elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 F Executive 21
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On takeoff I had inadvertently left [the] Com Select switch on the radio with Ground selected. When Tower cleared me for takeoff I heard it over the Ground radio. This caused me to not be able to communicate with Tower or Departure. If the Tower told me to switch to Departure; I did not hear it and during climbout. I switched anyway. We experienced a near miss of 200 feet with an aircraft crossing our departure on an assigned heading of 110. After leveling off at 2;000 feet as assigned; I was unable to hear ATC; and they were extremely busy. As we were in a single engine aircraft with passengers for me to continue on the assigned heading was placing me in an unsafe condition of being low over the ocean well beyond gliding distance to the shore. I elected to turn north. After a brief period of time I was able to remedy the radio selection problem and contacted ATC Center. I advised them that I had turned north and began to turn back to the assigned heading. I was then given further clearance to proceed to the VOR. At this time I was asked if I had been on an IFR clearance with an assigned heading and was given a phone number to call for possible pilot deviation. My actions were for passenger and aircraft safety. The weather was clear.




Synopsis: The pilot of an M20 had incorrectly set up his communication radio switches and could not communicate with ATC after takeoff. He experienced a near miss before rectifying his communication problem.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: Twin Bonanza 50
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked onto my frequency from Seattle Approach and was looking for the lowest altitude possible for icing. At first I told him I could only get him down to 8;400 feet; which was the Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA) on V2. My Minimum IFR Altitude was lower in the area but I would have lost radar contact with him and did not want him to be on vectors. Aircraft X advised me that he was GPS equipped and requesting the GPS MEA of 7;700 feet which I did not even realize was an option on the airway.I gave it a quick glance to confirm and I issued him a descent to 7;700 feet. He did indeed go non-radar for a portion and reported BEEZR at which point I had him back an re-identified him. At that point it was questioned by my Assist controller about the MEA after BEEZR. I quickly realized the GPS MEA was no longer valid and needed him up to 8;000 feet by BEEZR. I issued him a climb to regain compliance with the MEA on the airway. It might just be me; but since I learned how to read maps and charts and there was a few moments of panic as myself and my Assist were trying to determine what all the numbers were. We were confused by the MEA and also the Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude (MOCA); about what we could use and how to apply it. At least in our area; we don't do very much low altitude work and getting refreshed on what everything means again would be beneficial. I will definitely take the time to re-learn on my own. With more and more younger controllers coming in that have never used it at all before; it might be good to either clean up our maps if there are numbers that aren't even applicable or to have some of that included in our annual refresher.




Synopsis: A Center Controller was not familiar with the lowest altitudes he could approve for an aircraft experiencing icing and allowed the aircraft to fly below their Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Military
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent; Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Traffic Management
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Military Special Use airspace can be scheduled by different user's facilities. Today one facility sent the MOS (Military Operations Specialist) an email 1 month prior scheduling it and another facility scheduled the same airspace yesterday. When we entered the airspace NOTAMs into the system; a conflict alert was generated and apparently some work was done by the swing shift yesterday to track down the problem. However they were unable to locate the email from a month prior and assumed it was entered into the system in error. They cancelled the first request and entered the second request into the schedule. The first facility was unaware their schedule was removed and thought they still had the airspace scheduled. It wasn't until this morning that a Center Oceanic sector noticed the discrepancy and hour before the events and questioned who actually was going to have the airspace. Fortunately we were able to notify the users and cancel one of the missions in time; however this was lucky and was a potentially very dangerous situation.The way Warning Area schedules are sent to the MOS is confusing and inconsistent. We should only receive airspace activation from one entity and only on the day prior. Because the schedules come in different formats and at different times; it is hard (if not impossible) to track and catch errors. Furthermore it should not be the role of the MOS to catch and referee scheduling errors especially since Center is not the scheduling agency for this airspace. At a minimum consistent forms should be used for all airspace schedules (which would help the MOS catch any errors) and ideally we should only receive the schedule from NAWC [Naval Air War Center] along with the other daily airspace schedules we receive from them.




