elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The chosen vendor for most outstations...appears to not properly train their personnel on pushbacks; or they only gloss over it. On this particular flight; not only was improper phraseology used; after three attempts at telling the ground crew which way to push the airplane; it was still faced the wrong way. They had to pull us back onto the ramp and then push us back out the proper direction. After the pushback; we weren't shown the pin; and the ground crew just walked away without someone with wands or someone even facing the aircraft. This seems to be a trend at all of the stations they handle. [This] is a 'startup' station and many of the personnel staffing it were temporarily here from other stations to train the individuals. It is quite concerning that there is no language barrier; yet the ground crew's communication is so ambiguous that there is confusion about when to push. Then; when the airplane is set; they remove the tug and tow bar as per normal operation. After cleared from the aircraft; there is no one off to the side with the wands to verify the aircraft is clear. They all just walk away and none of them face the aircraft to give us the all-clear or to ensure we flash the taxi light prior to taxi. There is no way we could flash the taxi light 3 times if we need to have them come back to the aircraft. My main reason for submitting this report is my concern for highly degraded safety. Obviously we can't see very much of the operation; and can't tell if everyone is safely clear of the aircraft if they just walk away. Working around the aircraft can be a hazardous environment; and it would weigh heavily on me should one of the ground crew be hurt because they are untrained; unaware; or don't understand the safety processes we have in place to increase the margin of safety. The non-standard phraseology and ambiguous communication shows that they aren't properly trained on the hazards to themselves on pushing the aircraft.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported that contract ramp personnel are not properly trained regarding aircraft handling procedures.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [On approach] I realized that the gear would not come down. Overflew the airport and circled several times to try and get the gear down including the manual gear extension procedure. Nothing worked. Flew by a local Tower to get them to confirm no gear down. Went to larger airport with emergency facilities to perform a gear up landing. Landing went as planned with no fire and everyone out of the aircraft without any injuries.




Synopsis: BE55 pilot reported diverting to an alternate airport for a planned gear up landing when the landing gear failed to extend.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: MU-2 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C SNA
ATC / advisory: Tower SNA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After takeoff; beginning the SID I was too focused on noise abatement and failed to climb as I wanted.  Then I just lost Situational Awareness of the SID and was not 'in the game.'  I found myself at a 20 degree bank and now descending.  Corrected and went to engage the autopilot; but this plane has some lights on the MCP not working right and my confusion got worse.  Leveled wings and returned to a climb.  Tower asked my altitude; gave me a vector (which helped); and I began to collect myself; but I was low on SA.  It all worked out; but was embarrassing.Marginally night current with just 4 landings at night and only a few night hours recently. Second flight in this particular airframe (they all have little idiosyncrasies).  Squawks; I didn't realize until later (Mode Control Panel lights).  Nervous (about the passenger; the DP; the airplane).Address the squawks immediately. More familiarity with this airframe / GPS combo.  More time under hood; tired; at night when I am normally at home in bed.




Synopsis: MU2 pilot reports loss of situational awareness after takeoff from SNA at night in IMC employing noise abatement procedures.  The reporter found himself in a turn and descending through 800 FT before correcting and being issued a vector by ATC.  Lack of recent night IMC experience and familiarity with the aircraft were cited as factors.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departing ZZZ Runway XX at approximately 90 knots; we lost a green system pump and after liftoff and just prior to gear up we lost a second green system pump. Gear remained down; use of electric pumps allowed full recovery of green system. Followed QRH procedures and returned to ZZZ. No emergency declared or needed.


Second narrative: Lost 1 green system hydraulic pump at about 90 knots; we continued takeoff. At selection of gear up we second green system pump failed and we had a complete loss of green system pressure. Pressure was recovered with electric pumps. All systems were recovered and we returned to land at ZZZ.


