elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the last leg of a rerouted four-day trip; we were right base visual in VMC conditions. We have both done the same visual approach a million times. Captain was pilot flying and called for the Landing Checklist as we turned final. This brought his eyes inside for a few seconds. When he brought them outside; he realized he was slightly high. He made appropriate efforts to correct his aircraft state and slightly increased his sink rate. We received a 'Caution Obstacle' (if memory serves correctly) and the Captain immediately went around. We entered a right downwind; for another visual approach with a successful outcome. Good job for the Captain having the discipline to go around. We let complacency get the best of us. We both realize that regardless of familiarity; we need to stay focused and alert as a functioning team.


Second narrative: Cleared for a visual approach; configured with gear down flaps 30 from right hand base rolling out on final; got Caution Obstacle warning. Executed go-around and got vectors back to another visual approach and landed. I think it was a minor sink rate deviation close to buildings that caused the Caution Obstacle warning.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew experiences a GPWS 'Caution Obstacle' annunciation during a night visual approach and executes a go-around.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I received a phone call to go on a field trip to ZZZ for a 737 slide change. I accepted without knowing any information as to who was going. Once I got to the hangar I was informed that there was one other mechanic and an inspector going. I informed the supervisor that according to the checklist we have to follow we needed a 3rd mechanic to be the safety observer. He said that we did not need one. I left the room to pull up the paperwork and found that in reference to AMM 25-XX-XX-XXX-XXX Escape Slide Pack and Cover Installation; we had to follow form 46-XXXX; which is Escape Slide Render Safe Checklist. There it says that we needed the 3rd guy because it takes 2 people to install the slide. I took this information to [Operations Manager] who was in charge of setting everything up and he then informed me that the vendor who was going to be escorting us on the field would be the safety observer. I didn't think this sounded right but that was their final decision so there was nothing I could do from that point on. We then drove to ZZZ and changed the slide without any incident with the vendor who was escorting us as the safety observer.




Synopsis: Technician reported disagreement over policy and procedures not complied with during a road trip to remove and replace a main entry door slide.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Sport / Recreational
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [I] encountered strong headwinds; much stronger than official flight planning predicted. Also had much air turbulence over terrain. Fuel tube showed enough fuel to reach [the destination airport]. Prior to touchdown; fuel stopped being fed to the engine and the plane dropped 20 feet.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Light Sport Aircraft encountered stronger than forecast headwinds that led to fuel exhaustion while on short final. The aircraft dropped 20 feet onto the runway.
Date: 201205
Location: 31E.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Other Hazard
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The final approach to Runway 32 has a radio tower; FAA registration number #1048341. This airport was little used in the past; but currently is growing and expanding its operations. Hangars are under construction and 8 are pre-leased with 5 aircraft tied out. I believe this tower to be a hazard to aircraft navigation; considering its extreme proximity to the final approach of Runway 32.

Callback: The Reporter stated that the tower was approved in 1989 and constructed in 1992 when this airport was non-operational. The Airport was recently purchased by a new owner who is constructing a hangar to increase airport operations and a new taxiway was just approved for the runway. With the increase in operations the FAA approved tower is a potential flight obstruction during the day but especially so during hours of darkness. FAA guidelines need to be applied to this structure.



