elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME; Class E ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Staffing; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Area 2 at ZME was forced to work short staffed due to incompetence. Management here waited until mid-morning to attempt to cover the shift with overtime. There was no one available on the yes list and they knew it. They deliberately waited too long and did not assign overtime to someone on the 'NO' list. When we reported for the shift we were advised that not 1 but 2 controllers had called in that evening and offered to work. The supervisor denied them; telling them 'We have the shift covered.' By this they meant holding one CPC over and calling one in early. ZME is unique on the mid shift because we have a more traffic inbound and outbound. Weather developed and we were forced to open 3 sectors and have all three CPC's on duty at the same time. Two of us; myself included; worked over 4 hours and 6 hours with no break respectively with the 3rd going over 3 hours on position as well. Due to the weather the vast majority of transcontinental flights were allowed to deviate and fly through our airspace at the same time as the departure push. This was dangerous. The watch supervisor tried calling HQ for help and the airlines and we were afforded no relief. We were exhausted. We missed things. Aircraft and people were unsafe all to save $400. Safety is not a budget line item. The same thing happened the evening prior. Dismiss the supervisor responsible and retrain the rest.




Synopsis: Memphis Center Controller reported an avoidable short staffed shift where controllers went over 3 and 4 hours on position without breaks.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Engine Air Anti-Ice
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the takeoff roll in ZZZ with standard power set it seemed to me that the takeoff roll was a little longer than it should be. There was plenty of runway left and checking engine parameters I noticed the EPR readout on the EPR limit display was not steady and lower than it should be. I immediately pushed up the throttles to correct setting. Considering airspeed; runway remaining and aircraft performance it was safe to continue and safer than rejecting the takeoff. Immediately after takeoff the R Engine Heat Valve amber light on the overhead panel began to cycle off and on very rapidly along with the EPR readout. After assuring the power was set properly I turned on the R Engine heat and all indications showed normal for Engine heat on. I then turned R Engine heat off and all indications were normal for the rest of the flight. All of us know that on the airplanes the Engine heat valve slowly cycling on and off in cruise is almost a normal occurrence and is usually self-correcting before anything can be done; or performing the QRH procedure of cycling the switch has always corrected the problem. This is the first time in my experience it has happened other than cruise; and in my view on takeoff roll can be a very serious situation. I would hope that maintenance can solve this uncommanded engine heat valve problem.




Synopsis: A crew member in an MD-80 reported that takeoff roll seemed a little longer when he discovered #2 engine EPR was low.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After transfer of control between Ramp and Ground; we were instructed to taxi Runway XXR via [X;Y;Z;] cross Runway XYR and hold short of Runway XXR. Aircraft Z was taxiing into the ramp at [XY] and behind him Aircraft Y was taxiing on [Y]; neither we nor the Aircraft Y received instructions on who would be following who; and we had a converging course on the intersection of taxiways [X] and [Y]. After the Aircraft Y asked ATC if he was supposed to give way to us; the Controller stated 'I didn't suppose it was going to be a factor.' Both aircraft continued with our taxi without further inconvenience. The situation may have arisen because of the low level volume of operations due to the COVID-19 pandemics creating overconfidence; which might be a factor reducing the level of awareness of all people involved; further increased by multitasking (eg. ATC working as both Ground and Tower) at otherwise very busy airports.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported experiencing a ground conflict and cited reduced level of awareness due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the EWR4 SID off of Runway 4 we contacted departure after tower switched use. The initial controller gave use to climb to 5;000 ft. We responded with the altitude still on the SID. The same controller gave use a second climb instructions to 10;000 ft. and now we are turning west on the SID. We switched to the second controller and checked in still on the SID. He gave use a turn to 090 heading right turn. Then asked us why we are not on an assigned heading. We responded we never received a heading instructions. All four of us agreed we never heard a heading assignment on initial contact with departure. There was no aircraft conflict during the climb.