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported both Engine Driven Hydraulic Pumps failed on takeoff; and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground PHX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: On taxi-out via east route to Runway 25R the airport diagram shows Taxiway R as straight. Due to construction; the taxiway jogs abruptly to the right about half way south. There are several large skid marks showing crews are being surprised by this. I examined the approach at night and found that an unfortunate combination of lighting tends to obscure the jog. Only one blue light appears in the center of the taxiway. Anybody who misses that and is unaware of the jog will be surprised. It would be helpful to have barricades with red lights/flashers across the jog; so crew could see the way was obviously blocked and the taxiway does not continue straight.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported taxiway diagram misrepresents Taxiway R on the ground due to construction at PHX airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DRO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: CTAF DRO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were on a regularly scheduled Part 121 flight to Durango; CO. We were on with DEN center. We asked him what the minimum vectoring altitude was that we could expect near Durango. This information was to supplement our descent planning. He told us 11;000 FT within 10 miles of the airport. About 20 miles from the airport we called DRO in sight and he had us switch to DRO advisory frequency. The Captain was flying and we each had terrain pulled up on our MFD's. We referenced the terrain on the MFD it appeared safe to descend. The Captain initiated a descent and we heard the GPWS say 'terrain; terrain; pull-up'. The Captain then initiated a climb using full power and a vertical rate to match the VSI. Shortly thereafter the warning went away. We re-assessed our descent planning and felt it appropriate to resume the descent shortly thereafter. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. Our error was to start the descent a little too early in mountainous terrain. The threat was potential ground contact; which was avoided with the combined efforts of automation and immediate pilot input. The undesired aircraft state was dealt with immediately and decisively. Pilot action minimized the length of time of the undesired aircraft state. In retrospect; I think we should have planned on flying to the VOR; then descending; and doing a circle to land on 21. There is a VOR on the field; with an ILS; VOR; and RNAV to Runway 3. No instrument approaches to 21. We were landing on Runway 21 due to a tailwind component of 14 if we landed on Runway 3. The approach to Runway 21 was visual. Though it was VMC; it was night; and no moon (we were under a broken layer). Note: our Commercial charts say Runway 21 is the preferred runway though there are no instrument approaches to that runway. I'm sure this has to do with the mountains to the northeast of the field.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier First Officer reported taking evasive action to a TERRAIN; PULL UP warning during a night descent into DRO after they started the approach descent too early with an 11;000 FT MVA within ten miles of the airport.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: EC145
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While performing Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) operations at a hospital; I lifted from the hospital helipad to return to home base. The hospital helipad sits virtually equidistant between [two] airports. Both airports operate on separate Unicom frequencies; but are only 11 NM apart. Considering [one of the airports] to be closer I made a Unicom takeoff call on [their frequency] as well as with company dispatch radio; all the while monitoring [the other frequency] on the 3rd radio for any traffic making calls; none were heard on [the second frequency]. On initial climb from hospital (with no response to Unicom call on [either frequency]); TCAS sounded a proximity alarm and a low flying east-bound fixed wing was spotted approaching from my 9 o'clock at the same altitude. Evasive maneuvers were performed by both aircraft and collision was avoided. I then resumed my climb and northwest flight and landed uneventfully at base.




Synopsis: EC145 helicopter pilot reported an NMAC with a fixed wing aircraft.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FAY.TRACON, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: TRACON FAY
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the instructor on an instrument training flight; entering a hold at SDZ VOR specifically outbound on parallel entry to the hold. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. I saw an object which appeared to be lighted at a mile or less about 50 feet or so below which appeared to be approaching us and varying it's altitude up and down. The light could have been a sun reflection.  I told the student to look up to watch the object also as we turned away from it. We queried FAY TRACON and they did not see any conflicting traffic. It did not appear on TIS (Traffic Information Services) nor on iPad ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast).  When we took evasive action in turning toward the VOR (continuing in the hold) we lost visual contact and never saw it again.  As a matter of note there is a known model aircraft field approximately 6 miles east of the VOR.




