elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Tower, DC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Captain was the Pilot Flying; on departure we received the Low Fuel Pressure lights; and due to this distraction he tried to deal with the alert instead of fly the aircraft. I told him he was drifting right and watch his course; he said that he was but he was slow in responding. I said to watch his course again and to go left; he eventually did but it looked as though we were very close to penetrating the prohibited airspace. Nothing was said after that and we continued on. I do feel that from the previous day and throughout the flight; this Captain was not prone to good CRM. He also seemed irritable in his tone and tenor; leaving me guessing how well he receives correction. I realize this Captain is a very new Captain and perhaps he was overloaded.I should have spoken up louder and more forcefully so that I was certain he heard me the first time I called out the deviation. I also feel that he should have had a better cockpit are and friendly environment from day one. His attitude and irritability should have been more open to Crew communication.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported that workload and troubleshooting on departure resulted in a course deviation.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: A90.TRACON, NH
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: TRACON A90
Second aircraft: Light Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was vectoring Aircraft X for the ILS. The weather was IFR. It was a problem getting a pointout with Tower approved. The reason for the problem was the terrible relationship we have with Tower combined with the lack of accountability. This was the second time during this session that a pointout with Tower was a problem. Having to beg for a pointout is quite a distraction. When Tower finally accepted the pointout; they launched Aircraft Y on a heading that was a conflict for Aircraft X. Given that they had Local Coordinator staffed there is no reason for the poor communication.Tower needs to be required to look at enough airspace to the north to be able to accept or unable pointouts for ILS in a timely manner. They also need to be held accountable for blatantly disregarding their duty as controllers.




Synopsis: A90 TRACON Controller had difficulty coordinating a point out with a Tower. After approving the point out; the Tower departed an aircraft into a confliction with the pointed out aircraft.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Driven Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Contacted by Supervisor
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: I was sent from Base to ZZZ for a B737-700 aircraft with a #1 Engine fuel leak. We arrived at night. We discovered that the #1 Engine Main Fuel pump was leaking. We inquired about getting an Inspector sent to ZZZ for the fuel pump replacement; but were told by Maintenance Control that no Inspector was required. A fuel pump was sent to ZZZ. The [following] morning; we proceeded to replace the part. I did not see the computer link for the Maintenance Task [Job Card] in Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 73-11-01/401. I also was not aware that a [specific Job Card] was required. The aircraft was flown on a ferry flight back to Base. Upon my arrival at Base I was told that Job Card was supposed to have been accomplished with the pump replacement. I researched the Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM) Chapter XX; Table 10.1 and saw that the B737-700 Main Fuel pump replacement was not on the RII list. The aircraft was kept at Base and the Job Card was issued that night during a Routine Overnight Check (RON). The MPM RII list and the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) reference contradict each other. If Table 10.1 of the MPM doesn't list this job as an RII then why does the Maintenance Manual have a Maintenance Task [Job Card] with an RII requirement? [This was a] failure to use Job Card.




Synopsis: After replacing a Fuel Pump on the #1 Engine of a B737-700; a Line Mechanic was told he should have completed a specific Job Card that included an RII Inspection. Maintenance Control said no inspection was required. Mechanic questions why the Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM) and the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) contradict each other.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Center hydraulic system low pressure. Followed QRH; unable to extend flaps beyond 5 due to LE and TR flap disagree.


