elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Outflow Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After returning to the gate on the previous flight; the maintenance department determined they could MEL the affected system. MEL 21-X was issued. We refueled; reviewed the MEL; new flight plan; and pushed back from the gate [XX] minutes later. After takeoff; our first ECAM came up regarding the Outlet valve and was dealt with and somewhat dismissed as part of the MEL item and no big deal. ZZZ Departure passed us on to Center and we were given a climb from 16;000 ft. to FL230. Somewhere below 10;000 ft.; we got another ECAM and this started a series of pressurization issues that concerned us to the point of requesting from Center to maintain 16;000 ft. until we were happy with the situation. The cabin was climbing at a higher rate than normal and we felt several pressure bumps. Somewhere in the 12;000-15;000 ft.; area still climbing to 16;000 ft.; we heard a very loud bang or pop and the cabin pressure shot up; CRC warning; more ECAM's; Flight Attendant call ringing; red cabin pressure warning as the cabin hit approximately 12;000 ft. [We advised ATC]. Immediate decent to 10;000 ft. Cleared straight back to ZZZ Airport and landed safely again with no issues. I will reiterate the Professional job and high level my Crew performed.Shortly after takeoff an ECAM message-VENT SKIN VALVE FAULT appeared. While working through the problem the ECAM instructed us to maintain max FL100. We made the decision to return to ZZZ for landing. This was a non event. Following SOP;s and staying inside the TEM; Aircraft X landed safely back in ZZZ approximately [XX] minutes later. My First Officer performed his duties perfectly using his many years of experience on the aircraft and I had a crew in the back that worked together preparing for the return with no issues. I always judge this by the comments from my passengers and we received no complaints and many compliments.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported that a pressurization problem resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: Tower ANC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: There seems to be an issue with the 737-400 fleet when cleared via the Anchorage 6 departure [off Runway 32] in conjunction with the relatively new routing to Fairbanks--ANC J115 FAI. I have flown this route three times this month; each time in a 737-400; and the same issue happened each time when we program the Anchorage six departure and the ANC J115 FAI route in the FMS before departure and carefully verify each point. Shortly after liftoff when we engage the LNAV function expecting the LNAV to fly the Anchorage six departure the Anchorage six departure is no longer present in the FMS routing; it simply disappears-it's gone. The aircraft reverts to heading select and the flight directors simply point where the heading selector happens to be. I do not know if the same problem happens in the NG fleet as well. I do not know the cause; or why; the programmed departure is no longer available in the FMS following departure. The fact the Anchorage VOR was recently moved to a new physical location may have some bearing on this issue.




Synopsis: A B737-400 Captain was confused by his FMC's failure to direct the jet via the ANCHORAGE SID off Runway 32 at PANC.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 120
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pilot executed a normal takeoff. During the initial climb; pilot suffers a sudden loss of power. Pilot followed emergency restart procedure - engine failed to restart. Pilot attempted to return to [departure airport] to land; but landed short of the runway on airport property. The aircraft suffered minimal damage to the prop and right wing tip and was towed back to a hangar. Incident was reported to local law enforcement - they did not require pilot to fill out a written report of the incident.




Synopsis: C120 pilot reported engine failure in initial climb resulting in an off runway landing.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After leveling off at 7000 feet on departure from ZZZ; we experienced a #2 engine failure. No fire warnings were observed. Engine #2 indication showed a wind-milling engine with no EGT. ATC was notified and [advised]. Engine Failure Checklist was run and flight attendants; passengers; and Dispatch were notified via ACARS. Vectors to an ILS XXR were flown to a successful overweight landing. Taxiway E was used to stop the aircraft for inspection from the fire trucks. No fire or unsafe conditions existed so we taxied to gate. Maintenance report was documented. [Chief Pilot]; Dispatch; Maintenance; and flight attendants were all debriefed.


