elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TOA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D TOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Sea
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was receiving vectors to final for an ILS approach. Approach clearance call was something like: 'Fly a heading of 250 to intercept the localizer. Cleared ILS 29R circle to land 11L. Maintain 2;000 FT until established on the localizer.' No mention was given to intercepting the glideslope; or being established on the ILS. Conditions at that point were visual except for a small cloud between me and the airport. Upon intercepting the localizer (laterally); and being in visual conditions; my thinking was that I was cleared to descend at my discretion since no mention was made to intercepting the glideslope. I assumed that the Controller was aware I was in visual conditions; and I had always previously been cleared for an ILS approach with wording such as; 'Maintain 2;000 FT until intercepting glideslope'; or 'Maintain 2;000 FT until established on the ILS'. After a brief descent; Controller asked me to state my altitude; which at that time was 1;800 FT. He told me entry to the approach was at 2;000 FT. I affirmed back that I was correcting; and climbed back up to 2;000; at which point I was then a bit above the glideslope. This then caused a more rapid attempt to correct back to glideslope; with a brief overshoot; prompting a low altitude warning from the Controller. This was also rapidly corrected; at which point the Controller handed me over to Tower.Confusion arose due to the language of; 'Maintain 2;000 FT until established on the localizer'. While I know that I was cleared for the ILS; which means maintain the glideslope; during that process-intensive phase of flight; I just jumped to assume he meant established on the localizer to mean just that-laterally on the localizer (as the localizer provides no vertical guidance). A more precise phraseology; such as; 'Maintain 2;000 FT until established on the ILS'; or 'maintain 2;000 FT until established on the localizer and intercepting glideslope' would be more intuitive and prevent such erroneous thinking.




Synopsis: DA40 pilot reports being confused when cleared for the ILS and to maintain 2;000 FT until established in VMC and starts descending before glideslope intercept.
Date: 201507
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center MMEX
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Flight to MMMX experienced an ACARS outage and was unable to be contacted from dispatch around 280 NM NE of MMMX until on the ground.  About 25 ACARS test messages were sent to the aircraft from the dispatcher with an error in response for each time over an hour period. Commercial radio was also called to initiate voice contact with the aircraft after unsuccessful ACARS attempts.  Commercial radio called back several times to let us know they were still trying to contact the flight and they hadn't forgotten about us. The aircraft was out of communication with the company for roughly an hour and 4 minutes; until verified on the ground in MMMX by station agents.   The ACARS system sends position reports every 10 minutes for international flights.  Since the ACARS went dead; position reports were not sent thus no knowledge of aircraft position on fusion. At this point weather in Mexico City was causing airborne holding for aircraft; with no visibility to aircraft situation.The Dispatcher and CA were talking about a game plan for diversion when all communication was lost.  The Dispatcher tried ACARS; commercial radio; several AVTEC numbers for MMMX Tower and still no communication or even an idea of the location of the aircraft.This is unacceptable as far as communication with an aircraft and dispatch whether in domestic or foreign airspace; especially when adverse weather and ATC holding are occurring.  This may have been prevented by having only aircraft with SELCAL or SATCOM fly to MMMX.  An aircraft with SELCAL would be able to be directly called by commercial radio to hook up a patch with dispatch rather than having to work thru Mexican ATC with little success.  An aircraft equipped with SATCOM would be able to be called directly by dispatch to the cockpit in the event of ACARS failure.




Synopsis: Dispatcher experiences a loss of ACARS communication with one of his flights while inbound to MMMX during a weather event. Attempts at voice communication through Commercial Radio are also unsuccessful. The communication outage lasts for over one hour; until the aircraft lands safely in MMMX.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CYVR.Airport, BC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B CYVR
ATC / advisory: Tower CYVR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On ILS 08R to YVR; Tower told us we were 'number 1.' When I asked them to verify that we were cleared to land; they told us that [there] would be another aircraft departing before our arrival. Approximately 4 miles out; Tower cleared the other aircraft for takeoff on the same runway. On short final; (approximately 2 miles) the aircraft began its takeoff roll. As we crossed the threshold; aircraft was airborne. Below 200 ft. RA; aircraft began to 'waffle' and FO (First Officer) called missed approach. It would appear that we were caught up in either jet blast or wake turbulence from the departing aircraft. Either way; there was doubt as to whether a safe landing could be made. Safely executed go-around and returned for another approach.On second approach; YVR Tower did the exact same thing again! They cleared another aircraft for takeoff while we were on short final. Aircraft cleared the runway and we only caught a small amount of the wake/jet blast; but were able to land safely.Spacing between departing aircraft and our aircraft was inadequate. Recommend more spacing between departing and arriving aircraft; especially enough time to allow jet blast/wake turbulence to dissipate.Highly dangerous maneuver; in my opinion.




