elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202002
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aircraft Auto Temperature System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight Deck Temperature Controller was deferred. While climbing out on the departure passing 13;000 feet the FLT DK TEMP was indicating 83 Degrees F. The temperature continued to climb. At approximately 31000 feet the temperature indicated 93 F. The Captain and I conferred about the excessive heat. The Captain then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control as the Pilot Monitoring and I continued to fly the aircraft as the Pilot Flying. The Captain and I decided that we needed to divert due to the 'extremely Excessive Temp on the Flight Deck' and that it would be 'Unsafe to Continue ' as the temperature continued to climb to the Maximum indicated 99 F at 37000 feet. We conducted a normal uneventful diversion and landing.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Flight Crew reported diverting due to being unable to control the temperature in the cockpit.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: APA.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Cessna 310/T310C
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower APA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was plugging into Local to relieve the previous controller as he was beginning to deal with a C310 who called him on the Tower frequency after he was done with his run up in the North Run Up area and said he was ready for departure. He was taxied to the run up area by Ground Control and was never issued a runway assignment as per APA SOP. He taxied out of the pad; onto the active taxiway without receiving: 1) a runway assignment and 2) an instruction to taxi onto an active taxiway. I won't bother you with the details of APA and their confusing procedures and phraseology as it is a long documented problem and I'm quite sure that not everyone takes this issue seriously and so this will never get fixed. The local pilots understand what the procedures are and there is not an issue. The true issue has always been with the itinerants who have no clue as to what or why we do what we do. They just want to do what every other airport in the U.S. does. Management fails to write up the pilots for pilot deviations and controllers working as CIC fail to write up the pilots because no one cares anymore. GET A TEAM OUT HERE TO TRULY FIX THE PROBLEM. Go back to the .65 and issue normal taxi instructions. We need to standardize our procedures to what everyone else is doing.




Synopsis: APA Controller voiced a concern regarding local phraseology with regard to taxi and run-up instructions that frequently result in taxiway incursions especially with aircraft not locally based.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I received the weight and balance and entered it into the FMS. Our weight was 630;000 LBS. Maximum Structural Takeoff Weight was 630;500 LBS. We did our CG verification procedure and the aircraft; FMS; and paper Weight and Balance all agreed that our takeoff weight was 630;000. After breaking ground I noticed the gross weight of the aircraft had increased to 632.0 and continued to increase and stabilized at 633;700. During the flight I continued to monitor the weight and all the FMS calculations as well as my personal fuel burn log agreed with the takeoff weight of the newly computed gross weight of 633.7. Just prior to taking the runway I did verify the TOGW of 630;000 which also reflected the taxi out burn of 1;500 LBS. I have submitted reports before on this aircraft for faulty weights as well as its sister ships; all of which came from another air carrier. Previous reports concluded the problem with these aircraft were the fuel probes in the #2 tank; which are made by Parker Industries. The miscalculation of the fuel quantities has led to many overweight takeoff events and continues to be an issue. Upon arrival at our destination I did write this overweight takeoff indication in the logbook and observed while Maintenance checked for faults. No system faults were noted but an overweight takeoff was recorded by the FMS.




Synopsis: Immediately following a Maximum Allowable Structural Gross Weight takeoff an MD-11 Captain noted a 3;700 LB increase in the FMS generated aircraft gross weight. His previous experience leads him to believe this type of error is chronic on all the aircraft in his company's fleet that were purchased from another carrier and is associated with faulty fuel gauges in the #2 fuel tank.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a flight from ZZZ; I experienced an inflight stoppage of the aircraft engine. During my preflight; I calculated the fuel usage to be 6 GPH. In addition to my normal prefight; I ensured I had enough fuel in the airplane for the intended flight; which amounted to 19 gallons between the two tanks. The 19 gallons; according to my performance calculations and passed experience; should have allowed for a 3-hour flight. My prefight calculations indicated I would have a flight time between 1 hour and 40 minutes in the best conditions; and 2 hours and 10 minutes in the worst conditions. After a flight of 1 hour 50 minutes; the engine began to die. After initial power loss; I ran through the normal engine failure procedures. With an unsuccessful engine start procedure and the airport not in view; I landed in the best suitable field. The landing was successful minimal damage to property and no injury to persons on the ground.




