elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Company Material] was rejected. This shipment of two arcraft engines (possible Helicopter engines) was booked from ZZZ to ZZZZ via ZZZ1 . Upon inspection of the shipment; we noticed that this had some oil like substance on the bottom of the shipping crate and missing the purge certificate from the submitted documents. Should have had a purge certification for each engine and maybe have been classified as Class 9 DG.




Synopsis: Air carrier Ground Personnel reported Hazmat shipment refused due to missing required Hazmat documents as well as being improperly configured for transport.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was the instructor providing OJTI at sector 21. I had not trained with developmental in a week or two and was told he was ready for certification. Faster jet traffic was climbing out behind Aircraft Y traffic on the ZMBRO departure. Aircraft Y's final altitude was FL230 and they were cleared to it. Developmental 'Got higher' for the Aircraft X jet to make sure they kept climbing through FL230 and did not level. As Aircraft X was approaching FL230 climbing he transferred communications to the next sector before ensuring separation. I did not react fast enough and could not stop the frequency change. The next sector issued a slight turn and Aircraft X ended up topping Aircraft Y by 1000 FT with not much room to spare.  Always make sure you are ready to step in as an instructor and take the frequency. Your developmental may just do the dumbest thing possible at any time. A turn further to the right should have been issued to Aircraft X jet sooner and none of this would have been a problem.




Synopsis: ZMP Controller while instructing has an aircraft climbing faster than previous aircraft; Developmental gives higher for faster climbing aircraft. Developmental transfers communication on faster climbing aircraft before separation is ensured.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: ATC gave us a late crossing restriction and asked us to 'do our best' to meet it.  I started to deploy the speed brakes immediately.  It was very difficult to move the speed brake handle.  Rather than analyzing the cause for the binding I turned all my attention to moving the handle and forced it to move.  The FO was first to notice the rolling motion of the aircraft because I was facing the handle it was so hard to move.  He immediately took control and notified me that he was kicking off the autopilot.  That was when I became aware that the aircraft had started a roll to the left even though there was no sensation of rolling.  We had gotten to 35 degrees (plus) of bank when I took back control; stowed the speed brake handle and worked to roll the plane back to level.  It was very difficult to do.  It turns out the left spoiler would deploy but the right would not.  The spoilers deployed normally on touchdown and we tried them on taxi in with normal indications.  Wrote it up and maintenance checked the systems and found no abnormalities.  They suspected icing due to the rain accumulation [on the ground] and the flight above the freezing level. Water accumulation (most likely) set up the event and caused the flight control binding.  Don't know how those flight control bays are supposed to be drained but there may be some clogging of that system if there is one.   My determination to move the speed brake handle to make the tight altitude constraint was a big mistake.  I should have analyzed instead of forced. The FO's quick decisive action prevented a situation from deteriorating.  With the limited flight control authority to roll back to the right; if he had not taken some timely action this might have become unrecoverable. Check drains on all planes exposed to water accumulation. Don't force flight controls if there is binding.




Synopsis: McDonnell Douglas Heavy Captain experiences difficulty moving the speedbrake handle in flight and applies more pressure. The result is a roll to the left which is first detected by the First Officer and corrected. During approach the spoilers are armed and function normally on landing.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Local Control. Ground was training. The developmental had less than 5 hours of experience. A C525 called to taxi. The developmental issued instructions for the aircraft to taxi to Runway 13R via Bravo; Whiskey; Lima. The instructor then asked the developmental where the aircraft was. The developmental stated that he did not know. The instructor and the developmental then engage in a discussion about the situation as the aircraft is approaching Runway 13L. The aircraft was located on the east side of the field. To taxi the way instructed would require the aircraft cross both active runways. I as the Local Controller observed the aircraft approaching Runway 13L and gave Ground Control authorization to cross Runway 13L. I observed the Ground Control instructor attempt to clarify the taxi clearance as the aircraft was crossing Runway 13L. I then observed the aircraft continue straight on Taxiway Bravo towards Runway 13R. I brought it to Ground Control's attention that the aircraft was not stopping and appeared to be continuing across Runway 13R. The instructor brought the situation to the pilot's attention. The aircraft came to a stop in the middle of Runway 13R without authorization from Local Control. I feel the instructor let the situation go to far. I feel had the instructor controlled first and taught second; this situation would have never happened. The phraseology used was non-standard and confused the pilot. The aircraft should have been issued a clarifying taxi clearance immediately; using standard phraseology.