Synopsis: An instructor flying near the SDZ VOR at 3;300 feet took evasive action from a UAV which FAY TRACON did not have on radar.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: B737-800
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: OJT was being conducted at the sector and we were just put into hold when we took the sector. The reason we were put into a 'no notice hold' was because an air carrier departure was squawking hijack. Then the same aircraft squawked radio failure. This allowed the airport to open again. A soon as we started clearing our holding stack in they put us back into a no notice hold because fighter jets were being scrambled to escort the air carrier. This caused a big snowball effect because not only was Approach not accepting arrivals they also gave us a no notice hold for other arrivals. Right as the snowball started I had to take the frequency from the trainee because the situation was to complex for his level of training. Add to this; a couple of diversions were announced because they couldn't hold anymore. During this time is when I had a B757 lander holding over ABCDE at 150 and I had a B737 descending on the arrival going to another airport crossing FGHIJ at 130. This caused the conflict between the two. I told the B737 to stop his descent and to fly heading 180 and I told the B757 to descend to 140 expedite down and also turned him to a 270 heading. I turned both away from each other. We need to have better communication between Approach and the Center. If you know you are going to accept arrivals again you have got to be 100% sure that you can. If that takes waiting an extra five minutes then that is what has to happen. The no notice holds numerous times within a few minutes doesn't make this job any easier.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described an aircraft security event resulting from an air carrier squawking the hijack code followed by the no radio code; all leading to several 'no notice' hold instructions.
Date: 201812
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was instructing a new student pilot in his second lesson. For takeoff I was in the controls and I told him I would tell him when to pull on the yoke to rotate. My mistake was not telling him how hard to pull. He pulled the yoke very hard till it nearly hit the stops resulting in a tail strike which broke the tail tie down ring off the airplane. I pushed hard forward recovering the airplane and continued the takeoff under my control. I did not realize there had been a tail strike otherwise I would have circled around to land. When I got back to the ramp I realized the ring was missing and realized it had to have been from the tail strike. It will not happen again because I will always describe a rotation to a student in greater detail and guard the controls more closely with new students [are] doing takeoffs.




Synopsis: C172 instructor reported experiencing a tail strike during rotation due to student pulling to hard on the yoke.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ITO.Airport, HI
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I was receiving On the Job Training at the time. An inbound flight plan printed out for Aircraft X; filed TARDE direct ITO at altitude 9000. Before posting the strip; I underlined the TARDE estimate in red to remind myself to scan the radar scope for the target (since there is normally very little traffic in this area); and underlined the destination in red. I expected that our sector would radar identify the aircraft when it checked in; and provide radar vectors before handing off to ITO approach. ZOA called to transfer the aircraft a while later; and I notated the acceptance of the transfer on the strip.I was relieved before the aircraft checked in. During the relief briefing; I mentioned that we had one inbound over TARDE going to ITO as part of my traffic briefing.After I returned from my break; a supervisor informed me that after the aircraft checked in; communications were intermittent; and not fully established. Following a handoff and frequency switch to Sector 5; communications were lost and the aircraft was not vectored before possibly entering a 10000 Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) at 9000. I was also told that radio coverage in that area is poor. It was suggested to me that I should reroute low altitude oceanic inbounds in that area to ITO via TARDE direct WILYE direct.My expectations of the nature of service we would provide to the aircraft (radar vectors) were based on the premise of having the ability to communicate with the pilot. Areas where we provide air traffic service in the NAS should have good radio coverage. This is especially true if the area is adjacent to possible safety hazards; such as terrain.I recommend the installation/upgrade of radio equipment that would allow for better radio coverage in the area south of the Big Island (Hawaii). This specifically refers to the triangular airspace of Sector 7 that is bordered by Sector 2 on the west; Sector 5 on the north and NE; and parts of ITO Approach on the NE.In the interim; procedures should also be established for receiving aircraft we expect to encounter communications difficulties with. This should include specific locations and options for mitigation (e.g. reroute options).




Synopsis: HCF TRACON Developmental reported an aircraft got below Minimum IFR Altitude on approach to ITO airport.  Radio coverage in the HCF areas were cited as contributed factor.