Second narrative: #2 Engine failed on climb out at 7;000 feet. [ATC advised]; air returned to [Departure Airport]; Accomplished; [and] 10;000 lb. overweight landing.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported engine #2 failure after departure resulted in a return to departure airport for landing.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BNA.Airport, TN
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: While on descent to Nashville on the SWFFT ONE RNAV STAR and descending from the ADAAY Intersection to the CORRA Intersection I misread the crossing restriction as 4;000 FT and not 6;000 FT at CORRA. I appear to have looked at the crossing restriction at the ONUGE Intersection rather than that at CORRA. I realized this mistake as we descended through 5;000 FT when I rechecked the plate for the next altitude on the descent. I immediately changed the descent into a climb somewhere between 4;700-4;800 FT MSL. ATC called to check the altitude a few moments later. ATC then assigned an altitude of 5;000 FT for the remainder of that section of the descent. The Controller did not seem perturbed or overly concerned. This was the first flight into Nashville and additionally the first use of this STAR for my First Officer. Indeed the plate is only 30 days old after it's initial issue. Contributing factors are an overly information saturated approach plate that I feel should be spread out over a bi-fold approach plate as is common on other STAR plates. The ONUGE information bubble is twice the size and more prominent in placement just below the CORRA Intersection. This bubble overshadows the smaller CORRA bubble that is placed off to the left of the plate and is half the size. Task saturation in the VFR environment of a busy airport and my unfamiliarity with the location of the airport and landing runways added to my workload of interpreting the plate on this arrival while looking for VFR traffic and the location of the airport.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 flight crew misread the 6;000 MSL crossing restriction at CORRA on the SWFFT RNAV STAR to BNA and descended more than a thousand feet below until queried and reassigned 5;000 by Approach Control. The reporter cited the saturation and complexity of the STAR chart as a contributing factor.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Guests sitting at X1 and X3.X1 keeps coughing.X3 is wearing the mask with bottom tie off.X1 stood up and opened the overhead bin when the cockpit door was open during the break. I told him loudly to sit down please. He asked  'Why?' I answered 'Because the cockpit door is open.'X3 said 'Seatbelt sign is not on.'They both say 'That is so stupid.' shaking their heads.Every time X1 coughs; guests at X5 & X6  are concerned and look over to him.Get consents from guests about staying seated during pilot breaks.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported two passengers who were not complying with face mask policy did not want to remain seated while the cockpit door was open.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ALB.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ALB
ATC / advisory: TRACON ALB
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I have for years used the MGFIATR (Missed; Guidance; Final Approach Fix; Initial Approach Fix; Altitude; Time; Radios) to set up an approach and it has worked well. On this occasion; I skimmed over the process of setting up the LOC 19 because I had done the same approach the week before and thought I knew the initial and final fixes. Approach Control cleared me to descend to 1;600 FT outside EYMEY when he cleared me for the approach. When I crossed EYMEY; I mistakenly thought it was the FAF and started descending. During my scan I realized I had another waypoint to cross and it dawned on me that HAUKY was actually the FAF. I increased power and climbed to 1;600 FT again and finished the approach. Nothing was said by ALB Tower. Do what you know to be right; don't take any short cuts and pay attention to detail.




Synopsis: A solo pilot flying the ALB Runway 19 LOC thought he knew the IAF (EYMEY) and FAF (HAUKY) from memory; but after ATC cleared him to 1;600 FT prior to EYMEY; he forgot the actual FAF and began his descent early at the IAF. He realized his error and returned to 1;600 FT.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: One Inspector was here to work with 32 Mechanics and four [Aircraft] Cleaners. Four aircraft and a total of 36 people to watch over [by one Inspector] and safely inspect and oversee maintenance is next to impossible. We have talked to our Director and supervisors about the problem for months with nothing being done. The pressure put on these Inspectors is overwhelming. They feel pressured to cut corners to get the job done. The fear of overlooking a major step or procedure resulting in a major accident or fatality rides on all our minds. Safety is our number one concern. This happens almost every weekend. Please help the Inspection Department with this before we lose an aircraft or someone gets killed. Limit the number of people one Inspector can safely supervise at one time.