Synopsis: A pilot reported a FAA registered tower number 1048341 located near the approach end of E31 at about 284 FT high is an obstruction to flight and very dangerous at night.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Found out that there were flights scheduled to depart in less than 2 hours that the flight releases had not been done because the flights had never been assigned to a Dispatcher. Turns out there were at least 6 flights that were never assigned to anyone. The 4 that I wound up with were all scheduled to depart at the same time (XC00z) found out about the first of four at XA13z and last of four at XA41z(less than required 1hr25min departure time to have issued a release). This is unacceptable; disruptive and a safety issue. Since we are now under added pressure; because the various ramps and flight crews are looking for a release which we haven't done since we did not know we had these flights. These were all ad hoc flights which evidently had been built at least two shifts prior. Fortunately there was no weather/ATC/MEL issues of great significance to contend with; otherwise this poor situation we were forced into could have been much worse. This was caused by at least two people not following through on their job duties. It is my understanding that the managers are supposed to make sure all flights are assigned to the appropriate dispatchers and also make sure work load is dispersed evenly. The flights in question were charter flights; since the on set of COVID day in and day out there have been charters added; todays scenario is not new and is happening repeatedly with dispatchers being blindsided by extra flight releases to do that were never assigned to anyone.Assign the flights when they are built. And each subsequent shift manager needs to make sure all flights have been assigned.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported release issues relating to flights that are not assigned to Dispatcher in a timely manner.  Reporter stated this has been a problem since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FAT.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 3
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I filed for a VFR flight from FAT. While in initial climb visibility was limited due to heavy haze. I was able to see some cloud formations high above and had also briefed for the flight and expected scattered to broken skies over the Sierras. While in the climb I asked controller for a pop-up clearance. She asked what I meant. I stated that visibility was limited and I need to get an IFR clearance to get on top of or at least between layers. She then told me that would be approved and issued the clearance on V165. At no time did she say I must maintain VFR. I stated I would begin my climb and let her know when I was on top. While in IMC I encountered moderate icing. I stopped my climb and immediately contacted Oakland Center for their minimum vectoring altitude as I already was losing the performance of my aircraft and could no longer climb. The controller responded that the MEA for the area was 16000. I stated that I was in IMC and needed lower. She responded by telling me I not was supposed to be in IMC and that I had not been cleared to do so. She also continued to lecture me about what and how she had cleared me. I responded stating something to the effect that I don't really care at the moment; what I really wanted was to stay alive and that meant that I needed out of the ice now! She then told me I could turn back and to contact her when I was in VMC. Later she did give me a vector to avoid possible terrain. A few minutes later I broke out between broken layers and continued my flight back towards FAT VFR.




Synopsis: Cirrus SR20 pilot reported encountering icing conditions that forced a return to departure airport.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEA.Tower, WA
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Aircraft component: Radio Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On approach to 16R in SEA we experienced an intermittent RADALT failure. Weather was VMC; so a go around was not required. I first noticed this failure in the HUD at a RADALT of 390 AGL and approximately 580 MSL. It occurred one more time before touchdown. I am not sure if this is related to the 5G rollout; but though it was important to report. I made a logbook entry for Maintenance as well.




Synopsis: Captain reported experiencing radio altimeter anomalies on approach to SEA; citing 5G interference as the possible cause.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MYF.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MYF
Second aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing from a 1 hour scenic flight with 3 passengers; I was holding short of H; to contact ground. Ground instructed me to taxi via H and J and to follow a Centurion. I thought that the Centurion was the aircraft in front of me already on taxiway H so I crossed taxiway G while eastbound on H. The centurion was actually on G moving towards H. I passed in front of him and these were the communications on the radio after that: 1.- Some 30 seconds later; the ground controller said: 'Centurion XXX sorry about that; I guess he doesn't know what a Centurion is' (referring to me; it was then that I realized what the controller really wanted). 2.- The guy in the Centurion answered: 'yeah; (inaudible). That could've been an accident'. 3.- Controller: 'Roger'. 4.- Then the guy in the Centurion; some 40 seconds later requested the phone number for tower which was provided to him. 5.- Then another minute or so later; ground called me on the radio to tell me that I cut the Centurion at Golf; for which I apologized.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reports misunderstanding Ground Control instructions to follow a Centurion; believing it is ahead but is actually still approaching; and cuts him off.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MHTG.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower MHTG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain failed to taxi back into position to utilize all of displaced threshold for takeoff. Instead we departed from Taxiway F. I pointed this out and he told me in 20 years of flying MHTG this is the way it's done. I said everybody else uses the entire runway and I don't think this is right. The Captain was very adamant and made like he was checking the numbers out on the Takeoff Power System (TPS) and FMC. Now I think it was a bunch of bull. I held the brakes and ran the engines up (as I was taught by my Check Airman) and he yelled at me to release the brakes and I did so. Shortly after takeoff the Captain told me I was not to hold the brakes and run the power up for takeoff and that it was against the book. He also went on to tell me that I should not have told him that we were not to land in the overrun area of the airport. I should have waited to tell him. He said I have poor judgment. I told him I stand corrected. He said something about safety reporting the event.I guess I have poor judgment and using all available runway was not appropriate at MHTG. I was so worried about upsetting the Captain further that I did not dare reach for the TPS to make sure we could takeoff at F. The Captain was extremely angry with me and I let that get in the way of doing my job to the best of my ability. I will try to avoid flying with this Captain as I obviously anger him. As I do not have the TPS - could the flight operations team please let me know if taxiing back to use all available runway is the right thing to do and the runway length TPS is based on. Also; another exp. Captain told me that holding the brakes and running up engines was the recommended procedure for takeoff - and I swear that's what a Check Airman told me to do during training. I am open to any suggestions. This trip was a nightmare.