Second narrative: About 2 hours after departure; we received an ECAS message: C Hyd Low Quantity. Pulling up the status page showed the quantity at .49 and decreasing. We preformed the proper QRH checklist and then Maintenance and Dispatch were advised. We planned on a Flap 20 landing with an Alt flap extension using a long final and continued to destination. When we checked in with Center and an emergency was declared. They were advised about the loss of Center Hydraulics resulting in some degradation of the flight controls and the loss of some aircraft systems. We requested emergency equipment to stand by. About this time the Captain made a PA explaining what was going to take place. Bingo fuel levels were discussed so as to not get caught up in the problem and run low on fuel. Once we started doing the Alt flap extension procedure we got a LE Flap Disagree ECAS and preformed that check list. With attempted flap extension beyond 5 we got a TE Flap Disagree ECAS and preformed that checklist also as the flaps would not extend beyond 5. Maintenance was called on the radio during this to assist with trouble shooting and aid in getting more flap out but all attempts were unsuccessful. A new landing distance for a Flap 5 landing at new gross landing weight was calculated and all crew agreed we could land safely. Captain performed the Flap 5 landing with touch down and roll out uneventful. We had told Tower before the landing we didn't think we could clear the runway once we were stopped with potential nose wheel steering inoperable but that was not the case. After landing using alt nose wheel steering we were able to taxi unassisted to the gate.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew experiences loss of the Center Hydraulic system two hours into a long range flight. When the flaps are extended using the alternate flap switches a LE disagree is encountered immediately and dealt with using QRH procedures. The TE flaps exhibit the same malfunction after 5 degrees of extension; resulting in landing in this configuration.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 180 Skywagon
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Other surveillance
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [After landing;] all 3 wheels were on the ground and the aircraft was moving left towards the grass. Tried to correct with right rudder and it was not enough to stop the movement to the left. Applied brakes to slow/stop the aircraft. The tail raised; and the nose lowered. Aircraft came to a stop with the aircraft tail high in the air. I turned off the ignition and master switch; exited the aircrafts. Called 911 and local emergency personnel responded. Supervisory staff notified. FAA was contacted; and incident discussed over telephone. After discussion the FAA 'released' the aircraft to be moved from the runway to a storage hangar on the airport. Maintenance Supervisor came to the site and supervised the operation to lower the aircraft's tail back on the ground using local personnel and equipment




Synopsis: C180 pilot reported losing directional control on landing roll.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FAI.Airport, AK
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 4
Aircraft: Caravan 208A
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received a terrain warning alert and low altitude alert notification from Fairbanks Approach [while on the] GPS 20L Approach into Fairbanks International. At the time; corrections were already being made.I was undergoing a route check with a company check airman; and the check airman was attempting to be helpful; but there was a communications breakdown between the pilots resulting in confusion [as to the minimum] altitude of that approach segment.Better communications and understanding between the airmen would have helped prevent this problem.




Synopsis: A C-208 pilot being given a route check by a check airman received GPWS Terrain warning and an ATC issued Low Altitude Alert while conducting an RNAV (GPS) Runway 20L approach to FAI. A communications breakdown between the reporter and the Check Airman was cited as a contributing factor.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Lever/Selector
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After the gear down handle replacement there's an Operational Test; AMM Chapter 31-61-00 of the landing gear sensors.  Had to 'activate' and 'deactivate' landing gear and [landing] gear door sensors; while watching cockpit for certain messages.  After aircraft passed the [Ops] Test; started removing activators and deactivators from B757-200 aircraft. Started in the nose gear then moved to the Main Landing Gear (MLG). Went to the right side MLG.  Went up on the ladder and removed all activators and deactivators.Moved the ladder to the left and did the same. I had a second person walk around the aircraft to make sure all activators and deactivators were removed. The left MLG uplock sensor was supposedly left on. I thought I had removed all test equipment and pins. The uplock activator is in a hard place to see even with the  [safety] streamer on. There was high winds all day and the going up and down the stairs all day might have added fatigue to the situation.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports he may have left an 'activator/deactivator' installed at the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) up-and-locked sensor on the uplock assembly of a B757-200 aircraft; after an Operational Test for a landing gear handle replacement.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing the 'steering inop' message displayed as the nose was touching down. As we were turning off the runway; the airplane continued to turn and we stopped at the edge of the taxiway and runway while performing the 'Uncommanded swerving on the ground' memory items. The left main gear was on the hold-short line and the nose just outside. This meant a portion of our aircraft wing and tail was over the hold short line. I immediately notified Ground as we had already switched; and declined emergency services. Upon seeing the first aircraft land on that runway; I re-notified Ground that we were on the runway hold short line and they simply responded that the Tower controller had been notified. Several more aircraft landed; so we decided to give it one more shot at getting off and we were successful in clearing the area. We called Operations and were towed to the gate. If in fact a runway incursion actually happened; I could have been a little more clear that we were still on the runway.  Tower could have sent all aircraft on final around; a little more extreme; or I also could have switched back to Tower and said on that frequency that we were technically still on the runway.




