elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On descent into CLT; got ACARS message trying to assign additional flying after the termination of my trip. I did not acknowledge the message because we were entering a high workload environment; descending via CHESLY 3 RNAV Arrival. It created a big distraction; which is an impediment to safety.I knew I could not accept additional flying because of: 1. Possible fatigue - had already been up nearly 15 hours. 2. Physiological needs - had not eaten anything since lunch.Company trying to reschedule while pilots are entering high workload environment. Any schedule change should be while on ground.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported while entering a high workload environment an ACARS message came requesting additional flying.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxiing in from 27R; we got the instruction to taxi via Z; SS; hold short of T1. There is no taxiway direction sign to identify T1; and in fact it didn't look like there is a crossing taxiway at all. On the chart; just a few pixels just out to the west; and in real life; it seemed like our taxiway (SS) just continued without anything crossing it. This could have been very easily missed. We didn't miss it and did hold short as we had a good idea to expect it from the chart. Likely an oversight due to frequent changes of configuration and signage due to construction. Put in a sign.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported construction related Taxiway T signage issues at ORD.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise flight at FL380 near the beginning of the OZZZI 1 RNAV arrival into ATL; told to descend to FL350. PM (Pilot Monitoring) set altitude selector to 35000 ft. and I pressed altitude intervene button. We descended to FL350 and were at that altitude for several minutes when the aircraft began to descend near WLLSN waypoint. There was a moment of disbelief and why is it descending and how is it descending when 35000 ft. is in the altitude window. I disengaged the autopilot and auto throttle to take control of the aircraft and climb back to FL350. Lowest altitude descended to was 34;600 ft.  After reestablishing autopilot and auto throttles back on at FL350 we tried to assess what had happened. Our top of descent point wasn't for another 80 to 100 nm; 35000 was in the altitude window and we were in VNAV path. We could not determine why the autopilot descended the aircraft at that time.


Second narrative: Aircraft descended from cruise altitude for no apparent reason. At FL350 approximately 30nm North of WILLSN intersection. Aircraft began to descend with no known input from crew. LNAV/VNAV engaged; FL350 in CRZ page and Mode Control Panel altitude window. Only indication was sound pitch change and aircraft movement. PF disengaged AP (Autopilot) and AT (Auto throttle); hand flew to correct. Bottomed out at approximately 34;600 ft. Once back at FL350 we rest Mode Control Panel; engaged AP/AT and aircraft performed normally remainder of flight. I have no idea why this occurred. All seemed normal before and after incident.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported excursion for level assigned altitude with autopilot engaged for no apparent reason.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I occupied the right seat of a PA-28R-200. We were flying into ZZZ and were descending out of 10;500 feet. Upon contacting tower; we were told to fly for a downwind to Rwy XX. At that time and around 5;500 MSL; [the student; pilot flying;] placed the gear switch into the down position; announced that he had three green; down and locked and then removed his hand.He finished running through the before landing checklist. He made a short base and then turned a long final. He had a stabilized approach from there. At about 3 miles out I rechecked the gear and it showed three green. He made a full stall landing and very shortly after the nose gear made contact with the runway the entire gear system collapsed.




Synopsis: PA-28R instructor reported the landing gear collapsed upon landing after observing normal gear down indications during the approach.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was assigned aircraft with MEL 31-XXc applied. Navigation Display 1 was inoperative. After considering that the first third of the flight was to overfly MVFR/IFR conditions; the first hour of the flight would be spent circumnavigating thunderstorms; and then the destination was LAX; with its complex and potentially shifting approaches; I elected to refuse the aircraft in this condition. I notified the Duty Pilot and maintenance and received a different airplane. I must emphasize that once I voiced my concern everyone involved was more than happy to help me. I couldn't help but wonder why the airplane flew for four days like that. The MEL allows this to go on for 10 days. Ironically; a jump seat has to [be] repaired in two days. The only mechanism in place to get the airplane fixed promptly is for the Captain to intervene. And I understanding after going through it; it can be somewhat intimidating. It makes sense to have an MEL in place in order to recover the aircraft from to [a maintenance base] under appropriate conditions. It's certainly not acceptable to allow the aircraft pass through [a maintenance base] without repairing it. In fact; the plane passed through five opportunities for repair without being addressed.  I can see how this would evolve. The first crew gets it to [a maintenance base] and passes it off to the second crew. The second crew sees it is all legal and that the first crew flew it; so it becomes a mission hack. But we do ourselves a disservice. I think it would be constructive if one of the crews called after their flight and said: 'Hey we just flew this thing in and you need to fix it for the next crew'. I believe our company would be responsive to this. And it would save time. I also think that this MEL should have a much tighter time limit: one or two legs. That should apply to 31-XXa; b; and c. And maintenance should have a more robust tracking system in place to support our Primary Flight Displays so they get fixed. By the way; XXc allows CAT II 1200RVR with the FOs ND out.




