elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAT.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SAT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SAT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Working ILS final into Runway 13R at SAT. Moderate volume; so the final was out around 15 miles; in the vicinity for 5C1. Aircraft X on roughly a 14 mile modified left base; approximately heading 240; descending from 4;000 to 3;000 feet.  A VFR target pops off of 5C1; climbing rapidly; right into the face of Aircraft X opposite direction. As soon as I noticed; I gave Aircraft X a traffic call and an early turn to final. Before Aircraft X could start his turn; the 2 were 3;200 feet; nose to nose; less than a mile; Aircraft X descending and the VFR climbing. On the scope; it appeared that the 2 aircraft got less than 1/2 mile and 200 feet apart. A traffic alert was issued; and Aircraft X called traffic in sight. The VFR never called SAT ATC; but I continued to observe the aircraft climb northeast and become traffic for 2 other air carriers around 8;800 feet. One GOBBY Departure also needed a traffic alert for the same aircraft. This is far too common of an occurrence. We need to make it compulsory for aircraft departing 5C1; climbing above 2500; to contact SAT Approach Control. Due to the location of 5C1 and its vicinity to the 13R final approach course; to not do so is to jeopardize the safely of aircraft on the instrument approaches into our most commonly used runway.




Synopsis: SAT TRACON Controller reported an unidentified VFR target departed an airport in the vicinity of the final approach course and into confliction with air carrier arrivals.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approximately 40 minutes prior to planned departure; we received a final Dangerous Goods summary after preliminary ACARS initialization. Although it indicated 'final Dangerous Goods summary' it contained the exact format and information as the planned Dangerous Goods summary see FOM. Specifically; it did not contain bullet point referenced in FOM (Hazmat loaded by section). I called Dispatch and in coordination with load planning they advised us to wait until closer to departure to see if a correct final summary was sent to the aircraft. Approximately 10 minutes prior to departure we again made contact and were advised to wait the final weights were sent. The final weights were sent; and the final summary as described in FOM did not come to the aircraft. After another contact; the correct 'final Dangerous Goods summary' was sent 4 minutes after scheduled departure. My concern is there were two 'final Dangerous Goods summary' notifications with different information sent to the aircraft. Please see [Report] for the same condition. Thanks




Synopsis: B-787 Captain reported a communications breakdown between fight crew and Dispatch regarding Final Dangerous Good summary which contained errors and delivered to the aircraft after scheduled departure.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On flight from ZZZ- ZZZ1 we were in cruise at FL260; just about to begin our descent when the Captain and I both smelled a strong burning odor (electrical burning smell) in the flight deck. We called the Flight Attendant and she said that she smelled something burning as well. We had no indications of any abnormalities on EICAS. We performed the memory items for cockpit fire/smoke/fumes and then followed that by running the EPC. We notified the Flight Attendant and [advised] with ATC. We landed at ZZZ1 and were met by CFR. The odor seemed to have dissipated on the descent and landing.The aircraft was turned over to maintenance. The fire department could find no trace of any burning or smoke. We followed the procedure for cockpit fumes. Due to the surrounding weather and our close proximity to our destination airport continuing to ZZZ having completed the appropriate procedure is about all we could do at that time.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported 'strong burning odor' during initial descent. Fight crew advised ATC and landed uneventfully.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GYR.Airport, AZ
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Narrative: In the course of a bi-annual flight review; I think I may have descended below the altitude instructed by the tower at Goodyear Airport (GYR). The instructor on board conducting the flight review had requested a demonstration of a touch and go landing at GYR and a transition to Glendale Airport (GLE); 7 miles away; for a full stop landing.While climbing out of GYR on runway 21; I requested a transition to GEU and the controller approved the transition request and advised making a left hand departure and climb to 2500. I climbed to 2500 on the left crosswind leg and was going to clear the Delta airspace on the crosswind leg; however the CFI requested to fly directly to GEU. Outside the normal traffic pattern I turned on a downwind leg toward GEU. Intent on getting the GEU ATIS and checking the distance to GEU and the new tower frequency and preparing to change frequency I noted I had inadvertently permitted my altitude drop approximately 2200 feet and appeared this happened while still inside the GYR Class D airspace. Leaving the GYR Class D airspace and getting clearance into GEU Class D airspace happen to occur over a very short period of time as did the descent to GEU pattern Altitude. Lesson learned: I should have not let myself be intimidated by the CFI conducting the BFR; and exercised my prerogative; BFR or not; as pilot in command and flew out of the GYR airspace at the ATC requested altitude to a position that would have provided a suitable amount of time to descend and enter the GEU Class D airspace in a more organized and timely manner.




