elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NFL.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 12
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Special Use R-4812
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was on a VFR flight from LAS going north. VGT - BTY takeoff avoid restricted airspace north of Las Vegas. BTY - LOL with course deviations to west to avoid restricted air space east and southeast of Fallon NAS. I flew between R-4810 and R-4804. I was not aware at the time that these two restricted areas were attached creating a third restricted area in between them. After being informed by a Sheriff during a fuel stop that I had flown through restricted airspace; I checked the sectional and still didn't see the R-4812 space. I finally figured it out when I got home. I showed my flight path to two pilot friends and neither one could see where I was in restricted air space. In retrospect; this was pretty poor chart reading on my part. I even had a warning on my GPS; but I thought it was reading R-4804A; so I altered course to the west a little.

Callback: The pilot reported that ATC radar tracked him through R-4812 and at his next fuel stop the Local Sheriff approached his aircraft to get his aircraft N number. His GPS gave him advance warning about approaching the Restricted area but he thought that because he was going between R-4810 and R-4804A that he could carefully navigate between the two and so ignored the warning. In retrospect chart clutter was probably the main reason he failed to detect that the entire area he flew through was restricted.



Synopsis: A pilot reported flying through R-4812 southeast of FLX after he did not see the restriction between R-4810 and R-4804A because of MOA chart clutter even though his GPS gave him advanced warning.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Pilatus Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I came close to 2 [helicopters] on departure in ZZZ. When I was taxiing out they called in a flight of 5 inbound for [Runway] XX. I responded that I was taxiing for [Runway] XX and I would hold short for them. While I was holding short; they flew overhead; and I only saw 3 definitive lights. 2 [helicopter] with white lights followed by 2 [helicopters] with barely recognizable dim green lights; and one in the back with a red beacon. They called clear on [Taxiway] XX as I watched the white and red lights clear the runway I could not see the dim green lights after they passed in front of me because they were barely recognizable. I made a radio call that I was departing on [Runway] XX. I taxied onto the runway with all my lights on; did not see any aircraft lights on the runway; and started my departure roll. Just as I was about to rotate I felt wake turbulence and decided to abort. I saw a black silhouette pass on my right; then another one. I cleared the runway. They claimed that they didn't call clear of the runway and that they had all their lights on. There was a pilot at [FBO] that told me they only saw 3 sets of lights and all appeared to have cleared the runway. He saw me abort and was confused as to why I did because he never saw the other 2 [helicopters].




Synopsis: Pilatus Single Pilot reported coming close to 5 helicopters that were landing/taxiing while taxiing out for departure.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B757-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I meant to issue FL 330 but actually issued FL300.


Second narrative: I relieved Sector and was briefed that Air Carrier X was stopped at FL330 and the data block indicated the same. Air Carrier Y was a ZZZ arrival at FL320 westbound and Air Carrier X was a ZZZ1 inbound northbound. Air Carrier X's altitude was and interim altitude and I noticed it showed 100 feet low and thought it was because of the interim. If we use interim altitudes; the altitude will show low/high at times but with (hard) altitudes in the data block the computer allows the 300 feet up or down without actually indicating it on the data block. I thought it was from the interim altitude until I saw the altitude drop again and then questioned the pilot. I asked him to verify level at FL330 and he replied he was given FL300 and read it back. I had descended the ZZZ inbound to FL300 and told the Air Carrier X to maintain FL330. He came back and said he was getting ready to go through FL320. The aircraft were then at least 5 miles apart so I continued his descent to FL300 per LOA with [other Center]. He said he was given FL300 and he could check the tapes. I then told the Supervisor about the situation and he called back the Controller that I had relieved. The tapes were checked and the Controller had issued FL300 to Air Carrier X and just didn't realize it. I think this was just a memory slip from the Controller I relieved but I should have said something to Air Carrier X right when I noticed the altitude.


