elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After completion of pushback and after receiving salute I flashed the landing light.  The push lead and a wing walker were observed walking away as the tug backed away from the aircraft.  Approximately 10-15 meters off the nose a small bag which apparently contained the push headset fell out of the tug cab where the bag and the headset fell apart laying on the ramp.  The tug driver saw it fall out his side of the cab and stopped.  As the tug driver stepped out of tug it began to roll towards our aircraft with the tow bar still mounted on the front like a battering ram.  The tug driver immediately jumped back in the cab and stopped the tug and manipulated some controls.  The cab driver was the only one in tug and rest of pushback crew was oblivious as they walked back to gate area.  I don't know if the tug has a parking brake but the tug driver again stepped out of the tug while it idled away from the aircraft towards the terminal.  The unmanned tug continued towards the terminal at a walking pace while the tug driver scooped the headset into the bag and then he jogged back and jumped in the moving tug.  The tug now under manned control continued back to the gate are and we taxied out for departure.I don't know if it was complacency or rushing to get out of our way or both but I would like to think push tugs both have a park position as well as a park brake both if which should have been used in this case in my opinion. Emphasize safety to ramp members to protect persons and property.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported observing potentially unsafe ramp procedures after pushback at DFW.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: PRB airport was IFR for longer than normal resulting in an unusually high volume of IFR traffic into and out of the airport. I had just finished working out a very complex scenario with Aircraft X and another aircraft in which I had to use visual separation just to give an approach clearance in a timely manner. At some point Aircraft X who was still climbing out of 063 for 070 on V113 to ROM without provocation said; 'I can maintain my own terrain and obstruction clearance; can I get direct MAE?' I knew this would not work with the up and coming MIA because it was 074. I said 'That doesn't work for us; but cleared direct MAE; climb and maintain 080'.' The aircraft was in a 067' MIA at the time and only out of about 064-065'. I wanted to help this pilot because he got my other traffic in sight which helped me and give the other pilot an approach clearance; and earlier he departed PRB in a very timely fashion which also helped me out. I think that [I] temporarily blanked own his current climb status and thought that he was level at 070'.My close in scan of his data block and current MIA area was no where to be seen. I focused only on his future projected path.It also didn't help that I had a brand new D-Side that didn't help with any of the previous situations; nor alert me to the MIA situation when I issued the clearance.I didn't even see the MSAW flash for about a minute or so; and by that time corrective action was unnecessary. By the time I [tried] to fix it the aircraft would have been above the MIA.I need to have a better mental check in my head before issuing a clearance.I also think that the fact I was on my 'quick turn' day did not help. The quick turn really makes me tired because I do not get enough sleep; and the major change in schedule exhausts me.




Synopsis: ZOA Controller reported allowing a pilot to proceed direct to a fix while at an altitude that was lower then the MIA.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Learjet 40
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While departing to the north on the ORD5; we were instructed to slow to 250 KTS as I leveled off at 15;000 FT. I was indicating 290 KTS; and I complied with ATC instructions. No further mention or discussion about the request to reduce airspeed followed; and a quick review of the ORD5 confirmed that although some way points with a southerly routing required a mandatory 250 KTS; our routing did not. Although my First Officer had already done the updates for ORD; when time permitted I had my him check to see if a newer ORD SID might have not have been pulled. After searching; it was discovered that several revisions; including a new ORD6; had been missed. ORD6 required 250 KTS until advised in ALL sectors. My First Officer had written the ORD5 as the departure clearance; and since I also reviewed the ORD5 prior to departure; nothing seemed out of place. Upon reviewing the company filed flight plan; I discovered we were filed on the ORD6; but since my primary focus was on the 'as filed' portion of the flight plan following the written STAR; I didn't see that until much later. As noted; ATC only asked us to slow to 250 KTS and did not indicate anything was wrong - it was through our own searching that an error between the two departures was detected. The best remedy for this type of scenario is to have both pilots listen to the clearance and agree on it - most places I have flown this is an S.O.P.; and I think that from now on I will require both of us to copy the clearance to avoid this type of situation.




