elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Level at FL380 on the Western slopes of Sierras we encountered a strong mountain wave. As the speed started to roll back I selected max continuous thrust. This didn't help much. I then called OAK Center for lower. I was told unable and to stand by. I then told them we would not be able to maintain FL380 and I started a slow descent 300 FPM to get the speed to increase. As I was doing this OAK called back and gave us FL360. We descended 150 FT while waiting for the clearance. Total airspeed loss was approximately 35 KTS during the event.




Synopsis: A B737-800 flight crew encountered a mountain wave and began descending to recover a 35 KTS airspeed loss while awaiting ATC descent clearance.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Following his exterior preflight the First Officer notified me that the No. 2 and No. 4 brake wear indicators appeared to be at or below the limit for an MD-83; but he didn't have a ruler to measure. I entered the discrepancies in the logbook and notified Maintenance for a check. The Maintenance Technician informed us that the brake limit was 3/32 inches; not the 1/2 inch or greater as printed in our operating manual and signed off the book as 'well within limits.'During the preflight at the next station the First Officer again notified me that the same brake wear indicators still appeared to be below the 1/2 inch limit for an MD-83; so we again notified Maintenance at and entered the discrepancies in the logbook. This time; the airplane was taken out of service because; according to the Maintenance Technician at this station; both brake wear indicators were indeed below the limit and both brakes would need changing. This resulted in the flight being cancelled.I suggest we need more responsible Maintenance review of brake wear limits and less push to get airplanes released in any way possible.


Second narrative: They implied it probably should have never left the first station; and certainly was 'not well within limits.'


Synopsis: After Maintenance at their originating airport declared several suspect brake wear indicators to be 'well within limits' and signed off the logbook the flight crew of an MD-83 once again wrote them up as below limits at an intermediate stop and Maintenance there took the aircraft out of service until the brakes could be changed; stating they were '...not well within limits.'
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: No airspeed indications on initial takeoff roll. Rejected at low speed. Exact speed was not known but RTO (Rejected Takeoff) braking didn't engage. During the initial walk around I noticed the pitot covers installed. I didn't see a mechanic so I completed the preflight. I then then found a mechanic. We discussed the previous day's aircraft problems that were addressed on my layover the day before. We also discussed various maintenance items on the Airbus in general. I became distracted and forgot to mention to him the pitot covers were still installed. This event is my fault since I had initially noticed the covers installed and failed to remind him to remove them. To preclude an event like this in the future if I discover an irregularity I will immediately stop the preflight and have the issue addressed instead of completing the walk around and then addressing the issue. We do a similar scenario in the cockpit and then restart the checklist to make sure all items are complied with rather than guess where the checklist was stopped and potentially skip an item. Fatigue was not an issue as this was the beginning of the duty period and adequate rest was received at the hotel.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to no airspeed indication; after failing to ensure the pitot covers were removed during preflight.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TBPB.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Tower TBPB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: While on approach to TBPB; ILS lost glide slope and azimuth in IMC conditions. Elected to go-around. Visual approach was accomplished to a landing.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reports a go around at TBPB when both the localizer and glide slope fail during the ILS approach to Runway 9 in IMC.  The crew is able to land visually on the next approach.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GSO.TRACON, NC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C GSO
ATC / advisory: TRACON GSO
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I was working west and final combined. It was very busy and very complex. Lots of different types of aircraft on parallel ILS's. I had voiced; out loud; that I was going to need help on final; but because of the recurrent training class; we were short staffed; as usual. We did not have the available bodies to open final radar. I had numerous aircraft on the ILS 23L and 23R. Aircraft Y was on the left base at 7000 feet for 23L and Aircraft X was on the localizer for 23R at 4000 ft. I thought I could get Aircraft Y down to 3000 feet before he lost separation with Aircraft X. I was wrong. The closest they got was 2.61 miles and 800 feet. I knew immediately that I had a deal; but I had to keep going because we were still very busy. I was extremely angry because this is my second deal due to volume and the fact that we are so short staffed that we always have to be combined. Management hates calling in overtime because; from what I hear; the region doesn't think they need to spend the money. I realize that we are a little level 7 facility; but we do get busy and we consistently get screwed because big wigs in the higher places think we can handle it with minimum staffing. We are all getting fed up with having such low levels of staffing and management expecting us to be fine simply because we are a lowly level 7.I am not the strongest final radar controller. Our final only gets busy about once a week; so neither I; nor anyone else; gets a chance to practice final. Due to lack of staffing; we were unable to open a needed sector; final radar. My sector was extremely busy.Quit giving our management such a hard time for calling in overtime. We need it. We are short staffed. It is becoming dangerous.