Synopsis: B777 pilot reported receiving confusing clearances from ATC while flying the EWR4 Departure procedure.
Date: 202201
Location: EGGX.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center CZQX
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Due to wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft and prevailing winds we elected to offset two miles to the left of track to keep us clear of the moderate turbulence. I had forgotten that SLOPing left of course is not authorized per the FOM. Sometime later; while I was on break; Gander Oceanic queried us as to why we were showing left of course and the Relief Pilot and First Officer corrected the error and returned to the center of the track. (SLOPing right of course would've put us back into the wake turbulence.)


Second narrative: During cruise we entered the wake of a proceeding aircraft causing 5 to 6 sec of moderate turbulence. I decided due to wind direction to SLOP left of course to get out of wake. Once clear though I maintained the 2L SLOP for what I would guess 20 minutes until queried by ATC to verify course. The Relief Pilot pointed out that a left SLOP was not authorized and I immediately corrected my course by deleting the left SLOP. The preceding aircraft was well clear.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported they improperly deviated left of course in oceanic airspace to avoid wake turbulence.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the MMUGS1 SID - we were given an initial altitude of 4;000 feet and we had leveled. Just before TTAPS; ATC cleared us to climb via the SID except maintain 16;000 feet. I set 16;000 feet in the altitude window and the captain who was hand flying asked for VNAV and started the climb.... I then saw the mistake; called 'altitude; altitude' and he immediately corrected. He climbed to 4;300 feet and then corrected. We crossed TTAPS at 4;000 feet and then continued the SID.

Callback: The reporter confirmed that the admonition to 'climb via the MMUGS SID; 'except maintain 4;000 feet' is now given to departures along with their takeoff clearance (the specific reference to 'maintain 4;000 feet' was not previously included in a flight's PDC clearance.) He further reported there has been a great deal of discussion and bulletins issued at his airline to combat the initial surge of many failures to maintain 4;000 feet and; as a result; the rate of deviations has dropped dramatically.

Second narrative: There was a lot going on [in the cockpit] just prior to departure and I had not familiarized myself with the SID and had never flown it before with the 'climb via' clearance. There is currently no way for me to preview or review charted procedures anymore until I am at my station on the flight deck; since we no longer have personal [charts] and have not received the electronic version in our I-PAD. Also; our flight plans do not have a filed SID listed; so we must wait until the PDC arrives to review it; which may be very late in the flight deck prep time before push. I am not completely sure of the spelling of the SID or the fix since I am relying on memory. I have no access to the plates outside of the flight deck.


Synopsis: Although they had been advised they were to maintain 4;000 feet with their takeoff clearance; the flight crew of a B757; already level at 4;000 feet departing IAH; when cleared to climb via the MMUGS RNAV SID as they were on course to TTAPS initiated a climb prior to reaching TTAPS which must be crossed at or below 4;000 feet.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Anomaly: Other fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Over an extended period
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I am a pilot for a large unscheduled fractional operator. The [company's] fatigue inducing schedules are almost impossible to manage. I was forced to call in fatigued this time because two days in a row my scheduled duty start time forced me to wake up at 0300 one day and 0200 the next. These times reflect the time zone where I live. The workload is not the issue. The problem is that I am constantly being shifted back and forth on duty start times and it creates a constant state of fatigue while I am on the road. There are no controls or safeguards for this at the scheduling level and it is up to the pilot to call in fatigued. The company fatigue policy is supposed to be a no questions asked policy; yet I have been called into Headquarters and asked why I have so many fatigue calls. This causes me to be uneasy about calling in fatigued and to push myself when I should not. Another issue I see a lot are very early duty start times--often between the 0300-0500 hour--with six to eight hours of sitting at the airport. After these very early wake ups and extensive sits I am often expected to fly another five or six hours. This causes fatigue. Management's practice of calling people into Headquarters about fatigue calls has also created a social stigma among the pilot group where; if one deviates from the statistical average of fatigue calls; he/she is deemed an 'abuser' of the policy. Because our company is an unscheduled operation and pilots cannot bid trips ahead of time; Schedulers often give certain pilots 'preferential treatment' with their schedules thereby skewing the fatigue numbers. This helps the company justify that only a few 'abuse' the fatigue policy by giving just a few the most 'fatiguing' schedules.