Synopsis: E175 Captain reported executing a go-around from short final on approach to CYVR after encountering probable jet blast from an aircraft departing on the same runway.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We took off from ZZZ as usual. We were on the departure and ATC queried us saying we were off course about 10 degrees. I immediately looked to see if I may have left autopilot in heading mode but FMS 1 was displayed. I asked Person X to tell him we are showing we are on course. Again; ATC said he was showing 10 degrees off. I went to received messages in the FMS and saw that ATC had given us a reroute adding ZZZZZ to our fixes on the departure. I went to the fix page and brought the fix we were missing and we were almost a beam the fix. I asked the FO to ask ATC if he wanted us to turn there. ATC gave us a switch to next sector frequency and we asked him if he wanted us to turn there. He advised us 'out of FL240 direct ZZZ.' We maintained our course and at FL240 initiated the turn to ZZZ.I honestly don't have a reason why I didn't check the clearance on ACARS as I do every-time to verify what the FO wrote down. I hadn't flown in about a month and I guess I was just out of my groove to not check the received messages. The FO put AF 'as filed' down on the card and I went with it. Mistake on my part for not checking the PDC to verify.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an ATC reroute was received via ACARS; however it went unnoticed; resulting in a course deviation. Captain cited not having flown recently as a contributing factor.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 45
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at FL400; the Pilot Monitoring noted a crack developing across the midpoint of the left windscreen. Approximately 15 seconds later the entirety of the left windscreen outer ply fractured; leading to no forward visibility from the left seat pilot. The Pilot Monitoring initiated the 'cracked windscreen' checklist and followed line items per the LR45 airplane flight manual. Per the manual; a descent was requested to FL250 or below. Upon approval; the crew descended to FL250. Air traffic control was notified of the cracked windscreen. Passengers were made aware of the situation and advised to remain seated and belted. The crew discussed several options and determined that a landing at the intended destination under VFR conditions was the most correct option. Flight controls were transferred to the right seat pilot and pilot monitoring duties were transferred to the left seat pilot. A landing from the right seat was made and the flight concluded with the normal debarcation of passengers on the FBO ramp.


Second narrative: As PIC of this flight and performing Pilot Monitoring duties. At approximately XA:45hrs; FL 400; 350 miles SE of VOR. I noticed a brown streak; with bubbles forming through the middle of the left windshield; soon after a loud bang. The outer layer of the windshield shattered resulting in poor visibility from left windshield. The appropriate checklist was completed in accordance with the manufactures QRH. Passengers/cabin were briefed & secured. ATC was notified of the situation and a descent to FL 250 was requested and granted. Weather; NOTAMs and airport conditions at the destination were the most favorable and the decision was made to land there. The landing at ZZZ was uneventful; no assistance for the passengers was required. The Director of Operations and Chief Pilot were immediately notified.


