elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On Date; I was doing a LOSA (Line Operations Safety Audit) observation on the ramp on Gate XX. While waiting for the 737-800 on Gate XX to pushout Gate XY E175 pushed out and was disconnected right behind the 737-800 on Gate XY. The E175 was waiting for the A319 that was at the top of the [alley] waiting to taxi off on to the live movement area so that the E175 [was able] to proceed itself; in that time a fuel tanker drove up behind the E175 on the Vehicle Service Road (VSR) saw the aircraft; proceeded to drive around the E175 and squeeze in between the E175 wing and the tail of the 737-800 parked on Gate XY and around the back of the A319 that was about to taxi into the live movement area and at no point in time did this vehicle stop he just continue go. It's procedure that all vehicles give the aircraft the right away when they are about to taxi off. I would consider this to be a near miss for reasons of if this the E175 would have throttle up and begin to taxi a collision of the low wing and the fuel tanker could've taken place. This brings significant damage to the aircraft wing; cancellation of the flight and perhaps a potential fuel spill from the fuel tanker. This is an airport violation the drive was to stop and wait for the aircraft to taxi off to then proceed on the VSR. This information could be found in the city and ZZZ Airport Non-Movement Area Driver Training. All airport personnel who drives on the ramp is require to take this training to be able to drive on the ramp.




Synopsis: Groud employee conducting a LOSA observation on the ramp reported a near miss occurred when a fuel tanker truck drove close by several aircraft preparing to taxi.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Lightly cloudy; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Aerobatics
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a routine flight; I dropped to approximately 250 feet AGL and flew the length of the runway with a sharp maneuver at the end.While flying back to the airport from a wonderful aerobatic flight; I was approaching from a direction that I rarely approach from; I was approximately 1;000 AGL slowing the aircraft in preparation to join crosswind for landing. As I neared the center line of the runway; I made a decision that I immediately regretted. I lowered my nose and dived towards the runway. At approximately 250 feet AGL I conducted a low approach down the runway. At the end of the runway I did a barrel roll; entering and exiting the maneuver at approximately 500 feet AGL. Maybe 5 seconds passed between the thought occurring and me completing the maneuver. I then departed the pattern and reentered for landing.This was an impulsive and completely stupid decision; and while it resulted in no incident; and was in a very remote area posing no danger to anyone; it was a deviation from my regular flying practices that I can only conclude was ego and impulse driven. I greatly regret my actions. And I greatly regret my lack of restraint and professionalism.I have decided; in an attempt to retrain myself; to consult with regulation and aerobatic professionals. Learn and retain as much regulation associated with aerobatic and low level flight as possible; and not conduct any further SOLO aerobatics until I have completed a refresher course specifically for safe aerobatic maneuvers. I am also taking time to refresh my mindset; and acknowledge and stop impulsive and unsafe thought from entering my cockpit in any stage of flight.




Synopsis: Experimental aircraft pilot reported performing unplanned low level aerobatics over a non towered airport.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing thru FL380 to FL390; we noticed the aircraft getting slow. PF disconnected autopilot and pitched down three degrees to accelerate preventing stick shaker/stall. We lost at least 1;000 feet then; after accelerating; climbed back to FL390. ATC never inquired of our altitude loss nor did we see any conflicting traffic in our vicinity. Somehow we were in VS mode instead of VNAV. Neither PM or PF caught it.I believe that automation in the cockpit is taking away our scan and awareness of what the airplane is doing; I trust it too much! I also know we were tired as this was a long day; and; the last leg of the night.


Second narrative: We noted the aircraft was climbing in Vertical Speed instead of VNAV. As the PF; I reached up and hit the VNAV and the plane pitched down to accelerate. At that point; I turned off the autopilot to try to mitigate the decent; since we were supposed to be climbing. Because we were at high altitude; I wanted to try to make less abrupt inputs. Minimize distractions (keep conversations to a minimum) while climbing out so that we're not distracted from flying/monitoring the climbout.


