elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Other Preflight/Postflight Loading
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While the loaders unloaded my plane in ZZZZ; a gust of wind blew over some boxes one of these was a Hazmat box that I had not been informed was put on my plane back in ZZZZ1.This loader and I have had problems with multiple times he'll not listen to what I want for Max loading so I have to watch him closely as well as tell him a lower number because if I look away he always goes between 50-100 over; and will wait to tell me the door weight until after he's finishes his paperwork so I have less time to do my paperwork when they finish. I've spoken to another pilot in base and they've had the same issues. I will have to be even more diligent when he loads my plane. I have informed the chief pilot of this issue.Recommend this company develop should a similiar paper to other freight operators that states if they are or are not loading Hazmat. That way in case the Hazmat is put in a bag or hidden behind a larger box I would be able to say this is missing.




Synopsis: Captain reported undeclared Hazmat cargo discovered during unloading at destination.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This morning; I was unable to adequately brief the Flight Attendants due to the Agent boarding before the Crew was ready. I did the walkaround; accomplished the interior security inspections; and signed the checklist. After looking at the weather for our route of flight on the EFB; I was ready to brief the Flight Attendants about expected turbulence and the need to remain seated departing. The boarding process had begun so I could only speak with the A regarding the weather. She was distracted and I was not sure she was hearing me. Before push; I had to verify she had heard what I said. Luckily; I remembered as the distractions at push time are numerous. This situation of boarding the aircraft before the Crew is ready is unnecessarily causing distractions and has become a Safety issue.The decision that the entire Crew is ready to board needs to be made by the Captain; not management policies; Agents being pushed to board by said policies; or Flight Attendants being pushed by Agents. The fear of reprimand is sacrificing Safety. Management has stated that Safety and security are always first; however; the pressure from above filtering down to Flight Crews proves otherwise. The only person that has the responsibility and authority to be the 'Safety valve' without fear of reprimand; and with an unbiased view; is the Captain. The Captain should determine readiness of the Crew to begin the boarding process.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported being unable to adequately brief the flight attendants due to the Agent boarding before the crew was ready. The company is pushing the agents and the agents are pushing the flight attendants to board early.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We finished the first leg of three on the last day of a three-day trip. We pulled into the gate at LAS with a scheduled plane swap. After completing the Parking Checklist and other post-flight duties; I cleared the FO to head out while I stayed with the aircraft while passengers deplaned. Ground power was connected initially but air was not. As deplaning commenced; I asked the agent to call for ground air. It was 106F OAT and I was concerned about cabin temp. I understood from the agent that the aircraft would be on the ground for some time. After all passengers were off; I went outside and asked Ramp to connect ground air. A few minutes later one of the guys came to the cockpit and informed me that ground air was inop. In the meantime; one of the new FAs (flight attendants) came onboard saying she came down early because the terminal was very crowded. As the situation progressed I decided to leave the APU on for cabin cooling; informed the FA and agent and went on to my new aircraft. At the time I didn't give it a second thought. It wasn't until I got to the new aircraft; finished preflight duties and had a few minutes to reflect that I realized my error. Sick feeling. I told the FO that I would be back and hustled back to the previous gate to remedy my mistake. Probably 30 minutes or so had elapsed since I had left it. By the time I got back to the gate The new crew was onboard and passengers were boarding.I must say that I didn't feel any type of particular time pressure or any major distraction. I'm not sure why my thought process went so awry. While this situation is not common; I'm sure it's not unheard of and I should know better than to leave the APU running and Terminating Checklist incomplete. I certainly could have stayed with the aircraft until the new Crew arrived.I am sure that I hadn't reviewed FOM in some time so unless I'm the only one who has messed up this way; adding that to our training profile may raise awareness to this issue and prevent someone else from making the same mistake.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported they forgot to complete the terminating checklist.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-25 Pawnee
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Other Towing
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Tow plane pilot for club glider operation. On last flight I wanted to land long on grass field (glider grass) to leave tow rope closer to hangars before refueling the aircraft. The grass strip ends with a paved taxiway in the same direction as the grass strip. The taxiway is very close to hangars perpendicular to the taxiway and taxiways in between hangars. I completely misjudged the distance needed for roll out after landing and rolled at high speed onto paved taxiway; braking heavily! Only luck that no person or aircraft was coming onto the taxiway from the hangars at this time. Will be more conservative in the future; which is how I normally operate aircraft. Complete lapse of judgment.




