elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During my briefing with FAs I communicated that masks were not going to be worn while in the cockpit; at any phase of the operation by me or my First Officer and that we were going to keep cockpit door closed while on the ground and no visitors.At that time FA A proceeded to instruct me about her own requirements to visit the cockpit; if pilots didn't have a mask...pilots will not speak while she's in the cockpit and if they needed to; it would be only facing forward and not facing her at all.I immediately told her that her demands were not part of any policy or procedure stated in any company publishing and that it was not going to be granted.FA A's attitude was very receptive and she conducted herself in a very nice and respectful manner.As I was deplaning the plane in ZZZ; FA A and Chief Purser called my attention to the screen of the Purser's cell phone; stating that it was a note from my Flight Duty Manager showing that masks must be worn during flight attendant's visits to the cockpit regardless.I suggested them to file a report because I had no time to go over their claim as I had just few minutes to go to our next flight.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a Flight Attendant did not agree with the Captain not wearing a mask in the cockpit.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: First Officer decided it was the right time and right place holding short of a runway to cross to get out of airplane mode and check his phone messages. Did not even tell the Captain what he was doing as I was looking another way and was not aware he was not paying attention to our present position and to call out any deviations.Waiting to cross the runway; ATC did not clear us behind another aircraft to cross a runway at the same time so we had to wait for two airplanes to land. It was at this time the First Officer decided it was the right time to check his phone.Our pilot groups are being hired from CFI's and they have had no other real jobs that teach them how to be professionals. They assume that [company] is a stepping stone and not taken serious until they get to the majors or the better job. At this rate; they do not care for our policy's and tend to disregard them and assume that all Captains are okay with them being on their cellphones as we block out hold short of a runway and that is perfectly fine for them to social media check. Suggestion is that there needs to be a reminder of NOT USING CELLPHONES any time after block out to block in.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported that the First Officer failed to follow FARs and company policy by looking at his cell phone while on an active taxiway and during sterile cockpit.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Other After the fact
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Responding to a Dispatcher's inquiry on how to properly apply OpSpec B043; I discovered a flight may have been released inappropriately using B043. The flight in question; operating in North Pacific Airspace along A590; would not have been able to reliably fix its position; at least once each hour; along the entire route. The dispatch release shows 45 minutes of reserve fuel; indicating that no area along the route of flight was excluded from modified reserve fuel calculation. Upon further inquiries; it appears that there may have been discussions between Dispatch personnel and operations management that may have led to a misinterpretation of the rule. The belief appears to have been; OpSpec B050 allows the use of B043 relief in the North Pacific area of operations. This may have led to the interpretation that B043 could be applied to the entire planned route of flight through the North Pacific. To prevent this from happening in the future; I would suggest that the operations management team review the appropriate operation specifications and the related guidance material to gain a complete understanding of OpSpec B043. Detailed processes and procedures for dispatchers and pilots should be developed and documented in the appropriate company Dispatch Manuals to ensure OpSpec B043 is applied appropriately. In addition; all dispatchers and pilots should be briefed and/or trained on any new procedures.




Synopsis: While researching a question from another Dispatcher the reporter discovered that--a few days earlier--a transpacific flight had been dispatched under aegis of FAA 'Operations Specification (OpSpec) B043' which allows the use of a hybrid mix of domestic and International fuel reserve requirements but is predicated on being able to precisely fix their position at least once each hour. In the instant case that degree of precision had not been possible for the entire flight and; thus; those portions of the flight during which such precision was not possible the appropriate international reserves had to have been aboard. The calculated reserve fuel on board had been just 45 minutes; consistent with precise navigation 100% of the flight.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BFI.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D BFI
ATC / advisory: Tower BFI
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On takeoff; as we were cleaning the airplane up; PF looking out the Heads Up Display (HUD) and ahead; PNF cleaning up flaps; the [small aircraft] appeared to drift into our departure path. We had been given notice of the closely matching tail number and that he had just departed. We had him in sight as he departed; but our speed rapidly caught up to them after takeoff.After we departed; he had drifted into our departure path and at 500 feet; we needed to turn 30 degrees to our right to avoid a collision. We passed within 100 feet (our wingspan) and at his altitude.Tower was trying hard to get him to move; but their mic had broken at just that time and while they were replacing the mic another controller was also broadcasting for the [small aircraft] to move back left. We were hearing those transmissions. Tower sometimes splits controllers between the two parallel runways so we weren't hearing transmissions to the [small aircraft] until this occurred.As we went into our turn; the [small aircraft] started their turn to the left.In [all my] years of flying; this is as close as I've come to a collision. I was just cleaning up the airplane as PNF and when I looked up and out; the windshield was 3/4 full of another airplane's wing.




