elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [A coworker] and myself had been assigned to work the trip. We had been up to check on the plane and make sure everything was ok.The pilot then notified us of the problem with a slat repair and it had been 'cleared' but was not in the logbook correctly signed off and a placard was still on the dash above a panel notifying them of 'flight plan issues' The pilot was questioning this and wanted to know why the placard was still on the plane and it was signed off in the book? After reviewing the sign off there was not a reference [control] number; nor was entered in [the maintenance tracking system]. There was not a [control] number on the sign off neither. So the book was 'reviewed' with this not cleared.Before being able to clear the work it had to be found and verified being done.While looking for the signed offed work another [entry] was found to not be signed off correctly. So several items had been 'repaired' and either had not been 'cleared'; entered and not found on the review of the book and the pilots were about to just take the placard off the dash based on them calling 'dispatch' which told them to remove the placard.Looking at the logbook there was no way to verify anything was done [due] to the lack of review which then caused a possibility of multiple errors which continued to snowball.This first error was directly above the 'release' of the logbook with item not 'cleared' properly with the [control number] nor removal of the placard.Suggestions: Having a second person review the logbook; to catch errors.The facts that speed is what is important now with getting the planes in the air as fast as possible are showing the mistakes with people rushing and missing paper work which could cause a disaster.




Synopsis: B787 Mechanic reported flight crew identified aircraft repairs incorrectly documented in an aircraft logbook.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Aircraft component: Fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We experienced a high fan vibration (1.8 mils) on the left engine during climb to FL280.  Climbing through FL230 were cleared to climb to FL360; which was our filed cruise altitude.  Since we were heavy (>72;000 Lbs.) and it was warm (ISA+13C); I checked the altitude capability chart to ensure we had the thrust to climb to FL360.  While I was looking at the chart; the First Officer noticed the fan vibrations on the left engine; and pointed it out to me.  At that point it was still in the green (1.6 mils); but increasing.  When it hit 1.7 mils; I told the First Officer to get the QRH; and read the N1 Fan Vibration procedure.  As he was reading the procedure; the engine exceeded 1.7 and reached 1.8 mils; the first step into the yellow range.  Since we were approaching FL280; in compliance with the QRH procedure; I reduced the thrust on the engine and with ATC's concurrence; we leveled off at FL280.  The left engine vibration indication remained about 1.6 to 1.7 mils and we decelerated to Mach 0.70; which kept the left engine vibration indication at about 1.6 mils.  Since we had the vibration under control; the ITT; oil pressure; and oil temperature were all within normal limits; and heard; more than felt; the fan vibration; I opted NOT to shut down the engine; and to continue to destination.  Using ACARS; I contacted my Dispatcher; relayed the situation; and obtained the fuel burn and time for our aircraft weight; fuel on board; and Mach 0.70 cruise at FL280.  Since we had sufficient fuel on board for the reduced cruise altitude; and Mach; I chose to continue where we landed; and proceeded to the gate uneventfully.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain experiences fan vibration climbing to FL360 and elects to stop at FL280 and reduce thrust until vibration is below the caution range. Flight continues to destination and lands uneventfully.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PWT.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Other Training Center
Operating under: Other 61
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E PWT
ATC / advisory: CTAF PWT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Traffic on final called 3 miles. Student began to take [the runway] for takeoff with my approval. By the time student completed radio call and proceeded past hold short; aircraft on final called 1 mile. We stopped our aircraft and the approaching plane landed. We did not enter the runway; but we were past the hold short [line].




Synopsis: Flight instructor conducting a training flight at an uncontrolled airport reported crossing the runway hold line a short distance while another aircraft was on final.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-8
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Oil Cooler
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In preparation for an oil change; the aircraft was preflighted and flown to warm oil. Flight duration was 37 minutes. During flight all engine and aircraft parameters were normal. After shutdown while pushing back into hangar; oil was noticed dripping and puddling from the aircraft fuselage. Cowling removal showed the oil cooler ruptured and sprayed oil on lower cowl and firewall; with heavy streaming on the belly from the firewall to the tailwheel. Oil quantity from the streaming was sufficient to readily develop numerous puddles along the length of the fuselage. A review of the onboard electronic data log did not show any abnormal pressures. The highest value recorded for the entire flight was 86 PSI; well within design parameters for the engine and oil cooler. During preflight the dip stick indicated 4+ quarts oil. A post flight check indicated 2 quarts remaining. Post checks on the engine and oil system are not indicating any mechanical reason for a forced failure of the oil cooler. There are no signs of over pressure distortion anywhere on the unit; including the area of the leak. It is undetectable to the naked eye and can only be located by applying pressure to he unit. The flow pattern indicates this was an inflight failure that occurred in the last minutes prior to landing.




Synopsis: An RV-8 developed an oil cooler leak during flight which was only discovered after landing because of oil puddles. The cooler was a year old with in service time of 10.5 hours.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B787-800
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was cleared to land behind a Boeing 787. I was warned about wake turbulence and substantially extended my downwind leg for what felt at the time like a sufficient distance in order to avoid the wake turbulence. When I was approximately 20 ft AGL my plane made an uncommanded 30-45 degree roll to the right. I was able to recover using the go around procedure.At the time I thought that the high level of turbulence I was experiencing at traffic pattern altitude had been to blame but on further reflection the air near the surface was otherwise very calm. I believe that what I experienced was wake turbulence from the landing 787. I knew that I needed to give the 787 ~8 miles of separation but a review of my GPS data indicates that at best I had ~6 miles of separation. My lack of awareness about exactly how far I was from the landing AC made me rely on estimates that turned out to be incorrect. It would be helpful if ATC could give advisories about how far or long I needed to circle or extend to avoid the wake turbulence.




