elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Engine lost all oil pressure and oil quantity went to zero. Shutdown number 3 engine per appropriate emergency checklist. Elected to declare emergency with Center. Started descent toward the International Airport. Captain took aircraft and landed. No other significant problems encountered. I believe the engine lost all oil within 15 seconds and when this happens if you follow the emergency checklists and rely on the training received the aircraft can be recovered safely.


Second narrative: [No additional information in this report.]


Synopsis: A MD-11 number three engine lost oil and oil pressure at cruise so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we approached the end of runway; FO told Tower we were ready for takeoff. We both heard 'no delay; cleared for takeoff'. At the time we did not see any other aircraft at the end of the runway. As I started to take the runway I saw movement on the other side and stopped well short of the runway but not before crossing the hold line. We then queried ATC who informed us the clearance was for another aircraft. They subsequently cleared us for takeoff.First I broke my number 1 rule: If not 100 percent sure stop and verify! I will redouble my efforts to slow it down and be 100 percent sure of any and all clearances!


Second narrative: Upon reaching the end of Taxiway X; I called Tower and informed them we were ready to depart. We did not see a small general aviation aircraft on the other side of the runway also waiting to depart. I then heard Tower clear us to depart (what I thought). I read back the instructions as we rounded the corner from Taxiway X. Upon crossing the hold short line I heard Tower clear another aircraft to depart. We immediately came to a stop and saw the general aviation aircraft on the opposite taxiway. He also had crossed his hold short line. Tower inquired if we had already crossed the line and I acknowledged that we had. We were then cleared for an immediate departure. The small general aviation aircraft was asked to make a 180 back across his hold short line. He complied. When in question VERIFY! I did not do this. Verify your call sign in ANY ATC radio transmission. I assumed the takeoff clearance was for us and due to partially blocked radio call; missed the fact that it was not for us.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported they thought a clearance from the Tower to depart was for them; but was actually a clearance for an aircraft entering from the other side. The error was not detected prior to crossing the hold line.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Other unknown
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I experienced symptoms similar to what I normally associate with a common cold or seasonal allergies while serving as a crew member on a flight; the same conditions that are normally remedied with over the counter medications. It never crossed my mind at the time that it could be COVID; until after I got home.Since COVID symptoms vary from those of a common cold; a flu; or a total lack of symptoms altogether; non-medical personnel cannot be expected to self-diagnose. It would behoove the company to pre-screen crews prior to flight to avoid the trouble and cost incurred in situations like this. Until this is in place; and in my situation; I will call out sick rather than going to work and possibly risking the health and safety of our customers and co-workers.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported experiencing symptoms similar to a cold or allergies during flight and did not think it could be COVID-19 symptoms until at home.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight plan had us filed for the LAXX6 non-RNAV departure. Arrived at plane and were dealing with MEL Complete thrust management system inoperative and no clearance on file. Called company to re-file clearance; while plane was being closed up for departure; First Officer obtained clearance over radio; and the departure had been changed to the HOLTZ9. Still discussing the MEL item; we accepted an RNAV departure in a non-Pegasus airplane out of LAX. On departure; Tower informed us that we had drifted 1/2 mile north of runway and gave us a 220 heading. At point I realized that a crew briefing note said not to accept an RNAV departure out of LAX in a non-Pegasus aircraft. Called LAX Tower and they concurred there have been past problems with the departure depending on aircraft avionic installed.I have several suggestion: 1. Aircraft should not be dispatched from a major Maintenance Base with an inoperative thrust management system. 2. Dispatch should be aware of aircraft limitations and not file an unacceptable departure. 3. Many new First Officers on the property take the time to review with them all revised clearances and crew briefing pages each time a revised clearance is assigned. Possibly add note in preflight paperwork concerning non-Pegasus aircraft departing out of LAX as an extra layer to remind Captains not to accept RNAV departures.


