elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On night Visual XX; approaching ZZZZ; descended below 1100 feet and Tower called an altitude alert. Immediately climbed back above 1100 feet. Continued to an uneventful landing.Cause - Human error.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported receiving an ATC low altitude during a visual approach. Flight crew corrected altitude deviation and executed a safe landing.
Date: 201407
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Over a Period of Exposure
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The [implementation] of new departure and arrival procedures with multiple fixes; speeds and waypoints will likely lead to more deviations/violations; close calls; and increased accident risk. The desirableness of precise location and energy states of aircraft for ATC and commercial pressures is not worth the cost. Every new target [fix/waypoint] with speed and/or altitude [constraints] is now a potentially critical [compliance] point and there are way too many of them.  Proper attention to these targets is a high workload task that pilots will not be able to reliably accomplish.  Meanwhile; they are neglecting other needful attentions. Eventually some of these waypoints with their criteria will be missed even while attention to other critical duties is neglected.  Rule makers should be attentive to the possibility that there are issues in aviation other than ATC compliance for the safe operation of aircraft but these needful practices are now being sidelined.Worsening the problem; the procedures are not being flown as published but are continually being modified by ATC with heading speed and altitude changes followed by resume instructions.   In the past; such changes were easily accomplished in a comparatively heads up manner by mode control inputs.  Now; pilots are trying to enter then re enter these changes on the FMC. These heads down actions distract from a visual lookout and again; attentions to other inflight responsibilities.Finally; having a single waypoint point with restrictions would allow a fuel efficient profile to be selected [and flown]. I have never seen the throttles and speed rakes move around as they do on these recent profiles; needlessly wasting our fuel and again deteriorating safety.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain addressed his concerns over the proliferating number of complex SIDs and STARs which he feels predictably increase flight crew workload and increase the risk of deviations and separation issues while frequently not providing the vaunted increased efficiency for which they were developed.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While descending into PIB out of 14;000 ft. MSL; our aircraft was repeatedly illuminated by a green laser pointer approximately 100 times over about 5 minutes. The first illumination was from a distance of around 20-30 miles. The aircraft had a failed flight director and autopilot at the time and extra attention was required by both pilots for flight path management. Both pilots were directly hit by the laser on several occasions causing minor vision spotting. We notified approach of the approximate source location as we went over it. The laser continued hitting the aircraft as we flew by illuminating the entire flight deck. We were able to land at PIB without incident. I still have spots in my eyes approximately 1.5 hours after exposure. This was by far the worst encounter I have had with a laser while flying an aircraft.It seems to me that pointing a laser at an aircraft should be made illegal. If that doesn't work; borrowing laser guided bombs from the Air Force might be an option.




Synopsis: CRJ Captain reported that a laser shone repeatedly into the cockpit resulted in distraction and persisting vision spots.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: XBP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: UNICOM XBP
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I flew my Baron to XBP on a clear morning to get fuel. Checked the weather seq. and NOTAMs. (Have copies of NOTAMs) No comments in the weather sequence. The NOTAM printout read no NOTAM for XBP. On arrival I noticed that the runway was being replaced and a red X was on what is left of the runway. I called Unicom… no answer. I flew over the field looking at the old taxiway; since that is what is usually used as an interim runway. It had a white; what looked like; temporary threshold mark on it about a thousand feet from the approach end. I made sure the temporary runway was clear and landed just past the white mark and taxied to the gas pumps. On arrival I was informed that the runway was officially closed 5 minutes after I had landed. But now I needed to depart. The contracting construction supervisor drove up and we talked about the situation. He said that he would make sure that the taxiway was clear and allow me to depart; which I did without incident.In hind sight I should not have made the unverifiable assumptions and not landed. I told the folks at the airport that I was wrong and should not have landed but that under the circumstances; while the runway is closed an X should be in place on the old taxiway. I don't know why the NOTAM did not exist. I shall research it further.