Synopsis: C150 pilot reported an inflight loss of engine power due to fuel mismanagement; resulting in a forced off-airport emergency landing.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B HNL
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working arrival sectors combined. Aircraft X was inbound from the south being vectored to an ILS Final. Aircraft Y was on right downwind to the ILS Final. Aircraft Y was number one in sequence and was cleared for an ILS Approach. Aircraft X; number two in sequence was vectored in-trail and told to reduce speed to 210 knots for sequence. I noticed Aircraft Y had a ground speed of 110 knots on a nine mile final; so I reduced Aircraft X to 170 knots or less before clearing him for the ILS Approach. With approximately 8 miles between both aircraft on final; I noticed the compression of Aircraft X with an 80 knot overtake and I immediately reduced Aircraft X to final approach speed. The pilot seemed to question the clearance and I asked if he had the preceding heavy aircraft in sight? There was no response from Aircraft X so I instructed the pilot to cancel approach clearance and climb to 4000 feet. Upon hearing this; Aircraft X notified me he was a medical emergency and said he had coordinated ahead. The controller from the preceding sector nor the Front Line Manager in Charge had coordinated with me the fact that Aircraft X was a medical emergency. After realizing the severity of the situation; I immediately took action to make Aircraft X the priority inbound. I probably violated MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) altitudes during the recovery process when I had to breakout multiple aircraft in-trail to get the emergency inbound back to the airport as quickly and as safely as possible. The previous sector should have followed through on coordination; especially if an aircraft inbound is in an emergency status. Supervisors should get some form of acknowledgment from every controller that will work or be in direct communication with the affected aircraft. We should de-combine the sector so priority and full service may be given to emergency aircraft and prevent frequency congestion or overload.




Synopsis: HCF TRACON Controller reported they issued a go around to an aircraft that they did not know was a medical emergency. In order to expedite the aircraft's return the controller vectored aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CVG.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B CVG
ATC / advisory: TRACON CVG
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Departing CVG; we checked in with Departure climbing to 8;000 MSL. The initial altitude for the BLUEGRASS9 is 6;000 MSL. Prior to taxi; we reviewed and briefed the BLUEGRASS9 using the electronic chart on the multifunction display in the flight deck. We both read 8;000 MSL as the initial altitude and set 8;000 MSL on the altitude preselect. Upon check in with departure; we were cleared to 13;000 MSL and were asked; 'who cleared you to 8;000 MSL?' Our reply was; 'the departure procedure' response; 'negative; 6;000 MSL.' When we reached our destination; I called TRACON and spoke with the Controller and explained to him that we both misread the altitude on the departure because it appeared to be an '8.' When we reviewed our clearance; an altitude was not specified. I believe this would not have been an issue if the altitude was specified on the IFR clearance.




Synopsis: A Citation flight crew climbed to 8;000 MSL vice 6;000 MSL as published on the BLUEGRASS SID out of CVG. Both pilots had misread the '6' as an '8' on their MFD based aero chart display.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was conducting training. Aircraft X was on frequency (don't remember where he departed) at 14;000 feet. He stated '14;000 is right in the tops; requesting a climb to VFR-ON-TOP.' The radar trainee was unfamiliar with the procedures and their instructor directed them to use the EDST (ERAM Decision Support Tools). VFR-ON-TOP procedures are indexed on the ARTCC reference page; my trainee located the paragraph in the 7110.65 (kudos to whomever compiled the reference page. In this instance; it worked flawlessly and was a great help.) The four of us were able to discuss the VFR-ON-TOP clearance. The trainee fumbled through the phraseology the first time; then I corrected them and showed them the phraseology example listed in the 7110.65. We had no other traffic and the trainee issued the appropriate clearance. The pilot reported reaching VFR conditions on top; and after corrections from the instructor and myself; they issued the appropriate response. 'Roger; maintain VFR.' Aircraft X leveled at 14;500 feet.We initiated a handoff to [the next sector] and the Radar Controller transferred communications thusly 'For further VFR flight following; contact Chicago Center 120.12.' My trainee and I discussed VFR on TOP and its applications. I explained that it's an IFR clearance and the appropriate computer entries.Later the [neighboring sector] controller called and questioned Aircraft X's clearance. Based on the explanation; I believe Aircraft X did not fully understand his clearance that after reporting reaching VFR ON TOP and the clearance 'Maintain VFR;' he was VFR.I don't believe it's clear that while VFR-ON-TOP is an IFR clearance; once the pilot reports ON TOP and is instructed to maintain VFR; whose responsibilities are what? I don't think I've seen phraseology 'Cancellation of IFR received.' I thought it was odd an IFR aircraft requested an OTP (On Top) clearance; climbed to a VFR altitude; was told to maintain VFR.




