elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HLN.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower HLN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working combined Local and Ground control. I had one VFR aircraft in the traffic pattern; and one VFR aircraft doing a run-up; holding short of the runway. Approach control informed me of an inbound IFR Aircraft; who upon reporting a 10 mile final; will be shipped to me. Relief came and I informed the relieving controller of the two VFR aircraft and the inbound IFR Aircraft who will be shipped over on a 10 mile final. During the overlap period; I observed the Aircraft rolling out on the runway; still on Approach frequency and without a landing clearance. The Aircraft had missed his 10 mile final report with Approach.Tower and Approach control are entirely NON-RADAR. Approach relies on pilot reports of position in order to pass traffic to the next controller. There was no way to observe the Aircraft missing his report. Scanning helps; but the white Aircraft was difficult to see with clouds behind him. When you can see the aircraft; it is often just a few miles from the airport; which may be close enough to interfere with aircraft in the traffic pattern. This facility needs a form of Radar or surveillance to eliminate the need for pilot reports; which are often bad; incomplete; or missing.


Second narrative: During descent we were advised to proceed direct to [the] IAF on the ILS-Z Approach. Descending through approximately 14;000 feet we advised the approach controller that the airport was in sight. We were told to continue on the present heading until below 12;000 feet and then turn to the final approach course. During this process we noticed that our COM 1 radio appeared to have failed. At approximately the same time we received a query from the controller asking whether we had UHF COM equipment on board. As a crew we were both confused and distracted by the simultaneous COM1 problem and query about UHF COM equipment. Very shortly afterward we landed; and the ground controller asked us to call the tower for a possible pilot deviation. During the telephone discussion; we were informed that we had landed without a landing clearance.


Synopsis: Controllers and a Corporate pilot reported the pilot landed without a clearance.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft was unstable during night visual backed up with RNAV; go-around was initiated with a left pattern to a landing.Pilot monitoring detected the unstable approach near the final approach fix due to speed; configuration and altitude above the glidepath as out of reasonable parameters to complete a stable approach and landing.Pilot flying was too high; fast and configured too late for a stabilized approach. Guidance was full scale and PAPI was all white outside and just inside the final approach fix. Vertical speed was 1;000 FPM with no apparent capture of the glidepath. The pilot flying increased descent rate to 1;500 FPM and we were at 1;200 feet. I (pilot monitoring) immediately called for a go-around. The pilot flying did not respond; I called for it again and it was finally initiated. We climbed to 2;000 feet MSL and flew a left pattern for another approach. The landing was normal except that I had to intervene by adding thrust during the round out and flare.Called for go-around and pilot flying performed after second command. The pilot flying is new to the line and would benefit from more training by an OE instructor.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported initiating a go-around due to an unstable approach.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Outflow Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After leveling at cruise for a few [minutes]; got a Cabin Alt. caution msg. After getting some of the QRH done and starting down; got Cabin Alt. warning message. [Advised ATC] and diverted to ZZZ. The smell from the O2 canisters smelled like there may have been a fire. It took a few mins. to figure out it was just the O2 canisters making the smell. After landing had fire and rescue inspect aircraft. Taxied to the gate. Talked to [passengers] to let them know basically what happened. Asked if anyone needed help by paramedics on the airplane and all said no. So we let the [passengers] know that everyone would be [checked] out by paramedics in the gate area once they all deplaned. Everyone checked out ok is what I was told. Before leaving the gate in ZZZ1 had to get my O2 mask replaced because it would not test. Need to make sure every pilot knows how to pre-flight/check the O2 mask the correct way. Some [passengers] said they could not get their O2 mask to work. FA (Flight Attendant) tried to help and could not get O2 to come out [of] the [passenger's] mask. FWD FA O2 mask could not get O2 [to] come out. Even after being tested by [Maintenance] and the canisters got hot; it is not a sure way of telling that O2 came out of the mask or not. The auto 1st class PA did not work when the O2 mask deployed is what I was told by the FA's. [Cause of incident] appears [to be] the outflow valve opened.After an event there is way too many phone calls. Makes things way too confusing. Understand calling Dispatch and Maintenance. Had to answer so many question right off the bat from the company did not have time to finish the write ups and had to go back to finish. This brings another point to mind. If something comes out on [Company Document] lets say at midnight the pilot is responsible for the pages of info on their [flight]; lets say at 6 am. This is not realistic and needs to addressed. Need to give a minimum of 5 days for a pilot; mechanic; and/or FA to be able to understand the info NOT just checking a box. The pilots are responsible if they get a line check to have [Company Document] up to date or pulled off line. This is NOT safe.Always check your O2 mask before leaving the gate. Need to make sure every pilot knows how to preflight/ check the O2 mask the correct way.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain flying CRJ-701 aircraft reported inflight de-pressurization.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After a normal takeoff; 25 NM east of the airport; while climbing through 13;000 feet the cabin altitude warning horn went off and the cabin showed 10;100 feet with a pip rate surge from 300 FPM to 1;500 FPM. The flight attendants in the aft galley reported an excessive noise level from the doors. We immediately notified ATC and descended back to 10;000 feet. The AUTOFAIL light was on; but went out back at 10;000 feet and the pip changes were normal; but the noise level only dropped by half in the aft galley according to the flight attendants. Therefore; in the name of safety and with most of the late night trip ahead of us; we decided to divert back into the departure airport for maintenance. The AUTOFAIL light again came on during the final approach phase and since we were out of position for a non-routine landing on 6L; we went around and completed an ILS approach to 6L. The AUTOFAIL light cycled on and off 2 more times. We made a routine safe; smooth overweight landing at 148.0 lbs. and wrote it up along with the auto fail pressurization. We checked the QRH Cabin altitude horn exceedence; AUTOFAIL light on intermittently; Off Schedule Descent and the unpressurized landing procedure; as a precaution; because of the intermittent nature of the pressurization controller/system and warning light. Maintenance was able to resolve the issues on the ground and we departed later and completed a routine flight.




