elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Military
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While approaching 7NM initial at ZZZ AFB under Runway Supervisory Unit ops control; my 3 ship of military aircraft were told that tower was going to have control of the runway for commercial traffic at 20 mile final.  My 3 ship were instructed to carry through the overhead and go around the pattern.  We executed that and once we were 90 to initial at 2;800 feet we picked up the visual to a commercial aircraft (Aircraft Y) approximately 200 feet above and descending to the runway..  I initiated the turn to initial early and offset the runway to the west to avoid the commercial aircraft.  During the turn my wing men got perhaps 3;000 feet from me and they were not squawking in accordance with with our procedures.  I was told that Aircraft Y had previously gone around and this was their second attempt to land. I was also told they received a TCAS advisory. I do not recall hearing a TCAS advisory; however my system was on 'TA' and it is very common to receive multiple traffic advisories in the pattern.  I believe they were flying the RNAV Approach that does not have a hard altitude of 2300 feet at the final approach fix; like the ILS and TACAN approach does.  We do that to avoid the VFR pattern traffic at 2800. I would suggest a review of all approaches at ZZZ AFB to avoid this situation again; or for the commercial traffic to have been assigned a hard altitude of 2300 feet until Final Approach Fix.




Synopsis: Military Pilot reported an airborne conflict in the traffic pattern.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the flight control check after push back from the gate; the captain noticed that the rudder was swinging in the improper direction as shown in the flight control screen on ED2 (Electronic Display 2).  We returned to gate due to the rudder being rigged the wrong direction or a sensor issue with the rudder. I believe a mechanic was complacent on installing related parts to the rudders functions and should be investigated due to this being checked off in the AML as ops check good. This is for the safety of all future flights as well as the passengers and crew on board.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported a gate return caused by a mis-rigged rudder.
Date: 201703
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Stabilizer Attachment
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Unscheduled Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While accomplishing [Maintenance Document Number] for vertical bounce I discovered excessive wear at the horizontal stabilizer hinge bearings. [Maintenance Control] locked the log page and the Aircraft was ferried to ZZZ1 for permanent repair. Later [Maintenance Control] decided to continue the aircraft in revenue service with a [Deferral] for up to 100 cycles. On [Date] the aircraft was taken out of service for the same issue where it is currently being repaired. This is a known issue on the 737-800 fleet at our company and other carriers; Boeing has an FTD (Fleet Team Digest) 737NG-FTD-55-13001. With this amount of wear the Aircraft should have been repaired immediately at ZZZ1; the Aircraft should not continue in revenue service. A fleet campaign should be accomplished to check for failure of the horizontal stabilizer hinge bearing.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Technician reported discovering excessive wear on the 737-800 horizontal stabilizer hinge bearings. Technician stated this is a know issue with this fleet.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SEG.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Rain; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E MDT
ATC / advisory: TRACON MDT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: While VOR outbound on approach; because of temporary instrument problems; could not establish published procedure.

Callback: The reporter stated that for many years the SEG VOR has had an unusually unstable signal within about 15 miles; which is not associated with the cone of confusion. During this particular event; the signal did not stabilize and when he realized the CDI was not going to recenter or present a usable display he broke the approach off. Usually after passing SEG he holds the inbound heading until the signal stabilizes and although the CDI may not be centered; at least it is close. Another issue for him indirectly related is that his G155XL database no longer contains VOR only approaches. It does however provide guidance for VOR/GPS approaches.



Synopsis: A pilot reported that he was unable to establish his aircraft outbound on the SEG VOR-A because the VOR signal outbound was unusable.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Other
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was operating my Stemme glider on an IFR plan under VFR conditions under the auspices of an LOA with Center. We had been assigned a block altitude FL180 - 220. We were flying in classic mountain wave conditions along the mountain range. As we approached the ceiling of our block; both my copilot and I assessed our altitude; decided that we could climb a further 800 ft and so lowered the nose slightly. The climb rate reduced and we stopped climbing at what we read as 21700 ft with the altimeter set to 29.92. A moment later; we both reacted with surprise as we realized that the actual altimeter reading was 22700 ft. At that time we could not understand how we had both misread the altimeter; however I immediately took steps to return to our assigned block altitude. Only later in the flight did I discover the reason for our error. In the vicinity of 22200 ft; the three hands of the altimeter are all pointed at the 2; and the smaller hands are obscured. Later in the flight; the wave had strengthened and we had difficulty remaining below the ceiling of our block - still at FL220. The challenge was that at that altitude; Vne is significantly lower than the 145 kt red line. As a result; lowering the nose is generally not an option. Having exceeded the assigned altitude earlier; I requested and obtained an extended block ceiling to FL230. That provided enough buffer to enable us to shift the flight path laterally and so move to a weaker portion of the wave. We did not receive any comment about the deviation.Conclusions: 1. An altimeter with a digital readout is probably worth the investment when flight into the Flight Levels is frequent. 2. Some instruction about how to avoid misreading non-digital altimeters would be appropriate for pilots intending on flying in Class A airspace. I shall pass this lesson on to my flying community and also to instructors who teach at glider wave camps.




