elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGB.Tower, CA
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: Tower LGB
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During an internal review I identified the following loss of separation and violation of LGB N7110.20 (Long beach Tower Standard Operating Procedures). I forwarded the information to facility Air Traffic Manager (ATM) and asked if he would validate that these were losses of separation so that I could file the Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs).He e-mailed me back and ordered me not to file the MOR; and that this would be handled with the individual as performance. I walked into his office and suggested that we file the MOR as required in JO 7210.632. He stated that the service area stated that losses of separation found during an internal review are not to be used to fill out MORs. I have had this discussion with him before and had already pointed him to JO 7210.633 that requires us to report found items in accordance with JO 7210.3. I did not want to fight with him again so I am filing the report to document this loss of separation.Event: Aircraft X was on base to final for Helipad 2 and the ATCs cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway 30. This violates LGB N7110.20 (in effect at the time of the event); replaced today with N7110.21.I monitored the employee for almost an hour and there appeared to be no effort to comply with the separation standards found in LGB N7110.20. Other mandatory traffic advisories for helicopter operations were also not performed. The session was very slow and there was ample space and time to comply with instructions. There is another potential loss of separation that I will have to fill out another report for just like this one. I don't know what should be done. I just know I have to legally document this occurrence that I am aware of.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: LGB Tower controllers discovered operational errors doing a routine review of ATC Operations. The Support Specialist states the Tower manager ordered him to not report the errors.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A flight was delayed due to a maintenance issue. I was advised by the crew via ACARS that Maintenance was taking the aircraft out of service. At that time I posted a DCN (Document Change Notice) on the flight to allow the operations coordinator enough time to find a suitable aircraft. While on C; ZZZ sent an ETD (Estimated Time Departure) request through the Watch system for a XA50Z departure time. The system automatically overrode my DCN and posted this time without my concurrence therefore exercising operational control over my flight and overriding my DCN posting. This issue has been brought to the attention of the Director many times and to date a fix has not been implemented. The FAR's and Company Policy are clear of the Dispatchers responsibilities for operational control and this is a clear violation.




Synopsis: An airline Dispatcher reported the computer system overrode their plan without their concurrence or knowledge.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp DEN
Second aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Arrived at 1E and told to taxi behind an occupied gate. Just as we passed the bridge an aircraft started to push back and I had to veer to the left to miss his tail. [We] continued to our gate. No contact with other aircraft. It was either an E-170 or E-190. Did not hear that aircraft cleared to push but we may not have checked in with ramp yet. [It is] hard to see aircraft at [that] gate until the last minute due to the bridge. Ramp was dealing with construction which may have contributed to clearing both aircraft to be in the same place at the same time.




Synopsis: An A319 Captain reported having to take evasive action during taxi at DEN when another aircraft pushed back into his path.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Aircraft component: INS / IRS / IRU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cruising at FL400; we just checked in with Miami Center; passing URSUS intersection. Approximately ten minutes later the aircraft started pitching down abruptly. The speed started to increase rapidly so I disconnected the autothrottles and pulled back the thrust levers. I then disconnected the autopilot and initially followed the Flight Direct Guidance; the VVI and the altimeter. Both the FO and I noticed that the pitch and altimeter were not correct because we were still descending. I asked the FO to take the controls because it appeared that his instruments were correct. The FO started climbing back to FL400. About that time ATC inquired of our altitude and we told them we had a problem and to standby.The FO engaged CMD-B autopilot. At this point it looked like my altimeter was malfunctioning. We pressed the recall to find that we had a SPEED TRIM FAILURE - SINGLE CHANNEL. Approximately 12 minutes later; we get an UNABLE RNP message with the ANP bars closed and the ANP value increasing past 5.0. We ran the QRH for this and it required us to verify our position. We accomplished this by using the VORs. We informed center that we could no longer maintain our navigation using RNAV and would require vectors to proceed to [destination].About 50 miles from the airport; ATC said that the Command Center advised that they were [giving us special handling]. The FO and I discussed this earlier but felt that since this was not a control problem; special handling was not required. About 12 miles from the airport we got a Master Caution; and IRS light; the L IRS FAULT light was illuminated; all of the Captain's data was gone both on the PFD and ND; and the autopilot disengaged. The FO still had all his data and continued to fly the aircraft. The landing was uneventful. I informed Dispatch upon reaching the gate. I made a logbook entry for the IRS; the Speed Trim Fail light; and the Captain's altimeter.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported loss of several navigation-related systems as well as the Captain's altimeter.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was pilot flying; flying the SEAVU into LAX. ATC tucked us in about six miles behind a heavy aircraft ahead of us on the arrival. Approximately over SEAVU; we encountered heavy wake turbulence; which kicked off the autopilot. I engaged the autopilot in heading mode; and offset our course momentarily to escape the wake turbulence. I was turning back to LUVYN; when ATC noticed we were off the arrival track; and gave us a clearance to reacquire the arrival at KRAIN. We LNAV'd to KRAIN; and flew the ILS 25L to LAX. I should have immediately advised ATC of our situation to get a proper clearance back to the arrival. It would be very helpful if ATC would be more cognizant of the need to leave more space for arrivals following a heavy aircraft.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported encountering 'heavy wake turbulence' in trail of a heavy on the SEAVU arrival to LAX; resulting in a track deviation.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: TBM 700/TBM 850
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While in cruise flight IMC/OAT=(-20) experienced an icing event (rate-severe; accumulation-moderate) in which the airplane developed a moderate vibration. I informed ATC and requested a descent and deviation to ZZZ. Descending thru FL120 (OAT=(-5) the vibration stopped. I continued to ZZZ and with a normal approach and landing; and taxied to the FBO. I conducted a thorough walk-around and visual inspection of the aircraft and tested all its systems as per the checklist and found nothing abnormal. ATC/TRACON/TOWER all accommodated my request for Priority Handling and no in flight emergency was needed or declared. I refiled my IFR Flight Plan and departed to [my original destination]. The flight was normal.




