Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ELP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ELP
ATC / advisory: TRACON ELP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was operating flight as pilot monitoring. At first I didn't notice anything out of the ordinary. In fact the entire flight was normal up until landing time this morning. Step by step is the sequence of events that took place after being cleared the visual approach. After being cleared the visual approach and being at a safe altitude of 9;000 feet (mind you field elevation is roughly 4;000 feet) Captain puts in an altitude of 6;000 feet and didn't communicate to me that he set a new altitude in the MCP.After the short amount of time passing I told him 'sir; I show 6;000 feet set confirm?' Of course; as pilot monitoring; I'm watching very carefully what the Captain is doing so that nothing serious happens to risk the safety of our approach and landing. I give the Captain 10 seconds to see if he will tell me of the new altitude set in the MCP. I hear nothing; just silence as the aircraft descends into mountainous terrain.We are now descending through the highest terrain which is 7;176 feet and the Captain puts in 4;500 feet in the MCP we are still descending closer and closer and closer towards the highest terrain which mind you the 'MSA' in that quadrant states 8;400 for a minimum safe altitude.Now I know something seriously is wrong. Something just doesn't feel right I know we're not supposed to be this low especially over mountainous terrain. Now at this time the very loud and serious terrain terrain pull up pull up warning flashes red and sounds in the flight deck. As I immediately begin to perform a recovery procedure for this uncomfortable undesirable situation the Captain says 'I got it'. Unfortunately he did not recover properly which scared me even more and showed me that he was playing chicken with mountains and with our lives.This was no profile approach or visual. ATC kept us at 9;000 feet for a reason; so that we can be clear of obstacles and mountainous terrain and yet for whatever reason he decided to set 4;500 in the MCP and descend to this dangerous altitude in mountainous terrain. Instead of recovering properly he began a left base turn with close proximity to the mountains.He was 'cutting corners' way too close and there was no APP mode or LOC or LNAV selected. I mentioned to the Captain where the runway is and pointed it out clearly as the visibility was greater than 10 and the winds were calm. You couldn't ask for better weather during this approach. I've flown many flights to and from [this area] and am very familiar with this airport as it can be tricky if pilots don't pay attention to detail and don't brief or execute an approach as briefed correctly. Now with no CRM from my Captain into the equation and terrain warnings and flying toward the wrong runway; [let] alone wrong airport and me yelling 'go around' and no response and the Captain continuing the very unstable approach.I was put in a situation I would never want anyone to ever experience. Captain was hand flying from the time being 'cleared for the visual to the runway.' Now the aircraft still in a left turn towards final 1;000 feet above touchdown still no gear down and still no flaps configured for landing. This put me in a very uncomfortable situation. Not to mention we weren't even heading towards the airport; Captain was flying the aircraft blindly toward Biggs Air Force base which we even discussed about during the approach briefing that it can be easily mistaken for El Paso airport as I mentioned I flew here before and am familiar with the terrain and layout of the airport. At this point I am so uncomfortable to the point that my training kicks in and in the name of safety I say; 'sir we are way off course go around.'Unfortunately he does not respond and does not execute a go around procedure. He is flying the aircraft closer and closer to the ground.I keep trying to point out Runway 4 which is 12;020ft long and it is very clearly visible where El Paso is especially Runway 4. To my disbelief the Captain nowis doing a series of unstable erratic maneuvers and is now setting himself to land on Runway 8R. A much shorter runway that we were not cleared to land on. Yet he was committed and aiming for Runway 8. Even the Tower makes a remark and asks if we're okay.Meanwhile I am telling the Captain. We must go around. I now raise my voice even more and say 'Sir this isn't right go around' he claims that he has controls and he 'can do it' yet we were way off course and never were in course in the first place for a proper stable landing on the runway because of the descent he initially performed into the high terrain as well as aiming towards the wrong airport and wrong runway once I guided him towards the correct airport once again and correct runway.Then it was my third and final yell for 'go around'. He said no we're landing; everything is under control when in fact the aircraft was 100% not in control. It was fast and sloppy and behind the curve and the aircraft was very unstable all the way until we made contact hard with the runway. The Captain barely put the aircraft on the runway with extensive abnormal high power settings in the flare to keep the aircraft from hitting extremely hard.I hope and pray that nobody ever has to go through what I have gone through this morning on approach into El Paso; TX. We are not Cowboys of the sky we are professional aviators and are set to high standards and have standardization for a reason; either pilot can call for a go around. And if an approach does not seem right then it most likely is not right. And unstable approach deserves a go around period. Especially one with pull up terrain warnings and wrong airports and runways in front of the pilots windshield. We preach callouts for a reason to follow them and to be safe so we can live to fly safely another day with many blue skies and soft landings; so we can be role models to the generation in future of aviation safety.


Second narrative: This narrative starts while being vectored for a visual approach to Runway 4 at El Paso. We were cleared to 9;000 heading 270 about 7 miles north of ELP. We were cleared for visual approach to Runway 4. We continued descent toward 6;000 and heading westbound. Once clear of the mountain ridge to the west of ELP I began further descent when we had a momentary terrain warning; I could immediately determine that terrain clearance was not a problem as we were in the clear and visually cleared all terrain prior to descending; I stopped the descent and the warning ceased.I continued the turn to the east south of the mountains and had difficulty in reacquiring the landing runway. There was some confusion looking into the sun at Biggs AAF and ELP. I continued towards the airport and realized I was north of the position I planned. The First Officer suggested a go around; which I considered and elected to continue since I still had adequate area to maneuver for the landing. I continued toward the runway and the First Officer assisted in confirming the landing runway. The First Officer again called for a go around; I told him I had the Runway and was confident the approach can safely be completed. I made a right turn to a modified left approximately 2 mile base for Runway 4. During the turn the First Officer called for a go around. The aircraft approach speed was about 125 and during this approach nothing seemed rushed. At no time during this operation did I feel I was pushing the aircraft or my capabilities.Having thought many hours about this flight I can see where my CRM skills were far from my beliefs. I do believe in the company's policy on go arounds. I do believe that the approach; although not pretty; was safe. But the big thing was that the First Officer was not comfortable and his judgement should not have been overlooked. I will not do this again. As for the terrain warning; although not actionable could have been avoided by planning the flight path either higher or over a different ground track.


Synopsis: The flight crew of an air carrier aircraft reported they exhibited poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) while in a stressful situation during approach and landing.