Synopsis: Tow pilot reports landing long on a grass glider strip intending to refuel; and finding himself very fast as he leaves the runway onto a paved taxiway that is basically an extension of the runway. Heavy braking is used to avoid any conflict with aircraft which could have entered the taxiway from adjoining taxiways and hangers.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: CAVU; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: PFD
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Weather was clear; light winds; no turbulence.  XM weather on 530W and portable Garmin 696 indicated no precipitation at all. ADS-B system showed a line of magenta with red and yellow levels of intensity at our location. This indication was completely inaccurate; as there was no precipitation. Two other aircraft in our group reported the same inaccurate display. We were midway between JWN and M93 in CAVU conditions.Was the ADS-B system hacked? How can the system present such misinformation? I now have no confidence in ADS-B weather depiction. If it can report significant fronts that do not exist; can it report clear conditions when there is bad weather?Also; hours after the flight; I called the flight up on FlightAware and it showed weather that did not exist.  I presume that FlightAware uses the same data that ADS-B is using.

Callback: Reporter stated that he has noticed that; in general; ADS-B display seems to depict weather at a higher level of intensity compared to other weather depiction sources. Due to the similarity in the level of weather shown on FlightAware and ADS-B; reporter wondered if the weather data source was the same for both. At the time of the event; there was no precipitation within an 80 NM radius; and the reporter thought it might be an issue with the refresh rate of ADS-B weather date.



Synopsis: BE-55 pilot reported that while flying in clear weather conditions; the ADS-B display showed a line of heavy precipitation that did not exist at the current aircraft position.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ONT.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 340/340A
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ONT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: PA-34-200 Seneca I
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: After departing on a direct route to my destination the Tower advised me that traffic; a Seneca; was at 10 o'clock and two miles; frequency change approved. I acknowledged with 'copy.' I found the traffic visually and cross referenced with onboard TIS and ADSB traffic that the traffic was heading same direction as me; appeared to be level and slower. I continued to climb in the same direction. The traffic then turned 90 degrees right and was now; according to my TIS on a collision course with me. I was unable to turn left to pass behind the traffic due to proximity and I chose not to descend due to terrain; so I maintained visual contact with the traffic and continued to climb more aggressively to avoid. I also turned slightly right to avoid the aircraft. I maintained visual contact until I was past the traffic; but I had climbed to 2;800 FT to avoid them; and 100 FT into the floor of the ONT Class C airspace. After passing the traffic I realized the altitude and immediately corrected to 2;500 FT and opened up VFR flight following with SOCAL for the remainder of the flight. My onboard TIS and ADSB traffic were helpful tools in helping me 'see and avoid' the traffic by aiding me to determine a flight path that would avoid them. In hind sight; it would have been extremely helpful for CNO Tower to suggest a SOCAL frequency for further VFR traffic information since we were outside of their airspace and operating in close proximity.




