elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-38 Tomahawk
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon completing a simulated soft-field landing with the student at ZZZ; I instructed that we will immediately add power and perform a takeoff; as we were working on precision takeoff and landings and flying in the traffic pattern the entire time. After lifting off the runway the airplane entered ground effect and I instructed the student to continue flying in ground effect until we gained sufficient airspeed to continue climbing from the runway environment. Once in ground effect I noticed an engine performance problem; and we were no longer gaining airspeed. After hearing and seeing anxious reactions from the student I ordered; 'My controls;' and I took control of the airplane. At that point I confirmed full throttle; checked outside visually to see the end of the runway approaching; and tried maneuvering the airplane to gain minimal amounts of airspeed. When I let the nose down to gain airspeed the airplane did not respond in the manner it should have; and we began to sink. I accepted that the airplane was not responsive to the amount of power applied; and made the decision to continue with the sink toward the ground. At this point the airplane was past the end of the runway and I saw grass ahead that was towering over my line of sight; meaning that we were about to impact the ground very soon. The touchdown in the grass was very smooth; as I teach all students and myself that soft-field landings must be treated with the utmost amount of precision. After touching down in the grass past the runway; the airplane struck an embankment/ditch though I was still able to have full directional control. The airplane came to a stop in tall grass and I repeated many times to the student; 'leave everything and exit to the rear of the airplane.' I made a call saying; 'ZZZ traffic; Aircraft X down;' secured the airplane; and exited immediately.

Callback: Instructor stated the aircraft is still sitting and no action has been taken or determined as to the cause of reduced engine power.



Synopsis: PA-38 instructor pilot reported that aircraft developed less than full power on takeoff resulting in off field landing.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D10
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I took a hand off for the SR22 from ZFW; BYP; Seaver Sector; at 4;000 FT; IFR for TKI. The pilot checked in and I descended him to 3;000 FT and told him to report TKI in sight. Shortly thereafter; Seaver called and told me they forgot to issue a warning to the SR22 about skydiving activity. I wasn't really sure what to say; but I told the SR22 something like 'use caution for skydivers in the vicinity.' The pilot replied 'yeah; I'm flying through them right now.' This was clearly unsafe; in my opinion. I did not see a playback; so this is strictly to the best of my recollection. In the TRACON airspace; anytime we have skydiving a TFR is usually issued. I don't exactly know what the rules are regarding this; if there are any; in Center's airspace. Skydiving over the busiest arrival corner post at D10 seems like a bad idea. We work around these guys all the time; and if there are no actual separation requirements; this is an accident waiting to happen.




Synopsis: D10 Controller described a conflict event involving a TKI IFR arrival and parachute activity aircraft near the arrival route.  The reporter questioned parachute activity near a primary D10 arrival route.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAN.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: Ramp SAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We landed in SAN and taxied to a spot on the ramp to wait for our gate to open. It took just over an hour get to our gate due to Maintenance on another airplane. We parked at [the gate] and ran the shutdown checklist. My Captain pulled up the Flight Log page; I commented that we landed with 10.3 on the fuel and got to the gate with 9.2. The jetway operator was having difficulties with the jet bridge height. As she struggled with the jet bridge (all doors still closed) I noticed the fuel gauge go from 9.2 to 9.8 then 10.0. I said to my Captain 'Oh no! The fueler is hooked up and fueling!' I quickly opened my window and shouted back to the fueler a few times while waving my arm to get his attention. To my surprise I got his attention and motioned to with my hand for him to stop. He looked confused but stopped fueling and started to disconnect.I don't know why he hooked up to the jet before the door was open. I do remember seeing the ground power cable being lowered then later raised back up while all this was going on. I've since thought that maybe the signal to the fueler that it is okay to begin fueling is if the ground power cable is hooked up to the jet. That's purely my speculation but if it is then there needs to be something better for the fuelers to determine the status of the door before hooking as many times the ground power is connected before the door is open. Visually inspecting the door would be a better method.This is the second time I've seen a fueler hook up to a closed jet in SAN.




