elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Communication Systems
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I departed ZZZ1 for a short VFR flight via pilotage to ZZZ for a full stop landing. Departed ZZZ1 using CTAF 122.725. Enroute I switched to ZZZ CTAF 122.7 and monitored [the] frequency. Reported my position 5 miles out; entering downwind; downwind; base; final; and clear of the active. Did not see or hear conflicting traffic.Later flew from ZZZ to ZZZ2 for lunch and return. Upon engine start [discovered] radio still tuned to 122.725 for ZZZ1. Left aircraft at ZZZ for scheduled annual inspection. Got automobile ride back to ZZZ1 with a friend. Upon reaching ZZZ1 by car; another pilot alleged that I had flown 100 ft. above a trainer [aircraft] operated by [a flight school] in the pattern while landing at ZZZ. I did not see or hear radio calls from conflicting traffic.I believe that a contributing factor was that the radio was still tuned to 122.725 ZZZ1 CTAF instead of ZZZ frequency; which still displayed on the stand-by frequency. Either I had failed to press the button to 'flip' the frequency between active and standby; or in turbulent air pressed the button twice. Corrective action is to double check frequency change after entering frequency. Make sure [the] frequency change was actually accomplished.




Synopsis: Pilot reported being informed of a NMAC; by an eye witness; after the flight was complete.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I reported for duty this evening for a scheduled departure an hour later. The aircraft was at the gate being worked on by mechanics for an inbound writeup. It took three hours for us to push and subsequently return to the gate a half hour later with the same failure being displayed. The aircraft was repaired an additional hour later but during this time another unrelated failure took place. The failure required a new flight plan and added fuel for operation at lower altitudes. It was at this time I calculated my awake time from the previous day and concluded that if all went well; as it hadn't up to this point; I would have been up well over 24 hours while landing. Because of the ongoing maintenance items and the uncertainty of our departure time I felt it prudent to relent to my physical condition of certain fatigue if I were to continue. I called the Crew Desk and advised them of my current condition of fatigue.




Synopsis: Following multiple maintenance delays and false starts for a 'red eye' flight; the First Officer of an A320 felt he would be physiologically impaired due to fatigue at their likely arrival time at destination and refused to fly due to fatigue.
Date: 202003
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Divert to ZZZ. Fumes and very slight haze around Captains side window; a smell of engine coking (burning oil or electronics smell). 15-20 minutes after departure I turned to my First Officer and asked if he smelled anything. He did not. We continued; the smell persisted and about 1.5 hrs into the flight I began to become very bothered by the smell. I felt like I needed fresh air and decided to begin breathing out of my O2 mask. I began to feel physical issues; like shortness of breath and a little dizzy and thinking about needing to throw up. After a few minutes I got out of my seat for a restroom break and to determine if the smell was in the cabin. It was not. While I was in the restroom the A Flight Attendant came up and sat in my seat. She complained of the smell to the First Officer. He went to check it out and realized it was on my side but not his. I came back from the restroom and at this point it became clear to us that there was definitely a smell on just my side. We ran the QRH and then talked to Dispatch and Maintenance. We used the masks and [advised ATC]; then headed for ZZZ.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a burning oil or electronics" smell during cruise that resulted in a diversion."
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ASE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In an effort to comply with [FAA mandate]; we had type IV fluid applied to the upper surface of the fuselage.  The fluid obscured the windshield as it flowed forward off the aircraft but cleared with wipers.  All was normal until approximately 10-15KIAS prior to V1 speed; the type IV fluid that pooled below the windshield began to flow off the aircraft up over the windscreen obscuring our view of the runway.  Visibility for the crew dropped to zero for the remainder of the takeoff roll and climb out.  An abort was impossible and the initial climb-out; surrounded by high terrain; was an unacceptable safety risk.  The windscreen remained opaque for the first 1-2 minutes of flight.This procedure creates an unacceptable safety risk to our crews; passengers; and aircraft.  My recommendation is to immediately discontinue the procedure until a solution and mitigation strategy can be found.  As PIC of the flight; the degradation of safety is too great and I cannot comply with the procedure as written.

Callback: Reporter stated this was the first takeoff with the new procedure; thus the first time they had to deal with Type IV fluid flowing over the windshield. Reporter also stated now that they know what happens they will be ready with the windshield wipers.

