Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower BWI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We landed a visual approach to Runway 33L 'shortened' at BWI uneventfully; but were very alarmed to see men and equipment actively working on the closed section of the airport while aircraft were landing.  I estimate that on the normal glidepath provided by the PAPI's; we passed only about 100 feet above the heads of numerous construction personnel and vehicles.  We did not deem it dangerous enough to warrant a go around but I just wonder if it is worth the added risk to conduct landing operations with personnel and equipment so close to and just under the glide path.  To make matters worse; the runway is shortened and has no landing markings at 1000' to help Pilots gauge a safe touchdown point.  With a shortened runway and no markings; Pilots are naturally prone to err on the side of crossing the threshold lower than normal in order to preclude a long landing.  This increases the risk of coming too close to the men and equipment.  Has someone at the proper level assessed the risk of this operation?  Do the supposed rewards of a higher landing traffic capacity at the airport really justify taking on this level of risk? I think active construction to the runway should only occur when the runway is closed to aircraft.


Second narrative: I am deeply concerned that there are several potential hazards with operations on 33L in BWI that have proven in the past to define major runway overruns and excursions. I landed on the shortened runway today in a 737-800 and found these areas of risk. This was after I had asked for an approach to 28 but was told it would take coordination with the Tower and they didn't want to do it. 1.	The runway is NOTAM as un-grooved. According to the TALPA ARC and newly proposed runway conditions assessment matric the FAA has published (AC91-79A; appendix 1; page 3); it only takes 1/8 inches of standing water to produce a '''medium to poor''' runway condition. Using the guidance from FAR25.109 and the RCAM values Boeing and Airbus assign to this category; we can see that six overruns have occurred with braking coefficient values associated in this range.2.	There are no touchdown zone or any other standardized marking on the runway for the 33L touchdown zone.3.	The PAPI's installed do not correspond to any type of glideslope available on the jet. (After the recent error in landing at the wrong airport; it is common for Pilots to use electronic means to reference a glideslope. 33L has an operable ILS; but our experience was that the glideslope was well below the desired flight path from the PAPI's. The same is true for the vertical guidance cues and RNAV guidance.) 4.	The runway is significantly shorter due to construction with a landing distance of about 6800 feet. 5.	Past the departure end of the runway there is a large drop-off down towards the roadway below with no EMAS installed. Each element taken as a separate entity would probably be no cause for alarm; however; taken as a problem of conditional probability once you start combining the elements together the risk for an accident increases exponentially. As it is normal for all Pilots to use electronic glideslope guidance for 33L; the geometry of the existing guidance increases the chances for an unstable approach as conflicting sources are used both from the airport and in the airplane's data base. As there are no visual indications for what defines a landing area; the error for a long landing is also increased. All that is needed is for a nominal amount of rain that normally a grooved runway would drain but in this case could exceed 1/8th inches beyond the FAA guidance of 25% coverage and as per the above mentioned aircraft; the landing distance is exceeded well beyond the FAR dispatch criteria even with a 15% safety margin. It must also be asked whether the calculations for this runway include additives for grooved runways per 25.109 for if they do then even those base calculations may not be correct as a smooth runway will offer much less friction especially at higher speeds.I highly recommend the following. Runway touchdown markings should be painted on a temporary basis. Landings should be prohibited when the runway is wet as defined by the current FAA order JO 7930.2P (page 5-1-5). ATC should be given guidance that it is a high safety priority for Pilots requesting Runway 28 to be given clearance for an approach to that runway.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew believes that Runway 33L at BWI is unsafe while construction is in progress.