Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: De-ice in DTW was dangerous and unsatisfactory and caused over a 4 hour delay.  (Required to return to gate for more fuel for DFW weather alternate change and allow passengers to deplane.)Other planes experienced the same unsupervised and inadequate service. We overheard other pilots receiving 'clear of ice' reports when the pilots could still see ice from within their aircraft. One plane received 3 clear reports before they were actually clear of ice.We had the same experience. After being told we were clear of ice and Type 4 was to be applied; another pilot from 2 spots away could see ice on our trailing edge. It took several times communicating through the de-ice radio person to get the de-icers to confirm and acknowledge the ice. We were told they would remove it. About this time; because of pilots' frustrations; the contractor's supervisor finally came to the pad.NOTE: After we returned to the gate; we found that our leading edge was still encased in clear ice. Also; the communications were through a central radio controller who passed the messages between the de-icers. The disconnect between us and the de-icers was cause for improper procedures and confirmations for not only basic de-ice communications but also flap and spoiler extensions/retractions for inspection; prior to type 4 application.After returning to the gate; I coordinated with local [company representative]; who provided a de-ice certified [manager] to assist along with the contractor supervisor to ensure proper de-ice and anti-ice services were performed at the 21R de-ice pad. After being de-iced and anti-iced properly by a new crew; we departed safely and returned to [destination] without incident.I was told that the contractor is merging companies and the former experienced manager in charge of de-ice ops was no longer with either company for last 6 months.  It was also relayed to our station that the de-ice shift crew that was improperly de-icing and giving inadequate inspections was new.  It is disconcerting to know in light of this information there was no adequate supervision until pilots began noticing their aircraft were be cleared with ice still adhering to their/our aircraft.Very experienced supervisors should be on the pad overseeing inexperienced de-icers. Inexperienced de-icers should be accompanied by experienced de-icers. Direct communications should be provided between de-icers and pilots.Central communications should be manned by an experienced de-icer; if direct communications are not possible.Better training for new de-icers




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported 'dangerous and unsatisfactory' de-ice procedures on his aircraft at DTW.