elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CRP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Night VFR. Uneventful flight and descent to CRP.  Cleared Visual Approach to Runway 18. Fully configured at 1;000 feet and on speed with all checklists completed. Approximately 700 feet; received 'Caution Obstacle' GPWS. Lighted refinery stack in sight; VASI in sight; runway in sight and sink 400 rpm. Continued to land. Uneventful landing and taxi. After reviewing pubs after landing we should have executed a go-around in night VFR.


Second narrative: [Report narrative had no additional information].


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on a night visual approach to CRP Runway 18. They continued the approach in violation of SOP.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-31T Cheyenne I
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 1. Sudden lurch; ID'd problem engine (left)2. Checked power; left engine remained stable at 25' mp3. Contacted Center (problem occurred just as Tower switched me to Center); advised them of engine trouble. I did not declare an emergency; as the engine was stable; and the oil pressure was in the green.4. Worked on adjusting right engine to maintain altitude. 5. Continued to correct heading while navigating to VFR conditions; read gauges; troubleshoot. Referred to checklists and company procedures.6. Noticed considerable oil running down the wing; immediately [coordinated with] Center; and diverted to ZZZ.7. Landed without incident.




Synopsis: PA31 pilot reported an engine malfunction in cruise resulted in a diversion.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Weather was across ZID and ZDC resulting in increased traffic at ZOB. This was covered at the afternoon weather briefing. I came back from break and went to work at GAM D-Side. Soon after I was told by the supervisor to close the D-Side and let ECK-R training team go and combine GAM with ECK. All evening GAM had been open and busy; ACL showing 15-25 aircraft most of the night. When this decision to combine was made; there were 18 aircraft in GAM ACL. I felt it was too busy to combine but the supervisor wanted the training team to de-brief. We worked ECK and GAM combined and it was busy. Later the supervisor told my D-Side to combine it up. I objected; stating I needed a D-Side; especially after a long busy night. I was told that the D-Side needed to go home and that the supervisor would help me if I needed anything. He plugged a hand set in the D-Side and made and received hand offs for me. After ten minutes of this someone came back from break and sat with me and worked my D-Side. This combination of events would never happen in the middle of a shift; yet seems to be acceptable to at the end of shifts. It is unacceptable and unsafe. Keep sectors open when they need to be. A supervisor should not be working as Area Supervisor and D-Side at the same time. Supervisors should not approve leave at the end of evening shift when late traffic is going to be increased. Supervisors must understand that as the shift comes to an end the controllers are tired.




Synopsis: ZOB Controller described an unsafe condition when a supervisor elected to close a D-Side position to accommodate controllers leaving the shift. The reporter noted that this would not have happened during other time/traffic periods.
Date: 201810
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Lithium ion batteries were found during physical screening of the freight. This was undeclared.




Synopsis: Cargo personnel reported finding undeclared HAZMAT during freight screening.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: IAI1125 (Astra)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on an IFR flight to EWR and assigned the PHLBO3 arrival. We were given instructions to descend via the arrival and proceeded to do so. Upon reaching the crossing restriction altitude for the SOMTO Intersection; we leveled off approximately 5 miles prior to the intersection. At this time the Captain; the pilot flying; asked me to give him the Class B airspace information. I proceeded to evaluate the Class B airspace chart for EWR and when I looked up I noticed something did not look right. After a short evaluation of our location; I determined that we had passed our step down point to cross the DYLAN Intersection at 8;000 FT and advised the Captain to descend to 8;000 FT MSL. At this time; we were told top contact New York Center and the Controller realized we were at 10;800 FT. He instructed us to descend to 8;000 and turn right to a 120 heading. We were then turned back on course and handed off to New York. The Captain said he thought we had met all of the crossing restrictions since the VNAV glide slope had gone away after we passed the SOMTO Intersection. We were never given a TCAS alert and no aircraft was seen by the crew. I believe the concern for the Class B airspace and the busy airspace caused a loss of situational awareness by the flying pilot. While I was distracted by the task asked of me; I could have reminded the Captain of the crossing restriction before looking into his request. The crew was trying to insure the utmost safety and abide by all regulations. The timing of the planning was maybe at the wrong time and could have contributed to the deviation.




