elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On max power takeoff; at approximately 800 AGL; the left engine indicated an over temp of 647 with red border. No other indications existed. Selected VNAV for power reduction and EGT fell to within limits. Continued to destination and wrote up the overtemp. Maintenance reviewed the write-up; accomplished maintenance checks as per Maintenance Control direction; and signed off aircraft as cleared to fly. We had the same aircraft on the next leg. We accomplished a Reduced Power Takeoff with N1 at 89%. At 800 AGL; same engine over temped again indicating 646 and red border. We again wrote up aircraft overtemp and met Maintenance at the aircraft. We were told; 'over temps happen all the time out of ZZZ.' We discussed the problem of over temps; particularly two in a row on the same engine; and how the Captain and I were both concerned for safety. If the right engine hiccupped; we would be stuck climbing out with an over temping engine. (We went VNAV immediately when we saw the overtemp above 800 AGL; no telling how high it might have gotten had we not reduced power then). I feel this repetitive overtemp; (previously written up as well) is indicative of a greater problem with the engine; and the continued philosophy of 'it is within maintenance limits' is an additional problem that needs to be addressed. Do we have to wait until we shell an engine before we work on it?




Synopsis: B757 First Officer experiences two engine over temps in a row at 800 AGL with a maintenance inspection in between; and suggests the engine may be defective and should not be repeatedly signed off by Maintenance.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: WSI showed TRWs and MOD Turbulence near our route. Looked like we needed to deviate almost 200 nm east of course. Called Dispatch on SATCOM twice with no answer. Then sent free text ACARS message with no response. Coordinated with ATC for 150 nm deviation. Thirty minutes later [we] received message from Dispatch that he was called away from desk. I inquired about who was covering his desk and he said his 'compadre' behind him. Also stated that 'if he's busy or away; there is nobody else...last year we would have been thick as ticks...6 or 7 additional desks open...only 2 now due to COVID.'This 30 minute delay is unacceptable! If we had an emergency and needed assistance; we would have gotten no help! We could have already landed somewhere without any coordination with Dispatch.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a 30 minute delay in response from Dispatch regarding a deviation for weather.  Dispatcher cited reductions in staffing due to COVID-19 as contributing.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Other Push-back
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Push back
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During push back Passenger started to vomit in his seat.  Ran into lav continuing to vomit.  Exited Lav sat in unassigned seat vomited again. Ran into different Lav and proceeded to vomit again.  Returned to seat and then vomited in the aisle.  Ran into a third Lav and vomited again.  Captain contacted Operations and pulled back into gate.  Passenger removed.  Numerous passengers wanted to exit aircraft over COVID fears.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a passenger vomited multiple times during push back. Captain elected to return to gate and have passenger removed.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Lost Blue hydraulic electric pump during cruise flight. Tripped circuit breaker. Mx said no reset inflight and recommended landing at nearest Company MX station. Diverted to ZZZ. MX reset CB; checked pump operation; confirmed no previous aircraft history with that system; and signed logbook. No other issues during continuation flight to ZZZ1.




