elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While operating Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1; the flight crew noted a fuel imbalance message on the FQIS (Fuel Quantity Indicating System) display. A snapshot was recorded; and 0.0 readings were noted at L/H tank probes #14 and #16. Later; the R/H tank #10 position and L/H tank #12 position reported 0.0; as well. 777/787 Maintenance Control Technician then AOG'd probes to ZZZ1 to repair system prior to flight. Overnight; at some point; Engineering became involved and issued an EA (Engineering Authority) stating a specific MEL to use (which they do not have the authority to do) that was incorrect and bypassed the usage of the correct MEL; which limits the flight to 50 nm of land.Engineering must not be allowed to specify MEL usage in EAs. They do not have the authority nor knowledge to do so. Engineering must not be allowed to circumvent MEL usage causing a safety of flight or Out of Compliance issue.The correct MEL application is MEL 28-XX-Y; which limits the aircraft to within 50 nm of land. This created a major Non-Compliance and Safety of Flight issue.




Synopsis: Technician reported that during preparation for a repair procedure; it was discovered that Engineering had mistakenly applied the wrong MEL and did not have the authority to perform that function. The aircraft flew in service out of compliance for ETOPS.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ABI.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ABI
ATC / advisory: Tower ABI
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I fly about 130 hours per year; and have had 4.7 hours of IFR year-to-date. However; being single pilot; I use the autopilot in those situations. We don't have much IMC in this part of Texas (Abilene). I hired a CFII to accompany me for some practice hand flying in 900 overcast IMC. I've never been out of currency; but take an occasional IPC [Instrument Proficiency Check]. Three months prior [to this event]; I passed an IPC with NO problem using foggles.I would not have passed an IPC in actual IMC. Not this time; at any rate. I am filing this because [allowable] IFR deviations were broken while I was hand flying. I asked my CFII if I needed to file one; and he said I did not because we were being vectored and on radar the entire time. Nevertheless; I'm filing one.We did have 60 KT plus crosswinds at the VOR while flying the first approach; the VOR-A; so I'm sure they chalked some of the erratic flying up to that. However; I flew that portion pretty well. It was the initial turning climb that was so poorly executed. I then flew the RNAV-17L LPV approach and did that pretty well - the LPV guidance made a big difference. Maybe I was settling down by then.I am amazed at the difference between actual IMC versus foggles. There really is no comparison. I received my Instrument Rating with next to no actual IMC. While it would make completing the requirements for an Instrument Rating difficult in some areas; I really don't think you should be able to qualify for one without a bit of IMC. There is no substitute.




Synopsis: A BE35 pilot with minimal actual IFR experience was surprised when a refresher flight with a CFII in actual conditions proved more demanding than his previous Instrument Proficiency Checks utilizing 'foggles' to merely simulate IMC.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: DC Battery
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While performing Removal of MAU (Module Avionics Unit) 2; The first step is to remove the EICC (Emergency Integrated Control Center). The first step in removal of the EICC is to de-energize HOT BUS 1. I performed the procedure of removing battery 1 connector; removing external power and tagging the overhead panel. Ground power cord was removed; and external power door shut and tagged. I removed the rain cover and connectors to the EICC. I was in the process of removing the power and ground feed cables to the EICC at the back of the unit. I backed the ground wire nut most of the way off and started on the battery 1 wire. While removing the nut from the battery 1 cable my ratchet hit the aileron bell crank and an electrical arc occurred. The arc was massive. I than noticed glowing coming from the aileron cable force cables. I ran to the cockpit and removed the fire extinguisher. When I returned to the fwd electronics bay area; the cables were still glowing. I discharged the extinguisher onto the force cables. One quick burst on the captain's side and one quick burst on the co pilots' side. Verifying no more glow; I had co workers go get the lead and sup. I was working off my IPAD.




