elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201905
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Engine Indications
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aero data discrepancy between TO 2 assumed temp N1 on FDP and thrust setting on TMSP; FDP was@4.5% higher on FDP than TMSP. [This] has been happening repeatedly. Elected to perform TO 2 and numbers matched. Concern is that V speeds are based on a very different thrust setting than what airplane calculates. Many other crews are noticing the same issue. Began late last week for me. So far; I've only flown 767s; haven't checked if 757s are having same issue.




Synopsis: B767 air carrier pilot reported a discrepancy between the takeoff power settings on the flight plan vs those actually displayed on the TMSP.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMFR.ARTCC, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Software and Automation; Aircraft
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: While briefing the OBRUG 1B Arrival into MMPR (Puerta Vallarta); the crossing restriction at OBRUG on the Jeppesen Arrival Plate was noticed to be different than the crossing restriction in the FMC database. Jeppesen depicts a crossing restriction of at FL 230 while the FMC defaults to a crossing restriction of at or above FL230. We only programmed the OBRUG 1B into the FMC; so it may be worth checking the OBRUG 1A and all the other arrivals for the same discrepancy.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported their FMC Database contained a different crossing restriction than what was published on their Jeppesen chart.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at FL390 received 'HYD 3 ELEV OFF' alert; HYD 3 quantity 4.9 gal. HYD 3 quantity continued to 3.6 gal. Consulted Maintenance Control/Operations via sat. Selected HYD manual and turned engine pumps off to conserve fluid. [Requested priority handling] with Center and requested XXC and 20 mile final. Turned back on pumps for landing and received HYD 3 QTY LO. Gear extended normally. After normal landing had trucks inspect aircraft and taxied to gate. Final quantity 1.6 gal. Failed O-ring in HYD 3 system.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported that a 'HYD 3 ELEV OFF' alert was received during cruise.
Date: 201501
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Descend Via arrivals are fast becoming the standard; however the charting has not caught up to the new procedures.  We have multiple legs and transitions to different runways that have different speed/crossing restrictions all on one graphic page.  This is very confusing to say the least.Note; please; and example in the SWFFT2 STAR into BNA.Here we have 2 transitions to different runways that are 1 deg. (yep; one degree different); with overlapping intersection identification tags. (NOS charts)The intersection ONUGE id; wedged between BRETH and CORRA; can; and ultimately will; cause mass confusion and a pilot violation.I have personally flown more than a few of these into East Coast airports and; in watching the GPS navigate; have not looked out the window for over 100 miles.  2 pilot crew; not a big deal.  What's a single pilot to do?  See and avoid is still viable?There have been times I feel I have to program an arrival from the middle; working towards both ends.  Our current navigation radios are not programmed that way and could drop position/altitude calculations if transitions are changed in mid arrival.ATC seems to be content as well to just watch; to the point of a pilot deviation; with no input.  Us against Them?????  Not the industry I want to be a part of!We need to improve charting even to the point of 1 chart for 1 transition.  Remove all ambiguity.  Briefing strips on the top of the page including entry altitude (as appropriate); minimum altitudes; and no not bury critical information in a pile of notes in small type.  Critical information; like the default runway transition; is buried in the notes section on arrivals as the IVANE5 into CLT (3 pages long; by the way).  One must read the previous 5 notes; then note 6 to find the default runway is 23. Then the note says to 'program the ILS-23;' nowhere noting the 'Transition' to RWY-23. Splitting hairs; but this is the industry that does that. Bottom line: error prone.This current methodology; I do feel and in my opinion; is going to get someone killed.

Callback: The reporter stated the aircraft was a Citation Excel.



Synopsis: A Citation Excel Captain stated he feels RNAV approach charts should be simplified to reduce errors; citing the BNA SWFFT2 STAR as an example.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying pilot on ILS 8R at IAH. LOC was very squirrelly. Autopilot was chasing it; so I disconnected and hand flew probably around REIGN. LOC was very sensitive and fluctuating back and forth 1/4 to 1/2 dot. Kept it relatively centered. Was barely deflected; less than 1/4 dot and Tower override says we are south of localizer; turn left immediately and re-intercept.  According to CDI we were just slightly right; almost touching centered.  I made a correction to the north and changed to magenta needles to follow until outside of OM. While on magenta needles; we encountered wake turbulence. Aircraft in front of us was about 6 miles ahead. We had aircraft to the south on parallel below us. Went back to green needles outside of OM. Light rain but we got visual of the runway. Localizer seemed to be slightly off; and sensitive. I queried if anyone else had issues with localizer; Tower said no; and that we were back and forth across course for most of the arrival.  I wrote it up when we arrived at the gate. Threat of possible inaccurate CDI/localizer. Hand flying. Being south of localizer during parallel approaches is undesirable. Wake turbulence possibly because of south of course. Use magenta needles for longer on approach. Turn autopilot back on.




