elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After checklists complete we (the crew) took the active runway for takeoff. We lined up and I initiated the takeoff. I had power N1 above 80% when we got a trim miss-configuration horn. In the Beech Jet sometimes you have to flick the trim switch to re-adjust the trim to silence the horn. As my Captain did this I throttled back a few percent on N1 so we wouldn't roll as fast. Once my Captain silenced the horn I continued the takeoff and when the power was at 80% the horn came on again. I then rejected the takeoff. Airspeed was close to 65 KIAS at time of abort. We then vacated the runway as instructed by Tower. Once we were permitted to move; again; we took the plane to the ramp and shut down one of the engines; so we could exercise the thrust lever without using power; to fix the trim issue. We found that after running the trim up and down a few times the trim horn finally stopped and was indicating the appropriately. We discussed that there is nothing functionally wrong with the trim because it passed all the checks and elected to try the take off again. The trim worked and didn't malfunction the rest of our two day trip. The trim was indicated in the takeoff position at the time of takeoff as covered in the two checklists completed prior to takeoff. The trim was functional prior to engine start and passed all pre-flight trim checks per the checklist. The trim worked the rest of the trip without issue.




Synopsis: BE400 First Officer describes a rejected takeoff for a trim induced takeoff warning horn. After returning to the ramp and shutting down an engine for troubleshooting the warning is found to activate even though the trim is correctly set. After running the trim up and down several times the warning ceases to activate inappropriately and the flight departs.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew had accepted descent to FL350 meant for another aircraft with similar sounding call sign. After some time at FL350; crew noticed aircraft (TCAS) at same altitude; opposite direction. Crew began deviation but subsequently received RA. Then began climb back to FL360.


Second narrative: While in cruise flight at FL360 we were given a descent to FL350 and given a frequency change to 124.875. We began our descent and switched frequencies. It took a several calls to the Controller to check-in. At the same time I noticed a primary target on the TCAS display about 25 miles in front of us at the same altitude and closing. I stated to the Captain that 'something isn't right here' and shortly thereafter we got a TCAS RA to climb and a right turn of 15 degrees. We executed the proper procedure for a TCAS event and cleared the conflict quickly. We returned to FL360 and changed back to our previous frequency. The Controller asked what had happened and we explained that we had received and read back the descent and frequency change. All three pilots in the flight deck at the time Ccheck Airmen was occupying the jumpseat) heard the clearance to descend and change frequencies along with my read back. The flight continued with no further incidents.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reports accepting a descent clearance meant for another flight along with a frequency change. At the new altitude a TCAS RA is generated and the crew returns to FL360 and to the previous frequency.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were assigned 17;000. ATC gave us a climb to FL180; which we initiated. As we began to level at the transition altitude; ATC questioned our altitude. At this point we were leveling and we went to standard. The altitude ballooned to around 18;200 due to the pressure difference. The call from ATC was confusing at first; but we immediately corrected when we realized the problem.The book says the move to standard should be done climbing through the transition altitude and it states (18;000); if the pressure difference is great by the time you reach 18;000 you may have already deviated from the assigned altitude. In the future I think I would go to standard a little earlier perhaps 17;500 and be mindful of the barometric change.




Synopsis: EMB170 First Officer reported being level at 17;000 feet then assigned FL180 by ATC. The altimeter is not reset to 29.92 until reaching 18000 feet resulting is a 200 foot overshoot.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was given Aircraft X descending on ILS 25L.  Due to volume I slowed the aircraft.  I advised the Stadium ATCS who was given Aircraft Y on a parallel routing and slightly behind Aircraft X; on ILS 24R; that I was slowing my aircraft (Aircraft X); per SOP.  Evidently the STAR ATCS did not get visual separation in time; or block altitude in sufficient time to maintain separation with Aircraft X.  This is a common procedure at LA. These aircraft were given to Downey & Stadium by the same previous ATCS (Feeder).  This ATCS is well aware of the volume and can see if the sectors are overloaded to the point that they are being slowed while still in Feeders airspace (this event).  Although the Feeder Controller delivered the aircraft with at least minimum separation; it would have been appropriate in my opinion for the Feeder ATCS to have obtained visual separation with these two aircraft before transferring communication; instead of transferring that responsibility to Stadium; who undoubtedly was busy themselves with aircraft approaching minimum separation as they approached the runway; and thus preventing this loss of separation.  Unfortunately; work ethic can not be trained.