Second narrative: The Captain and I were busy trying to research compliance procedures for auto-throttles inoperative. PDC was not available and had to call Dispatch to re-file clearance. After receiving clearance through ATC we did not notice that they changed our filed SID to an RNAV SID. After takeoff ATC asked us to turn to a heading in order to join back up on the SID. After trying to determine why this occurred we realized that we accepted an RNAV departure in a non-Pegasus.


Synopsis: A non-Pegasus B757 departed on the LAX HOLTZ9 RNAV Departure and had a track deviation detected by ATC; which also alerted to the crew to the Dispatch filing error.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: ZZZZZ3 Arrival into ZZZ; just over ZZZZZ1 Intersection; told by ATC to fly present heading; maintain 9;000 feet; and to expect Runway XXR due to weather moving east of the airport. Weather radar indicated moderate precipitation (no convection activity) for about 5 miles; no red and no turbulence indications. At that time we observed some static off the nose of the aircraft; then either a lightning strike or static discharge. We also experienced a shot duration of moderate turbulence; aircraft descended approximately 300 feet; then returned to assigned altitude. Flight landed without incident. No initial lighting damage noted by maintenance; but aircraft taken out of service for further inspection. WSI was also being utilized and no lightning was indicated in the vicinity of our aircraft flight path.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported an altitude excursion and a possible lightning strike or static discharge during approach flying through weather/turbulence.
Date: 201603
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing thru 400 feet I selected LNAV; but it did not engage. The Captain continued to fly the aircraft and at approximately 1600 feet I requested vectors to insure we did not violate ourselves; and continued to troubleshoot the problem. At 3000 feet the Captain called for VNAV but after selection it did not engage. As we continue trying to figure out why neither LNAV; nor VNAV would engage; we climbed thru the assigned altitude of 4000 feet.The altitude deviation was noticed and we stop the ascent at 4500 feet. Before we could begin to descend to 4000 feet; ATC gave us a climb to higher altitude. Once the climb was begun I realized neither FD switch had been selected to ON. Upon selecting ON both LNAV and VNAV engaged and the flight continued without further trouble. ATC never queried us as to any altitude deviation.The habit of turning both FD switches to OFF after landing should be stopped. During the Departure Briefing; acknowledging the FD switches match who is flying the leg should be emphasized.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported having difficulty engaging LNAV and VNAV after takeoff; and then noticed both FD switches were off; inhibiting those functions.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DXR.Airport, CT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D DXR
ATC / advisory: Tower DXR
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On approach to DXR in night conditions; I was about 1 nautical mile from the airport; on a straight-in approach to Runway 26; behind another aircraft. I was concentrating on slowing down behind the slower-moving airplane ahead of me; and was not familiar with this approach; at night. I suddenly realized that there was a pole with a red light mounted atop it; ahead of my left wing. I swerved to the right to be sure that I would avoid striking the pole; when I realized that I could see the tops of treetops in my landing lights. I increased power and climbed to a safe altitude; then continued the approach.I feel that there should be a lighted visual approach slope indicator or precision approach path indicator for Runway 26; to help avoid this same situation; in the future. The rising terrain to the east of DXR; which is in a valley; necessitates this improvement.




Synopsis: A pilot reported that on approach there appeared a pole with a red light mounted atop it; ahead of the left wing.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EDDP.Airport, FO
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower EDDP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When we received clearance; we were given NAMUB 2S departure flight plan route. NIMBY was on our flight plan to turn left at 9 DME to NAMUD and intercept a T airway southbound. When we were handed off to Munich they queried us on our departure and said we were filed on the ODLUN2s with a right turn north to ODLUN intersection. They flew us north for about 25 NM the westbound for approximately 50 NM then south toward GTQ VOR . None of which was on our filed routing. No explanation; no traffic conflict; no clue!


