Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed from within my airspace. Aircraft was climbing east. As the aircraft approached a boundary I handed aircraft off to adjacent sector. Climbing southbound in [ZZZ] airspace was Aircraft Y. Both aircraft were climbing at similar rates and were at approximately the same altitudes. They displayed the data block for Aircraft Y on my scope but did NOT call for a point out or to reference my traffic climbing into their airspace.[ZZZ] area does not use interim altitudes; so I had NO idea if they were keeping their traffic climbing; or stopping Aircraft Y's climb so Aircraft X could climb above. Being that they were taking NO action; and the confliction was going to occur in their airspace; I took evasive maneuvers and stopped Aircraft X at FL190. Soon after; the [ZZZ] controller called and spoke to me and asked why I hadn't stopped my aircraft sooner since they had 'put theirs on my scope.' I advised them that they had taken no action; and they should have been expediting the climb of Aircraft Y; as they had given me NO instruction or advised me to stop or continue the climb with Aircraft X. I told them I would turn my aircraft 20 degrees left to pass behind Aircraft Y; who; although they NEVER told me; and did not indicate in the data block; had been stopped at 18;000 feet; which was UNUSABLE at the time. I issued 20 degrees left to Aircraft X; who began the turn. Immediately after issuing the control instruction; the [ZZZ] area called and told me to put Aircraft X on a heading of 180 degrees. Aircraft X who had almost completed the 20 degree left turn then had to turn right to heading 180. This ensured that the aircraft were a dead tie. Aircraft X turned right and ended up with no lateral separation between Aircraft Y; with Aircraft Y at an unusable altitude of 18;000 feet and Aircraft X at 19;000 feet. This is at least the second time in as many weeks the same controller in the south area has made an incredibly UNSAFE and frankly; illogical control instruction causing two aircraft to become uncomfortably close. The Control Area should be required to use interim altitudes in the data block.  Also; the controller in the area NEEDS remedial training. Also; that controller should be retrained on giving point outs and whose responsibility it is to resolve conflicts in their airspace; especially since no coordination had been accomplished. In my opinion; the controller is UNSAFE and management needs to take action to correct their behavior.


Second narrative: I sat down on the Radar Assist side of the sector and saw that Aircraft X was east-bound slowly climbing toward sector [ZZZ]. It appeared that Sector [ZZZ] had south-bound departure traffic that might be a factor with the Aircraft X so instead of doing a point out to them I handed off Aircraft X at sector [ZZZ]. Shortly after that the conflict alert went off and the radar Controller was talking to the sector [ZZZ] controller trying to coordinate a control action that would keep the aircraft separated in their airspace.My Radar Controller turned Aircraft X 20 degrees left; which would have avoided the Aircraft Y. Shortly after someone called my position from sector [ZZZ] and told me to turn Aircraft X to a 180 heading and hung up without giving their initials. I relayed this information to my Radar controller who turned Aircraft X to a 180 heading and shipped him to sector [ZZZ]. The sector [ZZZ] controller had stopped Aircraft X at 18;000 feet even though the altimeters were below 29.92; and because of the 180 heading; both aircraft passed directly over each other at 18;000 feet and 19;000 feet; even though 18;000 feet was not a useable altitude. The controller at sector [ZZZ] never called the my sector to coordinate an altitude or heading change for Aircraft X; even though it appeared that a loss of separation would occur in his airspace. From what he said in his communications the sector [ZZZ] controller just assumed my sector would separate his traffic since he put a display of Aircraft Y on my radar display. Since sector [ZZZ] does not put the actual altitude the aircraft is climbing to in the data block; the other sectors have no idea what sector [ZZZ] is climbing to and can not base any altitude decisions on a data block alone. Reeducate the control force on the proper use of the lowest usable flight level when separating aircraft at 17;000 feet and Flight Level 190. Retrain the controller at sector [ZZZ] on both the lowest usable flight level issue and whose responsibility it is to separate aircraft in his sector.


Synopsis: A Controller receiving a handoff from a sector did not take appropriate action to issue control instructions for that aircraft in order to avoid other enroute traffic.