elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 10/100
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were being vectored by Approach Control for the visual approach.  Our last assigned altitude was to descend and maintain 3;000 MSL (2;990 AGL in this area).  I had the airport in sight and we were just in the process of reporting the airport and being cleared for the visual approach; when my copilot said; 'Altitude.' The autopilot was engaged; but the ALT CAP was not. We were at 2;700 feet MSL descending; we hit 2;550 feet MSL by the time I added power and pitch to arrest the descent and climb to 3;000 feet MSL. At that second we were; 'Cleared for the visual approach- contact Tower.'  The autopilot on these 30 year old planes has a mind of its own. We operate [several] of the same model; and they all behave the same.  They seem to lose the ALT CAP function when they 'feel' like it.  They DO kick off the ALT CAP when you move the PITCH wheel to adjust your rate of climb/ descent within about 500 feet of level off.  But; they also drop it occasionally at their own whim too with NO inputs to the pitch wheel. Our normal operating procedure at the 1;000 feet to altitude tone/chime is; '1;000 feet to go (i.e. 4;000 for 3;000) ALT CAP selected.'  Which I must have missed in our discussion of seeing the airport in VMC/visual conditions.  Our descent rate was between around 500 FPM. Double/triple checking that ALT CAP is on in the climb and descent; as well as; checking ALT CAP is active at the 1;000 tone/chime without fail is key to solving this issue.




Synopsis: DA10 Captain reports an altitude deviation during vectors for a visual approach due to an autopilot capture anomaly that is well known.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MYF.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: Tower MYF
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was working Local Control and departed Aircraft X VFR right downwind to the east.  Initially; I issued traffic to the pilot that was approximately 3 miles northeast of his position. As the traffic converged; I gave Aircraft X a suggested right turn of 20 degrees to avoid traffic. I reached out to the traffic opposite direction and they happened to be inbound to the field with traffic in sight.  I gave Aircraft X an update of the traffic and they reported traffic in sight as well.  Aircraft X was instructed to resume own navigation and remain outside B with a frequency change.  No traffic was observed east of Aircraft X within the scope of my RACD settings.  Minutes later; Aircraft X reported a near miss with an aircraft that was westbound.  This occurred at least 10 miles east of MYF.  The traffic was outside of the scope of my RACD settings and I was unaware and unable to advise Aircraft X of that traffic.  By the time the Aircraft Y checked in; traffic was not a factor. Aircraft Y never had Aircraft X in sight. Pilot of Aircraft X was told to give the Tower a call on the land line.  I don't have any particular recommendations for the event. Our priority is to focus on the runways and aircraft in our airspace.  We provide additional services; however; there is a limit to how far we zoom out on our radar screens.  Being too focused on what's beyond the scope of our radar maps will take our eyes off of our D airspace and our runways and will result in a greater safety issue.




Synopsis: MYF Tower Local Control reports of a near mid air that was reported by a pilot after it left the MYF Class D.
Date: 201602
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Other General Ramp
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other post-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I wish to inform you that a 2 LB box was [listed] on my DSTG without any indication that it was radioactive. However I did not personally see the box myself; one of my team members confirms loading the little box which was loaded among the bags from the bag room. Again no indication of the box been radioactive on the DSTG. I go by the information on the DSTG.




