Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Tail Wind
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D CHO
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During night visual approach in clear VMC conditions; adverse tail winds on the base leg pushed the aircraft through the final approach course prescribed for the RNAV GPS Y Runway 21 at CHO.  Due to the proximity of high terrain only 1.5 nm from the approach end of the runway; and due to being above the proper glide path; a go around was executed. While approaching CHO from the southwest; there was a general aviation aircraft on a left downwind for Runway 21.  Potomac approach assigned us a heading of 030 degrees and altitude 3000 ft. MSL on a right downwind leg for Runway 21.  While in the downwind leg; I noted that the winds aloft were approximately 280 degrees at 50 kts.  Since we were on a downwind heading of 030 degrees; and the final approach course to Runway 21 is actually offset by 15 degrees; our ground track had us drifting within just a mile or so of the final approach course before being cleared to turn right.We were then assigned a right turn to 100 degrees and cleared for the visual to Runway 21.  With the tail wind of 50 kts. now directly behind us; we were pushed right through the final and had to make a large correction to get back on course.  With the delay in getting on course; we were not in a position to descend on schedule and get stabilized on course by 1000 ft. so I called for the go-around. There are many things that can be done to improve the safety of passengers and crew operating into CHO at night.  This airport can be challenging in the daytime with its high terrain on the approach end of runway 21 and the much higher terrain only 10 miles to the north and west.  At night; visual approach operations can accelerate from challenging to dangerous very fast.  While reviewing the suggestions that follow; reference the approach plate for the RNAV GPS Y Runway 21.1. DO NOT assign a 'west' traffic pattern for Runways 3 or 21 at night.Notice on the approach plate that a right traffic pattern for Runway 21 places the aircraft in a 'squeeze' between the high terrain north and west of the field and the offset final approach course for Runway 21.  Add in a strong west wind; and you can see exactly how an aircraft on a visual approach can be easily carried east of the final approach course.  If the crew is unfamiliar with the sight picture for a 15 degree offset approach course; or unfamiliar with the high ground just off the approach end of Runway 21; or simply fatigued and lacking strong situational awareness; this situation of being blown through the final could easily set a crew up for a CFIT accident.While the approach to Runway 3 is not an offset approach; a nighttime visual approach to this runway also incurs a CFIT risk due to the 2300 ft.+ elevation of the terrain immediately west of WULDU intersection.  It would only take one or two other aircraft in the pattern to cause a night VMC aircraft to  extend their downwind into close proximity of this higher terrain.2. NO VISUAL APPROACHES AT NIGHT.While suggestion #1 would enhance safety; this suggestion would take it one step further and simply prohibit visual approaches at night.  It would ensure compliance with the lateral and vertical guidance of the approach procedures and would greatly reduce the threat caused by diminished situational awareness.3. Publish a FOQA (Flight Operations Quality Assurance) warning on the 10-7 pages.When sending the in-range message; the aircrew automatically receives a FOQA-generated warning identifying CHO as one of the top 10 airports for unstable approaches.  While this is good information to have; receiving it when we do is not as useful.  The in-range message is typically sent just prior to or even after the descent has been initiated.  At this point; all crew briefings are supposed to have been completed.  By putting this information in the 10-7 pages; the crew can discuss and brief the hazards sooner in the flight and be less likely of overlooking the hazard s that exist.4.Increase the visibility of the high ground on the approach plate just short of Runway 21 and increase the conspicuity of note #2 that states that the final approach course is offset by 15 degrees.On the plan view of the approach plate; the high ground that could reach out and kill a crew is depicted with a small dot and 3 numbers representing the elevation.  This information is too small and almost inconspicuous.  The visibility of note #2 is just as bad. Summary: This airport is already on the top-10 list of airports with unstable approaches.   I understand the FAA process for changing approaches and procedures requires a formal process that does not happen overnight.  However; [Company] can dictate changes to our 10-7 pages and adopt these recommendations much quicker.  These suggestions for safety improvement should be enacted before a CFIT event occurs.




Synopsis: Flight Crew flying CRJ-200 aircraft encounter challenging night time approach.