elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SBGR.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON SBGR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The usual STAR RNAV arrival and approach to Runway 9R into SBGR is challenging enough even under the best circumstances. It requires precise planning and execution to keep the aircraft on the correct descent profile. There is little or no room for confusion. Recently; I have noticed that since the RNAV approach was changed that some Final Approach Controllers instructions hinder rather [than] help pilots at a point where exact altitude step downs are critical to maintaining the aircraft on the necessary profile in order to join the glideslope of the ILS for Runway 9R.   I have noticed repeatedly that on the UROSO 1C or the UTBUR 1 C RNAV Arrivals; the Controller's instructions as you near the IAF (VUSAG); seem to create ambiguity. The clearance outside of position UTBUR initially is stated as; 'cleared UROSO 1C (or UTBUR 1C if doing the longer arrival) and the ILS TANGO to Runway Nine Right; report established'. Then; as you pass UTBUR (on the UROSO 1C) the Controller says 'now you're cleared to 6;200 feet'.  Then at VUSAG he again says 'now you're cleared to 5;100 feet'. The altitudes are the same as on the arrival and approach.  Given that; these altitude instructions can be interpreted as a change to the prior approach clearance and create confusion for crews.  With the aircraft in VNAV and on the PATH; it can fly the profile very well with an altitude selected (i.e; touchdown elevation or minimums) in the MCP for the aircraft to fly down to capture the glideslope.  But when altitude instructions are introduced at this critical point; transitioning from the STAR to the Approach; it creates ambiguity and if the pilot now puts these altitudes in the MCP the aircraft is more likely to leave the path as it captures the altitude. The few seconds it takes for pilots to recognize this and set a lower altitude on the MCP leaves the aircraft higher on approach and makes it even more challenging for the pilot to re-establish the aircraft onto the profile. This all contributes to potentially unstabilized approaches which seem very common given the [published] information. Except for traffic or terrain conflicts; controllers need not introduce more instructions at this point.




Synopsis: A B767 Captain reported SBGR controllers use clearance techniques that may contribute to unstabilized approaches to Runway 09R.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GTF.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D GTF
ATC / advisory: TRACON GTF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Using RNAV Z 21 as a reference; descended to 4700 while lining up for visual approach to 21. I wish I had stayed higher. I didn't see the obstacles under the final approach course just outside KUDEY.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported descending too early on a visual approach.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Other Preflight loading
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In ZZZZ; after loading was completed; and during cargo inspection; the First Officer noticed a strong paint odor on the main deck. Two pallets containing shoes; 7 tons of oil pastels and lithium batteries in HL and GL position were removed due to safety concerns after a conference call with Dispatch; [Maintenance] and personnel.




Synopsis: B747-400 Captain reported strong odor during preflight due to Hazmat cargo on board. Hazmat cargo removed prior to departure.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In cruise I messaged Dispatch and asked the RVR for [Runway] XXR.  They told me 1400 for [Runway] XXR.  About 30 minutes from arrival we started our brief. We briefed the arrival and the approach plate for [Runway]. We then briefed the CAT2 checklist. We both put 705 feet in our DH and verified it. We did the decent check and verified it again. Did the approach check and was getting vectors to [Runway] XXR. Gear down flaps 45 before the marker.  I called 1;000 feet cleared to land when I knew something was wrong. I couldn't grasp why we only had 300 feet left to go missed. Told the First Officer something wasn't right. We hit minimums at 705 feet AGL and I called the missed. Did the missed approach; cleaned up aircraft and did the checklist. Didn't take me long to figure out what I did. The RA for [Runway] XXR is 116 feet. We put the new DH in and took our time to get set up for approach.  We got vectors on the LOC and shot the approach to a landing.We both missed the right number for the DH. I knew the approach would be to minimums so I was looking at chart in cruise so I wouldn't miss anything.  Ended up on a go around at 700 feet AGL because we had the MDA in. It was first flight of day we both felt good. Just the low visibility at destination caused a threat.Even after the lengthy briefing and checklist usage the DH was still put in there wrong. What I have learned over my career is not to get upset at the moment you realize you did something wrong.  Great training over the years and good CRM has trained me to fly the airplane. Run the appropriate checklists and then discuss what happened at a safe time later.


