elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GA2.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C GA2
ATC / advisory: CTAF GA2
Second aircraft: Stearman
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other taking off
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had just fueled up. The fuel pump is about 800 feet down the runway from the beginning of Runway 31. Traffic had been using Runway 31 and it is downhill. From the beginning of Runway 31 you can not see the last 2;000 feet of the runway because of the slope. From the gas pump I could see the entire runway. I announced over the correct frequency. I saw no one on approach for either runway. I announced 'Aircraft X back taxi on Runway 13 for a 31 departure'. I was heard but my volume was down and I received no transmissions throughout the event. Evidently the Stearman was on base to 13 when I announced and took the runway.At that time of day the sun was in a low position and could have obscured my ability to see the aircraft. While I was back taxiing the last 800 feet of Runway 13 the Stearman landed on Runway 13. There is no way I could see him behind me. At the end of Runway 13 I did a quick mag check and announced 'Aircraft X taking off runway 31'. I was airborn by the point about 600 feet to 800 feet down the runway when you can see the rest of the runway. The Stearman had just exited the runway on his taxiway about 300 feet in front of me. He was off the runway as I had a clear view out my right side window.My volume was down and I could not hear responses. The sun was low blocking the Stearman on base. Even though another aircraft was in the pattern for Runway 31; the Stearman chose to land opposite direction and also with me on the runway assuming I would hear his warning. It is not uncommon to land uphill on [Runway] 13 to reduce landing distance.




Synopsis: A pilot back taxiing to depart a non towered airport reported an aircraft landed opposite direction.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MFR.Airport, OR
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E EUG
ATC / advisory: TRACON EUG
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed MFR on the Jackson1 off RWY32. [I] told aircraft 'leaving 042; turn right heading 120; when able direct ACLOB (fix on flight plan).' Aircraft repeated 'Out of 042; turn right...say again heading...when able direct ACLOB.' I repeated 'Leaving 042; turn right heading 120; when able direct ACLOB; resume own navigation.' Pilot read back instructions correctly. I observed a slight turn of the aircraft out of 032 (MVA in area is 033); but I thought they might just be correcting heading to OED; which is part of the Jackson1. Nope; they continued to turn ENE; but not in a sharp turn to 120 [heading]. I almost thought they were maybe issued the Eagle departure instead; and just had started turn late. They were above MVA at this time; and no conflicting traffic. I just allowed them to continue turn to 120 [heading] and ACLOB.Not sure if Aircraft X may have an FMS issue with this departure procedure. I am not the only controller who has noticed them start a turn to the ENE on the Jackson1; without instructions to do so.




