Date: 201704
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I believe we need to review and critique our performance as an operation when severe weather impacted Washington Dulles; in particular; a tornado warning. We had closed and the Jet Bridge was pulled. When calling for push we were told all departure gates were closed; [and] we would know more in about 40 minutes. We called ops to get the Jet Bridge back and provide egress. Multiple calls on both VHF radios with no response. I advised the push crew. They chocked us and told us to call when we knew more. Again; we tried to contact ops. No response. No response to other aircraft. I even said; 'Ops; at least say standby so we know we're getting through'. No answer for quite a few minutes. Then we got an alert for a tornado warning. Again; multiple calls to Ops trying to confirm location of tornado. No response. I asked ops in blind is tornado going to impact airport? No answer. We could not use our radar of course. We told OPS we need to get these passengers inside the building. Multiple aircraft said the same. No answer. I called ramp. They did not know if a tornado was imminent. I called dispatch and the dispatcher advised the rotating cell that spawned the tornado warning was five miles south-southwest and going to impact Airport. The jet bridge driver arrived. I told everyone to move forward we would be getting off Airplane and into building. We were ready to get our passengers into the building. The gate agent hesitated with the Jet Bridge. Our passengers were ready to go. Then the gate agent either made a call or received a call and after having been at the controls another minute or two went back to the terminal. The winds were calm and remained so for plenty of time to get our passengers off the plane. We told OPS we needed to get the passengers off the plane. They advised us the ramp was closed. We told them we were parked and chocked and just needed the Jet Bridge. After a couple minutes; they advised they could see us and since we were hooked up to a tug THEY felt the airplane was the safest place to be. We advised we strongly disagree with this decision and we wanted to get the passengers off. We still had time to get the passengers off the airplane. I contacted the Washington flight office who transferred me to [the] Assistant Chief Pilot who was trying to assist us; however; now the weather was on us and it truly would not have been safe to move passengers and have them in the Jet Bridge when the weather hit. When it was obvious to me that we were indeed not going to get assistance to seek safe shelter I got on the PA and had everyone take their seats and fasten seatbelts including the Flight Attendants. The tornado did not develop and thus; no one was injured. However; that was not due to anything we as an operation did. Operations did not know that it was not going to develop and that the airplane would be safe. It was I believe a blanket 5 miles thunderstorm rule and lack of communication and coordination as an operation that risked the safety of our passengers. In this instance; we needed to 'think outside of the box'. I understand the lightning threat to the jet bridge; however; I think the tornado threat to passengers on an airplane was a much greater threat. My impression is that the attitude from operations afterwards was: there was no tornado. However; at the time they did not know better than the National Weather Service or Dispatch.I have personally seen what a tornado can do to an airport (airplanes turned over; aircraft on its tail) and an airplane is not the place to be whether hooked to a tug by a tow bar or not. Tow bar connections are designed to break and it's happened to me a couple of times with a lot less stress on it than we may have put on it. We; as an operation; need to do a better job during severe weather as it develops or stop the operation entirely. We need to be able to communicate better; get information to the captain better and be more agile as an operation. Had we acted on thefirst; second; third request we could have gotten the passengers; whose safety we have taken responsibility for; off our plane and into a safer building. When [our] passengers get on an airplane; [we are] responsible for their safety and the Captain; in particular is responsible. However; of course the captain needs assistance and timely information. I did not get either. Per the Flight Operations Manual and the FARs the Captain is the final authority for the safe; comfortable; on-time and efficient operation of the aircraft. It is not up to someone downstairs to decide that no; the passengers whose safety the Captain is tasked with would be safer somewhere else. Do not get me wrong; I would have taken advice and information from OPS. I did not get either. We need to work to be more 'agile' and responsive to the needs of the flight crew during severe weather as these situations are very dynamic and can be dangerous.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported the lack of communication and coordination with Operations during severe weather (including a tornado warning) short circuited his decision making authority; prevented him from deplaning his passengers; and jeopardized the passenger's safety.