elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We complied] to a RA to avoid a substantial risk of collision. The controller turned us on a short base leg to 4R; we were cleared to slow to 170; then descend from 3000 to 2000. Traffic was pointed out to us at 1 to 2 o'clock while we were in the turn; we advised we did not have the traffic. We were in a turn to the right and that area of our vision was blocked. As we rolled out; we immediately had a TA; and before we saw the traffic; we had the RA. We maneuvered in accordance to the RA to avoid the traffic. Once the traffic was below us and now south of us; the controller said the traffic was clear and to continue the approach. We reported to RA maneuver and continued. We only saw the traffic after it was passing under our aircraft. The controller basically turned us directly into this traffic. I wrote 'no information' regarding if we were within 500 feet; because I was not certain; but I do believe it was close to 500.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported complying with a RA to avoid a collision during a turn to base.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BOI.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Approach; First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Approach; Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We were] descending on the SPUDD arrival and cleared for the visual to runway 28 at KBOI. After seeing the airport and being cleared for the visual we turned toward the localizer and continued descending. My best estimate of altitude was around 6000 feet received a 'terrain pull up' warning from the GPWS. We leveled off and executed the proper terrain avoidance procedure and contemplated continuing the approach but then decided to execute a missed approach. We entered the pattern and came back around to land again on runway 28 uneventfully. I was unfamiliar with the airport and was not yet on the localizer or glideslope as I descended and my closure to the terrain became too rapid. I should have had ATC keep vectoring me until I was on the ILS before calling the visual. I should have stayed higher throughout the visual approach.


Second narrative: Night visual approach to 28R with autopilot off. I was pilot monitoring. During landing checklist; I observed the aircraft was descending below the glideslope. At approximately 5;000 feet MSL; I told the Pilot flying (First Officer) to level and recapture the glideslope. The GPWS then announced 'terrain; pull up' due to the high sink rate and terrain. The FO immediately executed the escape maneuver. We were quickly above the glideslope and minimum altitude. We then considered continuing the approach; but elected to go around. Next approach and landing was uneventful.Failure to maintain on or above the electronic glideslope. Earlier recognition of glideslope deviations. Controlling excessive descent rate above high terrain


Synopsis: Large Transport flight crew reported receiving a terrain warning after descending below the glideslope on a visual approach to BOI.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: There was a faint smell of oily fumes during departure and cruise which seemed normal since the aircraft had just come out of maintenance.  Upon initial descent into ZZZ; the fumes became much more prevalent.  We donned our oxygen masks [advised] with ATC.  We described our emergency and asked to continue expeditiously to land at ZZZ.  We had no other indications other than the strong smell of fumes.  We continued without further incident and landed safely at ZZZ.  Fire and rescue did a visual inspection of the aircraft as we cleared the runway and permitted taxi to and shutdown at the gate.  The mechanics have been working on the aircraft today.  They cleaned air conditioning ducts and appear to have found the problem within systems on engine number 1.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported strong oily fumes during descent.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.Tower, PA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I was not directly involved in this event; nor am I aware of what was coordinated between anyone. I was an observer. The aircraft had communication trouble. It appeared that instead of getting 7600 in the box; 7500 was entered. The datablock was showing [the incorrect information]. That was unable to be verified. It was apparent more than 20 miles from PHL. The aircraft continued inbound to runway 35 and landed. It appeared that the pilot could transmit but not hear anyone. A light gun was used in the tower. I am unaware if the pilot saw the light gun. An aircraft was eventually scrambled [to intercept it]. However; Aircraft X landed and was never intercepted. The scrambled aircraft got around 2 miles south of PHL. There was a CIC in the tower. I am unaware if the local police were notified. It did not appear they met the aircraft at the general aviation ramp. Anyways; how was this aircraft allowed to fly right by the tower and land after appearing to be a [distressed] aircraft for at least 25 miles? I do not even know what to say about this incident. Why was management or whomever so confident that this was not a hijack with no way of confirming it? Why were they allowed to decide that nothing bad was going to happen? What did they base that on? If they were wrong and something went terribly wrong because it was an actual [hazard] how would that be explained to my family? How was this plane allowed to fly right by the tower with personnel in it? I realize is always better to be lucky than good but this incident is ridiculous. PHL continues to amaze me with its new circus acts.




Synopsis: PHL Tower Controller reported an aircraft was squawking 7500 when it actually had a radio problem. Reporter was concerned that the aircraft was allowed to land at a major airport.
Date: 202108
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent in vicinity of sweet intersection; ATC notified of aircraft climbing in front of us in opposite direction.  Then immediately gave us a left turn to 070 degrees.   Then immediately received a TCAS RA.  Complied with RA procedures.  Aircraft was less than 500 feet from us.   Very close. ATC notified us when aircraft was very close.  Our turn and RA happened very quickly.




Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported TCAS RA on descent. Flight crew took evasive action.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This scenario is in reference to operating a live trip [with inaccurate weight and balance calculations]. I was informed of the event today. Apparently the cargo load forms for that route were incorrectly filled out (and therefore the aircraft was flown illegally) by the operations representative. I was also informed that the crew; consisting of myself; a relief First Officer; and the Captain did not notice the errors in the paperwork. My duties for both legs were in the right seat; with the captain in the left seat; and Relief Pilot in the observer's seat. My preflight duties include preflighting the flight deck; loading the route and winds into the FMS; and reading checklists. The pilot in the observers seat does the aircraft walk-around; gets appropriate manuals and does the weight and balance. It is not common practice to have all three pilots double check the math (or passenger and load forms) of the operations representative. We have to have faith in his ability to do his job correctly. This is not to mention that we generally receive this paperwork just minutes before scheduled pushback. The pilot doing weight and balance takes the zone total weights and unit load device weights and enters them into our operations weight and balance computer and there is a 'flag' if there is any discrepancy in 'legal' loading. We assume that the math to derive these zone total weights by the Operations Representative is correct; as that is information we do not enter into the computer. The event occurred because the load paperwork was filled out incorrectly by Mr. X; and not identified by the crew as incorrect. Since the math used to determine zone weights was incorrect; it was not flagged by our computer and therefore not noticed by the flight crew.




Synopsis: B767-300 First Officer is informed after the fact that the Weight and Balance calculations for a flight he flew were incorrect. The error occurred when the operations representative added up the various bin loads and passengers on board incorrectly then provided that incorrect information to the flight crew to preform Weight and Balance calculations.
Date: 202111
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I keep hearing that the QRHs are going to be removed from the cockpit. The iPad will be the primary and only source of information. I have started timing how long it takes the iPad to open the Content Application. 65 seconds seems to be the norm when the iPad is connected to the Airbus internet and I open the Content app. That is a long time to be staring at a red ECAM. I believe this delay needs to be addressed before we remove the QRHs if this is in fact what the future holds.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported misgivings over the removal of the bound Quick Reference Handbooks and relying solely on iPad access.
Date: 201810
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After returning to work from my scheduled time off; I was informed by the Base Maintenance Personnel that the pitot tubes on the aircraft had been replaced. I did inquire if the system required another 24 month re-certification; or if some other type of check was necessary. I was given a brief explanation of the process; and that the Maintenance personnel had performed the required inspection. The inspection was annotated in the logbook; and signed off as completed; and operational.In a later discussion with another pilot the next morning; with an extensive background in aircraft maintenance; he expressed doubts that the checks reached the level required for this type of repair work. After our conversation; I became concerned because the aircraft had been flown; and decided to follow up with Maintenance on what was necessary to satisfy the pitot system inspection criteria. Again; I was told it was checked as required; operational; and signed off as serviceable.I still had serious reservations; and informed the mechanics that the aircraft was grounded until everyone was satisfied with the specific requirements. The Maintenance staff indicated that they would do additional research; and get back with me. A short time later; the mechanics acknowledged that they did not read far enough into the Maintenance Manual; and that all the required checks had not been performed. The mechanics had to obtain a specific piece of test equipment necessary to properly complete the inspection; and are in the process of testing the system.Flight crew are not familiar enough with the specifics of each inspection; and rely on Maintenance to familiar with the necessary criteria. Additionally; advanced planning would provide the opportunity to have the necessary test equipment on-hand.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reported after maintenance work was performed; the mechanics failed to complete all required testing to return aircraft to an airworthy condition.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Initially upon takeoff we smelt a slight burning plastic smell but it went away and we continued to ZZZ.  Approximately 20 miles from ZZZ the smell became strong and did not go away; the FA called and said she and the passengers could smell it as well. We reported the burning plastic smell to ATC and requested expedited vectors to land. They requested souls and fuel onboard and I specified we were not declaring an emergency; but supplied the information. Upon landing the fire trucks followed us to the gate and after the passengers deplaned the fireman did a sweep of the aircraft for any signs of fire. None were found so maintenance was called.Identification: A burning plastic/electrical odor became present during flight.Cause: I am unaware what the smell was but upon arrival the fire department verified they smelled the burnt electrical/plastic odor as well and it was strongest in the flight deck but could not find anything actually burning.Response: We did not don masks as there was no smoke visible so it didn't seem serious enough to require masks but later the FA and I felt a discomfort in our throats possibly from the fumes. If a similar situation happened in the future I would don O2 masks to be on the safer side.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported burning plastic smell during climb in passenger cabin resulting in a return to departure airport.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Incident only: 90 degrees crosswind from 120 degrees at 8 MPH gusts to 18 MPH; flared to land on Runway 03; gust picked up right wing causing right hand turn; landed at an angle; and the nose gear collapsed damaging the prop and lower cowling. No injuries; damage confined to propeller; nose gear; and lower cowling.




Synopsis: Experimental aircraft pilot reports losing control during landing in a strong crosswind; resulting in nose gear collapse and damage to the prop and lower cowling.
Date: 202005
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Due to the unprecedented events of COVID-19; the FAA has made special exemptions to requirements of meeting 90-day currency for takeoffs and landings for Airmen and other rules in relation to currency of flight operations.The aspect of the exemption in question is the exemption for Air Carrier Pilots that allows 2 additional calendar months before De-Qualification. As a member of a flight crew for a 121 Operator; it has come to my attention that there has not been any guidance as to the scenario of two Air Carrier Pilots who have not flown within 90 days or greater to fly together. One concern of mine is a flight crew operating where a Captain was on Voluntary/Non-Voluntary Time Off for 90 days or greater and a First Officer was also on Voluntary/Non-Voluntary Time Off or not flying as a result of COVID affecting regular flights.Keeping in the rules 'No Green on Green' always in mind; I believe that the issue of pilot proficiency vs currency should be addressed.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer requested guidance in a scenario where two air carrier pilots; neither of whom has flown within the prior 90 days due to the new 2-month FAA extension; are operating on the same flight. The First Officer expressed concern regarding the issue of pilot currency versus pilot proficiency.