elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We landed Runway 10 at ORD and exited runway at M3; taxied east on Taxiway M to ZV then turned north where we were in a line behind 4 heavy jets; and one under tow from international terminal. We were stopped with parking brake set on Taxiway ZV pointing north with our nose half way onto the Delta Taxiway. We were waiting for traffic to move in front of us northbound so that we could continue; and that was our clearance from ORD Ground Control. After a few minutes a CRJ aircraft had landed on Runway 4R at ORD and exited at the end and now was taxiing west on Delta Taxiway; where we were currently stopped on waiting for traffic to move. This flight (did not get the flight number) was taxiing westbound at a speed in excess of 35 KTS I believe; and taxied past in front of us so close that his wing tip; with winglet sticking straight up; passed less than 3 feet from our nose cone. We could see the Captain in the window so clearly; as he was looking right at us as he taxied by. This clearly was an unsafe operation on his account; and he nearly caused a collision with us; and there was nothing we could do as we were stopped with the parking brake set. This was willful and an unsafe operation.




Synopsis: An air carrier was waiting at the end of an aircraft line on Taxiway ZV when an regional jet on Taxiway D taxied between his nose and another aircraft; creating an unsafe near collision situation.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After the doors were closed; I am just prior to engine start at the gate. The Gate Agent trying to get my attention by knocking on the rear Captain's side window. He knocked no more than three times and the window shattered. I believe he did nothing wrong as many gate agents do this when they try to get your attention obviously was a defect in the window.




Synopsis: A320 pilot reported that the Cockpit window shattered after the Gate Agent tapped on it.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Aircraft was dispatched with the right HPSOV closed. MEL stated that the HPSOV EICAS caution and BLEED lights would illuminate during high power settings. Shortly before level-off and during cruise the HPSOV EICAS caution light and BLEED light both illuminated and stayed illuminated. Since cruise would not be considered a high power setting we contacted Maintenance and Dispatch. They were of little assistance so we complied with the QRH; declared an emergency and returned to base.




Synopsis: B767-300 pilot reports being dispatched with the right HPSOV MEL'd and wired closed. In cruise the right bleed light illuminates along with an EICAS HPSOV caution. Maintenance can provide no insight and the crew elects to return to departure airport.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Second aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During the landing flare and low energy regime (less than 50 FT) our right wing dropped. This could have been due to wake turbulence from the Airbus that landed before us. I recovered by leveling the wings and starting to flare. Under 10 feet in the landing flare the Stick Shaker shook. We landed without incident. Despite calm surface winds there were plenty of updrafts on final. They may have existed over the runway as well. That coupled with a little wake leftover from the Airbus may have contributed to our right wing drop; which then resulted in a loss of airspeed during my recovery; leading to a shaker.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported possible wake vortex encounter in trail of an Airbus that led to a low altitude stick shaker.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight on Autopilot 'A;' I applied forward control column pressure; expecting control wheel pitch mode to engage. What I got was manual pitch with autopilot disengagement and an abruptly sharp disconnect on the control column. After reengagement I tried Autopilot 'B' and received the exact same response. Neither autopilot would default to control wheel pitch or steering mode. I also tried turning the control column and got the same abrupt autopilot disconnect. There was no amber indication of CWS or CWP on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator). I engaged the Autopilot again and selected CWS by the switch. The result was exactly what it was supposed to be. It released the control column smoothly and defaulted on the FMA as CWS-S/P. This is now the fifth aircraft that I have written up with the exact same conditions. I have found that all B737-700s work correctly. I am noticing that all -800s and MAXs operate the same. It seems to either be; I do not understand the system or there is a problem with CWS/P Autopilot system on these two aircraft. I have not found one B737-800 or MAX that operates the way it is described in the [Flight Manual]. The feeling on the control column is as though the pilot is fighting against the autopilot. A Pilot will have no indication that anything is wrong until they try to use it. Autopilot operates normally. Somebody needs to either change the books; or we need Maintenance to look at all -800's [and] MAX's and fix the issue. Something is not letting the flight controls release. I hope a cable does not break in flight.

Callback: Reporter stated Maintenance found the Flight Manual was incorrect; and the -800 and MAX aircraft do not revert to CWS when pressure is applied to yoke with autopilot on; they respond with autopilot disconnect; and this was not properly spelled out in the manual.  Manual is being corrected at this time.



Synopsis: Captain reported the B737-800 and B737 MAX autopilots do not function as expected in certain modes of flight.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On our flight deck preflight; we noticed the MAINT light illuminated and initially thought that was a problem. However; after some discussion and after it went out when starting engines; we decided all was fine. On landing we got a Master Caution and overhead light on rollout along with the MAINT light. As we investigated further we discovered that our initial concerns on preflight were correct. The MAINT light should be extinguished on preflight. If on it is designed to go out at engine start; (though I don't know why if it is non-dispatchable) and return 30 seconds after landing. Neither of us has much experience in the MAX and that definitely played a part in our errors. Flying the MAX more frequently would help.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 MAX flight crew reported departing with a maintenance item that should have been addressed before departure.  Unfamiliarity with the MAX reportedly played a part in the incident.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff the First Officer and I lost the first and third windows of the Flight Mode Annunciations; both flight directors locked up and the autothrottle and autopilot would not engage. Both Digital Flight Guidance System 1 and 2 were tested. It was immediately obvious that we would not be able to navigate because the two Digital Flight Guidance systems were commanding different headings. I was concerned that I would also lose both Primary Flight Displays and their Primary Gyros. We declared an emergency; requested and received radar vectors hand flying back to our departure airfield with compass; altimeter and VSI for a landing. For the safety of my passengers; crew and I decided to land 5;000 LBS overweight rather than risk losing both primary flight gyros also. This was the second time in three days this happened to this aircraft.




