elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL350; we received a TCAS RA directing a climb. The IVSI gave a green arc between 700 and 1;000 fpm climb and a red arc beyond that. The target aircraft was showing coincident with our location; however; while complying with the RA; neither pilot noticed the threat aircraft displayed on the IVSI was directly ABOVE us. (We didn't see the 'plus' symbol next to the target as it was mixed in with our aircraft symbol.) We complied with the RA and initiated a climb. We received a clear of conflict almost immediately after initiating the climb. Our altitude deviation was 100 FT to FL351 (35;100 FT.) I notified ATC of the RA and our maximum deviation. I told ATC we were clear and returning to FL350. ATC had only one other aircraft in the vicinity. Company XXX was level at his cruise altitude FL360. At the time of the RA; he was directly ABOVE us. Yet; our RA wanted a climb INTO the traffic. No other traffic was in the area and Company XXX did not get any TCAS warning either TA or RA. Upon landing at BWI; Maintenance was notified and the TCAS system was entered into the logbook as a discrepancy.  I believe this was a malfunction of the TCAS.


Second narrative: I reacted a little slowly but started a climb to maintain the 600 FT to 800 FT climb required by the VSI on the 737-300 and turned off the autopilot. At first; I overshot to 1;000 FT to 1;200 fpm; but reduced it to the green climb area...My slow reaction was due to looking for the directed information which is on the VSI on the 737-300 as opposed to the primary display on the 737-700.


Synopsis: While level at FL350 the flight crew of a B737-300 responded to an apparently aberrant TCAS 'climb' warning. The only traffic in the vicinity was a company aircraft level at FL360.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA; TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Two days in a row; flying two different -300 aircraft; we were unable to fly or determine where we were supposed to be while flying the same SSTIK RNAV Departure out of SFO. The aircraft did not appear to fly the proper arc to the first point and missed the turn after the first point on both occasions. Luckily ATC intervened and gave us vectors without our asking. They must know there is a problem with this combination (-00 and/or SSTIK Departure). Additionally; with VNAV selected on both occasions; the aircraft failed to fly the indicated VNAV speed above 10;000 feet. After holding 250 knots to 10;000 feet; the aircraft would lower its nose and accelerate past the VNAV indicated climb speed requiring Pilot intervention prior to the clacker. We were so surprised the first time that we took extra care checking the route the second time to make sure we had not created the situation. The results were identical.We should not be flying -300 aircraft in the new aircraft airspace. Its' inability to fly some RNAV departures combined with the lack of moving map produces stressful and additive conditions that puts Pilots in the RED. This distraction will lead to subsequent issues (flap overspends; missed crossing restrictions; etc.) and dangerous situations caused by the lack of capability of the avionics.




Synopsis: A B737-300 Captain reported his aircraft had difficulty tracking the SFO SSTIK RNAV route after takeoff and properly flying the VNAV path above 10;000 Feet.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: LAS was running their normal routine of clearing aircraft into position on the runway and confirming the preceding aircraft is in sight. We were cleared to line up and wait on 25L as another carrier began their takeoff roll. As the other carrier began; what appeared to us; it's rotation Tower cleared us for takeoff. As the aircraft began to roll and pick up speed; Tower cancelled our takeoff and I conducted a low speed rejection at approximately 70 KIAS. Autobrakes never engaged during the maneuver. The reason for the cancelled clearance was the other carrier had conducted a high speed rejected takeoff. We taxied clear of the runway and determined that we needed 25 minutes of brake cooling time. We coordinated with Ground to wait the required time. Dispatch and Maintenance were informed of the rejected takeoff. After the required cooling time and in our new flow time window; the flight was continued without further incident.Usually it is very easy to determine when the preceding aircraft has completed its rotation and is flying; however; in this case; due to the low sun angle in our face it was difficult to determine. We assumed that the other carrier had completed its rotation when Tower cleared us for takeoff and put our attention to flying our aircraft. While I understand the desire to launch aircraft in an efficient and timely manner; LAS Tower Controllers need to step back and evaluate if they are trying to launch aircraft too close together and in turn; compromising safety.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports being cleared to line up and wait on Runway 25L at LAS; then cleared for takeoff with the previous departure in sight. The previous aircraft appears to rotate into the setting sun and the reporter begins his takeoff. The previous aircraft rejects and the Tower calls for the reporter to reject; which is accomplished at low speed.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: As I took the position ATOPS system lost many functions including FDP (Flight Data Processing) interface; ADS/CPDLC processing. Lots of separation was predicated on function data link capabilities; which we lost. I had to move at least 6 aircraft via voice relay; as the planes formally using CPDLC were not responding to my clearances via Commercial Radio. As the data link went down ATOPS generated a ridiculous amount of messages that meant nothing to me. All coordination to the east (FDP) had to be done manually. Commercial Radio helped a lot but we lost ability to receive messages from them; so all communication had to be done via landlines. I have never seen 30 messages in my sector cue before; today I had over 140; 98% of these were worthless. Aircraft X had to descend 1000 ft.; I had another aircraft relay this clearance 'For traffic'. Aircraft X asked to climb; I relay; 'Unable' no response. I go through Commercial Radio Aircraft X descend 1000 ft for traffic; Aircraft X climb 1000 ft; unable descend 1000 ft. This was not ideal as other altitude movement was necessary and this guy had to first be level. He seemingly stopped talking to the relay aircraft when he was not hearing the clearance he wanted. This made a difficult situation worse; and should not have been a factor.ATOP should filter some of those messages that mean nothing. Have the messages that mean nothing auto route to one of the other cues (maybe make this a selectable function). Loss of separation messages are in this instance and all others; worthless; as these are visually depicted on the display. Make the messages for loss of separation cease or route to another cue.




