Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were operating Aircraft X at ZZZ. The sort was listed as running approximately 90 minutes late; however the flight was not loaded and ready to push until 2 hrs; 30 minutes after our scheduled departure time. We would later recall the ramp agent remarking as he closed us out that he had been called out to work this flight; and that it was not his normal flight. As we received pushback clearance; we also received an ACARS message indicating 'FOM 10.37 Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures in Effect.' I was asked to acknowledge the message via ACARS; which I did (as I understand it) to modify the FPR and make the flight legal to dispatch. I held the push as the First Officer got out of his seat; pulled out the monitors; and powered them up. I verbalized that the APU was already running with the packs on; that we would perform a 2-engine taxi; and we would need to start the APU after landing at ZZZ1. I assumed (wrongly) that I had missed the FOM 10.37 reference in the DG paperwork I had signed; AND that the FO had already provided a copy to the ramp agent while closing; and had RETAINED a folded copy of in his back pocket. We continued the push; now 2 hrs; 34 min late for an uneventful departure. When we leveled off; we reviewed the DG paperwork again and pulled out the 10.37 procedures in the FOM. It was then I discovered that the paperwork did not have more than 1000 KG of dry ice; that it did not have a reference to FOM 10.37 and that the FOM procedure also prohibited lives onboard; which we had (chicks). I felt relieved for our safety that we had air on the aircraft while conducting our preflight and waiting on the load for well over 90 minutes; although we had no knowledge of the dry ice during that timeframe; and the hot weather conditions were the only thing driving us to maintain airflow on the aircraft. While I am confident that we did not willingly break any FARs; I am not confident that we received dry ice updates in a timely manner; that we were dispatched with the right paperwork; nor that we met company policy prohibiting live animals while traveling with more than 1000 KG of dry ice per FOM 10.37. Excessive delays and ground crew changes likely drove some of these issues; and we should have pulled the paperwork and recalled the 'lives prohibited' part of the exemption; however I do believe receiving a 10.37 exemption while conducting a push was excessively late in the game and was not a recipe for successful compliance for this flight. Late notification during a push.Ground personnel ensure checklists are followed to generate 10.37 Supplemental paperwork early on. Lives are considered in this equation. Crew notified in time to mitigate safety issues with airflow while preflighting. If notified this late; crew would be best served to stay at or get towed back to gate; review FOM and DG paperwork. If in error; obtain new paperwork.


Second narrative: Because of delays caused by weather and volume; we pushed off the gate 2 hours and 40 minutes late. We had completed all of our pre-departure duties and were in the process of pushing back off the gate when we got an ACARS message from [Operations] alerting us to add to the flight release that we were dispatched with 'FOM 10.37 Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures in Effect'. The Captain acknowledged the message and said he was familiar with the procedure and we would continue as he discussed items regarding the procedure. (I've only dispatched with the exemption a few other times; however; I felt comfortable with what was required.) I further stated that we were already planning a two engine taxi and that we would need to run the APU upon arrival in ZZZ1; leave the APU running at the Gate and Notify the Ramp personnel in ZZZ. I also retrieved the Drager CO2 which the Captain turned on for us both and we wore per the procedure. The Captain made the comment that we could review the rest of the procedure while in cruise. The Taxi and Departure was routine. Once we got to cruise; the Captain and I reviewed the Supplemental Procedures and our DG paperwork. We realized that the paperwork was incorrect and showed live animals onboard in the ABK which is not allowed per the FOM. Cause: I think multiple things contributed to the event. First; the Hub has been severely delayed since the COVID Crisis Started. I think everyone is a bit 'tired' of this continued 'Peak like Operation.' I know the Ramp Agent who closed out our flight prior to push made a comment that he was unfamiliar with our flight and was working another Flight when told to close our flight out so we could push. Further; it was a long duty day for me and the Captain was eager to get to the layover. It was our first leg together; and while the Captain seemed very capable; we weren't used to flying together yet. I also believe the long and unfortunate cultural norm of 'rushing' started to creep in given that we were so late. I also had the thought that wondered if [Operations] had sent an ACARS message to the wrong flight regarding the Supplemental Procedures given that it was coming so late. Suggestions: My biggest frustration is that normally I am very good at slowing down a situation that is rushed and take pride in my attention to detail assuring that things are accounted for and speak up when I think we need to take more time. Unfortunately; given the late nature of the [Operations] message regarding the Supplemental Procedures coming during the pushback; and assuming the Captain was more familiar with the procedure; I did not suggest to the Captain that we return to the gate and or sit off the gate once pushed back to review the procedure and paperwork to assure we complied with all company procedures. At the time I felt comfortable enough with the Captains brief of the procedure and reviewing the procedure while en-route given that we verbally talked about the procedures required. That was a mistake and something I normally don't do. I never assume in the airplane and always prefer to verify/review information on my own. I will be more diligent on not allowing such complacency. I should have insisted that we stop and assure we were in full compliance considering that I hadn't had the Supplemental Dry Ice Procedure often. Further; what is disturbing; is that the Ramp Agent that closed out our flight obviously was not aware of what was onboard the airplane. He was unaware; and it had not been commented to him that we had the excessive amount of Dry Ice and Live Animals on board. Further; a checklist needs to be better developed for the Ramp to use; especially with notifying [Operations] and the Flight Crew in a timely manner of the dry ice supplemental procedure need. We had been on the airplane with doors closed and engines off/packs off in various stages of configuration with no idea that we were carrying the excessive amount of Dry Ice. Also; within that checklist; the ramp should be require to verify that the flight crew is notified of the Procedure prior pushback. During Pushback is not the time to tell the crew of a cumbersome operational procedure. Further [Operations should have advised a return to the gate to assure that paperwork and procedures were applied correctly; safely/legally considering they knew we had pushed back off the gate and needed to address this procedure. Lastly; I think in general from a Flight Ops perspective; two things. More training on the Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures should be stressed during Recurrent training. I am aware of the Procedures in the FOM; FM and QRH; but really it is a procedure that isn't discussed much given its importance. Further; I need to do better as a First Officer to question the Captain in the need to properly review the procedures to assure compliance as soon as something comes up like this comes up. Again; I'm very frustrated with my performance and certainly will be more diligent.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported Hazmat documentation errors due to late flight crew notification of 'Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures'.