elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Fluid was discovered on the bottom of the Number two engine cowl during the exterior inspection. There was also fluid that had accumulated on the ground as the aircraft sat overnight. The engine drain mast showed no signs of fluid leakage. A log item was entered and Maintenance was contacted. I was waiting outside when Maintenance arrived at the aircraft. As the Mechanic approached the engine; he immediately stated that the fluid on the ground was old and not significant in quantity. I showed him the fluid that was on the bottom of the cowl and stated that I believed the fluid on the ground was fresh from this aircraft's engine. His tone was extremely condescending and dismissive as he stated that this was completely normal for these engines. I explained to him that I was required to inform Maintenance of the defect and that in my experience this was not normal for the Airbus. As I began to return to the cockpit; he stated (without any inspection) that the fluid was due to an over service of the engine. The Mechanic followed me to the cockpit where the discussion continued in the presence of the Captain. The Mechanic was clearly irritated that I had entered the log item and that I disagreed with his assessment of the source of the leaking fluid. He then abruptly left the cockpit and returned to the Maintenance area. Shortly before pushback we received the MRD. The log item was signed off as 'Inspected Number 2 Engine; no leaks noted'. It is important to note that the Mechanic never wiped the fluid from engine cowl; never opened the engine cowl; and never did any kind of inspection. He signed it off as 'no leaks noted' even though he admitted to both me and the Captain that there was fluid on the ground and on the bottom of the engine cowl. After pushback during the engine start; the Number two generator failed to come on line automatically. I was able to bring the generator on manually; but was concerned that these two items may be related. Upon arrival in ZZZZ I inspected the engine and found the underside completely soaked in fluid as well as fluid already beginning to accumulate on the ground. The outbound crew was briefed.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer discovers fluid leaking from the Number two engine during preflight and contacts Maintenance. The Maintenance Technician states that the small leak is normal and signs off the logbook with 'Inspected Number 2 Engine; no leaks noted' without opening the engine cowl or wiping down the fluid on the bottom of the cowl.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Cleared by Approach from a base leg for 8L to descend to 1500 feet and turn inbound to intercept final approach course. We were advised of traffic in front of us and to follow. We were not cautioned that it was a heavy and no caution of wake turbulence. At this point we were only told he was 4 miles in front of us. I saw him and the runway and we were cleared for the visual. I could see he was ahead and below us. As we turned and descended we slowed and got flaps in. [The Captain] was just about to brief that he was going to stay high when we hit the wake turbulence. We were still on the autopilot and the aircraft was upset to a sharp right bank. Because of the loss of lift we descended even more and were now pointed about 45 degrees to the right. They were also landing on 9. [The Captain] quickly disengaged the autopilot; added power; and climbed back towards the direction of our runway. As a result we got an RA to descend back down. We responded and I immediately alerted Tower that we were responding to an RA as a result of the deviation caused by the wake turbulence. We were assigned a further climb and heading to re-sequence us for another arrival. There were many aircraft within the whole time frame that were commenting to Approach and Tower that they couldn't maintain the high speeds ATC was asking for. Another aircraft performed a go around. Completely unrelated to us. After the fact; we realized that ATC was keeping everyone fast and close and we realized that they did not give us the proper separation nor warning of the heavy in front of us. I feel ATC was completely at fault for this occurrence. We had a wake turbulence encounter that never should have happened. We performed the way we are supposed to for avoidance and we were put in a dangerous situation. In hindsight; if I had known the turn behind the heavy was assigned at an unsafe distance; I would have requested a longer downwind to increase separation. We assumed that ATC was doing their job.