Synopsis: IA1125 First Officer reports the Captain missing the crossing restriction at DYLAN on the PHLBO3 RNAV arrival to EWR while the First Officer is evaluating the Class B airspace.  ATC issues vectors.
Date: 201811
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After starting engine number 2 on taxi; we ran the maintenance check procedure for MEL [for] OPS PLACARD. DEFECT: ENGINE HIGH PRESSURE VALVE INOPERATIVE AND SECURED CLOSED.The check was normal. However; we had just barely two minutes completed when we were cleared onto the runway for takeoff. So; while completing the check and returning the ENG bleed switch to on and the X Bleed switch back to AUTO; we got an ECAM for Pack 2. I quickly glanced at the procedure again and read that it said to turn Pack 2 off; so I turned off pack 2; and the ECAM went away. Quickly; we ran through ECAM completed and screens normal; completed the before takeoff checklist; and then completed a normal takeoff. However; after leveling off; we returned to the written procedure check and determined that pack switch should have only been turned off if the PRECOOLER OUTLET TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS 240 DEGREES CELSIUS WITHIN 2 MINUTES AFTER X-BLEED VALVE OPENING. We then returned the pack switch to on without any issues.  As we started our descent we ran the procedure again for low power settings by again turning the engine bleed switch off and X bleed switch to open. The descent and approach and landing were normal. Overall the procedure was confusing and should have been clarified beforehand.




Synopsis: A319 pilot reported making a mistake with the aircraft's packs because of an unclear checklist.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After taking off; the left side of the plane started vibrating very loud. Then everyone heard a banging sound along with a smoky odor afterwards. My first thought was a decompression was coming; so myself and [the other Flight Attendant] called pilots immediately and they heard noise also and said they will call us right back. So they called us and said we were going to go back because they were getting indicators in the flight deck something was wrong with left engine. So Captain made PA to inform the passengers of the situation. We landed within 10 minutes. Upon landing we had passengers deplane and Maintenance came on board. They inspected the aircraft and found out that a seagull flew into the engine and damaged the left engine severely and flight was canceled.




Synopsis: EMB175 Flight Attendant's perspective of an engine failure at takeoff caused by the ingestion of a seagull. Flight returns safely to the departure airport.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In cruise at FL390 we lost radio contact with ATC for an extended period of time. After a lengthy cockpit discussion on the arrival; weather; and reprogramming the FMS to reflect the NOTAM missed approach procedure for the ILS; I realized I was only hearing one side of the airborne communications. The non-flying pilot thought he had heard from the controller a short while ago. I immediately turned up the volume on the 121.5 standby and began to search the EFB for the communications box; while the non-flying pilot tried to hail someone on the primary radio.I eventually transmitted on 121.5 and was able to reach [another air carrier flight] to get a relay for a new frequency. I recognized the similar call sign from an earlier sector and considered our call sign could have been a contributing factor to our blackout. Shortly after I heard a Guard Controller trying to contact us. The non-flying pilot also was able to find a good frequency on the primary.It became very apparent to me that we had been out of radio contact for an extended period. I immediately removed myself from flight duty upon landing because I felt I had fallen to extreme task fixation due to chronic fatigue. We had been placed on the late night schedule with a transcontinental red eye followed by [late night] standby shifts for days until they flipped us to an AM show for this trip. To be candid; this lost communication event alarmed me. I had thought I could handle this type of situation better than I did; but it was insidious in how we thought we were on task; but in reality we had fixated on the arrival instead of alert to what was happening.




