Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach; Descent
ATC / advisory: Tower SKBO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This was my third trip to SKBO. This was my First Officer's first trip to SKBO on the 757; but he had previously flown several trips to SKBO previously in the 737. During the initial descent on the Mariquita One Alpha (MQU1A) from MQU VOR; we were re-cleared by ATC to VULAM Intersection then direct to the BOG VOR. (This was possible intersection and STAR briefed by the check airman on my check flight 1 week earlier. So I wasn't too surprised by the new STAR. As we reprogramming the FMC to VULAM; we heard ATC clear the aircraft proceeding us direct to the BOG VOR and then to the VOR Charlie (C) to Runway 31 Right (R). When that aircraft requested an approach to either 13L or 13R; he was told; 'Sorry; that runway is below minimums.' When the previous aircraft asked for the current weather; he was told; again; the runway was below minimums and he was asked what his intentions were. ATC offered him the option of holding at the BOG VOR (anticipating that the WX would improve for Runway 13R or; again; a clearance for VOR C to Runway 31R. That aircraft stated that he would try that approach. ATC cleared the aircraft to complete one turn in holding at the VOR and then cleared him for the VOR C to Runway 31R. Having heard this conversation; I did a quick scramble to locate the VOR C to Runway 31R in my [charts.] At the same time; I asked First Officer to ask ATC exactly what the visibility was for 13R (it had a Cat II approach). ATC stated that the visibility was 200m (meters). The published minimums for the 13R CAT II are 350m. With both ILS approaches below minimums; the only options' open to us were the VOR C to Runway 31R; hold at the BOG VOR and wait for the visibility on the 13R to improve; or divert to Panama. Since we had sufficient gas to make either the VOR approach or hold; we began looking at the VOR C approach to Runway 31s. The first problem we encountered was that the VOR C approach to Runway 31R was NOT in the FMC. With the chart in hand; we began to build the approach; slow the aircraft for holding at BOG VOR and brief up the approach. In short; the VOR approach was only a 123 degree radial from the BOG to a 12.0 DME as final approach fix. We would then maneuver the aircraft for a visual approach from a downwind position northeast of the airport. (In short; a visual circling approach). I asked my First Officer if he was comfortable attempting the VOR approach to 31R. (I asked this question because neither one of us had flown nor reviewed the approach in any detail previously.) He pointed that the airport area was visually clear from where we were currently positioned (about 10 DME north of the BOG VOR). After a quick review of the approach; we requested the VOR C approach to Runway 31R. ATC then cleared us to the BOG VOR; one turn in holding; and then VOR C to Runway 31R. Our plan to fly the approach included: 1. 'Bingo' divert fuel to MPTO; planned alternate; was placed in Performance pages under RESERVES. If the 'Insufficient Fuel' light in the FMC illuminated and we were not either on final to landing or landing; we planned to divert to MPTO. 2. Slowing the aircraft and configuring; gear and 25 Flaps for a 160-180 KIAS approach from the BOG VOR. (Planned IAS over BOG [VOR] was set at 160 KIAS/12000MSL). 3. Start the descent from 12;000 feet MSL outbound from the BOG VOR on the 123 degree course. 4. Descend to 10;200 feet MSL; min altitude; using FLCH from 12;000 feet MSL. 5. At 12 DME off the BOG VOR; turn to a downwind heading of about 130 and descend to published SKBO airport traffic pattern altitude of 9;300 feet MSL. 6. Proceed on the downwind heading of about 130 until NO LATER than about 15 DME and then start the right turn toward base to final. (This would keep us within the restriction on not exceeding 18 DME of the BOG VOR.) 7. With the First Officer assistance in clearing the right circling turn to Runway 31R; start a descent to lose 500 feet on the base to final turn; arriving on final about 500-600 feetAGL. 8. Turn the turn to base to final; reduce speed to about 160 KIAS; 9. With the Runway 31R alignment; configure flaps to 30 and reduce to final approach speed. 10. Pick up the VASI/PAPI on the left side of Runway 31R and land. 11. That was the plan!  