Callback: Reporter stated his Air Carrier recently added only one Inspector for the entire weekend while their Maintenance production department added 30 mechanics during the same period. Their Inspection Department refuses to call-in additional inspectors on overtime pay to address the increased workload from their Airframe (Sheet metal) mechanics. Their Maintenance policy is 100-percent Inspection; of all work accomplished starting with C-Checks and Heavier Maintenance Visits; which they also do on their aircraft. He has worked Maintenance and Inspection for 35 years; the last 15 years with the current Operator. But the workload on Inspectors has increased beyond reasonable.



Synopsis: A Maintenance Base Inspector reports their Inspection Department's policy of not increasing Inspector staffing during heavy weekend Mechanic overtime has made the workplace virtually impossible for one Inspector to oversee maintenance of 32 mechanics; six aircraft cleaners and safely inspect four aircraft on one shift.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While performing his preflight checks; the Captain inadvertently pressed the left engine fire bottle discharge button instead of the shaker test.Departure was delayed due to a weather ground stop; and the gate agent was helping clean the cabin for departure. The extended delay and presence of the gate agent may have caused distraction.I think maybe I should study the Captain flows and perhaps watch out the corner of my eye while they are being performed. Of course I can't do this every time; but had I been paying attention I might have been able to speak up before the button was pushed. I was just sitting in my seat and not really watching what was happening.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reported that during preflight the Captain inadvertently pressed the left engine fire discharge button instead of the stall warning test.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While on Radar services with Miami Center; approaching R2901E; I requested transition through R2901 as it was reported by Miami Center as cold. Shortly before getting to the restricted airspace (JANGL); I and my passenger observed a small white drone (estimated 8 FT or so) flying opposite direction (heading 115 approximately) at about 3;500 FT off my right. I had not been warned of any traffic by ATC. Upon call up to Miami; I was handed off to another sector Controller who said he had a target at 1;200 FT behind me.




Synopsis: M20 pilot at 4;000 FT with ZMA reports sighting a possible drone opposite direction at 3;500 FT near JANGL Intersection.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DLZ.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: UNICOM DLZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was arriving into the airport area to practice landings at approximately XA:45. I had checked weather/NOTAMS prior to leaving home and did check AWOS which actually stated NOTAMS in effect in addition to weather. Upon entering the pattern at a 45 degree angle; I announced myself and continued as I continued through downwind; base to final; no response from the Unicom Operator. As I was taxing back another pilot was in the pattern and turning base. The Unicom at this point did speak up and stated the airport was closed due to a drone NOTAM. I did not see this NOTAM nor did the other pilot. I found out that about an hour 15 minutes earlier the airport sent out a NOTAM stating UAS activity from surface to 300 ft. around the airport (actually; west of the airport and traffic was landing west; away from this activity); valid from XA:00 - XA:45. The NOTAM did not state anything about the airport being closed due to drone activity. I landed at about the same time of the NOTAM was expiring so it didn't affect me anyway. To address this situation in the future; the operating should publish the NOTAM close to 24 hours prior to the NOTAM being effective; otherwise; how are pilots to find out about them when they are released about an hour before they are effective? The Airport Operator needs to learn what NOTAM's mean; given this NOTAM did NOT close the airport; thus; he should not have stated that it did.In any event; in the future I will double check NOTAM's prior to immediate departure; however; as stated above; people releasing NOTAM should assume pilots get their briefing often up to a couple of hours prior to leaving for the airport to preflight; etc.




Synopsis: Pilot reported they were made aware of a UAS NOTAM after arriving to a non towered airport.
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback; Operations informed us that a DG item had to be relocated to another cargo bin.  We advised that we received a NO DG message.  Operations then informed us that a lithium battery had to be relocated. We advised operations that Section 9.30.3 of the FOM states no lithium batteries are to be loaded.   Operations then said they were removing batteries. Departed uneventfully.


Second narrative: Operations informed us of the need to transfer bags from one cargo hold to another to 'encircle' a 24 lbs package with a lithium ion battery. Our aircraft servicing firm indicated no dangerous goods and lithium ion batteries are prohibited in the cargo hold per the FOM. Package was removed.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported being notified to return to gate to correct Hazmat load configuration error. Flight crew additionally reported no NOTOC provided to crew. Hazmat removed prior to departure.