Synopsis: Local Controller described an unauthorized runway crossing event during training on Ground Control; the reporter indicating the instructor was late in taking the position and used non-standard phraseology leading to the incursion.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through 30;000 feet; we lost Hydraulic A system quantity. We complied with the checklist; then notified the company. We decided to land at [a nearby airport]; due to longer runway. We [advised ATC we need priority] due to the loss of our primary [landing] gear; steering; and brakes on landing. We stopped on the runway and were towed to [FBO].




Synopsis: CE-750 Captain reported they diverted to a nearby suitable airport following the loss of hydraulic System A.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SA-226 TC Metro II
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I had an uneventful flight and a smooth landing. On rollout Tower advised me that I could take the reverse high speed or continue my rollout to the intersecting runway then exit at XX. I advised that I would like to exit at the intersecting runway and then XX. As I continued my rollout and began to slow down to exit the runway everything felt completely normal. As I was making the turn to exit at XX; I felt a slight vibration but figured that maybe it was just due to taxiing on an uneven surface. When past the hold short line; I contacted Ground and received taxi instructions. Immediately thereafter the plane began vibrating on the left side and the plane slowed down even further. I immediately stopped and advised Ground that I thought my tire was flat and requested to shutdown the engines. Ground advised me that my left main tires were indeed flat and approved the shutdown (thus closing Taxiway XX). Upon inspection; both the inboard and outboard left main tires were flat. There was also brake fluid leaking from in between the tires. Both tires had flat spots with the inboard tire having a larger flat spot than the outboard. In my opinion the brakes locked up which therefore blew the tires. I promptly wrote up the maintenance issues; reported to Dispatch; and obtained control numbers from Maintenance Control. Two mechanics were promptly flown in to fix the tires and we were able to move the aircraft.   I had a long rollout on landing; and slowed the aircraft down using reverse thrust. I consciously did this to avoid putting undue stress on the brakes. I did not slam on the brakes and do not believe that I 'rode the brakes.'




Synopsis: SA-226 Captain experiences two flat tires on the left main gear after landing; during taxi off the runway. The left brakes had apparently locked up during rollout flat spotting both tires and causing the flats.
Date: 201909
Location: ICT.Airport, KS
Light: Daylight
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was in my C boarding position (exit row) when an older couple pre-boarded even before all the wheelchair passengers and came to sit in the exit row. I was kind and asked them if they were pre-boarding and they said yes and I advised them that they could not sit in the exit row due to FAA regulations and they told me that they could because some other [Company] agent said they could because their son had died; I said no and offered them any other seat in the cabin even the first row and offered to escort them back up to the front row but they declined and wanted the exit row. I asked them to give me a minute and went to the front of the cabin to talk to the Operations Agent who was a contract employee and was not who I needed to deal with so I saw a uniformed employee and asked to speak to her; she didn't want to deal with me and keep on pushing wheelchairs. I said stop the boarding now and come up the jetway away from the passengers we need to talk! The First Officer was helping with wheelchairs and I asked him to come also. I explained to this Agent that they cannot pre-board and sit in the exit row due to FAA regulations but they can sit anywhere else. She wanted nothing to do with me and said I just need to do the right thing. I keep explaining FAA regulations and she would not listen; (very ugly) scene. I told her I did understand the situation that I've been with [Company] for [many] years but the right thing would be to sit them somewhere else. She would not listen; I was getting nowhere with her; we were delaying boarding so finally I felt so much pressure I ask the First Officer if he would back me up if I got in trouble for letting them sit in the exit and he said he would back me up and we continued boarding. When I got back on the plane the A Flight Attendant yelled at me because he didn't know the whole story at that time. That was very upsetting to me; we boarded and later had time to discuss the situation among us Flight Attendants and the A had already told the agents that the 2 pre-board passengers could not sit in the exit.I'm upset with myself this morning typing this and I will never let another agent bully me into not doing my job. I know what my job is; she doesn't. She doesn't know our contract and FAR's I want her reprimanded for her actions; I do not want her doing this to anyone else. I also want to know the outcome with her and how [Company] is going to handle her.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported Customer Service Agent pre-boarded wheelchair passenger in exit row seats in violation of FAR.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: VMC; 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Approximately 90 miles due north of the airport we got a 'TANK #2 FUEL QTY LOW' warning on our system display. Approximately 39 miles from the airport we received a 'TANK #3 FUEL QTY LOW' warning light. We had an uneventful landing in day VFR conditions with 4;000 kilos of fuel. Flight planned landing fuel was 5;745 kilos. We noticed enroute that our expected fuel at a couple of our waypoint fixes was less than flight planned. We suspected either fuel gauge indication problems or a fuel leak. We had an issue on the previous leg where we received a level 2 'FUEL QTY/USED CHECK' indication that also indicated that we might have a fuel leak issue. The problem eventually resolve itself and the alert went away. The problem ended up being Dispatch and our paperwork showing 'planned payload of 6 tons' instead of the actual payload of 92;900 tons. This 'mistake' went unnoticed by myself and two other crewmembers.  Our previous leg landed with approximately 89;092 tons and were only stopping for 2 tons of fuel and a stack of pallets (approximately 5 tons). We expected very little change on the next leg.Crew fatigue was a probable issue since all three of us slept very little the day of the flight and flew an 'all nighter' landing after sunrise in the morning before resuming this flight.