Synopsis: BD700 Captain reported an NMAC with a small aircraft on departure at BFI.
Date: 201905
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While performing a slide installation on [aircraft] over wing; noticed deploy cable loose. Upon further inspection found hoses kinked & collapsed along with deflation valves flapper assemblies damaged. Also found dry rot spots. Part being returned to stores as bad from stock.




Synopsis: B757 Aircraft Technician reported slide components found damaged during installation.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ2.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other UAS
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I departed ZZZ with my PPL student for his second cross-country flight; destination ZZZ1. We departed runway XX with a downwind departure to the East. Climbing through 4;000 feet; I decided to get flight following due to low visibility in haze. I had just contacted [approach] and was halfway through my request when I noticed engine roughness. I immediately pitched for best glide speed; applied carb heat; and turned back toward ZZZ with just enough engine power to maintain altitude. The carb heat had no effect. I informed approach of my situation; and they were able to locate me without a unique squawk code. The controller told me the location of the airport (though I already had it in sight) and asked me to call them when we were safely on the ground. I was able to maintain an altitude of 4;000 feet and navigated directly over ZZZ. I made a call on the CTAF informing all traffic that I had engine problems; and asked them to yield. An aircraft on approach to runway XY broke off and exited the pattern. Winds were light; so I chose to spiral down over the numbers for XX and join the right downwind. I was able to land without incident; and taxi back to the FBO where I noticed that oil was leaking down the nose gear strut. Upon inspection by the mechanic on site; I had thrown a rod in the number 3 cylinder. Oil temperature and pressure were both normal for the duration of the flight. The cylinder was replaced and the aircraft has been returned to service.




Synopsis: Instructor Pilot reported an air turn back caused by engine problems.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-23 Apache/Geronimo Apache
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on short final for XXR at ZZZ when an aircraft was lining up to land for the wrong runway; they were supposed to be making left traffic for XXL. The other aircraft was told to make a left turn to the northeast heading 040 by Tower. The aircraft makes a right turn which puts him on a head on course with my aircraft; requiring me to take the controls from the student and make evasive maneuvers; a diving right turn away from final coming within a couple hundred feet of the trees on final for XXR. Prior to and while entering the pattern. [Tower] had made multiple calls directing the other aircraft because he was not in the proper positions entering and flying the traffic pattern. I was on alert to locate the traffic prior to entering the and in the pattern. Just after turning final I had the other aircraft in sight. This is when the Controller radioed the other aircraft to make the turn to 040 because he was in conflict with me. Luckily I already had him insight and was able to maneuver to avoid them.




Synopsis: PA23 flight instructor reported NMAC with an aircraft on a head-on course in the pattern.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: Citation III; VI; VII (C650)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I de-combined sectors and received Aircraft X. Under the new implementation of STARS; when a sector is decombined; restricted areas show inactive on a local geography display regardless of its actual status. I was unaware that when a position is decombined that a supervisor must run a new macro to show the correct status of the restricted area.This was not done and the restricted area showed inactive above 3;000 feet on the decombined scope only. Not being aware of this issue; I put Aircraft X on a vector at 8;000 feet through the restricted area that I believed was not active. The receiving controller had the correct local geography display on his scope showing it was active and advised me. I issued an immediate turn to the aircraft and the aircraft went about a mile into the restricted area in his turn. The status of this deficiency in the latest STARS implementation has not been disseminated to all controllers and after this event I was told this is a known issue and the same type of event has occurred more than onceEven though I am told the problem will be fixed in the next implementation; it still needs to be disseminated to the controllers so they are aware that the local geography display on their scope may be incorrect if a new macro has not been run concurrent with decombining a position.