Synopsis: Enroute Controller issued FL300 when thinking FL330 was issued which lead to a loss of separation.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Reverser Lockout
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Staffing; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft had a right hand thrust reverser light illuminated. I dispatched on-call maintenance personnel to defer the reverser per MEL 78-1-01. The Mechanic complied with the MEL procedures; but I did not verify that the lower thrust reverser pins were installed. The next morning; the flight crew found the lower pins were not installed. I dispatched [other] on-call maintenance personnel to the aircraft and they installed the lower pins and verified that the MEL procedure was complied with.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller dispatched on-call maintenance personnel to defer the reverser on a B737-700 per the associated Minimum Equipment List. The next morning; the flight crew found the lower pins were not installed. The Maintenance Controller stated that he had not verified each step of the MEL procedure with the Maintenance Technician prior to releasing the aircraft to service.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were performing a flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ. The route filed was. I was picking up the passengers inside the FBO and my First Officer was taking care of the clearance. He got a full reroute.When I was seated on my station; I asked him what was the clearance and he gave me the new route. But he inserted in the FMS 'ZZZ1.[RNAV]4'because he got confused with the previous route filed that was ZZZ1 as initial transition for the arrival. I asked him if that was the approved route and he confirmed the route was correct. When we crossed the position ZZZZZ1; we turned to ZZZ1 an after about 3 minutes; ATC asked what position did we have on the flight plane after ZZZZZ1; then we said ZZZ1 to join ZZZZZ4. He asked to fly ZZZZZ intersection and we immediately turned to the position. We didn't fly more than 5 miles to ZZZ1 until ATC let us know and also there was no any kind of traffic conflict or TAs and RAs. When we started the final descent; ATC gave me a phone number to call regarding a possible pilot deviation. Next time; I will be in the cockpit with the other pilot to pick up the clearance then we can listen together to prevent this kind of mistake.




Synopsis: A corporate pilot reported entering the wrong STAR transition into the FMC causing the aircraft to fly off of its route.
Date: 202111
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Mission: Photo Shoot / Video
Flight phase: Hovering (UAS)
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Commercial Operator (UAS)
Reporter function: Observer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Other post-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A photo online from a drone company out of ZZZ appears to depict illegal; unauthorized UAS activity at a height far above potential authorized limits. This image was taken in the area immediately southeast of ZZZ. This area is surface level E LAANC-enabled. The spot where this photo was taken is well inside the zero-grid area where automated approval cannot be obtained. I am a local Part 107 remote pilot who has consistently received authorization denials for 100 feet and even 50 feet-AGL requests in the same area. I've submitted requests through both LAANC and the FAA Drone Zone with substantial safety justifications without success. The reason cited by ZZZ1 ATC (the local governing body) is the high volume of helicopter traffic in the zero-grid area here. This image was obviously shot from an altitude well above 100 feet (I estimate 300 feet based on the sizes of the ground objects; but make no absolute claims regarding accuracy). I have been building a drone photography business; and my inability to obtain permission to fly in this area is putting me at a competitive disadvantage with those who do not follow FAA guidelines and procedures. I am obviously uncertain of the authorization status of this flight; but it's very difficult to believe it was an authorized flight based on my own experiences with this coordinated LAANC zero-grid. As a Part 107 remote pilot dedicated to following protocol; I would like to see a consistent playing field in the area of my business operations. This company appears to be flagrantly flaunting their willingness to fly illegally in a controlled area.




