elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft had maintenance done at ZZZ1 requiring a [confirmation] flight. The reported problem was with the aileron system. Aircraft was cleared for service and flown to ZZZ the following day. The aircraft had aileron control problems going into ZZZ and the pilot opted not to report the discrepancy; however he informed me that the problem was on the flight to ZZZ and he had decided to bring the airplane to ZZZ2. The pilot then flew the aircraft to ZZZ2 and reported the problem. The aircraft went OTS and had extensive work to the aileron/spoiler system. The pilot in spite of having reviewed the aircraft maintenance history ignored policies and procedures set in place by airline when he did not report the discrepancy in ZZZ. His complete disregard for the safety of the passengers; crew members; and potentially the safety of any number of persons on the ground as any accident/incident would involve unwilling participants. Provide reinforced training to the flight department covering the responsibility of pilots to put safety first in spite of schedule; crew layover; or return to home base prior to scheduled time off.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported that an Air Carrier pilot neglected to notify the appropriate personnel that he had an inbound flight control problem. Instead; he departed to the next station where he reported the aileron issues.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OEB.Airport, MI
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E AZO
ATC / advisory: CTAF OEB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While I was entering the area of Branch County Memorial Airport (KOEB) from the east; I was calling out my position on common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF); 122.70 MHz. I entered the traffic pattern with the standard 45 degree entry on downwind for runway 7. On the frequency; I heard other traffic calling out their positions for Coldwater traffic and other airports. I paid no attention to that as this frequency serves many airports in the vicinity. As I approached the 45 and getting ready to turn left base; I saw a Piper at my 8 o'clock (between me and the airport) making a left turn also toward Branch County airport. I took evasive action and called out the traffic conflict. The pilot rudely informed me he was calling out his position for Coldwater airport. On the ground; I called out on the CTAF that the AFD calls this airport Branch County and NOT Coldwater and there was a close call because they were using a non-standard name that only a local would know. I was told on the air that it is called both and they continued using the non-standard name.




Synopsis: A multi-engine pilot reported an NMAC occurred in the vicinity of OEB airport; in part because local practice in airport terminology (locals call the airport 'Coldwater') differs from the AFD name (Branch County).
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: AVP.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON AVP
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Got a spurious EGPWS warning on visual approach for Runway 22 into AVP. We were on 2 mile right base intercepting between WEXIN and JULUT and just leveled off at 2800 feet (published glide slope intercept altitude for WEXIN/FAF). Clear of all terrain/towers; but still received warning. Disconnected autopilot and climbed up 100 feet and warning stopped.


Second narrative: On right base for the visual to Runway 22 at AVP at night. Flying to intercept ILS at WEXIN at 2800 feet MSL. GPWS warning for terrain went off with 'Pull Up.' We were clear of obstacles and terrain. The Captain disconnected autopilot and climbed 100 feet and the warning went away.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported a spurious GPWS warning on a visual approach at night.
Date: 201811
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp was advised to secure hazmat with 15 bags in the pit when loading and ramp only loaded 12 bags around hazmat. Aircraft had to return to gate to secure hazmat with the 15 bags the FAA requires to secure hazmat.




Synopsis: Ramp personnel reported HAZMAT cargo was incorrectly loaded and required a ground return to gate.
Date: 201912
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: LOSA OBSERVATION NOTICED THE FOLLOWING:Due to numerous complaints and delays due to the language in this section (3;A;9) Hydraulic Quantity Check; Brake Accumulator 2800 PSI; We are asking for further instructions and/or explanations (Notes) inserted into this section of the check.We ask for 3 items to be reviewed at a minimum:1. How do you want technicians to setup and/or check for the pressure to be 2800 PSI. (Note: If System B is turned off and flight crew sets the parking brake; accumulator pressure will be below 2800 PSI; to the laymen; under this check; as it is written; it would fail!)2.If it does fail; How do you want us to proceed. I.E. a Parking Brake Hold check per 32-XX-XX-XXX-XXX?3. Furthermore; If it does fail the parking brake hold check; Shall we service the accumulator per a specific AMM reference? We also would like MEL relief so as to not inconvenience our passengers. We would like to be given an opportunity to fix it at the next available maintenance opportunity!




