elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MGM.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: During a training mission the aircraft had a potential wire strike to unmarked and uncharted wires; with only cosmetic damage to the aircraft; the flight was able to be completed without any other issues. There were no injuries.

Callback: Reporter said that he and his copilot were conducting a survey at approximately 300 feet AGL along the Alabama River; about 40 miles west of Montgomery Regional Airport MGM) when the wire strike occurred. He saw the wire and felt a jolt; then climbed out.Two weeks after the incident; they returned to the area where the wire strike occurred to look for the wire. He saw two thick communication-type wires with orange marker balls mounted on them at both ends near the river's edge. Reporter stated that these were not the wires he struck. He and his employer have attempted to find who owns these wires; but have been unsuccessful.He believes the wire he struck was a smaller; single wire; strung at treetop level. He was unable to locate the wire and opined that it may have been broken by the strike or subsequently removed.



Synopsis: Small aircraft pilot reported striking uncharted wires while performing low altitude training.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The past four times I have flown an approach to Runway 28L at PDX; the aircraft with autopilot engaged; on glideslope; in approach mode with glideslope captured; at 3.5 DME at approximately 1000 feet AGL; the aircraft pitches nose down with a corresponding GS showing 1/4 dot high. The aircraft recovers; then continues normally on the approach.The first time it was day IMC several months ago. The last three times; it was day VMC on a visual approach. At first I thought it was just a 'glitch.' Now I think there may be an anomaly on the approach.  There is an antenna on a ridge at the 10 o'clock position; from the aircraft perspective; that is nearly level to the aircraft on the rising ridgeline south of the airport. Perhaps it interferes with the ILS signal?




Synopsis: A B737-700 First Officer believes that a radio tower south of the ILS 28L at PDX may be interfering with the glideslope signal causing a bump at about 1000 feet.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During cruise flight; I noticed the Captain grab the oxygen mask and use it to breath. He then turned the air temperature way down. Afterwards he told me that he was feeling dizzy and light headed like he was going to be ill. He said he was having trouble staying focused. We continued our descent as he said he was feeling better after the oxygen. He said he was still not 100 Percent. I noticed that he was having a little difficulty reading back the instructions but that he was okay and good to continue. The Captain was the Pilot Monitoring and I; First Officer; was the Pilot Flying. We were given a descent via clearance.... I then set 6000 as the bottom hard altitude to follow the Vertical Path Indicator down. Initially we were given the 8L transition; which was the assigned runway via the arrival. We were then given a frequency change to another Controller and what I heard him say was change runway 8R and fly present heading. I heard the Captain read that back. Since I did not hear anything about an altitude; I assumed that we would continue to our last assigned of descent via or 6000. We leveled off at 6000 on present heading and the Controller asked 'Say altitude.' It was at that point we were made aware of a possible pilot deviation. I asked the Captain if he had heard an assigned altitude and he said he thinks it was 8000. Supposedly; the ATC Controller gave us fly present heading; maintain 8000; and switch runway to 8R. I never heard the 8000 and never changed the altitude selector to 8000. It was left at 6000. The pilot monitoring never said anything about an altitude that I recall. If I had been aware of the 8000 restriction; I would have set 8000 in the altitude alert. I'm not sure if I got mixed up with the 8R and 8000 or if someone stepped on the last part of the transmission and I never heard it. The Captain said afterwards that he remembered the ATC Controller saying 8000 but he never mentioned to me to change my 6000 to 8000 as a level off. The Captain at that particular moment was still a bit out of it from his sudden sickness which may or may not have played a part in a breakdown of monitor cross check.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported an altitude overshoot during descent while the Captain was not feeling well.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Tower, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On departure from KATL were cleared for takeoff on 08R to fly the VARNM2 departure RNAV to RONII; RESPE transition. We deviated approximately 0.4 miles south of the 082 course to RONII due to the fact that we were in HDG and not NAV on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator). Upon realizing that the aircraft was not in NAV we immediately corrected using HDG SEL to rejoin the course. It was at about that same time Atlanta Tower queried us about our track I advised we were turning to rejoin the course to RONII. The controller asked what the heading we were turning thru and I advised 080. We continued and rejoined the departure in NAV mode. No further comments were made by ATC. My FO (First Officer) and I had flown this departure earlier and recognized the fact that we needed to pay very close attention to the RNAV departure and that we were very tired since fatigue was now a bigger factor. I am sure that NAV was selected and armed on the briefing before taxi out. I think what may have happened is one of us during the subsequent taxi out and briefing pushed the NAV select tile on the MCP (Mode Control Panel) unintentionally causing it to be deselected and then neither of us noticed that NAV was not armed on the FMA. We briefed the threats on departure including the LIFR weather; complicated taxi out; T/O alternate; RNAV SID; to watch each other for fatigue and to be on alert. Even though we missed the initial error we captured our mistake at autopilot engagement altitude (1000 ft AGL) during the FMA scan engaging CMD2 we noticed we were in HDG and began our correction. We learned once again how fatigue can sneak up on you and that FMA awareness is extremely important not only to avoid errors but to trap them.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported deviating off course shortly after takeoff.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; mountain wave; 100
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We had been trying to find altitudes with smooth air. We were in light to moderate chop; which had been reported at all altitudes. Mountain wave had also been reported. We were cruising at .81 Mach when we encountered three or four strong bumps; at which time the airspeed went from .81 M to .84 to.85 M. I reduced power to keep from going through maximum Mach; which is .85 M. As I retarded the throttles; we encountered more bumps and the airspeed dropped immediately down to .75 M. I advanced the throttle while in the bumps at which time the left engine flamed out. This all happened within a few seconds. We advised the Controllers; explained our situation; and requested a descent. We descended to FL240; restored the left engine; and climbed back to FL400 without incident.The fact that it happened so fast was a contributing factor. I possibly could have moved the throttles a little slower and prevented this from happening; but not sure. The crew worked very well together to resolve the situation and at no time were we off course or off altitude.