Synopsis: GSO Controller reports of a busy session working a combined position due to a training class. Controller had a loss of separation with two aircraft and attributes it to not being a strong controller and being unable to work busy sessions with non-combined positions. Controller indicates it was the lack of staffing that led to combined positions; being overloaded; and having a loss of separation.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Wind
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departing ZZZ Runway XX at XA23; Aircraft X encountered a complete hydraulic failure on initial climbout. Conditions at the time were winds out of the north west 14 knots Gusting 23 knots. The annunciator panel indicated that both the Left and Right Hydraulics Failure annunciation and a cross check of the hydraulic pressure gauge confirmed this with an indication of low pressure. An After Takeoff Checklist was completed followed by the Hydraulic System Failure Checklist; Landing Gear Emergency Extension Checklist and a verification of Gear 3 down and green. The decision was made to continue to the destination of ZZZ1 airport due to the better runway environment; ILS; emergency services and the nature of the windy conditions in ZZZ. ATC was advised and a request for vectors to the IAF for the ILS XY at ZZZ1 airport was made. ZZZ1 airport conditions were reporting winds out of the South West at 4 knots; 10 miles and clear skies. Upon landing and rollout a loud vibration was noticed which appeared to be from the nose-wheel area and possible cantering nose wheel or a tire issue. Ground crew was requested to inspect the condition of the landing gear and wheel well area before continuing the taxi and any possible damage that may have incurred by the aircraft or to the runway and taxiway environment. After an all clear from Ground Ops; a normal taxi without nose-wheel hydraulic steering took place proceeded with engine shutdown at the FBO. Upon initial inspection; hydraulic fluid was visually confirmed leaking from the wheel well of Engine #1. All cargo was unloaded from the aircraft and Dispatch and Department of Maintenance coordinated a ferry flight after an inspection by the mechanic. The ferry flight was canceled shortly after taxi upon the realization that the nose-wheel vibration and shimmy was too excessive to be able to execute a normal takeoff and the aircraft was grounded for further mechanical inspection.




Synopsis: Air taxi pilot reported Hydraulic failure after takeoff.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon entering the smoke curtain on arrival; the ramp team discovered that the load team didn't secure the 9G net.  The load team has the primary duty to secure the net; however; I didn't discover this prior to blocking out either. Several factors contributed to not catching their mistake. We had no accessible Directional Gyro on board which requires me to go aft of the net to check it and I usually verify them closing the net when I am in that process. Also; the inaccessible DG paperwork was not in order and I had to get the Ramp agent to straighten it out. The load process was running late and when we finally received the final; I went aft and they had already sealed the smoke curtain. I should have required them to open the curtain and verified that the net was secured.I will verify in the future that the net is closed - period. Also; I feel that the load team could used some feedback/additional training on the importance of closing that net and making sure the cargo is secured. Nothing happened this time; but this had the potential to cause damage to the aircraft or injury to personnel.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: The crew reported that the 9G net was not properly secured before block out on this MD-11 freighter.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In cruise at 320 kts I was working in the FMS with my left hand. My wristwatch caused my sleeve to bunch up and catch on the flap lever. The flap lever moved to the Flaps 1 position.I felt it pull on my wrist and knew immediately what had happened. Within a second or two I returned the lever to Flaps 0. The overspeed clacker had already sounded and I looked at ED1 for a flaps display. I saw that the Flaps/Gear display was not on ED1 and I told the captain it was an inadvertent flap movement but the lever was back at Flaps 0.ED1 never showed a flap movement and there was no pitch change so we concluded that the slats probably didn't have a chance to extend. We continued the flight and contacted maintenance at our destination when we landed. I now wear my wristwatch on my right arm to prevent any chance of this happening again.




