elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TVC.Airport, MN
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Icing; 10
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On the way to TVC; we listened to the ASOS (tower was closed) and the weather was 200/8G13 10 SM. Once we were stable on the approach we realized that the crosswinds were a lot higher than the ASOS had reported; we experienced turbulence and as we continued getting close to the runway the crosswinds were still stronger than expected; I decided to go around for the safety of the flight. On the way up to 3;000 feet we picked up a lot of ice; later the controller cleared us to climb to 4;000 feet and we were still picking up ice. I called to get a higher altitude to stay clear of ice. We were very busy. I determined that if vectored for another approach the ice accretion might exceed the deice capabilities of our ice protection system. As a result I decided to return for my alternate. I sent a message to the dispatcher informing that we were going back to [departure airport]; unfortunately I did not have enough time to relay more information to dispatch due to the short duration of flight. I think it was the safest and best thing to do; get more fuel and try again.ASOS weather report a crosswind completely different than actual wind.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering high winds and inflight icing during the approach to TVC.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X departed PDX heading 280 climbing to 070. A 1200 code indicating 015 was 5.2 miles west-southwest of PDX northbound. As soon as Aircraft X contacted my trainee; I advised him to turn Aircraft X to avoid the VFR. I don't understand how an aircraft can be right in the way of PDX departures not talking to ATC. The Class C airspace is outdated. The departure needed to be turned immediately after takeoff to avoid a non-participating aircraft.The floor on the outer Class C airspace needs to be lowered to below 010 and extensions need to be designed to protect aircraft landing and departing PDX.




Synopsis: P80 TRACON Controller reported that airspace structure resulted in an airborne conflict.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During preflight activities; both the first officer and I noticed when checking the oxygen that the PSI indication on the overhead panel would drop considerably when oxygen was flowing. When the first officer pointed this out to me; I ran my mask on Emergency for 10 seconds and verified continuous flow. At cruise; we both donned and wore oxygen during lav breaks and had oxygen flowing from the mask. We both remarked that each time we inhaled; we would take notice of the overhead indicator as it dropped towards zero but would immediately return to around 1200 PSI. While we both thought it odd; we took no further action. Upon arrival we learned that the crew operating the next flight had written it up and maintenance had found the valve to be not in the full open position. When receiving this information; the Flight Manual's 'normal' section was reviewed and the indications we observed should have pointed us towards a call to maintenance as the drop in PSI was not normal. Contributing to our failure to address this with maintenance was the normal flow of oxygen which led me to believe it might not be a system malfunction.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported the crew oxygen system pressure dropped excessively when testing. Later; Maintenance found the oxygen valve not fully open.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On final approach we had GPWS terrain Caution and shortly after a GPWS obstacle caution. We were doing the RNAV Approach. Captain had decided on a flaps 40 landing due to rain that had recently moved through the area. There was a small rain shower on final between the end of the runway and the final approach fix. Ceilings were appx 1;000. When we were initially cleared for the approach I set the final approach fix altitude and verified that LNAV and VNAV Path were both engaged. Crossing the initial fix we then set 100 feet and proceeded on the approach. At 1;000 I called approaching minimums and runway in sight. Right after that we got the GPWS Terrain Caution. I called GPWS Terrain Caution Climb. At that point the Captain arrested the descent and made a climb back to the approach path and continued to landing since we could visually verify the aircraft position and return to approach path. I looked at the FMA and for some reason we were now in level change. I am not sure when that change took place as when I set the 100 feet we were in LNAV and VNAV Path if I remember correctly. I pointed out to the captain that some how we were in level change. My best guess is that somehow by being in level change we slipped under the flight path designated by the GPS. My only thought is that perhaps the speed window was opened in an attempt to adjust the approach speed except instead of the speed window level change was perhaps selected. I do not remember the captain announcing that he was opening the window or adjusting the speed. I am purely speculating as to how the wrong mode could be selected that close to the ground. Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data might be able to provide more clarity as to when and what was selected.