Synopsis: Motor glider pilot reported overshooting block altitude ceiling due to thermal activity and misreading the aircraft altimeter.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ELM.TRACON, NY
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ELM
ATC / advisory: TRACON ELM
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: A C172 came from SYR Approach at 4;000 FT; RADAR was intermitten at best. We were finally able to call RADAR contact; and vectored him to a 130 on a downwind and then a 210 for the base turn and lost RADAR. We called BGM Approach to get control of the aircraft. We climbed the aircraft to 5;000 and didn't have RADAR on the C172. When we finally got the aircraft in RADAR [we sent] him direct to the ITH VOR and we lost RADAR again. We climbed the aircraft to 6;000 FT and still could not see the aircraft. SYR Approach saw him and called 'RADAR contact'; so we sent him over to SYR and they worked him back to RME airport. We need our RADAR fixed. I think the trees up at the RADAR site need to be cut down so we can have better coverage.




Synopsis: ELM reporter voiced concern regarding the existing RADAR coverage providing an example event of a lost target; the reporter indicating tree height may be blocking the needed RADAR coverage.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I had 22 flights airborne as of XA:36z and 23 flights as of XA:50z which is too many even during ideal weather conditions.  Weather at all stations was ideal; so I was able to complete all duties; but I feel I would be pushing operational control if I had any medical/mechanical or airport/enroute  weather problems.There were X sick calls this morning which were not covered and subsequently desks were closed.Should have opened additional desk(s) to cover workload.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported having to work too many aircraft due to staffing related issues after several dispatchers called in sick.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing Captain called stating they had a cargo fire indication.  On approach the crew had a #3 hydraulic system failure.  Crew stopped on taxiway and trucks were rolled.  [Requested priority handling].




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported receiving a call from a Captain who stated they had experienced a Number 3 Hydraulic System failure during approach and a cargo fire indication during landing.  The aircraft was stopped on a taxiway after landing and was met by airport vehicles.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAD.Airport, VA
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We encountered wake turbulence on our descent into Washington Dulles at 7;000 FT MSL and approximately 30 miles northwest of IAD. The autopilot was engaged at the time and the aircraft began to roll uncommanded. I disconnected the autopilot; arrested the roll; and slowed the aircraft towards maneuvering speed. The encounter only lasted for a matter of seconds. The bank was never greater than 30 degrees and no limitations were exceeded. The pilot not flying contacted the cabin crew and they reported that everyone was ok. The seat belt sign was on and no passengers or flight crew were injured during the encounter. The pilot not flying reported the wake turbulence event to ATC and they responded by informing us for the first time that we were following a heavy Boeing 777. I then noticed that my windscreen wiper had moved during the encounter. During a post flight inspection of the aircraft I found that the First Officer's windscreen wiper was bent. The Captain contacted Maintenance and informed them of the situation. This event occurred because of the lack of communication from ATC and possible mishandling from the Approach Controller. We were never informed that we were following a heavy B777 and the Controller descended us behind and below the B777. As a result we encountered wake turbulence. At no time was the B777 in sight.


Second narrative: [Inbound to] IAD; we encountered moderate to severe wake turbulence. We were on the ROYIL2 Arrival talking to Potomac Approach at an altitude of 7;000 FT. The aircraft unexpectedly banked approximately 30 degrees to the right. The First Officer; pilot flying; turned off the autopilot and recovered. I; pilot not flying; immediately scanned the PCFS to verify that we were not experiencing a flight control malfunction. During the recovery ATC issued us a descent to 6;000 FT. As soon as we started to regain control we notified ATC that we were unable to comply with the descent at this moment because we were experiencing some really bad turbulence. ATC responded with a confused sounding 'really?' and then informed us that we were behind a heavy B777. ATC needs to provide adequate space and inform us when we are behind a heavy.


