Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Stall Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On EMB-145 aircraft flight into ZZZ; the Rudder Yaw Trim Indication on the EICAS was erratic.  Maintenance Control dispatched Contract Maintenance to issue MEL 27-4 (Yaw Trim Indication) which requires an Operational Check procedure of [electrically] powering down the aircraft and powering back up.   Upon power up; the Stall Protection Test FAILED- No Pusher and had EICAS SPS Advanced 'Stick Pusher Fail' and 'AOA' amber comparator fault on the First Officer's (F/O) Airspeed Indicator.  Company mechanics from ZZZ1 did road trip to ZZZ and changed out the Stall Protection Computer.  The Stall Test still FAILED. The mechanics then 'dummy replaced' the Stick Pusher (they said they couldn't legally replace the Pusher because this requires an Inspection Authorized (IA) Mechanic and neither of them were IA qualified).  But the test FAILED again even with this dummy procedure on the Stick Pusher. The mechanics then 'dummy replaced' the stick pusher by unplugging the original stick pusher box and plugging in a new stick pusher box; because replacing the stick pusher requires an IA sign-off which neither had. The Stick Pusher still FAILED its test.  Maintenance Control informed me that the 'dummy' procedure means that one stick pusher was slaved to another.  However; Maintenance Control informed that there are no written procedures for this and that mechanics learn to use the installation instructions on their own and do not need IA sign off and not having approved written FAA procedure is acceptable.   The Chief Pilot also supports these maintenance practices claiming it is standard for Maintenance to perform procedures not written under FAA approved procedures. He added that when mechanics say the airplane is good to go; than pilots must accept their word because they are the mechanics.  Further; Chief Pilot said that Maintenance performs tasks that are not procedures in order to get the airplane back in service and captains do not need to know every little detail done to the aircraft. Aircraft was out of service for over 27 hours; yet Maintenance Control and Chief Pilot concurred that if mechanics say the aircraft is good to go; then PIC need not inquire further.  Inquiring further leads to Management filing insubordination actions against PIC and the threat of the loss of their career.  PIC aware that mechanics had performed a 'dummy' procedure but Maintenance Control refused to provide PIC with the procedure stating that no such written procedure exist.  Maintenance possibly performing procedures for which the company does not have approval from the FAA. PIC cannot ensure compliance with designated duties without requested supporting information.Maintenance should cease from performing unapproved procedures by non-qualified IA mechanics. Strict compliance with all FARs and approved procedures are the only assurance to a reliable safe airline. PIC must be provided with supporting information to meet their delegated duties of ensuring airworthiness. Company policy is recognizing that running a safe operation is the key to our success. Safety must be the first and foremost consideration in every decision and in every facet of the company. Each employee is responsible for complying with all safety policies and procedures to ensure his or her safety; and the safety of coworkers and our customers. Each employee will immediately and accurately report safety issues to his or her Supervisor. The Captain must ensure that the strict usage of checklists is complied with in all operations. 14 CFR 91.3 Safety responsibility.  14 CFR 121.563; 121.701 and Flight Manual. Review the Logbook and concur as to the airworthiness of the aircraft and the Logbook has been completed and correctly signed-off. Lack of approved procedures for maintaining aircraft. Airline Transport Pilot (ATP). Stick Pusher procedures compliance issue.

Callback: Reporter stated seeing Rudder Yaw Trim Indicator fluctuate on EICAS display; but did not feel anything from the EMB-145 aircraft. Not sure what was going on; so disconnected Autopilot; EICAS indicated Yaw Trim still erratic. After arrival; Contract Maintenance performed Rudder Trim Check to verify rudder pedals were at neutral to satisfy an MEL of the Rudder Trim Indication.  Prior to each flight however; a pre-flight check of the Stall Protection System (SPS) is required. Since the aircraft was powered down than powered back up as part of the Rudder Trim Check; another Stall Protection System Operational Check was required. That's when the Aural Warning and Stick Shaker worked; but the Stick Pusher would not function.Reporter stated Contract Maintenance did not use a Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) or any troubleshooting Guidelines and no reference to the maintenance procedures used were noted in the Logbook. The same aircraft continued to have four more incidences of Rudder Yaw Trim indication problems.



Synopsis: A Captain reports about improper maintenance practices that were applied to an EMB-145 aircraft during troubleshooting procedures for a Stall Protection System (SPS) Stick Pusher 'Fail' EICAS indication. The unwritten and unapproved Maintenance practices were considered 'OK' by the Chief Pilot and Maintenance Controller as acceptable practices that should not be questioned by a pilot.