elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Radio Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Just after takeoff we encountered fluctuating radar altimeter readings and associated nuisance GPWS alerts. I contacted Maintenance Control. I indicated numerous times that we had; in fact; departed. Maintenance Control advised us to pull and reset circuit breakers associated with the GPWS and radar altimeter system; which we did. At this time Maintenance Control realized that we were in the air already. We were then instructed to reset all circuit breakers; consult our QRH and talk to Flight Control for further instructions. When the circuit breakers were reset the problem initially corrected itself; but returned shortly thereafter. The Captain then consulted with Flight Control and we decided to return to the departure airport. The radar altimeter problem was intermittent with periodic RA flags; so I ran the QRH checklist again in preparation for landing. The rest of the flight was uneventful.My communication with Maintenance Control was lacking. However at no time did Maintenance Control verify if we were on the ground or in the air. Also; communication in the cockpit broke down and led to a violation of company SOPs; i.e. pulling circuit breakers in flight.I can double check something when it goes against SOPs. I assumed that the Captain felt as though pulling circuit breakers was necessary for the safe completion of the flight. I also assumed that Maintenance Control knew we were in flight and were giving us instructions accordingly. Neither of these two assumptions was explicitly stated; however. I know for next time.




Synopsis: After departure a CRJ-200 radio altimeter indication began fluctuating affecting the GPWS so; after resetting circuit breakers at Maintenance's advise; the aircraft returned to land with the faults continuing.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator Tab
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: May 2011; Task Card XXX [was] completed by me on both the left-hand and right-hand Elevator Tabs. I reviewed the past completed [Task] Card in the Inspection Office to compare my numbers of the Tab free-play and the last inspection. Reviewed history of the tabs and found no work was accomplished in the last year on them. When the inspection was complete; the hardware installation to my understanding of the Task Card was correct. February 2012; Inspector X completed the same inspection and found a washer missing on the left-hand tab; number one hinge; between the inboard bushing and bearing. The tab has been removed and replaced with; I think; new hardware.The Task Card refers you to different drawing [illustration] numbers for different tab configurations and the drawing number this event occurrence deals with is XXXXXX411. On the surface [the Task Card] appears straight forward; but is incomplete and confusing; the references do not match from one page to the next. Page # 4; explains the quantity (QTY) of parts in the build-up of the hinge [assembly] for one side of the airplane. The number of washers and their build-up is confusing; as there is no 'number' of how many washers are to be used; item (h) said maximum of three under the [bolt] head. This and other problems with the entire Task Card package for this job were brought to the attention of our Air Carrier Management back in late 2010. They said they would correct the [Task] Cards; however nothing has been done to date. No work has been done on this [Elevator] Tab back to 2006 and it has been inspected five other times with no one seeing or thinking; by their understanding of the Task Card; that a washer was missing/required.I think this could be avoided by clarifying the Task Cards so the illustrations and text match. If there was a way to simplify the process; that would be very helpful.




Synopsis: A Line Lead Mechanic was informed an Inspector had found a washer missing at the left-hand Elevator Tab # 1 Hinge assembly; between the inboard bushing and bearing on a B737-400 aircraft. Lead Mechanic notes the same tab had been inspected five other times with no one seeing or thinking a washer was missing or required; using the same Task Card and reference Drawings.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My first officer and I arrived at [the aircraft for an early morning departure]. Per company procedure I (Captain) completed the cockpit preflight and the first officer completed the exterior preflight. The first officer reported no discrepancies. Just before departure; I conducted an abbreviated external inspection. I noted that all prop tie-down straps and pitot covers were removed. I also did not see an installed cowl inlet plug. Departure was normal; and we flew four legs with no abnormal engine indications. It was brought to our attention that in fact we had operated the airplane for four legs with the cowl plug sucked down into the intake and jammed on a splitter. A different crew operated the aircraft an additional leg with no problems before discovery.It has been determined that aircraft at our company of the same make/model/year have plugs that are worn; discolored; and ill-fitting. Although the plug could have been installed properly the night before; it appears it could have easily slipped down into the intake overnight; making it hard to detect. It is also possible the plug was simply pushed too far in by the previous crew making it difficult to see. A possible fix would be to incorporate a strap that connects the plug to the prop tie-down; to ensure a positive connection to something exterior to the intake. Also; in this incident; when the first officer noted that the plug was not installed he assumed that meant that the plug was simply missing from the aircraft and did not mention the missing part to me. Had he mentioned it; I would have taken a more close look into the intake in order to try to locate it.


