elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PVD.Airport, RI
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E PVD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PVD
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While being vectored for the visual approach into EWB; we came very close to tandem parachute jumpers under canopy. We were on a vector of 090 from PVD Approach; at 3;000 FT. The Controller informed us of parachute operations in effect at the UUU airport. The non flying pilot happened to have the WAC chart book out following our progress up the coast as it was a nice VFR day. He noticed we were headed for the Newport State airport. So we asked the Controller about the progress of the jump operations. ATC then gave us a turn to 060. After completing the turn; and less than a minute later; ATC came back and said jump operations were several minutes earlier and probably concluded. Then another Controller came on the frequency and said cleared direct to BONDI (one of the fixes on the approach). So we turned back to 090; heading to BONDI. Just a few seconds after the turn; the SIC yelled; and I instantly looked where he was looking; and saw a tandem chute with two people in black suits; looking at us; at 12 o'clock and about 1;000-1;500 FT and slightly above our altitude. I quickly disconnected the autopilot and banked hard left missing the jumpers. We informed ATC about our surprise on the vector and all he said was that we were cleared direct to the airport. We landed uneventfully.I do not know of anything we could have done to prevent this from happening. I am thankful that my partner was so heads up about our location; reference to a non controlled airport with jump operations; and asking ATC about that operation even if ATC's timing was way off. Plus seeing the jumpers when he did; the credit goes to him; for the good outcome.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Fractional jet flight crew observed parachute jumpers near UUU and took evasive action to avoid a collision while on vectors to a visual approach at EWB.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Window Ice/Rain System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X; at cruise FL380; instantaneous very loud complete shattering of window L1 Captains forward window outer pane. I was flying and requested my First Officer to request a descent to a lower altitude. After initiating the descent; I gave the airplane to my copilot so I can perform checklists. I requested my relief officers to return to the cockpit from the bunk to help. Since the aircraft seemed to be holding pressurization; and window was not deformed or showing signs of an air leak; we leveled off at FL200. We performed the window damage FWD L checklist; and turned off the window heat for that window which had already failed. I contacted Dispatch; and [Maintenance]. We all agreed the best option was to divert since the window and pressurization were holding; maintenance was available there; and another aircraft for passengers. We performed the fuel jettison checklist; notified ATC that we were going to dump fuel; and recorded our Lat/Lon for start and end; and the amount we dumped. We dumped enough to be just below max structural landing weight at landing. We notified ATC of the position; heading; wind; ground track and GS where we were dumping the fuel. We continued to ZZZ at FL200 uneventfully; landed and taxi to the gate. The crew worked well together in managing the work load; and we were all in agreement on divert plan.




Synopsis: B787 Captain reported the complete failure of the outer pane of his windshield which necessitated an en route diversion.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the departure from BUR; we were given a clearance to level off at 6;000 feet due to traffic. After level off at 6;000 feet; ATC gave us a vector to a heading of 290 to avoid traffic now approaching our 12 o'clock position. As we began our turn; the TCAS system initiated a Resolution Advisory and provided descent guidance. I disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and complied with the TCAS guidance. I initiated a descent to avoid the intruder aircraft and we notified ATC of our TCAS RA event. At an altitude of 5;700 feet; I received the 'Clear of Conflict' alert from the TCAS system. We noticed while level at 5;700 feet; the TCAS system was showing the intruder aircraft 400 feet above our aircraft. When clear of all traffic ATC provided clearance to climb and instructed us to proceed back on our filed flight plan. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.I think this event could have been avoided with better separation from the other aircraft. I am unsure if the intruder aircraft was at the proper altitude it was cleared to; or if this event was caused by lack of ATC separation.


Second narrative: As we reached 5;700 feet; our TCAS showed traffic 400 feet above us; and visual contact was made with the aircraft directly above us; passing overhead. I [estimate] the aircraft was also at (or very close to) 6;000 feet MSL (our clearance altitude). I informed ATC that we were descending in response to a TCAS RA and that traffic was directly above and in front of us. ATC responded that traffic was at 6;500 feet. The Captain and I agreed (as well as our TCAS information) that the aircraft was much closer than 6;500 feet and must have descended below his cleared altitude to our altitude of 6;000 feet.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported an NMAC with another aircraft during departure from BUR.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MKT.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E MKT
ATC / advisory: CTAF MKT
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On about a 5 NM [final to] Runway 15; a helicopter (who had made no previous calls) announced 3 NM final ILS Runway 33. I let him know our position specifically to avoid [an] incident. The helicopter said he was going to go missed and stay at 500 AGL to avoid me and the traffic in the pattern. Once I reached 2000 MSL (1000 AGL) I told my student to look up; all of the sudden I saw the helicopter climbing through our altitude within 500 ft then broke off direct IKIBY for the RNAV 22. The helicopter was over Runway 33; and we were over Taxiway A.