Synopsis: BE-400 First Officer reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence on approach to MIA. Reporter stated the Tower did not warn them of possible wake encounter.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC assigned a vector '[Heading] 140 and maintain 3;000 ft. until established on localizer....' As Pilot Monitoring I heard the vector and maintain 2;000 ft. until established. Captain heard 2;000 ft. as well and entered 2;000 ft. I read back 2;000 ft. to the controller. The Captain briefed and all checklist items were briefed prior to this event. The Captain flew through the localizer due to his failure to move the localizer frequency from Standby to Primary. He quickly recognized it and visually maneuvered aircraft back toward course. We received a Terrain Alert and we discussed to shallow our intercept angle. The course was intercepted safely. The controller transmitted that the altitude was 3;000 ft. until established. We were at approximately 2;000 ft. at that time. I transmitted that we had heard '2;000 ft. until established' and read that back to him earlier. We maintained 2;000 ft. until glideslope intercept. We landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: Beautiful day; 30 mile visibility; clear skies; airport in sight 30 miles away. Routine departure from ZZZ. At altitude; we were given direct to a fix and descend to 3;000 ft. Approaching the fix estimating 5;000 ft. altitude ATC gave us a clearance: 'Left turn of (EST) about 30 degrees and intercept localizer' which was inside of the fix 'and descend to 2;000 ft.' The First Officer clearly repeated to ATC '2;000 ft.' and no ATC correction was said. I set 2;000 ft. in the altitude alerter and pointed at it until the First Officer repeated '2;000 ft. A slight north wind caused my track just slightly south of center line of final; well within reason; estimate one dot right. As I was correcting and back on centerline the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning) sounded; when back on center line the GPWS stopped. The hill was always in sight and we were never left of center line; never was there any danger. At that moment ATC asked if we had the airport in sight and we said yes. ATC cleared us for a visual approach to the runway and said our clearance was only to 3;000 ft. Uneventful landing. I clearly heard and after discussion; the First Officer also clearly heard '2;000 ft.""


Synopsis: Flight Crew reported they read back to ATC descend to 2000 feet when ATC meant 3000 feet and then flew through the localizer and received a Ground Proximity Warning.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RJJJ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center RJJJ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: 'I signed in as PIC to relieve [the] Captain. We were cruising at FL410 southbound on R220 with strong quartering headwinds (~220/184) and occasional chop. There was an aircraft at FL400 approximately 20 NM ahead on R220 southbound. When it became apparent that we would be overtaking the aircraft ahead; we discussed offsetting to the right to prevent wake turbulence encounter for the aircraft below us but considering that the winds were from the right; we concluded it would be best to maintain centerline.  Approximately 3NM from the aircraft below; we noticed the aircraft was experiencing altitude oscillations of 200-300 feet due to turbulence. We also began to experience some turbulence with slightly lower oscillations. I requested 2NM offset to the right and the First Officer executed the offset.  While overtaking the aircraft past position NOGAL; we received a TCAS 'Traffic; Traffic' alert followed by an RA 'Maintain Level'. I disconnected the autopilot and complied with the RA. Once cleared of conflict; I requested for left autopilot and continued to complete the offset.  In hindsight; one option I neglected was an attempt to coordinate on 123.45 with the aircraft ahead to see if he would be willing to offset to the right so as to avoid our wake and prevent a possible TCAS event due to turbulence. Another option could have been to perhaps attempt to coordinate with RJJJ via CPDLC. Although; the decision to maintain centerline was made based on safety concerns for the other aircraft; I now see that it would have been much safer to offset 2 miles and avoid the RA and possibly a worse case of altitude separation loss due to worse turbulence than we encountered.




Synopsis: B747 Captain reported receiving a TCAS RA on an oceanic flight when his aircraft experienced altitude deviations due to turbulence; possibly wake-induced in RJJJ airspace.
Date: 201705
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Manuals
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: On two separate days of my previous trip I could not access [my EFB contents manager app] on my iPad. During my initial preflight planning I noticed [the EFB contents manager] updated over 150 items and assumed it worked. I had to divert on my last trip from landing in ZZZ and a windshear go around and on the way to ZZZ1 I tried to open the QRH for the diversion guide to no avail. Nothing in [my EFB contents manager] would open. Today I was again preflight planning for a flight to start another trip and [my EFB contents manager application] again updated everything. I tried to open something but again nothing opened. I spent the better part of 30 minutes of my preflight planning updating; installing; rebooting; hard rebooting; uninstalling [my EFB contents manager app] and installing yet again. For now it appears to be working. What a great idea to do away with our emergency paper checklists!




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported difficulties with his EFB contents manager application. He was unable to access required and necessary information during flight and spent excessive time booting; installing; uninstalling; and rebooting the EFB contents manager application.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C OAK
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: NORCAL put me on a 020 vector (toward higher terrain) and cleared me 'at or below 3;100 FT.' I saw no reason to climb as landing was a few minutes away. I slowed down to play for time as I awaited the command to turn left. Hearing none; I turned so as to avoid terrain. Subsequently; the Controller chewed me out for doing so. I expressed my disappointment of being headed into the mountains. What if it were real IMC? Controllers need to pay better attention to the aircraft they handle. Pilots should not have to disobey vectors to save their lives.