Synopsis: When their B737-700 was climbing out of FL380 for FL390 the flight crew discovered they were in Vertical Speed mode instead of NVAV and the airspeed was rapidly declining into the yellow arc. The PF took over manual control to re-accelerate which resulted in the loss of approximately 1;000 feet. They then continued climb to their cleared altitude.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the RAVNN 3 Arrival; we had received a few unsolicited shortcuts and eventually found ourselves three thousand feet high (or so) with approximately 10 miles to go before crossing SABBI (published altitude 15;000 feet). I had mentioned it to the Pilot Flying and he made a correction. Other Pilot Monitoring duties pulled my attention away for a minute or two but when I came back to our vertical profile it was evident we would not be crossing SABBI at the published altitude. Due to radio congestion; I was not able to advise Potomac Approach in advance of the impending altitude deviation before crossing SABBI. Upon eventual contact; about one mile past SABBI; Approach said no problem but to make sure we meet the next one.  The aircraft was on Autopilot in VNAV PATH. If there was a flight management status change; it was never communicated. Prior to this event; there were some communication issues with the Pilot Flying. I will not attempt to assign background experience as a cause but he would often mumble checklist responses and use incorrect terminology. The turn was very quiet in the cockpit aside from the required callouts. From a technical standpoint; I do not know what happened with the aircraft in regards to remaining high. VNAV PATH was highlighted on the FMA and there were no notes on the CDU that we would not attain the crossing restriction. Ultimately the deviation distills into poor monitoring (my part) and poor communication (our part). Correct terminology and clear communications would certainly make the work environment easier but I cannot be certain if it was the cause of this situation.  Concerning Pilot Monitoring; one can always make the argument the Pilot Monitoring needs to do more.




Synopsis: Air carrier on the RAVNN STAR into BWI missed a crossing restriction due to miscommunications within the cockpit and also listed unsolicited ATC 'shortcuts' as contributing to the event.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Tower, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Handoff / Assist
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was instructed to cross Runway 25L northbound at Taxiway G and turn right on Taxiway H. Aircraft X crossed the runway; but turned before he reached H. His data tag dropped since he was in a masked area of the ASDE-X. He turned right (eastbound) between the runway and the taxiway. When Aircraft X realized his mistake he started making a right turn toward the runway. I sent an aircraft around and got Aircraft X facing northbound and had him cross Runway 25R as well.The issue here is the runway markings at 25L and G and H. This is at least the 5th such incident in the past few months of our current closure (shortening of Runway 25R). Management is aware of this problem yet it continues. This needs to be fixed. The lead in lines are confusing and keep leading aircraft to turn onto Runway 25L. We need help from the airport to get this done. Not sure why the airport has not yet fixed this; but they apparently need more motivation.This is actually a place where a confused aircraft could cause an accident. Had I not stopped Aircraft X; he appeared to be heading back to Runway 25L. The safety logic would not have sounded until he re-entered the non-masked area on the runway. This could easily have led to a crash. It is shameful that it has not been fixed yet.


Second narrative: The City Operations has identified the problem as misleading taxi lines. The City has decided to postpone the fix due to construction on the airport. It was night time; this very well could have resulted in the loss of life if the aircraft hit. It is a simple fix. Have the city remove the misleading taxi line that encourages pilots to make a right turn down Runway 25L.


Synopsis: LAX Tower Controllers reported a taxiway incursion prompting them to send landing traffic to go-around.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: UKFV.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center UKFV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were enroute from the Middle East to Europe and flew thru an airspace temporarily off limits to U.S. Airlines. This is a route I have flown many times in the past with similar routing. I was the operating IRO (International Relief Officer) and flying with two other crew members who were also very familiar with this route. We were filed for this flight by our company dispatcher on a 'normal' route and we missed the NOTAM identifying this particular airspace as temporarily off limits for U.S. operators. I believe complacency played a role in this case; along with not closely enough reading all of NOTAMs listed in our flight paperwork. We do pass thru many countries and airspaces every day as International crew members and we sometimes think we are more familiar and comfortable than we probably should be. Also; the ever changing political climate in the world adds to the complexity of international airspace and this obviously affects the workload of international airline crew members. Bottom line; we all missed the pertinent NOTAM all the way down the line from our Dispatcher to the other two crew members and myself. I will certainly pay much more attention to all details of my flight paper work in the future whether I am familiar with the route/flight or not.


Second narrative: I recently vacationed on the beaches of the Black Sea so flying the more efficient route over the Black Sea did not give me any red flags. In fact; flying route L851 was so familiar that I was glad to see our carrier using it again. It did not dawn on me that the UKFV FIR area was still prohibited. I must have missed the NOTAM. No incident occurred in this airspace.