Second narrative: Fatigue could have also played a factor. More sleep and time dedicated to preflight actions could keep this from happening again.


Synopsis: PC12 flight crew reported they departed with an inlet cover still in the intake. Five legs were flown before the cover was noticed.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MDQ.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G MDQ
ATC / advisory: CTAF MDQ
Second aircraft: Chinook (CH-47)
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was on a final stabilized VFR approach to runway 18 at MDQ and just about to flare when I encountered significant turbulence from a Chinook helicopter; both rotors turning; that was waiting to takeoff from a spot on the grass between the touchdown zone of runway 18 and the parallel taxiway. The turbulence hit me just at about the flare and I was barely able to salvage a very hard landing. This is an airport that has significant helicopter activity. I believe some airport rules should be considered to restrict this type of helicopter operation near the approach end of the active runway as an effort to eliminate/minimize such turbulence.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported a hard landing resulted after he encountered rotor wash from a helicopter operating on the ground near the approach end of the runway.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class C AUS
ATC / advisory: Tower AUS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other divert
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: There was bad weather in ZZZ.  ( Lightning and thunders storms ). I believe the Captain told on us on our descent to ZZZ that ATC was holding all incoming aircrafts from entering ZZZ. Being that ZZZ1-ZZZ is a long X.5 hour flight; the aircraft did not have enough fuel to continue holding until ATC gave us the confirmation to land so the Captain said that we would be landing in Austin to refuel . However; once we landed in Austin; ATC said that we couldn't taxi out because of the continuous bad weather in ZZZ.  Our Termac Delay last for 146 minutes before we were allowed to take off to ZZZ.




Synopsis: Pilot reported having to divert due to weather at intended destination; then having to stay on the ground for over 2 hours at diversion airport due to weather at the intended destination airport.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC; Special Use SUA
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X started getting continuous light bordering on moderate chop. I knew there was moderate turbulence reported 30-40 miles ahead. I descended Aircraft X from 26;000 feet to 24;000 feet. I did not think about special use airspace being active.[The airspace] is not active very often so when it is; I need to double remind myself it is.




Synopsis: A ZDC Controller descended an aircraft into military special use airspace.
Date: 201905
Location: CMA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D CMA
ATC / advisory: Tower CMA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying with a private pilot doing take offs and landings. Weather was perfect and light winds and my student and I were cleared for take off. Everything was normal on climbout up to our crosswind turn for left closed traffic. Upon reaching pattern altitude at 875 feet and just about to turn downwind we were faced with another aircraft joining the downwind and we experienced a very near miss. The Control Tower screamed out a tail number of another aircraft and told that aircraft to turn right immediately which of course didn't help us and then a scream from the Tower to execute a right 360 degree turn to avoid traffic by which time we were in a head on situation.After following up with the Supervisor of the Control Tower his explanation was to say sorry; but they were training new controllers and admitted the horrific mistake. Upon checking the tapes in the Tower we realized that this incredibly bad decision by the Tower was evidenced by the communication. My student was horrified and completely discouraged from flying again which is so regrettable.




Synopsis: Small aircraft flight instructor reported an NMAC in the CMA airport pattern.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-34 Seneca Undifferentiated
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I am a single engine commercial pilot but was taking multi-engine lessons from a local flight school located at ZZZ. We departed ZZZ and landed at ZZZ1 airport to practice a short field landing. After making an uneventful landing I taxied back and took off again. Everything was normal until we reached roughly 400 ft AGL. The aircraft yawed and rolled left so we immediately assumed we lost or was losing the left engine. My flight instructor took over flying the aircraft at this point. He started turning back to the airport. At this point I told him that the left engine was showing about 1700 RPMs. He decided to leave the engine running but partially feather it because it may still be providing some thrust. We flew back to make the approach and he gave controls back to me to make the landing. We were high and fast on final approach so I lowered the gear and put in all of the flaps to get us down and slowed. We were not coming down or slowing as desired so I brought the engines to idle and heard the right engine come down to idle but could hear the left engine was way above idle. I noted that the left engine was still at 1700 RPM even though the throttles were at idle. At this point we were crossing the numbers fast. I landed the airplane but due to the excessive speed I nearly did not make the last turnoff of the runway. We taxied back to the parking area and shutdown. We called the flight school and a mechanic was flown to our location to inspect and/or repair the airplane. After pulling the cowling from the airplane he made a statement to the effect that 'Oh; I guess I forgot the safety wire on the clip when I changed the throttle cables last week'.