What actually happened was: 1. During the right turn from downwind to base to final turn; I delayed the descent as I was looking for the runway; the 520 foot tower obstruction (8;880 feet MSL) depicted on the plate; and the possible high terrain outside of the 18 DME BOG arc. 2. As we turned base to final; the main divided highway that runs parallel and to the right of Runway 31R is more brightly lit than the runway and was a distraction. 3. There are no lead-in lights; terminating light bars; strobes ('rabbits'); nor other runway end zone; or normal runway or overrun cues. Only the red runway end lights. 4. When we rolled out on final; we were high on the VASI/PAPI; which indicated all white. As I attempted to descend to capture the visual glide path; throttles idle; the IAS began increasing to about 20 KIAS above final approach speed (FAS); and the 'SINK RATE' alert started sounding. 5. After continuing the descent; seeing the IAS was still about 20 KIAS above FAS and with 2 additional 'SINK RATE' alerts; I told the First Officer we were going around. 6. I TOGA'ed the throttles; advanced the throttles; began a climb straight ahead; called for Flaps 20; got a positive rate; and called for Gear Up. 7. I then asked the First Officer to ask the Tower if we could continue with a right circle back to Runway 31R. Tower approved the right circle. 8. Climbing back up to 9;500 feet MSL; I made another turn to right down wind; base and final without incident. A normal landing on the VASI/PAPI was completed. 9. We landed in the touchdown zone but as we passed taxiway 'C' due to high speed (and did not attempt to exit the runway there) and approximately passing taxiway 'D' we went into thick fog on the runway. 10. We proceeded to the end of Runway 31R and slowly taxied back on Taxiway 'A' to the gate. 11. After parking at the gate; I made a PA to the passengers explaining that due to weather/fog we had to fly a different approach to SKBO; in this case to Runway 31R. The reason for the first missed approach was because we were not correctly lined up for landing; and a second approach was required. As I pointed out the fog outside the passenger windows; I reminded them to drive home safely. Problems noted after the flight: 1. VOR Runway 31R/L in not in the FMC which required us to build the approach in the FMC. We loaded the BOG [VOR] and the 123 course outbound with a planned manual back-up of raw data; using the VOR and course selected on the MCP and tracked on the HSI using Heading Select. 2. While building the approach; the Visual Approach prompt to Runway 31R; when selected gives you a 5 mile final. But that 5 mile final is beyond the 18.0 DME BOG VOR Arc restrictions for a visual flight path. (During the return flight to ZZZ; I rebuilt the Runway 31R approach and discovered selecting a 3 mile final would keep you within the 18.0 DME BOG VOR Arc.) 3. There is neither distance nor heading of 'R' (Romeo) from Runway 31R/L for reference. 4. During the missed approach; when I TOGA'ed the throttles; all FIXES in the FMC went away. A. 'R' went away and would not be available for the MAP (missed approach) in case we abandoned the second circling approach and elected to fly the published MAP or the second circling approach was denied by Tower. B. Both 'R' and 'ED' (the LOM) for the Engine Failure Procedure were put in the FIX pages during the initial approach briefing were also deleted during the MAP. 5. If during the second circling approach; we abandoned the approach; to fly to 'R'; it would have to be re-entered in the FIX pages. Recommendations: 1. Add all approaches carried in the [charts] for SKBO to the FMC data base. 2. Modify the FMC software so that when the aircraft goes MAP and the TOGA switch is pressed; the information on the FIX pages in the FMC are not deleted. 3. Publish the distance and position from 'R' from SKBO airport Runway 31R. 4. Publish the SKBO minimum traffic pattern altitude (9;500 feet MSL) again somewhere in the PLAN view of the airport. (Initially; we almost missed it in the approach notes as we discussed the approach and briefed 1;000 feet AGL (9;300 feet MSL) during the downwind circle.)




Synopsis: A B757 Captain describes an approach and go around to SKBO Runway 31R which is not in the FMC because the Runway 13 weather is below minimums.