Synopsis: EMB Captain reported Tower advised of a track deviation on ILS approach to IAH.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Second aircraft: Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi out from Chicago from [gate] short of A; we were cleared by Ground to taxi to '28R at N5 via A3; N2; N.' I wrote down and acknowledge the clearance as I understood it and the Captain began a right turn on A commenting that A3 was 'way up there.' I agreed and stated they must be putting us in line. Just then; as we were passing A13; Ground called and said we missed A13 and to use A12; N2; N and to follow the RJ. I replied with the new clearance and stated that he had cleared us via A3; not A13. We did not see an RJ; but as we turned left onto A12; we did see an Embraer on B moving from right to left. I told the Captain to stop because the Embraer was moving fast and I thought the Embraer was the aircraft Ground wanted us to follow. The Captain immediately applied the brakes and we shuddered to a stop just short of B. Ground then called and said 'Aircraft X; keep it moving and follow the RJ on N2.' We both now saw the RJ on N2; but the Embraer was moving too fast on B; and we were concerned with wingtip clearance from the Embraer so the Captain did not continue the taxi. The Embraer passed in front of us with an unknown close wingtip to nose clearance (best guess was 10 ft.). There was another Embraer following the Embraer and Ground stated 'Aircraft Y; let Aircraft X out.' We proceeded to the runway in front of the second Embraer as cleared and switched to Tower once holding short of Runway 28R/N5. The rest of the takeoff was uneventful.Cause:Mis-stated and/or misunderstood initial clearance to A3 vice A13. In addition; it was dusk and we could not see any RJs. I thought Ground meant the Embraer; so we played it safe and stopped. The Embraer passed us uncomfortably close at a fast taxi speed.After further review of the taxi chart it was obvious that we couldn't connect to N2 from A3. I should have verified the route better on the taxi chart and drawn a line. That would have led me to verify the route with the Ground Controller.




Synopsis: B737-900 First Officer reported that a misunderstood taxi clearance resulted in a critical ground conflict.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Compressor Bearing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance

Narrative: My Lead and I were the only two technicians working on 3 different aircraft with production items on all 3. After determining that the debris on the chip detector was fuzz; a preliminary check of the report viewer showed no history. I still had multiple tasks (production) to complete on [this aircraft] before attending to the tasks associated with the chip detection. By the time all the work was finished I had forgotten about checking the chip detection history file. There are too many places for maintenance history to be recorded. This only creates events where the wrong avenue of checking history is used and a non-compliance results. All history should be checked in one place. Due to low manpower and a high workload; I had many tasks to complete; [and I continued] under the assumption that there was no history.




Synopsis: A busy Maintenance Technician neglected to follow up on the debris found on a chip detector after becoming convinced that there was no previous debris history.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the PNF (pilot not flying) in an unintentional wrong surface landing at ZZZ. The circumstances leading up to the incident are as follows. After filing an IFR flight plan to ZZZ1 we departed [in the afternoon.] After takeoff and obtaining our clearance I was asked by the pilot flying to review the airport information from the AFD as we were both unfamiliar with the airport and surrounding area. After reading the AFD information we were made aware of the close proximity of other airports to ZZZ1. As we began our decent for ZZZ1 we reviewed the approaches into ZZZ1 and considering our position and weather conditions we choose to conduct a visual for Runway XX. I asked the Controller if we could fly directly to ZZZZZ which is the final approach fix for the RNAV Runway XX as a reference point to line us up for the visual approach for Runway XX at ZZZ1. The Controller told us that the airport was at 10 to 11 o'clock at approximately 15 miles. He also informed of reported snow and ice covering the runway with a braking action report of 3 3 3 I believe.As we got closer we called the field in sight and the Controller then cleared us for the visual approach as we neared ZZZZZ from the southwest. We then turned northbound toward the airport. As we began our decent from near ZZZZZ the Controller again cleared us for the visual and told us to go to the CTAF. We told the Controller we could cancel IFR as the runway was in sight in VFR condition. He acknowledged this and we switched to CTAF announcing our position and intentions. As we came closer to the runway we could not see the runway numbers as they were covered with ice and snow which confirmed the conditions the approach controller had informed us of earlier. After we had landed and exited the runway and someone on CTAF for ZZZ1 informed us that we had landed at the wrong airport and they instructed us to call the tower on another frequency which we did. We were then allowed to back taxi on RWY XY at ZZZ and takeoff to reposition to ZZZ1.