Synopsis: A U.S. based airline crew on a flight from the Middle East to Europe was filed through Crimea (UKFV) unaware US carrier flight through that airspace was prohibited.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Overhead Bins; Latches
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon arrival; we were met by a Company Mechanic. He said he was there to fix a broken overhead bin. I knew nothing about the forward bin. The Mechanic informed me that a Passenger took photos of the bin and was appalled about the appearance of our aircraft; and sent the photos to a social media website. The complaint went right to the top of Maintenance and the Mechanic was there immediately to try to repair the bin. I did not preflight the bin (not in my job description); the Flight Attendant never said a word to me about the issue; and I never had a chance to talk to the Passenger. Apparently there was some rubber sealant that had come loose from the underside of the bin. It functioned safely and was not broken; it was merely a cosmetic rubber strand dangling from the most forward underside of the bin. It was promptly deferred by the Mechanic. Flight Attendant should've told me what was going on. He bolted before I could ask him anything since they were involved in a swap.




Synopsis: B737 Captain was informed by a Mechanic at gate arrival that he was present to repair an overhead bin which the Captain was completely unaware of. A previous passenger had photographed a piece of hanging rubber trim and published it on a social media website.
Date: 201511
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: A310
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: DISPATCHERS; not Training and Standards; maintains operational control of flights. Fuel policy is very often NOT followed depending on various circumstances. It is simply a guideline; called a policy. In this case with the concurrence of my manager; I over tanker on a regular basis and will continue to do so for the following reasons:1. My manager and I stated the reasons of this over-tankering practice in last year's recurrent to the instructors of the class we both attended. 2. Aircraft has a 1.5 hour quick turn. Why possibly delay the flight?.... 3. Fuel truck would otherwise be called as soon as possible for the aircraft at destination to fuel if flight is to be on time. 4. We often fuel Airbus aircraft above this tankering parameter more than 1.5 hours prior to push. There is not policy against such fueling. The former policy stipulated do not tanker more only if more than 12 hour before the next flight. That former policy DID make sense but only while aircraft leaks issues remained. 5. This destination is an Islamic terrorist hotbed. We try not to overnight crews there if possible. And I read the news.... 6. Tankering enhances safety/security in this situation. All performance parameters are being met. Safety and Security takes precedence. 7. Tankering when indicated (as in this case) saves the company money and makes 'fuel sense'.I recommend changing the fuel tankering policy to reflect these realities. At the very least acknowledge the operational control in this situation of the dispatcher. This fuel policy as the others must take a back seat to the actual flight dispatchers operational control and best judgment as stipulated in the FAR's. Get rid of the confusion on who should make such decisions ('what caused this event') as I suspect the reports were added to the system by someone in Training and Standards.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported that company policy concerning fuel tankering to international destinations needed to be clarified.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL430 emergency pressurization came on. Next the cabin altitude annunciator light illuminated. Cabin altitude was approximately 11;500 feet. We performed emergency checklist; notified ATC; and requested immediate descent to 10;000 feet. The decision was made to divert to [a suitable nearby airport]. While passing approximately 16;000 feet MSL the cabin altitude annunciator extinguished.  No further problems and aircraft was landed without emergency assistance.


Second narrative: Part 91 ferry flight to pick up passengers on the next leg. We just reached FL430; the filed altitude. A few minutes after leveling off; we both heard the Emergency Pressure Valve open [and] at the same time we saw the EMER PRESS annunciator. It came on and off intermittently. The airplane cabin altitude rose rapidly. I remember seeing the Cabin altitude at 7;000 feet; and watch it rise to 11;500 feet. The CAB ALT annunciator and Master Warning lights did come on. The Pilot Monitoring put his mask on first; I held my mask to my face and monitored the radio until he finished securing his mask; then secured mine. It took a movement to talk to ATC due to radio congestion; but did get clearance down to FL260; and a few other intermediate levels. We never had to level off in our descent. In our descent; we did notice the cabin altitude maintained 11;500 feet. So; at times I did slow the rate of descent to our clearance limit; but that was relatively minimal. We were cleared to 10;000ft without interruption otherwise. At approx 16;000ft; the CAB ALT and EMER PRESS annunciators extinguished. The pilot monitoring did accomplish the QRH emergency descent. After we established our descent. We opted to land at the closest field in front of us. ATC; at times; did have a hard time understanding our radio transmissions due to the oxygen masks. We landed uneventfully.


Synopsis: CE-560EP flight crew reported loss of cabin pressurization at FL430. An emergency descent was executed and the flight diverted to a nearby suitable airport.