Synopsis: Piper Seneca pilot reported a throttle control problem resulted in a partial-throttle precautionary landing.
Date: 201707
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: During taxi out on BOS Taxiway K in a heavy aircraft; Ramp Control advised us to hold at Spot 7. We held just prior to the Spot 7 pavement marking. When cleared to taxi to the runway; I released the parking brake and advanced the thrust levers to approximately 35 percent; and the aircraft would not move. We were in the alleyway; and I was very aware that I did not want to use excessive thrust to avoid damage to aircraft; equipment; and Personnel behind us. We called Ramp Control to clear all aircraft and Personnel from behind us so we could use a higher thrust setting. Ramp Control cleared the path behind us; and we advised them that we needed to use a higher thrust setting in an attempt to move forward. I released the parking brake and advanced the thrust levers to 35; 40; 45; 50; 55; and finally 60 percent. The aircraft did not move. I called Maintenance Control to determine if B737 brakes have a history of 'locking' up.The Maintenance Representative said the brakes have no history of locking up. Ramp Control then told us that last week an aircraft was stuck in the exact same place. We considered that our main tires might be stuck in a rut in the blacktop. We called Company BOS Operations to have a tug assist us. We shut off the A hydraulic pumps and released the parking brake. The tug could not budge us at all while pushing us. The Ramp Agents determined that our main tire(s) were in a big (4 inch) depression in the blacktop where aircraft always stop in the same place. We started the APU; shut down both engines; and the tug began to rock us back and forth. Finally; the tug was able to push us back out of the rut. The Tug Driver confirmed that all our main tires were rolling and not skidding. We released the Tug Driver and Ramp Agents. We started the engines; taxied around the rut to the runway with no further problems. As we taxied past the rut just prior to the Spot 7 yellow triangle marking; we noticed barely noticeable paint markings indicating that someone may have previously marked the edges of the rut for repair. However; as of this date; the repair had not been done. BOS Airport Facilities Maintenance Team needs to repair the rut(s) in the blacktop pavement on Taxiway K near Spot 7. Until it is repaired; Pilots need to be made aware of this potential hazard via ATIS; NOTAMS; etc.




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported the aircraft got stuck in a rut near spot 7 at BOS which required a tug to push the aircraft free.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While boarding the aircraft and walking halfway down the jetbridge; a very strong electrical/oil burning smell could be sensed emitting from inside the cabin of the aircraft.  I asked the flight attendants if they could smell anything and they all acknowledged the strong odor.  I called Maintenance and made an entry in the aircraft's AML describing the discrepancy.  The packs and recirculating fans were turned off and the odor remained present throughout the cabin. Main cabin door and galley doors were open to get cross ventilation and odor remained. The strong odor was later verified by a Maintenance Technician and the Agent working the flight. Within a few minutes the entire crew exhibited discomfort symptoms of lightheadedness; headaches; nausea and watery eyes. The First Officer was not present since he had been reassigned to a different trip. The new First Officer was in transit and not present when the event occurred. I removed the crew from the aircraft for further assessment. In the interest of safety; it was decided to have the crew assessed by medical personnel. Company medical was closed and the other alternative was the hospital. I advised Dispatch; Operations; base chiefs and crew tracking of the event and pending medical assessment. I was tested with an arterial blood test (hurt like a bugger) to determine the CO2 levels in my system. All crew members were eventually discharged with the proviso to seek further medical attention if further symptoms were noted.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported a burning smell emitting from the aircraft while boarding. The Captain and cabin crew were removed from the aircraft for medical assessment.