Synopsis: A-321 Captain reported refusing an aircraft because a Navigation Display had been deferred inoperative for four days; even though it had passed through maintenance facility stations multiple times.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing and exiting XXR on the reverse Taxiway XX we were cleared to cross XXL and contact Ground. As soon as we switched over to Ground Control; we heard our call sign and the instructions to taxi XX1; XX2. The First Officer read it back with clarification 'XX1; XX2; XX3 to the gate.' No correction was received. A short while later; while we were on XX1; we heard a Company flight get tersely queried; 'Why aren't you moving?' The Company flight stated they were doing what they were told. The Controller replied; 'No you're not.' A quick back and forth argument ensued. We made our turn on XX2 and then XX3 and held behind the 'offending' Company aircraft. Shortly after we heard 'XXXX what are YOU doing?' We replied with the clearance as we understood it (and read back). ATC said (again tersely) 'No; you guys must've taken each other's calls....' He then cleared us to taxi to the gate as able. It was very busy on frequency and the whole thing was easily sorted. There were no traffic conflicts (maybe just an efficiency hit in the whole operation). I write this report because the Controller was very perturbed; and who knows; maybe we did make an error. In fairness to the Controller; I wasn't paying attention to the other call sign. It might have been similar; which would be a potential explanation. That said....1. Our read back was not corrected2. The other Company flight clearly didn't take our clearance either; as they never moved.3. The above combined makes me think the Controller might have been the confused party.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported confusion with an ATC ground clearance and possible Controller personality related problems.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other During Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An A300 aircraft arrived at the Station with one pilot write-up: # 1 Engine High Pressure Bleed Valve (HPBV) faulted after takeoff from ZZZ1. Repeat write-up. MEL 36-11-03 requires manual lock-out of HP Valve and associated thrust reverser deactivation. The final steps of thrust reverser deactivation; MEL 78-30-01-A include removing electrical connector from directional pilot valve pressure switch. This step had not been accomplished and on takeoff roll; crew was alerted of an associated thrust reverser pressurized fault on the ECAM and aircraft returned to gate. [This is a] one man station [and aircraft had a] short ground time. [Mechanic faced] routine distractions [and was] trying to avoid delay. [Mechanic should] take the time needed to accomplish each published step; self check each published step; avoid distractions [and if needed] take delay.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports an A300 aircraft returned to gate after aborting a takeoff roll due to an engine thrust reverser pressurized fault indication on their ECAM for #1 Engine. Technician noted he had failed to remove an electrical connector from the directional pilot valve pressure switch on #1 Engine that was a requirement to defer a High Pressure Bleed Valve (HPBV) fault.
Date: 201601
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Aircraft component: First Aid Equipment; with Medical Kit & Defibrillator
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I submitted a report regarding the relocation of the First Aid Kit on the 737-700 fleet. The First Aid Kit (FAK) has been relocated to compartment C-10. After takeoff; this new location caught my attention causing me to wonder if I would be able to retrieve this piece of emergency equipment because of the close proximity to the slide bussel on the door. I tried to take the FAK out of the compartment and was unable to do so. I brought this to the attention of my crew members who also tried and did not succeed. Upon arrival and after all customers deplaned I tried again and was able to retrieve the FAK with the door open. I have since flown on other 737-700s and encountered the same issue.