Synopsis: BE55 pilot reports arriving at XBP to find the runway closed and under construction. The parallel taxiway had apparently been used during previous repairs as a temporary runway and is used in this instance. The airport is in fact closed.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Consulting Team] was on [Aircraft X] to ZZZ1. It was a miss communication with the team. They did not properly review flight CARD; the aircraft was being loaded with other employees. When I arrived and did not verify all Dangerous Goods cargo was loaded also [Consulting Team] prevention team did not show up or help in anyway when they showed up it was 5 to 10 minuets before departure and they did not verify that dangerous goods were on board the aircraft. These teams were put here to help and verify and locate freight mail and other items and fail to do so.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ramp Lead reported a communication breakdown between company ramp personnel and other ground personnel [consulting group] regarding Hazmat cargo load.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Second aircraft: Dash 8-400
Reporter organization: Government
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A Dash 8-400 inbound for landing Runway XX had declared an emergency due to blown tire on departure. We were aware of the emergency status of the arrival for at least 45 minutes prior to landing; and as such; we advised airport operations and ARFF of all pertinent information in a timely manner. The ARFF Commander requested and was cleared to position emergency vehicles at Taxiways F and D in anticipation of the Dash 8-400's arrival. The ARFF commander also advised that he wanted to go onto the runway after the Dash 8-400 landed and follow him down the runway. I responded with; 'Roger; I have your request.' Ops 2 requested; and was cleared to hold short of Runway XX at F. He then told me he planned on closing the runway after the Dash 8-400 landed and proceed onto the runway to follow him. I  responded; 'Roger; we'll plan on that.' The Dash 8-400 then landed on Runway XX and as he passed Taxiway F at approximately 100 knots; Ops 2; and one of the fire trucks went onto the runway without a clearance to follow the aircraft. After both vehicles were already on the runway; the ARFF commander advised me he was on Runway XX following the aircraft and I responded; 'Roger; but you should probably get a clearance before you do that.' At that; Ops 2 came on frequency and said; 'I closed the runway.' While I realize that it is airport operations and not the FAA that has the authority to open or close the runway; I don't believe it is reasonable; safe; prudent; or even legal to close it right after an aircraft has touched down and is still rolling out. It is also worth noting that there was no coordination with ATC on the runway closure prior to the vehicles entering the runway other than Ops 2 stating his intentions to do so at least 10 minutes prior to this incident. Ensure that airport Ops personnel close runways only after coordinating with the Tower; not just declaring it closed and letting us know after the fact; and not declaring the runway closed as an aircraft is rolling out at 100 knots.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an emergency event that resulted in an unexpected runway entry by the emergency trucks.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Duchess 76
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight for Part 141 Multi-Engine Instructor (MEI) applicant. Preflight was claimed complete; both instructor and student walked out to [the] airplane; started engines; and taxied out. Run-up was normal; as was taxi. On takeoff; engine checks were complete and in the green. Upon rotation and climbout; both oil temperatures and cylinder head temperatures were rising rapidly. At 500 feet; instructor told MEI student to return to airport; [the] temperatures were rising too fast. Lowered power output and maintained 700 feet AGL. By the end of the downwind; both temperatures were in the red; oil pressure still in the green. Base to final had normal airspeeds. Landed safely with engines operating.Upon landing and rollout to taxi; engines began to stutter. Mixtures were pulled as we exited the runway and airplane was shut down. Post-shutdown examination showed engine plugs were not taken out. Thus; pre-flight had not been completed. Engine malfunction was due to student not completing pre-flight and instructor placing too much responsibility and trust upon [the] student to complete such actions. It is the student's responsibility to complete the pre-flight; but the instructor's responsibility to ensure pre-flight is completed. Corrective action would be for instructor to check the MEI student's pre-flight responsibilities and checklist items.




