elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At Cruise FL370 we had a momentary 'config' light flashing on the EAD; so I selected the 'config' page and saw 'TIRE FAIL' Indication with all of the wheels missing from the display; then it returned to normal immediately. There were no other alerts and CAWS did not alert either. Then about 10-15 minutes later in the descent; passing about FL 250 we got a CAWS 'TIRE FAILURE' and a Level 2 'TIRE FAIL' alert; which did not resolve itself. We ran the QRH for 'TIRE FAIL' but again suspected an erroneous indication since ALL of the wheels and pressures were missing from the Config Page. We planned for a flaps 50 landing for minimum speed at touchdown just in case. We also planned to extend the gear early so that if the indications did not return to normal with the gear down; we would then [advise ATC] to have the fire crews ready. It was still before dawn so we did not consider a low pass so the tower could look; given that they wouldn't be able to see if a wheel had failed; and the restriction in the QRH to not retract the gear. When the gear was extended the Level 2 'TIRE FAIL' remained; and the config page did not show any wheels or pressures; so we [advised ATC] and assumed that we had one or more tires failed. Approach and landing were good; with a 1.14G touchdown and a normal rollout; so we taxied clear and waited for the fire chief to inspect all of our tires. Fire Chief reported that all landing gear and tires looked good; and the Airport Safety vehicle reported no debris on the runway; so we continued taxi to the ramp. When Maintenance came on board they found indications of a failed computer which they will attempt to replace.The CAWS alert 'TIRE FAILURE' and Level 2 'TIRE FAIL' were accompanied by a CONFIG Display that was missing all of the wheels and pressures; so we suspected an erroneous indication; but proceeded as if we had an unknown tire failure. Maintenance troubleshot upon block in and they suspect a failed computer.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported that an erroneous tire failure warning resulted in a precautionary landing.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DFW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: DFW was shooting triple ILS approaches with monitors due to the weather. I was working the Arrival 3 position when I noticed an aircraft track with no data block at 6000 feet (a splat * with an altitude) southbound right in between the final for 18R and 17C (17C's aircraft were at 6000 [feet] and 7000 [feet] for their turn on to the ILS (turn on altitude is 6000 [feet] for 17C)). I alerted other controllers of the traffic. It was approximately 18 miles north of DFW Southbound. I slewed to the target and the identified the beacon code. I had the Supervisor full route the beacon code and he said it showed 'flight not stored.' The target was southbound at 540 knots. It traveled approximately 5-8 miles then disappeared. Another of what I call 'Ghost Targets.' There are too many of these and eventually one of the 'Ghost Targets' is going to cause an incident. By the time I alerted other controllers; the aircraft were already below the 'Ghost Target' (as it was now south of the trip fixes where the aircraft begin their descent to DFW). Had someone seen it sooner and issued a safety alert and had the aircraft descend or turn it could have caused a very serious incident as there were aircraft side by side near this target. The FAA is supposed to be safety first and above all else. Someone needs to immediately address these 'Ghost Targets' and this system should be shut down and this facility returned to the ARTS IIIE before someone gets hurt. This system should not be brought back online for live traffic until they ensure that this problem is fixed. I have heard some of the STARS people say this is a 'RADAR problem;' not a STARS problem. Each time the beacon codes come up 'not stored' and I do not know if that will help them track down the problem. The ARTS IIIE did not have this problem. Either way; we should go back to a system that we know worked until we can determine the problem.




Synopsis: D10 Controller described a 'Ghost Target' event while using the STARS system; the reporter noting continued events involving the STARS equipment.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RNO.Tower, NV
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C RNO
ATC / advisory: Tower RNO
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was the Controller in Charge position (CIC) listening to Local (LC); Ground Control (GC); and Clearance Delivery (CD). The Local Controller (LC) was located on the south side of the tower; I was on the opposite side of the tower watching LC's sequence via the STARs radar display.  The sun was directly in our face at the time which makes it difficult to visually acquire aircraft on final; especially small aircraft. Aircraft X was told to land on Runway 34R; Aircraft X acknowledged his clearance to land Runway 34R. Aircraft Y was cleared to land Runway 34L. Aircraft Y acknowledged his clearance to land Runway 34L. Aircraft X was ahead of Aircraft Y for the parallel runway. Aircraft Y initiated a go-around; as I went to do the paper work and find out why Aircraft Y went around; the LC and I noticed that Aircraft X had exited the runway and was in between Runway 34L and 34R indicating that he had landed on Runway 34L (the wrong runway). I called NORCAL to verify that was the reason Aircraft Y initiated a go-around; and it was. I suggest that all aircraft be required to turn on their landing lights during periods of difficult visual condition to include sun glare.