Synopsis: Gulfstream Jet Captain reported the left engine flamed out possibly due to rapid throttle movement in turbulence.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Lead Technician; Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Inspection Authority
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Service was rendered to a Mooney aircraft which led to an annual inspection. This aircraft had been sitting for several years following rumored issues. This work was completed in [the previous year]. The Fuselage was inspected according to Mooney's recommended inspection list. AD's provided by self and the owner were reviewed; verified and/or completed in accordance with service and maintenance guidelines. The aircraft was determined to have had a running engine prop strike and a new two blade prop replaced the previous 3 blade. It was determined according to Lycoming to remove the engine for a tear down and inspection. The owner located a used engine that had been sitting for multiple and unknown years. He took the engine to [an A&P]; for inspection. Parts were disassembled and reassembled and it was test ran for 45 minutes. A log book entry was made by him. Here is a miscommunication issue. It was assumed that [the A&P] was an IA; and that his log book endorsement constituted a completed inspection for return to service. The inspection sign off alluded to that endorsement. It has come to my attention that his credentials only have him as an A&P. This was an error as I signed off the aircraft for an annual inspection. This information was not known at that or any issues. This report is made at the earliest possible time of the knowledge of events as I learned them and became aware of the issues and being presented as timely as possible. Obviously in the future more careful reading and verifying past work by others will be implemented in my aircraft history research for annual inspections paying closer attention to details that may have been overlooked for this event.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician with Inspection Authority reported releasing an aircraft for service that had not received a full annual inspection.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 12
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: No radio communication. COVID-19 lack of traffic. Flew out of radio contact with the Controller. Pilot complacency due to the reduction in air traffic and radio communications.