Synopsis: PCT Supervisor reported failing to not make the correct system macro entries after de-combining a sector. The Restricted Area status displayed not in use on the Controller's radar display when it was actually in use. The Controller allowed an aircraft to enter the Restricted Area.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were assigned the TRUP RNAV STAR into DCA in our MD80. We initiated the profile descent using GPS VDI in VS mode; however; the VDI guidance had us high on the first hard crossing altitude so I reverted to manual (human brain) vertical guidance to complete the arrival. My observation and concern for safety is that this type of procedure requires a total heads down operation and the pilot flying is almost completely removed from traffic watch; systems monitering etc. If anything were to happen during the intense VNAV operation of trying to make all the stupid crossing and speed restrictions; chances are great the anomalies would go unobserved.I suggest we have the guys who design procedures get in the lowest common denominator aircraft; test fly the procedure and evaluate the safety ramifications prior to publishing. The designers must ask ordinary users on both sides of the radar screen if changes are reasonable; necessary and safe.




Synopsis: After abandoning autoflight due to its inability to comply with the altitude constraints on the TRUPS RNAV STAR to DCA an MD-80 Captain expressed his belief the STAR (and other RNAV STARS of similar complexity) are incompatible with rudimentary RNAV systems such as those installed on his aircraft.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 350
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After Departure; while climbing in icing conditions and climb or takeoff thrust selected; we received a 'WING ANTI ICE LEAK' red EICAS message with associated Master Warning and triple chimes. I was flying pilot and assumed radio communications; while the captain began running the checklist. During this time; the warning message disappeared and was replaced by 'R WING ANTI-ICE FAIL; L WING ANTI-ICE FAIL; R ENG THRUST FAULT; and L ENG THRUST FAULT'. The original checklist allowed us to turn the anti-ice back on at some point and it continued to work fault free. We elected to divert and wrote up the aircraft. After landing and while writing up the aircraft; the Captain relayed a conversation with the Bombardier representative that receiving this message is a known issue with the engines at high power settings due to the volume of bleed air available. I heard the word 'normal' used but don't want to put words in anyone's mouth. This is an issue that needs to be worked out. A master warning should NEVER stem from a known issue. We were flying an obstacle Departure in icing conditions relying on a system that failed due to a design fault. While we did not notify ATC of an emergency; that fact exists because ATC was informed of the situation and assigned a higher altitude out of icing conditions. A successful outcome was further enhanced by a crew that was able to automatically assign and communicate task assignments immediately upon digestion of the situation. Both of us were relatively new to the aircraft but have extensive experience in other aircraft as well as airline experience. It is still a major problem that a known issue throws us a potential emergency during a high workload phase of flight. This known issue could easily result in an undesirable outcome if replayed by a fatigued or more inexperienced crew.




Synopsis: CL-350 First Officer reported receiving warning messages for anti-ice and engine thrust while climbing through icing conditions.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Phenom 300
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Design
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In the cruise/descent portion of the flight we were cleared to 12;000 ft MSL and on an assigned heading of 245 degrees. I was the Flying Pilot (PIC) occupying the left seat. The First Officer stated that he was going to leave comm 1 to contact [FBO] at the airport on comm 2 and I confirmed the 'transfer' of the radios stating I had comm 1. The First Officer was on comm 2 for approximately 1 minute; all the while I was monitoring comm 1. Once my First Officer stopped his communication on comm 2; tower stated our call sign and I responded. ATC stated that they tried 3 attempts to reach us. This was the first and only time I heard ATC. This was the result of the radio/comm setup in the Phenom. When the non-flying pilot utilizes comm 2 and broadcasts; it 'blocks' the ability for the other pilot to hear ATC. Once we were established in communication my First Officer stated that at times when utilizing the comm 2 Radio it will 'block' out the comm. 1 Radio; which was the case in this flight.There needs to be a radio modification of sort to remedy the 'blocked' comm 1 radio on this fleet as this is posing some issues.




Synopsis: During cruise; the flight crew of an Embraer 505 experienced communication issues when the First Officer used comm 2 inadvertently blocking the use of comm 1.