Synopsis: ZAN Controller describes situation where ATOPS doesn't work correctly and is issued numerous messages from it. Consequently; he deems it worthless.
Date: 201511
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Passenger that lacked mobility was about to be boarded with seat assignment of over wing exit. He was brought to the airplane door in wheelchair with cane when we noticed his seat assignment was an exit row. We informed Passenger Service Representative that he could not be boarded in exit row. Passenger Service Representative asked us to reference in Flight Attendant Operating Manual (FAOM). We reference FOAM which states the following requirements be met: the person lacks sufficient mobility; strength; or dexterity in both arms and hands; and both legs to operate the exit and any slide mechanism. Passenger Service Representative said this training was only to ask if customer if they were able to perform exit row responsibilities not to assess whether customer could be in exit row or not. Also referencing FAR 121.587.




Synopsis: A Passenger Service Representative attempted to board a disabled passenger in an emergency exit row. The Flight Attendant cited the FAR prohibiting certain passengers; but the agent stated the passenger could perform the duties even if unable to exit.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower JAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: At JAX; clearing Runway 26 at Taxiway J; the signs at the entrance to the taxiway have a blank; black face; there is no identification of the taxiway. The only way we were able to identify the taxiway was to look at the sign at the far southeast end of the taxiway near the ramp. As we taxied at this airport both arriving and departing we noted that many of the taxiway signs were of that same appearance. The Captain and I shared the opinion that the JAX taxiways are marked with inadequate signage.Review all taxiway signage at JAX and upgrade so taxi routes can be identified by taxiing aircraft. At a minimum; the entrance to Taxiway J when clearing Runway 26 and crossing Taxiway A needs a sign.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported that exiting JAX Runway 26 at Taxiway J; the taxiway sign displayed a black face devoid of lettering. Other JAX taxiways signs were also noted devoid of lettering.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the 1-man mid 'training' for 25 minutes today; a VFR aircraft called on 118.05 which is not provided at the active sector; despite it being the sole low altitude frequency for sector 31.  I was unable to respond as working two operational positions at one time is prohibited by the FAA. The aircraft was forced to call a nearby non-RADAR approach control. TWF approach was able to call me on the landline and issue the high sector frequency; 121.15 to the VFR aircraft.1-man mid operations are dangerous. In the first 25 minutes; I could not provide VFR services to an aircraft without the relay of a non-RADAR approach control. The transition to permanent 1-man mid operations shall be halted immediately.