Synopsis: Pilot reported flying out of radio contact with the Center due to complacency from the reduction of air traffic caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLT
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were instructed to taxi to Runway 36C via D; left on Romeo; hold short Runway 36R [at] Romeo. As we were holding short of 36R [at] Romeo; the Ground Controller instructed the pilot flying to expedite; cross Runway 36R and join Alpha taxiway. The pilot flying quickly looked left and advanced the power levers to expedite as instructed. The PF then slammed on the brakes as a B737 nose wheel touched down in front of us. It appears the 737 was in a flare as ground ATC instructed us to expedite across the runway. The PF did look before crossing; but Taxiway 'R' positions the aircraft at a 45 degree angle away from the landing traffic on 36R. This makes seeing down the runway a bit difficult. We were instructed to call the Tower when we land at our destination. Once at our destination; the FP called CLT Tower as requested. The manager stated they played the tapes and we did nothing wrong and followed directions as they were given. The Controller did in fact call our tail number; however it was not meant for us. Mix up by the Controller. Mistake that we caught pretty quickly. I believe CLT could minimize this issue by having all GA aircraft use the closest runway to the FBO; 36R/18L. This would minimize runway crossings and would make it safer for all. I tend to believe that work load for the controllers would drop as well.




Synopsis: BE350 First Officer reports a critical ground conflict with a landing B737 after being cleared to cross Runway 36R at Taxiway R. A collision is avoided by a quick stop and it is later determined that Controller error was responsible for the close call.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Coming into Memphis on the Tammy arrival. Descending via. First Approach Controller stopped our descent at 10;000 FT. Then just prior to frequency changed she gave a descent to 3;000 FT. Checked on with next Approach Controller with our altitude and down to 3;000 FT. Passing through 3;700 FT Controller questioned our altitude and she thought we were cleared only down to 4;000 FT. Probably because of the descend via arrival. I don't believe we made a mistake; but just covering myself in case we did. I honestly don't think there was a deviation on our part; but because the Approach Controller questioned our altitude; I thought it was best to fill this out. If we did make an error the breakdown would have occurred sometime during the initial clearance down to the lower altitude and my read back.


Second narrative: Given the descend via Tammy 4 into MEM Landing South transition; we were following profile when we were issued descend via except maintain 9;000 FT. We stated that we did not understand that clearance; maintained published speeds; stop 9;000 FT. Then we were issued maintain 10;000 FT. Then we were told to descend to 3;000 FT. We received frequency change; checked in descending to 3;000 FT; got acknowledgement from Controller. As we were leveling at 3;000 FT; Controller stated we were supposed to be at 4;000 FT. We stated we were issued 3;000 FT from previous Controller; no further comment was made from Controller. Cause; Poor ATC clearances. Suggestions; ATC needs to give proper clearances.


Synopsis: Air carrier inbound to MEM assigned the Tammy 4 STAR encountered confusion with regard to the 'descend via' clearances issued by ATC.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 2
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On transition to the ILS 24R after the SEAVU Arrival; we were cleared for the ILS approach and asked to maintain 180 KTS to JETSA. We had already received moderate turbulence from a preceding heavy 757 going to the south complex. We were asked to maintain visual separation from that aircraft and then were given additional traffic turning onto the ILS 24R in front of us; a 747 jumbo and were told by ATC 'Caution; Wake turbulence' (All this with low visibility requiring ILS approaches.) Additionally; we had a slight quartering headwind than generated just enough crosswind to put the wake turbulence in our path. As the pilot flying I perceived on the TCAS we were gaining didn't have enough separation to prevent another wake turbulence event. Thus; I slowed 20 KTS and began flying one dot high on the ILS glideslope. Cockpit workload was high and the radios were busy and the Captain was unable to advise ATC; who then asked what our speed was and complained that he had to slow following aircraft. Perhaps we could have cut in on the radio and advised ATC of the decision to slow for safer separation. I believe that in this case ATC at LAX paid lip service rather than actual respect of the seriousness of the wake turbulence threat. My perception is that they are far more concerned with running a standard spacing than providing safe separation from wake turbulence. I'm not sure what 'caution wake turbulence' even means if they don't want pilots doing anything about wake turbulence. It also seems inappropriate to ask pilots to maintain visual separation from aircraft on the ILS with two miles of visibility while at the same time issuing cautions for wake turbulence from multiple preceding aircraft with speed assignments that generate closure. Thankfully; we were able to avoid wake turbulence from the 747 that would have been worse than what we had just experienced from the 757 only seconds before. Safe separation behind 747s; not a compact final; should be everyone's objective.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew; after encountering wake from preceding B757; deviated from assigned speed on arrival to LAX to avoid further wake turbulence.