elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PVD.Airport, RI
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 4
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Shortly before reaching KENTE we were told to change frequency to BOS Center and advise them that we were intercepting the LOC. We were unable to make contact on the given frequency; and after several attempts we reverted back to PVD Approach frequency and were unable to contact them as well. At that point we were beyond ETA and we continued on the approach making normal CTAF announcements and landed uneventfully. An aircraft behind us had the same issue. We were able to relay through another aircraft our close of flight plan.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported loss of communication with ATC prior to landing.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LNK.Tower, NE
Aircraft: Learjet 40
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C LNK
ATC / advisory: Tower LNK
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working Local Control at the time of the event. We had just changed the flow to a north configuration (Runway 36; Runway 35; and Runway 32). There were a few departures; both VFR and IFR as well as one Cessna VFR in the pattern. A LR40 called for departure with an eventual flight plan to the southeast. I cleared the LR40 for take off Runway 35 with a restriction to fly runway heading. This was due to other traffic; a VFR on a fan heading of 030. After clearing the LR40; I continued with other duties. As the LR40 was tagging up; I got a Conflict Alert. I looked at the TDW to see what was going on and the LR40 was in Conflict Alert with another transponder north of the airport. It took me a couple seconds to recognize what was happening and it took me aback because I could not figure out who the other aircraft could be. As it turned out; there was a duplicate beacon north of the field. The LR40 was in conflict with the dupe beacon. The LR40's data tag should have been associated with the aircraft which was about 1 mile north of Runway 35. Instead; the actual beacon of the LR40 had no data tag. The dupe beacon which was approximately 3 miles north of Runway 36 had the LR40 data tag. It took about 15 seconds for the LR40 data tag to establish on the real beacon and then a few seconds more before the dupe beacon went away. This was a terrible distraction at this moment. Recommendation; to have an ASR system free of anomalies like dupe beacons; this as not been a big problem with our ASR-11 system at LNK so it was weird to see it today.




Synopsis: LNK Controller voiced concern regarding a false 'Conflict Alert' apparently caused by a 'split target' and/or 'ghost/duplicate' target anomaly.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After taking off and raising the landing gear; the nose gear light remained red. When at a safe altitude; the Captain (pilot flying) took the radios and asked me to accomplish the QRH procedures. After following QRH procedures and verifying that the light remained green with the gear extended; I retracted the gear and the light remained red. The Captain transferred controls to me and made calls to Dispatch; Maintenance; and Operations. It was decided to return to the departure airport. Announcements were made to the passengers after discussing the situation with the flight attendants. The Captain and I discussed whether to declare an emergency. We decided that since all three lights and the pin indicated a safe gear in the extended position; we would only declare an emergency if the unsafe light was red with the gear extended. We decided to lower the gear early in the approach; which produced green lights on all three gears. A short time later; the nose gear light turned red and alternated red and green sporadically. Vectors were requested from ATC to 'break off' the approach to accomplish QRH procedures; and declared an emergency. After completing the QRH and the return checklist; we asked for vectors back to the approach and landed without further incident.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A MD-83 landing gear indicating system malfunctioned after takeoff so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and; after an uneventful landing; a nose landing gear position fault was discovered.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At approximately 1;200 AGL while landing 9L ORD our Evac Alarm began going off on its own. After landing we were cleared to follow the aircraft ahead on M. Unable to silence it or call the cabin; we were cleared to stop in C pad to speak to the F/A (Flight Attendant) face to face to ensure they had not initiated it; still unable to silence it we then resumed taxi with Ground. Having lost the preceding aircraft to follow we were cleared C Z SS short of T6. While taxiing we called ramp to see if gate was open; we then began discussing if there was any other way to silence the very distracting alarm; as we were on taxi Z; we discussed calling Maintenance to see if they would be able to give us guidance; at about this time the FO (First Officer) called out that I had just missed my turn for SS. I stopped immediately and called Ground; the controller said to hold position while she called her supervisor to see if Z through the device pad was open. She then cleared us Z K short CC; which we complied with; at which time we were handed over to the south Ground Control. They cleared us the rest of the way without incident. At the gate I called Ground on the phone and was told they understand distractions come up for us and said she just had to check about Z due to random closures of it but that it was open at the time.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported taxiway incursion during taxi to gate after landing.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At the start of the First Officer's takeoff roll; with the 'Terr' warning system already selected on his 'Mini map' and ND; the Captain elected to display 'Radar' on his ND using his EFIS control panel's rotary selector drop-down 'Menu' function. This resulted in an uncommanded test of the radar system including all audible and visual warnings appropriate to both Radar and PWS systems tests on both pilot's displays. At 80 KTS the 'windshear' abnormal EICAS checklist message was displayed. In the presence of otherwise benign conditions; the takeoff was continued and was uneventful through the departure phase.




