elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff we received an ECAM that the autobrakes had failed. Upon further investigation we had also lost normal brakes on top of a deferred item BSCU1. Due to deteriorating weather conditions in [destination] and the multiple system failures we conferred with Dispatch that in the event of any additional failures that the best course of action would be to declare an emergency and continue to [destination]. We landed without incident and canceled the emergency.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: An A320 flight crew reported being dispatched with BSCU1 deferred; then losing autobrakes after takeoff. They continued to destination after declaring an emergency.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MPTO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center MPZL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Upon arrival at MPTO I proceeded to operations for the paperwork. Our crew meals were on a shelf with access to anyone and not secured. They were wrapped but had no idea how long they had been sitting there with no time stamp and were not [on] ice. We took them and left for our next leg. At the next destination; my first officer chose one of the meals and of course I had the other. After departure (his leg); we were on climb out and he started to perspire a lot and became extremely nauseous saying you have control then darting to the back where he proceeded to vomit heavily. He felt he could make it to our next destination which we did. There we contacted scheduling and fortunately a commuting pilot was on the jumpseat and replaced the first officer for last leg. I understand this has happened before in MPTO. We are talking a DEADLY situation. I thank God I did not get sick. The meals in MPTO first should come from separate vendors; arrive packed in ice; and a date and time stamp on each package. With the lengths of some of these trips having safe and proper food is as important as carrying enough fuel and having an aircraft that is safe. I know the FAA would agree with me. I should have refused the meals and delayed the flight until proper and safe catering could be obtained. Again we were lucky that we both didn't get sick.Again we were lucky that we both didn't get sick. Other equipment in sealed with expiration date. Why not the crew meals?




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported his First Officer became very nauseous during flight after eating a meal prepared in MPTO by the same vendor; not refrigerated; and without time of preparation/expiration specified.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On our flight to IAD the First Officer's FMC Display was previously placarded by another crew. Prior to descent; because of the placarded FMC and the filed GIBBZ1 arrival; I had made the decision--because of safety and crew workload--to not accept a 'descend via' clearance. While on Cleveland Center; the flight was cleared to cross BRNDN at FL290. Upon reaching FL290; we were switched to Washington Center.Immediately upon check-in; I informed the Controller that we were unable to descend via the GIBBZ arrival because of a placarded FMC. The Controller told us he was going to have to vector us for a different arrival. We were given vectors to FINKS for the DOCCS1 arrival at IAD. The Controller questioned why we accepted the RNAV arrival from Cleveland Center. At the time we were with Cleveland Center; I had not made a final decision to not accept a 'descend via' clearance. Cleveland had not cleared us for the approach or to 'descend via' the GIBBZ arrival prior to switching to Washington. While on the DOCCS1 arrival; after a frequency change to Potomac Approach; the Controller was confused by the arrival we were on; apparently because he did not receive information about our arrival change from the GIBBZ1. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful.The FMC placard specifies no RNAV (RNP) approaches authorized. Although we were not on an RNP approach; because of only one FMC and the intensive descent profile of the GIBBZ1 arrival; I made the decision to not accept a 'descend via' clearance for safety and crew workload. We told center that we could still fly the lateral navigation. Since the MEL did not preclude RNAV arrivals; we could have flown the approach as filed. We could have also informed one of the center controllers prior to Washington Center to give them a heads up; but the final decision to not accept the descent profile was not made until just prior to the switch to Washington Center.




Synopsis: Although technically legal to do so; B737-800 Captain advised ATC the flight was unable to descend 'via' the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD due to a deferred FMC component and requested an alternative arrival. His decision was based on excessive flight crew workload associated with the complex RNAV STAR's multiple speed and altitude restrictions.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the transition from arrival to instrument approach we had a temporary loss of GPS signal with localizer frequency in active causing the FMS to use dead reckoning for about 10 or so seconds before realization occurred and ATC was able to give vector back to localizer course. Increased vigilance in monitoring of navigational performance [is suggested].




Synopsis: CRJ700 First Officer experienced a loss of GPS signal during approach prior to localizer intercept which resulted in a track deviation and a vector from ATC.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD Helicopter 500/C/D/E/L
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Helicopter Control Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cruise over the Bay near the sand bar when violent high frequency shaking started.I directed the aircraft toward the shore line in a power on autorotation and maintained speed to locate safe landing place. I located a dirt road and tried to turn left into the wind but had no left turn capability so I tried right and had a little so used cyclic and the little right I had to line up with the road as I slightly turned and came in with the autorotation; near the end I was able to use slight power on for touchdown. No injuries to passengers or the aircraft and landing was uneventful.




Synopsis: MD-500 helicopter pilot experiences violent high frequency shaking during cruise flight at 2;000 feet. The ability to turn left or right is impaired but the reporter is able to line up and land safely on a dirt road.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC asked our filed route after MCKEY Intersection and assigned us a heading. We checked the flight plan against the legs page and found two fixes missing in the departure. DAISY and BENET prior to SXC on the OFFSH departure. We reloaded the correct fixes and proceeded on the route as filed.I figured out how this happened. I loaded the FMS with the [canned route] and it loaded 1R for departure. When I went to the departures and arrivals page and selected the correct Runway 1L for our flight I then reselected the OFFSH6 and saw below the transition SXC with an ACT beside it. I then was thinking OK it's already there; but apparently to get the transition complete you must reselect it again and have it show SEL beside it or it drops when you execute it with just an ACT beside it. Nice got'cha; it got me. Not again though. Please put out a Flight Operations bulletin. Please let others know about this got'cha. We and ATC corrected it before there was any significant course deviation; but we felt others needed to know before some one else was led farther astray and gets into trouble.