Second narrative: We incorrectly set the 705 feet in the DH for a CAT 2 approach and logically got the mins aural alert more than 500 feet early. We executed a go-around; set up the DH properly and flew the second approach normally.


Synopsis: CRJ--900 flight crew reported setting the wrong DH for the approach and executing a missed earlier than required.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During passenger boarding; a passenger brought a large case on board. When the Flight Attendant (FA) told him that the case could not fit in the overhead bin; the passenger told her that the case could not go on the cart because it contained lithium batteries. During their conversation; the FA learned that the case contained a drone with a lithium battery installed along with six spare batteries (4 batteries @ 81 wH and 2 smaller batteries of unknown capacity). We could find no information in the FOM about the carriage of lithium batteries other than in Flight Crew Information File 2016-0043 which only addressed pilot battery packs. Dispatch and Ops didn't have any pertinent information. FA manual states station agents are responsible for ensuring battery does not exceed limits; is labeled and properly documented; removed from the devise and packaged accordingly. This did not get done as the agents were not even aware of the batteries. I am also concerned by my perception as to the lack of clear guidance on this at the station level. FA manual also states that FA SHALL ensure battery is stored in overhead bin above the customer. (This was impossible due to the relative size of his case to our overhead bins). What is unclear from the FA manual is if there is a maximum number of batteries or a cumulative total of wH allowed. (7 batteries total with a combined wH rating of over 400 wH). We called the Duty Officer for insight; but he had none; and by this time; Operations had already decided to pull the passenger and his batteries. Still; this question needs resolution. Kudos to both FAs for their tenacity to ensure that the issue was addressed and for their expertise in finding the pertinent guidance to resolve the issue. To the credit of the passenger; he did not attempt to put the case on the cart. Had he done so; no one but he would have known that the batteries were in the aft hold: a disturbing consequence on several levels.While the delay and the resulting chaos on display resulting from the lack of information was embarrassing; several passengers thanked us for our vigilance and attitude towards safety.