Synopsis: BE-76 flight instructor reported an engine temperature problem during takeoff resulting in a return to departure airport.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During descent; flight experienced an abnormally high E2 oil temperature on the EICAS. After observing the indication I instructed the First Officer (FO) to continue flying the aircraft as the Flying Pilot (FP) and I acted as the Pilot Monitoring (PM) referencing the Emergency Procedures Checklist (EPC); then the QRH for the Engine High Oil Temperature procedure. Due to the number 2 thrust lever being at flight idle during the initial descent; I noticed the oil temperature decreasing back into the normal range. It stayed there for 2 minutes then; despite the thrust lever being at flight idle; the temperature went back into red range. I then realized we would be unable to control the engine's oil temperature. I transferred physical control of the aircraft from the FO to me and from then on; I acted as FP; instructing the FO to act as the PM. We then completed the Precautionary Engine Shutdown procedure; communicated with the Flight Attendant; coordinated with Center; and completed all other required procedures and checklists.Given we were only 40 miles east of our destination airport; I believed it to be the nearest suitable airport and chose to continue there and land. We then did the Single Engine Landing procedure and all other required checklists prior to touchdown. After landing; we stopped the aircraft on the runway. Since the fire trucks were not there yet; we accepted a helicopter's offer to do a nearby low level hover to verify if there was any fire hazard or condition that would warrant an evacuation. Given there was no indication of a fire; I elected not to evacuate the passengers and instead taxied to the gate. After the fire trucks arrived at the gate the firemen present did a ground inspection and verified there was no obvious fire or visible engine damage. During post-flight inspection; the FO found a possible smoke or oil stain from the E2 engine driven generator exhaust vent.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported making an uneventful landing after shutting down the Number 2 engine due to uncontrollable oil temperature rise.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On descent; Flight Attendant 4 came to fwd galley and reported smelling a dirty sock odor mid cabin and aft galley. I (Flight Attendant 1) walked thru the cabin and detected a smell row 8 thru wing area and again in rear galley. I called the Captain and reported [it]. Flight Attendant 2 walked thru cabin and also smelled odor but could not describe. I asked Dead heading pilot to walk thru cabin and he confirmed [the] dirty sock smell. Called Captain again and updated. Captain stated they performed a function to pull air thru/out of the cabin. The Captain called back to ask if had improved? We were strapped in jumpseats for landing (3-4 min out) so; could not confirm. Aircraft was met by firemen and a Mechanic. Captain advised he had [advised ATC].




Synopsis: A320 Flight Attendant reported notifying the flight crew of a dirty socks odor in cabin during descent.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: X51.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZMA
ATC / advisory: UNICOM X51
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon reaching the threshold of Runway 10; an aircraft reported a right downwind for Runway 28. I asked the pilot to say his position on downwind and that we were ready for takeoff on 10. He responded you have plenty of time for your departure. I then visually confirmed the location of the aircraft and that the departure path was clear. After departure; I told the downwind pilot that I would make an early right turnout to allow him to proceed with no delay and he acknowledged. After departure and climbing to 400 feet I was beginning my right hand turn and visually acquired skydivers under canopy directly south of my position I then decided to side step to the right of the final of 28; yet remain north of the skydivers area. I extended my departure leg and turned south once clear of the skydivers. The pilot landing on 28 was the jump aircraft pilot and I received no notification of skydivers in the area. There was also no notification broadcast on the AWOS indicating active skydiving in progress. I think it is imperative that better notification be provided to pilots operating within the area when sky diving activities are being conducted. I hope that this report will help in this regard. Some of my suggestions: Require that AWOS's at uncontrolled fields broadcast an alert to pilots anytime skydiving activities are being conducted not just the 24 hour generic advisory. In that broadcast there should also be an accurate description of where those activities take place; when the will begin and an estimated end time.




Synopsis: A departing General Aviation pilot reported they altered their course to avoid parachutists near the airport.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Physiological - Other; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Captain's window opened and detached from aircraft during climbout. All checklists were completed; perhaps they were not completed in normal sequence due to severe noise associated with window detachment. Aircraft configuration was fulfilled after much consternation due to nearly nil communication due to wind noise and headset loss.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that the Captain's side window opened and became detached during climbout.