Synopsis: B737 flight crew approaching minimums on an RNAV approach a crew received a GPWS terrain caution. The crew climbed back to the correct the approach path and landed.
Date: 202109
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Jet Blast; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: IAH was landing in an east flow configuration while departing Runways 15L and 9. We were vectored for an approach in VMC conditions to runway 8R. The approach was straight forward as the winds were rather consistent meaning no gusts encountered the entire way down the approach. The aircraft was stable and configured properly and accordingly with what seemed like very little input needed from the PF to maintain the approach profile both laterally and vertically. We approached the runway and I noticed an aircraft beginning the takeoff roll on 15L and did not think anything of it. In the round-out to flare; the airplane abruptly rolled left while being pushed to the left of the centerline of the runway and then had the nose yaw to the right at about 30-50 feet RA according to the callouts I recall hearing. This also coincided with the Runway 15L threshold passing behind my right shoulder as I recall. The PF made some quick and precise control inputs to get the aircraft back over the centerline wings level and landed while still in the TDZ. As soon as the airplane was slowing and tracking the centerline the PF made a comment/question wondering what the heck happened. I stated that I had an idea; but would wait until we cleared the runway to continue the conversation. After clearing I stated to the Captain I thought we might have encountered a jet blast event due to the surface winds and the aircraft departing on 15L. I was unsure what the aircraft type was that departed 15L as from the cursory glance I gave it on final it did not look like a widebody; so again I did not even think that we might be setting ourselves up for a jet blast encounter. That being said; this was the end of our second leg in this very jet and it had performed flawlessly both flights; so I do not think that there was any malfunction that could be associated with this event.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a possible jet blast encounter during landing flare at IAH airport.  First officer stated they were landing on Runway 8R and the jet blast was from an aircraft taking off on Runway 15L.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Recirculation Fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In final descent phase of flight approximately 15 minutes prior to landing; odor was detected on flight deck; Flight Attendant advised odor throughout the cabin and reported by passengers. Odor dissipated somewhat; but reoccurred. Upon gate arrival; no odor detected. Flight Dispatch; Maintenance Control and Duty Pilot notified. Flight attendants requested medical evaluation. Advised by Maintenance Control failure of recirculating was the cause of the problem.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported undefined odor on flight deck and cabin on initial approach which dissipated periodically. Flight attendants requested medical evaluation.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Air return back to [departure airport].  Leveled off cruise altitude; 'R OIL STRAINER CLOG' light illuminated on OAP.  Complied with QRH procedures.  Light did not extinguish. Engine oil temp reached 129 and fuel temp peaked at 38. Contacted Company; spoke with both Dispatch and Maintenance Control; and returned without incident.  Both oil temp and fuel temp decreased during descent.  As a note; [this aircraft] had the same issue 3 days prior. The aircraft had been flown only about 10 hours until we got the light again. When these issues occur; replacing a part or 'Ops Check Normal' is not the best course action. Many times there is more than meets the eye. We need to stop fixing the symptoms and fix the real problems. If you ask me; [this aircraft] does not just need a new oil filter; but needs to be looked at much closer.  Also; I believe the right engine is the one on the MTO program.  As the technicians were finishing up putting on the new oil filter; Scheduling was informing me that they were thinking of launching us back to [destination]. (Note: they informed us that hotel rooms were very hard to find.) I shared my concerns and proceeded to talk with Maintenance Control.  Flight was finally cancelled.




