elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: First day of three day trip; second leg of first day. Flying with this First Officer for first time. He wanted to use headsets and intercom mode with headsets. I don't usually use intercom and headsets at cruise; I use speakers.This time I thought I would honor his wish and try headsets. Worked well on first leg; I was flying and he was talking to ATC. Second leg I was talking to ATC and he was flying. Approximately 10 minutes after level off at FL380 and after PA to passengers we hooked up our headset to intercom and spoke through headsets.I inadvertently selected 'Receiver/Transmitter (R/T)' instead of 'Intercom (I/C)' on radio tuning panel transmitting our conversation over active Washington Center frequency. It seemed like 5 to 7 minutes and I realized I wasn't hearing ATC or other aircraft. I immediately disconnected my intercom and called ATC. Washington Center told us we had been transmitting our conversation for about 10 minutes and instructed us to call Jacksonville Center. I was shocked; embarrassed and humiliated all at the same time!This will never happen again as mistakes that embarrass and humiliate are very good learning lessons toward future actions! Have felt terrible about this for last several days as I understand the possible hazards for us and everyone else using this frequency during that time.I think the labeling on these radio intercom switches should have a better identifier saying something along the lines of 'external transmissions' and not just R/T!It was also at night and hard to see labeling on switch.If you are transmitting on B-777 for more than 20 or 30 seconds you get 'ICAS' message saying 'TRANSMIT!!' Letting you know of potential stuck mic.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported mistakenly transmitting personal conversation on ATC frequency when he set the radio panel up incorrectly.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: The First Officer was the flying pilot and the captain was the Pilot Monitoring. We were cleared for the ILS 8R into IAH. I don't really remember what the ceilings were but I would guess around 1500 feet. We were IMC when the deviation took place. We were outside EELPO but approaching it when the autopilot pitched nose down around 9-10 degrees to hold the glide slope. Then the plane started pitching back up then back down again. At that point I disconnected the autopilot. The glide slope start[ed] moving all around. At that point I asked the captain if we had the right freq. which we did and he noticed that we were below the published minimum outside of EELPO. I want to say I was about 500 or more below the minimum of 3000 feet but approaching EELPO. I made corrections by climbing and around that point; the glide slope centered back up and seemed to be working normal.We asked tower if anyone else was having problems with the glide slope. Tower said they get that sometimes when an aircraft taxis across the ILS critical area on the ground. Another aircraft behind us reported the same issue. Tower was not having aircraft hold short of the ILS critical area even though aircraft were shooting ILS's. Houston Tower told us that they don't hold aircraft clear of the ILS critical area unless the ceiling are at 800 feet or below. I can't believe that they allow aircraft to pass through the ILS critical area while they assigning an ILS to all aircraft because you are starting the approach off in IMC conditions. I'm not sure why 800 feet is the magic number for using the ILS critical area when they know it cause issues on the glide slope. I really think that need[s] to be addressed with Houston Tower.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew encountered an unstable ILS glide slope during approach.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was providing OJT to a CPC-IT on Local Control East. The developmental joined me during moderate traffic after I'd worked around 20 minutes. A B737 was set up to land on Runway 35 in front of an E190 (on 27R); however; there was a headwind that affected the 35 arrivals more than the 27R arrivals. We had had several aircraft which were well behind the ghost target (Converging Runway Display Aid-CRDA) for 35; and the 'back end' of the gap was the problem - i.e.; rather than the 35 arrival conflicting with the 27R they were to go behind; they in fact were placed such that once they'd slowed; they conflicted with the 27R arrival following them. It was clear that this would be the problem with the B737; so upon communication with the E190; we asked him to start slowing to his final approach speed; and later asked for an S-Turn for additional room. The two aircraft were still a tie; and at about a 3 mile final on the B737; I asked the CPC-IT how it looked; he responded that it was still a tie; and initiated a go-around with the B737. However; the response was 'Embraer; going around.' I immediately took the frequency and corrected it; telling the E190 that was not for him; however; as I was talking; I saw that E190's nose was already up and that he'd started the go-around. I then reversed the situation and told the B737 he was still cleared to land and fortunately he did continue and land. While I had the frequency; a second tie at the intersection occurred and I sent another aircraft - [a Runway] 35 arrival - around. I fault myself for not taking the time to brief with this trainee about my expectations while training on Local East before actually starting training there. I should've taken the time to talk to him about this situation - there is no 7110.65 phraseology for this tie; but I have used language to tell both aircraft well in advance that it would be a tight one; and which one of them would be going around in the event it did not work. As it worked out; I gave this developmental too much leeway; and nearly had a double go-around occur (tie at the intersection turns into a tie in the air).




