elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: October 2013; I incorrectly installed a narcotic (narc) lock box into the hatrack area of the medical helicopter. The previous narc box was incorrectly located and had become unserviceable; so a new one was ordered. When the new one arrived; it came with the narc box that was pre-drilled with two holes; and two 'pop-rivets' to attach it with. I incorrectly assumed that the rivets were to be put into the box to secure it to the hatrack. After installation; I signed-off the discrepancy per my company's drawing; once again incorrectly thinking that this was the drawing that used the rivets. I failed to look at the Revision number or the most current drawing. According to the new drawing; I was supposed to drill four new holes for bolts and put the bolts through the narc box; hatrack; and a doubler on the underside of the hatrack (which was not present). This error was discovered when one of the rivets pulled through the hatrack and the narc box became loose. Upon this discovery; the rest of the parts of the installation kit were ordered and the narc box was installed according to the most current drawings. I believe that this could have been avoided by two factors. The first and foremost would be to inspect the drawings and not make assumptions. The second is to send [current information with] the Installation Kit to properly install the narc box instead of outdated methods that are not used anymore; therefore reducing the assumptions made by the mechanics.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes how he incorrectly assumed that a new narcotic lockbox that arrived with two pre-drilled holes; two pop-rivets and a company drawing was the procedure to install the lock box in a Bell 206L helicopter.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbing to cruise altitude; an EICAS alert of RH Window overheat. Burn line appeared in RH forward windscreen; approximately 10 inches long and 1/4 inches wide. Within 30 seconds a loud pop occurred and the outer pain of that window shattered. Accomplished QRH checklist; pressurization normal. Declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. Accomplished overweight land checklist and landed uneventful. Log book write-up made.




Synopsis: A B757 EICAS alerted RH WINDOW OVHT followed by the windshield outer pane cracking so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed; and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: PDC stated CLIMB VIA SID (BNDTO1 SID). 4;000 feet was not mentioned in the PDC. The SID [provides] an altitude profile up to cruise altitude. It also states 'MAINTAIN 4;000 feet.' We expected that the CLIMB VIA clearance negated the 4;000 feet like it would if received in flight. It is ambiguous for the statement CLIMB VIA to mean something different on the ground that it does when airborne. Clearance should not state CLIMB VIA SID if ATC wants us to maintain 4;000 feet; then PDC should state maintain 4;000 feet CLIMB VIA should have only been issued by the Departure Controller.




Synopsis: A B737 First Officer expressed concern about the altitude dichotomies on the BNDTO RNAV SID from IAH; believing that a 'climb via' clearance is incompatible with a procedure that depicts both 'at or below 500' and 'at or above 13;000 feet' restrictions during the climb to cruise but also contains a 'ROUTING' note advising all departures to maintain 4;000 feet. Reporter believes their airways' clearance should have stated cleared via the procedure; maintain 4;000 feet and the 'climb via' the SID clearance given only by departure control as appropriate.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Night landing practice; flat tire on runway disabled aircraft. While attempting to phone the local FBO (Fixed Base Operator); ATC (Air Traffic Control) and the flight school; another aircraft was spotted on final for same runway. Our aircraft beacon and nav lights were on; but not visible against the runway lights. We turned on all our lights and made a radio call to inform the other pilot of the situation; they went around. The FBO on field had closed for the night and this was a situation not in any syllabus. Ultimately; local law enforcement came out and used their vehicles and lights to make it plain the runway was currently closed. The ATC TRACON that provides services to the airport was also eventually contacted (by the other pilot) to communicate the situation. Once enough manpower was available; the aircraft was repositioned well to the side of the runway; in the grass; and the runway was reopened. A NOTAM (Notice To Airmen) was published warning of the disabled aircraft since it was still in the runway safety area.The main takeaway from this incident is that when airport services are not available and ATC (Air Traffic Control) cannot be reached.




Synopsis: Flight instructor reported a flat tire during landing rollout while night landing practice; causing other aircraft to go-around.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying and we were cleared via the FMS Bridge Visual 28R approach. I contacted Tower and received a landing clearance on [Runway] 28R. Outside of the F101D fix; Tower gave us a low altitude alert; and we continued to cross F101D above 1;200 FT. The flight continued normally; we were stabilized by 1;000 FT and we landed safely. I'm not sure; however; if we crossed SAMUL at or above 1;500 FT. We were landing into the sun at dusk and the workload was high at this point. I am unsure if we crossed SAMUL at or above 1;500 FT; since we received the alert from Tower. I will be sure to keep my scan up; especially during high work loads.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reports being issued a low altitude alert by SFO Tower approaching SAMUL during the FMS Bridge Visual approach to Runway 28R. The flying pilot continues to a normal landing.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Upon the route; thunderstorms were heavily building to the north and I requested deviations to the south. We were then cleared direct to destination where I had to request more deviations for thunderstorms. When handed off to next controller; I was informed of 'military operating airspace' that was active and asked if we could fly a more northern heading to avoid the airspace. I told ATC I was unable due to heavy thunderstorms to the north of our current heading. When I looked at the high altitude chart; I then saw that our current heading had us directly over the Florida panhandle shoreline where we penetrated restricted areas R-2919A; R-2919B and R-2915A. I could not have flown south of these areas due to restricted over water operations and was unable to fly north around these areas due to heavy thunderstorm activity. ATC did not alter my path nor incline that there was any issue of this airspace penetration during the entire flight. As for corrective action; ATC could have possibly altered my route to fly north of the entire system otherwise; weather avoidance and safety take precedence in a situation like this.




