elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202007
Location: LNN.Airport, OH
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E LNN
ATC / advisory: UNICOM LNN
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: LNN has apparently recently changed its name to 'Lake County.' However; the chart says 'Willoghby/Lost Nation' and the ASOS broadcast also says 'Willoghby/Lost Nation.' [I was] arriving recently [and] several aircraft were in the pattern. Some were saying 'Lost Nation traffic' during their calls with others saying 'Lake County traffic.' I was a transient pilot unfamiliar with the airport. I was unable to visually identify all local traffic. Due to the naming mismatch; I was unaware that one other aircraft in the pattern was present; as he was calling it 'Lake County' while I and others were calling it 'Lost Nation.' One other transient aircraft appeared to nearly have a collision taking evasive maneuvers. He later said over the frequency; 'Sorry I haven't been here before.' He was also referring to the airport as 'Lost Nation' as listed on the charts and weather broadcast. I was informed by the Attendant at the FBO that the name recently changed. It is EXTREMELY DANGEROUS that the names on the charts and the names on the weather broadcast do not match the names of the airports. The chart should only have one name listed - the name used to reference the airport in traffic call-outs. The age-old system of having 'local knowledge' at uncontrolled fields is antiquated; unsafe; and completely dangerous. There is no reason the chart could not be updated; a useful NOTAM published; and a recording on the ASOS 'Lost Nation is now Lake County.' Signs could be posted near the Ramp and near the runway ends as well.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a non-towered airport's publications and ASOS broadcast have not been updated to reflect a recent name change; with the inconsistency in naming causing NMAC events.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HPN.Airport, NY
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Lancair Evolution
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On an IFR approach in VMC conditions; I was being vectored to the Sound Visual RWY 34 at HPN. I had been told that I was #4 for approach. A Bonanza was also approaching VFR along the shoreline from the East. I had not been warned of any traffic or impending conflict by NY Approach. All of a sudden the approach controller told the Bonanza to stop its descent; and instructed me to descend from 3000 to 2000 and turn right to 270 from my 180 heading. Even then I was not given any indication of a possible mid-air. I immediately started my turn and descent and saw the Bonanza pass right in front of me at perhaps 100-200 distance. Once settled at the new heading and altitude; I told the controller that I had come very close to the Bonanza. He replied that if I had descended faster; it would not have been a problem. The frequency was very busy; as was I preparing to land at HPN; so I did not comment on his lack of any conflict warning. I believe that the controller was overloaded; and failed to give proper warning of an impending conflict. I also believe that he improperly allowed a VFR aircraft into Class B airspace in a fashion that conflicted with IFR aircraft setting up for a published approach. I fly regularly into HPN. This sunny Sunday was the busiest by twice that I have seen.




Synopsis: Lancair pilot reports a NMAC with a Bonanza while flying the sound Visual to RWY 34 at HPN at 3000 feet. ATC issued instructions to the two aircraft to avoid a collision but they came too late to have much effect. The Lancair pilot; on an IFR flight plan had accepted the Sound Visual and the Bonanza pilot was VFR. See and avoid.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At the time of the event the weather was VFR with better visibility and ceilings on departure than arrival. Due to arrival visibility/ceilings we had no plan alpha. Aircraft were reporting the field in sight between 1;400 and 900 FT on the ILS. Departures were visible to us until 1;500 to 2;000 FT MSL. A B767 called ready to go at the end of Runway 13R when a Citation X was on a five mile final for the same runway. The Citation X was indicating 160 KTS; I decided there was plenty of room for the B767 to depart. The B767 was cleared for take off; and I included 'Citation X on five mile final' with the clearance. The B767 heavy took an abnormally long time taking the runway for departure. The Citation X reported the field in sight on approximately a two mile final. I notified him that the Heavy B767 was on the go; which he appeared to be. Sending the Citation around would have resulted in both aircraft being at the same place at the same time so I elected to allow the Citation X to land. When the Citation X crossed the threshold standard runway separation existed; 6;000 FT (at least) and airborne. I was relieved that the operation had worked out. I shipped the B767 to departure. When the Citation X exited the runway he said 'That was pretty close Tower'. Normally in bad weather we provide two miles increasing to three miles for arrivals/departures. At the time of this event we were able to use visual separation as we were able to keep our departures in sight long enough. The best solution to solve this problem would have been to tell the B767 Heavy to start his departure now; or cancel take off clearance. This would have either encouraged the B767 to stop dilly-dallying; or created a safe out. With the B767 Heavy in position but not rolling I could have then sent the Citation X around with no possible conflict to worry about. Having the B767 Heavy try to exit the runway wouldn't have been a timely enough solution; at the rate that they were moving. Another good practice would be to allow even more room for the Heavy jets to get going; previously I felt five miles was enough.




