elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VHHH.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were departing VHHH.  It was our 7th day of the trip.  The new 'old' procedure of taxiing before takeoff weights and data is received was now active.  I requested the takeoff data for runway 25L several times after receiving final weights and they did not come.  We began to taxi.  I was heads down from the moment of taxi until we reached the runway holding point dealing with dispatch to get the weights/speeds and in particular; the new checklist.  I was no help as a look out or giving directions during the whole taxi. I am of the opinion that the old way was more safe and a better way to do things.   We are usually on the backside of the clock and not as sharp as we think we are.  Most incidents occur on the ground these days and I think this new procedure is going to increase them.  Any savings in time or fuel is going to be wiped out by bent metal.




Synopsis: A First Officer reports that he was 'heads down' from the moment of taxi until reaching the runway holding point. As such; he was not able to aid the Captain during taxi. He attributes the problem to the new company policy to begin taxiing before receipt of the final weights.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Fourteen minutes after takeoff; I noticed the engines were still in takeoff mode and had exceeded the five minute [at takeoff thrust] limit by nine minutes. Both the First Officer and I were tired and had briefed at the gate to watch each other well; so we didn't do something 'stupid' while taxiing and departing. We carefully briefed the climb profile and departure restrictions for doing so. I think being so tired and concentrating on the profile and restrictions while performing the after takeoff flows and checklists contributed to our failure to catch that the engines were still in the takeoff mode.We called Maintenance Control when we arrived and wrote up what had happened and reviewed it with Local Maintenance personnel. I also called local Maintenance the next morning and found out no engine parameters were exceeded and the aircraft had continued on schedule. I was relieved all was well this time with and realize it could have been a different outcome.I know being fatigued was a major contributor. Even though we knew we were both starting to drag and I had not eaten anything other than breakfast early in the day--and even though we briefed all these things--it still played a bigger part than I expected.




Synopsis: An E-145 flight crew; fatigued and undernourished due to a long workday and lack of meal opportunities; failed to reduce thrust per the after takeoff checklist and exceeded the five minute limit by nine minutes.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FCM.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D FCM
ATC / advisory: Tower FCM
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed FCM on a VFR climb to the south.  Climbing through 2;300 [feet] we saw an object (looked like and aircraft) we assumed an aircraft potentially on downwind for Runway 28L at FCM.  We adjusted our flight path to pass to the right of the object.  No indications on ADS-B. As we got closer we were able to identify the object as a large drone with 4 rotors. The drone was stationary as we flew pithing 2;000 feet horizontally.  We immediately reported this to the FCM Tower.




Synopsis: Flight Instructor reported taking evasive action to avoid a drone.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC assigned us to maintain 210 kts while vectoring us to intercept the Runway 28R Localizer and a descent to 3;000 feet followed by a clearance for the approach in VMC and to maintain 180 kts until 5 miles out. I asked the FO (First Officer) to set 1;800 feet in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) altitude window; pushed the approach button and verified FMA's (Flight Mode Annunciator) to be correct with Single Channel displayed while configuring the jet. The autopilot pushed the nose over while tracking the localizer and quickly descended below 1;500 feet. The ATC controller called out a low altitude warning approaching AXMUL. I disconnected the autopilot and started to climb towards 1;800 feet. The ATC controller issued a climb to 3;000 feet which confused us because we were not sure if he meant go-around. I commanded a go-around and executed the procedure while climbing to 3;000 feet in order to repair the unsafe condition and confusion over the perceived non-standard phraseology.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported unsafe condition resulted from ATC climb clearance issued as flight crew was responding to to a previously issued low altitude alert.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: P50.TRACON, AZ
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E P50
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ZAB called to say that Aircraft X was not descending via. That was because ZAB dumped Aircraft Y to 11;000 feet in front of Aircraft X instead of putting them in trail. This is the easy out the ZAB continually does when they just dump on us (over deliver). Our Letter of Agreement (LOA) with ZAB allows them to do this with an APREQ; however; there was no APREQ. They never APREQ; they just do this. ZAB refuses to push the numbers from Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) to the glass so the controllers can use them to sequence properly. Instead; ZAB's Traffic Management Unit (TMU) supposedly monitors the numbers. Our TBFM is not set up correctly. We need to redo the setup completely; from nominal routes; to buffers; streams; matrix; super streams; etc. During this period and the one before; ZAB over delivered by giving us 21 aircraft in each 15 minute period for a total of 42 arrivals in a 30 minute period. They should only be giving us 18 arrivals according to the way the Flight Schedule Monitor (FSM) is set up. We could possible take 19 arrivals; but that would be the absolute max (19 when TBFM is set up properly and followed by ZAB).Make setting up TBFM correctly a priority and get it done ASAP; not waiting for Optimization of the Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM); since OAPM won't be implemented until. Make ZAB push the TBFM numbers to the glass. Make ZAB adhere to the TBFM numbers. Don't allow ZAB to stack arrivals; there are other routes available in our LOA.