Synopsis: Q400 Captain reported concern over lack of information on restrictions and regulations regarding carriage of lithium batteries in the cabin.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While climbing via WEVIC 3 HVE; [ATC stated] CLEARED DIRECT ETALK; DELETE SPEEDS; M FL230. Mistakenly believed ETALK at or below 16;000' still applied because of climb via clearance. Leveled off at 16;000' a few miles prior to ETALK ; ATC then said climb unrestricted to FL230. After reviewing climb via/descend via quick reference guide; I realized the altitude restriction at ETALK was deleted with 'maintain FL230' clearance. It seems that there is still mass confusion on new rules for 'climb via' clearances; and with 'descend via' clearances; as some procedures are becoming more and more complicated; especially when one or more 'except' clearances are issued. I'm sure someone thinks these new rules are an improvement; but my opinion is that there are often too many complications for too few benefits. The email type messages I have received on these new procedures have not been effective and I have received virtually no formal training.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported misunderstanding the meaning of a revised clearance to fly direct to ETALK; delete speeds; climb and maintain FL230 after initially being cleared to climb via the WEVIC 3 HVE. The altitude at ETALK is honored and should not have been.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Gate agent put a passenger in seat XB.  When the gate agent boarded the plane to confirm the cabin count with FA B; I discreetly asked her why there was a passenger in XB. She got very befuddled and confused and forgot that she was boarding a [type aircraft]. I told her that at one time I wanted to put a deadheading pilot in XA; but the gate agent informed me that she would have to write me up for doing that so I politely asked passenger to move back to his assigned seat. Because we were ready to close the door I let the passenger sit in XB; but throughout the flight he lifted his mask above his mouth.  He was sniffling and blowing his nose and his mask remained above his mouth.I'm not sure what should be done.  If gate agents have told me they will write me up moving someone to XA; then I suppose this gate agent should be reminded of our policies.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a gate agent put a passenger in a seat which they shouldn't have.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Cleared to 10;000 feet; passing around 8;800 feet had momentary 'traffic' from TCAS; had traffic ahead at 11;000 feet. Hand flying using HUD; started to reduce rate of climb but had 'reduce vertical speed' command before aircraft could react. Followed HUD guidance; which was aligned with what we were doing anyway; and guidance had us level at our assigned altitude; so no deviations. ATC did not state anything about traffic; and had assigned us a heading which we were flying. If they had left us on the RNAV departure it would not have occurred due to the different track.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported TCAS traffic alert on departure from DFW. Reporter stated he felt the problem was caused by ATC taking them off the RNAV departure.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: EGTT.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On initial approach we were instructed to proceed direct to Ockham and to expect no delays into Heathrow. Prior to beginning the descent phase we briefed that we would hold at the clearance limit unless told otherwise. We were handed off to the final London controller and were told again to proceed direct to Ockham and descend to 9;000 ft. We complied. As we approached the fix I confirmed with my colleagues that we were not given a hold associated with the last clearance. All agreed. Approximately 1.5 miles prior to Ockham I asked the captain to confirm the instructions as we were not given a heading after the fix; which I thought was strange. The captain tried diligently several times to confirm the clearance; however due to frequency congestion he could not get a word in. We tried several more times to confirm our clearance and were told to stand by. We proceeded beyond Ockham still trying to get clarification. At this I thought it was prudent to turn back to Ockham VOR and take up the hold. As we discussed the turn back the controller gave us a heading back to the VOR and stated that the instructions were to hold over Ockham. Unfortunately none of us heard those instructions nor did the captain read such instructions back to the controller. The combination of the information given to us by the previous controller (stating no holding at Ockham) and the inability of the crew to ascertain on or confirm the clearance from the final controller created an ambiguous situation. Had we been able to confirm the instructions; as we attempted to several times prior to the fix; we could have avoided the error.




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported uncertainty about the assigned clearance; but was unable to confirm because of frequency congestion. After OCKHAM; ATC directed them back to enter OCKHAM holding as previously instructed.
Date: 201809
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Right after arming the main cabin door; I went to inform Captain that the cabin was ready. He asked me to close the cockpit door. As I was trying to close the cockpit door with no success; I continued to try 2 more times; when the Captain shouted angrily! 'Don't slam the damn door.' He repeated it several times; while slamming his hand on the Yoke! 'Don't you ever slam that door again; I'm sick of flight attendants slamming this door.' This was clearly a loss of temper heard by other crewmembers. I stood in fright and shock. After a moment; I told him his outburst was unacceptable and unprofessional for my attempts to close the door. It was then that First Officer explained how the door could be closed. He realized that the door closing mechanism switch (red toggle switch) was not engaged and was preventing me from shutting the door. The door was finally closed; and we departed. There are other events that gave me serious concerns about Captain [name removed].During the flight; the Captain asked for a bathroom break. I was terrified of being alone with him; so I asked another Flight Attendant to stay with me while I stood by the cart barricade. When he came out of the cockpit; he tried to intimidate me by staring me down; I ignored him. When he was finished using the lavatory; Flight Attendant [name removed] and myself noticed Captain fumbling with the keypad on the cockpit door; after several attempts; we were concerned. Flight Attendant [name removed] told him not to press so many numbers; as it would lock him out. He clearly did not know the door code; Flight Attendant [name removed] told him the door code.Captain [name removed] made it clear to us that he did not want us to use the door key pad; he wanted us to call the cockpit whenever we are to enter the cockpit. This is not in the Standard Operating procedures for flight attendants.During his briefing; he told us that while he's taxiing and if a passenger goes to the lavatory; he doesn't want us to call him; because he does not consider these events 'important or an emergency.'I am reporting this event as a 'Hostile Workplace Environment Incident' and that the matter be forwarded to the proper administrative forum. I make no personal request or recommendation for resolution as there should be standard procedure for handling 'Hostile Workplace Incidents.'




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a negative interaction with the Captain.