Synopsis: A Boeing widebody crew report how their EGPWS entered an uncommanded Radar and Predictive Windshear System (PWS) test during takeoff with First Officer's ND selected to TERR while the Captain's was selected to RADAR using the EFIS drop down MENU.
Date: 201912
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I'll try to explain the irregularities in the several different ways. In EASA authority regulations; there shouldn't have been a department named or tagged 'Technical Support Staff;' but in the Company; there is. Also technical support staff and aircraft maintenance engineers work on the exact same aircraft and do [the] same job; but they're still paid [a] different salary.In the company; the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) is completely ignored. During work; all [of] the technical staff get prevented work with [the] AMM. They always desire to lead by [the] AMM during work on [the] aircraft; but almost all [of] the managers in the company block it. Authorized staff always slack in the boards [and] they never work. Only the non-authorized staff work in the aircraft. Task Cards/NRCs (Non Routine Card) of work are closed without checking by C/Ss.Technical staff are forced by [the] managers to finish work early in almost all [of] the maintenance applications. For example; [one may be] appointed 120 hours of work in Task Cards/NRCs [but] get [it] finished by force in 20 hours. Inappropriate/inconvenient work in AMM have made the technical staff [work] by force by managers. All [of] these irregular elements and more in Cabin Interior Maintenance; Component Maintenance etc. are hidden by the company to [avoid] detection by [the] EASA and FAA.




Synopsis: Individual reported that the Contracted Maintenance provider was not using approved technical data to service aircraft.
Date: 202104
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 MAX 9
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: The Lead was marshalling in the flight and stopped it short of the 737-900MAX stop line. We attached the wrong tow bar to a 737-900MAX upon seeing that we attached the wrong tow bar we stopped and disconnected the tow bar. Thinking that the brakes were set; the 737-900MAX rolled back a couple of feet. We froze the scene and called for the supervisor. No one was hurt or any damage to the aircraft. After the supervisor looked at the scene; took pictures and saw that no one was hurt and there wasn't any damage to the aircraft we hooked up the correct tow bar and proceeded to pull the aircraft back in a couple of feet to the correct stop line.


Second narrative: In the processing serving the aircraft; hooked up the wrong tow bar to the 737-9MAX.  Because; shortage of the tow bar.  The MAX tow bar from the gate was taken from other gate; it caused a confusion on the hook up.  When it was brought to the attention the tow bar was changed to the correct tow bar.