Synopsis: RNO Tower Controller in Charge; CIC; reported due to sun glare blocking controller's view of final; traffic landed on wrong runway resulted in traffic executing a go around.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RNT.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Rain; 1.5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower RNT
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Crossing the final approach fix we descended down to 860 feet MSL. At level off we got a caution obstacle from the GPWS and at the same time a low altitude caution from Renton Tower. They advised us we were at 660 feet; but our indicated was 860 feet.  As we executed the missed approach ATC gave us the altimeter setting of 29.85 which was exactly what we had set. Once on with Seattle Departure we climbed to 4;200 feet and requested vectors to BFI for an ILS. We also asked ATC to keep an eye on our altitude because we believed that we had an altimetry error and we were IMC. Our altimeters were jumping and not steady during the ILS. Upon landing the aircraft was written up with the maintenance discrepancy. A Cessna Technician purged the system and noticed water coming out of the lines. The system was tested and returned to service.




Synopsis: CE680 Captain reports descending to 860 feet during a non precision approach to RNT and receiving  a caution obstacle from the GPWS and at the same time a low altitude caution from Renton Tower is issued. A go-around is initiated and the flight diverts to BFI for an ILS. Maintenance finds water in the pitot static system.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared into position for takeoff. The power application and the beginning of the takeoff roll were normal. At 80 knots on my airspeed indicator I noticed that my IOE student did not make the call '80 Knots Thrust Set.' I made the call and he replied I have no airspeed. I initiated a rejected takeoff. I believe we were between 85 and 95 Knots. We had plenty of runway remaining and were not going very fast. I then kicked the autobrakes off and let the airplane roll. We informed ATC of a reject and then we cleared the runway. We then stopped and called Maintenance to the cockpit. He said it was not fixable and then he said we need to get back to the ramp as soon as possible. With the long taxi and the rejected takeoff I was concerned about the brake temps. We brought up the status page and the Brake Temps were showing ZERO. I decide to taxi back. I was expecting the temps to start rising and they never did. At this point I figure that the Brake Temperature Management System (BTMS) is failed. When we got back to the ramp I asked the third First Officer (FO) to do a post flight walk around. I told him to stay clear of the wheels; as they may be hot. I also instructed the ground crew that we might have hot brakes. When FO returned he informed me that while he was doing his walk around the right landing gear had a tire that had fused. The technician informed me that the BTMS system was not hooked up. I wrote it up. I told him that I had to write it up; because it wasn't placarded as not working. I made some of my decisions based on the fact that I assumed we had a working BTMS. Let us know if we have a system that is not working on the aircraft.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported that a Rejected Takeoff was performed between 85-95 knots due to failure of the First Officer's airspeed indicator. The Brake Temp Monitoring System was found to be inop on return to the gate.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon doing the cabin sweep; I notice [Passenger in] X1 talking on the phone and asked her to turn it off. I only knew she was on the phone because her phone was facing up in her palm and I could see the active phone call with the phone screen. She seemed to act like she was complying; but she was still talking. Her mic for the phone was inside of her mask; so I would never have been able to say she was on the phone had I not seen the phone. I told the forward she was still on the phone.People hide their cell phone microphones in the masks all the time. It is hard to tell when they are actively talking or just singing along to a tune.If it is so hard for me to discern an active phone call is taking place with a passengers face covered;  I have to wonder what else people can hide inside a mask that could cause me; fellow passengers; crew or the plane harm. 3D printers can make all kinds of gadgets - including sharp objects - that could hide in a mask; not to mention the possibility of any kind of explosive that could be detonated between the teeth.COVID masks - supposedly are for crew and passenger safety; but these federal masks on airplanes create more safety concerns. I know the masks appear to keep us safe from the dreaded COVID; but the reality is the masks pose a much greater safety risk than COVID. I can't see what people are actually doing (talking on the phone or not). I can't identify a human trafficking victim from any other masked passenger. I can't identify a bad actor hiding in a mask from an innocent one in a mask. I can't smell alcohol; smoke; or even jet fuel when wearing a mask; which is required of me at all times - especially in my jump seat.The ability to do my job as a safety professional on an aircraft is greatly reduced thanks to these mask mandates. I am really surprised that the FAA and airlines care more about the optics of safety than the actual safety on board a plane these days.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concern regarding the face mask policy as it covers a passenger's identity and creates a possible way to hide unwanted items under the mask.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise at FL380 at the VOR with the autopilot engaged we felt 3 separate uncommanded rudder inputs. They were separated about a minute each. After the third time the aircraft yawed and stayed in a side slip with about 3.6 units of rudder trim input. We then got the ECAM Message: AUTO FLT RUD TRIM1 FAULT. Captain continued flying and I executed the ECAM follow up (there was none) and consulted the ECAM Supplemental Manual for more information. The aircraft was under control; although uncoordinated; with the autopilot engaged so we agreed the safest course initially was to leave the autopilot engaged. I notified ATC and requested the longest runway for a landing at ZZZ. We were vectored to join the arrival to ZZZ and ATC cleared us to descend VIA. We declared unable since we were reluctant to use the speed brakes with the aircraft in a side slip. Below 8000 feet Captain slowed the aircraft; leveled off and disconnected the autopilot. With the autopilot off the trim was re-centered and the aircraft was again coordinated. Captain then transferred the controls to me; and we landed uneventfully. Failure of the Autopilot Rudder Trim system caused the aircraft to be in uncoordinated flight at high altitude. This failure had been written up previously by another crew and signed off as repaired by Maintenance in ZZZ1.




