elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAN.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C LAN
ATC / advisory: Tower LAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While on a visual approach to runway 28L into KLAN; we were experienced an unsafe condition resulting from reckless use of a large fireworks display.  The fireworks began immediately in front of the aircraft along the extended runway centerline; approximately 1-2 miles from the approach end of runway 28L.  After a couple of bursts; the display stopped.  ATC immediately issued an advisory; and the first officer and I had a quick discussion about the approach.  I advised the Pilot Flying to continue; and rejoin the runway centerline only after we pass the area; just to be sure we remained clear of additional fireworks.  While maneuvering; the display began again; with several large fireworks bursts at the aircraft 9 o'clock position.  The aircraft remained well clear; and in a safe condition; and the approach was safely conducted to a normal landing.  There was no aircraft damage; as the aircraft was well clear of any debris/incendiary; however; without prompt corrective action; or if we had been in the location of the display 10 seconds earlier; the aircraft would have been struck by the fireworks mortars; as they were detonating above our altitude.The unpredictable nature of fireworks displays is well known; however; this rarely occurs within close proximity to the airport.  Also; having a display EXACTLY along the runway extended centerline seemed careless misuse of fireworks.  Raising public awareness of these dangers seems warranted; along with requirements to restrict dangerous fireworks near airports.




Synopsis: The crew encountered a fireworks display on approach to KLAN 28L.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After receiving a clearance to 'descend via Seavu arrival cleared for the approach; maintain 280 knots' the Captain didn't set MCP altitude and I failed to catch it. ATC called us back in approximately two minutes and asked if we had started down. We realized the mistake and attempted to comply with the clearance but slowed below assigned airspeed due to VNAV built in speed reduction; which we corrected immediately after which we received no further word from the Controller. There were no altitude busts; just a slight reduction below assigned speed. The arrival had been briefed thoroughly for what we expected and what was given. Event was simply a mistake we attributed to unfamiliar new MCP procedures. A contributing factor was a heavier than usual workload environment due to monitoring fuel management to avoid an over weight landing. We tankered fuel from IAH. We requested a lower altitude at approximately PHX to comply with landing weight.


Second narrative: At approximately PECOX I noticed IAS was decreasing and immediately commanded an increase in airspeed. Also; for unknown reason; 17;000 FT had been re-selected into window. Pilot not flying commanded an immediate descent.


