elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOI.TRACON, ID
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Aircraft X checked in with me on the BOISE 2 Departure climbing to 12;000 feet. I caught it and climbed him to 16;000 feet; which he should have been doing on his own. I don't know if clearance cleared him to 12;000 feet; if they told him to climb via SID except maintain one six thousand; if the pilot read it back correctly or not. [Company X] gets their clearances via PDC; so there should be no confusion what so ever. All I know is that [Company X] jets get it wrong more often than not. See my previous [safety report] submission on this very issue; where I was bit by a [Company X] pilot I did not catch checking in climbing to 12;000 feet. I'm hyper-vigilant about that now. Our 2 year 'airspace trial' is ended and we have our airspace set at 40 nm and 16;000 feet. It's time to stop fooling around; doing a jerry-rigged clearance every time and confusing pilots which leads to deviations; errors and missed readbacks. This facility and this procedure is setting pilots up for failure with each and every single departure clearance. Certainly [Company X] pilots with their PDC never catch that they are to climb; initially; to 16;000 feet. We have to catch and correct it in the radar room probably 9 times out of 10. Is there anywhere else in the nation with a SID that lies to pilots? They are not to climb to 12;000 feet; they are to climb to 16;000 feet; per our letter of agreement. Which is incorrect; the letter of agreement or the SID? Two years running? It's time to rectify this....Get rid of the BOISE 2 Departure! Replace it with a BOISE 3 that instructs pilots to climb to 16;000 instead of 12;000! We are doing a ridiculous work-around by telling them 'climb via SID except maintain one six thousand'. Well; that's not climbing via the SID then; is it? We need to get rid of confusing phraseology. We need to stop setting pilots and controllers up for failure. We need a departure procedure that is clear and concise. No more band-aid fixes. Do it right or don't do it at all. Pull the BOISE 2 from the next flip chart production; or print it correctly.




Synopsis: The reporter states that aircraft repeatedly climb to 12;000 feet on their airports' SID but are supposed to be climbing to 16;000 feet. The SID assigned altitude is 12;000 feet.
Date: 202008
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Other N/A
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On Day 5; an employee in the X office was told they had COVID-19 and notified management of the situation. I worked with this employee all day in the office on Day 0. I was not notified by the company that the employee had contracted COVID. I had visited my family that weekend; when I returned home where I live with my girlfriend who is very high risk due to some medical conditions. This is unacceptable according to CDC guidelines you are supposed to contact trace and notify all employees that have come in contact for more than 6 hrs on that day with the person who is infected; you not only put myself; my children and my girlfriend at risk; and god forbid worse things could have happened.This is not the first time ZZZ has failed to notify employees that have been around others that have contracted COVID; thank god when I came back to work I got tested and was negative but I never want to be put in this situation ever again where I am worried I may get my family and especially my girlfriend sick or worse killed due to negligence.




Synopsis: Ground worker reported not being informed by management that a co-worker tested positive for COVID-19. The ground worker had worked with the co-worker and then visited family; resulting in possible exposure.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After [bleeds-off] takeoff while performing the after takeoff items; we received a clearance to 'resume the arrival'.  We got this clearance just before I turned on the bleeds.  I then reached across to program the First Officer's FMS.  I then made a mistake during the programming; and had to take a little more time to rectify the error.  Once I had gotten that corrected; I reprogrammed my FMS.  We then received another climb clearance; which I promptly put into the alerter.  At this point we were about to enter the clouds and icing conditions; so I selected on the icing equipment.  Needless to say; I never got the bleeds selected on; and apparently never finished the checklist.  On descent at about 10;000 ft we received a cabin altitude warning light.  We immediately realized the bleeds were off; and selected them on.  We were already in the descent to 7;000 ft; and before we could complete the emergency checklist; the light extinguished.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 provided no additional information]