Second narrative: After about 100 KIAS the Type IV fluid spooled from under the windshield and completely covered the windshield proving ZERO visibility. We were a few knots below V1 on a fairly narrow runway in ASE and we were unable to see out of the airplane for a safe takeoff. I kept my feet on the rudders to as close as I could imagine was putting us down the centerline and lifted off. This all took place in a matter of seconds; but the timing could not have been worse. If we had to do an abort; there would be zero visibility out of the window and there would have been a very slim chance of a successful abort. This is extremely unsafe and we almost had an aircraft accident because of it. Type IV is very thick and heavy and is probably why it took so long for the fluid to lift and cover the windshield at such a critical flight phase. We did not have much time to react and we were both very surprised by what happened.


Synopsis: Airline flight crew reported their forward visibility was obscured on takeoff roll and initial climb when Type IV fluid flowed over the windscreen as their speed increased.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The incident flight was the first flight of the duty period. The duty period followed an approximate 10 hour rest period spent at the hotel. The flight departed with the First Officer acting as Pilot Flying; and experienced light chop with occasional moderate turbulence. The turbulence began to include light mountain wave turbulence. At no point was the turbulence of abnormal intensity. The caution light and audible chime illuminated and FLAPS illuminated on the CAWS panel; shortly followed by the PUSHER CAWS (which remained illuminated for about 30 seconds). The PIC directed the First Officer (FO) to remain in control of the aircraft while the PIC ran though the QRH procedure for FLAPS/PUSHER and the FLAPS QRH. The crew also confirmed the flap handle was in the 0 degree position; and confirmed actual flap position with the flap position indicator and with visual inspection from the cockpit. The QRH procedure gave no troubleshooting instructions beyond resetting tripped circuit breakers; which were not tripped in any case; and the advice to 'land as soon as practical with flaps at the failed position.' At this point; we advised ATC of our issue. We also attempted to call Maintenance Control on the satellite phone without success. We also determined that a landing at Flaps 0 would use almost the entire 4;200 foot runway at ZZZ1 and that ZZZs 11;500 foot would be more than sufficient. We copied the ATIS; and executed the In-Range checklist; and then advised Approach that we intended to divert to ZZZ and asked that we not be given speed restrictions; we discussed that the PIC had more experience in Flaps 0 landings and switched roles. We also decided on a 130 KIAS approach due to reported Wind Shear and ample runway. We then landed without incident with the flaps in the 0 degree position. After landing; we contacted [company] and Maintenance Control; and then successfully executed the flap warning reset procedure at the direction of Maintenance Control.




Synopsis: PC-12 Captain a flap fault in cruise led to a diversion and no flap landing.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed from airport; recieved master warning 'PTRIM MAIN INOP' climbing out of 400 ft AGL. Advised ATC and requested runway heading up to 4000 ft. After running checklist advised the flight attendant we where going back to the airport. [We got a] vector back to an ILS and landed over weight; touching down at 300 FPM. Taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: ERJ-145 Captain reported a trim failure during takeoff. Flight crew returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On climb out; passing about 25;000 feet with a [temperature] of about -4; we picked up enough ice to almost completely obscure the forward window. I sent an ACARS Flight Ops report message to Dispatch for 'heavy ice.' Dispatch sent back a message that we needed to use the terms 'moderate' or 'severe' as 'heavy' was not a term used as a PIREP. Knowing 'severe' would have a major operational impact on our system; I wanted to make sure I was following the correct narrative; so I opened the AIM I had downloaded in ForeFlight. 'Severe' icing was described as an accumulation rate that exceeded the ability of the aircraft's systems. As we had placed the engine and wing ice on; I had looked outside to see if we were getting the leading edge clear and it appears we were. To be honest; I'd never seen such icing buildup in [many] years of flying and while I thought we could handle it; I was worried about other aircraft with deicing boots or military aircraft with no wing deicing. This left me with the question; in reality; when would a 737NG ever experience the true definition of severe icing? If we did; could we tell? The side windows give very limited visibility to the wing and if we had ice buildup aft of the leading edge; could we tell from the cockpit? I had my doubts. What about our ice accumulation on the vertical and horizontal stabs? If our engine and wing icing could deal with this level of ice accumulation; would there be any level they couldn't handle? I ended up reporting 'moderate' icing since that seemed to correspond to the AIM definition that we had. Still; for some reason the experience left me a little worried that something in our guidance may be missing.