Synopsis: EUG TRACON Controller reported an aircraft turned early on the JACKSON ONE departure.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out of about 20;000 feet; speed about 295 kts; V/S about 2000 feet per minute we experienced sudden significant and strong aircraft vibrations. Vibrations were more pronounced in the aft of the aircraft and seemed to originate from the tail section. According to the aft flight attendants it was intensity of vibration they have never felt before. We were in absolute smooth air. We did not have any abnormal engine vibrations and no other warning messages associated with the vibrations. After leveling off at 27;000 feet and reducing the airspeed to about 270 Kts the vibrations stopped. We ran the QRH checklist for aircraft vibrations. Then we got in contact with [ops] and maintenance control. We discussed the event and since all indications were back to normal; we concurred to continue on to [destination]. We also agreed that if vibrations would return we would divert to [a nearby alternate]. About 10 minutes later we experienced another event of vibrations; this time not as strong; would call it light vibrations. Still; we made the decision to divert at this point. I used ACARS to inform dispatch. Dispatch acknowledged and gave us diversion info. We diverted and landed without further incident. During the descent and approach phase we felt more light vibrations; however we could not tell for sure that it was not turbulence related. After deplaning and taking care of the passengers I made a very detailed log book write up in accordance with QRH.To prevent other flight crews experiencing an event like that I would like to see serious maintenance attention and really trying to find the cause of the problem. The aircraft was placed back into service and considered green after only a general visual inspection based on a certain AMM task card. No panels were opened and no computer flight control checks and tests were performed.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after experiencing significant airframe vibration.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Apprentice
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flexible braided line above gear failed. Replaced with line from [another] hydraulic kit. Asked [service] desk if I should submit a report because of part number difference of lines. I was told no because line replacement is covered under AMM 20-23-XX-XX. After aircraft departure and before arrival at next station I called maintenance control and spoke to Mr. X quoting AMM ref and page 50 para 6 in ref to time tracking on a line replacement with a line from our kit. I was told it was a permanent repair and no [follow up item] would be issued. Next morning I involved my Manager with my concerns that some kind of tracking should be in place for the installation of correct part number line. At first Mr. X insisted it was a permanent repair. We agreed that I submit a safety report for clarification. Ultimately deemed repair as temporary and maintenance control issued a [follow up item] for 20 cycles.Not exactly sure how to prevent when two maintenance controllers and an engineer told me it was a permanent repair only to find out otherwise upon my own insistence.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported of some confusion if a replacement hydraulic line was a permanent or temporary fix.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was the 3rd or 4th lesson with this student. He is a taller student with a larger foot (size 15). The purpose of the day's lesson was for patterns. He had difficulty before with taxiing an aircraft with a castering nose wheel; but had seemed to figure it out. The first two takeoffs and landings were acceptable for his level of progress. The third takeoff was good and on centerline. His third landing he wanted help to maintain on the centerline. We touched down and began the rollout. My feet were on the pedals. I told him to press the brakes. As soon as he began to press the brakes we veered to the left. I got on both brakes but noticed the pedals were displaced to the left and I could not center them nor get enough pressure on the right pedal. It was if they were jammed. Before we departed the runway surface; I pulled the mixture to idle cutoff because we were heading for the taxiway signs. As we touched the grass; the airplane came to a quick stop. I asked him what happened and he was dumb struck. I taxied out and parked the plane. He demonstrated to me that his foot got trapped between the bottom instrument panel and the rudder pedal. I have this same problem with the Diamond DA20.