Synopsis: BE55 pilot at 2;500 FT reports turning without clearance from NCT to avoid terrain north northeast of OAK due to the perception that terrain was a factor. Reporter was receiving vectors from NCT in day VMC.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I'm getting checked out on the 787. We were flying the GIBBZ 2 RNAV arrival HVQ transition into IAD. While flying the arrival between OTTTO and RYPIN; the aircraft (787) required full speed brake extension to make the crossing restriction at MAAAY which we just made. This [report] is being sent to highlight the fact that the 787 has a high probability of missing the crossing restraints on the GIBBZ 2 arrival if the tailwind is stronger or if the plane is slower (closer to max lift over drag speed). For planning purposes the 787 flies closer to a 4 to 1 ratio verses 3 to 1 on other aircraft. Distance from OTTTO to MAAAY is 7.1 miles in which the plane has to descend 2000 ft. Additional distance is also required for the auto flight system to transition from level flight into the descent phase and back. I strongly suggest changing the distance between the points or the amount of altitude between these points.




Synopsis: Boeing 787 Captain reported difficulty in meeting crossing restrictions on arrival due to the aircraft's increased glide ratio.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I would like to address what I consider to be a safety concern in the fleet; the fuel loads presented to the PIC as inadequate on the dispatch release. I am hoping that a comprehensive examination (and subsequent change) of our practices and procedures will ensue.I was presented with a release for a Flight with a landing fuel load less than safe. This is unacceptable. This event precipitated this report; however; the issue is systemic and is not isolated to this flight.When I started [at this company] over four years ago; it was unheard of to plan to land with less than 7000 lbs of fuel (as is the case at [other carriers]). A couple of years ago that was reduced further. It was then reduced even further. Now; it appears that dispatch considers this new amount 'preferred' and 5000 LBS landing fuel 'minimum.' Why are we planning to land with fuel loads that other company captains refuse? And why are we planning to land with fuel loads that an in-house captain would have refused 24 months ago? It is worth noting that many of my company captains simply order additional fuel by speaking to the fueler and do not contact dispatch. Although this is convenient and easy; I believe it masks a fundamental risk in our current operation and needs to be discussed in detail.Allow me to recommend; Minimum fuel for landing at destination AND alternate airports should be at higher levels. Additional fuel should be carried when dispatched to an airport with only one usable runway (physical runway; not different ends of the same piece of pavement.) This should be irrespective of weather at said airport. The burn profiles of our fleet need to be evaluated. Burn numbers should include approach/enroute/departure vectoring allowances; and other items listed as anticipated. Routing to the alternate needs to be shown on the release.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain reported being given a release with an amount of fuel he considers unsafe and indicates this is a systemic company-wide issue.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Engine Driven System 'A' Hydraulic failure. (System 'A' Engine Driven Hydraulic Low Pressure light on; hydraulic light on system annunciator panel; and master caution light.) Ran checklist for event. Also; thoroughly reviewed and discussed total System 'A' failure just in case. While at cruise at FL370; we got the above indications; which were preceded by rapid drop in System 'A' quantity to about 18%. Ran checklist; talked to Dispatch; and requested that ATC notify [divert destination] to have emergency crews standing by just in case the malfunction evolved into a full System 'A' failure.Initially Dispatch told us to proceed to [diversion airport option 1] then about 15 minutes later Dispatch instructed us to divert to [diversion airport option 2]. We discussed other possibilities should the emergency continue to get worse - it didn't. Got vectors; configured a little early and normally; which was uneventful. Landing was uneventful. Taxied back to gate but Captain noticed that when finer steering inputs were required that the aircraft was sluggish. Decided to stop aircraft and be towed to the gate. The System 'A' hydraulic system had three previous writeups of hydraulics needing service and aircraft notations that hydraulic quantity dropping quickly. Maintenance did do an engine run and had us cycle flight controls. No leak detected. Not sure what more could have been done.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported failure of Engine Driven Hydraulic System A. They declared an emergency and diverted to a suitable nearby airport for a safe landing.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on climb-out at about 39;000 FT; I was filling out the logbook; looked up and noticed the airspeed was low. I informed the Captain of the speed. He disconnected the autopilot and lowered nose to gain airspeed back.I informed ATC of our intentions. We descended 1;000 FT and regained normal airspeed. I believe the mode had changed in the FMS and we did not realize the change.




Synopsis: B737 flight crew failed to notice loss of airspeed during climb. When airspeed decay was eventually noticed; corrective action was implemented and ATC was informed of deviation.