Synopsis: During climb at 13;000 feet; a B737 Cabin Altitude Warning Horn alerted with the cabin at 10;100 feet; so the crew descend to 10;000 feet and with AUTOFAIL light cycling; declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport for an overweight landing.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RWI.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Small Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was OJTI at [multiple sectors] combined. Aircraft X came off RWI VFR looking for IFR to the west. Ceilings were low; so they stayed low to avoid. The MIA (Minimum Instrument Altitude) at RWI is 2;000. The pilot got his code assignment several times; but once he got it right; my developmental cleared them on course as filed and climbed. At that time they were at 2;500; and the MIA rose in that area to 3;200 due to a large antenna. I observed that the plane was a mile north of the antenna; and the flight was not in danger. Aircraft X then climbed unusually slowly to the west out of the high MIA.Stay on top of the trainee and don't let them do anything stupid.




Synopsis: ZDC Controller reported an aircraft was below the Minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: R90.TRACON, NE
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E R90
ATC / advisory: TRACON R90
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X; called 6 miles west of ZZZ airport. He was given a beacon code.  Aircraft Y; was on a converging course 3 miles from Aircraft X at the time. I told Aircraft X to remain outside of Charlie airspace which would have eliminated the need to issue him a traffic alert reference Aircraft Y on a converging course. And; it would have permitted Aircraft Y to proceed directly to his hospital pad. Aircraft X failed to answer the remain outside of Charlie airspace instructions and several of the same instructions over the course of the next 2 minutes. I issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y with a resolution to proceed no further eastbound due to NORDO Aircraft X traffic 10 o'clock and one mile on a converging course with no reported altitude; no mode-C; and no reported route of flight; destination or intentions. Aircraft Y took the evasive turn away from Aircraft X. 2 minutes later; Aircraft X reported 'over downtown' and requesting to fly to ZZZ1 airport. At that point communication was re-established with Aircraft X. Traffic volume/complexity was clearly high enough to have split the position. But; that being acknowledged; even if Aircraft X had his own dedicated frequency; the fact remains he went NORDO and the events would've transpired the same. R90 has seen other incidents like this over the busy summer season with pilots who call approach control; get a beacon code; then go NORDO. This pilot was contacted by the FLM and said he has a bad radio. The FLM correctly told the pilot not to fly near the Charlie airspace until he gets his radio repaired. My recommendation would be that pilots be made aware that claiming NORDO is not a get out of jail free card. Either they are knowingly flying with a bad radio which is dangerous. Or; they are choosing not to follow ATC instructions that they don't want to follow (remain outside of Charlie; altitude restriction; etc.). And; when you engage the pilot in a discussion about the failure to comply; they say 'I went NORDO' or 'I didn't hear you tell me to . . .' In other words there seems to be a perfect understanding by pilots that they need to establish two-way radio contact with ATC. But; there is not a belief that maintaining two-way radio contact and following ATC instructions is just as important.




