elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute both Captain and First Officer iPads would not access the Jepp charts for the destination. When the destination was selected the Jepp APP would crash. I consulted with Dispatch and decided to activate an [airline wifi] account to receive emailed charts from dispatch. Dispatch sent me required charts for our destination via email. We proceeded to our filed destination and landed normally.I'm not sure what needs to be done to fix the iPad issue.




Synopsis: Both Captain's and First Officer's iPads could not access destination JEPP charts. Dispatch emailed the necessary destination charts to them inflight.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 'Fume event' [followed by immediate] air return.




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reported a 'fume event' on takeoff followed by immediate return to departure airport.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cabin crew reported burning smell in back of cabin. [Identified as an] emergency. Landed at ZZZ.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reported they executed an uneventful landing; after notification of 'burning smell' in passenger cabin.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MTPP.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C MTPP
ATC / advisory: TRACON MTPP
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I have done RNAV approach as published to Runway 28 in MTPP several times now and have reached the conclusion that the VNAV portion of the database for this approach is wrong. It has you coming in way too high on the approach and if you weren't in VMC conditions; this would cause huge issues. The FAA or someone in management needs to check this approach out as published. There is definitely something wrong with the VNAV programming for this approach. The course is fine; it just has you coming in way too high.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported the MTPP (PAP) RNAV Runway 28 final approach altitude as published in the FMC is too high and flight conditions other than VMC create a problem.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: It was my takeoff. On takeoff roll just after the 80 KTS call I heard increasing wind noise coming from the copilot sliding window. I notified Captain and he noticed that the latching handle was not in the stowed position; even though the window appeared closed. He took aircraft control and performed a rejected takeoff at approximately 90-95 KTS. We referenced the brake cooling charts and contacted Maintenance; Operations; and Dispatch. During the Before Starting Engines Checklist the handle was physically checked by myself and crosschecked by the Captain. The only thing I can come up with is that on taxi my headset cord became looped over the latching handle. I slid the cord back over the handle and may have inadvertently tapped the top of the handle and unlocked it. The handle must have slowly opened unnoticed during taxi and takeoff roll. In my opinion the button that is depressed on top of the handle seems very sensitive.


Second narrative: Captain should have been more focused on and briefed rejected takeoff criteria and speeds.


Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew reported that the First Officer window was noisy and unlatched on takeoff; leading to a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Snow
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the approach; we selected flaps to one and received a slats fail caution EICAS message along with a slats zero indication on the flight controls synoptic page. We ran the slats fail checklist and still; no slats; along with slats fail message. We notified Dispatch; Maintenance; the flight attendants and passengers. We declared an emergency with ATC and landed without further incident. At the time of the failure; we were in IMC conditions; no ice or rain observed. This is the second occurrence of this failure for me within a week.


Second narrative: While on final approach; when configuring the aircraft for landing; a 'Slats Fail' caution message was displayed when the Slat/Flap Selector was moved to the '1' position. At that time; the approach was discontinued and ATC was contacted and apprised of the situation. The emergency procedure checklist for 'Slats Fail' was executed; an emergency was declared with air traffic control; and the aircraft was landed in a modified configuration as designated in the emergency procedure.


Synopsis: A CRJ-700 EICAS alerted SLATS FAIL the Flap/Slat 1 was selected; so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and an uneventful landing completed.
Date: 202202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While taxiing to gate in ZZZ after landing the flight attendants informed us that they experienced a fume event shortly after passing 10;000 ft. on descent. All four flight attendants experienced fume exposure symptoms ranging from burning throat; dizziness or nausea. I asked if anyone needed medical assistance and they all said they did not.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being notified by the flight attendants of a fume event during descent. All flight attendants experienced physiological symptoms but no medical assistance was requested.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PIA.TRACON, IL
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON PIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather; Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we approached PIA in the descent; a strong line of thunderstorms had just crossed the field. We attempted to find a safe gap in the line to penetrate; but elected that it was safer to divert and let the weather pass. We attempted three or four times to contact our Dispatcher via ACARS. We received no response. I could not raise ATL Radio either due to our low elevation/radio coverage. My First Officer and I mutually agreed that nearby BMI would be the most suitable alternate to divert to. We diverted to BMI without Dispatcher concurrence/release amendment. Obviously; the solid line of impenetrable thunderstorms spanning from central Missouri to southern Wisconsin was a considerable threat. I; however; consider the lack of flight following oversight from the Dispatch side the greatest threat to this event. Not once did the Dispatcher contact us to update on the status of the line or the weather at our destination airport. Even as we queried our Dispatcher as we first encountered the line of weather we received no response. Several ACARS messages went unanswered including the one that stated our decision to divert to BMI. After landing; while holding short of the gate for departing traffic; we received the release amendment for the diversion from our Dispatcher via ACARS.




Synopsis: When a line of thunderstorms forced the CRJ-200 flight crew to divert from their destination they were unable to contact their Dispatcher to coordinate doing so.  Only after landing at their diversion airport and while awaiting access to their gate did an ACARS message arrive from Dispatch.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Clear; 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-24 Comanche
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cleared for takeoff; took the runway and accelerated; prior to flying speed gear motor prematurely engaged and the airplane settled onto the runway.