Synopsis: ZLC Controller reports of working a one man mid shift and not being able to answer an aircraft that called on a frequency he didn't have at the position he was working. The frequency was at another position; but since he was working two positions combined already; he couldn't answer the aircraft. An adjacent approach called via the landline and he gave them the correct frequency.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The filed flight plan was TIPRE JESIE RLG. After departure out of ZZZ we were given multiple headings to fly. We were then given another heading and to now expect BTY JESIE RLG. We were questioning why we would fly so far south to BTY instead of the normal route. We brought out the map and again questioned ATC about the routing because BTY to JESIE was going to take us right through a restricted area. ATC's response was 'you will be above it.' Right as we crossed BTY and initiated a turn we were given immediate heading instructions to turn the other way. We then were just given vectors until we cleared the airspace and could fly towards our destination of EGE. I called the facility phone number after the flight to find out they thought we were going to another intersection called JESSE. This intersection is hundreds of miles away from our destination and would not make any sense to be on our flight plan. I am working with ATC to see how it was possible to have that interaction spelling come on my flight plan when I still hold my filed fight plan with the correct spelling. It was a turn of events where we knew something with the flight plan wasn't correct but every time we questioned what we were seeing; ATC thought it was normal because they were looking at a different intersection (same name different spelling.) After talking to the ATC facility if it turns out there are four different spellings of JESIE that can be flown to after BTY. They said they are going to note this so other ATC can pay attention to the flight direction and destination so something like this doesn't happen again.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that the flight plan included a fix called 'JESIE' but ATC issued the clearance to similar sounding 'JESSE.'
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ., US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise FL320 we requested FL340 per flt plan; upon starting climb ECAM warning came up stating excessive cabin altitude. We donned masks; and started ECAM actions.  I noticed that the cabin altitude on pressurization system page was steady at 5200 ft; normal for our altitude so I consulted QRH  but found no futher guidance. Upon consulting ECAM non normal supplemental manual; I found further guidance stating to rely on cabin excess altitude warning and not rely on SD [pressurization System Display page] cabin altitude so we declared emergency; performed emergency descent and initiated diversion to our destination which was the nearest suitable airport. Upon reaching 10000' we cancelled emergency and performed a slow descent into [our destination] and landed normally. Aside from conflicting information which caused some confusion initially we found it difficult to get ATIS and comunicate with dispatch due to this aircraft having the new ACARS system which both First Officer and I have little to no experience with other than reading the ops bulletin.




Synopsis: An A321 received an ECAM excessive cabin altitude warning despite the cabin altitude displaying only 5200 MSL.  When researching the dichotomy they determined the ECAM warning takes precedence; declared an emergency; performed an emergency descent and proceeded to the nearest suitable airport; their destination.  A complicating factor for their troubleshooting was a new ACARS interface with which they had minimal training and little experience; thus compromizing their efforts to communicate with the company.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RNM.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D RNM
ATC / advisory: Tower RNM
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While instructing a student and preparing to enter Ramona's Class Delta air space we discussed the radio call we would make to the control tower requesting touching others. My student made the radio call to the tower; it was disjointed and not very professional; he's a student after all.  There initially was no reply from Ramona tower. I instructed him to repeat his call to the tower.  When the tower finally responded he spoke to my student in a condescending arrogant and sarcastic way.  At which point I told my student I'll take care of this.  I'm not proud of my behavior; but I came back to the controller with the same level of sarcasm he gave my student.  You see; I've had issues with this control tower before.  The control tower personnel are not FAA controllers; but are contract controllers.  They consistently have very poor attitudes; and a terrible customer service mentality.  They use non-standard phraseology and I've witnessed many times where they're rude and sarcastic to other pilots.  So I responded to the controller with a sarcastic attitude; he replied I should eliminate the sarcasm and remain professional.  I said I'll be professional if you'll be professional.  He then said remain clear of Ramona Class Delta air space.  I replied 'smell you later' and executed a 180 degree turn away from his airspace.  Like I said before; I'm not proud of my behavior. I shouldn't have lowered myself to his level; but those controllers at Ramona Tower are terrible. My next step is finding out how to lodge a formal complaint against them.  I know many other local pilots who've experienced the same issues with them. IMO RNM doesn't need a tower; except during aerial fire fighting Op's.  The airport could function perfectly as an uncontrolled field.  We routinely fly at ZZZ which is uncontrolled and busier than Ramona.  Never have any issues there.




Synopsis: Instructor Pilot reported communication problems associated with Controllers at Ramona airport.