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported encountering icing conditions obscuring the forward window that raised concerns to a crew's ability to discriminate between icing intensity level definitions.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was training a CPC-IT (In-Training) on South Departure and we were discussing when to use the climb via and when it would be best not to. There were arrivals into IAH that made it a good opportunity to use the climb via clearance with Aircraft X. Aircraft X checked in climbing via the FLYZA1 departure. The CPC-IT issued Aircraft X Climb via the FLYZA1 Departure except maintain 16;000. The pilot read it back correctly. I told the CPC-IT that even though we issue the climb via clearance we still need to make sure they comply with the altitudes. I saw Aircraft X climbing out of 3;400 at a normal rate. Then a supervisor was walking behind me and asked for a PIREP and I turned my head and gave him the PIREP from the previous aircraft. I turned my head back to the scope and saw Aircraft X climbing through 6;800 right in front of Aircraft Y who was on the HCKRY1 arrival turning the downwind at 6;000. I keyed up the microphone and told Aircraft X the top altitude was 5;000 at BOTLL intersection and a possible pilot deviation. Aircraft X did climb a lot faster than all the previous departures; they climbed 4;000 in 3 nm.Somehow change the phraseology so that pilots understand to comply with the altitude restrictions on the departures.




Synopsis: I90 controller reports of issuing a climb via clearance; the pilot reads it back correctly; but the aircraft misses a crossing restriction which leads to a loss of separation.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was solo practicing touch and go in PA-12. ATIS Zulu reported winds at 270 or 260 and 10 knots. Crosswind practice consisted of a low pass; a wheel landing without touching the tail wheel down; a wheel landing until the tail dropped; a wheel landing to full stop; and another wheel landing. On the intended final landing I attempted a wheel landing to full stop but had too much right aileron on initial roll out; I reduced right aileron and veered to the left; upon entering the grass on the left of the runway I applied power and departed. I notified the tower that I was going to land at ZZZ. Upon landing and shutting down I called the tower as requested and was interviewed and asked if there was any damage or injuries; I reported that there was no damage or injuries. I was told that a report would be filed. Later that evening I brought the aircraft back to my parking as winds were reported at 360 and 6 knots on ATIS Uniform.




Synopsis: PA-12 pilot reported a runway excursion while practicing crosswind landings.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OKC.Airport, OK
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C OKC
ATC / advisory: TRACON OKC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival to OKC 17L; cleared the 'visual approach outside of GOLFS waypoint on the ILS; Captain choose your go direct to HANGS'. We were offset to the east approximately 7 NM. Outside of GOLFS; altitude is 4;000 ft; inside to HANGS is 3;000 ft; so Captain dialed in 3;000 ft as we were inside of GOLFS; but we were still offset of the final course. We got an Obstacle Alert at approximately 3;300 ft; approximately 1-2 NM northeast of a tower group depicted on the approach plate. Approach Control called out the towers as the Captain initiated a climb of a couple hundred feet to increase the tower crossing clearance altitude. We could have coordinated and reviewed the approach plate and plan better prior to executing the cutoff of course to final. The towers in question were the highest obstacles on the approach. Additionally; the towers were very difficult to see at night because the lights blended into the city surrounding lights and at times appeared to be straight; lighted roads. A little better briefing and review would have prevented the alert. Aircraft systems worked flawlessly however; as well as ATC involvement helped to gain altitude to increase the altitude crossing safety margin. Fly the instrument approach plate as depicted to avoid any threats is a good idea.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew received Obstacle Alert for towers during approach and climbed to avoid them.
Date: 201904
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was sitting at my 2R jumpseat as we were taxiing out. About 30-60 seconds before takeoff I smelled a musty vinegar smell that went away after we took off. Once I was able to leave my jumpseat in the air; I was dizzy and had a headache and had to sit for a few minutes. I informed the Captain and rest of the crew of what happened and also submitted a report.




Synopsis: A321 Flight Attendant reported informing flight crew of a musty vinegar smell before takeoff and experienced health issues once airborne.