Synopsis: EA50 pilot reported landing at wrong nearby airport.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I am writing over the fatigue inducing schedule I had and for the fatigue call I made.The previous day; we had an [early] show for [standby]. This was the 2nd day of before [a later] show [from a different time zone]; so it wasn't too early but was still before my normal time I plan for work. Then at the end of [standby show]; we were shut down and given a XA00 local show for [standby] until XG45 [on day 3]. Due to the early show and no planning my previous nights sleep to adjust to this; I was unable to get to bed until XS00 and sleep 5 hours waking up at XX00 [day 4]. As the [standby] was only until XG45; I was comfortable I could make it this long on 5 hours sleep. However; at XG30; my brief changed with a XI00 ferry to ZZZ which would have been a 2+48 flight landing at XJ48. This would have been a 10+48 duty day. There was no way I could complete this; so I fatigued. I can't believe the Fatigue Mitigation Software would even allow for this. This wouldn't have even been legal under part 117 that regulates 121 passenger flights. As this duty uses the most modern science; I tend to use this as a guide for fatiguing as it closely represents how I fatigued I have been in the past when I would exceed the duty times for part 117. For part 117; if I was acclimated to my home time; a XA00 show would be XX00 and good for 9 hours. Even if I acclimated to [local] time; a XA00 show is good for 10 hours. Therefore; this 10+48 wouldn't even work for this. The Fatigue Mitigation Software at a minimum needs to reflect the part 117 duty times as these have been done taking into account modern science in determining fatigue.




Synopsis: Corporate Jet Captain reported 'fatigued' when assigned flight at the end of 8 hour aircraft standby duty.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Evacuated; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we were deplaning the aircraft rapidly filled with very dense; noxious white smoke and choking fumes; smelled of burning diesel or some other oil based solvent. There was so much smoke; it was difficult to see in the Cabin. There were still about 60 passengers on the aircraft when the event occurred; in the rear of the aircraft. We instructed the passengers; to deplane as quickly as possible. The 'C' Flight Attendant instructed passengers to hurry up; and deplane immediately; due to possible fire; and dangerous smoke in the cabin over the PA system at the 2R jumpseat. Passengers followed our instructions and deplaned quickly; with no physical injuries that I am aware of. I went out into the Jetway; and passengers; who had deplaned; were very visibly upset; angry and concerned. The Crew was also very concerned; regarding our exposure to the poisonous fumes and smoke. Some Luggage was left behind; and the Ground Agent Supervisor; retrieved them afterwards. I warned the Supervisor; to be careful because the aircraft was still full of smoke; and he went onto the aircraft and retrieved the passenger's luggage; anyway. Now; it is about 12 hours; since the event occurred and my lungs feel very heavy; and I have been coughing; bringing up phlegm; and awoke this morning in the hotel; with a bad headache. The Captain informed me; this exact same kind of incident has just happened to a different aircraft here on a previous flight; and that he would also be filing out report. Obviously; someone is not doing their job correctly; on the ground in this airport. It needs to be investigated to find out what kind of fumes to.




Synopsis: An A321 Flight Attendant reported the cabin filled with a dense; noxious white smoke as the aircraft was being deplaned so everyone exited the aircraft and the reporter had a headache; heavy breathing; and a cough the next day.
Date: 201810
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MBB-BK 117 All Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During post flight/refueling discovered the fuel cap was missing behind secured fuel door. After further investigation the aircraft was flown the night before to another airport/FBO where the fuel cap was not reinstalled after refueling. Fuel cap was recovered by Airport personnel. Fuel sample was taken after post flight.Always verify the fuel cap and door are secured after refueling. Also follow all items on the aircraft preflight checklist.




Synopsis: Air taxi helicopter pilot reported a fuel cap was discovered missing during preflight.