Synopsis: CRJ First Officer reported catching his sleeve on the flap lever and moving it to the #1 position. He caught the error right away and moved the handle back to zero before the slats started to move.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing there is a very short taxi from the runway to the terminal; [so] minimal opportunity to obtain the 2 minute cool down for the engines to be shut off. The Captain was taxiing slowly to the gate and told me to shut the left engine down as soon as we have 2 minutes. I looked down to look at the times off the FMS and went straight to shutting down the left engine. At that time the standard MASTER WARNING and MASTER CAUTION messages were appearing therefore I immediately checked them and turned off the warnings. [Then] I looked up and noticed the Captain [had] taxied past our gate and was going into the wrong gate. I told him that we passed [the gate] and he immediately stopped and began turning. The Captain added enough thrust to blow over construction equipment. This was caused by a combination of the Captain not noticing the ramp workers standing outside waving us in; forgetting the gate number assigned as well as the FO (myself) 'heads down' during taxi-in.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 First Officer reported the Captain made a late turn towards the gate and added enough power to blow over some ground equipment.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During descent into the Tower Controlled Airspace (TCA) from the east; our clearance was to maintain 10;000 FT and a heading of 255 degrees. Level at 10;000 FT; we were asked to visually identify Learjet traffic at our 2 o'clock position. The Lear was at 9;000 FT and on ATC vectors heading southbound. We saw the Learjet on the TCAS at approximately our 2 o'clock position and 6 miles and started to acquire the traffic visually. As the Lear traffic approached our position; now 2 o'clock and three miles the Lear traffic called us insight; followed by Approach Control clearing them to climb through our altitude and to maintain visual separation with us. Instantly we were on high alert because this seemed like a conflicting clearance. As the Lear started to climb and rapidly approached our position/altitude; our TCAS commanded an RA CLIMB at 2;500 FT/minute. The First Officer had the traffic insight and realized that IF he followed the TCAS it would very likely cause a midair collision or near miss situation with the Lear traffic. When the Captain realized the close proximity of the traffic; he agreed with the pilot flying; (First Officer) in maintaining level flight at 10;000 FT. The Learjet climbed over us and came dangerously close. As the Lear climbed through 10;000 FT our TCAS then gave us a reversal- RA DESCEND. When I alerted ATC to our RA CLIMB/DESCEND he replied; 'You were to maintain visual separation with that traffic.' To which I replied; 'I NEVER called the traffic insight!' His reply was; 'it only takes one aircraft to call visual separation.' Ultimately; this was a situation that was induced by Approach Control and then aggravated by the Learjet crew. Airport traffic was light in the TCA and if ATC would have waited another minute or so; before climbing the Lear traffic; there would not have been a separation conflict.




Synopsis: Air Carrier described a TCAS RA between himself and a Lear who was reportedly maintaining Visual Separation with him.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IND.TRACON, IN
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E IND
ATC / advisory: TRACON IND
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying at night on the arrival direct MOSLY; got a traffic alert from ATC that required evasive maneuvering. An Aircraft was northwestbound at 200 kts. descending through 3500 not talking to Indy. Instructor had to take control to prevent a midair collision. This was a high task saturated portion of the flight as the instructor was evaluating the Pilot's ability to load the arrival procedure and communicate with Indy approach. I could have divided my attention between the ADSB; evaluating and outside better.




Synopsis: Light aircraft Instructor Pilot reported a near mid-air collision with another light aircraft on arrival into IND.