Synopsis: A pilot reported the fueler began fueling the aircraft before the passengers deplaned or the jetbridge had approached the aircraft.
Date: 201701
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Lately I have done multiple trips into MMMX. This place is a disaster waiting to happen. Each time the arrival is an improvised; non-standard procedure depending on the whims of whichever controller happens to be working that day. Arrival procedures are ridiculously complicated; completely non-standard; unlike procedures anywhere else in the world that I have ever gone. There are never ending; constantly ordered turns to headings to intercept multiple radials; demands to expedite descent and slow down simultaneously; being placed on different airways than the published arrival contains and then told to descend via even though you're no longer on the arrival itself!! I could go on and on but you've likely heard all this before.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported concern about the non-standard procedures and ATC inconsistencies during arrivals to MMMX.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We performed a low speed abort when taking off Runway 7R in LAS due to a flap takeoff warning.When the FO received the ATIS; Runway 1R was written down. It actually stated 7R for takeoff. I did not listen to the ATIS until after the fact of this event.When we were given taxi instructions by LAS ground; it was for 7R. Flaps had to be changed from 11 (takeoff setting for 1R) to 8 (takeoff setting for 7R). The FO set 8 in the flap setting on the left side of the center console and 8 in the flap takeoff selection on the right side of the console. The actual flap handle was left at flaps 11.I did not verify the new settings with another increase of the throttle levers to make sure no aural takeoff warning occurred.Make sure the ATIS is correctly written down. The FO assumed 1R. This is easy to do this at this time in LAS due to Runway 25R construction; and the observation while we were waiting for our aircraft to arrive that planes were taking off of 1R and 1L. There was a slight wind shift before our departure so with [the new] ATIS; LAS switched to Runway 7R for departure.I should have asked the FO to let LAS Ground know we required a place to stop for a minute to configure our aircraft for 7R. I have done this 'on the fly' many times before. I feel it would be better to take a moment and verify with our new flap settings; and the brakes set; we get the 'brakes brakes' aural warning. There are a couple of aircraft that require the throttles to be bit more forward to get the aural warning. Without the brakes set; it might be possible to think all settings are correct if the throttles are not pushed up far enough. With the brakes set; this possible complication is eliminated as you are definitely wanting to hear something instead of nothing.There is no checklist for a runway change. I feel it would be a good idea to add one to our checklist. LAS is prone to many runway changes with the spring winds and summer thunderstorms. This would also make sure the FMS is properly set up if a new departure procedure is given.




Synopsis: MD80 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at a low speed when they received a takeoff warning horn related to flap setting.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon arrival in ZZZ; the Captain shut down the engines and I ran my Parking Flow. Right about then the Captain said that the ground crew was motioning that the number one engine was still running. I looked at the fuel levers and they were in cutout. I looked at the MFD (Multi-Function Flight Display) and sure enough; the left engine was still running. The Captain wiggled the fuel lever until it shut off. He then wrote it up. Earlier in the day a Ramp Agent came to the cockpit in ZZZ1 to ask the Captain if he had waited until the Captain had given the engines cut hand signal before he gave the clear to enter signal because left engine was still turning after he gave the all clear. We assumed at the time the motor was just winding down; but after what happened in ZZZ; we couldn't help but wonder if the same thing might have happened; albeit briefly; in ZZZ1.We should have asked more specific questions to the Ramp Agent in ZZZ1 to make sure we knew what he was talking about instead of assuming.


Second narrative: We arrived at the gate and I selected cutoff on the engine levers. I gave the engine cutoff signal to ground. The Marshaller pointed to the Number 1 engine. I saw it was still running and recycled the start lever. The engine then shut down. I called Maintenance and wrote it up in the log. The issue was resolved and the engine worked normally after that. After that; the FO (First Officer) and I were discussing it and realized on the previous leg; the Marshaller came up and asked if I had given him the shutdown hand signal before he gave the clear to enter to enter signal. I told him he had followed the correct procedure. He said the engine appeared to be running after that. We hadn't noticed that and assumed it was simply spooling down. In light of the second flight we realized he was right; but during the previous leg the engine had not continued to run as long and it shut down before we intervened.We need to confirm engine shutdown on the instruments before giving the hand signal and also ask better questions when an abnormality is pointed out to us.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported engine continued to run even after fuel control was selected to cutoff.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: This is a recurring problem at JFK regarding vehicles parked in the NB alley. Arriving and parking; I saw several fueling trucks as well as some ramp equipment parked along the outside of the barriers. As usual; I informed the Ramp Tower that the vehicles and equipment needed to be moved. As I said; this is a recurring problem and I have encouraged numerous Captains to stop their taxi until the vehicles are moved. Sad to say; not all listen to me. On one occasion I witnessed [one airline] coming off Gate taxi out of the NB alley with the right wing passing over at least one vehicle parked along the barriers. On another occasion we were taxiing into NB and we stopped due to the number of fuel trucks; catering; pickups and a tractor trailer all parked along the barrier area on the taxiway. One of the fuel truck had to be pushed clear with a pickup since no one seemed to know where the driver was.I have talked to the Ramp Tower folks about this on several occasions; but since the vehicles in question are usually not [our company] equipment; little can be done. There is not a red line or any painted line showing the separation required; however; it is my; as well as Ramp Tower's; understanding that the 'line' between the asphalt NB taxiway and the concrete parking spots is the 'red' line for equipment. Sooner or later someone is going to hit something back there since it seems common for crews to ignore the problem.The ramp service personnel must be educated as to where they can and cannot park.




