elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was departing ZZZ for ZZZ1 at approximately XA:15. I had filed an IFR flight plan. ZZZ Tower was closed due shortened hours related to COVID.  In the XXL run-up; I picked up my IFR flight plan clearance from Approach. Approach gave me my clearance and I wrote it down.  I plugged it into my FMS but failed to put in the squawk code in the transponder (I was squawking 1200).  This may have been because I usually receive my clearance by CD at ZZZ on the ramp and this was the first time I had to call Approach from the run-up. Or maybe I just missed it when inputting due to the fact it is in my checklist to be done prior to leaving the ramp.Once the airspace was clear and I was ready to depart; I called back Approach for release and departed after calling my position on CTAF.  There was no traffic within 10 miles of the airport at departure time.  About 30 seconds after departure; I called the given Approach frequency in my clearance to check in.  I was acknowledged; and asked to squawk my code and was given a direct heading to my IAP. It was then I realized I hadn't put in my code on the ground.  I imputed it and confirmed my position with ATC.  The flight was uneventful and landed XX minutes later at ZZZ1.I recognize my oversight in failing to input my squawk code was in part due to my reliance on always receiving my clearance while on the ramp; rather than in this case at my usual airport; but one where I had not departed with the Tower closed; so my checklist SOP was not reliable.After the flight; I contacted my regular flight instructor to discuss how best to verify inputs in this situation as my own checklist is clearly insufficient when CD is closed. We are going to go over such during my next lesson in two weeks. I have updated my SOP and will now triple check my clearance has been imputed with the squawk code before leaving any given run-up.




Synopsis: Pilot reported forgetting to set the correct code in the transponder due to not talking to Clearance Delivery; but rather the overlying TRACON since the Tower was closed due to COVID-19.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Weather elements / visibility: clear
Aircraft: J3 Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Tail Wheel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On landing; he got me off the runway with a full right rudder left aileron lockup.  No damage; no mention on the frequency.  We need more work!  I think he would be ok on a zero crosswind session; but no longer sure.  On several occasions in the last three sessions; I have had to save a landing with power and right rudder.  Crosswinds were generally 220/8 with occasional gusts.  This particular landing was that way - I got it straight and let go; showing him he was still flying the aircraft both with words and hand gestures.  He immediately jammed full right rudder in; and when the nose darted to the right he tried to correct with full left elevator.  All this happened in an instant; at which time I took the aircraft; straightened it out with power and appropriate controls; and got it airborne.  At no time did any portion of the aircraft other than the wheels contact the ground or any runway lights.A post flight inspection indicated that no portion of the aircraft suffered any contact or undue force.  Both tailwheel springs had jumped out of their loops; which is common with tailwheel shimmy or excessive rapid tailwheel movement.No mention of this incident appears to have made it to official channels - no comments were made on tower frequencies.  It is possible that nobody saw it - it took only about ten seconds; start to finish.




Synopsis: A Piper J3 Cub Instructor Pilot was conducting training when the student pilot overcontrolled the aircraft on landing; resulting in a momentary loss of control.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Performing Localizer Runway 27 into SAN. Vectored onto final. While on VNAV Path; aircraft did not honor CIJHI altitude constraint of 2;700 feet (fix outside of FAF REEBO). We were at 2;400 feet when Approach Control notified us of a 'Low Altitude Alert.' We immediately corrected aircraft flight path back to altitude; and completed approach and landing. Reviewing FMS; 1R did not show the required 2700A at CIJHI. I do not know how it dropped out of the flight plan string; but neither pilot caught it. Triple check; compare; and verify the approach and FMS programming and aircraft flight path.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported descending below charted altitude on approach to SAN triggering a 'low altitude' alert from ATC.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While in climb to FL410 we were given a turn 20 degrees left for traffic.  Passing through 36;600 feet Controller said a mistake had been made and descend to FL360.  As we were descending Controller gave us a right turn to 110. At that time we received an RA which we followed to 35;500 before we were clear of conflict. We then climbed back to FL360 and reported our altitude and RA event to ATC.  ATC stated there was confusion between two controller's plans. The controllers [should be] on the same page. What happened today isn't a surprise to me. Since the reduction in staffing of the controllers from the COVID-19 pandemic flying has been miserable and less safe. Most controllers are controlling several frequencies and are overloaded. We have had more TA's in the last 2 months than the last 3 years.