Synopsis: Upon landing the ERJ-135 First Officer noticed a steering inoperative message and the aircraft was stopped while still partially on the runway. Despite several radio calls to Ground Control reiterating the fact that a runway incursion existed; and assurance from Ground Control that the Tower had been notified; several aircraft landed on the compromised runway.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll; the Captain noticed the 'Wheel Not Turning' light was illuminated and he elected to abort the take off at approximately 100 knots.  The rejected takeoff was successful; and we taxied back to the gate without any problems.  Upon reaching the gate; we noticed the left inboard wheel temperature indicated approximately 310 degrees; while the other wheel temperatures indicated approximately 200 degrees.


Second narrative: During takeoff roll 'WHEEL NOT TURNING' light illuminated. I immediately rejected the takeoff at approximately 100 KIAS. We cleared the runway and taxied back to our original gate. The left inboard brake temp reached approximately 310 degrees (Brake temp light; which illuminates at 305; came on after reaching gate). The other three brakes never exceeded 200 degrees.


Synopsis: MD82 flight crew reports a 'WHEEL NOT TURNING' light during takeoff and rejects at 100 knots. The aircraft is taxied back to the gate where the left inboard brake indicates hot.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ILS 22R circle to land 29 at EWR. Began circle to land procedure just inside FAF on ILS 22R at approximately 1;200 FT. Runway 29 was clearly visible in front of us as we began the turn to downwind. Runway 29 had been preprogrammed into FMCS RT2 with 5 NM Runway extension. RT2 was activated and the 5 NM point extended upon initiation of the downwind turn. Shortly after completing the downwind turn (approximately 110 heading); ATC directed us to start the base turn. The base turn -as directed - was well inside the 5 NM point depicted on the map view. Though the runway was discernible when we initiated the downwind turn; it proved increasingly difficult to keep visual contact once we began our turn to base (Runway 29 was lost in a sea of surrounding city lights). To further compound the problem; we had insidiously initiated a descent away from the circling altitude as we turned back to intercept final. We were on a dogleg heading; right of the extended centerline when the GPWS - TOO LOW OBSTACLE warning was heard at approximately 500 FT; we initiated a climb; reported the go-around and ultimately leveled at 5;000 FT per ATC instruction. We flew an uneventful subsequent approach to Runway 22R.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier on an EWR ILS 22R Circle to Land 29; lost the Runway 29 runway lights in the city background lights; descended too early and executed a go around after an EGPWS TOO LOW OBSTACLE warning.
Date: 202009
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control Unit
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After leveling off for cruise. I pulled the power levers to set cruise power. As I did I noticed the torque continued to decrease even as I pushed the power levers further and further forward. Eventually the N1 reached below 30% and torque was bouncing between 300 and 500. The plane was losing airspeed rapidly so I request a descent. The propeller was wobbling in the air stream and the plane was shaking. I tried everything I could think of; then came to the conclusion I would need to shut the engine down and feather the propeller. After [advising] ATC I diverted to a nearby airport. Loss of power [occurred] right away. At the time I had no idea [why]. Maintenance came to where I was and determined a failure in the FCU (Fuel Control Unit) caused the engine to lose almost all powerFollowing training procedures securing the engine and landing as soon as practical.Maintenance [is] checking the state of the FCU; but it seemed like a rare event that might be difficult to predict and train for.




Synopsis: Beechcraft 1900 Captain reported loss of engine power during flight due to FCU failure.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VHHH.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON VHHH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ATC directed 300 knots or greater as long as possible below 10;000 feet due to spacing.  Captain flew 320 knots until 3;000 feet and 12 miles from LIMES. Even though waived by ATC; we made the 210 knot restriction at LIMES. Captain wanted this filed.ATC directed high speed below 10;000 feet. We complied with ATC instructions.




Synopsis: Pilot describes being assigned 300 knots or greater below 10;000 feet while on approach to Hong Kong.