Synopsis: Technician reported failing to disconnect #2 Main Battery during maintenance; causing an electrical arc and a fire.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ; TFR ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I began my flight and flew to multiple airports when I was intercepted by an F16. He rocked his wings and I rocked my wings back then landed as soon as possible. After landing the police and secret service came and took a full report of the occurrence. On the day of the flight I was unaware of the TFR and did not properly check the area while making my flight plan. In the future I will carefully check for flight restrictions. I am currently getting training from a flight instructor on the subject and now know multiple ways to check the area prior to my flight.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported he flew through a TFR and was intercepted by an F16.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This aircraft had a previous writeup [two months earlier] pertaining to the same issue and was put on a [Deferred Item]. On climb out of ZZZ; at 14;000 feet; the stabilizer started bumping the nose of the aircraft up and down slightly. It continued up to FL 240. We were indicating 284k per the FMC and there was no movement with the yoke. I disconnected the auto pilot and bumping of the nose up and down continued. I felt no movement within the flight controls. I turned back on the auto pilot. The bumping was consistent with regular intervals of around 1 to 2 seconds. It was not turbulence that was causing the bumping to occur. My FO (First Officer) and I were uncomfortable with continuing the flight. I notified ATC and requested rescue vehicles upon landing. We leveled off at FL 250; I slowed the aircraft to 250k and the bumping stopped. I handed the aircraft over to my FO. I took at the QRH to see if there was a check list for our flight condition. I call Operations (we were still in radio range) and told them we had an emergency and to please contact my Dispatcher. I called and briefed the lead FA (Flight Attendant) and made a PA to the passengers that we would be returning to ZZZ. I took the aircraft back from my FO and proceeded back the ZZZ. My FO sent the logbook entrees to maintenance via ACARS. We continued to ZZZ at 250k with no further issues and made a safe over weight landing. Maintenance met us at the gate and was briefed. I call my dispatch and briefed them and also briefed two [Flight Operations Managers] on the phone.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported vertical bounce during climb.
Date: 201901
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While on the BANND 2 Arrival into OAK; a descend via clearance was given to us. I set in the bottom altitude of 4000 FT and verified that VNAV PATH was displayed on the FMA. After receiving a frequency change to NorCal; our clearance was revised to 'Descend via except maintain 7000 FT.' Both the First Officer and I heard 'Descend via except maintain 7000 FT'; and is the clearance that was read back to the Controller. After crossing KEENR intersection at 8000 FT; the NorCal Controller informed us that we were to cross KEENR at 7000 FT. We were then informed; by the Controller; that the chart altitude was incorrect and that is why our descend via clearance was amended. There were no NOTAMs in our weather packet; nor were there any operational notes on the coversheet of the weather packet concerning the BANND 2 Arrival.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported a missed crossing restriction due to a communication breakdown or charting error.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X on frequency; Aircraft Y handing off to sector 39. I attempted to advise Aircraft X that Aircraft Y would soon be on frequency. No reply was received. I tried multiple times until Aircraft X finally answered; saying they had heard and responded multiple times. I had heard nothing; not even a static or a squelch break. Aircraft Y was a PUB landing aircraft. My concern is that if I had descended Aircraft Y; and both Aircraft Y and Aircraft X had responded; but I was only able to hear one of the aircraft; I would have no way to recognize the dangerous situation. This particular frequency issue of not being able to hear an aircraft happens multiple times a month across multiple frequencies in my area. I believe it may be tied to a specific site (TAD? LHX?) but am not sure. I believe it is just a matter of time before an aircraft reads back something incorrect/declares an emergency and is not heard/reads back correctly but is assumed to be NORDO so a different and competing clearance is issued (ie. both climbed into each other) happens.In this case I descended Aircraft Y and was aware that communication with Aircraft X was questionable; so I closely monitored Aircraft X's altitude. Aircraft X remained level and there was no loss or unexpected action.This issue with the frequencies is unsafe and needs to be fixed.




Synopsis: Denver Center Controller reported an issue with similar sounding call signs and a consistent frequency problem in the area.
Date: 202006
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I want to bring a safety issue regarding flight attendants wearing face masks while on board aircraft. One of our critical duties is to be on guard for the smell of smoke. Today on our flight I realized that the mask hinders my ability to pick up the minute traces of smoke. Shortly after I had this realization I did smell smoke very powerfully; I took down my mask to have a better idea of what the smell really was. This occurred shortly after takeoff; so I was hesitant to call my Lead; but decided it was strong enough I should. When I picked up the phone the FA in the back of the aircraft was already describing the issue; the Lead and the Captain were on the line listening.The Captain speculated we had just pulled in the smoke from outside and we were told to stay vigilant. At this point I did not resume wearing my mask until I was confident the smoke had subsided.I feel wearing the masks at any time while on the aircraft hinders me from performing my duties to the best of my abilities thus putting the entire aircraft and everyone on it; including myself; lives at risk and exposes us to greater liability. I am formally requesting we rethink and hopefully revoke the suggestion any flight attendant impair their abilities by wearing a face mask while on board an aircraft.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported wearing a COVID-19 mask hindered her ability to smell smoke in the cabin.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at FL330; we lost AHRS data to to the #1 PFD. We transferred the flight director and autopilot to the First Officer's side who had been the pilot not flying. After a few minutes the #1 PFD data reinitialized itself. We returned the flight director and autopilot to the Captain's side. The aircraft began descending. I immediately disconnected the autopilot; assumed manual control and returned to FL330. ATC queried our altitude as we were returning to FL330; we reported the malfunction and requested a lower altitude. Upon arrival; the discrepancy was entered into the maintenance log; and Maintenance was called.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported an altitude deviation when he lost AHRS data in cruise at FL330.
Date: 201405
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to MIING on the ENDEE approach transition tried to load MINNG approach transition into CDU while flying the ENDEE Arrival. Because MIING is a fix on the ENDEE arrival with two waypoints after MIING and MIING is the initial fix on the RNAV (RNP) Y 22L approach; there was confusion as to how to load the approach into the CDU. We kept getting a route discontinuity. Finally disconnected autopilot and flew approach manually. Approach Control eventually issued a visual approach clearance.[To prevent this confusion in the future flight crews should take] a detailed look at the construction of the arrival and 22L Y approach and perhaps [there should be] a bulletin calling attention the complexity of the arrival and approach. After speaking with Approach Control personnel; a procedure of using only the STERE transition of the 22L Y approach instead of the MIING transition was discussed. I have spoken with the Manager of ATC systems prior and will speak with him again today regarding this issue.




Synopsis: A B737NG flight crew flying the ENDEE RNAV STAR to MDW was unable to program the transition between MIING waypoint on the STAR and the RNAV approach to Runway 22L. They took manual control of the aircraft and completed the approach and landing.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise; the right pack failed. The Captain ran the QRH for single pack operations. About 15 minutes later; we received a Left Bleed Duct warning and the left pack failed. The aircraft became unpressurized at that point. We descended immediately to 10;000 feet MSL. The Captain completed the QRH procedure for unpressurized flight. We advised ATC and our dispatcher that we would be diverting.Multiple failures led to a high workload environment.




Synopsis: A Bombardier CL600 First Officer reported a failure of the right pack; followed shortly after by a Left Bleed Duct Warning and the left pack failed.