Synopsis: SCT Controller reports of a loss of separation between two aircraft on final due to the other arrival sector not attaining visual separation or saving 1;000 feet as required.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was the first to arrive at the airplane.  When I entered the cockpit; I immediately noticed the FO seat was positioned full aft with full recline rearward.  This is not uncommon in ZZZ when an aircraft has been at the gate for an extended period (apparently it is a good place to sleep; I've awakened someone more than once).  I reviewed the AML and noticed that the aircraft had been in storage for an extended period.  I conducted my power up and origination flow and noticed a gooey substance on the MCDU keypad and the Radio Management Panel. Due to my reclined seat position my initial thought was the gooey substance had come from someone's shoe as they were reclining in the cockpit.  This turned out to be incorrect.  Maintenance arrived; I exited the cockpit to make space; boarding had begun.  The Captain informed me that maintenance said the gooey substance was bird droppings. We started to discover bird droppings in numerous locations throughout the cockpit to include; glareshield; Flight Control Unit (FCU); side panels; sliding window control handle; headrest; storage compartments; and floor/carpet. Maintenance finished the cleanup; boarding was complete. We had to call maintenance back to the aircraft because we had another 2nd discrepancy; Uplink INIT REQUEST not working. I had to make space for maintenance again; it was then that I started to notice areas around the forward galley and entryway with bird droppings to include: FA jumpseat; panels near the main cabin entry door; and floor. The 2nd discrepancy was taking a significant amount of time so it was determined that passenger would be deplaned. I was talking with the flight attendants when we noticed significant bird droppings throughout the cabin to include: at least 5 passenger seats and seatbacks; headrests; and especially on several locations on cabin flooring/carpet.  It was eventually determined that we would swap aircraft.Company needs to develop a more detailed plan in how to bring aircraft back into service.  This obviously needs to include a comprehensive inspection of the aircraft.




Synopsis: Pilot reported finding bird droppings in the cockpit and throughout the aircraft after aircraft had come out of long-term storage.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 1.25
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This does not refer to our aircraft; but the departing aircraft we witnessed being deiced. We arrived in ZZZ and had to hold off the gate while the departing aircraft got deiced with a 'two-step' process. This was during the difficult weather conditions of the winter storm this past week. ZZZ apparently has one truck to deice. I can't be sure; but I think it may even have been driven by the Boom Operator rather than in the cab. So a one man/ one truck operator.As I watched him deice the aircraft I was concerned that he was not deicing correctly and would like guidance.  The way I have always understood the process to work was Type 1 the complete aircraft to deice and Type 4; then to provide the anti-ice for the specified holdover time. The whole Ramp operation appears to be contract rather than (Company) Personnel.The Iceman started at the nose and moved to the left wing with Type 1.  He then switched to Type 4 and applied that. He then moved to the tail and did the same. Type 1 followed by Type 4; he then moved to the right wing with Type 1 and Type 4. The process took quite a while even like that. My concern would be contamination of the Type 4 with Type 1 and subsequent reduction or nullification of the anti-ice ability of the Type 4 and any holdover time.If I am right and the process was incorrectly done; then it's a Safety issue that needs resolved and correct (Company) deicing procedures should be taught. If I am not; then I would like to know for my own edification.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported witnessing what they determined to be an inappropriate deicing procedure.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Second aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X was a test flight requesting FL430. Aircraft Y was a JAX departure filed ..ATL.VOLLS8.BNA at FL340. Aircraft X was climbed to FL320; then when Aircraft X was 7 [miles] west of Aircraft Y and still heading to MCN he was climbed to FL340 and handed off to Clark Hill (23).  As Aircraft X was approaching FL340 radar target was lost and track went to coast status.  I advised Aircraft X that I lost his transponder.  He acknowledged and said he would switch to another.  Still no target; then I got one or two hits on his transponder and the aircraft was 5-6 miles directly behind Aircraft Y heading towards AHN.  Clarkhill gave me higher and FL430 was issued with an; 'Expedite!'  I believe Aircraft X turned way before MCN towards AHN and this resulted in the aircraft being directly behind Aircraft Y.  I don't know why we lost radar on Aircraft X; but I do believe this lead to an unsafe situation. If radar had been maintained I would have noticed the early turn and would have taken action much sooner.  If aircraft had flown to MCN or close to MCN then this would not even be an issue; but I honestly believe Aircraft X turned to AHN early.  I don't know if the lost transponder was an equipment problem from ZTL or from the Aircraft X transponder.If it is a problem with our equipment; then correcting it would solve this type of problem. If it was a transponder issue then a correctly working transponder would correct this issue.  If it was a pilot turning too soon; then pilot retraining would solve this type of issue.




