elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Night
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Leaving ZZZ to ZZZ1. I forgot to turn the bleed switches on at acceleration height. Our takeoff required the bleeds to be off. We got a cabin press warning at cruise; to which we noticed the bleeds we're off and we turned them on. This cleared the cabin press warning and pressurization was normal; I went over the E&A checklist to confirm everything. We didn't execute an emergency descent as it wasn't required. Flight continued on with no incidents. Same as above.The early morning; plus the dark cockpit led to me noticing the bleed switch position. In the dark; the switches appear normal. A technique taught during sim is to touch the bleed switches during the acceleration height flow. I'll definitely be using that technique from here on out.




Synopsis: Captain reported not turning engine bleed air switched to on after an engine bleed off takeoff; causing a loss of cabin pressure control.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Had been cruising at FL370 and was issued a descent to FL290. While in descent at Mach .77 and around 31;000 feet; experienced significant wake turbulence roll (approximately 45 degrees AOB along with aircraft 'roll authority' warning) due to Boeing 767 aircraft 8-10 miles ahead of us. I contacted ATC and told them that we needed more separation and they allowed us to slow. When I had the chance; I made announcement to passengers explaining that it was unexpected and isolated wake turbulence that should not happen again. Later near 10;000 feet; I started to get into wake turbulence again; so I queried ATC as to was it same aircraft and stated we needed more separation. Boston Approach stated that they had just implemented new reduced separation criteria for B-767 aircraft which were now considered a lower category heavy aircraft (I believe 'Re-certified as Class C' was terminology used or something close to that). Not sure what the ATC separation standard was at altitude; but I am very thankful we were already descending or it likely would have been an emergency descent. Down low with approach control; the new 3.5 miles of separation minimum behind 'heavy; low and slow' B-767 (previously was 5 mile minimum per my query to Controller) was not sufficient. The FAA should further address safety issues associated with reduced wake turbulence separation. Been flying close to [XX] years and this was an eye opener at altitude.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported encountering wake turbulence descending into BOS in trail of a heavy B767; and expressed concern about an apparent recent change to ATC procedures allowing reduced separation to heavy B767 aircraft.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on our sixth leg and were running approximately 30 minutes late due to a ground stop. Operations wanted us to push off the gate anyway because a Company aircraft was waiting for the gate. We pushed off under some time pressure (two-man wired push). We started one engine with the intention to taxi out and hold somewhere when we were informed that the hold was no longer in effect. So I directed the First Officer to start Number 1. I finally cleared the ground crew off. Just after completing the Before Taxi Checklist; Ground informed us that the inbound Company aircraft noticed something hanging from the nose gear. I suddenly realized that the ground crew had not held up the bypass pin and was certain the pin had not been removed. We called Company and asked them to get the push crew back out to remove the bypass pin. They came out and removed the pin. The rest of the flight was uneventful. We were tired and under some time pressure due to the lifting of the ground stop; which led to increased coordination to start the second engine. Couple this with being at the end of a long day; I didn't catch the pushback crew not having removed the bypass pin. This may have been a training issue (or a long day for them); but it was still incumbent on me to confirm the pin had been removed. Lesson learned and I will make sure I see the pin in hand before I clear the crew off.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports a rushed pushback and engine start where the ground crew departs without removing the nose wheel steering bypass pin. The flight waiting for the gate notes the flag attached to the pin and informs the reporter. The ground crew is recalled and the pin is removed before taxiing is attempted.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other Part 105
Flight plan: None
Mission: Skydiving
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While climbing to altitude over jump zone; I observed a large cloud moving over the airport. The cloud was at approximately 6;000 feet; and estimated 1 mile by 1/2 mile in diameter. Approximately 500 to 700 feet in depth. As we approached our exit point for the skydivers; I noticed part of the cloud was still over the airport. I advised the jumpers in the aircraft that there was a cloud in the vicinity of the airport and to let me know which way to adjust my flight path in order to ensure cloud clearance. When I was on jump run and turned the exit light on; 5 experienced jumpers exited the aircraft. As the tandem instructors approached the door; they advised me to go around and offset jump run slightly to the west to avoid the cloud. The remaining jumpers exited the airplane.When I landed; I was advised by an Observer on the ground that the first 5 jumpers had penetrated the cloud. An announcement was made to the entire drop zone that disregard for cloud clearance requirements would not be tolerated and everyone was warned.