Synopsis: C172SP pilot reported encountering wake turbulence at 20 ft AGL in trail of a B787.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AUO.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF AUO
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After touching down on the 1000 foot marker the aircraft veered to the left; exiting the runway into the grass. I believe this was caused by a left crabbed attitude at the time of touchdown. Shortly after exiting the runway the aircraft struck a taxiway sign (A3) knocking it over. After crossing the taxiway we were able to get back on the runway and continue our taxi to the FBO where we did a visual inspection of the damage and reported the knocked over taxiway sign.




Synopsis: The pilot of a C172 experienced a runway excursion after landing and contacted a taxiway sign.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: ZSE ERAM; a Dispatcher filed an ICAO Flight Plan; when they called by phone to verify acceptance; it was discovered it had rejected. I made several attempts to correct and re-file the Flight Plan; using the AISR (Aeronautical Information System Replacement). After several attempts rejected; I manually entered the Flight Plan via the ERAM (at) workstation. The boxes are very small roughly 4 inches wide and 11 lines long for entry and 4 inches wide and a 1/4 inch high for error correction. Recall screen is 4 inches wide and 3 lines high to make corrections on; all with scroll on a 22 inch monitor. After I had gotten Flight Plan acceptance; I continued to work on the Flight Plan during my shift; gathering data for a trouble report of the reject and to see if I could find the error causing the reject. While reviewing the original Flight Plan; comparing it to what I had entered manually; I discovered an error I had made in the routing. I had entered the wrong LAT/LONG information. As the aircraft had all ready departed; I immediately sent a service message to appropriate Centers down the line with the corrected route information and a copy of the original Flight Plan. If I had not been searching for the error causing the reject in the first place; I would not have become aware of my typing error and it would have been a deviation error. The window size for each individual work box is way too small and makes it extremely difficult to ensure errors like I made today do not happen; and to perform the job efficiently. This issue was reported 3 years ago and several tickets have been turned since on that issue. The agency needs to have the contractor fix this problem immediately and not continue to put the informational tickets on a back burner; or to place the fixes to the software for delivery to Centers yet to come up on ERAM.




Synopsis: ZSE Controller voiced concern regarding ERAM equipment and certain functionalities.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BUY.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G BUY
ATC / advisory: CTAF BUY
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on the 45 degree entry to the left downwind for Runway 24. We made radio calls on the CTAF frequency. [Another aircraft] announced that he departed Runway 24; then crosswind. We announced on the 45 then downwind. We monitored the [other] pilot's position and saw that he was coming straight towards us from the left and a little above us. I asked the pilot if he saw us and he said no. I told him that we were at his 12 o'clock low and he then said he did see us; and he made a climbing turn to the right to avoid a collision. These types of near miss events are far too common at uncontrolled airports. Had my student and I not been situationally aware [and] vigilant; we likely would have been killed. The [other] pilot clearly was not paying attention to the radio; was not looking out for traffic; and was not situationally aware. Suggestions for the FAA to reduce these occurrences: Make position reporting in the pattern mandatory. Make flight reviews be with a DPE. Make flight instructors unable to give instruction outside of being with an 'approved school'. These steps; either individually or in combination; will dramatically improve pilot training and re-certification standards. Additionally; it will allow the FAA the opportunity to place special emphasis on certain areas during recurrent training and the flight review process. Getting a flight instructor certificate should be just like getting a commercial pilot certificate. Becoming a commercial pilot does not allow you to become a commercial operator without significant FAA oversight. The same should be true for flight instructors.




Synopsis: C182 instructor pilot reported an airborne conflict with another light aircraft in the pattern at BUY airport.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BUR.Tower, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was on LC (Local Control) during the event in which the incident occurred.  I was briefed in mid-December that the B757 was to be treated as a large aircraft.  I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff on runway 15; I instructed Aircraft Y to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) on runway 8 after getting clarification from a supervisor that this was in fact okay to do now that the B757 was to be treated as a large. Shortly after Aircraft X rotated through the intersection I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on runway 8.  Inaccurate briefings for the RECAT change led to this misunderstanding of the rule and how to use it.  Also being told by management that this was okay also played a small role in the event.I think that if there is a briefing with something so critical they should put emphasis on what rules remain the same; and what rules are do not remain the same.  I also believe we should not be briefed on something that isn't officially implemented.  If it's something they are working on or trying to get clarification the brief should be held off.




Synopsis: BUR Local Controller reported of a loss of separation due to lack of understanding of wake turbulence rules.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During pushback and early in the start of number one engine; the Pushback Driver reported a large amount of fuel streaming from the bottom of the engine. He sounded quite anxious. We aborted the start; ran the Aborted Start QRH Checklist; then shutdown number two and were towed back to the gate. The Pushback Driver showed me the large fuel puddle where we had attempted to start number two. There was another significant fuel puddle under number one at our stopping point with fuel streaming out the bottom of the engine cowl. We called MX Control and they asked if we were familiar with the five minute engine run to stop a cold day related fuel leak. We were in vague terms but this leak seemed excessive. After reading Bulletin 15-29 we felt we had acted correctly.MX Control had us call Contract MX out. The engine failed the leak test with the engine running and statically after shutdown. After that; Contract Maintenance did two static maintenance diagnostic tests that cycled engine valves followed by two five minute engine runs. After multiple valve cyclings from this testing the fuel leak was confirmed to be within limits and we departed after the logbook was signed off and passengers reboarded.I'm not comfortable with Pushback Crews who aren't trained trying to explain if a fuel leak is within limits. My cutoff given the emphasis on doing business taking the conservative approach is if the Tug Driver's voice goes up a couple of octaves it's time to have Maintenance check things out. In this case we all made the correct call.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported the pushback driver alerted them to fuel streaming from the bottom of the engine. The flight departed after maintenance attention.