Synopsis: A Tower Controller described an unsafe event when a B767 was cleared for take off with Citation traffic on a five mile final. The reporter acknowledged questionable spacing judgement on his part.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commander 112A
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft developed electrical failure approximately 30 minutes prior to landing. After checking sectional; pilot elected to continue to destination rather than landing at an unfamiliar field with unknown maintenance facilities and emergency response. While transponder with Mode C was operational on departure; it is unknown if it continued to function until landing. Pilot entered mode C veil and proceeded for landing. At no time did aircraft enter or under-fly Class B airspace.




Synopsis: After in flight loss of a critical system aircraft proceeded to destination and landed.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft was deferred with Thrust Management inoperative. Approximately 40 miles east of ZZZZZ; [we] were given climb to FL340 from FL320. Used FLCH [and] added power manually to QRH climb power for altitude/TAT - observed ALT HOLD annunciation; ALT HOLD light on MCP and aircraft leveled off normally. As I was fine-tuning the N1 to achieve the correct Mach number; I saw the altitude warning light illuminate on the baro altimeter with aircraft descending thru FL33.8 with flight director above; autopilot light was engaged and I think the ALT HOLD light was too but not 100% sure. With assessing situation and reaction time; the plane had descended to 33;700 when I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew to FL340. Lowest altitude deviation was approximately 350. Airspeed was .805 (I know because I was fine-tuning it to try to get to target of .81). I went on break shortly after and Captain had call with Maintenance and they suspected MCP issues based on AP checks Maintenance asked the Captain and Relief Officer to do. (Aircraft was wandering in altitude with VSI swings of +/- 300-700 with different AP selected). ZZZZ did ask about our altitude deviation and we said we were having flight management issues.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 pilots reported an altitude deviation due to a malfunctioning autopilot.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Rudder
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Heavy Check
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Mod-5518y004 Elevator Rework. SRM and GPM procedures were not followed during rework of elevator hinge fittings. (elevator side); Procedures for damage limits ; damage dimensions; and RII inspections were not followed. Supervisor Frank Giordano improperly used a machinists name and changed the SRM reference to sign off multiple non routines. Aircraft ETR / C-Check was nearing the end and pressure to complete paperwork without checking all policies and procedures.Retraining to ALL maintenance personnel on RII procedures; and maintenance inspections requiring NDT corrosion checks. Also to CLEARLY explain who can and how to sign off another persons work.




Synopsis: Technician reported concerns over non compliance during repairs and rework to the rudder during a scheduled C Check; including RII steps not accomplished.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we approached [the] runway for departure one aircraft notified Tower that it appeared that our right inboard tire had something stuck to it. Another aircraft said it appeared that the tire had some tread separating from it. We had [another aircraft] assess the tire in the runway run-up area; and they too confirmed what appeared to be some type of tread separation. We arranged one last check with an Airport Operations vehicle and they had the same assessment as the other pilots about our tire. There was no indication of a dragging brake; deflated tire; or other abnormal indication. After consultation with my First Officer; Maintenance; and Operations; it was determined that we would return to [the] gate to have the tire serviced by Maintenance. We made a left turn and soon after we heard a pop; followed by a slight settling of the aircraft to the right. I stopped the aircraft and we notified Ground Control that we most likely blew a tire. Ground Control had [ground personnel] come out to assess that damage and they confirmed that the right main tires were both deflated. We coordinated with Maintenance to have the tires serviced at the present location. Operations initiated a recovery plan and sent buses and air stairs to our aircraft to deplane the passengers and take them to [the] gate were a spare aircraft was positioned to take our passengers to [destination].