Synopsis: A B737 flight crew suffered modest deviations while performing the SEAVU STAR to LAX while utilizing new company Mode Control Panel SOPs.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Hit a small bird at 100 KTS followed by a normal takeoff. After the gear was raised; at approximately 500 FT AGL; three rapid loud 'booms' were felt followed by three more rapid loud 'booms.' Slight aircraft yaw was felt followed by normal flight. Engine instruments were checked and rechecked with NO abnormal indications. An emergency was declared and a return to land was coordinated with ATC asking for the equipment to standby. Flight attendants were informed and told to 'secure' the cabin. The passengers were informed; and Ops was informed and asked to call and inform Dispatch. The decision was made to utilize the Number 2 Engine as normal since we had no adverse readings. Normal landing was made right at max landing weight (128;000 LBS) followed by clearing the runway and having the equipment take a look at the aircraft and the engine. No noticeable damage was observed and the aircraft was taxied back to the gate. The aircraft was taken out of service and the passengers re-accommodated. I gave my apologies to the passengers and asked what they observed. Several sitting on the First Officer's side abeam the Number 2 Engine saw flames coming out of the front and rear of the engine during the 'booms.'Preventative Measures: Not really sure. I'd like to know if the possibility of having too much Glycol (oil based) sprayed into the engines during the overnight deice could have been a contributing factor. Suspected compressor stalls.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 crew felt vibrations and heard loud noises emanating from the Number 2 Engine.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The East area was notified the ZZZ Tower may be ATC Zero. We had a FLM from another area in charge and were unfamiliar with ATC Zero procedures. Even though we have been briefed on ATC Zero; no one in the area felt they had sufficient knowledge of how to proceed. Within minutes of being notified; we were told ZZZ ATCT was ATC Zero and we had their airspace. This was confusing because why would the Center take the Tower's airspace and not the TRACON? We were then told [the TRACON] and ZZZ ATCT were both ATC Zero and we had the airspace. We were asking how to both go ATC Zero at the same time and where is the relief briefing or call from [the TRACON] to apprise of the traffic. No one in charge knew. We were then told ZZZ ATCT was open but the TRACON was ATC Zero and we had their airspace. We told the FLM we needed the proper sector opened to take over [the TRACON] airspace; he told us to open it but no one knew how. We paged back a Controller that had run some ATC Zero practice problems to open the sector. He was back with in minutes and before he could get the sector open; [the TRACON] took the airspace back. The total elapsed time of ATC ZERO was 3 minutes. This was a chaotic and confusing situation. It felt as if no one in charge; or that the FLM or OMIC had a clue what was going on or how to proceed. This was also the 3rd time within a month that the TRACON has declared ATC ZERO. The procedures need to be simplified so they are understandable. Adjacent area FLMs need to be trained on ATC Zero if they are going to be in charge of our area. [The Center] needs to understand what happens with ATC Zero and what the proper steps are. Even though there is an ATC Zero document; no one in charge that day even looked at it. I am not sure they know where it is. Controllers need more training on procedures. Quick briefings from those with limited knowledge are of no use. No one remembers a 5 minute confusing briefing. We need DISYM time for this. Management needs more training.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described the Supervisor/Controller unfamiliarity concerning a recent ATC Zero event; noting that more training needs to be accomplished concerning contingency plans.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Second aircraft: A330
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We] were behind an A330 with approximately 12 miles of in trail separation; based on my recollection from the range rings on TCAS. We were flying the same route [from departure airport] and had departed behind this aircraft. We had at least 5 miles of separation between us and the A330 when we departed. While climbing through FL210 we began to experience a buffet that I initially thought was light chop. Within a few seconds after that; the aircraft had slowly begun to bank right; and the Captain and I both thought that perhaps we were losing aileron control. However; when the aircraft reached approximately 30 degrees of right bank and the autopilot failed to correct the problem; my Captain correctly disengaged the autopilot and attempted to hand fly the aircraft back into a level flight attitude. It was then that we began getting rocked with left and right banks as we apparently encountered wake turbulence from the A330. After regaining control of the aircraft; we started climbing again. Then; at FL230 or so; we began to experience the same symptoms yet again; only more violently. At this point; and after consulting with the Captain; I asked for a reroute around the A330; which was authorized. No further instances of turbulence occurred after this point. The FAA may need to re-examine wake turbulence separation criteria for the enroute environment. 12 miles was simply not enough at this altitude. The CRJ-200 handles turbulence quite well; but had we been in a CRJ-700 or CRJ-900; the encounter could have been even more violent (assuming the larger wingspan of those airframes would have still subjected it to wake turbulence).




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence climbing through FL210 12 miles in trail of an A330.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We started our preparation for a flight by pre-flying the aircraft in accordance to the SOP's and checklist with no visual abnormalities. We then proceeded to taxi for takeoff following the checklist and SOP's; at that time no messages on our computer were displayed. So we continued; just before takeoff we checked our computer one more time for no messages; after rotation and departure the computer still had no messages until we reached 4;000 ft. MSL. After we reached 4;000 ft. MSL the computer gave us a message of 'CABIN DOOR'. As soon as we received indication we immediately initiated checklist. At that point we realize the pressurization was abnormal. We attempted to troubleshoot the problem by proceeding with the SOP's and by a checklist and visual inspection; however; the checklist indicated to land as soon as possible so we proceeded to divert to ZZZ1 since we were too heavy to land back at ZZZ. Other than the abnormal pressurization indication no other issues presented itself on our way to ZZZ1 and we landed with no further incidents.