Synopsis: A ZAU ARTCC Controller used incorrect clearance phraseology with a VFR-on-top clearance request. The Controller did not understand how to use the procedure and requested clarification.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: A11.TRACON, AK
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y; IFR was on the GPS Approach to MRI. The North Radar Controller restricted ANC departures by coordinating a Red Light and canceling automatic Runway 7L departures. Aircraft Y completed the transition off the Runway 33 Departure Corridor and North Radar resumed auto releases off of Runway 33 by issuing a green light to Local Control. The Local Controller departed Aircraft X off of Runway 7L into conflict with Aircraft Y on approach into MRI. The Local Controller advised that he believed the green light also resumed automatic releases off of Runway 7L.The facility just implemented a new SOP. ANC Tower and A11 are separate facilities; collocated; that utilize an SOP that covers both facilities instead of two separate SOPs and a LOA. The SOP was very recently changed; the change involving the coordination of SVFR aircraft that operate into any of the Class D airspaces that are very closely related here. There has been a great deal of confusion on the floor in the radar room as to what is required concerning MRI GPS approaches and coordination with the Tower. The procedures and required coordination must be clarified in some way.




Synopsis: A11 Controller describes situation where two facilities are using the same SOP; which recently was changed; but is causing confusion in both facilities.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCX.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Airspace: Class E MCX
ATC / advisory: CTAF MCX
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The White County Airport (MCX) shares a CTAF/UNICOM frequency with the Starke County Airport (OXI). The two airports have identical runway configurations -- a single Runway 18/36 -- and are located approximately 37 miles apart; well within radio range for pilots at both airports to hear one another.Every time I visit this airport we run into one of three problems on the radio:(1) Foreign student pilots who cannot adequately pronounce 'Starke' or 'White' with enough clarity to avoid confusion.(2) Pilots at either airport believing someone said 'Starke' when they actually said 'White;' and beginning a conversation about who said what and where he/she is located.(3) Pilots who use city names in their CTAF broadcasts -- Monticello for White County; or Knox for Starke County -- which would be preferable if everyone on the radio were on the same page; which is not the case.The FAA should move either airport to a separate frequency so long as pilots will continue to make position announcements using 'White County' or 'Starke County' as their respective airport name.




Synopsis: A pilot reported that because MCX and OXI are in close proximity and share a common CTAF frequency; sometimes an aircraft's location is confused. Reporter stated some pilots do not clearly speak the respective airport names adding to the confusion.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At touchdown; the aircraft veered immediately to the right. Suspected blown tire. Corrected with rudder pressure and applied light braking. The aircraft started to the left and was very difficult to control if at all. The aircraft headed to the edge of the runway. Stronger braking action was applied. The brakes appeared to lock up and the aircraft departed the runway at about a 45 degree angle. It skidded in the dirt and spun slightly to the right coming to rest 75 feet off the runway and perpendicular to the runway (facing runway).There was substantial damage to the right tire and wheel. Left tire and nose tire were still inflated. Prop struck ground at spot where plane came to rest. There may be additional damage.The aircraft was secured using a dolly under the right wheel and moved to a hangar.




Synopsis: PA-46 pilot reported losing directional control on landing roll following an apparent main gear tire failure.