Synopsis: DA-40 instructor pilot reported a runway excursion due to a student's foot getting jammed on the rudder pedal.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were asked by Maintenance Control to conduct a high speed taxi test to ascertain if Contract Maintenance had solved a landing gear issue. I had secured both galleys in preparation for the test. We were told it would be a few hours prior to repair to be done so we were escorted to main terminal to get lunch while Maintenance worked on aircraft. Upon return to aircraft the only authorized airstair operator advised us he was leaving. I did not return to aft galley to recheck. We taxied out to runway with Maintenance man onboard sitting in row 1 on the aisle. He did not want to sit in cockpit jumpseat. The door to flight deck was open in order to communicate with him. After reaching 100 knots (as per discussion with Maintenance Control) RTO braking brought us to sudden deceleration. Fortunately; the door stop mechanism did not hold and the door slammed shut. About one second later an unsecured galley cart from the BACK galley impacted the flight deck door and caused damage to door. There was fortunately no injuries to the 3 of us on board. I don't believe this could be reproduced if tried. The cart did not hit any aisle seats on the way up and hit door at full speed. I fear for the consequences had the door remained open. As the PIC it was my failure to double check the aft galley again. Most importantly; I would like this event to be disseminated to the pilot group for safety sake so that my error will not be repeated.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported that an RTO braking test caused an unsecured aft galley cart to impact the cockpit door.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger in XX boarded the plane with no mask; but complied once asked. He was rowdy at the beginning of the flight but did not cause any issues until he began throwing almonds at a passenger 2 seats away; when asked to stop he did. He was then asked multiple times through the flight by both FA A & B to put his mask on. He would comply when asked or when we were walking by but would take it off as soon as he thought we could no longer see. I reminded him that it was a policy; he then all at once told me he had some sort of test done and if that wouldn't work what about a medical condition so that he wouldn't haven't to wear the mask. I asked him if he had spoken to a gate agent about it which he threatened me; telling me that I didn't want to go there with him because I wouldn't win. I then decided to call the CA; and informed the passenger that this was not an argument; and that face masks are a policy and that he would be met at the gate.After deplaning; the group of older and large men that were traveling with the disruptive passenger gathered in the terminal and I felt extremely uncomfortable and unsafe walking by them. They then also got on the same tram as I and were loudly making comments in regards to me asking them to put their face masks on during the flight. In the future I would like to feel safe while doing my job and feel that I am supported for enforcing the companies policies.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger being confrontational about wearing a face mask.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff; both the First Officer and I noticed a smell similar to burning plastic in the cockpit. There was no smoke in the cockpit. As we climbed out of 5;000 feet; the flight attendants called and reported a strong smell of something burning and that the passengers were reporting the same smell to them.I transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer as I spoke with the flight attendants. We determined that the best course of action was to return to the airport. We requested to level off at 9;000 feet and advised ATC. I began the smoke and fumes checklist as we entered a downwind vector to return to the field. We descended and executed the Runway XX ILS approach to an overweight landing of approximately 163;000 pounds. Upon exiting the runway; we requested an inspection by crash fire rescue personnel who met the aircraft. They reported a normal heat signature on the aircraft. We returned to the terminal and parked at gate. We were met by station Maintenance Personnel to discuss the incident; and then wrote up the details for the smoke/fumes incident and the overweight landing in the AML.We loaded our passengers onto a new aircraft and departed approximately 2 hours late.I suspect that this event may have been the result of a recent engine change. Maintenance told us upon our return that there had been an engine change. Possibly some residual fluid that entered the bleed air system upon takeoff and climb at high power.I do not have any suggestions for avoiding a recurrence of this event I believe the situation was handled appropriately by both the cabin and flight deck crew when one considers the very real possibility of a potential fire.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that smoke and fumes in the cabin resulted in an air return.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Rain; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Handoff / Assist; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Staffing; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was working the handoff position for approximately 30 minutes at the time of the event. There was a large thunderstorm around the area that necessitated rerouting multiple arrival routes and airport arrivals through our sector in addition to pushing a large portion of the east west traffic that would normally be spread over multiple sectors. The Radar Controller was working Aircraft Y on a north route through our sector. The aircraft was flashing at the next sector for several minutes but they had not taken the handoff. Prior to the aircraft crossing the boundary he observed a limited datablock among the many in that area that appeared to be descending. He brought it up and told the controller to stop the descent on Aircraft X. I walked over to the sector who had control of the aircraft and pointed out the confliction. They acknowledged and attempted to stop the descent but kept getting stepped on by numerous aircraft. I believe the closest they came by the conflict alert was 4.6 miles with Aircraft Y behind. The Controller did turn Aircraft Y in an attempt to keep separation but it was insufficient. All the sectors involved and numerous surrounding sectors were in an alerted status and stayed that way for several hours. I believe that much of this situation was caused by the lack of foresight on TMU (Traffic Management Unit) Command Center. They knew the weather was coming and did little to nothing to assist the Center. We were well over an hour and a half in to being overloaded before any rerouting occurred.




Synopsis: ZKC Center Controller reported their sector had a loss of separation between two aircraft during a period their sector was overloaded due to weather deviations.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An inconsistency [was] found in DGD [Dangerous Goods Documents] (wrong UN for toxic liquid; organic; nos/ were indicated as UN2811; as well as wrong quantity measurement per UN) during preparation for loading on transfer flight to ZZZ1. Closer inspection of shipment showed wrong UN on one of the DGR shipments for this type.




Synopsis: Cargo Personnel reported multiple errors and inconsistencies in Hazmat documents of arrival shipment.