Second narrative: Captain called for and received clearance. Both pilots listened on headsets. We heard and read back the NAMUB 2S departure. This made sense for our direction of flight and our flight plan fixes. The person handling Clearance was also handling the push and ground control; duties. The push back; start and taxi were all normal. The noise abatement procedure and initial route of flight were thoroughly briefed. We were switched to tower and departed shortly thereafter. After takeoff tower switched us to departure. He seemed surprised at our route of flight and gave us a heading of 350. This was a large turn in the opposite direction of what we expected. Radio congestion was a factor; but eventually the controller stated that we were supposed to have flown the ODLUN 2S departure. Needless to say this was a surprise to us. This was my first departure out of EDDP. I had no reason question our departure; as I was convinced that were heard and read back the correct clearance. From now on I will have to insist that we read back phonetically the departure clearance. The language barrier is significant. I wonder if it is possible for the company Field Officer/Agent to coordinate with the local controllers and find out what the usual SID/STAR would be in use; and file that accordingly.


Synopsis: An aircraft departed EDDP filed on the NAMUB 2S but ATC stated they should have been flying the ODLUN 2S and so issue that change to them.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LFPG.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Rejected Takeoff
ATC / advisory: Tower LFPG
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Distracted by discussions about the long line for takeoff; fuel requirements for the next leg and possible delays if we did not 'tanker' enough fuel out of Paris; we missed setting the flaps in the before takeoff checklist. At approximately 45 KIAS we received a configuration alert and began a rejected takeoff around 60 KIAS. We cleared the runway at the first high speed taxiway; performed all the checklists appropriate to complete the rejected takeoff (to include brake cooling charts) and set the aircraft up for takeoff again; taxied back to the runway holding point; and departed uneventfully. Lesson learned on completing the checklists early; and before discussing down-range issues.I believe I allowed my concern for fuel down-range to distract me from normal checklist flow. It being my first time operating this sequence; the note about extended delays for fuel at the first stop and my awareness that a long line for departure could result in us landing with less than required for the subsequent leg; somehow I began thinking that through before I called for normal checklists. My First Officer; who had flown this sequence before; had good input for me on the fuel situation; and perhaps my questions to him distracted him from catching the checklists. I take full responsibility for the error.Good reminder for me as a new Captain: The here and now is more important than the there and later; meaning get my required normal checklists and briefings out of the way before I allow a down-range topic to be discussed. As I solidify my habits and routines in this jet that is new to me; prioritize getting required items done as early as possible to prevent my crew from errors of distraction.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reports becoming distracted by fuel considerations for the next leg and forgets to call for the before takeoff checklist. The flaps are never set and the takeoff warning sounds at 45 knots; resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SEA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: New arrival procedures just implemented with Seattle Center due to greener skies which allow more aircraft into our TRACON airspace which in my opinion is new to us and the Center and the procedures are not finely tuned yet. I was working arrival east and west and in a matter of 15 minutes or more the airspace became very busy with arrivals to Seattle; arrivals to Boeing and arrivals to Paine Airport which we now control. I was at my maximum ability to separate all the aircraft that I had during the last 20 minutes or so of my time on position. As it was getting busier I looked over towards the Supervisor and was thinking of calling for help and then realized that he wasn't even aware of the building volume and was just standing away from the scopes in front of his desk doing nothing at the moment. I did not see a Traffic Management Specialist in the room either. I was getting so busy that I decided to just slug it out. In hindsight I should have taken that moment and yelled for the Supervisor to either split the arrival positions or get an extra set of eyes over to me. We have tools to forecast the upcoming hour's potential traffic and the supervisor responsibility is to open and close positions with this knowledge. The supervisors in our room; particularly this one; are known to open/split positions when we either don't need to but have many controllers on shift and it makes them look good and also the flip side they also don't open/split positions up at times when traffic is building. In other words they don't use good judgment; it is random to why they open and close positions. In this case they should have had Arrival West open and Arrival East open earlier instead of keeping it combined. I do believe that we did NOT have as many controllers available in the room on that day shift as we usually do. The Supervisor just was not aware of the room situation. Our supervisors are not aware of how to use the controllers in an effective way. We get caught too often either splitting positions open with little volume of traffic but lots of controllers or like yesterday positions are combined when they should NOT be because the supervisors are not being proactive and aware.




Synopsis: S46 Controller described a very busy traffic period when supervisors were apparently unaware of the building traffic and taking no action to assist; the reporter noting a continued lack of attentive supervision in the control room.