Synopsis: Captain reported a diversion after an electric motor driven hydraulic pump popped it's circuit breaker.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: A11.TRACON, AK
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11; Tower ANC
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Suspected 5G EventOn an Autopilot coupled ILS approach to 7L in Anchorage we intercepted the glide slope at 2;000 ft. about a mile and a half outside the final approach fix. Just after the intercept the glide slope indicator on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) began rapidly bouncing between 1/2 dot low to 1/2 dot high. The yoke correspondingly began oscillating in short rapid forward and aft movements. The aircraft flight path remained stable. My first thought was that there was a temporary ground interference with the glide slope antenna. The oscillations began diminishing as we crossed the final approach fix at 1;600 ft. when we got a NO LAND 3 EICAS Caution advisory. About five or six seconds later the Autopilot disengaged un-commanded. I cancelled the Autopilot wailer and completed the approach manually. The entire approach was accomplished in VFR conditions This event occurred at approximately XA:20Z.I didn't get a chance to read the 5G Interference bulletin until after we landed in Anchorage. When I did it occurred to me that our event may have been a 5G interference issue.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported that during an autocoupled approach the glide slope indicator and yoke began oscillating; followed by an uncommanded disengage of the autopilot. Pilot completed the approach manually.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was stationary with the engine running. I had just called Ground and told them who I was; where I was parked and my intentions to taxi for VFR North departure with appropriate ATIS information. Ground responded with my airplane # with taxi instructions to runway and permission to cross [the other] runway. These instructions required me to make an immediate right turn; which would be to my blind side. As I made the turn a citation jet was in motion on the active taxiway right next to where I was parked and getting ready to cross. I had to take immediate action of slamming on my brakes to avoid an immediate crash with the moving citation jet. After the jet passed by me I immediately called Ground and said; 'you gave me permission to taxi and you never mentioned another airplane was headed in my direction. I had to slam on my brakes to avoid hitting him.' Why didn't you warn me?Ground responded by telling me to taxi behind the citation jet. However at that point there was another citation jet headed to the same runway I was. It was not the jet I nearly hit. The ground personnel never responded or acknowledged the predicament he put both airplanes in.




Synopsis: The pilot of a PA46 reported a critical ground conflict with a Citation after receipt of a clearance to taxi from Ground Control.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LRY.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 99
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G LRY
ATC / advisory: CTAF LRY
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Somebody needs to have a little heart to heart talk with [users of LRY] airport about their use of non-standard traffic pattern operations (LONG - 6 mile straight in approaches) during higher density periods of flight operations.I had a near mid air with one of the aircraft that ignored the Traffic pattern.[NONE OF THE PILOTS WERE] FOLLOWING STANDARD TRAFFIC PATTERN PROCEDURES AS CALLED OUT IN THE AIRMANS INFORMATION MANUAL (AIM).Aircraft would fly out of the airport operations area and instead of using accepted procedures to join with other traffic operating at the airport (Left traffic for RWY 18 - as winds were out of the south); aircraft with the airport open house...were returning to RWY 18 on SIX MILE LONG straight in approaches (in perfect VFR conditions).We arrived at LRY in a no radio used for glider tow operations. We entered Left traffic using standard AIM procedures in front of a departing aircraft exiting in Left downwind. We turned standard left base and were about to turn final when a small aircraft broke off their long final. I witnessed several other aircraft ignoring the standard pattern while we refueled.There is a good reason why all aircraft -- especially during heavy operations - need to observe standard and accepted arrival procedures.These were NOT instrument arrivals - they were using the CTAF - but a discussion should be had with airport management about standard arrival procedures including standard pattern entry procedures when operating these flights.Fortunately both my student and the other pilot spotted each other and we both took appropriate evasive maneuvering...we landed with no incident; the other aircraft went around and circled to right and reentered a straight in (again a non-standard arrival pattern for a VFR aircraft.




Synopsis: While flying a standard pattern entry and circuit; the pilot of an aircraft not equipped with communication radios; suffered a close encounter on final with a straight-in another small aircraft.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight declared an In-flight Emergency and landed uneventful at destination airport after experiencing a HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR ECAM while stable at cruise altitude. Pre-dispatch of our flight was normal. Maintenance had cleared 2 inbound write-ups on our aircraft; both were cosmetic cabin items and irrelevant to our event. Due to late inbound arrival of this aircraft; our flight pushed back from the gate nearly 45 minutes late. Our aircraft was deiced with type II and Type IV fluid before initial taxi. Taxi out and takeoff was uneventful. At 21 minutes into our flight (and only a few minutes into level cruise at FL360) crew received a HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR ECAM message. Captain remained as Pilot Flying (PF) while First Officer remained as Pilot Monitoring (PM). Flight crew contacted Dispatch and Maintenance; and all agreed to continue to destination airport. Flight crew informed Center Controller of situation; and declared an emergency. While on downwind leg; crew performed the Landing Gear-Gravity Extension checklist. Approach and landing was normal on runway. Crew used idle reverse thrust on the Number 2 engine as briefed; as the Number 1 engine reverse thrust was inoperative due to the hydraulic malfunction. Aircraft stopped approximately 3;500 feet from the end of the runway on the centerline. CFR personnel approached the aircraft after the engines were shut down; and determined some residual hydraulic fluid was still leaking on the runway. Approximately 25 minutes after landing; the CFR personnel allowed the aircraft to be towed by company tug to planned arrival gate. Passengers deplaned normally through Jetbridge upon gate arrival.




