Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAEF.ARTCC, FO
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center SAEF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During pre-departure flight planning the Captain noted on the flight plan that there was an area of high terrain we would be flying over which was higher than the other high terrain areas we usually overfly in South America. After departure; and enroute; the Captain sent a message to Dispatch. Basically; he wanted to make them aware of the terrain and to request a depressurization decision point like the one we currently use on UQ108. The terrain on the portion of the flight plan in question was 18;400 feet according to the flight plan; which is above our Cabin Altitude Emergency Descent initial level off altitude of 17000 feet.Soon after this; I stepped back to take my break. The IRO (International Relief Officer) took my seat. I was gone for approximately 2 hours and 40 minutes.Upon my return; I was briefed on the series of ACARs communication between our flight and dispatch as well as the voice call on SATCOM between the Captain; the dispatcher and the Chief Pilot on Duty; that had occurred during my absence. I was also told that the Captain was unable to get a satisfactory resolution from dispatch concerning the high terrain and that we were approaching it soon. So before he went on his break; he instructed us to get clearance from center to fly to a waypoint abeam the high terrain and then back to the route; thus circumnavigating the terrain. This only added about 3 minutes. A message concerning our reroute was also sent to dispatch.Ultimately; dispatch did send us a message with acceptable enroute decision point diversion information but unfortunately it was after passing the high terrain. A call to dispatch from ops might have led to a route change satisfactory to both dispatch and crew.


Second narrative: I've read the Captain's report regarding our flight and I agree with his description of events and his conclusions.In addition to his report; I'd like to highlight the following. We have three existing examples that I know of in South America with decision points in the event of explosive depressurization. Two are listed in [the manual] in the diversion section. In addition [the manual]; details very specifically what a pilot is to do in the event of an explosive D. A dispatcher had filed us directly over the mountains; and I had to insist that we could not do that; even though; as one crewmember argued 'we would only be over the mountains for a few minutes and they did it all the time on the MD-11.' Flight ops technical later agreed that we could not; in his words; be 'a little bit pregnant' and needed to come up with an alternative. In this case; two nights ago; our Dispatcher's very surprising message that the decision point on UQ108 (Captain pointed it out to concentrate her mind) was for 'engine out' and not for depressurization planning; when the title of that section is 'Depressurization planning.' That's a concern on several levels: One; it shows a significant lack of knowledge about our procedures. Two; as the CA (Captain) pointed out; the level of push back we received from her in various forms was alarming. Not only was she completely wrong and unhelpful; but the fact that she felt entitled and righteous enough to argue her point to the degree that she did; and even enlist the help of a Chief Pilot at 2 am is of deep concern to me. To add to the mess; she argued that she could not change our route because of terrain to the West (there is none of concern) and weather that may or may not have been there 3 hours later to the East. (There was none when we passed that area; and there are several options for alternate routes; including what we ended up doing.) Is the culture at Dispatch these days such that a Dispatcher is permitted to act like this? Finally; if in fact someone in flight ops has indeed told her that it's 'up to the CA to avoid terrain' and that 'the chance of depressurization is low' then I suggest that something is profoundly wrong. We have procedures that detail what to do in these cases; and whether they happen rarely or at all is not the point. I will piggy back on CA's comments that the Chief Pilot's demeanor on the SATCOM call was also quite unhelpful. Nobody likes to be awoken at that time of the morning; and I have no idea how the Dispatcher set him up prior to putting him on the line with us; but he in essence seemed to be working backward from a possible hearing; instead of figuring out how to be of assistance. I don't think he ought to be answering those calls; if for no other reason that he was completely unfamiliar with the subject matter we were dealing with.We have an entire area of South America that is a 'no fly' zone for the 777-200 and the 767. The fact that there is an 18;400 foot mountain that is not designated as such I think is an oversight that needs to be corrected. Admittedly; we rarely fly that route; and did so only because of an outage in Kingston's airspace. Nevertheless it ought to be marked as a 'no fly' area whether we fly over it or not. The area detailed on UQ108 between ILVIR and GEKAR ought to be so marked as well. To not do so is illogical; non-standard; and unhelpful.There seems to be an element of 'stump the dummy' here. The CA meticulously goes through the flight plan terrain; and found the area of concern. I can tell you that he is an exception in that regard. As best as I can tell; I've never flown that route; and I suspect that the Dispatcher when he filed us on it did not see the terrain of concern. The MEL is very specific in regards to what we should do if a piece of equipment is not working. Our maps and procedures ought to be as specific. In the case of South America; EVERY possible route that takes a 777-200 over terrain over about 15;000 feet (because it is likely that in the case of an extreme event; leveling at 17;000 feet might not occur) should be highlighted and flagged to both the dispatcher and pilots. In other words; not only does a decision point need to be established on that UG444; but something needs to highlight it on the flight plan. We flew an all-nighter the day before; and I can tell you while rested enough to perform our jobs; it's expecting too much for pilots to notice every nuance on the flight plan. Give us some help. I cannot tell you how many pilots (mostly new) that I fly with who are unaware of the decision points on UQ108 and are surprised when I show them the paragraph in the [manual]. I suggest that is a lack of training; and more importantly; because it is buried in an obscure section of that manual. Whenever we are on such a route; (and I'm adding UG444) there should be a message in the [manual] that details the point; and what to do. Last but not least; the 767; and the 777-300 both have [has] displays that show terrain at altitude. That increase of situational awareness is invaluable; particularly in the case of deviations. Not only because it helps differentiate terrain from weather (I've had many guys try to deviate around mountains) but because in the case of deviations we can see what is below us; without poring over a chart at the back side of the clock. I don't know what it would take to add that feature to the 777-200; but to have it would be a real positive.There is a lot to digest here. There are issues with personnel; and I suspect Dispatch culture. But there is also a Swiss cheese element to how we file over these unusual points. It can be cleaned up considerably; because right now it's a bit of a non-standard mess; and leads to slip ups like the other night. We never should have been filed that way without a decision point. That our attempts to get one were met with unnecessary confrontation and escalation was uncalled for; and a safety detriment.


Synopsis: B777 First Officer's lament the lack of standardized contingency plans for route planning in all areas of South America that details procedures for engine failure or depressurization in the vicinity of high terrain.