Synopsis: R90 Controller reports of a conflict between a NORDO aircraft and a lifeguard aircraft.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the Relief Pilot on [the] flight. The preflight; taxi out; and takeoff were uneventful. I went on first break. About 20 minutes into my break; I was woken up by the galley Flight Attendant; and was told I was needed in the cockpit; and we were returning to [departure airport.] I returned to the cockpit with the Purser; who wanted to be briefed by the Captain on what to expect. On returning to the cockpit; I found the aircraft at FL350. The First Officer was starting to run the Low Oil Pressure Checklist on the Left engine. He ran that checklist; [and] then I helped him with the Drift Down checklist. During that time; I noted the Left engine had zero oil quantity; and wind milling oil pressure of about 7 psi. The Captain obtained clearance to descend and return direct [departure airport.] I briefed the Purser initially; as the Captain was still busy; [and] then he finished filling her in on our situation. We started dumping fuel per that checklist. The Captain asked me to check the diversion guide in the FOM for anything we may have missed. We all discussed the approach and landing; and cleared up a few minor confusions about the checklist. The Captain made the initial PA to the cabin; and I followed that up with a few more; as the situation warranted. We finished dumping fuel; and started the Fuel Imbalance checklist. Set up for the Visual Approach. All the normal and irregular checklists and procedures were finished (except for the fuel crossfeed; which the Captain elected to continue to landing). We made a normal single engine landing; and taxied clear of the runway; and stopped crossfeeding. After the crash trucks checked the aircraft; we taxied to gate.




Synopsis: A B777 left engine LOW OIL PRESS alerted at cruise shortly after takeoff; so an emergency was declared; fuel dump begun; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BUY.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: CTAF BUY
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As PIC of a part 91 flight inbound to BUY; I approached the departure end of the runway while believing it was the approach end in operation. My calls on CTAF were acknowledged and another aircraft was following me on approach. In my rush to keep distance in initial descent and final phases of flight I flew the final for Runway 6 at BUY; rather than 24 while making calls indicating Runway 24. Two aircraft were holding short of the active and waiting to depart on Runway 24. The number 1 aircraft was a large private jet. After I called missed and side stepped the active and made the go around call on CTAF he acknowledged to me what occurred and let me know he had me in sight. There was never another aircraft on the runway departing into my flight path; nor on the active runway. I entered an immediate climb and side step maneuver and exited the airport environment to the north to clear traffic and begin the approach on the correct side of the airport.




Synopsis: A C172 pilot reported flying to the departure end of the active runway rather than the arrival end on a visual approach to BUY airport because of lack of situational awareness.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Guest boarded with a face shield only. Approached guest and inquired if she had a mask she could wear in compliance with the policy. Guest I guess was having a bad day but initially pushed back asking when that had started. Informed her we had started this policy on the [date] and we had masks on board to assist with. She indicated she had her own cloth mask.  Don't allow guest onboard without proper face masks. Makes it very difficult to work and gain complaints onboard.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be told to wear a mask while on board.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BUR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just prior to push; new ATIS came out which favored Runway 33 vs 15 for departure. Completed new takeoff data and called for taxi and was cleared by Ground to taxi to Runway 33 via Runway 26; with no hold short instructions. I taxied down 26 and I knew that I was not cleared to enter 33 but was unsure where to hold exactly as there is no hold short line painted on Runway 26 for Runway 33. Began to make a short left turn toward the departure end of 33 and as I was stopping at what looked like a hold short line; was told to stop there as well by Ground. We never crossed that line and there was no runway incursion; but after reviewing the airport diagram and company briefing pages; it appeares that was the hold short for 26 coming the other direction. Was cleared to switch to Tower and departed without incident. Not sure why we were cleared to taxi on 26 to 33 as there is no published taxiway to get to 33 other than back taxi on 33 which we were not cleared to do.  There was no further query from ATC on this event. I think to avoid this problem in the future with Runway 33 departures; all taxiing aircraft should be on the taxiway around the terminal which is properly marked with hold short lines.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports being cleared to taxi via Runway 26 to Runway 33 at BUR but is unsure of which hold line is the correct one for Runway 33. After takeoff it is determined that a runway incursion may have occurred.