Synopsis: Commercial pilot on a flight review was instructed by ATC to hold 2;500 feet. While setting up for an airspace transition; the pilot inadvertently descended to 2;200 feet.
Date: 201712
Location: MROC.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: From the departure end of runway 07; it is approximately 1.5 nm to the 4 DME fix turning point. The procedure requires a 25 degree bank turn. If you lose an engine on takeoff; where do you accelerate to V2 + 15; when the profile is to climb at V2? And what altitude you are going to attain at that point? It seems that in order to accomplish this procedure; you will be extremely close to the ground with minimal or no altitude gain and likely to hit the obstacle(s) depicted.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported concern about the safety of the engine out takeoff/climb procedure for Runway 07 at MROC.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LEX.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 6
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C LEX
ATC / advisory: TRACON LEX; Tower LEX
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At XA:42 we departed LEX direct to ZZZ on a southeast heading. Over the air-to-air frequency; Aircraft Y announced their position as 15 miles southeast of Lexington. We informed Aircraft Y of our departure from Bluegrass and departing on a southeast heading. Approximately one minute later we changed from tower to departure frequency and were alerted by departure control of the inbound aircraft. Simultaneously; the crew was in contact with [Ops.] announcing our departure from LEX (I had pin 3 turned off during departure.) The crew was not informed of the inbound aircraft by [Ops.] At approximately XA:45 Lexington departure updated the location of the inbound aircraft. By this point one searchlight; the position lights; and the strobe lights had been turned on; but visual contact had yet to be established. Aircraft Y announced over air-to-air that they would descend to 1800 feet and I replied that we would climb to 2200 feet. Visual contact was established - and confirmed with Aircraft Y - approximately 1 mile out and our paths crossed directly; resulting in roughly 400 feet separation. The TCAS was not functional in this aircraft. The specific reason has yet to be determined; but this failure was accepted as 'normal' by the crew because of a misunderstanding the functionality basics of TCAS. It was explained away as only working in 'certain' airspace environments (i.e. Class B airspace). Upon review of this incident; my research has shown otherwise; thus indicating an equipment failure. This incident suggests the possibility of a systemic issue of unfamiliarity with the function of TCAS and similar non-functioning systems in other aircraft. It is my recommendation that information be disseminated to all crews briefly explaining that TCAS is not dependent upon ground equipment and any failure to identify other aircraft is due to degradation of equipment. Also contributory to this event was the failure of company flight over watch [Ops.] to alert crews of close proximity.




Synopsis: Pilot of a medical mission helicopter reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the vicinity of LEX. Reporter commented the TCAS seemed to be malfunctioning.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: When power was advanced for takeoff; configuration warning occurred; power was retarded; we cleared the runway; corrected the situation and returned for takeoff.




Synopsis: B757-200 pilot reported rejecting the takeoff when they received a configuration warning as power was advanced.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Rotor Hub
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During autorotation training the student pilot undergoing AS350 training allowed the rotor speed to build to a point the high rotor alarm was triggered. Both the student and instructor observed a peak rotor of less than 430 RPM; however; the maintenance page of the VEMD read a peak of 458; which required a major inspection of components IAW the Airbus Maintenance Manual. Erroring on the side of safety it was decided to go with the worse case scenario and send the components in for inspection.