Synopsis: A corporate jet Captain reported penetrating restricted airspace after he was forced to deviate from his course toward the restricted airspace due to weather and could not circumnavigate the restricted airspace because of overwater restrictions.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the Hazmat [preflight] inspection I discovered a flammable liquid box that was crushed on the bottom of the stack. There were no fumes or spillage; but the box had 'do not stack' on the side and we determined it was not safe to transport in its condition after having a discussion with DG personnel. It was removed and we continued the flight after a 35 min delay. Cause - Improper loading of hazardous cargo.Suggestions - Properly load cargo. Pay attention to hazardous goods documentation.




Synopsis: B767-300 First Officer reported a Hazmat loading configuration error during preflight. The Hazmat box was crushed on the bottom of the stack even though the box was labeled 'Do Not Stack'.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We received a] momentary stall warning/activation due to encounter of B777 wake turbulence. ATC assigned us 210 KTS; and then descend to 6;000 FT at CLARK on the LTOWN arrival with a B777 ahead; around 6 mile range; and they were given same [clearance earlier]. Captain (pilot flying) using autopilot and descending on downwind; calm winds and aircraft began [to] roll right due to wake encounter approaching OLIVV Intersection. Autopilot unable to counter roll to return to level flight; approaching approximately 15 deg bank; speed of 210 gave us foot +15 in clean configuration. While PF disconnected autopilot to return to level the bank angle; had momentary stall warning/stick shaker activation. Normal roll to wings level and stall recovery normal; with a short auto slat extension during encounter. Extended slats for added protection as we were being vectored along same B777 approach. No further encounters. FOM-required logbook entry and crew performed post flight visual inspection with no defects noted.MEM Approach Controller should have notified us of B777 ahead; [and] applied greater separation distance on downwind arrival. Suggest that crews may need to consider use of 0/slat extended configuration while following B777 on initial arrival routes as aircraft is still relatively clean configuration and potential of greater wake production.




Synopsis: DC-10 Captain reported wake turbulence encounter in trail of a B777 on arrival to MEM and suggested additional spacing might be a good idea.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Upon advice of the Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) gate keeper I am submitting this report.We did a high speed abort after rolling thru a flock on pigeons on Runway 18. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) and noticed birds crossing the centerline at about 60 to 80 knots. A moment later a flock of pigeons came out of the grass next to the runway going left to right. I heard a loud thump and the Captain instantly closed the throttles and kicked off the auto brakes. We rolled a way down the runway before clearing without using the brakes. Tower was informed and they closed the runway for an inspection. We taxied to a gate where airport Ops came plane side and showed us a bag of dead pigeons. There was evidence of bird strikes on the nose; the inboard slats; and the engine nacelles. 3 hours later we departed again; this time uneventfully.


Second narrative: We ran through a flock of birds on takeoff. We were approaching 100 kts. With 13;000 feet of runway I chose to abort. I immediately released the RTO and coasted to the end of runway.


Synopsis: A B757 air crew performed a rejected takeoff after multiple bird strikes at around 100 knots. They returned to the gate. After maintenance inspected the aircraft they once again departed for their destination uneventfully.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Often flight attendants will stop allowing carry-on baggage when the bins are full and then require the passenger to leave their bag at the aircraft door. The passenger is then allowed to continue boarding after the bag is left; the Flight Attendant will then put a note with their seat number on the bag so the agent can then tag the bag correctly or sometimes a hand written tag is filled out and given to the Flight Attendant to pass back to the customer. The issue is that in all the haste to get the door closed at the end of boarding the Customer Service Agent has not asked the customer about hazardous materials; smart bags; e-cig; etc.




Synopsis: Ramp employee reported passenger carry-on baggage that is gate checked to cargo due to lack of space in over-head bins; is frequently not checked for hazmat items.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was given a NOTOC form showing 35 kg of devices containing lithium ion batteries. I was aware that the FAA had issued an interim final rule banning lithium ion batteries from passenger aircraft. I had the pallets removed from the aircraft. This interim final rule should have been distributed to all stations.




Synopsis: B787-900 Captain reported directing Hazmat cargo of Lithium Ion batteries removed from aircraft prior to departure.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was informed that a CRJ-700 aircraft had difficulties with the rudder movement through the rudder pedals that had maintenance performed the previous night; March 2014. The event happened at ZZZ and Maintenance discovered rags in the Aft Equipment Bay in the rudder pulleys. The CRJ-700 had a Maintenance Check performed that night; which has an IDG Service required and the need to pull the Engine Ignition Circuit Breaker (CB) out in the Aft Equipment Bay. The Maintenance Check has a sign-off for performing a FOD Inspection in the Aft Equipment Bay. I performed a General Visual Inspection (GVI) of the Aft Equipment Bay; and at that time I did not see any rags The event was brought to my attention by my superiors; informing and questioning my observations of what was looked for and what inspection methods were used. At this current time; I do not know why; or how; the rag got into the Aft Equipment Bay; or why the rag was left behind. Rudder pedals hard to push. [I am a] Maintenance Inspector; Graveyard shift; Line.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports being questioned about his FOD inspection methods after he had performed a General Visual Inspection (GVI) of the Aft Equipment Bay on a CRJ-700 aircraft. Difficulties with rudder movement through the rudder pedals were later found to be caused by rags in the rudder pulleys.