Second narrative: We should have compared the fixes in the box to the published fixes on the ground. Time constraints and task load were big factors at the gate. We made a runway change to the box; re-entered the departure and noticed the departure transition said 'active.' I am certain the transition did not actually load; and my failure to verify the fixes ultimately caused the deviation.


Synopsis: A B737-700 flight crew suffered a track deviation on the OFFSHORE SID; SXC transition when they unnecessarily reinstalled the SID but not the transition after changing their departure Runway 1L.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ABQ.Airport, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ABQ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ABQ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During initial climb to 9;000 departing Runway 21 we received a traffic alert as there was an airliner approaching from the west; I believe the aircraft was at 10;000 FT. Pilot flying slowed the rate of climb; am not sure of the sequence; however ATC cleared us to I believe FL200 as we were making the turn northwest bound and in that sequence; turning northwest; we heard the aircraft that was approaching from the west tell ATC they received an RA and we did as well that stated 'monitor vertical speed' however it lasted for less than 2 seconds. We did see the aircraft to our left and appeared roughly a mile away. I believe the major factors are the proximity of the ASTAH Intersection on the SID and possibly the fix that the other aircraft was going to; I can only assume that the other aircraft was flying the KRKEE1 RNAV arrival and was in the proximity of STIKI. In my opinion this will occur again due to the proximity of these 2 intersections and the climb capabilities of many aircraft; this clearly was a forecasting event which both TCAS predicted. I am not sure if there is a clear solution other than to move those two intersections or redesign the 2 procedures.




Synopsis: Corporate aircraft departing ABQ experienced a TCAS RA with an arrival aircraft; the reporter suggesting the close proximity of arrival and departure navigational fixes could be one causal factor.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Coalescer Bag
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During idle descent from 10;000 to 3;000; mild dirty socks smell only in the cockpit. Dissipated as power increased at level off. VFR; clear of clouds; over water. Tech Ops crew could still notice smell when they entered the cockpit at the gate.




Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported a 'dirty sock' fumes event during idle power descent.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had a noticeable loud howl on takeoff and initial climbout as remarked by both pilots. [We] watched both vibration indicators and all instruments normal. Climbing out of 10;000 FT and above; howling increased and engine one vibration indicator went steadily up above 4.0 to 5.0 and EGT was rapidly increasing to just below red line of approximately 910C. As pilot not flying; [I] told First Officer to pull number one back. We leveled at FL200 advising Center we might have engine problem. Asked Lead Flight Attendant to check out number one engine and had one of our pilots talk to us about vibration and howling he heard. Contacted Maintenance on Company radio and they contacted Maintenance Control. We advised we had run the QRH and Maintenance Control advised we should return to the departure airport as we were only 60 miles south. [We] returned normally to field. Maintenance called later on and they said engine was being changed out as borescope showed internal blade damages. No birds or other FOD ever encountered prior to this event. No conflicts with any other aircraft or any deviations with ATC other than telling ATC we needed to return to field only as a precautionary.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B737-400 engine developed a howling sound during climb accompanied by increased engine vibration and EGT; so the crew completed the QRH and returned to the departure airport where severe engine damage was discovered.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PBI.Tower, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C PBI
ATC / advisory: Tower PBI
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was departing Runway 10R with the intention of turning north after departure. An airliner had just departed Runway 10L. The Tower advised me to turn the crosswind; as soon as practicable but as a student pilot at the time I did not fully understand what that meant. As I climbed straight ahead; my instructor sitting in the right seat said nothing. At about 400 feet; I began to make the left turn. About 5 seconds after I completed the left turn; the airplane shook violently with what seemed to be a rapid-fire vibration. It seemed we were flying through 1000 tennis balls. We heard and felt the rapid-fire vibration. I asked my instructor what that was and he stated that the Controller advised us to turn as soon as possible. He stated that was wake turbulence.I believe that if the Controller stated; 'Make the left turn at 200 feet' (for example) it would have been more clear to me as a student pilot; what to do.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence from an air carrier aircraft after departing PBI.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We departed on Runway 18C in CLT on the CLT 1 departure.  The departure states to fly runway heading to 1.6 DME off of the CLT VOR then turn right to a heading of 200 degrees.  We set the departure up in the FMS and verified the runway was correct in the FMS.  On take off we flew the FMS course which resulted in runway heading and a turn to 200 degrees.  As we entered the turn the Captain remarked that it seemed early and upon checking in with ATC notified them we were on a 200 degree heading.  ATC acknowledged and gave us further climb instructions and vectors on course.  After reaching a safe altitude we discussed the departure and reviewed the plate again.  We then became confused with the instructions on the chart.  The chart depicts a turn on the north side of the CLT VOR so we thought our initial turn was correct because this also coincided with what the FMS showed.  We were still unsure; so the next morning the Captain contacted Mr. X to get clarification.  By the afternoon Mr. X got back in touch with the Captain; and told him that he contacted CLT ATC to get clarification on the procedure as well because he agreed it was confusing.   From what we have been told it appears that the FMS is incorrectly coded and the graphics on the chart are incorrectly depicted.  As a result we now understand that the 1.6 DME turn is to be SOUTH of the CLT VOR.  After review it was discovered the 1.6 DME to the north is approximately the center of Runway 18C; which explains why the FMS; which is coded incorrectly; gave us an early turn.  At no time did ATC express concern nor were we at any time aware of any conflict with other aircraft.  We as a crew discovered the mistake and at the time were actually unsure if we had made a mistake or not.  We as a crew decided to seek clarification and upon being made aware by the company; decided to fill out a report.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reports that the CLT 1 SID is poorly depicted and greatly confusing to crews that are not familiar with it.  The 1.6 DME turn when departing runway 18C is depicted on the north side of the VOR and it should be on the south side.  The FMC also appears to initiate the turn early. (Corrected in the June chart revision).