Synopsis: AS350 Instructor reported that during autorotation training; the rotor was oversped; requiring a major inspection for components.
Date: 201509
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I am writing to bring a charting issue to your attention on the new SFO DYAMD2 STAR. The published altitude and speed restriction at ARCHI intersection is 7;000 feet and 230 kts. On the ILS 28R; the published altitude at ARCHI intersection is also 7;000 feet. First; we are being told by our flight department that ARCHI intersection at 7;000 feet is BELOW the current floor of the SFO Class B airspace.  If this is true; then the published speed of 230 kts. at ARCHI is in direct violation to the 200 kt. speed limit below Class B airspace. If ARCHI at 7;000 feet is below the floor of the Class B airspace; why would there be a published altitude on a STAR that would put an airplane below the floor of the Class B airspace? I have also learned that the floor of the SFO Class B airspace was supposed to have been lowered from 8;000 feet to 7;000 feet with the introduction of the DYAMD2 STAR; but supposedly that has yet to happen. If this is true; then it will take care of the speed limit issue.The other main issue is that on the DYAMD2; ARCHI is listed at 7;000 feet; and on the FMS Bridge Visual approach; the published altitude at ARCHI is 8;000 feet. This is creating confusion between pilots and ATC when given a 'Descend Via' clearance. Most of the time SFO ATC uses the FMS Bridge Visual approach; which causes confusion regarding the correct altitude at ARCHI. The ATC Center gives pilots the clearance to 'Descend Via the DYAMD2 STAR' which has 7;000 feet as the bottom altitude; but then as you are descending on the arrival; the SFO ATC Approach controller then clears you only to 8;000 feet; thereby increasing the work load and chances of busting a speed or altitude restriction. So; in order to relieve any confusion; publishing the same altitude at ARCHI on all approach plates and STARS would be much better. This would alleviate any question about the speed limit issue below the Class B airspace; as well as have all the altitudes at ARCHI all be the same. I have also been informed that the STARs are basically created for transitions for instrument approaches; and not visual approaches. This does hold true because the altitude for ARCHI on the DYAMD2 and on the ILS 28R are both 7;000 feet. However; It would be much easier for both pilots and ATC if all the altitudes for ARCHI intersection were all the same on all the STARs and approach plates; no matter whether they are visual or instrument approaches.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported the SFO DYAMD2 STAR may have some errors related to Class B floor.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: After departure; flight crew sent me an ACARS message: 'call me 7700'I attempted a phone patch; the phone rang several times; but then disconnected. I dialed the frequency again and was successful in contacting the crew. Crew reported EICAS message: 'Right engine fuel filter'; and flight manual required landing at nearest suitable airport.  Flight returned to [the departure airport]. Reason for this report is I should not need to dial twice to make contact with crew via radio. Either the phone system is still not working properly (most likely) or Commercial Radio frequency is not reliable. I should not have to worry about phone reliability during an emergency.




Synopsis: Dispatcher was unable on first attempt to contact flight crew that was experiencing an emergency.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Second aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was driving [a Super Tug with an observer]. We were dispatched and told it was a hot move. We waited for the ramp to finish and hooked up to the plane. I called ramp tower for clearance once we went wheels-up. Ramp tower cleared us to the North Spot. I thought this was odd but decided I could get the plane off of the gate behind the airplane at the south spot without incident. I completed my turn in the alley and was on the centerline. The ramp tower advised me to continue coming back to allow inbound traffic into the gate. My observer had the TTWS (Tow Team Warning System) wands and I was on the centerline. I decided it was safe to go as far as I could. At no time was I alerted that my wingtips were in proximity to another aircraft. Ramp tower told me I was back far enough. I contacted [my observer] and told him we were good. I spun my chair and waited for [the observer] to enter the tug. [The observer] advised me that 'our wing went over the tail (horizontal stabilizer)' of the 787 [at the adjacent gate]. We tried several things to get the aircraft out of the alley. Eventually; it was determined to move the 737 [at a nearby gate] forward to give me wingtip clearance. (I had to maneuver my tug left of the centerline to clear my wingtip from the 787. The move was completed without any further incident.




Synopsis: Super Tug Driver reported being advised of ground conflict with parked aircraft after tow completion.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I accidentally took off on Runway XY instead of Runway YX. I was holding short of XX/XY at intersection B. I was cleared to take off; and thought I need to double check the runway because this takeoff intersection is unusual as my plane is stored at the FBO on the other side of the runway. When I was cleared to takeoff; ZZZ also had a much larger plane cleared to taxi to YX. I usually try to be curious to the larger aircraft at ZZZ because we have a large diversity of operators and types at this airport. I didn't double check my heading with the runway as I normally do because I 'self-rushed' even though there was no need to have hurried. I think I subconsciously took the clue from the YX-XY runway identifier sign and turned towards the YX numbers which instruct the pilot what direction to turn to get to the YX approach end. This had me turned around. I caught my own mistake once airborne. At that time I apologized to the Tower Controller and asked how I should maneuver to fix my mistake. I will also say that currency and proficiency may be an issue here. Normally by this time of year I would have had over to 20 hours under my belt; Because of COVID-19; I only had 8.




Synopsis: Pilot reported taking off in the wrong runway direction.