Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This concerns an airframe overspeed of approximately 5 KIAS for approximately 10 seconds that occurred at FL300 and .78 mach. We had experienced two issues on takeoff; the first of which required a low-speed RTO and the second involved no FLEX annunciation on the FMA. The FO and I were discussing these events on the climbout (above 10;000) and I was mentally focused on what had happened. Upon reaching our assigned cruise altitude of FL300 I checked that the aircraft had leveled out and I picked up my iPad to start reviewing reporting requirements; ARMS codes; etc. What I did not do was properly review the FMA indications. A few moments later we got a CRC; Master Warning; and aircraft overspeed annunciation. We were approximately 5 KIAS too fast. I immediately retarded the thrust levers (to an intermediate position; not idle) and deployed the speed brakes. As we slowed down I reset the thrust levers to Climb; retracted the speed brakes; and stabilized the aircraft at the desired speed. The FO and I discussed the situation and looked over the instruments. We both agreed that the engines had stayed at climb thrust after level-off and had not retarded to a lower cruise thrust setting; leading to our acceleration and overspeed. He observed that the autothrust was not engaged. We engaged the autothrust; confirmed proper cruise indications on the FMA; and resumed normal flight. We notified maintenance of the overspeed and made an AML entry.It is likely that the autothrust never engaged during takeoff. We did not get a FLEX indication on the FMA during takeoff roll. We were prepared for this since the previous crew had reported the same thing. I advanced the thrust levers to TOGA; the FO called TOGA set; and we continued for a normal takeoff. At some point during the early climb I did notice that there was no TOGA indication on the FMA. Discussing this later with the FO; he stated that he had confirmed TOGA (and proper engine thrust) on the ECAM displacement; but not on the FMA. My subsequent failure to confirm the cruise indications on the FMA lead to me not seeing that the aircraft was accelerating into an undesired state. I also think that lack of proficiency was a contributing factor. This was my third flight (second as PF) after seven weeks off. This is the longest I have ever not flown without a simulator refresher before returning to the line.Ensure that I confirm desired aircraft state on the FMA at every phase of flight.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an airframe overspeed in cruise that likely resulted from the autothrust not being engaged during takeoff. Captain noted that the failure to see the FMA indications resulted from a lack of proficiency and recency of flying.