Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We experienced A-I ENG 1 FAIL (Caution) failure enroute to ZZZ upon entering icing conditions. We ran the appropriate QRH and were unable to alleviate the discrepancy; exited/avoided icing conditions per QRH and uneventfully landed in ZZZ. I wrote up the discrepancy in the A/C Maintenance Log and contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. We were scheduled to keep the same aircraft to ZZZ1 and had a 1 hour ground turn. Maintenance arrived after 30 minutes and began to address the issue; while we held off boarding. After receiving word that the discrepancy will be Maintenance Deferred; we were given the go-ahead to begin the boarding process. The ZZZ maintenance did not clearly specify to me the maintenance procedure and required further instruction from Maintenance Control and Embraer/GE. Apparently they secured the A-I 1 ENG valve open and wanted to do an engine run-up at the gate; but because of time constraints opted not to do it. They placed MEL 30-21-01-2 Engine Anti-Ice Valves (Secured Open) on the aircraft; signed off the Maintenance Log and left; without verifying the procedure in the Maintenance Status Page. As were; past the scheduled departure - we quickly looked over the lengthy MEL. We followed all appropriate crew actions and discussed appropriate drag/performance penalties. Upon pushback and dual engine start; with Reference Anti-Ice set to ENG per MEL; No Flex; and verifying appropriate EICAS messages we began taxi out to the runway for departure. During taxi A-I ENG 1 FAIL (Caution) came up again; which we believed to be associated with the maintenance procedure; and system logic of A-I Engine valve failing in the open position. We referenced the MEL and could not find anything pertaining to the message at hand; assuming again it was part or result of maintenance procedure performed. We also; discussed the penalties with dispatch via ACARS and proceeded to taxi for takeoff. Enroute to ZZZ1; in cruise flight we looked at the MFD Ice Protection page and noticed that the A-I ENG 1 Valve was closed; so we queried dispatch via ACARS and were informed that ZZZ Maintenance might have performed the wrong maintenance procedure. Instead of securing the A-I ENG 1 Valve OPEN they in fact secured the A-I ENG 1 Valve CLOSED. We ran the A-I ENG 1 FAIL (Caution) QRH which cleared the message. We obtained enroute PIREPS; forecasts from ATC and dispatch as well as AIRMETS prior to departure. Multiple regions had icing AIRMETS affecting them at low altitudes as well as destination airport of ZZZ1. We were aware that; although we were able to clear the Caution message the system was not going to perform as it should and that we must take action to avoid or minimize exposure to icing conditions. Latest ZZZ1 PIREP was Light Rime icing between 5000-3000. Dispatch informed us that the closest airport we land without encountering icing conditions (on the field) was ZZZ2. Exercising 'Captain Authority' after evaluating all information at hand; from multiple sources; and careful consideration/discussion with my First Officer we decided to proceed to ZZZ1 where the lite rime ice reported; would translate into minimal exposure. Proceeding to ZZZ2 would not 100% ensure icing condition avoidance; according to the AIRMETS; as we might have been susceptible to icing accumulation on the descent; through cloud layers. We instructed ATC of 'Operational Necessity' for icing avoidance and minimal icing exposure. We were given 'Priority Handling' to the runway; with airspeed; altitude; management at our discretion. The cloud layer began at 3000 feet and ended at 5000 feet; as advertised. We leveled off; configured and began slowing prior to entering the cloud layer as to minimize icing exposure; planning on descending rapidly through the layer. We accomplished everything as planned; even having the authorization from ATC to 'Dip below the glideslope' and only encountered very minimal rime ice accumulation in the 45-60 seconds we were descending through the cloud layer. As anticipated; the aircraft recognized the icing conditions; appropriate valves opened per the EICAS; followed by the A-I ENG 1 FAIL (Caution) We landed; uneventfully in ZZZ1 and taxied to the gate where; upon parking; I wrote up the discrepancy and contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. I believe that this unfortunate event could have been prevented had we; as the flight crew; discovered the faulty maintenance procedure; right after engine start in ZZZ. Even though the mistake was made by ZZZ maintenance; we are the last line of defense. We were unfamiliar with the convoluted and confusing MEL and assumed that ZZZ maintenance performed the maintenance procedure accordingly. We were preoccupied with the penalties; and other; multiple crew MEL procedures as well as time constraints and may have missed; one of several CAUTION/NOTE tabs on the 4 page MEL that stated: 'CAUTION: Do not dispatch if the message A-I ENG 1(2) VLV OPEN status EICAS is not displayed when ENGINE ANTI-ICE VALVE(S) is locked open and engines are running. Consider locking the valve closed.' In the future; I will take more time to verify maintenance procedures; as well as more thorough and repeated MEL procedure review/compliance regardless of time constraints. Perhaps if the MEL was rewritten as to clearly spell out; in large (eye catching) print and worded differently (not confusing double negatives) highlighting a crucial Crew Status EICAS (which we are often prone to dismiss) this could have been caught and addressed; accordingly! Furthermore; I will not rely on the assumption that maintenance always performs every procedure correctly; nor rely on my system knowledge and assumptions. If anything does not look right; I will promptly contact Maintenance Control and Dispatch; and resolve the problem at hand!


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ170 flight crew; Dispatcher; and Maintenance Supervisor reported that an engine anti-ice valve had been deferred open; but the valve was mistakenly closed.