elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Positional / Directional Sensing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Number 1 CDI glideslope indicator failed after glideslope capture on IFR approach. Descent below glide path triggered alarm with ATC which advised below glide path. Switched Number 2 radio CDI and initiated climb rejoining glide path and continued approach. Note localizer functioned normally.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported that the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI); failed after capturing the glideslope during an instrument approach.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-400 and 400 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FDR
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Logbook Entry
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: January 2012; a B767-400 came in with Flight Recorder flight data status message. I Troubleshot (T/S) the problem to be the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) M200. So I went to the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and; in the search; I typed in MXX200 which is the M # for the DFDR M200. Two different Part Numbers (P/N) XX43-00 and YY00-042 came up as 'effective' for the aircraft. We did not have one in stock; so I had Stores/Parts order up P/N YY00-042. When it arrived; I installed it on the plane and all Checks were normal. When I went to Stores to turn in the bad part I called [Maintenance Control] Aircraft On Ground (AOG) to make sure the part was effective because the part I took off was P/N XX43-00 and the one I installed was P/N YY00-042.  I wanted to verify what I saw in the IPC for the B767-400 was right. I had AOG check and they concurred that the part was 'effective'. I don't remember the name of the person I spoke to; but they saw it in the IPC for this aircraft. Then the plane left. About a week later my Manager told me that he got information saying that the part I installed was not effective for the aircraft. I told him not to worry; that I would find it for him in the IPC. I checked the IPC and could not find it but on [the day the aircraft came in] it was there. He told me that there was a scheduled maintenance item to replace the DFDR with the same P/N XX43-00 [that was previously removed] and it was done five days later.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic was informed the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) he installed on a B767-400 aircraft was not 'Effective' for that airplane; even though both he and a Maintenance Controller for Aircraft On Ground (AOG) had noted the DFDR he installed was correct per their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) at that time.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Once again the aft jump-seat harness was installed incorrectly. This has been going on for a few years now and whoever is changing the middle bolt is the one who is installing it incorrectly as the mechanics no longer unclip and reinstall it correctly. I have written this up in the past and they said they were going to send out a work order. I would like to know why this is still happening???




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported jump-seat harness to be installed incorrectly.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On a visual approach to Runway 35R into ZZZ at approximately 1;500 feet we flew through a swarm of bats. We could see and hear them striking the plane. After landing we counted approximately 75 to 100 bats contacted the plane. Nose cone; windshields; engines; cowlings; wings and tail. We contacted Maintenance and the local station ops and sent a maintenance code. ATC told us the aircraft in front of us on approach reported hitting bats; but didn't mention how many. If we had an idea it would be so many we probably would have chosen a different runway or held until they moved from the area.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reported multiple bird (bat) strikes on final approach that resulted in damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 3G3.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Other 107
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G 3G3
ATC / advisory: CTAF 3G3
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After doing a day long course on Part 107 and FAA exam prep; I acted as a RPIC (Remote Pilot in Command) and another RPIC were demonstrating to our class the safe operation of Drones. A pilot in a Cherokee PA-28 landed and a plane was on final. We were well off of any runway and safely conducted our demonstration. As the aircraft was clearing the runway we put both Drones on the Ground. We were not near the aircraft and we were far away from the runway safely demonstrating on the far west taxiway of the apron. The pilot in the Cherokee started accusing myself and the other RPIC for illegal flying a drone in class D airspace. We cordially told him we were in Class G airspace and flying pursuant to Part 107. He kept saying that we were not and were operating illegally. We then informed our class of the misunderstanding of the regulations and how Part 91 pilots and Part 107 share the NAS and how we need to work to educate each other and effectively communicate with each other.




Synopsis: A commercial pilot instructing a UAS ground school class at 3G3 Airport (Wadsworth; OH) was confronted by an aircraft pilot who accused him of flying in Class D airspace. His UAS flew below CLE Class B and outside CAK Class C.
Date: 201904
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was #2; I was in front galley when #4 came up to say he smelled dirty sock smell in back galley; and around row 8-15 in cabin; #1 and myself went thru cabin; and confirmed musty odor smell. DH pilot walked thru cabin and confirmed fume odor also. #1 called Captain who performed fume procedures; [notified ATC and landed]; we were met by firemen.


