elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Case
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; MEL; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Found Speed Tape on outboard aft area of #2 Engine nose approximately three o'clock position. No colored Dot [sticker] and no Deferral Number in logbook. Notified Supervisor then removed tape to examine why installed. Found a four and half inch (4-1/2') scratch; no damage in mesh; pirep; per Structural Repair Manual (SRM) 54-15-01-1a. When I requested a deferral from Maintenance Control; I was given ATA Chapter 54-99. The correct ATA Chapter for cowling is ATA-71. I believe ATA-54 does not apply; and ATA-71 must be used.The Deferral List (Manual) is not complete; needs to be updated with each ATA that might have metallic tape issues. We're using incorrect ATA Chapters because the correct ATA does not have reference in the Deferral List. Update the Deferral List for all applicable ATA chapters; including the Engine ATA Chapters.

Callback: Reporter stated they use a Deferral List similar to the MEL; CDL and NEF Lists with limited ATA Chapters that can be used to track discrepancies involving Metallic Tape as a sign-off. The Speed Tape that is used for repair on their B767-300 engine Inlet Guide Vanes (IGV) and Outlet Guide Vanes (OGV) is not the typical thin; three inch wide Speed tape; but a 9' to 10' inch wide; very thick metallic tape. What mechanics and pilots are seeing on the flight line is peeling; separating and shredding of improperly applied metallic tape or the unapproved 3'-inch wide tape. Reporter stated that currently there is no Engine ATA Chapters on their Deferral List for the Engine Fan case that has approval for the use of Metallic Tape on the IGVs and OGVs. Part of the issue also involves what to do when the applied tape is no longer serviceable on the IGVs or OGVs. That's why he recommended the correct ATA Chapters be updated on the Deferral list to reflect the area that has metallic tape applied. Instead; his Engineering department decided to allow continued operation of the affected engines irregardless of the condition of the applied tape. These are overwater ETOPS aircraft.



Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports about the lack of proper documentation and deferral tracking of metallic type Speed Tape applied to the # 2 Engine Outlet Guide Vanes (OGVs) on their B767-300 ETOPS aircraft.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Driven Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight at 41;000 feet I experienced an engine failure. Initially the failure manifested itself with a fuel boost pump failure and associated popped circuit breaker. Immediately thereafter; the engine flamed out and rolled back. We declared an emergency; obtained a lower altitude and clearance into a nearby airport. We worked through all appropriate checklists and performed an uneventful single engine landing. Having flown Part 121 in the past; the training gained there was extremely helpful in handling the situation. In working with Contract Maintenance; and several manufacturers; a bad engine driven fuel pump was identified and changed as a result. Freezing fuel was a second considered possibility. Since fuel contamination was considered a possibility I contacted the last vendor we purchased fuel from. They quarantined their truck; sumped it; contacted other clients who took fuel from the same truck and advised them. The fuel samples were clear and no adverse reports were received from other customers.




Synopsis: A Falcon F20 engine flamed out at FL410 after the engine driven fuel pump failed. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working as a mechanic helper; removed electric hydraulic pump 3a from Aircraft X. [Ordered new] O-rings; [but] supervisor on duty instructed us to re-install old hydraulic pump back in the aircraft and also did not service hydraulic system.  Learned next day by management aircraft was back in service.Supervisor did not followed established procedures.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Maintenance Technician and helper reported being instructed to reinstall a part because replacement parts were not in stock.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E FQD
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Even with two GPS receivers; suddenly I lost all GPS information (no error messages) and it continued to be off for the remaining 2 hours of the flight. However; in a dozen flights since then; the problem has not recurred.




Synopsis: Instructor reported an unexplained loss of all GPS information during the last two hours of a flight.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing roll
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a non-company pilot training flight the brakes were used excessively during landing roll causing the left main tire to deflate. This was the second flight I had made with this particular pilot. He was sitting in the left seat while I provided flight instruction from the right seat. We had completed several takeoffs and landings during the preceding flight and during the incident flight. On this particular landing the student pilot applied excessive brake pressure during the landing roll. Before I could verbally correct his actions the left main tire went flat. We stopped on the runway; contacted ATC and our company; performed the after landing and shutdown checklists and then waited for maintenance personnel. The tire was replaced. There were no injuries; no damage to the aircraft or to the runway. I normally brief other pilots on the dangers of applying the brakes during the landing. I will now stress the dangers of excessive brake use throughout the landing roll as well.




Synopsis: A PC12 tire failed during landing when a student used the brakes aggressively after touch down.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Aircraft: ATR 42
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Second aircraft: SA-227 AC Metro III
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working three sectors combined; I had a D-Side. An ATR42 inbound to ADQ descending to 060. A Fairchild SA-227 Metro was released (rather late) climbing to the MIA of 050. The ATR42 had the airport in sight; had requested clearance for the visual approach; was told to continue inbound and advised of the Metro traffic climbing to 050. I knew he was getting close to the airport; I had traffic complexity issues at 3 different airports going on at the same time. I was thinking one thing but my mouth was saying something different as my brain started moving on to the next task.  I requested the ATR42 report 5 miles north of the VOR and decided I had better give him a holding clearance just in case (though didn't expect he would hold) in my holding clearance I told him to maintain 050 instead of 060. I didn't realize I had said it; he even read back 050 and I didn't hear the read back. Listening to the tape you could hear the hesitancy so I believe he was questioning it but he didn't say anything. Fortunately my D-Side looked at me funny and the Supervisor who had been monitoring looked at me funny and said; 'You know you said 050 right?' I didn't know it; but I didn't waste any time fixing it. Both aircraft were non RADAR; however the Metro had just reported 040 and I believe the ATR42 was barely out of 070 so I do not believe separation was actually lost but I did not only give an altitude I didn't intend; but also missed the read back. Teamwork saved this; my D-Side as well as the Supervisor monitoring the busy session. Staffing staffing staffing. Our staffing is hurting so badly; Sector 9 should have been split off long before the incident but we are so tight that we push the traffic volumes. Expectancy factor and moving on to the next task bit me.  Secondly; having a Supervisor monitoring; being that extra pair of ears paid off here. All too often at our facility; we have supervisors working our area that are neither assigned to our area nor certified in any sector in our area. The have zero knowledge of the sectors within that area and are unable to provide the type of assistance that this particular Supervisor was able to provide. This one happened to be assigned to the area and certified on a couple of sectors within the area.




