elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VHHH.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON VHHK
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While verifying the SID on the ground in VHHH; we noticed that there were 'at or below' restrictions in the FMC that did not exist on the JEPP for the PECAN 1B departure from VHHH. At both the PRAWN and RUMSY intersections; there were the altitude restrictions of 5000B on the altitude restriction side of the '/' in the FMC. That restriction does not exist on the JEPP [page]. I filed a safety report for the VHHH SIDs that departs in the opposite direction a few months back. The same problem existed in that there was a '5;000 or below' restriction in the FMC where no such restriction existed on the SID. I received a response back from your team stating that indeed there was an error in the FMC database and that it would be fixed in the next data cycle. Apparently this error exists on other SIDs in VHHH as well and perhaps they all need to be reviewed to make sure that the proper restrictions are placed in the FMC database. If pilots got busy or distracted while flying a VNAV departure; the aircraft might unintentionally level off at 5;000 when a higher altitude clearance might have been given by ATC.




Synopsis: A B777 Captain reported that the navigation database in his company's aircraft included commands to cross the first two fixes (PRAWN AND RUMSY) on the PECAN 1B RNAV SID from VHHH at or below 5;000 but the fixes on the Jeppesen SID graphic shows no such restriction.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EQY.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G EQY
ATC / advisory: CTAF EQY
Second aircraft: Bonanza 33
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching Runway 23 at Monroe after making appropriate radio calls and flying a full published pattern I turned left base in a stabilized descent when I heard a Bonanza announce a runway 23 departure. I had previously visually cleared the runway and did not see an airplane near the approach end of runway 23. I asked the Bonanza pilot to verify their position over the radio and received no response. I was still unable to visually verify the position of the Bonanza as I was turning final. Once established on final I recognized the landing light of the Bonanza at or near our altitude. I performed an immediate go-around and side-stepped the runway to the right onto a left upwind for Runway 23. I then flew a normal published pattern and returned to land runway 23.




Synopsis: C150 pilot reported a NMAC with another light aircraft in the pattern at EQY airport.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The R1 [1-Right] Door forward Girt Bar [floor] fitting was removed on a B737-800 aircraft on midnight shift to facilitate removal of the G1-Galley and was missed on installation and close-up of the airplane. We became aware of it when the airplane was delivered to the Terminal. The [Girt Bar floor] fittings must be removed to remove the galley.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed the 1-Right (R1) forward cabin door; forward Girt Bar floor fitting on a B737-800 aircraft; had not been reinstalled after removal of the G-1 galley. The missing floor fitting was noticed after the aircraft was delivered to the Terminal.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was vectoring for staggered ILS approaches. My attention was drawn to a situation where the other Final Controller (training) was extremely late turning into a gap and I was trying to make that work. When I looked to my other traffic I saw the two aircraft coming together at a rapid rate. I felt the base leg traffic that had been descended to 6;000 feet had not been descending at a standard rate and didn't help the situation. I turned him hard right immediately and turned the Airbus 319 hard left and tried to descend as it almost appeared the CRJ-200 had leveled. They both had at this point started into a TCAS maneuver. It gave me one hell of a scare! Meanwhile; I still had the other aircraft on the final high on the glide slope because of the original problem; who eventually had to come out to get re-sequenced. This was a classic case of being distracted by something and a couple normal things end up getting away from you and causing a big mess! I was not happy with the trainer allowing his trainee to contribute to this when he could have; and should have; taken over and taught the trainee how to work as a team to work out a situation. A simple descent for a visual approach would have done that. That being said; I take responsibility as I always have for my actions and for my part in this.There has been much discussion that on the high side (b) you have to level at 7;000 feet because of an airspace boundary which is the base leg altitude as well. So in order to get aircraft down it is very common to use 7;000 feet as a short gap...when on the (a) side you have airspace to descend. We should have airspace on both sides to avoid people constantly having to point out or put themselves in jeopardy of these type things happening. I have already spoken to my Supervisor about this being a training (lessons learned) tool for the TRACON as we have many new feeder and final controllers who may learn from this scenario.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event during staggered ILS approaches; listing distractions and training as contributing factors.
Date: 201902
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Our Captain told us the flight was going to be bumpy to LAS and he wanted us to stay seated for the entire short flight. Up at cruise the air was smooth so he called us after a while; stating that we had 10 minutes before descent if we wanted to do a service. I told him as the B Flight Attendant I did not have time to set up my galley; take drink orders and serve people. I said it normally gets bumpy 3 to 4 minutes into the descent for LAS. He said then you can do a water service; not a full service. We are told by management that we are not to do a water service [as] it is a full service or no service. The A and C flight attendants then said we are doing a full service; if you want to stay seated on the jump seat go ahead.I felt peer pressure to get up and start service because all my passengers would be watching them and also the C Flight Attendant would be in the back galley working standing right next to me on the jump seat. When we had established our descent the Captain called us to tell us [to] sit down NOW and do not get up for the duration of the flight. He personally told me not to get back up and close cabinets.The turbulence hit; it was very strong and everything open in the galley started flying around. I was soaked in liquid and the galley was a complete mess. Upon landing; the rest of the cans; trays etc. went flying out into the aisle. This was a dangerous situation and someone could have been hurt.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported feeling pressure to accomplish a beverage service even though the flight crew knew there was turbulence ahead.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Dash 8-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While in the process of an A-Check; I was assigned the duty of checking the filter units on the Pack Flow Control Valve and the Left and Right hand pack Bypass valves. After pulling the circuit breakers as directed in the Job Card; I proceeded to service the filters. Thinking the job would proceed smoother and I would be less likely to make a mistake; I decided to service both left and right hand units at the same time. After finishing; I returned to the flight deck to reset the circuit breakers and found that other technicians were on the flight deck doing other tasks. Not wanting to interrupt their work I decided to go to lunch and reset the breakers when I returned. After returning from lunch; I started a different task and forgot to reset the breakers. Upon arriving at work the following evening I learned that the line fitting on the Left hand Bypass valve hadn't been tightened enough; resulting in a cancelled flight. As a new Mechanic; I now realize that I should not have serviced both filters at the same but rather as separate tasks. I should have had another person inspect my work since it was my first time doing this task.  I should not have signed-off on the breakers being reset until after I had actually done it and I should have been more diligent about finishing the task after returning from break.  [Recommend] more emphasis on newer mechanics getting a task inspected; or a Job Card reviewed by someone else before assuming the job was done correctly; especially the first time they are performing the task no matter how simple it seems.




Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed that a line fitting on the Left Pack Bypass valve had not been tightened enough and circuit breakers had not been reset on a DHC-8-400 aircraft; resulting in a cancelled flight. He had previously serviced the filter units on the Pack Flow Control valve and Left and Right Bypass valves.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: Fire Protection System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the preflight; the First Officer noted that the FSS (Fire Suppression System) did not work (screen would not turn on). I called maintenance to look into it. The arrived about 20 minutes later; and said the aircraft had been fueled improperly and the fueling equipment had made contact with the aircraft. We inquired about the Fire Suppression System and they said it was being inactivated. They came back later with a new [Release Document] and had written up the FSS and the aircraft damage with the fueling equipment. As it turned out; the hose was hooked up the can; but not to the fire extinguishers. We were notified about 2 hours into the flight that maintenance discovered that they did not attach the hoses to the fire extinguishers and that we needed to divert to get the hoses properly installed. We diverted uneventfully and continued to LAX after the hoses were connected properly.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported Dispatch informed crew that Fire Suppression System was not reinstalled correctly; resulting in a diversion for correct re-installation to be accomplished.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: RV-9
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At night; cleared to land. Below 500 feet; after selecting 20 degrees of flaps; and bringing the nose up to slow down; a total loss of engine power occurred. An attempt to restart the engine failed. Gliding down I landed on the extended runoff area prior to the threshold of the runway. The aircraft continued rolling and was unable to stop before contact with plastic barriers placed across the pavement. The nose gear wheel pant was damaged with the fiberglass cracked.After the incident I found the two electronic ignition power switches in the OFF position. The only explanation is that during the run-up; these were turned off to check the internal power from the EMAG ignition; and they were never turned back on. The ignition supplies its own power; unless the engine RPM drops below approximately 1400 RPM. Once the engine RPM got too low; both ignition EMAG devices stopped supplying the spark plugs.




Synopsis: Vans RV-9 pilot reported the engine quit on short final; leading to slight damage to a wheel pant after a runway excursion. Reporter stated after landing he found the ignition power switches in the wrong position; causing the engine to shut down.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DE25.Airport, DE
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Immediately following a normal approach and landing; on landing roll noticed objects on runway which were turned out to be a large flock of geese. I thought I would be slowed enough and they would start to move so that with these two factors occurring; there would be no conflict. However; since it was a grass runway; and while not wet; I did not want to apply maximum braking on a 'soft' field and risk a loss of control. Since they did not expedite their departure; I ran through them; striking five with propeller and gear door. I do not think anything other than a reduced geese population could prevent this. I retrospectively thought about if a low approach to inspect first would have been useful to avoid this. But I think this would have positioned me to potentially be flying through a departing flock at high power; higher speed; and low altitude in dark conditions resulting in a much less favorable outcome. I have been flying to this field and have not previously noted flocks of birds on the runway while landing.




Synopsis: BE33 pilot reported multiple bird strikes during landing rollout.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After departure from ZZZ1 flight began receiving vectors due to flow into ZZZ. Flight crew monitored fuel load and eventually declared minimum fuel while with Center. While enroute; aircraft encountered icing conditions. Shortly after the Bleed 1 Low Temp EICAS message appeared. Following the QRH procedures eliminated the message for a time; but the message then returned while the aircraft was already at a high power setting and a fast speed and no more power was available to raise the bleed temperature. The message cleared when the aircraft exited ice. During the descent into ZZZ while passing through 10;000 ft. the aircraft again encountered icing conditions. This time the message wing stab A/I (anti-ice) fail message displayed. The bottom of the cloud layer was just below us and an increased power setting allowed the icing system to operate. The Captain opted to increase the power in the descent to keep the bleeds up until below the clouds and out of icing conditions. The Captain was aware that this would cause the aircraft to exceed the 250 kt. speed limit below 10;000 ft. but decided it was a safer option to escape the ice. The Captain informed ATC and [received priority]. When clear of icing conditions the Captain canceled the [priority] and the flight resumed without further issues. Upon landing Captain notified the controlling Dispatcher and spoke with Maintenance Control and made a maintenance write-up in the aircraft log.Root Cause - The bleeds were too low temperature at even relatively high power settings. The aircraft icing system; specifically the Wing/Stab anti ice system failed to operate at power settings required to fly under 250 kts. even when level.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain flying an EMB-145 aircraft reported an anti-ice system malfunction inflight.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ASD.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class G ZHU
ATC / advisory: CTAF ASD
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: At ASD. I had finished my pre-flight and saw 2 skydivers land at ASD. I thought the area was clear. I started up my airplane called taxi and another skydiver landed in front of me; off the landing zone. There was 5-10 minutes between the first 2 landings and the third. Was evasive action taken? Yes; I stopped my taxi. This sky-diving landing zone needs to be moved to the south end of the field.




Synopsis: GA pilot flying small aircraft encounters skydiver in front of aircraft during taxi at ASD airport.