Synopsis: A Q400 Captain reported high workload after takeoff and failure to open the pneumatic bleeds; resulting in the aircraft's failure to pressurize.  When bleeds were opened; normal operation resumed.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y was unexpectedly slow on their approach; and Aircraft X; the following aircraft was unexpectedly fast. I issued a speed reduction to Aircraft X in what I believed was plenty of time to keep 2.5 miles by the threshold; however; I failed to consider that; being 12 miles from the airport; I am required to keep 3.0 miles spacing; as 2.5 miles is only legal at 10 DME. Apparently; during my speed reduction to Aircraft X; I used the words 'speed' and 'knots' the same sentence; which led to a side conversation between 2 supervisors and 2 controllers in my immediate area wherein they all agreed that such phraseology violates the 7110.65; that it generally leads pilots to believe we are incompetent at our jobs; and that such willful non-compliance to published rules is grounds for formal punishment; etc. I allowed this side conversation to distract me from my duty; and cancelled Aircraft Xs approach clearance later than I otherwise should have; at approx. 2.94 miles; 11 DME from the field. A more timely speed reduction to Aircraft X would have helped; as well as a more concerted effort on my part to remain diligent to my work and not allow side conversations to distract me.




Synopsis: A Controller allowed final approach spacing to decrease to 2.9 miles before breaking the second aircraft out for re-sequencing. Three miles spacing was required.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff off of 9L last night. During the takeoff roll; at about the 80 KT callout; we heard Tower direct a commuter inbound to Runway 17 to go around and turn to a 050 heading. About that time we were past V1 and the First Officer had started to rotate when we both saw the commuter; still on the runway heading; just to our left. My First Officer slowed our rotation to ensure sure we had adequate clearance with the plane now right above us. My best guess is that there was about 150 foot separation between the aircraft. Tower also directed us to make a right turn to 120 heading but we delayed the turn to ensure that we had adequate [vertical] clearance from the other aircraft. We were then handed off to Departure.I believe it was both misjudgment on the timing of the ILS approach to Runway 17 and our takeoff off from Runway 9L; and the slow response of the commuter crew to make the turn that contributed to this close call. This has never happened to me before but better situational awareness of the Tower or a quicker response by the other crew to make the immediate turn could have prevented this.




Synopsis: An ERJ-170; taking off; suffered an NMAC with a commuter aircraft directed to go-around and turn left while on approach to an intersecting runway. The failure of the commuter flight crew to respond promptly to the turn was cited as a contributing factor.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Pitts S-2 All Series
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Acting as repairman (A&P); tasked to move aircraft from hangar to shop by taxiing.  Unfamiliar with the Pitts S-2B; surveyed the controls for location and operation.  Proceeded to start aircraft; mixture rich; throttle full; fuel pump on check for fuel flow.  Mistake starting with throttle still full forward; aircraft started full power.  Admittedly I knew I had a problem; couldn't quite get my hand on the throttle and the aircraft was moving toward the hangar.  I stopped fumbling for throttle and went for what I could control; flight controls; stick and rudder.  Within seconds went from A&P to pilot; the aircraft was airborne.  The only problem I had no experience in flying high performance aerobatic aircraft.  Took a few moments to become accustomed to the control inputs of this aircraft.  I landed the aircraft on the second attempt; the first was a mess.  Lesson learned stop being relaxed; and [be] more careful; and use that checklist even for taxiing.




Synopsis: Airframe and Powerplant Technician reports an inadvertent flight after starting the engine with the throttle full open.  A successful landing ensues on the second attempt.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: There were calm winds on descent tracking the BRBBQ1 STAR landing north.  We encountered wake turbulence that rolled our aircraft 10-12 degrees on the longitudinal axis for a couple of miles.  I told First Officer to offset to the right.  We entered 1 mile right offset in the MCDU. A few minutes later Center mentioned we appeared to be off course. I told him we had offset 1 mile due to wake turbulence. The aircraft in front of us was 10 miles ahead.  We were not off course.  I am under the impression we get 4 miles before being 'off course.'Wake turbulence on these arrivals occur with no winds aloft. Offsets work fine getting out of the turbulence.Allow offsets.