Synopsis: During takeoff roll the landing gear of the reporter's PA-24 retracted prematurely and settled to the runway.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAN.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LAN
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: After landing on Runway 28L we exited left onto Taxiway C for passenger pick-up; located on the 'TRANSIENT RAMP' on the airport diagram. Surface markings were partially obscured by a developing layer of frost early in the clear night. During flight planning I expected the ramp entrance to be a confusing entrance so we taxied slowly past Taxiway B and began a left turn near Taxiway C1 where the alert controller corrected us that we were to turn in at the next intersection. We turned left as instructed. Upon entering this area the taxiway lighting abruptly ended and marking and definition of the pavement edge was insufficient. We both assumed we had entered the ramp area and focused our attention on the Marshaller with lighted wands in the distance. The aircraft departed the short pavement stub/entrance to the west and all three wheels decelerated as they depressed into the soft sod. Days earlier the mostly frozen ground was subjected to rain and in some areas several inches of top soil had thawed. After shutdown and exiting the aircraft we contacted airfield operations to inform them of our position. Noteworthy items: After exiting the aircraft we noticed our right main landing gear had just missed a blue-topped plastic pavement edge marker; and another marker was in front of the aircraft. Although lighting from the hangar illuminated the ramp near the hangar; the lights had detrimental effects at our distance. The airfield diagram depicts continuous pavement between the terminal and FBO but this is not necessarily available for aircraft passage. Separate ramp entry points are necessary under current layout. Linemen and airfield maintenance personnel promptly returned our aircraft to the pavement undamaged.

Callback: Pilot reported when exiting taxiway C in the dark; the lighting ends and there are only reflective posts on the west side of the taxiway leading to the transient ramp.  Being there was ground frost; ground markings were obscured and the variance between concrete and grass was not discernable. Pilot suggested that lighting be extended to the ramp to aid navigating.



Synopsis: Captain reported a taxiway excursion while taxiing in the dark with limited airport lighting and ground frost conditions.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MIA
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing on 26R in MIA; and cleared to cross 26L; Ground instructed us to taxi to the gate via M and W to gate.  Turning onto taxiway W Aircraft Y flight that was told to give way to us; did not give way.  My FO (First Officer) was clearing the turn when he noticed Aircraft Y and directed me to stop.  I immediately and abruptly stopped the aircraft as Aircraft Y taxied by us.  Spacing was close and it didn't appear that Aircraft Y slowed down at all.  Ground admonished the Aircraft Y pilot and apologized to us.  I then called back to the Flight Attendants to make sure nobody was standing and to make sure no one was hurt.  I was told no one was up and that no one was hurt. I was taxiing slowly as we were very early arriving in MIA.  The FO was looking out the window during the turn and informed me as soon as he was able.  It's possible that Ground Control could have noticed this happening and given us a warning.  But; the Aircraft Y pilot should have yielded. This was a very close call.  Also; with my abrupt stop; people could have been hurt.  Maybe Ground Control could have made sure that the both aircraft were aware of each other.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with another air carrier while taxiing at MIA airport.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: S56.TRACON, UT
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: TRACON S56
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: SLC was in a South Flow configuration with level 1 to level 6 weather throughout S56 airspace creating a lot of weather deviations. Heavy rain; moderate turbulence and in-cloud lightning was reported by several aircraft throughout the evening. As I worked SLC arrivals on Stockton; I over heard the Jordan Controller; who was working straight-out departures from SLC; tell the FLM that his departures were deviating to the southwest (towards oncoming arrivals who were descending to 110; towards precipitous terrain with MVA's up to 127 and climbing to 100); prior to checking-in on frequency; below the MVA (60) with no coordination from SLC Tower. I believe the DC10 was the 4th or 5th departure that deviated. During these deviations I heard the FLM tell the Jordan Controller to advise the aircraft to; 'maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance'. It was obvious to me that the Jordan Controller did not believe this was a safe solution to the problem and placed his SLC 'straight out' departures on call-for-release/ hold-for-release. It was after the Jordan Controller did this that the S56 FLM and SLC FLM coordinated a different heading off the airport so aircraft on this routing could avoid this situation. I also overheard a controller suggest this while the Jordan Controller and FLM began initial discussions on the matter. The number of aircraft that were allowed to depart on a known unsafe route and the amount of time it took to create a safe solution was alarming and I don't think a Controller can or should tell an IFR aircraft who departed a controlled airport to maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance after they have departed; especially if you don't ask the aircraft if they have the terrain in sight prior to telling them. There was a large amount of uncertainty and confusion during this not-so complex situation and its obvious to me that there was a lack of leadership.




Synopsis: S56 Controller voiced concern regarding an unsafe condition when SLC departures were deviating for weather and entering MVA areas below the required altitude; the reporter questioning the actions of management decisions.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PDX.Tower, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were deiced at the gate and had a short taxi to Runway 28L at PDX airport.  Shortly after gear retraction the left engine began to have compressor stalls.  The throttle was retarded and the stalls stopped.  The First Officer and I discussed our options and possibilities.  I informed ATC that we were returning to the field and declared an emergency.  I requested ARFF to be standing by.  I briefed the Flight Attendants about our situation and made a PA to the passengers informing them we were returning to PDX due to an engine problem.  The First Officer and I briefed the approach and decided to use flaps 28 in case of an engine failure.  After completing checklists; we landed overweight.  The landing was smooth and I shut down the left engine after stopping on the runway.  I elected to remain on the runway until we were inspected by ARFF.  After we were advised of no fire or visible damage; we taxied to the gate and deplaned without further incident.




Synopsis: An MD80 experienced compressor stalls from the left engine after gear retraction.  The flight crew elected to declare an emergency and return to their departure airport.