Synopsis: Center Traffic Management Specialist reported two different agencies had scheduled the same Warning Area at the same time.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: At approximately 120 knots on takeoff at [a high elevation airport] we had a direct bird strike to the Captain's forward windscreen.  We were about 3000 feet down the runway and had 9000 feet remaining and were 35 knots below V1.  The impact was extremely loud and forceful so I rejected the takeoff. At approximately 100 knots with about 8000 feet of runway remaining I disengaged the auto-brakes to help avoid overheating the brakes.  I used reverse thrust; spoilers and the remaining runway to slow the airplane.  We exited the runway at the last high speed taxiway and brought the plane to a stop and did not set the brakes.  We requested fire/rescue support and ran all appropriate checklists.  Airport ops arrived quickly and notified us there was no fire or visible damage to the gear or tires; only some light smoke coming off the right gear.  Fire rescue arrived in about 10 minutes and set up cooling fans on the gear.  The brake temperatures initially climbed into the caution zone and then began to cool.  After coordinating with Maintenance and waiting for the brakes to cool we were towed back to the gate. After a maintenance check of the bird damage and brakes we were cleared and pressed on to our destination.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff after experiencing a bird strike at approximately 100 kts.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Aircraft component: Cylinder
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; engine began running rough resulting in rpm loss. Made a 180 degree turn under 1000 feet and attempted to make it to Runway XXR; but was too high and had to move over to Runway XXL. Caused by a cracked cylinder making the aircraft unable to climb and maintain altitude.




Synopsis: C172 instructor returned to land immediately after takeoff due to a rough running engine. A cracked cylinder head was discovered as the cause.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CRP.Airport, TX
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: This is a safety concern that has been present for some time; involving daily flights from CRP. The local area has many towers with obstruction lights that are NOTAMed out of service for several week periods and then are renewed without any action taken. I tried to educate myself on 47 CFR 17.48; but the current situation still presents an immediate danger in the area for the length of time some of the lights are out. Some repeatedly have the NOTAM 'renewed;' which ultimately means the obstruction light is out of service for months. I have tracked some lights that have been out of service for over a year. Of particular concern are six 1;000 foot towers and one 800 feet just west of CRP. These seven towers lie underneath the CRP Class C outer shelf and just outside the Class C surface area. The towers are a constant threat to both helicopters in the area. The towers are extremely thin and difficult to see even on NVGs (Night Vision Goggles). At night; the wires are invisible. The current towers at issue; without lights; are:11/003 - OBST TOWER LGT (ASR UNKNOWN) 274717.00N0973601.00W (5NM W CRP) 1048FT (988FT AGL) NOT LGTD.09/063 - OBST TOWER LGT (ASR 1053367) 273934.00N0973413.00W (7.6NM SSW CRP) 1045.9FT (997.0FT AGL) U/S.09/062 - OBST TOWER LGT (ASR 1053363) 274703.00N0972728.00W (2.5NM ENE CRP) 319.6FT (280.2FT AGL) U/S.This tower is an issue because it is along a commonly used departure route and it has not been lighted [for more than two years!] Based on the history; especially of the 1;000 foot towers; a quicker turnaround time could be the difference between a mishap or not. If there is a way to hold the owners accountable to fixing the lights in a faster amount of time; it should be pursued in the interest of aviation safety; especially given the proximity to CRP.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reported concerns with 1;000 foot towers that have had inoperative lighting for extended periods of time.  The tower and guy wires are reportedly difficult to see at night.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff roll at 40 knots ECAM displayed amber ENG1 Shutdown. Performed RTO; ECAM cleared once throttles at idle. Cleared rwy at taxiway; performed all necessary checklists; QRH. Called [Maintenance] and advised. [Maintenance] could not identify issue so we attempted a second takeoff since all engine parameters were normal and no warnings existed. Second takeoff attempt resulted in a RTO due to same issue at same speed. TOGA was selected for both cases. Rolled to end of [runway] and taxied back to MX service area. Once comm was established with MX; APU was started. During shutdown of ENG1; fuel lever was placed to off position but engine continued to run at idle power. Informed MX of issue and was advised to cycle fuel lever. It took 3 attempts at cycling fuel lever for ENG1 to shutdown. Contacted [Dispatcher] and [Chief Pilot] and completed 2 AML write ups.


