elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201202
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon arrival; after the seatbelt sign was turned off; I made my announcement for flight attendants to prepare doors for arrival. I followed proper protocol and disarmed my doors. The jetway was not up to the plane; so I waited for the Operations Agent to be there before cracking the door. I saw the Agent through the window; and I proceeded to open the door. I immediately heard a click noise; and the 'C' Flight Attendant yelled out to stop opening the door. I looked down and noticed that the girt bar had fallen out of the hooks and the bustle of the slide was 1/2 way out. I immediately asked the 'C' Flight Attendant if she saw that I had disarmed the door and she agreed that I did. I know that I did; and I know that I heard a click as I was opening the door; which meant the girt bar fell out. We informed the pilot what had happened; and he immediately contacted Dispatch to get a hold of Maintenance. With cooperation with Operations and Maintenance; we deplaned from the back of the aircraft via air stairs. I feel that the older planes need to have the hooks that the girt bar is supposed to sit in when disarming it re-enforced in some way so this doesn't happen to people when they disarm their door.




Synopsis: A B737-300 L1 door escape slide girth bar fell off its retainer after the door was disarmed and subsequently the slide fell partially out of its container before the door was fully opened but the slide did not deploy.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 47N.Airport, NY
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sail Plane
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Solo glider flight... no transponder; not monitoring approach frequency. While ascending in a thermal; passing through 3;000 MSL; as I turned (in a left-hand circle) to a heading roughly SW; observed an airliner (most likely Airbus 320; but not positive) converging almost head-on; descending out of the clouds above from the S/SW. This aircraft was in a wings-level descent; and as I began to turn across its path; I saw that it was making no effort to check its descent or turn; so I immediately steepened my turn; deployed full spoilers; and descended to the NE as rapidly as possible (within safe limits). During this event; the distance between the two aircraft came within about 2;500-3;000 feet laterally (estimated). I have been flying gliders without transponders in this area for almost five years; and have certainly come fairly close to transport aircraft descending into the NYC Class B before; but in all cases; visual contact was made at a greater distance; and there was always evidence that the crew of the other aircraft had me in sight; or at least happened to be making a favorable change in course. On this occasion; I am quite certain that the crew of the other aircraft did not see me; at least not prior to my evasive maneuver. On this occasion; I first spotted the conflicting traffic when it first became visible from my position/altitude due to haze and clouds (it 'appeared' within my field of vision; well between me and horizon); so my visual scan was probably not a factor. The greater contributing factors were; in order of importance: lack of a transponder; no prior alert to NY TRACON that glider ops would take place in that area at that time (home base for glider club is not listed as a gliderport by FAA); and my not at least monitoring that ATC frequency to enhance awareness of transport flights descending to land within the NY Class B. Eliminating at least one of these variables on future flights should serve well to prevent another similar incident.




Synopsis: Glider pilot reports a conflict with an A320 at 3;000 feet SSW of SBJ. Evasive action is taken by the reporter to avoid a collision.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DC-10 30
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were descending through 3;000 FT MSL on final on a visual approach backed up by ILS. Slats were extended and airspeed was stable at 190 KIAS; which was approximately 30 KTS above the lower foot. We then had two intermittent stick shaker events; perceived at two seconds each. I called for 15 flaps; but the First Officer initially could not move the flap handle. By further effort; including moving the dial-a-flap wheel forward and aft; he was able to get the flap handle to move from 0 degree flap position to 15 degrees. Further flap extensions were uneventful and we completed a normal landing with 35 flap. We then notified maintenance and wrote the problem up in the AML.




Synopsis: A DC-10 flight crew experienced two stick shaker events with slats extended.  They encountered mechanical resistance to their initial attempts to position the flap handle to 15 degrees. Subsequent attempts allowed positioning of flaps and they landed normally.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Left rear outer tire on left main truck blew on takeoff at 80 KTS. Post flight revealed the tire had blown and had caused damage to the brake fan housing. First Officer was the flying pilot. All brake temperatures normal prior to taking the runway with around 40 degrees on the left truck (within 10 degrees of one another) and right 70 degrees (within 10 degrees) on the right mains. On Line Up and Wait for 17R the First Officer set the parking brake. When cleared for takeoff the brake was released normally. At around 80 KTS there was a bang. Above 80 KTS pre-briefed reject speed set for 'other than engine fire/failure; unsafe to fly' speed and by the time of recognition we were above that and accelerating fine. The rest of takeoff roll uneventful. Airborne there were no other abnormal indications other than the single tire temperature was at zero. On climb out we called Dispatch and Maintenance to discuss condition. I asked for Dispatch to also notify the departure airport Tower that we may have left FOD on the runway and also to relay to Tower of our condition and request in advance CFR to look at the aircraft prior to taxiing to the ramp. At our destination airport; cleared onto Runway 3/21 after uneventful landing on 12R. Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) informed us that the tire was in fact flat and damaged but all the other tires were holding air. Maintenance had previously relayed that it was OK to taxi in with only one bad tire so we proceeded to the ramp with CFR following us in. Also; we asked ARFF if there was any damage to the flap area; which there was none; so we raised the flaps. We called Station Operations to ensure they knew our condition and to keep personnel clear until ARFF and Maintenance had ensured the area near the gear to be safe. Post flight revealed a stuck brake.