Synopsis: Reporter states ambiguous task card wording is causing unnecessary delays during preflight of the brake accumulator pressure during the parking brake checks.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: TBM 700/TBM 850
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL240 aircraft began to show inability to maintain cabin pressure with cabin altitude slowly rising. Requested descent to FL220 precautionary. Upon reaching FL220 BLEED OFF annunciated; bleed flow turned off and cabin pressure began to dump to ambient. Emergency procedures followed; with oxygen mask donned and communication established with ZZZ [Center]. Requested and initiated an [expedited] descent to 12;000 initially at a maximum rate of descent observing maximum airspeed limits. Requested and received headings for ZZZ. Below 12;000 feet oxygen mask was removed and normal communications re-established with center. Handed off to ZZZ1 approach for vectors to ZZZ. Handed off to tower for an uneventful landing. Was not asked for a follow up phone call by tower so did not initiate one.No damage to the aircraft beyond the ruptured pressurization supply line that precipitated the [event]. Only myself on board so no exposure of passengers to the experience.All that I would have done differently would have been to initiate a more aggressive descent upon first seeing that the cabin was not maintaining a normal pressure in order to have perhaps precluded the [event]. There were no other indications in the cockpit that anything was amiss until the catastrophic failure of the pressure line.




Synopsis: Pilot reported an expedited descent after a bleed air supply duct failed and cabin pressure was lost. Pilot reported making a normal landing.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reciprocating Engine Assembly
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: With three passengers on board I departed the Airport with full fuel tanks. At about 100 AGL I suffered a complete loss of engine power on engine #1 (critical). My airspeed was about 5 MPH above Vyse. I lowered the pitch slightly and maintained Vyse. I first verified all engine levers were all the way forward then immediately verified both engines were feeding off the main tanks and switched both boost pumps to high. Engine #1 gave a brief lurch like it was trying to restart but then just stayed dead. I slowly pulled the prop lever for #1 back to verify I was feathering the proper engine. I pulled it back to the feather stop then pulled the #1 mixture lever to idle cut off. I then realized the prop was still windmilling; so I pulled the prop lever all the way into the feather detent and the prop feathered. After reporting the problem to the Tower I was immediately cleared to land. I was able to easily make it around the pattern and land.An inspection of the engine revealed that a bolt that holds the mixture cable to the rear of the engine had backed out causing the cable to fall and pull the mixture to idle cut off even though both mixture levers appeared to be full forward. The aircraft was four hours out of annual inspection and new mixture cables had been installed. The IA believes the bolt was not properly tightened during the installation.




Synopsis: BE-55 pilot reports a left engine failure at 100 FT after takeoff. The engine is feathered and the flight returns to the departure airport. Post flight inspection reveals that a bolt that holds the mixture control to the rear of the engine had come loose causing the mixture to go to idle cut off. Maintenance had recently been performed on this component.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RNO.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C RNO
ATC / advisory: Tower RNO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Moderate turbulence below 14;000 feet.  Heavy winds as well. 290/19 G29 on the ground.  Cleared Visual Approach 34L. Approach was normal; but Captain very busy dealing with speed fluctuations and turbulence.  I was double checking the winds with Tower. Watching terrain as well.  Adjusted REF speeds for gusts and prevailing winds. Captain called for flaps 30; I inadvertently moved flap handle to 25 and did not know it.  Everything was good until short final; we got Too Low Flaps" aural alert.  We executed go-around immediately. Need to look down and see if correct flap detention is selected."


Second narrative: On flight to RNO we received a Too Low Flaps warning from the GPWS around 500 feet AGL on an approach to Runway 34L. We had continuous moderate turbulence below 13;000 feet MSL on our approach and that was distracting. We were on a high right base leg because of the terrain. We were cleared for the visual on the right base leg. Also; on base we were gear down flaps 15; and near flaps 15 approach speed. I called for flaps 30 and the Before Landing checklist well above 1;000 feet AGL; because I wanted the extra drag. I did not notice the flaps were at position 25 during the Before Landing checklist. Our REF speed was plus 9 and then increased to plus 15 with the new Tower winds.  At about 500 feet AGL we received the Too Low Flaps warning and I did a go-round. We were vectored for another approach to Runway 34L and did a normal landing.I felt task loaded on the approach. I was concerned about the turbulence; terrain; and changing surface winds. I let these additive condition distract me while doing the Before Landing Check List.  I should have bought myself more time by asking for a longer down wind on the approach.