Synopsis: B737-700 Flight Attendant reported that the new storage location for the emergency medical kit does not allow the kit to be accessed in flight due to conflict with the slide bustle when the door is closed.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Fuel Filter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had not flown in 5 days and had multiple discrepancies that were found by pilots and flight attendants delaying the departure by over 2 hours. On departure; received a L ENG FUEL FILT message on the EICAS. [Relief Officer] ran the checklist as we asked to be vectored by ATC as we ran checklists; communicated with dispatch; flight attendants; passengers and ATC. We were 60;000 lbs over max landing weight so we put the flaps to 20 degrees and the gear down to begin to burn down the fuel. We ran the checklist for ENGINE FUEL FILTER which stated 'Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport'. Because the checklist also referenced the possibility of an engine flameout due to fuel contamination the decision was made to not dump fuel and to land the airplane sooner rather than later in an overweight condition. We ran the Overweight Landing checklist that directed us to land flaps 25 due to our Flaps 30 approach speed (162 kts) being within 10 kts of the flap placard speed of 170 kts. The [relief officer] reviewed the landing distance and determined it would be 6;400 feet for a landing weight of 367;000 lbs. We elected to use the longest runway and utilized the visual approach backed up by the LOC instrument approach. No autobrakes were selected and it was a very soft touchdown by the captain. Brakes were not applied until below 60 kts with 2;000 feet remaining. We cleared the runway and stopped to have the brake temperatures inspected by the ARFF. (the parking brake was not set during the inspection) After the inspection was completed and we were certain there was no danger to the aircraft the ARFF were cleared from around the aircraft and we continued our taxi to our gate.


Second narrative: At rotation observed L ENG FUEL FILTER ICAS message; notified company; briefed Flight Attendant (FA) and passengers; accomplished all QRH required and appropriate checklists; performed and overweight landing at departure airport. Landed without further events.


Synopsis: A B767-300 flight crew experiences a L ENG FUEL FILT message on the EICAS just after liftoff. The QRH procedure for this message states 'land at the nearest suitable airport'. The crew elects to return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were told to line up and wait on Runway 8R and were told to be ready to go so that they could get more departures out. We got into position and then were cleared for takeoff. The aircraft ahead of us had just rotated and was airborne. We then began our takeoff. The F/O (First Officer) called 80 knots and after that call we saw and heard the 'Windshear Ahead Warning.' I rejected the takeoff and simultaneously told the F/O that we were rejecting. We informed Tower immediately of our rejection on the runway. We then cleared off to the right and stopped on Taxiway Delta. I informed the passengers that we had rejected the takeoff due to a Windshear Warning and that the aircraft was under control. We ran the brake cooling numbers to determine if we could return to the gate or not. We could. I contacted the Chief Pilot and explained the situation. After taking a breath; we reviewed our procedures to see if we missed anything. I informed the passengers that we would be returning to the gate. At the gate; I talked to the Chief Pilot and Maintenance. Additionally; I went to the cabin and spoke to the passengers face to face and explained what happened. After that; we were replaced and deadheaded back to ZZZ.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported rejecting takeoff after receiving a wind shear warning.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were on the [SID] from [the Airport]. We took off in LNAV; which I verified silently at 400 FT because the Captain doesn't make any calls or communicate in any way. Sometime between 400 FT and when we were supposed to start the turn (at 1.8 DME); the Captain tried to press Level Change but inadvertently selected HEADING mode. Since the autopilot was on; the aircraft followed runway heading and didn't make the turn. I was calling Departure and didn't notice that he had changed modes. When we realized the error; he started a turn to heading 123; but since we had started the turn fairly late; we were still off course. During the turn; we got an RA for traffic; but it was not an issue. ATC never said anything to us about the error and eventually gave us a turn to another heading.Some communication between Crew Members would have been helpful. This Captain likes to press a lot of buttons and never keep the First Officer in the loop on what he's working on.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported that during climb; the Captain tried to press Level Change; but the Captain accidentally pressed Heading Mode Instead.