Synopsis: An apparently new B757-200 First Officer detailed a breakdown in CRM between herself and her Captain; primarily as a result of a dispute over operational practices for takeoff from the short runway at MHTG.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: THV.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E THV
ATC / advisory: CTAF THV
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the PIC; and the Pilot Monitoring. The SIC was flying a briefed visual approach backed up with a RNAV (GPS) Rwy 17 approach which has a 3 degree Glidepath. Inside of a mile from the end of Runway 17; the SIC verbalized and adjusted aircraft pitch and rate of descent because a tree appeared to be close off the right nose. There were no Terrain; Obstacle; or Descent Rate warnings. A normal landing was made over a blast fence that was not noted on the 10-9 page.It was Day VFR when we flew this approach. If we had continued the approach as depicted; the tree on short final would have been very close to the 3 degree glidepath. This approach (THV 12-1) was dated 18 Jul 14; and it's possible this tree had grown in the past 3 years. The PAPI is shown on the 10-9 page to be 4.5 degrees; quite a bit different than 3.0 degrees on the RNAV (GPS) 17 approach. Flying the PAPI angle at 120 knots would result in a descent rate of close to 1000 fpm. In addition; the blast fence was not mentioned on NOTAMS or on the 10-9 page. The 10-9 page also does not show the tree on short final. The 12-1 page for the RNAV (GPS) 17 does mention in note 3; that landing on Rwy 17 at night is not authorized. I feel that this approach is also not safe in IFR conditions.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Phenom 300 flight crew reported that a tree protrudes into the normal 3 degree glideslope for Runway 17 at THV.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff and climb while level at FL300 received a Level 1 Brake Diff Temp alert. #8 Brake was showing 443 degrees; all other brakes were a max of 120 degrees. The Aircraft Operations Manual was referenced for the Level 1 alert; as well as for the Level 2 Brake Overheat so we could review the procedures if the brake temperature continued to climb. Level 1 Brake Temp Diff is Maintain/No consequences. We notified Maintenance about the Level 1 alert via the dispatcher and notified both that we would be descending to FL200 and slowing to lower the gear and cool the brake. We had extra fuel on board and was still 2000 lbs above flight plan fuel. The gear was left extended thru out the descent until 10;000. By then the temperature had reduced to 10 degrees. Once in contact with Approach; we [advised them] to have the trucks and equipment in place in the event the brake overheated above 550 degrees upon landing. A normal approach and landing was accomplished. Minimal braking was used on the right truck to slow to taxi speed. Once clear of the runway the #8 brake was at 80 degrees; in line with the other brakes. The emergency was cancelled but the trucks followed us during taxi in. While taxiing using only the left truck for braking; the #8 brake rose to 375 degrees. [Airport ARFF vehicle] did a temperature scan and reported there was equal temperatures across the rear tires. With the temperature stable at 375 degrees we continued a slow taxi into ramp. Once parked the #8 brake rose to 404 degrees. Maintenance reported the internal #8 brake was over 600 degrees and the brake had disintegrated.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported receiving a Level 1 Brake Diff Alert in flight. After parking the #8 brake was found to have disintegrated.