Synopsis: LR-40 Captain reported exceeding the charted 250 KT restriction on ORD6 departure. Crew was using expired ORD5 departure charts and did not copy the clearance correctly.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BNA.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B BNA
ATC / advisory: TRACON BNA
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the initial vector climb westbound (HDG 260 / ALT 4000 feet and climbing) on the KRISTA7 departure; the Jeppesen Navigation application failed. Pilot monitor did not have SID information. After making a determination that the application was stuck in processing phase; an attempt to re-start the EFB was attempted. The Microsoft Surface provided the option to 'update and shut down' or 'update and re-start'. The latter was selected and by the time the update; restart; and selection of navigation app was complete; the aircraft was past the last fix of the SID/DP and climbing through FL240.Event occurred while switching from check list page (After Take-off Checklist) to navigation application.The Microsoft Surface has been a very unstable platform; often freezing; and is painstakingly slow in processing user commands. This is the third time this has happened to me. In this case (and previous two incidents); I was forced to update the EFB before it allowed for a reset during a critical phase of flight. This particular brand works well about 40% of the time and is problematic approximately 60% of the time.  Switching to a more stable EFB such as the Apple iPad would be better. My experience with the latter product allowed for reliable use approximately 90% of the time (also 'on' means on; and 'off' means off). This would have been more problematic if we were departing from RNO and we lost the engine past V1. There would have been heavy reliance on the Pilot Monitoring's EFB for the complex departure procedure around terrain during IMC.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported the tablet provided; the Microsoft Surface; is an unreliable platform and could pose a safety hazard if it failed at the wrong time.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / Allegro
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was on an IFR flight plan in visual conditions except for scattered clouds at approximately 4;000 feet MSL. The flight was uneventful until I tried to lower the landing gear on final. At that time; the gear actuator circuit breaker tripped and the gear stayed in the up position. I initiated a missed approach; climbed and informed the Tower who immediately switched me to Approach Control. The flight continued westbound over the water and the malfunction was confirmed and the emergency gear extension checklist completed; however; the emergency gear cable was jammed and would not move the gear down. I decided to return to [departure airport] because I believed better emergency equipment and medical facilities (if needed) were there as compared to my destination. During the flight back attempts to rectify the problem continued; at certain points in consultation with mechanics and other pilots via ATC telephone relay. I then decided a gear up landing was inevitable and began preparing. A gear up landing was eventually completed and the aircraft evacuated. There was minimal damage to the gear doors; propeller and cowling. There were no injuries and no fuel or other fluid leakage. After the flight; I provided requested information to and coordinated activates of the fire department; security; police and airport operations.




Synopsis: A M201J gear actuator circuit breaker tripped when the gear was selected down. A gear up landing was completed with minimal damage.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After engine start and during taxi both the Captain and First Officer smelled a strong odor of dirty socks in the cockpit. We started to feel light headed and nauseous. I donned my oxygen mask. I checked with the flight attendants and they did not smell anything. We returned to the gate. We went to the hospital.


Second narrative: After push back and normal start of #2 engine; ground crew disconnected and CA instructed me to start #1. Engine #1 started normally. After start/taxi checks completed and the takeoff checklist initiated; we received taxi instructions; and began to roll. That's when I first recognized an unpleasant odor and made a comment to the CA. We continued taxi for another minute or two and the CA asked me if I smelled dirty socks. I replied yes; and the CA decided to return the gate; we coordinated with Ground to return and the CA put his O2 mask on. I elected to open the FO side window as we were still fairly close to terminal and wanted better communications. We elected to start the APU and turn off Engine Bleed air. We returned to a different gate than we departed from in another terminal after coordination with Ops. We didn't feel as well as we had previously; both pilots experiencing some nausea and headache. We notified station personnel and they helped coordinate our transport to the hospital for further evaluation.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported a dirty sock smell after beginning to taxi for takeoff. The flight returned to the gate and the pilots were transported to a hospital.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MRLB.