Synopsis: PA28 flight instructor reported an NMAC with a helicopter on approach to MKT airport.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tires
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The pilot reported he found an incorrect tire installed on [Aircraft X]. The findings were reported to ZZZ Maintenance on 06/XX/19 and a log page was created changing out tire and wheel assembly correcting the problem that same day. I was notified today that I may have incorrectly installed this tire on 06/XY/19 as I replaced the wheel and tire assembly due to cord showing. After looking into and researching what may have been wrong with the tire or installation I discovered that the [Aircraft X]is a [Large Transport] with carbon brakes and by closely looking at my parts tag I installed a tire and wheel assembly for a [Large Transport] Carbon. I can recall when I changed this tire I needed a carbon assembly; and also knowing that; the wheels for the [aircraft] I needed were marked with green dust covers; as mine was. I installed the wheel and tire assembly correctly but unknowingly installed the wrong part number. I recall pulling the tire and wheel assembly from the proper rack and noting the green dust covers on it. I can't recall checking for the correct part number and this is where I made my error. I do recognize my mistake and the importance of following all proper steps in part identifying and inspecting selected parts and part numbers to be installed.	While I was retracing my steps trying to remember and think about what may have happened when changing this tire assembly I walked the process in terminal two of pulling a tire assembly from the tire storage area. What I found was shocking! The location where [Large Transport] carbon tires are kept I noted one in stock and it had installed on it one side dust cover yellow and the other side dust cover green. Located next to this are more stored tires with two signs on the same wall located right below each other. One reads [Large Transport] and below that sign another sign reads [Large Transport]. All the tires located in this area had yellow dust covers. All the [Large Transport] should have green covers and they did not. The terminal two tire storage area needs to be remarked and reorganized. There is room for improvement in this area and I would be more than happy to assist with making any changes to improve this process.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reports that aircraft tire storage area has signage that is confusing.
Date: 202006
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Portable
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Discovered incorrect O2 walk-around bottles in OFAR Fwd S/S and OFCR S/S Aisle-side location. Found (1) 66N bottle positioned in OFAR (incorrect) and (1) 4.25 Single-Hi Flow bottle (incorrect) in OFCR S/S Aisle-side location. After discussion with Purser (and confirming aircraft compartment placards); each bottle was swapped to position correctly. Aircraft operated unknown number of revenue cycles with incorrect provisioning (thus violation of FAR 121.329) regarding supplemental O2 requirements. It is highly unlikely that a FA swapped the location of each bottle. Therefore; it is reasonable to assume this error was caused by Line Maintenance/Tech-Ops. This is a repeat write-up regarding incorrect identification and placement of 66N O2 bottles. As previously reported; Line Maintenance/Tech-op has documentation/understanding these cyl bottle are 'interchangeable'. Line Maintenance is confusing with former airline dual flow (Hi/Lo) 4.25 liter bottles. 66N bottle are *only* fitted with dual Lo flow outlets. See previous ASAP/CERS reports for additional details/suggestions.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported finding O2 bottles of different types swapped in their locations and are not interchangeable.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The aircraft was parked at [the] gate. I accomplished the walk around and found an abnormally large amount of debris around the aircraft. Often times; this debris is isolated to the area in front of the right engine; near the forward cargo hold.  Not today.  About 2/3 of it was on the right side of the aircraft from the nose to the tail; while the other 1/3 was directly underneath or on the left side of the aircraft.  [There were] metal items; many rocks; plastic debris.  [A] large rectangular metal piece was located right behind the front right tire. I don't know if it was sharp enough to cut the tire; but it was a safety hazard in my opinion.  Additionally; I came across an abnormal amount of safety wire. It was if maintenance actions were performed on an aircraft at the gate; and the old wire was simply discarded to the ramp.  It is readily apparent that there is no culture of looking for FOD potential on the ramp at EWR. All of this debris was in plain sight. The people on the ramp simply have no understanding of the importance of picking up this debris. My guess is that they have not been educated that this is a significant issue; and that simply picking it up can prevent aircraft damage than can eat away at our profit margin or worse.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a potential FOD problem due to debris often found in the gate area at EWR airport.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EGPX.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center EGPX
Aircraft component: Data Transmission and Automatic Calling
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Oceanic Clearance Delivery CPDLC late logon due to equipment glitch. [We] complied with B777 Datalink Comm Guide as per reversion to voice procedures. Scottish [Control] was upset we did not obtain our oceanic crossing clearance 30 minutes prior to coast out; which is not what the 15 minutes indicated on the form states. All issues were resolved and the crossing was otherwise uneventful.ATC failure to communicated with the aircraft CPDLC systems on scheduled time.




Synopsis: When CPDLC communications failed a B777 crew reverted to voice comm to receive their oceanic clearance.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival at the aircraft; my First Officer mentioned that the log book was not signed off and associated placards [had not been] removed correctly. I began to review the log book and indeed; maintenance was done the night before but the placard was not removed correctly. So from the jet bridge I called Maintenance but was directed to call Ramp Tower. I forgot that now a-days Maintenance screens the calls. So I began to explain the situation to the man that answered the phone. He then began a step by step lecture on how I can cross check pages; log book entry items; and read the sign off. And I myself can ensure that everything was OK.He said that if I confirm that everything was done correctly; I myself can remove placard [and] toss it or take it home with me. I did none of this.Maintenance is swamped.Stop cutting corners.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that Maintenance failed to properly sign the logbook and remove a placard; and attempted to defer responsibility to the flight crew instead.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Initial climbout; given instruction left turn northeast. Pilot flying (SIC) observed difficulty in roll and pitch axis. Pilot Monitoring (PIC) made positive control exchange and verified the aircraft; hand-flown felt very heavy in the roll control and decided to return to airport of origin. At this point ATC noticed the deviation and queried the crew. PIC decided to [advise ATC of the issue] due to difficulty in maintaining aircraft control and wanted freedom to deviate as necessary to mitigate the situation. Aircraft landed no flap without incident.

Callback: Reporter stated he took control from the copilot and verified flight controls felt heavy in roll after takeoff and decided to return to the departure airport. Reporter stated autopilot had been deferred with circuit breaker pulled and collared. Reported stated post flight maintenance inspection could not duplicate the gripe; but mechanic hypothesized they might have had an autopilot clutch servo grab. Reporter stated he flew the aircraft later and the flight controls felt normal.

Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: PC-12 flight crew reported stiff roll control on takeoff and returned to the departure airport.