Synopsis: Ramp air carrier employee reported loading a radioactive box with other bags because it was not indicated as radioactive on his information document.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Maintenance; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During pre-flight in heavy snow and wind; the APU generator dropped off line; and became available again within about 10 seconds. This happened twice; about ten minutes apart. Also; the APU bleed air pressure dropped to lower than usual; then recovered about 30 seconds later. We advised maintenance; the mechanics checked our plane (737 MAX) and the 737 MAX on another gate; and informed us that the APU does that in heavy snow; likely due to snow entering the inlet door. The APU was operating normally. We planned to start one engine at gate (to keep ground power available; just in case APU dropped offline; similar to starting without an APU).  Flight eventually cancelled due to weather; we did not ever start an engine or leave the gate. If this is a known issue to the local mechanics; it should be in our manuals; or the problem should be addressed in some way. The APU is operating normally; but if the power can drop offline due to snow; that could be very problematic during pushback and engine start in snowy conditions; and potentially a safety issue if the aircraft is effectively stranded after pushback with only battery power in snowy conditions.  Our plan to start one engine at the gate with ground power available would be a proposed workaround; but that should probably be codified somewhere. Filing to indicate a potential safety issue.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Check pilot reported the APU on their 737 MAX continued to shut down while in service at the gate while in a heavy wet snow storm. The pilot also stated that another MAX aircraft at an adjacent gate was experiencing the same scenario.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IZA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E SBA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Preflight with DUATS (logged in). No TFRs on flight path for flight from IZA to ZZZ. Departed IZA. Flew directly over what appeared to be a fire. Upon returning back to IZA; I checked my tablet. It showed a TFR for firefighting along my path. No firefighting aircraft were visually seen on either leg of my route and I did not spot any fire.I don't believe this is an issue as this was a non-official source; but I wanted to bring it to the attention of NASA as I am seeing differences between DUATS and other sources on TFR's. This happens in both graphical and text versions. As of this morning; the tablet source still shows a TFR but DUATS does not. Can NASA help in bringing official and non-official sources more closely in line?




Synopsis: Pilot reported he may have violated a Fire Fighting TFR near IZA because of differences between his DUATS briefing and his tablet display.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We did not make the 7000 ft crossing restriction due to wake turbulence from preceding aircraft. We were on the VNAV PATH getting close to MYNEE but had to slow the descent because we got into preceding aircraft's wake turbulence for the third or fourth time on the STAR. The Captain and I discussed getting out of the preceding aircraft's wake by asking NorCal for the visual approach to 30 at OAK. This would alleviate the wake turbulence issue. By the time we asked for the visual 30 and got cleared the visual; we did not make the MYNEE 7000 ft restriction which we didn't think was a big deal because we had just gotten cleared the visual. Somewhere around MYSHN approximately five miles past MYNEE; NorCal advised us we didn't make the altitude restriction at MYNEE. We just agreed and moved on even though both of us were confused.


Second narrative: We were distracted by the wake turbulence and neglected to inform ATC that we were high. In retrospect; advising them earlier would have been a better idea.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported they failed to make a crossing restriction on arrival into OAK after multiple wake turbulence encounters.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed ZZZ1 airport and wanted to pick up his IFR flight plan into ZZZ airport. He asked for a visual approach and I informed him that the ceilings were too low to issue vectors for a Visual and to expect the vectors for the ILS XX into ZZZ. I radar identified him and then after receiving a correct altitude report; I thought that he had passed the 3;200 MVA area; but he had not. Upon his reaching 3;000 MSL I cleared him to ZZZ airport at 3;000. My Data Controller informed me of the error and I immediately climbed the aircraft to 3;200.I should have checked the new MVA map and seen the aircraft was in the 3;200 foot MVA.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported having an aircraft below the MVA while on vectors to landing airport.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On the job training was being performed on arrival and departure sectors. I was the Instructor on the arrival sector. Tower Local Control called us to coordinate a departure left on the SID. We were unaware of this situation prior to them calling. Realizing our confusion; Local Control hung up and called the Supervisor. We told the departure sector to keep the aircraft runway heading on departure because we had an aircraft in the downwind for a runway that would have conflicted with the departure had it stayed on the SID. The Supervisor over rode both myself and the Departure Controller and insisted the departure be left on the SID. No further coordination was made with us and the departure took off and entered our airspace on the SID.  Another Controller resequenced the aircraft on downwind so as to not conflict with the departure. The departure had to be taken off the SID anyway due to conflicts with other aircraft.I would recommend that the Supervisor not override the two controllers whose airspace this aircraft was going to enter. This aircraft should have been left on runway heading thus staying well clear of any conflicting traffic. Instead; it was left on the SID and flown through 2 final vector sectors and an arrival sector that had inbound traffic. If the Supervisor was so insistent on keeping the aircraft on the SID; they should have coordinated all of this well ahead of the traffic about to depart. In my opinion it was an unnecessary risk that caused confusion with 3 sectors and 5 different controllers.