Synopsis: A single A300 tire failed during takeoff at about 80 KTS; but the flight continued to its destination where an emergency was declared for landing. During post flight a locked brake was discovered on the flat tire.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LHD.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LHD
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: The pilot flying wanted to fly the aircraft and delegated the radio operation to me. We were in position for takeoff short of Runway 32 in number 2 position. There were several aircraft arriving at the same time. The controller was transmitting on both Lake Hood and Anchorage International Airport's frequency at the same time on the same frequency. The tower informed us to standby instead of saying 'Hold Short of Runway 32' for arriving traffic and the tower immediately transmitted to another aircraft. The number one aircraft was cleared for takeoff. A short time later both the pilot and I heard 'Cleared for Takeoff' with some background interference. While I entered the downwind on my 360 turn for altitude the controller tried to call me 3 times and the transmission was blocked by other aircraft on the same frequency 126.8. I received a call from the controller saying 'Possible deviation when able contact Anchorage Tower; standby for phone number'. To prevent this occurrence in the future I would suggest that there be one controller for Anchorage Tower (118.3) and one controller for Lake Hood Tower (126.8) especially when Lake Hood is busy. Transmitting on two frequencies at the same time is not a good operating practice and will lead to future problems. Also the term Roger or Standby should be readdressed as 'Hold Short of Runway 32 at Lake Hood for arriving traffic' and make sure the pilot repeats the clearance in the order given. As an example; Merrill Field Tower requires that the controller transmit Hold Short instructions and requires the pilot read back Hold Short instructions or the controller will say again repeat the Hold Short instructions prior to takeoff.




Synopsis: An aircraft heard a garbled transmission saying 'cleared for takeoff.' The pilot assumed it was for their flight. The takeoff clearance was for a different aircraft. The adjacent airport Control Tower also controls this airport and was transmitting and receiving on two frequencies.
Date: 201904
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Second aircraft: Heavy Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: FL320 SLOP (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) R1. We were behind a wide body aircraft. Started to encounter wake turbulence. We moved to SLOP R2. A little while later the wind shifted just enough all of the sudden we encountered moderate wake turbulence. Pilot flying put in SLOP R3 to avoid any possible severe wake turbulence. We were distracted momentarily with the turbulence issue and seating everybody. We did not get to notifying ATC of the R3 deviation in a timely manner. A few minutes later were informed via CPDLC about the deviation via ADS-B. We immediately returned to SLOP R2 which did keep us out of the wake from the preceding aircraft at this time.




Synopsis: B777-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence from a preceding wide body aircraft in cruise flight over the North Atlantic.
Date: 201709
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Pins
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: New B787 aircraft arrived for post-delivery mod. The NLG drag brace pivot link hollow bolt will accept the gear pin snuggly from LH side while the correct locking hole is 3 inches away and 'unmarked.' An inexperienced mechanic could accidentally place the locking pin in the wrong hole leading to gear collapse during ground testing damaging the aircraft and potentially injuring or killing persons in the vicinity of the gear.Apply sealant or similar mitigation to the LH inside bolt hole; mark correct hole with red outline. Has previous Engineering Authorization been implemented on the fleet?