Synopsis: Q400 flight crew reported a significant wake vortex encounter with a preceding B777 that ATC had not mentioned.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Move Team dispatched to take 777-300 from Gate XX to the hard stand. Upon arriving to the gate they saw that when you put the 777-300 on Gate XX the entire tail of the aircraft hangs over the VSR (Vehicle Service Road) and anyone driving has to break the company policy and drive under the aircraft or go around and drive into the active taxiway; both of which are against company's SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) and city driving regulations. I know there has been a SRA (Safety Risk Assessment) done on this ongoing problem and they have decided to take the risk rather than move the aircraft to a gate that can accommodate it.


Second narrative: The 777-300 aircraft parked at ZZZ on Gate XX places the tail beyond the VSR (Vehicle Service Road). When this aircraft type is positioned on this gate it leave the drivers of GSE (Ground Service Equipment) two options: to drive equipment directly under the aircraft; [or] leave the VSR and enter the alley where aircraft are actively taxi or under tow.


Synopsis: Ground personnel reported that 777-300 aircraft extends over vehicle service road when parked at gate.
Date: 201506
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Our current After Start Flow for single engine taxi operation typically results in an illuminated 'ELEC' and/or 'HYD' system annunciator light on the respective system annunciator panel. As a result; I have observed First Officers (rather reflexively and quickly) cancel the light(s) via the 'Master Caution' light. However; when queried as to what annunciator lights were illuminated prior to cancellation; the First Officer; far more often than not; cannot recall. Furthermore; I have observed many Captains cancelling the light(s) in a SET scenario without advising the First Officer.This absence of positive identification prior to cancellation fosters an inadequate response to illuminated annunciator lights which may not be illuminated as the normal result of the After Start Flow for single engine operation; i.e. 'ENG'; 'OVERHEAD'; etc.; and dismisses an opportunity to trap errors; thus relying solely on the 'RECALL' step in the Before Takeoff Checklist. Airplane Operation Manual (AOM)...'MASTER CAUTION from known cause with normal Pilot flow items -' does allow cancellation without Crew confirmation; yet how does that allowance form good habit patterns of response when an abnormal situation develops?Even though the AOM...ultimately speaks to the abnormal scenario; SET is performed far more often than an abnormal scenario. Thus; I suggest AOM...'MASTER CAUTION from known cause with normal Pilot flow items -' does more to hinder than promote confirmation of annunciator lights in an abnormal scenario. After all; faulty practice yields faulty results.A confirmation of illuminated annunciator lights by the Captain AND First Officer after completion of the Before Taxi Checklist; and prior to initiation of taxi operation would address potential anomalies more efficiently and effectively than our current; by default; common practice as previously detailed.




Synopsis: Pilot questioned the procedure of automatically cancelling system annunciator lights from known causes (such as the 'ELEC' and 'HYD' lights resulting from single engine taxi) without confirmation. Pilot suggests that such a procedure can foster a bad habit pattern.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X had departed MSP and was climbing to FL350 north of ALO; passing through FL265. A red alert notified me on my Enroute Decision Support Tool (EDST) that it was a conflict with Aircraft Y. I had handed off Aircraft Y to MSP Center Sector P17 (Mason City). I called P17 and told them COTON (ZAU75) will work Aircraft X at FL310; in order to miss the Aircraft Y at FL330. The P17 controller stated Aircraft X was issued a crossing restriction to top Aircraft Y. The aircraft began to flash when I had noticed Aircraft X was leveling off at FL330. I called P17 and said I am turning Aircraft Y to avoid a traffic alert and loss of separation. He said the aircraft was issued a crossing and could not make it. I said I was going to turn Aircraft Y 25R [25 degrees right]. Mason City turned Aircraft X to a 090 heading. At 6.10 miles I called a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and descended the aircraft to ensure vertical separation. The aircraft lost separation at approximately 300 feet vertically and 4.61 miles laterally. Mason City called me back to say Aircraft X missed his crossing restriction to top Aircraft Y and APREQed direct to IOW after the aircraft was free of conflict from Aircraft Y and positive separation was reestablished. When Mason City takes RADAR or a hand off on an aircraft they need to miss their traffic and not use crossing restrictions for aircraft climbing. This does not seem efficient at all and does not always work.




Synopsis: ZAU Center Controller reported a loss of separation when an aircraft was unable to comply with their issued crossing restriction.