Synopsis: A flight crew reported a 'TANK #2 FUEL QTY LOW'; followed by a 'TANK #3 FUEL QTY LOW' and suspected a fuel leak. They later discovered a dispatch weight and balance error listed the payload at six tons instead of the actual 92;900 tons.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out passing FL230 declared emergency with ATC due to cabin pressurization problem. Requested immediate lower altitude to 10;000 feet. Once at 10;000 feet we continued the arrival with normal approach and landing.


Second narrative: Single pack operation; (inbound write up of hot left pack) complied with MEL direction to bleed APU for rightpack operation during departure. Approximately 3;000 AGL MEL procedure to bleed right engine to right pack. Duct pressure was good and right pack in auto. Climbing through the mid teens we both noted that cockpit temperature seemed to be getting warmer; cooler temperature was selected. (Aircraft cabin/cockpit temperature was already warm due to ground temperature). Level 24;000 we received cabin altitude warning. We donned O2 mask establish com; I descend approximately 300 feet before I declared emergency with ATC. I closed the outflow valve manually. Initial descent to 14;000 feet for mountains; then down below 10;000 feet. The cabin altitude was controlled through descent and outflow valve; the cabin masks were not dropped.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew experiences a cabin altitude warning horn passing FL230 after being dispatched with an inoperative pack. Passenger oxygen masks are not deployed and flight is able to continue to destination.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training on East RADAR and had a departure; Air Carrier X coming off Runway 22. His departure point was southeast. I left him on runway heading to top some traffic and climbed him to 7;000 FT. Once he was approximately 5 miles south of the airport; I turned him left on course. I was cognizant of the fact that a nearby MOA was active at or above 7;000 FT; but I projected his track to remain at least 3 miles north of the airspace. I focused my attention elsewhere on other aircraft and the surrounding weather; and by the time my scan came back to Air Carrier X; I noticed his track was getting closer to the MOA and the aircraft was not on my anticipated track. I gave him a turn twenty degrees left; but by this point his speed had increased and he was sliding into the turn; and thus; closer to the MOA. I gave the aircraft a 270 heading (I meant to give him a 090 heading which the pilot questioned; and eventually I correctly assigned the 090 heading) heading but by the time he was established on the heading; he appeared to be quite close to the MOA; perhaps closer than the required 3 miles. The MOA controlling agency; called inquiring as to whether the aircraft was being turned away from the MOA. This incident taught me the value of looking at an aircraft's airspeed and planning for turns. An aircraft with a 290 knot ground speed does not turn on a dime. I should not create situations that I have to 'watch'; i.e.; I should give an aircraft a larger turn; not 'finesse' it around the MOA; especially when it is traveling at a faster speed. My overall lack of experience also contributed to this. Also; I think the transposition of headings (when I meant to give a 090 and mistakenly gave him a 270) also contributed to some confusion between me and the pilot; although I never actually observed the aircraft begin a turn to 270; and I corrected myself before he turned.




Synopsis: TRACON developmental described a probable MOA airspace incursion when failing to anticipate the turn radius of an IFR departure that was increasing speed rapidly.