Synopsis: Corporate jet Captain reported a communication issue between ATC facilities resulted in an airborne conflict.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Light: Night
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D TEB; Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flying from the west at 2000 FT MSL on radar vectors for Teterboro airport; we were cleared upon intercept [for] the ILS 06 between VINGS and DANDY. On most airplanes; when pilots are cleared for a precision approach; select APPR mode on the FGP (flight guidance panel). Its seems that even if you are cleared for the ILS on this approach you must descend below the glidepath to make the restriction of 1500 FT at DANDY even if cleared the ILS and have captured the glideslope. FGP protocol is much different in this case. After discussion with many pilots who have been to Teterboro; all have been caught in this same predicament in the past. If this is the case and confusion exists why not clear pilots to 'track localizer inbound; descend to 1500 FT and upon reaching DANDY cleared for the ILS 06?' In this case no confusion exists. This seems to be an old problem and still claims many victims among those that rarely go to Teterboro.




Synopsis: A corporate CL-60 Captain expressed confusion over frequent approach clearances for the ILS or LOC RWY 6 approach at TEB which do not include specific language clarifying the need to comply with the below glideslope crossing of DANDY at 1;500 FT MSL.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Was flying direct at 7;700 msl with flight following. I was handed off to Center and was assigned a barometric pressure of 30.18; which was in line with my previously assigned pressure. I could see a front off in the distance but didn't consider any pressure change. Center was busy; so my attention was reduced from the radio as most of the radio chatter was for others. Someone came over the radio and stated that they were showing traffic at 7;500 at their same altitude. I can't remember if there was any talk of course or altitude change as my focus went out of the cockpit. A few moments later a high wing Cessna flew over us at 100 ft with a nearly head on course. A few moments later a radio report goes out to me that traffic is 0.25 miles same altitude. I report back that he is too late. The other aircraft states that he saw us on the ADSB and was climbing prior to our close call to avoid. He also requests a number to file a complaint with FSS. I'm asked to check my altitude and I tell him I'm at 7;700 and my pressure is 30.18. I'm told that the controller had me at 7;500 and that I should have been given a pressure of 30.11 which put me at a physically higher altitude.Since I was flying into a front I should have known that the pressure would be changing and that I should be adjusting more frequently. Since the last time I got a pressure setting was when I entered Approach airspace and the Center's pressure was the same I reported my altitude lower than I physically was. I have Foreflight and a stratus so I could have been more proactive with adjusting my pressure as well as seeing my GPS altitude for comparison. I also realize now that flight following is not a flight plan or a VFR version of an IFR plan and that it gets low priority to all other traffic.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an incorrectly set altimeter led to a near mid air collision.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Its 95 degrees in IAH; aircraft has APU inoperative. Aircraft arrived at Gate XX Jet bridge air was connected 5 minutes after arrival but not turned on. The hose was then disconnected and a portable system connected. 10 minutes later with help of a [Maintenance] person the air was turned on. Now 85 degrees in aircraft cabin. Air seemed insufficient. Four kinks in hose. Asked it be fixed to help with cooling. Air then disconnected. Seems a clamp came loose. Now no air on aircraft. Cabin temperature now 92 and 96 in cockpit. Air then reattached and on.  5 minutes later; air cooler than cabin was being delivered. Had to start engine at gate. Air disconnected. Cabin temperature still 90 degrees. Ground crew could not get air cart to produce air and hose then became disconnected or came apart. Cabin temperature 93 degrees. Asked external air to be reconnected again. 5 minutes later hose fixed and engine started.  This is a typical APU [inoperative] scenario. Equipment doesn't work or breaks and ground personnel don't know how to operate it nor is there a sense of urgency.  I takes just a few minutes to have baking temperatures inside the aircraft and a long time to cool it off again.  