Synopsis: TBM-850 Captain reported moderate vibration from severe icing event.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon entering downwind; I moved the landing gear handle to the down position. After a short time I realized nothing was happening with the gear. At this time I told Tower that I had possible gear problems and wanted to circle for a minute (because I had already had clearance to land). After completing the checklist and not finding any obvious problems; I then left the gear handle in the down position and manually pumped the gear down until I had the green light and could see the right and left main landing gear. At this time Tower said that I could do a fly by and they would take a look. After the fly by Tower told me that it looked like I had all three wheels down and I again confirmed it with the green gear indicator light on the instrument panel. At this time Tower again cleared me to land and told me that the emergency equipment was going to come out to the runway. I then proceeded to land with no further incident. After shut down I called the Maintenance Department and they told me to pull the gear pump circuit breaker and to leave the gear selector down; and that it would be safe to fly it home. At this time I had the airplane topped off with fuel and proceeded to fly home with no further issues.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reports failure of the landing gear to extend when the gear lever is selected down. Troubleshooting does not reveal the cause and the gear is successfully extended using the hand pump.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NTD.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On an IFR flight plan; departing CMA; we were instructed to fly heading 270 for vectors to the VNY VOR. On climb out; we were instructed to contact Mugu Approach. I looked inside and changed frequencies; and noticed a traffic alert on the G530 that was close. I announced it to the student; and he started a right turn.I could not see the traffic; and told him to continue his turn. I instructed him to to roll out on about a 050 heading. The aircraft passed off of our right side in a descent. We contacted Mugu Approach; who asked if we were on an IFR flight plan; which we confirmed. He instructed us to fly a 070 heading. We continued with flight to ZZZ without further incident.The incident occurred very quickly; and we were unable to query Tower due to the early frequency change. In retrospect; I would not have looked inside the cockpit at such a low altitude with a student.




Synopsis: PA-28 instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the vicinity  of CMA airport.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In approximately the past 30 days; I have encountered numerous events involving extreme bleed through of the ACARS transmissions on CRJ700/900 aircraft. These bleed-through events have at times occurred 15-20 times in the first five minutes after takeoff; which is one of the most critical times for communication between pilots and ATC. The volume and properties the bleed-through has; completely block out critical ATC communications. On the flight indicated above; we had to ask twice what heading ATC had asked us to turn; due to the ACARS blocking the transmission; not to mention the extremely deafening sound it makes in our headsets. I elected to turn off the data transmission switch on COM 3; due to the ACARS transmissions interference with ATC communication. I later turned it on; and noticed most transmission bleed-through occurred soon after takeoff. My First Officer noticed that the ACARS NO COMM was displayed immediately after takeoff on each leg of the flight day; just as an informational note. Either a software update or other vendor technical problem is likely the root cause. COMMUNICATE with our PILOT GROUP to promote awareness and guidance in these situations. I would recommend to other pilots to turn off the ACARS for the first five minutes after takeoff. THAT IS HOW BAD THIS BLEED THROUGH IS!!! I have been flying this plane since 2006; and have only encountered the ACARS transmission this loud when someone has the COM 3 volume knob pushed in and directly listening to the ACARS data transmission.




Synopsis: CRJ700/900 Captain reports ACARS data transmissions on VHF 3 blocking ATC communications on VHF 1 at critical times.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Obviously the instructors and check airmen doing this have no idea of the possible repercussions of this act. To quickly review; like inputs are summed; opposed inputs are cancelled. To actually have your hand on the side stick while the other pilot is flying can have catastrophic consequences. A subtle; unconscious input by the pilot monitoring say during the flare or strong crosswind landing to 'help' the pilot flying may generate a dual input warning but by then recovery may be unattainable. The reason given during training is to be quick to push the take over button. I can have my hand in my lap and in 1/2 second can reach to the button; depress it; and have control of the aircraft. When flying a conventional airplane; one with a control wheel; does the pilot monitoring actually have their hands on the controls while the other person is flying. No! The PM can have their hand on the side console; rubber grommet around the base; or arm rest; but should not be actually on the side stick while the other person is flying. Stop this training practice.This is the X time this year I have flown with a new pilot where they have actually had their hand on the side stick while I was flying the airplane. This is expressly forbidden in the pilots operating manual; 'Only one person will fly the aircraft at a time'. They all tell me that is the policy during training that the instructors and check airmen have been telling them to do this not only during training but on their initial operating ride as well!




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported new pilots to the Airbus are being instructed to shadow the PF on the controls. The Captain reported this is contrary to the information in the pilot manual. The Captain reports the manual says 'Only one person will fly the aircraft at a time.'
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CBF.Airport, NE
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C OMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: An experimental aircraft departed CBF and entered the OMA Charlie airspace 7 miles east of OMA at 3;500 FT before establishing two-way radio communication with us (R90). The Charlie airspace in that area starts at 2;500 FT. We need a remote receiver/transmitter at CBF. This is a known issue and has been known for many years. CBF is very busy for an uncontrolled airport 7 miles east of OMA Eppley and barely 3 miles east of the primary runway finals. I'd estimate; given current traffic counting procedures; they'd run about 250 operations a day on nice weather days. They have an ILS; several GPS approaches; and a new runway. Failure to have a remote transmitter/receiver to our Approach Control is a factor in many of the CBF pilot deviations.




Synopsis: R90 Controller described a Class C airspace incursion; the reporter alleging that a remote receiver/transmitter at CBF is need to accommodate aircraft attempting to make required communications. Allegedly; this has been a known problem for many years.