Second narrative: On descent Flight Attendant 4 came to front galley and reported a dirty sock smell mid cabin and in rear galley. I was #1 and put a paper towel over nose/mouth and walked thru cabin and confirmed a musty smell; especially higher up in both those areas. #2 also walked thru and confirmed smell. Called and notified Captain. Asked DH pilot to also do a walk-thru and he confirmed smell also. Captain notified us he did a procedure to pull air throughout the cabin. Captain called us to ask if it helped but; we were strapped in jumpseat for landing and could not confirm. Aircraft was met by 2 Firemen and a Mechanic. Captain advised he had [notified ATC]. Normal deplaning.


Synopsis: A320 flight attendants reported Captain notification of a dirty socks odor in passenger cabin. Flight crew executed an expedited landing.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After flight I was informed that I had been exposed to COVID-19 the day prior to my 2 day trip. I called the flight operations manager and informed him of my exposure.  I made sure that he knew to contact the Captain on my trip as I know that he was going to his relative's home after work and that older people are more likely to have complications.  Additionally; I knew that he had a trip leaving the next day.  I was called by the on call assistant chief pilot; and told that the Captain would be contacted.  I failed to mention that I had dinner with another airline crew on my layover; as I had been concentrating on getting the Captain informed quickly.  Had either the flight operations manager or the assistant flight manager on call asked me about other interactions I would have listed the close contact I had with 2 other employees and been able to have them not show up to work for subsequent trips potentially exposing more crew members.  Additionally; I found out that the Captain was not informed about his exposure until after his return from his next trip.  I was surprised that given my reported exposure he was permitted to operate his subsequent trip.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported being exposed to COVID-19 and cited concerns with the company not notifying other employees who may have also been exposed.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DPA.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Do 328 TJ (Turbojet)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: VMC on an IFR flight plan talking to Chicago Center; 20 NM southwest of DPA level at 4;000 FT shortly after being cleared direct DPA (was previously direct JOT). Level at 4;000 FT the TCAS in 'below' mode started painting a target approximately 3 miles at 12:00 500 FT below; followed very quickly by a TA 'Traffic; Traffic' announcement. Both my First Officer and I immediately acknowledged the alert. Chicago Center Controller also simultaneously alerted us to 'VFR traffic 3 miles and 12:00; 500 FT below'. Both I and the First Officer started scanning outside to identify the threat. We did not make visual contact with the traffic. We then received a TCAS RA of 'Climb; Climb'. I immediately advanced the power levers to maximum thrust and followed the RA climb command. We never identified the VFR traffic. I leveled at 4;500 FT. We reported the RA to ATC and were then cleared to descend to 4;000 FT.




Synopsis: Do328 Captain; at 4;000 FT southwest of DPA; experiences a TCAS RA with VFR traffic at 3;500 FT and takes evasive action.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOI.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower BOI
Aircraft component: SELCAL
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During the initial takeoff roll; after takeoff thrust was set; received a double 'SELCAL' audio from the ACARS indicating the aircraft was out of service. The notification was sent to the wrong aircraft. The volume of the SELCAL notification was so loud and the timing so bad; that it nearly resulted in an aborted takeoff. Company failure to understand that the aircraft is in a critical phase of flight or that the SELCAL audio notification is so loud that it completely disrupts flight deck communications; even startling pilots. The SELCAL audio volume is broadcast at a volume that is most likely loud enough to cause hearing damage. The FAA clearly does not understand that the allowance of this type of audible disruption to the flight deck exceeds and minimizes any other preexisting 'avoidable' sterile flight deck violation. The avionics manufacturer clearly did not do any type of testing or research to understand that the audible is so loud and so completely unnecessary that its current design and operation; disregards the human ear and hearing as being as an important part of human function and hence aviation safety.Remove the SELCAL audio completely and replace it with something that represents a design of which is not similar to that of a rock concert sound system. The redesign needs to respect the sensitivity of the human ear. Expert audiologists need to be consulted on what levels of noise exposure can and will cause hearing damage; such as in this case. The FAA needs to pay attention to design flaws in avionics and investigate this poor design and its continued use as a hearing damaging interruption; rather than concentrating on flight deck distractions that have no merit.




