Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Down Lock
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Procedure; Staffing; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While an unplanned layover in ZZZ for a maintenance failure on (Data Acquisition Unit (DAU) 1 A Fail Warning) which began when we flew Aircraft X to ZZZ. The Captain and I; the First Officer (FO); were ordered by company to maintenance reposition fly the broke aircraft we had been declining to fly for two days to ZZZ1 from ZZZ with the gear down. The weather at that time period indicated moderate icing for the altitudes we would be flying as we climbed to (per Captain's prior experience with gear down flight in an ERJ145) cruise altitude. At about XA00; the captain spoke on telephone with company operations about the icing threat and company agreed with him the flight would not go due to icing. At about XA45; the Captain was notified that we would fly Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ2. Upon arriving ZZZ and walking thru the corridor the other Captain reassigned moments previously from Aircraft X to our inflicted aircraft; Aircraft X; approached me and introduced himself. He stated that he had been reassigned and his ZZZ Operations escort had been told by [company] to 'arrange the swap so the two flight crews did not speak with each other.' For this reason the captain wanted to actually talk to us about the situation with Aircraft X. We briefed the Captain on the events since landing at ZZZ with the DAU1 A failure in Aircraft X two days earlier:[Day 1 of 3]On climbout from ZZZ2 we heard/felt a loud 'THUMP' from under the pilots' feet. EICAS indications appeared normal. About 45 minutes out from ZZZ we got a DAU 1A Fail EICAS Warning Message. We followed QRH using DAU reversion button. The QRH Note stated after in DAU Reversion mode we would not have available many Side 1 engine and fuel; bleed air EICAS indications. We lost those and Landing gear; and Fuel Used indications when DAU1A Failed. However in reversion mode; we had all these EICAS indications except now Fuel Used showed yellow dashes. The captain ACARS messaged to [Company] Maintenance asking if we can trust the three green gear down indication anticipating landing ZZZ. In IMC at about 6000 msl the Bleed Low Pressure Caution momentarily presented while the power was in midlevel setting. Then we had Warning EICAS message DAU 1 WRN MISCOMP presented on five mile final. All observable landing gear indications showed landing gear down when we landed normally.Captain wrote up Maintenance issue and called [company] Maintenance about problem. [Company] told us to reposition the aircraft gear down to ZZZ2...after discussion regarding viability of this long flight with an untrustworthy (differing DAU/IC600 indications) EICAS system and no trustworthy cockpit indications that the Landing Gear is actually down and locked and the Moderate Icing forecast along our route; [company] then changed plan to fly gear pinned down to ZZZ1 Maintenance station to catchup with remainder of our 4-day trip scheduled. Now evening and dark outside; for the same reasons we refused to fly this flight at that time. [Company] said they would possibly send Maintenance team from ZZZ3 (short drive away south) to fix problem.[Day 2 of 3]Our schedule showed a repo flight in Aircraft X to ZZZ1 in the morning. We showed that morning and discovered that nothing was fixed on Aircraft X and [Company] wanted us to fly the airplane in Moderate Icing with gear up now to ZZZ1. The captain spoke on telephone with a manager at [maintenance] about the history of problem with the THUMP. [The manager] stated the noise had been previously reported and they ascertained that the problem was the Nose gear up lock device oscillating and that Maintenance had changed out parts to fix it. We further discussed this Group 2 Non-Routine Flight Operation (NRFO) flight and why such an oscillation would occur possibly due to Landing Gear Electronic Unit (LGEU) and the DAU and SG/IC600 systems not properly communicating with each other.  We again refused the airplane because we could not trust the EICAS indications regarding was the landing gear down or not.  The threat did not square with the risk flying in Moderate Icing conditions and possibly executing a belly landing in ZZZ1-- just send Maintenance and fix it in ZZZ.[Day 3 of 3]We awoke knowing the planned flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 in Aircraft X. Discovering that no maintenance action was taken to fix the DAU1 A malfunction; and that icing flight conditions still prevailed; the captain and Maintenance agreed the flight would not happen. The rest of the story continues above at XA00.Threats: -- [Company] QRH actions and procedures differed from what crew observed in cockpit--- negatively affected trust of displayed cockpit indications.-- Weather: moderate icing-- Company Maintenance personnel withholding from flight crew known history of aircraft mx issues with apparent intentions to convince crew to fly unsafe aircraft to mx base.-- [Company] company maneuvering to prevent exchange of crew changeover information and debriefing significantly undermines trust between flight crew and management and greatly undermines CRM and safety.-- Confusion with wording in FOM regarding qualification for line aircrew to fly a Group 2 Non-routine Flight Operations (NRFO) flight.QRH wording and procedures should be reviewed for accuracy and corrected. More detail is needed.Maintenance personnel should be more open to flight crew about recent past mx complaints/actions that directly apply to current situation. Withholding information from flight crew members negatively effects the intra-office trust necessary for effective CRM and efficient completion for flight operations. [Company] maneuvering to prevent exchange of crew changeover information and debriefing significantly undermines trust between flight crew and management and greatly undermines CRM and safety.




Synopsis: EMB-145 First Officer reported the Data Acquisition Unit (DAU) 1A unit failed in flight accompanied by a thump. After landing the crew's company asked that they ferry the aircraft to a Maintenance Station. The crew refused successive days because icing conditions existed and gear down ferry was high risk. The company asked another crew to ferry the aircraft; but would not allow the two crews to discuss mutual concerns.