Synopsis: P50 Controller reports of ZAB feed to P50 as being excessive. P50 Controller reports that the Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) is not set up correctly and that the facility needs to configure it correctly.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I made the standard call for 'GEAR UP' in response to the PM's (Pilot Monitoring) 'POSITIVE RATE' call. We then received a triple chime aural; master warning; and the following messages posted on EICAS: 'NOSE DOOR WARNING; GEAR DISAGREE WARNING; WOW (Weight on Wheels) INPUT CAUTION; STEERING INOP CAUTION; and WOW OUTPUT STATUS messages. We continued to clean up the aircraft. Filed altitude was 12;000 ft; to sort out the problem; I told the First Officer to tell ATC to stop us at 8;000 ft for a few minutes to run a few checklists. The First Officer ran the QRH for NOSE DOOR WARNING and the GEAR DISAGREE situation was corrected with all longing gear down and locked with 3 GREEN. Then I had the First Officer complete the 'STEERING INOP' CAUTION; the message disappeared; and that is when the 'WOW OUTPUT' STATUS message posted on ED2. Informed center that we will be staying at 200 IAS for fuel conservation. I then myself transferred the controls to the First Officer and went to get the Flight Attendant in the loop; as well as a PA to the passengers. I then ACARS Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] advising them of the malfunction. I relayed our current fuel flow; fuel on board; and the 'EXTRA' I still had after plugging the new speed into the FMS via the 'VNAV' function key. The flight continued without further incident; landed safely; and taxied to the gate with RESERVE fuel intact.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 air carrier flight crew experienced a gear problem upon the attempt to raise the gear after takeoff. Flight proceeded to destination with gear extended and landed normally.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Talking off out of ZZZZ on Runway XXL. On the takeoff roll we got a NAI over-temp on engine #2. No master warning. We continued the takeoff and after rotation we got engine fire #2. We let it produce thrust due to a high climb gradient. We ran the Quick Action items followed by the engine fire #2 checklist. After doing so; the fire indication went away. The aircraft was above max landing weight so we decided to tell ATC that we needed to return. We proceeded to run the jettison checklist and climbed to 6;000 feet. We got vectored around the missed approach area of Runway XXL. We talked to the company and Maintenance and advised them of the situation. We got time and initials for a re-dispatch back to departure airport. We requested priority handling to return for landing. After landing and clearing the runway; [it was determined it was safe to taxi] to our gate. After we got to the gate; Maintenance opened the cowlings and determined there were a lot of melted wires.




Synopsis: B747-400 First Officer reported an engine #2 over-temp indication during takeoff roll that continued into initial climb resulting in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to top of descent; I briefed that I would fly the visual approach to RWY XX backed up by the Localizer DME approach.  Landing configuration would be Flaps 30 and Brake Setting #3.  We were cleared the visual to RWY XX by Approach at 3;000 feet MSL.  I decided to start slowing and configuring early and the aircraft was properly configured and on reference speed of 148 KTS plus 5 KTS; approaching the FAF.  The aircraft position was slightly high on visual glide path; so I disengaged the autopilot; left autothrottles engaged; and started a descent to capture normal glide path.  The throttles reduced and the nose was lowered.  When I raised the pitch attitude once the normal visual glide path was attained; I did not notice the autothrottles did not advance.  With the raising of the pitch attitude; the airspeed decreased 15-20 knots below reference speed.  The Captain announced; 'Airspeed' and I immediately overrode the autothrottles and increased power.  The flight path continued on a slight descent when power was increased.  As the airspeed increased; I raised the pitch attitude to level flight and we regained proper pitch; power; airspeed and glide path at approximately 800 feet to 1;000 feet AGL.  All stabilized approach criteria were met before the 500 feet [required] for VMC approaches.  Landing and taxi in were completely uneventful.  Automation is a great tool and works as expected 95% of the time.  I would say that pilots can be 'lulled' into a sense of security when using it.  All the automation in the world does not relieve us of the charge to fly the airplane at all times.  Closer monitoring of approach speed and faster realization of the 'lag' of the autothrottles would have prevented the decrease in airspeed.  Had the situation progressed further; a go-around was; without a doubt; the proper action.  Needless to say; one must remain vigilant in monitoring and assessing all flight parameters at all times.  It's the times when you think you have things 'wired' that you need to maintain total awareness.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer; late to recognize slow autothrottle response after raising the pitch attitude on approach; responded to the Captain's 'airspeed' callout and overrode the autothrottles to increase power. Approach was stabilized and preceded uneventfully.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departure time is XA:45. AT XA:40 called the cockpit to advise crew of ready to depart on 2 occasions and no response. Tow tug was connected. Third attempt captain responded stating he was busy with things not ready to go. At XA:50 called again to see if they were ready and to advise that the tow tug was required at another airplane if he was not ready. Still not ready and only minimal communication was received. At XA:55 advised crew that the tow tractor was going to the other airplane; confirm brakes parked. Brakes parked and chocks placed at XB:00. Still no tow tractor; beacon comes on and brakes are released airplane rolls back on chocks and mechanic standing by startled and jumps clear. I request brakes set and beacon off twice he responds with we are clear to push; again I say brakes on and beacon off as we have no tow tractor; he states the check list says that he do it; also who is in control here myself or the tower; again I request for the brakes to be set and advise that he is putting people's lives on the ground at risk. The brake is set and beacon off. At XB:03 the tug arrives and is connected and advise that we are ready to push; the rest of the pushback is completed normally. At XB:08 the tug is disconnected from the airplane per normal procedures. At XB:10 the salute is given while displaying the steering pin and we wait for the confirmation; prior to this being received the captain does a steering check to verify the pin is removed; confirmation received and we depart the ramp.




Synopsis: Five minutes prior to scheduled departure; the leader of the pushback crew advised the B787 Captain that the ground crew was ready for pushback with no response. The Captain eventually responded that he was not ready and the tug was taken to push another aircraft. While waiting for the tug to return the Captain became ready for pushback; turned on the beacon; and released the brakes without consulting with the ground crew.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp; Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZZZ slide shop received 4 slides that were removed from Aircraft X. These slides had been deployed; then they were put in large plastic bags three of them were shipped in a wooden box and the fourth in a cardboard box with no lid. All of the reservoirs were empty but the survival kits contain signaling flares which should have been shipped as hazardous. Explosion proof boxes were provided for the return shipping to shop but were not used.




Synopsis: Air carrier ground personnel reported Hazmat cargo shipped in wrong container.