Synopsis: CRJ700 Captain experiences SELCAL chimes during takeoff that nearly lead to a rejected takeoff; due to the high volume and inappropriate timing.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: PDC clearance we received showed a minor change in routing compared to filed route listed in the Master document. Filed route showed: '...TYI.J79.JFK..DPK..MAD..HFD.GRAYM2.KBED' PDC clearance showed: '--ATC CLEARANCE--' 'TYI J79 SBY THEN AS FILED' For our filed route; J79 airway starting waypoint was TYI and ending at JFK. SBY is a VORTAC prior to JFK on the J79. The above clearance provided by PDC made me believe to join the J79 from TYI and jump at SBY then go direct to JFK. Upon review of our waypoint list; it showed that we would bypass (omit) the VILLS and JOANI waypoints. These waypoints exist on the J79 between SBY and JFK. We discussed this change in detail as a crew and programmed our FMS appropriately. Upon passing SBY and flying to JFK; ATC asked if we were flying the J79. We explained no based on our PDC clearance and asked if he wanted us to rejoin the J79. Controller decided to give us a HDG change for about 15- 20 miles then direct JFK. There was no discussion of a route violation from ATC. I suggest that PDC not indicate 'TYI J79 SBY THEN AS FILED' if the actual clearance was as filed (TYI J79 JFK).


Second narrative: In the future; I intend to scrutinize the routing in my turn/before start checklist more closely. I believe the other crew member and I came to the conclusion that we were going direct to JFK after SBY because it was noted in the PDC as a change in the routing; when in fact; the flight routing didn't change at all from the filed routing. I am very confident that the confusion would not have been an issue if our clearance read cleared as filed. The other crew member and I only became aware of the misunderstanding after ATC pointed the issue out to us.


Synopsis: A revised PDC was given which indicated TYI J79 SBY THEN AS FILED after the filed routing TYI JFK DPK MAD... so the crew omitted the VILLS and JOANI because they thought they were cleared SBY then JFK.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During IOE with the First Officer on final approach received a GEN 2 caution message; briefly considered continuing but reconsidered and ran checklist. I misidentified GEN 1 as the faulty GEN and attempted reset; as a result the ADG deployed. Subsequently correctly identified and reset GEN 2.  Continued to landing uneventfully.  I as the PM made the mistake and was the cause of the misidentification and deployment of the ADG.I was very involved in giving instructions to my student for the approach and landing and allowed myself to be distracted enough that I misread the caution as a GEN 1 caution instead of a GEN 2.  Completely my mistake; I should have probably either continued at that point or conducted a go-around to assure adequate attention and fewer distractions which would have prevented a simple situation from becoming a more serious one.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reset Gen 1 for a GEN 2 caution message; therefore the air driven generator automatically deployed. He was busy on approach with an IOE student.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: ZZZ
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Other Instructor
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other downwind abeam numbers
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a student out of ZZZ; which happens to be a parachute drop airport as well. After training; about 40 minutes doing landings; the drop plane began to make a descent.I was making calls for every phase of the traffic pattern (crosswind; downwind; etc.) when I get an alert for traffic. I look out to my right when I see the drop plane on a collision course with my student and myself (we are abeam the numbers on downwind). I make a call on the radio informing the pilot that the correct entry is midfield downwind and that he is less than 300 ft. from colliding with my aircraft. The jump plane spiraled down from 5000 ft.+ MSL to 1600 ft. MSL in a matter of a couple minutes and tried to enter a short base for the runway. If the plane entered the pattern at midfield downwind; this could've been avoided.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported a NMAC with a parachute drop plane that made a nonstandard entry into the traffic pattern.