Synopsis: A C90 skydiving jump pilot at 14;500 feet attempted to avoid dropping his jumpers on a cloud at about 6;000 feet but was told after landing the divers had penetrated the cloud.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We experienced a disruption in ATC service because the ZZZ Tower evacuated due to Coronavirus concerns. This is the second occurrence of ATC Controllers immediately abandoning their duty stations with airborne aircraft to avoid exposure risk. This protocol poses an unacceptable risk to Aircrew and Passengers; and should be re-evaluated based on the number of lives put at risk versus the number of Controllers avoiding virus exposure. If ATC Controllers won't stay at their duty station long enough to recover airborne aircraft in these scenarios; we should be dispatching every flight with a suitable alternate until the Corona Virus crisis is contained.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a Control Tower that was ATC Zero; leading to a disruption in communications.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Fractional
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: System Monitor: Indicating and Warning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing in ZZZ the yellow AUX HYD LO LEVEL light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel.  The light remained on during the landing rollout and for most of the taxi to the FBO.  After our passengers left the FBO; I contacted Maintenance Control.  An appropriate M2B form was submitted and the aircraft went AOG.  Another aircraft arrived in ZZZ and we went into a 6 hour [tentative] status at the FBO.  Two mechanics arrived to repair Aircraft X.  They walked over and wanted to discuss the write up.  I was glad to talk to them.  I communicated the symptoms previously described and commented that on my post flight a meniscus was clearly visible in the auxiliary hydraulic system sight tube.  They also commented that the system was full.  Nevertheless; both mechanics stated that [Headquarters] just wanted them to add a little fluid and sign it off.  The next day we were assigned Aircraft X.  The M2B form from the previous night was cleared in this manner.  Subsequently; we departed ZZZ for ZZZ1.  Upon landing; the yellow STALL IDENT light illuminated on the master warning and caution panel.  It remained illuminated during the landing rollout and for part of the taxi to the blocks.  Again; an M2B form was completed and the aircraft was AOG.  A day or two later I observed that the aircraft was grounded for corrosion behind the master warning and caution panel.There are times that I find myself wondering if we are really trying to fix aircraft properly the first time an event happens.  Over the past couple years I have reported the following events to the Chief Pilot:  (1) Right engine oil cap found on preflight at maintenance facility.  (2) At maintenance facility I was accepting an aircraft that was released to the line. The aircraft was in maintenance for repeated auto shutdowns of the APU.  At power up; the APU auto shut down.  (3) Aircraft in maintenance for a thrust reverser issue.  After the aircraft was released from maintenance the issue persisted.  Other repeat issues have included avionics write ups; fuel leaks and cabin electrical discrepancies.  While it is probably more challenging than I could imagine; are we serious about properly effecting repairs?




Synopsis: Captain reported his concern over observing chronically unresolved repeat maintenance issues.
Date: 201606
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I took the pass down and was told there was 1 flight remaining and no issues. When I logged into my desk; I researched why [my] flight did not have out or off times in the system. Based on their scheduled departure time they should have already been airborne. I looked for the flight on my fusion screen and it was not visible. I called Operations to ask for verification and was given the out and off times for the mentioned flight. I then checked flightaware.com for the location of the flight and saw that it was crossing the Mexican border. I then proceeded to try to contact the flight via ACARS; but received the message 'ACARS free text could not be delivered at this time.' I then tried to establish communication with flight via ARINC phone patch. ARINC was also unsuccessful in contacting the crew. I tried ACARS several more times but got the same undeliverable message. I informed the Chief of Dispatch about the situation. I was unable to establish communications with the crew for the duration of the flight. I verified that the flight landed safely with Operations.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported he was unable to establish contact with his flight.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Arrival into JFK; weather CAVU. Captain was pilot flying; First Officer was pilot monitoring. Planned and briefed the visual 13L with the RNV RNP RWY 13L approach as backup. Approach cleared us direct to ASALT; cross ASALT 3;000; cleared approach. During the descent we received several calls for a VFR target at our 10-12 o'clock position. We never acquired the traffic visually; but had him on TCAS. Eventually Approach advised traffic no factor; contact Tower. On contact with Tower we were cleared to land. Approaching ASALT I noticed we were approximately 500 feet below the 3;000 foot crossing altitude. Somewhere during the descent while our attention was on the VFR traffic the plane dropped out of VNAV path and I didn't catch it. I disconnected the autopilot and returned to 3;000 feet. Once level I reengaged VNAV and completed the approach with no further problems.