Synopsis: A G200 First Officer reported a 'Cabin Door' warning and abnormal pressurization on climbout; resulting in a diversion.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying to EGE; we were just past RLG VOR. I was having difficulty adjusting the brightness on my iPad; which was distracting me. After crossing RLG at 14;000 feet; ATC informed us of a low altitude alert; I looked and we were at 13;500 feet; the MOA is 13;800 feet for that leg. The First Officer immediately corrected; and climbed the aircraft to 13;800 feet. He then reset the Vnav path for the approach and the approach was continued uneventfully with a normal approach and landing on RWY 25 at EGE. At no time did we get any alerts or warning from the GPWS.The First Officer was trying to assist me in dimming my iPad; which distracted both of us for a few seconds. The moon was low and this is an approach into a dark valley; so the brightness of the iPad was very distracting to me by putting a glare on my window and making it difficult to see outside.On the layover I found several quick different ways to dim my iPad to very low settings for future use. This has never been a problem for me until last night. I will not have this problem again.


Second narrative: Instead of monitoring LNAV and VNAV I was distracted by the Captain and was trying to help him with the brightness of his iPad. It is imperative that while on the approach that LNAV and VNAV be monitored at all times and that small distractions like iPads be ignored until after the approach or go around.


Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew reported they were distracted by an overly bright iPad while on an approach to EGE and descended below MOA.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi out in LGA to runway 13 for departure; LGA Ground instructed to enter runway 13/31 at taxiway J and to proceed down runway 31 and hold short of the 'main intersection.' The FO (First Officer) and I had no idea what the ground controller meant when he said hold short of the 'main intersection.' We queried the controller about what intersection we needed to hold short of and he replied; 'the intersection; the main intersection; the big one.' At this point we just assumed he meant to hold short of runway 4/22 since runway 22 was the landing runway in use.A few minutes later; the same controller cleared us to cross the 'main intersection.' We again assumed he meant runway 4/22 and crossed as instructed. Looking back; this was a stupid decision on my part because; although that was what the controller wanted; he failed to use proper phraseology again and never gave us a proper clearance to cross 4/22.I heard the controller give several other aircraft on parallel taxiways the instruction to cross the 'main intersection' when he meant runway 4/22. The lack of standard and acceptable phraseology from LGA local and ground controller is an ongoing problem and never seems to get rectified. This particular situation was an egregious violation of the FAA Order 7110.65 and presents a safety hazard to aircraft. At no time should a controller instructing an aircraft to hold short of or to cross a runway be omitting the runway number and using something like 'main intersection.'This event occurred because the LGA controllers on a regular basis do not use standard phraseology as outlined in the 7110.65. It causes confusion among pilots at a busy airport that frequently has frequency congestion. It makes it difficult to understand instructions and causes poor communication between pilots and ATC.The LGA controllers really need to be re-educated on proper phraseology. Issues such as these at LGA have been reported several times and unfortunately there have been no positive changes that I have observed with those controllers.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported LGA Controllers routinely use nonstandard phraseology causing confusion understanding taxi instructions.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter 407
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Main Rotor Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a flight back to base after dropping a patient off I noticed that my transmission pressure indication was decreasing rapidly. I contacted Dispatch and let them know that I would be diverting to [a nearby] airport and why. On final to the airport my transmission pressure indication came back to normal and throughout the situation I did not receive a CAS message indication XSM pressure on my MFD. Upon landing I shutdown and contacted [Operations] and informed them what was going on; and then proceeded to contact my maintainer on duty and inform him of the situation. [The mechanic] asked if I had written up the transmission pressure reading and at the time I had not. [He] then proceeded to tell me that all he was going to do was come out and have me do a ground run and see if the transmission pressure would drop again. He then said if I would conduct the ground run and then if no adverse condition arose to fly the aircraft back to base and he would take a look at it in the morning. I conducted the ground run and a hover check and all indications were in the green. En-route back to base my transmission pressure reading began to decrease and I made a [precautionary] landing in a parking lot. I then called the appropriate personnel and made an entry into the aircraft logbook stating a rapid decrease of transmission pressure was observed during cruise flight.I should have made an entry in the logbook at the first incident and not conducted maintenance over the phone.




Synopsis: BHT-407 helicopter pilot reported making a precautionary landing in a parking lot after the transmission pressure dropped.