Synopsis: LR45 flight crew reported Captain's cockpit windshield outer layer failed.
Date: 201912
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Toilet Furnishing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Logbook Entry; MEL; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Pilot in Command (PIC) and I as Second in Command (SIC) conducted 4 flights in Aircraft X. There was a Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing in the aircraft maintenance logbook listed as 25-XXX; Forward Lav flight attendant call button inop; dated [date]. However as my PIC discovered after the flights were completed; this MEL was not the correct one for the aircraft condition.We were again assigned Aircraft X in ZZZ and my Captain was conducting his preflight inspection. He was reviewing MELs and maintenance records and it suddenly stuck us that the attendant call button might not be possible to defer. He reviewed the Minimum Equipment List and noted that MEL 25-XXXX applied to 'Cabin reading lights; light lens covers; and lav occupied lights may be inoperative provided enough light is available for safe working conditions during night operation'. Consequently the MEL did not apply to the flight attendant call button in the forward lav. My PIC checked the expiration date of the Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing; noted that it was still within limits before expiration and he did not investigate further. Consequently; we conducted the flights listed above.My Captain contacted the local Company maintenance personnel and Company Maintenance Control and informed them of the situation; stating that we would not be able to fly the airplane until the issue was corrected and we can legally fly the airplane. Subsequently; the forward lav was locked out and deferred in accordance with MEL 38-XX; paperwork was completed and my Captain conducted all the following scheduled flights for the day; although [flight] was delayed due to the maintenance issue.This has been a recurring issue with incorrect MEL/Non-Essential Equipment Furnishing guidance from Maintenance Control which resulted in aircraft flying when they are legally required to be repaired; grounded; or a more restrictive action is due to be applied.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported that an aircraft flew several times with an incorrectly applied MEL.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Excessive Cold
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While operating the flight controls as PF (Pilot Flying); and beginning the takeoff roll; after brake release; as power was applied and throttles passed through approximately 10;000 ft-lb torque; the Captain/Pilot Monitoring and I simultaneously heard and felt a 'thud' which we immediately interpreted as a possible load shift. The Captain called for a rejected takeoff which we conducted in accordance with company procedures. We taxied back to the ramp; parked and shut down all engines. All hands conducted an inspection of the load. The skid load consisting of approximately eight long steel drill pipes; approx 15 feet long by 18 inches in diameter appeared to have shifted approximately two linear feet aft from the original loaded position. (Caused by) inadequate securing of cargo skid load; suspected due to improperly affixed and/or inadequate number of aft securing straps and/or chains.


Second narrative: On takeoff roll a noise was heard and felt in the cockpit.  The takeoff was rejected and the aircraft returned to the ramp for evaluation.  Upon examination it was determined that a portion of the cargo had shifted aft. Insufficient aft restraint on the affected portion of the cargo.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff after hearing a load shift at power application.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When we are number 2 for departure; and at the runway hold short line in Las Vegas; the Las Vegas Tower frequently requests as to whether we have the aircraft in sight that is directly in front of us; holding in position on the runway; fifty yards away. When we say we do; then they state that we need to keep them in sight after they takeoff; and during our takeoff. This is virtually impossible; and should not be a stipulation of departure. We can not say we do not see them at 50 yards; but that should not tie us to the departure responsibility for separation; or relieve ATC of their obligations.




Synopsis: LAS air carrier departure expressed concern regarding ATC's application of visual separation with successive departures and the transfer of responsibility to the flight crew.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During boarding we noticed a sour musty burning odor coming from the gaskets in the aft galley. We notified the captain but the smell seemed to dissipate so we took the flight. Upon landing the smell returned but a lot stronger and was irritating our eyes and throats. We notified the captain by phone and told him this. The pilots left the aicraft without writing it up. I have irritation in my throat and some balance issues for 2 days now. If these do not improve I will seek medical advice.




Synopsis: A320 Flight Attendant reported a sour odor in the aft galley.  They informed the Captain; but the flight continued as planned.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: YNG.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 340/340A
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Taxing to Runway 23 via 'H' leaving to FBO; there are no taxi signs visible until approaching the opposite side of the ramp as the FBO area is well below the taxi/runway environment. My Safe Taxi diagram was in-op since the FAA chart is not drawn to scale; Safe Taxi is not available. I was heading toward what I thought was taxiway 'H'; and was too far north on the ramp so Ground cleared me Taxiway 'J' to 'H' to Runway 23. Making a left on 'J' and a quick right on 'H' I inadvertantly crossed over the Hold line on Runway 23 thinking I was not yet to the runway...My mistake for sure. Ground gave me the clearance to continue crossing Runway 23; which I did; swung around on 'H' and stopped at the hold short line facing southeast. I proceeded with my final checks; called up Tower and was cleared to take off. The area is designated as Hot Spot (HS) 1 and even though I saw the Hot Spot vigilance indication on the chart; I still made the mistake. Thankfully Runway 23 was not the active runway at the time and no other traffic was involved.I have since contacted ForeFlight to question the issue of not having Safe Taxi available. They explained to me the issue of a non scale FAA chart; but informed me that they have taken action on their own to create a 'ForeFlight Taxi Diagram' which is Geo-Referenced. Had I used their chart; this mistake would not have been made; and I will certainly remember this option should I find myself at an airport with this condition again. On this occasion; I should have asked for Progressive Taxi rather than try to find my way without assistance.




Synopsis: C340 pilot reported a runway incursion at YNG. Taxiway signage and electronic chart issues were cited as contributing.