Synopsis: After departure MD-83 crew declared an emergency due to Flight Guidance System issues; returned to the departure airport and landed overweight.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Current air carrier scheduling practices allow for trip sequences (pairings) to be constructed that may not be consistent with the Fatigue Risk Mitigation Plan (FRMP). A demanding pairing was competed. Fatigue was declared for a subsequent pairing. Through the generation of required air carrier internal reports for that declaration; I became aware of an inconsistency between the flight time/duty time regulations governing this pairing and our newly implemented Fatigue Risk Mitigation Plan (FRMP). This inconsistency has been reported to the airline; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the department of transportation.




Synopsis: An A320 Captain refused a trip because after flying a trip the subsequent trip was not constructed in accordance with the FAA Fatigue Risk Mitigation Plan (FRMP).
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This report is in regards to a possible weight and balance error. After MCD was closed and pushback from gate; we were contacted by operations that one additional (late) bag came from TSA for our flight. The baggage tug drove out to where we were pushed back. It looked like a heavy bag. However; the Captain (CA) Pilot in Command (PIC) decided not to load the late bag. His reason being the CRJ ER would reset the out time and indicate a late departure; when the cargo door is opened. The ramp understood and assured the late bag would be sent later and make final destination; eventually.After an on time departure during cruise climb we received an ACARS message from [dispatch] indicating the ramp made an error reporting the bag count. The cargo load report initially had a total of 76 bags. The update from [dispatch] had an updated; actual total of 54 bags. Also; the bags zone placement was much different than the original CLR paperwork count. I did a paper weight and balance calculation. The aircraft was not out of CG and not over Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight (MGTW). The CA/PIC was advised; and the flight continued without further interruption or contact from [dispatch]. This was basically a full passenger flight in a CRJ ER aircraft. On take-off; I did not notice any unusual trim forces. The aircraft handled perfectly. Nonetheless; I would recommend our customer service management and ramp management is properly notified.




Synopsis: First Officer reported being notified in flight of changes to the weight manifest.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Normal ground operations; approaching Taxiway WP from Taxiway NB Tower cleared us for takeoff. On Taxiway WC approaching Runway 15R; the Tower Controller asked if we could 'take it on the roll' and we responded 'affirmative'. I lined the aircraft up on the runway and transferred aircraft control to First Officer (his flying leg); he advanced the throttles to FLEX MCT and we made the appropriate call outs. Immediately thereafter; the red stop lights bracketing the runway centerline illuminated. We immediately aborted the takeoff at airspeed of 40-50 kts.; the auto brakes did not engage. A couple of seconds later the Tower Controller said 'cancel takeoff clearance; exit at next right turnoff.' The delay between stop light illumination and the 'cancel takeoff clearance' call was excessive and the Tower Controller talked very fast while directing exit instructions. We complied with an exit at Taxiway WQ. We made an announcement; reset the FMGC per the QRH; re-ran the before takeoff checklist; and held short of Runway 15 on Taxiway WC on the West side.We queried the Tower Controller as to why the stop lights illuminated; and he responded there was an aircraft on final for Runway 09 at less than 1.6 miles when we initiated the takeoff roll; the stop light illumination was automatic. We delayed another takeoff for approximately 10 minutes; the brake temperatures on the left side were right at 300 degrees. I made the decision to allow them to cool a bit for a downward temperature trend before taking off again; I did not want to risk a brake ECAM on the next takeoff roll. The subsequent takeoff was uneventful.While we were waiting; it did not appear that the aircraft takeoff queue was excessively busy; it was not that busy when we took the runway the first time. My thoughts are 'what's the big rush'; especially with the controller knowing the automatic function of the stop lights.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported seeing red stop lights bracketing the runway; resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CMH.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C CMH
ATC / advisory: Tower CMH
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was Pilot Flying a visual approach into CMH Runway 10R. At about 500 feet AGL; FO keyed mic and told Tower there was a drone underneath our aircraft at about 200 feet and there was no conflict. We landed uneventfully. I never saw the drone.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported his First Officer spotted a drone operating about 300 feet below them; at approximately 200 feet AGL; while on visual approach to CMH Runway 10R.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: KLS.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF KLS
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was landing at KLS on runway 30 with winds 270 at 13. As I turned from base on to final; I was a little high; so I added full flaps and reduced power to get back on the glide path. My approach speed was 70 mph and I was slipping into the wind for the landing. When I began to flare at 65 mph; the left wing dipped even more and the aircraft began to go to the left. I made the mistake of trying to level the wings and compounded it by not applying more right rudder. The plane got hit with a gust from the left side and it lifted the aircraft up; to the right; then back down. I tried to lower the left wing with the ailerons and pulled back on the elevator; but it was too little too late. The aircraft landed on the right main and nose wheels; and I heard the ringing sound of the prop hitting the runway. The strike did not stop the engine and damaged only the very ends of the prop so I was able to regain control and taxi off the runway.Contributing factors:There was a row of trees of varying height about 500 ft away from and parallel to the runway. When the owner of the flight school flew down to pick me up; he explained how the wind blowing over the trees and on to the runway could have cause a 'roll' or 'eddy' effect which may have caused the dipping/lifting of the left wing.What can be done to prevent a recurrence:I would practice slip landings; both with my instructor and solo; on a more consistent basis. I would practice them on days with and without crosswinds to reinforce the techniques; build muscle memory and improve reaction times. If the runways allow; I would use slightly more airspeed and less flaps on crosswind landings. I would become much more knowledgeable about where obstructions are and what impact they can have on the winds.




Synopsis: C172 student pilot reported experiencing a prop strike during a landing in gusty winds at KLS.