Synopsis: Ramp workers reported they used the wrong tow bar for a B737 MAX 9 aircraft and when they removed it the aircraft rolled because the brakes were not set.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Somebody; ANYBODY ON EARTH; show me where anything 'wake remnant' is written. I get it; a heavy tows a line of wake turbulence behind it that trails for 5 miles. But; there's nothing written about 'wake remnant'; yet I'm to be held to a standard to separate from something which has no separation requirement? What!?! My Aircraft Y was 4.63 miles to the east; and 3 miles to the northeast of a 'heavy' cargo aircraft; as well as 1100 feet above it on a vector to join a final approach course separated by 2800 feet; and because I crossed a point in space at the same altitude the heavy was 4.63 miles ago...that's a 'wake remnant' issue?Does wake turbulence not spin downward and outward? Do the laws of physics not apply to anything except the aircraft which are solely relying the laws of physics to stay airborne? Does the wake turbulence have an agreement with the Heavy aircraft to not start falling downward and outward until it has visual confirmation that the Heavy is exactly 5 NM away? I'm not separating from an agency introduced 'theory.' Put that 'theory' in the 7110.65; and then we have a separation standard. If my Aircraft Y was below the altitude the heavy was at in that same point in space; this would be an entirely different [report]; but again; it would still have no scientific evidence to back it up. At what rate does Wake Turbulence spiral down and out? I made sure to step Aircraft Y down 1000 feet at a time in a safe manner which caused no delay; and what I got called on was bunk.Have the agency define wake remnant in all instances.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller expressed frustration with being cited on an operational error based on a wake turbulence separation violation. The Controller believed the 5 miles separation did not apply due to the aircraft passing 1000 feet above and across the heavy aircraft's trail; not following it directly as the regulation states. The Controller pointed out that there is no published standard for this situation in the 7110.65 and suggested that the FAA address this.
Date: 201402
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Final Approach
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Flap overspeed by 2 KTS. Flaps selected to 10 at 195 KTS; hit wake turbulence from aircraft ahead. Speed increased rapidly from 195 to 212; speedbrakes deployed. Put information into logbook. Maintenance inspected [aircraft] and we departed.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported a flap overspeed as a result of a wake vortex encounter.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RNO.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Second aircraft: F/A 18 Hornet/Super Hornet
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared direct to FMG VOR. We were issued a descent to 16;000 and I believe we were somewhere around FL210-FL220 when we received a call from Center advising us that we had F18 traffic at one o'clock. Seconds later we received a TA that showed the F18 5000 ft below us and climbing. It immediately turned into a climbing RA which we complied with and advised ATC. During this whole ordeal I was trying to divide my time inside and outside the cockpit to locate the traffic. There were a few transmissions to both the F18 and us from the Controller. At one point I believe he mistakenly told us to descend and then corrected himself. When I got a visual on the F18 he was climbing rapidly and rolling and then seemed to level off. I believe [ATC] told him to descend to FL190. He then passed behind us. We recovered from the RA and continued our descent into RNO.




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reported an airborne conflict with an F-18 on descent into RNO.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL260 and 310 knots assigned airspeed; the aircraft executed an uncommanded roll. The FO and I had just been discussing the possibility of an arrival change; due to the landing configuration at destination and were referencing our iPads in anticipation of the change. When I returned my attention to the instruments the aircraft was rolling through 60 degrees of bank. It took a few moments to process what the aircraft was doing. At approximately 70 degrees of bank I disconnected the #1 autopilot and initiated a recovery. Approximately 500 feet of altitude was lost during the recovery. With control of the aircraft reestablished; we notified ATC of the deviation. ATC then directed us to descend to FL240. Although noticeable to the passengers and cabin crew; the seatbelt sign was on and no injuries were reported. The remainder of the flight was unremarkable. After landing; I entered the anomaly in the logbook and spoke with Maintenance before leaving the aircraft. I am still puzzled as to the cause of roll; but I am grateful for the unusual attitude recovery training we practice at recurrent.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported recovering from an autopilot malfunction that put the aircraft into an uncommanded 70 degree bank and resulted in an altitude loss of 500 ft.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: UWL.Airport, IN
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E CMH
ATC / advisory: TRACON CMH
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: We were on an IFR flight plan to UWL. Filed route of flight was ZZZ RID ECONO. ECONO is the only IAF on the approach VOR or GPS 27 UWL. Crossing RID were still talking to Columbus Approach and Columbus Approach cleared us for the VOR 27 Approach. The plate shows a bold hold at ECONO and does not state 'No PT' at RID VOR. But going straight in from RID I queried Approach Control to ask if we could go straight in or if they needed us to fly the mandatory hold at ECONO. The Controller then asked us what approach we were on. I reminded him that he had cleared us for VOR 27 at New Castle. Approach Controller responded; 'Oh I thought you were doing the VOR 6 at RID. Contact Indianapolis Approach now on 135.45.' I quickly contacted Indianapolis Approach and they seemed surprised to hear from us. Indianapolis then re-cleared us for the 'VOR 27 New Castle Straight In.'  In all the flying I've done I've never been handed off from one approach facility to another after having been cleared for the approach.  We were in the clouds at the MEA when this occurred; so it was concerning that the Columbus Approach Controller thought we were on a different approach than we were on and then had to hand us off to another sector.




Synopsis: Small Aircraft pilot describes flight where they are cleared for one approach then the Controller asks them what approach they are on. Controller then clarifies in his mind the approach and ships the aircraft to another Approach Control. Pilot questions why they were switched from one Approach Control to another after being cleared for the approach.