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reported uncommanded rudder inputs with the autopilot engaged due to rudder trim fault.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Climbing out of EWR on a heading of roughly 300 and around 10;000ft we were given instructions that I heard as 'climb to 13;000 and fly heading'. We continued the climb to 13;000 and started a left turn to 230. Shortly thereafter the controller says it should be a RIGHT turn to 320. I apologized and said I must have reversed the numbers but we would correct it and start turning back. He was polite and said something like 'Oh maybe I gave you the wrong heading'. We had maybe turned half way to the incorrect heading.




Synopsis: Pilot reported flying towards an assigned heading only to be promptly queried and redirected by ATC.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TPA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; Windshear; Turbulence; 3
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 F Executive 21
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B TPA
ATC / advisory: TRACON TPA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I had not flown for several months and was getting practice in. As I tried to get to BKV I found myself hemmed in by building cumulonimbus; rain; and thunderstorm activity. I was unable to make BKV and updrafts and cloud tops pushed me above the class B veil beyond 6;000 ft to 6;400 about. I had relied on my Garmin weather in cockpit; but it was not depicting actual conditions. I will not rely on this instrument again.




Synopsis: M20 pilot reported encountering an updraft which caused him to climb into TPA Class B airspace.
Date: 202006
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: For as long as I can remember I've been sending concerns about using small gate rooms with single jetways for the amount of customers. Boarding is organized chaos! Not enough room for over 350 passengers; overlapping gate room announcements; customers having difficulty finding the right place to stand in line without accidentally or intentionally 'cutting' in line to board. Now COVID has reduced the amount of customers but maintaining safe distancing especially deplaning is very challenging. With single jetway and wheelchairs waiting and gate checked strollers; it's not uncommon for disembarkation to come to a stop preventing smooth flow and passengers standing right next to each other and next to FA's standing at each exit door. Having an orderly disembarkation despite announcements (wheelchairs; passengers remain seated; deplaning by rows) doesn't work. Most customers can't wait to get off; especially on longer flights.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported social distancing concerns during boarding and deplaning the aircraft.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Wheel
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: 'Wheel not turning' light came on between 80 and 100 KTS. Captain aborted takeoff.


Second narrative: High Speed rejected takeoff. All indications and procedures [were] normal up to the event. Between 80 KIAS and 100 KIAS on takeoff roll; both crew members simultaneously noticed a 'Wheel Not Turn' light illuminated on the forward instrument panel. As the Captain and the pilot flying; I rejected the takeoff at approximately 100 KIAS. V1 was 141 KIAS so reject was approximately 40 KIAS below V1. [Accomplished] rejected takeoff procedures normal and exited runway. Brake temperature did not exceed 200 degrees. Emergency not declared and returned to the gate for maintenance action. Aircraft [was] subsequently taken out of service.


Synopsis: MD83 flight crew experiences a wheel not turning light during takeoff and rejects.