Second narrative: FMA mode changes are insidious. In clear weather; with your head out of the cockpit clearing for traffic in a high density environment; especially at your home field on a familiar approach; it is easy to miss a mode change. This is a good reminder to keep instruments in your cross check on those relatively few great weather days.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported an altitude deviation on approach to JFK that resulted when they lost autoflight mode awareness.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aerofoil Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When conducting an ice system test in flight the test performed normally until we turned the system off. When turning the system off we the flight crew noticed a 'boom' sound; however didn't receive any ICAS notification or any other signs of abnormalities. The Flight Attendant called us to ask if we hear the same thing but she also reported the sound of a 'grinding noise.' She stated a passenger also told her they heard something abnormal and asked the Flight Attendant what it was. After getting this information I decided it was best to return to the airport of departure. We told ATC we needed to return to the airport. We landed safely and upon further inspection MX did state to us there was a broken bleed line that was causing all the noise and the initial boom.


Second narrative: On departure; the PIC and I initiated the ice detection test per the checklist and first flight of the day. We heard a boom noise as if somebody had dropped a case of water in the cabin. The flight attendant called us directly after and informed us of a loud grinding noise coming from underneath the floor of the aircraft. The PIC and I elected to return to [departure airport] where ample maintenance was present; and we were only on the departure. We returned safely with no further issues.


Synopsis: EMB-135 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an anomaly in the anti-ice system.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I landed on the Runway XXL to do touch and go. I was stabilized and on the centerline. After landing; I turned off the carburetor heat; put flaps up and full throttle in order to do touch and go. When I rotated at 50 knots; the airplane didn't lift off and I lost directional control. I couldn't maintain centerline so I pulled throttle out and pushed on the brakes. I ended up skidding to the left side of runway on the grass; hitting the runway lights. The runway was wet so I think I could have hydroplaned. I could have done more rudder control. I could have stopped and go.




Synopsis: C152 student pilot reported a loss of control and runway excursion during landing on a wet runway.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-42 Cheyenne IIA
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I filed an IFR flight plan in a Cheyenne III I have flown for a private company for many years. In the pattern; I lowered the landing gear handle; I felt the landing gear extend but did not get a green light for the left main and the 'gear not locked' light was illuminated. I abandoned the landing and gained altitude to orbit and run the checklist(s). Using the Emergency Gear Extension Checklist I tried using the hand pump and the blow down systems and could not get a safe indication. I assessed weather; fuel and daylight and decided to fly to another airport; 170 NM away because I felt I needed to burn down fuel to make the aircraft lighter and minimize the fire hazard. I checked NOTAMS and weather at another airport along the way. ATC suggested I fly by the Tower and have them visually inspect the landing gear. They advised me the landing gear appeared down but the inner gear doors were open. I advised them I wanted to go to another airport and land. I arrived in the pattern and a local pilot in a Cirrus offered to have a closer look at the gear and I accepted. He advised me the landing gear appeared extended with the inner doors open. I proceeded with a normal landing. About 500 FT after main wheel touchdown and decelerating through 90 KTS; the left main gear retracted and the left propeller; flap and aileron contacted the runway. When I filed my flight plan; I anticipated a flight student would come with me but they did not. My flight plan was filed showing 2 Souls On Board (SOB) and I did not change it to reflect 1. I should have changed the flight plan to reflect the correct number of SOB.




Synopsis: PA42 pilot reports unsafe left main landing gear during approach and elects to divert to another airport. All attempts at obtaining a safe indication are futile and after a normal landing the left main gear collapses.