Synopsis: HS-125 Captain reported experiencing an extended period of no communications with ATC. Reporter cited chronic fatigue as a contributing factor.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Due to lack of man-power and shift turn-over; I was assigned to move aircraft using a tug from gate. My partner was coming from another assignment in which he met me at the gate. While awaiting for my partner to arrive; I prepped the aircraft per move team guidelines. Once he arrived; we finished disconnecting PC air and ground power. Weather conditions were high winds and rain.Called Ramp Tower for pushback permission; continued with the push; [and] was told to hold abeam Gate X; then short Gate Y. From there; instructions was Spot X to Ground [Control].Contacted Ground Tower from Spot X; he instructed to proceed Bravo hold short Bravo 1. From Bravo 1 we was instructed to continue Bravo 1- Zulu- Charlie too Plot. Complying to Ground's instructions making the turn from Bravo 1 onto taxiway; the super tug slid and turned the tug's nose gear a complete 180 degrees. Once coming to a stop and regaining composer; contacted Ground for Airfield Safety; then call our Supervisor on duty; following Tech Ops.




Synopsis: Tractor driver reported the tug spun out while towing aircraft in windy and rainy conditions.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: My co-pilot and I were flying Aircraft X as instructed by management. We were advised the aircraft had been returned to service and was safe to fly. We had no passengers; as this was a reposition flight only. We planned to land with 1100 pounds of fuel. During the flight home we encountered a few squawks; which we noted. We were cleared for the visual approach around XA:00 local time. Upon selecting the landing gear down; the co pilot and I waited for the common '3 green; no red' indications. We only received a left main; and nose gear indication; and the red lights in the gear handle were still illuminated. We advised the tower to cancel our landing clearance so we could run the appropriate checklist. We attempted 2 more normal extensions. Same results. Hydraulic pressure was normal. We attempted an alternate extension. Same results. We flew over the control tower and requested a visual confirmation and status of the position of our landing gear and main inboard gear doors. We were advised that our gear 'appeared' to be down; but our inboard doors were still open. We attempted to close the doors two more times with nitrogen pressure. Unsure of their position; we flew over the control tower again. The controller advised the gear still looked down; and the doors appeared closed now. We advised we were ready attempt a landing; and was immediately cleared to land. Almost no wind. We rolled the wheels on the runway very smoothly during touchdown. We both agreed as a crew not to use any brakes unless required. No thrust reversers on Nextant. We turned off the runway's end and cleared the hold short lines; and shut the aircraft down. We advise ATC we were safe and the aircraft was disabled; but clear of all runways. We still had 650-700 pounds of fuel remaining. I exited the aircraft and went out to look at the right gear; and saw the gear indeed was not locked. We were fortunate it didn't collapse during rollout. The indicators weren't lying.




Synopsis: Beechjet400 Captain reported they had unsafe gear indications and landed after the Tower told them their gear appeared to be down but the right main gear was not locked.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Skydiving
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was operating a skydive jump aircraft from a non-towered airport. The airport has two runways: [laid out in V-shape]. For our operations we regularly takeoff RWY 12 and land RWY 30. The winds were from the north at 5-10 knots and traffic was mostly using RWY 30 or occasionally RWY 05. I had been coordinating our departures on RWY 12 with the frequent glider and glider towing operations using RWY 30; as we regularly do on busy weekends. I announced on CTAF that we were holding short of RWY 12 and looked for traffic in pattern. A glider reported it was downwind for RWY 30 and I thought it told me that we had time to depart ahead of them. I then announced that we were departing RWY 12 straight out. As we were rolling on departure the glider announced it was turning base for RWY 30. I reported we were rolling on RWY 12 and saw the glider turning base. The glider then said it was going to switch to RWY 23; which is lined up with the base leg of RWY 30. I climbed above the glider's approach to RWY 23 and the glider passed about 1/2 mile off our left side. I thanked the glider for making the adjustment and continued operations without any more incidents. I believe the incident is the result of the high volume of flight training; glider operations; and high-performance aircraft operation at this non-towered airport. I also think if the glider had announced in position when I first reported holding short of RWY 12 it would have given me more time to visually acquire the traffic. The glider also should not have turned base after I announced we were departing on RWY 12. I also need to ensure I visually acquire any traffic in the pattern before departing to verify there will be sufficient spacing and confirm that any traffic in the pattern is aware if we are departing ahead of their arrival.




Synopsis: A conflict resulted when a King Air C90 departing Runway 12 and an arriving sailplane on Runway 30 failed to co-ordinate their operations. The sailplane altered its arrival runway to facilitate separation.