Synopsis: A Part 107 pilot reported seeing a photograph online taken from what they believe to be a no-fly zone.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Parked; Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Squawked VFR (1200) in the SFRA. Returned to work as flight instructor after being gone for about three months due to closures caused by the COVID-19 Virus. First day back at ZZZ. Flying with XX year old student who tends to skip around checklists (it was his first day back; too); I usually watch him like a hawk because of this tendency. Still; he managed to miss the 'transponder' item and somehow it got past me. Even still; I normally double (sometimes triple) check the transponder as part of my pre-takeoff flow. Because of my extended absence and lack of proficiency in the SFRA; I forgot to double check and took off with 1200 on the transponder. In order to resolve this issue; I need to keep a closer watch on my students; as I am the PIC. Aircraft is based in ZZZ; so transponder should be set to 12XX as its default squawk code. I must be more adamant about checking my transponder before takeoff.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported taking off with incorrect transponder code and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 as a contributing factor.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FDK.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Special Use DC SFRA
ATC / advisory: Tower FDK
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Military
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute from EVY the route of flight was to circumnavigate the outside NW corner of the DC SFRA between the SFRA boundary and the FDK Class D then head south west. Both GPS's showed us approximately 2 miles outside the SFRA boundary. I was up on FDK tower frequency and just prior to contacting them to notify of our transition south of their airspace; the tower called and asked if the aircraft approximately 8 miles to their south east were up frequency. I responded and after letting them know who we were and where we were 'Aircraft X is Southeast; north of the DC ADIZ and south of the Class D'; the tower asked what our destination was and I informed him. The tower then instructed us to contact Potomac Approach upon landing. After contacting Potomac Approach; I was informed that we had penetrated the boundary of the SFRA by 1-2 miles. We were flying at a low altitude to stay out of forecasted turbulence at higher altitudes and the poor radio reception with approach that we normally encounter in that area otherwise we would have been flight following at that time. I have been through that area several times but this is the first time I have had an issue. We were slightly closer to the boundary but as stated above; both aircraft were showing the same thing; just outside the boundary. I understand that regardless of what the equipment is reporting; it is the pilot's responsibility to follow the rules. It is my intent to keep a minimum of 5 miles distance in the future. Possibly a larger thicker boundary marking on the VFR sectional and TAC's that is actually a couple miles further than the actual boundary would help future penetrations.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight of two helicopters with two GPS sources flew a course 2 miles outside the Washington DC SFRA; yet PCT TRACON claimed the aircraft was inside the SFRA by two miles.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MMGL.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center MMFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Departed Runway 28 in MMGL (GDL). Non-Standard Departure on a heading of H260; due to Military Airspace lockdown to the north of the field. Right above 7;000 ft I received 'Terrain; Terrain' + GND PROX flashing + Terrain map on MFD turned red over a value of 9;800. I set Max Thrust and kicked the Autopilot OFF. Maintained 200 knots and present heading. Airplane transitioned from a 2;000 ft/min climb to 3;700 ft/min in a matter of a few seconds. Looked outside again to locate the terrain; however no mountain/terrain in-sight. Visibility was hazy due to yellow fog in the region. Heard the EGPWS warning only once; reacted to it and never received it again. Flight continued normally. MMGL should try to avoid assigning this heading on departure. Captain requested the published departure on clearance and got DENIED. Reason was 'Military Activity' to the north. We believe that Departure Control was late to turn us to the North; which in a sense got us going west-northwest; probably longer than we should have. The published departure has a great DME ARC that keeps you away from this high terrain for a very good reason.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported taking corrective action after the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System was triggered due to a non-standard departure.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft FMC did not have ACARS button.


Second narrative: The Captain had brought aircraft in and completed the walk around prior to my arrival at aircraft.I sat in my seat and began preflight duties. In my flow; once I got to the FMS/MCDU; I noticed the unit had a DIR. INTC button in place of where MENU normally was. I tried to figure out how to get to the ACARS menu but as there was no MENU button; I could not.The Captain had stepped out to stretch. I thought I would look in the logbook to see if there was a write-up regarding the aircraft having no ACARS or anything of that nature. There was nothing to indicate that.When the Captain came back and I asked him about the lack of ACARS; and he said it was like that on the first leg also. We laughed and both thought that maybe it's a ZZZ; so it doesn't have ACARS; and we actually both mentioned that it was the first time in a long time that we had an aircraft without ACARS.After that; I continued my duties and got the clearance and ATIS via COMM 2 (the old fashioned way) and we went about as normal. After we got back 3 flights later; we were informed that we were flying an aircraft that should have had an MCDU but did not.The Captain and I had discussed the issue prior to the first flight; and thought that since nothing was in the logbook to indicate that ACARS had been removed; maybe this is the way this ZZZ was configured. Had it been a XXX or YYY; I am sure the level of scrutiny would have been higher.Now that I know this issue of having no ACARS is a non-normal event (even in a ZZZ); I will call Maintenance immediately if this situation should arise again.


Synopsis: Both pilots of a B737 were a little surprised to see a Flight Manager Computer (FMC) unit without an Automatic Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) access function. No abnormal log data or Configuration Deviation List (CDL) was found so it was assumed the older aircraft simply wasn't so equipped. They subsequently learned the lack was unintentional and should have been entered in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) and investigated.