Synopsis: Cargo widebody Captain reported selecting a 1 mile offset after a wake turbulence encounter; and was questioned by ATC regarding the deviation.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft arrived with AFT CARGO SOV [Shut Off Valve] msg on Eicas.I climbed into avionics bay and JB10 [Junction Box 10] latches were not engaged and were hanging down. Junction box 10 was sitting loosely in its rack. Upon removing PCB2 [Electronic removable Card] the relay K41 had two rubber spacers installed and was not making contact. I also found a walkie-talkie in-between the air conditioning ducts next to JB10. Relay K41 in JB10 was not installed properly; found JB10 not latched.Reseated JB10 and reinstalled new relay in PCB2 K41. Reassembled and latched JB10 properly. Complied ops check of the Aft cargo shut off valve.complied with operation and functional for JB10 checks In accordance with Manual; no further defects noted.

Callback: Reporter stated that shoddy workmanship was previously performed on the aircraft when it arrived.



Synopsis: CRJ-900 Mechanic reported avionics equipment was not properly reinstalled following previous maintenance action.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OMDB.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Dubai airport was engaged in a one-runway operation due to a disabled aircraft on Runway 12L. We were cleared to line up and wait on Runway 12R behind an Emirates 777. Taking the runway the crew visually checked in the approach direction for landing traffic. No approaching traffic was in sight. The Tower cleared us to takeoff and told another aircraft to slow to minimum approach speed. On takeoff roll; at approximately 100 KTS the Tower instructed us to stop our takeoff roll. At the same time we heard them tell another aircraft to execute a go around. Captain executed rejected takeoff procedures. Flying first officer and relief pilot executed their procedures of communicating; assessing; and telling the passengers to remain seated. As we rolled out we observed the aircraft on the go-around fly directly overhead at approximately 500 FT to 1;000 FT. We cleared the runway and executed the appropriate electronic rejected takeoff checklist; and referred to the appropriate Flight Manual and FOM procedures and guidance. Due to an inoperative deferred Brake Temperature Monitoring System guidance indicated an approximate 80-minute brake cooling time before next departure. Aircraft returned to gate and appropriate maintenance inspections were completed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Dubai Tower cleared a heavy jet for takeoff then at about 100 KTS commanded a reject while directing an aircraft on final to go-around. The go-around passed 500 FT-1;000 FT overhead.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Vehicle Driver
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Due to the lack of equipment for out of service equipment (tractors) and the remote parking of supertugs; crews getting from the terminal to the other side of taxi lane [X] to man equipment is proving difficult.  As well as the remote parking finding equipment and doing multiple user checks is proving a challenge causing both Dispatch and the Supervisor to ask for multiple updates on status causing an unnecessary sense of urgency.  This is even after a move team employee reports looking for equipment/user check/ etc.; and you will advise ready or enroute.This combined with COVID restrictions in place is causing crews to use equipment previously driven by the others.  Not only are we having to perform a 2nd; 3rd and sometimes a fourth user check we are also being forced to sanitize the equipment again due to possible cross contamination.While obtaining a vehicle for transit back to the terminal I checked the user log. The piece of equipment I used to transit had no user check performed for several days.  I have witnessed it used on multiple occasions to support moves.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported that it is difficult to get from one area to another because of out of service equipment and the equipment that is usable is not cleaned correctly.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Parking
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival we were using the self-parking system to dock at the gate. The system failed about 20 feet from the stop point and we stopped the aircraft immediately; calling ramp to attempt to get the system reset. The ground workers thought that we must have stopped at the correct point; and one worker went and chocked the front gear. Another worker went and chocked the right main gear as we saw him on the 777-300 camera and a reflection in the window. The First Office and I noticed him; and after he placed the chocks; began to walk forward while between the right main gear and the operation engine. This worker was only a few feet (maybe 3) from the left side of the right engine and heading towards the inlet. I immediately reached over and cutoff the Fuel Control to the right engine shutting it down to prevent this worker from possibly being ingested into the operating engine. Especially with the GE-90 engine; being in close proximity would likely be fatal. This worker probably passed within 3-4 feet of the inlet of the now spinning down engine. This was a very serious breach of safety procedures and could easily have resulted in that workers death; along with the trauma of the other workers; crew; and passengers. I shut down the left engine to prevent anybody from approaching it also as they ignored the beacon light and operating engines. Next time we may not be so lucky. In this case; it only resulted in a 20 minute wait to get a tug to pull us into the gate.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported shutting down the engines prior to parking due to ground personnel attempting to walk in front of the engines.