Second narrative: Starting takeoff roll the Captain hit TOGA for takeoff power. Once the engine's spooled up we got an Amber ECAM that stated 'ENGINE #1 SHUT DOWN' with all engine instruments showing normal operation. We had only accelerated to 40kts before we rejected the takeoff. We advised tower and exited [the runway]. We accomplished all of our checklist items and then called maintenance. After explaining the situation and what we had accomplished we were advised that we had the option to try to takeoff again. All engine parameters were normal during the entire event so we elected to attempt another takeoff. We attempted another takeoff and got the same indication causing us to reject the takeoff again at less than 40 kts. This time we proceeded back to our gate for Maintenance to take a look.


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported rejecting two consecutive takeoff attempts when they experienced 'ENGINE #1 SHUT DOWN' warnings on both attempts.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SBN.TRACON, IN
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E SBN
ATC / advisory: TRACON SBN
Second aircraft: M-20 E Super 21
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A B737 on the FISSK3 arrival to MDW descending to FL110 was issued 'direct to HALIE Intersection; fly the Runway 4R transition'. The 737 turned toward HALIE but then descended into an IFR M-20P that was at 10;000 descending to 4;000. The B737 pilot stated he was descending on the arrival.The 'descend via' clearance is an accident waiting to happen. Whether it's because the ATC workforce has bad phraseology and the pilots interpret what we say into what they think we should have said or the pilots just don't understand that they require specific language to be able to descend on their own is irrelevant. What has happened is that ATC [the FAA] has established a procedure that has introduced risk into what had been a cut and dried situation. Prior to 'descend via' the pilot descended when instructed to do so. There was no ambiguity. Now pilots can misinterpret a phrase and cause a conflict; if not an accident.My last report was about this very situation. Last time it was an airspace deviation. This time it's a Loss of Separation. Will it be an aircraft accident next time?




Synopsis: When the reporter/Approach Controller cleared the B737 (descending to 11;000 FT while established on the FISSK RNAV STAR to MDW) to proceed '...direct to HALIE; fly the Runway 4R transition' the 737 crew continued their descent and suffered a loss of separation with an IFR M-20 at 10;000 FT. The flight crew advised they were descending on the arrival.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After takeoff avgas was observed venting from fuel tank. Emergency declared and an abbreviated traffic pattern was flown returning to the same runway. Landing was normal and aircraft taxied to fuel and maintenance facility where an adjustment was made to fuel cap locking mechanism by Certified Mechanic. Ninety percent of tank contents (one fuel tank of four) had vented while airborne. No fuel leak on ground. No damage or traffic conflicts were observed.




Synopsis: BE35 pilot reports fuel venting from a fuel tank cap just after takeoff. An emergency is declared and an abbreviated pattern is flown to the departure runway. Ninety percent of the fuel in that tank had vented in the short flight.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: Tower VNY
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The tower and ground facility were extremely congested. While holding short of the runway; next in line to depart; tower began to issue a new departure clearance to our aircraft. As soon as the new clearance was being transmitted the frequency was 'stepped over' by other aircraft. As the SIC (Second in Command) I was handling the communication from the aircraft and advised ATC I had only copied part of the clearance in the meantime the PIC (Pilot in Command) had taxied the aircraft forward partially onto the runway. I advised the PIC I had not received a takeoff clearance; we stopped the aircraft; clarified with ATC that we were not cleared for takeoff. We advised ATC of our position partially on the runway; and they issued a clearance to cross the runway and turn around. Shortly thereafter we departed and the rest of the flight was without incident.




Synopsis: Air Taxi First Officer; the pilot monitoring; reported Captain inadvertently taxied over hold short line without clearance at VNY airport.