With a 28 min flight to ZZZ1 this aircraft never cooled off.  ZZZ1 temperature 99 degrees. This is not fair to our passengers; in fact could be quite dangerous to elderly; young or other compromised health individuals.  My clothes were soaking wet upon arrival in ZZZ1. This is very distractive; a major threat. Abnormal Operations are already being accomplished. We might as well just opened the windows. This problem is a repetitive occurrence. This Captain will never take an APU Inoperative aircraft when outside temperatures are over 85 degrees; because despite constant promises to have the ground support; it rarely happens. It doesn't count if the air hose is connected but not turned on; turned on late; turned on with hot air; broken; etc.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported inoperative APU and excessive temperatures; coupled with insufficient cooling systems caused unsafe operations.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Taxied north on the right lane on Ramp. Taxi speed was 5 to 10 knots. Approaching the center roadway; I kept an eye on an approaching luggage tug from the right. When he did not slow down and was about to encroach on the aircraft footprint; the FO said that I needed to stop while I; at the same time; brought the aircraft to a rather abrupt stop. The tug stopped about 20 feet in front of our right wingtip.We told Ramp Control what had happened; swung left; around the tug; and continued taxiing north on the side of the ramp. I was about to make a PA to explain to the passengers why we stopped when the A Flight Attendant called and said that the C Flight Attendant might have injured himself (whiplash). Upon further investigation it was determined that the C Flight Attendant in fact was injured and wanted to be taken off the flight. We then returned to the gate; subsequently called EMS personnel to have the flight attendant evaluated and he was taken off my flight.I kept the passengers informed and walked the cabin twice. No passengers mentioned anything about the braking. Conversations were all about connecting flights or cabin temperature. A replacement flight attendant was found and the flight left again for destination. Just before departure I was informed that the B Flight Attendant also felt some strain in her back; but was good to go to city. I checked on her during the flight and she mentioned some minor muscle pain.Do not have ground vehicles cross active ramp areas where aircraft taxi.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain took evasive action with an aggressive stop to avoid a baggage tug on an ATL ramp when the tug driver failed to give way. After returning to the gate one flight attendant removed from the flight with a suspected whiplash injury.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Angle of Attack Vane
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During takeoff after approximately 100 KTS the stick shaker and overspeed clacker activated and remained on until after touchdown and below 100 KTS. The Captain's airspeed tape on the EHSI became erroneous. I was the pilot flying throughout the flight and handled ATC communications while the Captain worked through the QRH and did an excellent job managing the overall flight. The landing was overweight but not considered a 'hard landing.' The Captain and I both agreed that an emergency did not need to be declared with ATC. Upon arrival at the gate Maintenance found the angle of attack sensor; aircraft left; was broken. I began to mentally recall my preflight inspection: I arrived at the airplane as Maintenance personnel were operating the jetway. I boarded and performed my normal flight deck inspections. The A Flight Attendant asked me to have the Gate Agent close the canopy as it was raining. The Gate Agent happened to check for boarding and noticed the jetway was not lined up properly. I had to close the L1 door so the Agent could realign the bridge and close the canopy. I then completed my walk around and found no defects. I do not know how the angle of attack sensor was damaged. It is logical to assume that the sensor was damaged prior to pushback; but I feel I did an adequate preflight of the sensor. I would be curious to know if the Gate Agent or ground crew could recall if they perhaps noticed the sensor was damaged during pushback.




Synopsis: B737-400 First Officer experiences the stick shaker and over speed clacker passing 100 KTS on takeoff. Both warnings remain activated until the aircraft slows below 100 KTS after an overweight landing. The angle of attack vane is found damaged on post flight.