Synopsis: B787 Maintenance Technician reported the nose gear pin can mistakenly be installed into the NLG drag brace hollow bolt rendering the gear unsafe for ground testing.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This airplane had a problem with the center hydraulic demand pump which led to the deferral of the HMG (Hydraulic Motor Generator). There were 3 circuit breakers that needed to be pulled and safetied; as well as physically disabling the HMG in the wheel well. This was not accomplished by maintenance even though the [maintenance documentation] indicated that it was. While dealing with the additional problems of the nose wheel strut being completely compressed; and a 40;000 pound weight penalty; I neglected to double check the safetied cockpit circuit breakers. During cruise flight we noticed that the 3 CBs were not pulled; notified maintenance and pulled them with [Maintenance] concurrence; wrapping a sticker around each. The flight attendants complained of a loud whining sound between rows 27 and 30. I went back to check. The sound was mechanical; like a pump (indeed the HMG had never been disabled). On approach I called for flaps one; allowing extra time for gear and flap extension. EICAS message flaps asymmetry appeared. The first officer and relief pilot began the checklist. I called for gear down. It took a long time and then we only had that main gear and not the nose gear. Performed a go-around and [advised ATC]. In addition to having the center hydraulic system light illuminated; both center hydraulic pump lights illuminated. Finally the nose gear came down and we had 3 green gear indications. The first officer and relief pilot performed the leading edge flaps checklist and we landed flaps 20 without incident.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported difficulty extending the landing gear and flaps related to an improperly handled hydraulic pump deferral at an international station.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SGF.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SGF
ATC / advisory: TRACON SGF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At dusk; inbound on ATC assigned Right base leg vector (approximately 285 - 300 heading) for what appeared to be 5 NM final to RWY 02. As is my technique - unless weather is a concern - I go into Terrain Mode descending thru approximately 16;000 feet MSL. Aircraft (AC) was descending on profile (Gear down / Flaps 30 / Airspeed approximately 160kts).  Relative to my pilot flying PFD; I was on a 10-NM Terrain scale at this time.Both VISUALLY and Terrain mode-wise; I was aware of the smoke stack(s) / obstructions at the ACs 11-o'clock position; roughly 6-7NM ahead as we descended. Terrain Display showed height to be 1;900 feet MSL.  Airport / RWY 02 was in sight. We had a couple of towers off the right side of the AC; and we were 'visual relative to them' as I angled toward final (non-square pattern). At this time; we received a Terrain GPWS Warning. I added power; climbed approximately 200 feet. The GPWS Warning ceased; and we continued on the base leg turn. Configured for flaps 45. Landing and all other procedures normal.Not wanting to ever 'second guess' a Warning system; it did its job. All I can think is that it was looking ahead to our projected ground path and descent rate as we angled to final for runway 02. Possibly; GPWS was looking at the towers off the ACs right wing; but those towers were NOT on my Terrain Mode Display (we did have them visually).As we talked about it after - and I reflect upon it now - we could have discussed the obstacles/threats even more as we vectored ourselves once calling the airport in sight. In hindsight; I would square my pattern off more; and thus hit that '5 mile final point' a little high; thus ensuring no potential GPWS Warnings. In doing so; we would have ample distance/time to configure flaps 45 and land more straight-in.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain experienced a GPWS terrain warning while on right base visual for Runway 2 at SGF. Climbing 200 feet silenced the warning which may have been caused by one of the radio towers in the area which were in sight.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MMMX
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [In pre-dawn darkness] MMMX ground control cleared us to push and release 'Short of Bravo; Facing Bravo.'  I passed those instructions to the ground crew; and they read it back to us correctly. We stopped; were cleared to start; and I cleared the ground crew to disconnect. The nose of our aircraft was over the ground vehicle roadway painted on the ramp; but not on or over Bravo.  During the start sequence the First Officer; said; '[my name]!' and pointed to the left.  A B747 was in a high-speed taxi; and the right wing tip and large winglet appeared to be heading right toward our cockpit.  The ground crew was still there (but with the headset disconnected) prior to the salute; and our #2 engine was not yet up to idle.  Our only option to avoid decapitation would have been to unbuckle and hit the deck. A radio call would be useless due to the speed of the B747 and because of how quickly this event took place.   Just then we noticed the green nav light 'moving on the windscreen' and not on a collision course.  We watched the large winglet pass ten to fifteen feet in front of our cockpit.  It is unknown whether or not the [B747] crew saw us; or; due to the darkness; whether or not the [B747] Captain was on the Bravo centerline.  (That entire area is regarded by many pilots as a 'black hole.') I made a radio call to MMMX.  For your reference; please see Jeppesen MMMX charts 10-7Z; 10-9; and 10-9B. I would suggest that the MMMX ground crews be instructed to release our aircraft at least 20 feet prior to the painted ground vehicle roadway northwest of taxiway Bravo.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported they were parked near Taxiway B after pushback and were almost hit by a B747 taxiing past them.  Darkness was a factor; and the crew suggested push procedure should not position them that close to the taxiway.