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported being advised of a main landing gear tire issue by ground observers during taxi to the runway.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was awarded a two-day trip on (date) with the first leg to TNCA. Because I've had only one previous international landing (also TNCA) and it was approximately 18 months ago; I called Scheduling and requested [an Instructor Pilot]. Scheduling denied my request and stated the First Officer (FO) on the trip was International (INTL) qualified. I reviewed the TNCA enroute briefings and watched the videos to refresh my memory; and decided it would be a 'game time decision' between me and the FO as far as our experience and risk tolerance. When I met the FO at the aircraft; we mutually agreed that because he had significant Latin American experience (but not TNCA) and I had one landing in TNCA; and because there were no apparent negative conditions (weather; Maintenance; etc.); we would proceed without [an Instructor Pilot]. The FO told me that the Captain who I had replaced had also requested [an Instructor Pilot] the day before the trip began; was also denied and decided he was not comfortable; and was pulled without pay. Although our trip proceeded uneventfully; it was clear to both of us that TNCA and presumably other international destinations pose unique and unfamiliar environments that are dissimilar to Contiguous United States (CONUS) operations; and that reading a route briefing or watching a video cannot replace real time assistance from a pilot who has personal experience and knowledge and can convey that information as the flight proceeds. [An] Assistant Chief Pilot told me that he contacted Scheduling on my request after the trip and reported that Scheduling's policy is to attempt to assign [an Instructor Pilot] when requested the day prior. This did not happen; twice. [An] INTL designation reflects neither recency of international experience nor experience at any particular international destination. Scheduling's failure to comply with a pilot's request for [an Instructor Pilot] eliminates a valuable operational resource; unnecessarily increases risk and reduces the margin of safety.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Captain reported he was uncomfortable flying to an international destination without an experienced individual in the cockpit to assist.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff (approximately 2 minutes) the Flight Attendant called. Captain was in discussion with Flight Attendant over some type door issue. No door lights on overhead panel. I as pilot flying continued flying and talking to ATC as appropriate. Captain informed me he needed to call Maintenance over the issue. As we started to climb above 10;000 FT (it was late night and ATC gave us clearance to climb almost immediately); the cabin altitude warning horn sounded. I descended/ leveled at 10;000 FT (we were barely above it). Captain ran QRH checklist; as well as all other appropriate checklists; coordinate with company; Flight Attendant; made a PA; [and] declared emergency. We returned to [our departure airport] for an uneventful (though overweight) landing.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer as the pilot flying takes over ATC communication also so the the Captain can discuss a door issue a Flight Attendant. Passing through 10;000 FT the cabin altitude warning horn sounds. An emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On climb out from PHX; ATC queried us about our climb speed. This is when we noticed we were climbing at 230 KTS. I noticed flaps were still at one. We corrected the flap position and continued flight. Flap 1 airspeed was never exceeded. I'm not sure whether I called for flaps up or not; but I obviously didn't crosscheck the flap position indicator. So crosschecking and confirming the requested action is needed. We also started to get multiple ACARS messages regarding mountain wave avoidance areas around FTI and CIM. This distraction led to me not keeping an eye on the airspeed. Aviate; navigate; and communicate come to mind.


Second narrative: I (First Officer) became distracted immediately after takeoff and do not remember hearing the 'flaps up' call. I did not put the flaps up. I became distracted by receiving multiple ACARS messages concerning MOD-SEVERE Turbulence plots along our route of flight between PHX and CIM. ATC asked us about our airspeed and we noticed that we were slow on climbout passing FL230 at 230 KIAS and realized that the flaps were still down in position one. We placed the flaps up and continued to accelerate to our normal climbout schedule. Prioritize what is really important in 'critical phases of flight.' During my employment with another Legacy carrier; we had a Climbout Checklist passing 3;000 MSL which was: 1. Flaps; 2. Landing Gear Handle - Off; 3. Autobrakes - Off. Adding that to the FOM and Checklist cards may be worth considering; since we are about to meld different procedures.


Synopsis: A B737 crew failed to recognize the flaps had not been retracted climbing through FL230 because of distraction from numerous ACARS messages regarding enroute mountain waves.