Synopsis: PHL Controller providing OJT during simultaneous landing on Runway 35 and 27R and utilizing CRDA described a go around event when the developmental issued the instructions to the wrong aircraft; the reporter noting too much leeway was given to the developmental.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ1
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At XA:30z [Dispatch name] received a phone call from [Ramp name] [who] said that there was undeclared Hazmat on Aircraft X. [Ramp name] relayed the info to me and I send the crew an ACARS message letting them know that there was 60 kg of dry ice in position X; can number YYY. They were not above the max so no other actions were required. Advised the crew that I was going to submit an [company] report and it wouldn't hurt if they did as well. We let the manager on duty know.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported being notified of undocumented Hazmat on an airborne flight.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain didn't wear a mask throughout the airport; on the plane; in the [hotel] van; nor in the hotel. When asked by the flight attendants; he said he can't wear one. This puts us all at risk and with a higher chance of having to be pulled from the line if he tests positive for COVID.If crews cannot wear a mask; they should not be at work.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not wear a face mask throughout their flight pairing.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: Y90.TRACON, CT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E Y90
ATC / advisory: Tower BDL
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 6 and switched to BDL Tower. An unknown VFR; soon to be identified; was then observed departing a [nearby] airport on a converging course. I immediately notified the Local Controller. The aircraft merged over the 5 mile final at the same altitude. Aircraft X responded to a TCAS RA. Replay showed the aircraft to be separated by 0.22 miles laterally and 0 feet vertical.The Class C airspace surrounding BDL must be changed to protect aircraft on the final approach course. The VFR aircraft was flying below the outer ring of the airspace. This must be extended to the ground to protect the final approach course.




Synopsis: The TRACON Controller observed an unidentified VFR aircraft depart an airport on a converging course with an air carrier on a visual approach to an adjacent airport already in communication with the Tower. The TRACON Controller pointed the traffic out to the Tower Local Controller. The air carrier responded to a TCAS RA.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During very busy radio traffic we were given what we heard was a descent from flight level 300 down to 250. The pilot not flying read back to the controller descend to flight level 2-5-0. The controller read back 2-5-0. However his read back must have been cutoff because apparently he said 2-5-0 knots. We began our descent out of flight level 300 passing through FL290 the controller queried our descent. We told him that we were given a descent to flight level 250. At that time he asked us to stop descent at FL280 and fly to 250 knots. We complied.


Second narrative: Cruise at FL300; 50 miles prior to starting the SNKPT1 arrival. Indy Center cleared us to descend to FL250. I read back 'Descend to Flight Level 250'; and Indy Center responded 'Roger'. The FO then dialed in 250 and began descent. Passing FL289; Indy Center called and asked if we were given descent instructions. I replied 'Affirmative; you cleared us down to FL250.' Indy then told us that we were given instructions to SLOW to 250KIAS. Indy Center then cleared us to level at FL280 and slow to 250KIAS. Indy Center told us 'no problem'; then sent us to next controller and said 'Have a nice day.'At this point Indy Center was beginning to vector everyone off the arrival and I believe their initial transmission got stepped on by another aircraft in all the confusion.We were operating into Indianapolis from the East; using the SNKPT1 arrival. For the last several months Indianapolis Center and Approach have been struggling to make their arrivals happen smoothly 'as published'. From approximately 100 miles prior to starting the ODP arrivals into Indy until the final vector to the localizer; the arrivals are a chaotic mess of constantly assigned vectors; speed changes; and altitude changes - many times going against the published parameters requiring more queries to ATC. Add a few similar call signs and stepped on radio calls and the whole situation is a flight violation waiting to happen.


Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew reported receiving a descent clearance to FL250 while on the SNKPT1 Arrival to IND; but the Controller meant to issue a speed of 250.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SDF.Airport, KY
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SDF
ATC / advisory: TRACON SDF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While Pilot Flying on the DLAMP 5 Arrival into SDF landing north and expecting Runway 35R; shortly after NERVE on the arrival we were told to proceed direct to BRELL and then rejoin the arrival. This was a shortcut because it allowed us to cut a corner on the arrival; saving a short amount of time. I put direct BRELL into the FMS and confirmed with the Pilot Monitoring before activating; taking us direct to BRELL. BRELL is the last fix on the arrival; after which the arrival instructs to track a 171 degree course; so I had previously put in a waypoint on a 171 bearing from BRELL and out 15 miles so we had a course to track after BRELL. After crossing over BRELL; the aircraft turned to track the 171 course; but we were right of course due to BRELL being a flyover waypoint and not a flyby waypoint on the arrival procedure. The Controller informed us we were 2 miles right of course; and that if there had been an aircraft on final there would not be adequate separation. The Controller told us it wasn't a big deal; gave us a heading for a base turn and cleared us for the visual without further event.The problem arrived due to the clearance to proceed direct to BRELL; which made us arrive at a 45 degree or greater angle. BRELL is a flyover waypoint; so we cannot turn early than BRELL according to the arrival procedure. Normally on the arrival aircraft arrive at BRELL already on a 170 degree course; so BRELL being a flyover waypoint is not an issue. Clearances that bring you to BRELL at a steep angle will cause you to overshoot and incur on the final approach course; but turning before BRELL is technically not following the arrival procedure.




Synopsis: EMB-175 pilot reported track deviation while on the DLAMP 5 arrival into SDF due to having been cleared by ATC direct to a flyover waypoint and procedurally not being able to turn early.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Tactical
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Weather that was depicting heavy to extreme precipitation impacted the Tiroe sector ZTL. The area of convective activity covered a 90 mile radius in the sector. There was no 'clean air' we had aircraft inbound to ATL deviate to avoid the heavy thunderstorms. They deviated into the south departure sector and also the west departure sector. It was not possible for them to join the arrival from the south west. We coordinated headings with ATL approach A80.Our Traffic Management Unit (TMU) was informed by our Controller in Charge (CIC) that aircraft were requesting different arrival fixes. The other 3 arrival fixes and sectors in ZTL airspace had no weather at all. 2 Air carriers demanded a new arrival for safety. Our TMU responded by saying the air carriers could deviate. So we vectored aircraft to deviate north and rejoin the arrival when able. When the aircraft reached the Transfer Control Point (TCP) however the controllers at A80 said they had no knowledge of this plan and did not agree to it. Lack of communication between our TMU and A80 put the flying public safety at risk. Our TMU said that they put out a re-route to put the arrivals on other arrivals. However the aircraft were still purposely being routed into known convective activity on the arrival into ATL. No proactive measures were taken by our TMU to off-load arrivals to safe arrivals with no convective activity. The flying public was put at risk by this lack of action and planning. In the future when an arrival sector is covered in convective activity the aircraft should be re-routed to other arrivals. This was another example of how our management and TMU do NOT work to help the controllers of ZTL.




Synopsis: Atlanta Center Controller reported aircraft being cleared into known weather.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Flight to [ZZZ1] just after takeoff center advises they require 30 miles in trail to [ZZZ1]. They began radar vectors and slowed to 290 kts. 670 miles from [ZZZ1]. [ZZZ1] was VFR and landing expressway visual 31. They continued to climb us but had us slow to .77. This continued and we were slowed to 180 kts on the arrival. Total fuel was 9;496 lbs.; enroute burn 5;226 lbs. min to was 9;122 lbs. We flew the flight plan as closely as possible. We arrived at the gate with 2;200 lbs. our enroute burn was 7;570 lbs. Reserve fuel was 2;271 lbs.Dispatch fuel planning. Company enroute fuel burns are not accurate! Company needs do an audit on the enroute fuel burns system wide.


Second narrative: The flight plan said we should have landed with 3;900 lbs. That was a 1;700 lb. difference. We flew the flight plan as close as possible to the profile. The delaying vectors may have contributed to a greater fuel burn than may have been expected but not a 1;700 lb. difference. The fuel burn numbers may be incorrect or the historical data may also be incorrect. Perhaps the dispatch department needs to review the fuel burns and historical data for all flights.


Synopsis: A CRJ-700 was dispatched with a planned landing fuel of 3;900 lbs. With delay vectors enroute; the flight landed with 2;200 lbs which was less than expected even with delays. The crew questioned the company planned fuel burn number.