Synopsis: B-737 flight crew reported executing a go-around upon receipt of a configuration GPWS warning.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Reverser Position Indication
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at cruise flight at FL380 we received ENG 2 REVERSER FAULT ECAM. I was the pilot flying with autopilot 2 engaged. The Captain instructed me to continue flying and to take the radio while he handled the ECAM. The Captain briefed me on the ECAM and we agreed to contact Dispatch via ARINC patch. A decision to divert to our nearest and most suitable airport was made since the ECAM directs to land ASAP; which I supported after considering weather; mechanical clues (no secondary indications); facilities; terrain and overall passenger and crew safety. We coordinated with Dispatch and ATC about the diversion. The Captain reviewed the diversion guide; briefed the flight attendants and passengers; while I followed ATC instructions to proceed. The Captain elected not to declare an emergency after he considered all factors in front of us aided by the inputs that he received from Maintenance; Dispatch; and our threat and systems analysis. We briefed the visual approach and landed without incident.




Synopsis: An A320 flight crew received a reverser fault indication at FL380; they did not declare an emergency but decided to divert to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: ZZZ
Location: GFK.Airport, ND
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D GFK
ATC / advisory: Tower GFK
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The student and I were conducting a go-around due to an unstabilized approach. I; the Flight Instructor; contacted Tower and informed them we were conducting a go-around on Runway 17L. Tower responded and stated 'Go-around left side; I will call your crosswind' I replied; repeating the go-around positioning but I do not recall if I repeated the crosswind call. We continued to climb up to traffic pattern altitude. When we crossed over the runway threshold I continued my traffic scan and my student turned crosswind. At this point I spotted another aircraft entering downwind abeam the threshold of 35R. I took controls and initiated a climbing right turn while the other aircraft descended and turned right. I then stated to ATC that we had turned crosswind early. Tower then told us to follow the aircraft now in front of and below us. We then finished our traffic pattern safely; and finished our operations. A few brief moments of less than complete situational awareness on my part and the long downwind entry of the other aircraft put us in close proximity. I was so focused on teaching and scanning for traffic that I quickly forgot the crosswind call; a simple mistake; but a dangerous one. I should have realized that teaching should have been put aside during congested traffic pattern operations.




Synopsis: An Instructor pilot reported a near miss at GFK after he and his student forgot that ATC would call the crosswind. They turned toward an aircraft already on final but took appropriate evasive action.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X; ZZZ-ZZZ1. 10 minutes prior to scheduled departure time; briefings and checklists complete; awaiting numbers from Preliminary Weight & Balance. The Ops Agent came down with a NOTAC form requiring Captain signature for two boxes of radioactive material; not in the remarks on the release. I looked up FOM [reference section] Radioactive Pharmaceutical Shipments XXXXXX as Cargo to determine if it was acceptable HAZMAT. I determined from the NOTAC that the Transport Index was in the acceptable range; and that it was stowed correctly. We received an ACARS amendment to the 'Remarks' on the Release 'HAZMAT ON BOARD REFER TO NOTAC (time) XX'. I called the Dispatcher to confirm that; according to what I was reading in the FOM; we were safe and legal to carry the HAZMAT on this flight. He was in concurrence. We got our numbers and departed normally. Approximately an hour into the flight; I was reviewing the NOTAC and realized that although it had the correct 'origin' and flight number; it had ZZZ2 as the destination. The flight was not a through flight. Upon arrival in ZZZ1; I called the Dispatcher to confirm that ZZZ1 was the destination. He looked up the waybill and confirmed that ZZZ1 was the destination. I went down to the A bin and confirmed that ZZZ1 was the destination. I then called the Chief Pilot on Call to relay the information to him and see if he had any questions or additional input.I think there is a certain amount of continuation bias in the way we handle HAZMAT. The Ops Agent assumed that the Dispatcher okayed everything; the Dispatcher assumed that the Ops Agent okayed everything. I am not sure if anyone (other than me) actually looked up the policies regulating our carriage of medical HAZMAT. Introducing this scenario; 10 minutes before departure; greatly decreases the time available to trap errors. I believe that ZZZ2 was a typo. I should have caught it before departure. I caught it after departure; at cruise; where I had more time to examine it without distractions.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported identifying NOTAC [Notice To Captain] documentation error during cruise. Flight continued to a safe landing where the error was reported to Chief Pilot.