Synopsis: ZAN Controller described a near loss of separation when intending to issue one altitude but in fact issued another caught by a fellow controller and corrected.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Taxi; Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After receiving a last minute MEL for a deferred FO reading light; we departed without the appropriate DTG (Date Time Group) from Dispatch. The book had been completed and closed correctly.  All procedures of the MEL were complied with and verified. Climbing through 10;000 feet we realized my error.After not flying for approximately 5 weeks my normal rhythm in the cockpit was off.  A high workload environment along with receiving the Maintenance book and the close out at the same time just prior to push caused me to be distracted and miss the step of notifying Dispatch of the new MEL.  I cross referenced the close out revision number with the signed release. They matched. I believe somehow in my mind that because I received the close out that I had signed an updated release.This event is my responsibility and the error rests on my shoulders. The only slight suggestion I could recommend would be to prevent a weight and balance close out from being sent if maintenance is on board. While it remains my responsibility this could help trap this type of error. I verify the close out revision number against the flight plan. They matched. I gave myself a false impression that my paperwork was in order.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported departing without correct paperwork and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The chocks were not removed from the aircraft prior to taxi. We were parked on a taxiway short of the active Runway at the holding point. It was night and the area was completely unlit. I took my break in a bunk and returned to flight-deck to be part of the takeoff briefing. We were disappointed to learn that our ground handling personnel had abandoned us. This happens in ZZZZ and other US military bases from time to time. This particular day was challenging for [us]. It was apparent that conflict existed within the personnel handling the aircraft. Nevertheless; it was no excuse to disregard basic start-up procedures. We considered contacting them on their ground handling frequency; but considering the extreme likelihood that they would not return to our aircraft. Intuitively; we knew that they would not further contribute to the safe departure of our aircraft. The Captain asked me what we should do and I suggested that we coordinate with the Tower to start-up. We were not aware of chocks being in place until we initiated taxi. We discovered that there might have been a chock(s) left in place when we started to move. The aircraft was empty and it was similar to starting the movement after sitting for a long period and the bottom of the tires becoming flat. Given the same circumstance in the future; I will contact the Company via SATCOM and require a supervised handling team return to the aircraft. There are some very serious supervision and security issues not just in ZZZZ; but others such as ZZZZ1 and ZZZZ2. There seems to be no accountability for who has access to our aircraft; and if they have adequate training or any legitimate purpose whatsoever. We need to ensure that people in and around our aircraft have been thoroughly vetted and trained. There are some individuals that strongly resent the United States and [the Company]. They accomplish small but malicious acts enough to delay or disrupt our operation. A thorough audit of our ground handling in places similar to these would likely uncover a disturbing trend. Although we operate in active war zones; our aircraft is still an American workplace which demands the same standards of one serving in our US domestic operations.




Synopsis: Heavy aircraft Captain reported that aircraft chocks were not removed prior to aircraft taxi.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We departed Runway 24 at TEB on the RUUDY 4 Departure. The First Officer briefed all the altitudes and course headings and planned to fly the departure with the autopilot engaged. On departure the First Officer called for the gear and flaps to come up. Then he said autopilot. I assumed he meant he had engaged the autopilot but he meant for me to engage the autopilot for him. We noticed that we needed to level off at 1;300. The First Officer was waiting for the autopilot which was not engaged at the time; we recognized the problem and the First Officer began the level off and we leveled off at approximately 1;580 and then returned to 1;500. We were slightly off course and corrected back on course. The Controller contacted us several times as we were sorting out the issue. We then changed over to New York Departure and at that time we were on course and altitude. We needed to be clear on who was going to engage the autopilot during the departure.




Synopsis: A communications breakdown on the TEB RUUDY 4 SID caused an altitude overshoot because takeoff brief did not clearly state that when the First Officer requested 'autopilot ON' the Captain was to complete the action.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After two hour wait to get both nose gear tires replaced due to low pressure; departed gate. After takeoff; when gear retracted; had red light in main landing gear. Auto-spoiler DO NOT USE light came on at the same time. Complied with QRH procedures. When hydraulic pumps turned to LOW; gear door open light came on. When hydraulic pumps turned back to HIGH; gear door open light went out. Declared emergency and returned to the departure airport. After gear was lowered; all indications were normal. Landing was normal. Returned to gate and aircraft was taken out of service.


Second narrative: Pre-dawn sign in; waited 2 hours for Maintenance to change the nose tires. When gear retracted after take off right main landing gear indicated 'unsafe;' with gear doors closed. Also 'auto-spoiler do not use' light came on; both of these were previous write ups from the previous flight. When hydraulic pumps turned to low; 'gear door open light' came on. When hydraulic pumps were turned to high 'gear door open light' went out. Accomplished QRH procedure and declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. Landing was normal. Aircraft was taken out of service. I declined to continue the trip out and back with different aircraft due to frustration and being tired.


Synopsis: During takeoff after a maintenance delay; an MD-83's right main landing gear indicated unsafe with the gear doors closed and the AUTOSPOILER DO NOT ARM light annunciated; so the QRH was completed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.