Synopsis: A TRACON Arrival Controller reported a Supervisor disregarded the Sector Controller's wishes and approved a route for an aircraft that caused the controllers to have to move other aircraft out of the way.
Date: 201707
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Customer Service / Gate
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Due to thunderstorms with severe lightning; a ground stop occurred.  While the ramp was still closed and the radar showed lightning within 2 miles; the decision was made to have a ramp supervisor go around to our 'critical flights' to crack doors so that flights showed arrived; due to the long tarmac delays. Instead of just cracking the door the ramp supervisor actually opened the aircraft doors and allowed passengers to deplane all while the ramp was closed due to lightning. I called immediately on the radio to verify that the ramp was still closed and we were told yes by the Ops Manager. Then another CSA called the Ops Manager on the phone to verify that the supervisor was deplaning pax and that the ramp was still closed. The Ops Manager confirmed again ramp was closed but that 'Upper Management' made the decision to deplane. The ramp supervisor continued to open other aircraft doors and deplane pax. While passengers deplaned through the open door outside onto a metal hard stand passenger loading bridge out into the open tarmac into the building; you could visually see the lightning and the radar continued to register strikes within 2 miles of the airport. Agents at these gates then had to explain why we could not retrieve their luggage; due to the ramp being closed. So my question is why; if it is unsafe for the ramp personnel to be outside; why is it safe for a supervisor or our passengers to be outside?




Synopsis: CSA reported that passengers were deplaned from aircraft at gates while the ramp was closed due to lightning reports in the area.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GAI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G GAI
ATC / advisory: CTAF GAI; TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other CFI-I
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the ramp at GAI I listened to the ATIS; then contacted Potomac Clearance to get my IFR clearance. Winds were 330 at 6+ [kts.]; so while I was putting the plan in my GPS; I listened in on the common frequency; but didn't hear anyone. I was fully loaded and felt Runway 32 was optimal for me; and noticed one plane ahead of me earlier used Runway 32. I announced on the common frequency that I was taxiing to 32; and stopped at the hold short line. I contacted Clearance and said I was number one at Runway 32 at GAI; and they said to stand by. While I waited; I again listened; announced on CTAF that I was at Runway 32 but didn't hear anyone. When I got my clearance void time; I announced again on CTAF that I was departing Runway 32 and when I lifted off I finally saw the student pilot veering to his right (my left) about 500 ft. away and I turned opposite also in a steep climb. I never heard the guy; and obviously we didn't see one another till we were very close. He never said anything; and I chalked it up to a new pilot.Potomac Approach did ask me to call; which I did when we got to ZZZ; and I explained the situation. My take was that it was probably a new pilot who 'complained'; I gave my viewpoint; and thought we had cleared up the issue; until contacted a month and a half later. I'm not normally based at GAI; but have learned to be more vigilant; especially with all the flight training that goes on there. In the future; I'll probably wait longer after getting a void time; so to give every pilot the opportunity to hear and respond call outs.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an NMAC at GAI non-towered airport.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine Thrust Reverser
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After landing; then turning onto Taxiway Delta; we started seeing snow blowing over the windshield. The Ground Controller asked if we had an engine problem because he saw all the snow being blown around. I looked inside and saw the amber REV UNLOCKED light on engine #1 illuminated. I cycled the reverser lever twice which resulted in the green REVERSER light illuminated; so I decided to shut down the engine. The QRH applied only to an inflight situation. We taxied to gate and shut down #2 after ground power was applied to the aircraft. I wrote it up in the AML & spoke with Maintenance. Inadvertent/uncommanded deployment of #1 thrust reverser on taxi in. (Both reversers showed stowed on landing at 60 KIAS)




Synopsis: A300 Captain reports the left thrust reverser failing to stow after landing. This failure is not immediately detected by the Crew but it is brought to their attention by the Ground Controller.