Synopsis: ZTL Controller reports of an airborne conflict with an aircraft that has an intermittent transponder; or the FAA radar site doesn't pick up this aircraft at times.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X arrived from ZZZ with a re-inspection done on a Captain's window seal. The window was re-taped and blocking the Captain's view. Unknown why they taped it like that. Use proper procedures.




Synopsis: Technician reported that a procedural error and lack of oversight caused an aircraft to be signed off with an improper repair.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I flew the first leg. The first thing I noticed was a very high flap 2 speed minimum; around 194. Winds were 180/16G29. I made a very hard landing. The aircraft felt heavy; but I attributed it to the gusty winds and the hangar causing some swirling winds. Next leg with the FO flying; same thing; flaps 2 speed was about 195. He called for flaps 2; after they were set; we began the descent (I was now watching the speed and flap issue carefully). Sure enough; the speed started towards 200 KIAS; which would have been an overspeed. I grabbed the speedbrake and got them out in time to keep the speed around 198/199. Oh; he had called for gear down too; we needed some early drag due to the steep descent angle on that approach; but the speed was increasing. I told him what I did and we slowed on back and got fully configured. Another hard landing. FO commented that the pitch attitude seemed high and he felt like he was dragging it in with lots of extra thrust. On the third leg I was flying again. By this time; I felt like something was not right. On the STAR there is a 210 KTS restriction. I looked at the clean speed limit and it was 212 KTS; on a 319. Our weight showed 132;200. Again; flap 2 speed was about 195. I quickly checked the FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer) weight:FAC 1= 140.0FAC 2= 138.5VREF was 124 + 5 =129. I changed it to 132. When established on final; fully configured; 132 was right at minimum; so I went 135. I managed a decent landing; but the aircraft still felt heavy. I radioed MX and told them about our experience. Because we had to clear customs; I could not communicate directly with the line mechanic. I have heard many pilots complain about bad weights and how they always check the FAC weights. I have flown the Airbus for 23 years and never really had a problem; but this got my attention. I would like to receive some feedback to find out if there was a problem detected or not.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported that the weights generated by the Airbus onboard computer were inaccurate and resulted in hard landings. Captain reported the issue to Maintenance.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GSO.Tower, NC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C GSO
ATC / advisory: Tower GSO
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Second time this happened today in 2 separate aircraft at two separate airports. While on final approach just about at the final approach fix; the autothrottles disengaged. Concerned about possible 5G issues.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported loss of autothrottles on final approach to GSO; possibly related to 5G issues.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CRP.TRACON, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Airspace: Class E CRP
ATC / advisory: TRACON CRP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We are a STARS facility that runs the bulk of our approaches to NGP;a Navy base. They have our radar feed. They have STARS equipment; but not our STARS feed.  Because of this; we are forced to make manual inbound and handoff calls for every approach. This takes the radar controller's focus and attention away from the radar scope and forces him or her to make a landline communication that would be completely unnecessary if our STARS equipment talked to the Navy STARS.  This is a huge safety risk. Our facility is constantly training new controllers and new pilots; which is the Navy's mission; to train new pilots. Hear back/Read back is a huge issue here with the brand new; green; pilots and it is only exponentially compounded with the added landline communications. I have been told over and over that this is just a money issue. That is an unacceptable answer for the amount of safety that is at risk.  We are talking chump change to get these two systems to talk to each other. This needs to happen ASAP. It has been a problem for years and controllers have just had to learn to deal with it. Get the FAA STARS to talk to the NAVY STARS and then we can develop procedures and scratchpad entries to ensure a safe operation.




Synopsis: CRP Controller reports of the lack of a data link between his facility and NGP. Both facilities use STARS but the system does not communicate and the controller has to make manual hand offs on all inbound traffic. Controller reports this is a safety risk.