Synopsis: MD-83 Captain reported 'R OIL STRAINER CLOG' light after takeoff. He returned to departure airport and noted this was a recurring problem.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying and we were on final at SFO Runway 28R. We were on a visual approach and heard Tower clear another aircraft for takeoff on Runway 01R. I pointed this out to the Captain and we both began to monitor his progress as we were on short final. We agreed it looked pretty tight but would probably work out. Tower then cleared another aircraft to takeoff on Runway 01L. We were now on a very short final and knew the spacing would not work; but before we could relay our concern to Tower he canceled the takeoff clearance for the aircraft on Runway 01L. We were still monitoring the aircraft on Runway 01R and approaching 500 FT we realized the spacing was going to be too close. This is when Tower directed a go-around. We began the go-around and Tower directed us to fly a 280 heading. The Captain; while hand flying; spun in the 280 heading and pressed heading select. He then followed the flight director as we began to clean up. A few seconds later Tower relayed the heading again and that is when I realized we were on a 310 heading following the published missed approach. I pointed this out to the Captain and he was a little confused. We quickly returned to the correct heading. We were only on the incorrect heading momentarily and did not appear to be a conflict with any traffic. We were vectored around again for an uneventful landing on Runway 28L. We discussed the heading error later and noted that on the B737 the aircraft will not come out of the approach mode unless the FD's are turned off and then back on or another ILS frequency is selected; etc. Pressing the heading hold button is not effective here.ATC Tower should not schedule takeoffs and landings on crossing runways with spacing that tight. A heavy aircraft on a hot day may accelerate considerably slower [than planned]. Also; ATC should realize that during a go-around the pilots have a high workload and can become task saturated when they are giving multiple clearances while the aircraft is still trying to clean up and accelerate.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer landing Runway 28L at SFO describes a conflict with traffic departing Runway 1R that results in a go around.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GUM.Airport, GU
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Rain; Fog; Haze / Smoke; 4
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D GUM
ATC / advisory: Tower GUM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent to the Guam airport we flew an approach into Guam for a landing on 24R. We began the final descent phase to the runway with weather which was above minimums. During the approach we encountered moderate turbulence and heavy rain. Upon reaching the MDA crew communications were somewhat hindered due to the extremely loud impacts of rain on the windshield. As a result of confusion and coordination we inadvertently descended below the MDA (while a non-flying crewmember was yelling altitudes AGL in the back of the cockpit); upon realizing this we also noticed the runway in sight ahead of us and being in this position with a clear descent path to the runway after executing a small correction to the left. The Captain and I elected to continue to a landing. We landed approximately 3000 feet down the runway at the very end of the touchdown zone.The problem was most likely caused by fatigue (extremely long day and wake cycle including an earlier diversion); flying a non-precision approach in marginal weather; inability to communicate clearly due to the loud environment within the cockpit; and confusion caused by other individuals (ACM) interfering with communications between pilots flying the aircraft.




Synopsis: Large transport First Officer reported descending below charted altitude on a non-precision approach to GUM in heavy rain.
Date: 201604
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the arrival process first bridge XX docked with door 1 no incident. The 2nd bridge XY now begins movement. The guide signal is now not needed because of camera monitor in bridge. The #1 engine was still running and bridge had traveled approximately 10 feet. A ramp person now stopped the bridge with a signal to the operator. The concern by the ramp was the fact the 2nd bridge docking to door 2 would travel too close to the still running engine. The agent that this happen to told me about this incident a week later. More of a concern if we should meet door 2 with the 2nd jetbridge and engine is running. I brought this up to labor safety group and they said we should file a safety report. I am not aware of any procedures or web regulations that would prohibit travel to door 2 with engine still running. This applies to gates with dual bridges where the 2nd bridge travels closer to the #1 engine on approach. In this case the ramp person was concerned of the air hose getting sucked in to the engine. We do meet other aircraft with the engine running; however the travel path of the bridge is different than the 2nd bridge. Could it have been near miss? The jetbridge operator at this station does not receive direction of movement signal as of April 2016. Only a camera with monitor on bridge is used to check travel path for clearance. No policy is stated on approach with aircraft and running engine.




Synopsis: A ramp agent reported that while driving a second jet bridge to an aircraft's door 2; another ramp agent commanded a stop because the jet bridge was too close to the running engine 1; which may have ingested an air conditioning hose. Only a camera fed monitor is viewable by the jet bridge operator to check travel.