Synopsis: Pilot reports that fueling trucks and equipment are routinely parked outside the safety barriers at JFK airport.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Before the TOD; we briefed the arrival and programmed the FMC to descend via the ZZZZZ RNAV STAR correctly. When we got clearance from ATC to descend via the STAR; I selected 4;000 feet in the MCP window as previously briefed. Somewhere below 10;000 feet; ATC gave us vectors off the STAR and to descend and maintain 5;000 feet. We complied. I selected 5;000 feet in MCP window; HDG Select and LVL Change and informed the PM. Sometime later ATC gave us direct to ZZZZZ fix and descend via STAR. I programmed direct to ZZZZZ in the FMC; selected LNAV and set 4;000 feet in the MCP window as per the STAR. I informed the PM.We had a frequency change and the PM got a new ATIS at the same time as that was taking place.  As we are approaching ZZZZZ fix; ATC confirmed that we were descending to 4;000 feet instead of crossing ZZZZZ fix at 5;000 feet.  That's when I realized that we were in LVL Change pitch and not in VNAV. As I was communicating that to the PM; ATC gave us a further descend and vectors for the final approach.  The rest of the flight was uneventful. There were no TCAS TA or RA at any time. We debriefed the incident at the gate. I realized that due to recent events regarding the future of my flying career and the constant uncertainty has hindered my rest. This may have been a factor for my distraction on missing such a small yet critical step.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported not descending via the STAR due to selecting LVL Change Pitch instead of VNAV on the MCP.
Date: 201712
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: MEL; Aircraft
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: I received a call from [Maintenance] Supervisor on speaker phone with Shift Manager. [The Supervisor] wanted to use MEL for #1 Main Fuel Tank Flight Deck Indicator. They were adamant that this was the correct MEL and that I was just interpreting the MEL incorrectly. This MEL is intended for the Refuel Control Panel Ind. We see this issue often with this MEL and Numerous other MEL's due to the way they are formatted in EDOCs. It is very concerning that it [got] misinterpreted by Technicians; Supervisor and Shift Managers. The Issue is the Title lines are combined on the header of the MEL with the name of the system; equipment; or location affected by the MEL on the first line and second and third line contain stipulations. In this case; the #1 Tank Fuel ind in the flt deck was reading incorrectly and they wanted to use MEL for the 'Refueling Control Panel Quantity Indicators' when the Flight Deck Fuel Qty Indicators are also Inoperative. Clearly to those of us that live in the MEL every day; this is incorrect; but I understand how it's easily misinterpreted. We often get calls from tech with this MEL as well as others with the same argument. This could be a safety of flight issue as the incorrect MEL could easily be added.




Synopsis: A fuel indicator on a B737 was deferred using an incorrect MEL reference.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: Tower MEM
Second aircraft: MD-11
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival at MEM; ATIS included the notation that 'RECAT Wake Turbulence Separation Standards In Effect.' Unsure of what that meant; crew queried ATC and received an explanation. ATC planned to sequence our flight for arrival 3.5 NM behind a Heavy MD-11. ATC complied with our request for additional spacing but informed us that had they been busy; our request would not have been accommodated and we would have been placed on the approach 3.5 miles behind the heavy aircraft. Cause; The FAA has apparently decided that current spacing is too conservative and that more aircraft can be handled with reduced spacing. Suggestions; while 3.5 NM behind a Heavy aircraft might seem like a good idea from a desk in Washington; in the real world; that appears to compromise safety. It also appears problematic that ATC would reject a pilot request for additional spacing based on these arbitrary standards.




Synopsis: MEM air carrier arrival expressed concern regarding the RECAT Wake Turbulence Separation being utilized.