Synopsis: An HS-125 Captain for a fractional operator alleged coercion of some pilots to fly fatiguing schedules and preferential treatment for others to avoid the same; resulting in flight crews being compelled to fly when not fit to do so.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We landed on 34R; rolled up to H8; tested the braking and found it to be fair. Slowed to 10 KTS then started the turn onto Taxiway H. There was an aircraft southbound on H holding short for us. Tower told us to take either the reverse high speed or the easy turn and contact Ground. I elected to take the easy turn since the braking previous to our landing was fair to poor. I was doing about 5 KTS by the time I was halfway into the turn and the aircraft went into a very slow slide to the left that could not be stopped or corrected. After slowing to a stop we ended up turned 180 degrees from our original direction facing back toward the runway but still on the taxiway. We did not hit anything; burn any rubber or produce any g-loading. The cabin crew had no idea we slid because is was so slow and even. The Tower saw what happened and asked what the braking was on the taxiway. We responded that it was nil and they immediately stated that the airport was closed. We were instructed to stay where we were so we shut the engines off and ran the APU. We were told it might be a couple hours before we could get to the gate. We were told by another aircraft that tow bars had snapped trying to tow on the ice so decided to wait until the taxiway could be sanded and sprayed before we tried to get to the gate. Finally the taxiway was treated; tested and we were told we could proceed to the gate. There needs to be better monitoring of braking conditions on all surfaces during icing conditions on the ground. We were told the braking was fair to poor on the runway so I expected the taxiway to be about the same. That was not the case. The braking was nil and even though I was going very slowly the aircraft slid out of control. After our incident we were told that we were the second aircraft to slide. That would have been useful information to have. Despite my discussing the flight with my Dispatcher; I had no reservations about going since the weather stated light freezing rain. That is within the parameters required for landing so I was not overly concerned that we could complete the segment safely. However; I would in the future request that braking action reports be made available for all surfaces; not just the runways.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reports loosing control while taxiing on an icy taxiway at SLC. once the aircraft is stopped the crew waits for the taxiway to be sanded then taxis to the gate.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Container [DG] cargo not secured correct. Cargo not secured in container.




Synopsis: Airline Safety Officer reported Hazmat Procedural violation of unsecured DG container during arrival unloading at destination.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Rain
Aircraft: Super King Air 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B HOU
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was inbound on the ILS 13R approach descending from 3;000 feet inside of JABBS Intersection and was cleared to land on 13R. I misinterpreted my glide slope indication and believed that I was above the glide slope; but in fact was below it because I had not passed ROYCE Intersection yet (FAF). I descended below 2;000 feet early and received a low altitude alert from Hobby Tower. I immediately climbed back up and intercepted the glide path and continued inbound to a normal landing.I have recently transitioned into this aircraft and avionics system. It was my confusion in reading the glideslope indicator and loss of situational awareness that led me to believe I was high. More familiarity; vigilance and a better approach briefing to reinforce my situational awareness will prevent this from happening to me again. Hobby Tower assured me that there was no problem and I thanked them for their help.




Synopsis: BE-30 Captain reported ATC issued a low altitude on approach to HOU.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During the descent into DEN; I was aware of the fuel temperature and the fact that we were tankering a significant amount of fuel. I mentioned to the First Officer that we would not be loading much fuel to raise the fuel temp and would probably have CSFF [Cold Soaked Fuel Frost]; with probable de-ice requirements.  Fifteen minutes after arrival; I checked both wings and it appeared as if we had CSFF.  I planned on checking the condition of the wings prior to departure.  Due to a very early arrival and an already long (55 min) turn we had almost 1.5 hours in DEN.  I guess I had too much time on my hands; as I forgot to re-check the condition of the wings prior to departure. I realized my mistake after takeoff.  It is possible that I departed with cold soaked fuel frost on one or more wings; but I don't know.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: After landing with nearly full fuel tanks in just above freezing conditions the flight crew of a B737NG planned--but failed--to check the tops of the wings for cold soaked fuel frost prior to their subsequent takeoff.  A lengthy layover permitting intervening distractions may have been a contributing factor.