Synopsis: While climbing to avoid another aircraft and incurring an NMAC the pilot of a C340 inadvertently entered the ONT Class C under which he had been flying. After clear of the traffic he descended and proceeded to destination.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EISN.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center EISN
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 1 hour into the flight from London we started smelling an acrid smell in the cockpit. Immediately after that the International Relief Officer (IRO) called up from the cabin to say that seat 3A was smoking and that they had: removed the passenger; removed the power from the seat and In-Flight Entertainment (IFE) system and had used a squirt of the halon fire extinguisher just to make sure that any fire was a non-issue.While this was going on I messaged Dispatch to let them know the initial problem and we reviewed checklists and contingency plans and planned on diverting to a nearby [airport] if necessary. The lead flight attendant and IRO called back to say that the smoke had rapidly dissipated when the power was turned off. No hot spots remained. They'd removed all flammables from the area including newspapers and blankets and reseated the first class passenger.We then consulted with [Maintenance] and Dispatch again and they reiterated to keep the IFE switch off for the rest of the flight. After consulting with both FOs; Dispatch; [Maintenance] and the lead flight attendant we were all confident that the fire was out and posed no safety threat. We concluded that the safest course of action was to continue on our route of flight and we landed uneventfully. A logbook write up was made.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional Information.]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew on an international leg reported the cabin crew successfully dealt with an overheating passenger seat power issue.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SIT.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 2.5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Cleared for the VOR/DME A approach 5500 Ft upon crossing BKA turned right to intercept 009 course inbound descending to 1800 then to 1000. After WINKA FAF continued to missed approach point at which point we had visual with the island but could not see the airport. Executed missed approach with climbing left turn at which time we got a terrain avoidance alert. MSA for the approach in the northern sector was 6600 ft. MSL. Elected to continue climb to satisfy terrain avoidance alert which remained illuminated through 6500 Ft. Over climbed the published missed approach altitude because of the terrain alert and conflicted with opposing traffic. We feel that we possibly had an erroneous terrain alert but due to being unfamiliar with the area and the terrain we felt the best action would be to continue our climb.




Synopsis: An air taxi flew the SIT VOR DME-A Approach and after executing a missed approach overshot the missed approach altitude because of terrain warning; possibly false; and conflicting traffic.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Dornier Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Other go-around
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While conducting a Captain Proficiency Check; a Blue EICAS system status message 'HYD MAIN PMP INOP' was displayed on the EICAS after the execution of a simulated single engine missed approach. I immediately discontinued the check ride; instructed the Captain as the pilot flying to fly visually to the northwest practice area; that he had the use of the both engines; while I remained pilot not flying and consulted the QRH. Since this message is only advisory in nature the Do-328 QRH only lists what the message means and offers no course of action to follow. On the HYD system page of the MFD a blue 'INOP' was listed near the main pump with hydraulic pressure of approximately 2900 PSI being delivered by the DC standby pump. Once clear of controlled airspace I asked the Captain to climb above 5;000 FT and maintain terrain clearance. I then extended the landing gear normally and then the flaps to 32 degrees. After completing the descent and approach checklists I asked the Captain to turn back towards the airport; contacted the Tower and requested a full stop landing when we were 12 miles north of the field. The landing checklist was completed and NWS and Anti-Skid systems were available normally. Captain landed with no other anomalies.I used my best judgment and systems knowledge to deal with the situation at hand; I recognized that the DC hydraulic pump could deliver sufficient pressure to operate the roll spoilers; flaps; NWS; and wheel brakes (including anti-skid). This blue advisory (non warning; non cautionary) message should not be displayed in-flight. Further review of this advisory message being displayed in flight should be conducted.




Synopsis: Do328 Check Airman reports a Blue EICAS system status message 'HYD MAIN PMP INOP' during a simulated single engine go around. The flight eventually returns to the departure airport for an uneventful landing but the reporter questions why this EICAS message should be displayed when no crew action is required.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through FL230; we experienced two compressor stalls on the left engine; the left EGT gauge displayed amber and a vibration presented. As we began the Engine Severe Damage checklist; the flight deck filled with smoke. The checklist was interrupted in order to don oxygen masks and goggles. This is where the problem occurred and is the reason for this report.The mask/goggle setup consists of two separate pieces. In order to don both; the mask needs to be applied; a vent on the mask opened; the flow switched to EMERG. The goggles must then be located; removed from their pouch and then donned in such a way as to position them over the vent on the mask. This procedure is awkward and time consuming. We were forced to divert our attention from dealing with a developing emergency in order to ensure the safety equipment was correctly fitted. This created a significant distraction in an already fluid and busy situation. A one-piece; full face mask/goggle system would have allowed us to concentrate on actually dealing with the true emergency rather than having to deal with the proper fitting of the gear.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer experienced compressor stalls climbing through FL230 that resulted in high EGT and vibration; along with smoke in the cockpit. The reporter was most concerned with the difficulty encountered donning the separate oxygen mask and smoke goggles. The engine was shut down and the flight returned to the departure airport.