Synopsis: An A320 crew declared an emergency and landed uneventfully at the destination airport after the ECAM alerted HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I set up the RNAV to Runway XX in the FMS. Saw what we thought was the airport at 10 o'clock and called it in sight. Center cleared us for a visual approach and switched us to Tower. After turning final I noticed we were paralleling the final approach course on the FMS and realized we had misidentified the airport. I advised the Tower and turned towards [destination] and landed uneventfully. Lesson learned: always follow the Final Approach Course depicted on the FMS. Glad we set up the approach even though we were on a visual approach otherwise we might not have noticed our error and landed at the wrong airport. Although I am embarrassed and feel stupid; I also feel good that we always set the Final Approach Course in the FMS. I have read about disregarding indications of things not right when you have a mindset for a course of action and I can attest that it is indeed powerful. It was only the sight of paralleling the final approach course on the FMS that clued me into something not right. The runway we were going to was the same direction and later I found out this is not an unusual occurrence [here]. They even have a note in the AFD to use caution. Bottom line is another great lesson learned!




Synopsis: C560XL flight crew on a visual approach lined up for the wrong airport until noticing that they were paralleling the Final Approach Course on the FMS. Crew re-established course to destination and landed without further incident.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 airport via direct on an IFR flight plan; level at 5;000 feet. It was a charter; empty out. One soul; 3.5 hours of fuel on board. A little over halfway to my destination; my fuel flow gauge began to rapidly fluctuate between 100-450 PPH. I turned my ignition and fuel boost on and checked both fuel tanks on; my fuel flow then began to fluctuate between 300-450 PPH; no other indications; annunciations; or failures at this time. I simultaneously requested to return to the ZZZ Airport and requested a higher altitude out of caution. I added power and initiated a climb to 8;000. During my climb to 8;000 my fuel flow began fluctuating again between 100-450 PPH accompanied by an oil pressure fluctuation between 85 and 100 PSI. Oil pressure unstable but maintaining within the green arc. There were no other failures or annunciations at this time. Given my inability to remedy the fluctuating gauges as well as the introduction of an oil pressure instability; I deemed it most appropriate to declare an emergency at this time. I landed safely at the ZZZ airport; approximately 45 minutes after my departure.




Synopsis: Cessna 208 Caravan pilot reported fluctuations in both fuel flow and engine oil pressure indications; resulting in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Inbound flight attendants reported a seat back was broken and failed to stay upright. A maintenance code and write-up was entered into the logbook. Due to thunderstorms the flight was late with a quick turn. The seat was blocked and the back secured in the upright position. Due to the fact that the seat back was secured in the upright position and the seat not used; we assumed that the matter could be dealt with at the next station (the Captain's write-up was info to Maintenance). We discovered on the flight to our destination that the write-up should have been cleared by Maintenance back at the previous station. In the future any logbook write up should be discussed with Maintenance and the MEL procedures checked before making the decision to proceed with the flight.


Second narrative: Things are always changing and I assumed it was no big deal to leave with a seat inoperative that was not being used. I have learned my lesson and will never takeoff without looking up an item in the MEL. One suggestion we could do as a company is that if an arm code is sent that requires Maintenance to address the issue (i.e. not crew placard-able); would be to notify Operations by an automated system tied to the arm codes to call Contract Maintenance to expedite the operations and prevent overlooking an item that needs to be addressed by Maintenance to prevent other crews from possibly making a similar mistake. I made an assumption and will not in the future.


Synopsis: A MD-83 flight crew erroneously departed with an open cabin seatback write up because the seat was not being occupied and was fixed upright.