shroud putty compound repair he and another Mechanic had applied to a CFM-56 Engine Fan Case was considered not acceptable by an FAA Inspector; the compound was not smooth enough. His Maintenance Manager pulled the B737-700 aircraft from service prior to revenue flight and corrected the problem.
Date: 201308
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After liftoff we felt a strong vibration from the Number 4 Engine. The N1 vibration indicated above 5. At approximately 2;000 FT we retarded engine per the QRH. Vibration went away but continued once throttle moved above 70% N1. We left Number 4 Engine retarded and climbed to FL220 where with concurrence from Dispatch and Maintenance Control declared an emergency; dumped fuel and returned to our departure airport. After a normal landing and gate return; Maintenance advised us that there was a bird strike on the Number 4 engine.


Second narrative: We coordinated with ATC to dump fuel down to Max Landing Weight. Approximately 220;000 LBS of fuel was dumped while holding over the intersection.


Synopsis: Upon experiencing excessive vibration from the Number 4 Engine shortly after takeoff; a B747 flight crew declared an emergency; shut down the engine; dumped fuel to max landing weight and returned safely to their departure airport.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying. I loaded the route in the FMS and did it by the filed route prior to receiving the clearance. The clearance received was quite different; so I had to adjust the routing. After that; I put the SID in the route and wound up with two GAYLE/GAYEL intersections; GAYEL being the correct one however; I mistakenly erased the correct one. The FO noticed the distances were not correct sitting in the takeoff position. I should have stopped it then but the position would have lost with a long wait. My FO was flying pilot and has been in this airplane for some time. On departure the FO called for flaps up at 200 feet and this distracted me; when his next call was clean wing. Then; he was not tracking the departure; which also distracted me. We were then cleared to GAYEL intersection; which I went direct to and ATC later asked us where we were going and I said GAYEL intersection to which he replied you're going to the wrong intersection and spelled the correct one. We then got a heading and speed restriction; which I asked if the FO had it and he said yes; so I worked on the FMS. The next thing I knew; we were given a query about speed and when I looked up he was going 320 knots. We finally got it sorted out; put in the FMS and went on. It is difficult working with a person and trying to watch the whole airplane. Never doing that again.




Synopsis: Corporate jet Captain reported he put the incorrect intersection GAYLE versus the correct one GAYEL in the FMS on departure from TEB.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MHRO.Airport, FO
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Center MHTG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The less than optimum approach profile of [our flight to MHRO] was at least partially precipitated by a complete lack of any guidance from the Ops Advisory pages regarding a circling approach.The threats at MHRO include: non English speaking country; below average ATC and ICAO phraseology standardization; single non ILS approach to single runway; high terrain immediately north and east of the runway; shifting winds due to the high terrain rising straight out of the water; a short poor condition runway; cruise ships moored immediately off the approach end of runway 23; no approach or visual guidance to runway 23...feel free to add a few of your own.A tailwind that increased from 9 to 12 knots during descent required using the RNAV approach to runway 5 with a visual circuit to runway 23 in deteriorating weather conditions. The Captain was required with no ops advisory guidance to execute a maneuver that is virtually never trained or practiced in very challenging deteriorating conditions. Adding to the challenge the wind sheared from a headwind to crosswind on final approach. A go around on the base leg of the circle would have been highly inadvisable due to terrain. The shifting wind certainly contributed to the pod clearance issue on touchdown.I have spent very little of my 'career' with [my current airline] but in the short time I have been trained [here] there has been no information (as in zero; zilch; nada) or training or guidance regarding PAN OPS versus TERPS circling criteria. I attempted a mini tutorial on the subject during the descent but the last thing a new Captain needs is a flunky know-it-all First Officer trying to explain that the approach in MHRO is designed by a different regulatory body than the FAA and has different criteria. I know if I were him I would have ignored me. Recurrent training on PAN OPS circling (or any circling for that matter) would have permitted a more 'leisurely' approach if anyone could fly a 'leisurely' circle in a new aircraft to an airport with the dozen or so threats listed above.




Synopsis: A First Officer reported flying a challenging circling approach in marginal weather to MHRO that was complicated by what he felt was inadequate training and substandard ATC procedures.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: SA-227 AC Metro III
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During normal landing; and on landing roll at a speed of 25-30 KTS; the steering was engaged and the aircraft abruptly veered to the right and off into the grass stopping about 20 feet off the runway. No lights were hit; no injuries; and the aircraft did not sustain any damage. After the plane was towed back to the ramp a mechanic inspected the aircraft for damage; and none was reported. He did find that that a Nose Steering Coupler (sensor) had failed to be safety wired and thus had fallen off. This caused the steering to fail because it had no sensing functions as to what was straight in relation to the rudder pedals or to the nose gear itself.




Synopsis: SA-227 flight crew experience an unintentional excursion from runway during landing roll-out when steering was engaged. Nose Steering Coupler reportedly failed and fell off.