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON MRLB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On initial arrival to MRLB; we planned on an ILS DME Runway 07 approach. This approach was loaded and briefed. Shortly after contact with Liberia approach; we were instructed to expect the VOR DME Runway 25 approach instead. This occurred approximately 15 miles north of the airport. As time was compressed due to our location to the airport; the captain did a cursory brief/load of the new approach. We were cleared to proceed to the LIB VOR; descend to 3000 feet and conduct the VOR DME Runway 25 approach. This was a VFR clear day event. I suggested VNAV as the flight mode to conduct the approach; as well as an airspeed of 180 knots for the course reversal to prevent a large radius turn near rising terrain. After crossing the VOR outbound and on the teardrop procedure turn at 3000 feet; the captain (PF) elected to use V/S mode and slowed the aircraft. Since we were cleared for the approach; level at 3000 feet and inside of the IAF; I asked to set the MCP to 1100 feet (FAF crossing altitude). The PF agreed and I set 1100 feet. LNAV was engaged. At the 10.0 DME outbound point; the captain (PF) chose to leave 3000 feet via V/S and begin a shallow descent to 1100 feet. The procedure does not allow a descent until 10.0 DME inbound to the LIB VOR. The airport was in sight throughout the entire approach. At some point during the course reversal; we received a GPWS alert 'caution terrain' and then a 'pull up' warning. I announced 'stop descending and climb'. The captain (PF) immediately stopped the descent and began a climb. This stopped the warning; we visually confirmed our clearance of terrain; and concluded the approach and landing without incident.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported receiving a GPWS 'Terrain; Pull Up' warning on approach to MRLB.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: 45 minutes prior to landing; I went to the lavatory. Passenger came to lavatory and told Flight Attendant she felt dizzy. Passenger laid on the ground and a doctor was called. I came out of lavatory and passenger was awake. Flight Attendant got an O2 bottle and gave O2 to passenger. Doctor came up to help with passenger. I needed to return to cockpit so I told the doctor to move behind first class curtain in case this was a security threat. Passenger said she was OK; but she was on the Flight Attendant's jumpseat. I got Lead Flight Attendant to act as a blocker with the galley cart while I called the First Officer to explain what happened. I was confident that passenger was not a threat so I allowed her to sit on jumpseat while I called the First Officer again to let me in. There was also a Flight Attendant sitting next to the passenger on jumpseat to assist. I returned to cockpit and called to Lead Flight Attendant to keep me advised. I checked in with Lead 2 times prior to landing and he said that passenger was ok and did not want assistance. This is a common occurrence and if I was not in the lavatory at the time; I would not deem this report necessary.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported an ill passenger was in the cockpit door secure area as the Captain prepared to reenter; causing a security concern.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ground Operations had run the APU all night for heat and had turned off the Engine Bleed switches. Only the APU Bleed switch was on. We missed catching it during our flows. Upon reaching the runway; we were expecting to wait for the traffic we saw on final; but Tower cleared us for takeoff. The Takeoff Checklist was hurried and with expectation bias we again missed that the engine bleeds were off. Taking ATC calls and talking about the aircraft on final kept us from recognizing that things weren't right; ears popping; etc. Center cleared us to climb to FL230. Climbing through 10;000 ft we ran the climb check. Once again expectation bias let me see the cabin climbing normally. I don't recall checking the cabin altitude. Climbing through 14;000 ft the Cabin ALT horn/light went off. I immediately saw the problem and turned the Engine Bleed switches on; called Center for a level off and descent to 10;000 ft. The cabin pressure returned to normal and after we felt all was stable we resumed our climb and continued the flight. I called the FAs (Flight Attendants) to check if the masks had fallen and to check if anything seemed abnormal to them. They said that they felt the pressure bump; but everything was ok other than more than normal noise around the door. The rest of the flight was non-eventful.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a Cabin Alt warning after taking off with the packs selected off.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D21.TRACON, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E D21
ATC / advisory: TRACON D21
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Trainee; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: Supervisor / CIC; Instructor
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working west departure combined with east departure. I accepted a point out from X position on Aircraft Y going to ZZZZ intersection. I stopped Aircraft X at 12;000. I noticed that Aircraft Y was level at 12;000 converging with Aircraft X. I climbed Aircraft X to 13;000 and assigned a frequency change to Center. After he switched frequencies; I recognized Aircraft Y began to climb. I notified the X controller that I had already changed Aircraft X's frequency. Coordination was made with Center that Aircraft X was their control.My recommendation is that east and west departure be de-combined early enough as to not have the position overloaded.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Three TRACON controllers reported that two aircraft at the same altitude on converging courses both started to climb with possible loss of separation.