elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MTPP.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower MTPP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: FO was PF. During takeoff roll at MTPP right at rotate speed; a bird in the cockpit suddenly flew from the Capt.'s left side to cross in front of the Capt.; across the window; bumping off the window/glare shield in front of me; and then headed right toward my face; causing me to lean out of the way as it brushed by my face while I was pulling the aircraft nose up through rotation. Aircraft control was not compromised. The bird passed by me; and we were unable to locate it for the duration of the flight. Presumably it escaped our view in a small crevasse and perished.Prior to departing ZZZ for the MTPP turn; the aircraft was on the ground for three days. It was towed from the maintenance hangar to our gate. As I boarded the aircraft for preflight duties at ZZZ; ground personnel was attempting to remove a pigeon from the cabin and apparently succeeded. The electronic maintenance log indicates that a pigeon was removed from the aircraft; but unclear to me whether that entry refers to the preflight pigeon or our inflight bird of unknown species. We were aware of no other in-the-aircraft bird activity.On the ground in MTPP; ground personnel secured the jet bridge door in the open position throughout the ground time. There is a remote possibility the bird joined us from there too. Regardless of where our avian friend originated that day; it most likely entered the aircraft through open doors; especially if the aircraft was left open for days prior to the flight. As such; I recommend the review of the existing guidance for leaving aircraft doors open for extended periods of time and determine if the guidance is inadequate; or simply not followed in this event.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported being distracted during takeoff roll by a bird which emerged from inside the cockpit. Aircraft control was maintained at all times and the bird subsequently disappeared for the remainder of the flight.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Fatigue
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: My crew and I experienced about a 6 hour delay before our first leg. This had us leaving after midnight local time. We went on duty at late afternoon before sunset. Nobody ever called us to notify us of rolling delays to departure. The only call we did receive was about boarding passengers and departure. Our destination airport rest was reduced from scheduled and we anticipated arriving shortly before dawn. We would then have to report early afternoon to work a 5 leg day. Staff more crews so that we would not have to wait about 6.5 hours to get a Reserve Captain to fly the right seat. Understand that having legal rest doesn't mean 'safe' or appropriate rest. We were expected to sleep at a hotel all morning when cleaning staff and hotel operations are awake and making noise. Other hotel guests are slamming doors and making noise too. In order to eat anything; we would have to interrupt rest cycles to eat and attempt to sleep again in the remaining time before show. We cannot fly a 5-leg day without eating. A 5-leg day is a busy day when you brain is potentially not engaged all the way due to a weird rest situation. Understand that nobody flew that wasn't fit to fly; however; this situation is completely preventable if the company would 'adequately staff' the airline which is required by the pilot working agreement.




Synopsis: An ERJ-190 Captain reported that because of staffing issues; his trip departed six hours late; arrived at the hotel near sunrise and after a minimum rest they were scheduled to flying 5 legs fatigued.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: After signing-in; I completed my self-brief. From the verbal briefings I received from the outgoing dispatchers; I remembered hearing that ZZZ Center would be ATC Zero for COVID cleaning. During my self-brief I saw ATC messages; and information in the written brief regarding the ATC Zero status for ZZZ Center. Because I knew my red-eye Flight ABCD; would not be affected by the ZZZ Center closure; I skimmed the messages; information in the briefing regarding the closure; and reroutes page; and did not notice that ZZZ1 Center was also going to be closed for a COVID cleaning tonight.  I planned the flight on a normal routing which traversed ZZZ1 Center. Approximately 30 minutes before departure; I realized that I had missed the fact that ZZZ1 Center was also going to be closed for COVID cleaning during the time in which my flight would traverse it. I asked the crew if they received their clearance yet. They did. I asked the Captain to call me so we could talk over the details of fuel/route. I called ATC to cancel the current filing; as well as called ZZZ airport station to send out the fueler to add more fuel to the aircraft. I computed a new route in SABRE that would avoid ZZZ1 Center; and re-released/refiled the flight to avoid ZZZ1 Center. I asked the crew to confirm the new routing with ATC. When ATC re-issued the clearance; they changed the departure routing. After confirming the new ATC route with the crew; I re-released the flight again.  The flight departed 6 minutes late.Expectation bias was a factor in me missing the ZZZ1 Center closure when originally planning the flight. Because I had remembered hearing about the ZZZ Center closure during turnover; I expected the messages and briefing information relating to ATC COVID cleaning to only contain information regarding the ZZZ Center closure. As I skimmed the messages; I expected ZZZ1 Center to read [as] ZZZ Center in the messages regarding the closures; and disregarded the messages too quickly; because I knew the ZZZ Center closure didn't affect my flight. Because I disregarded the messages; expecting it not to apply to my flight; I missed the fact that ZZZ1 Center was also impacted by the COVID cleanings; and that my flight would be need to be routed around ZZZ1 Center.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported not properly planning for a Center to be ATC Zero for COVID cleaning.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: Cessna Twin Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While departing ZZZ Runway XX; and after making appropriate radio announcements and visually assessing the runway condition; at approximately 50Kts and half way down the runway; an unknown twin engine Cessna aircraft entered the runway at the XY end of the runway without announcement. I was forced to take evasive action and reconfigure the aircraft on the roll from a normal takeoff to a short field takeoff to avoid the other aircraft on the runway. At the time; Runway XX was the active runway and wind conditions favored this runway. I was departing Runway XX directly after another aircraft who departed 60 seconds before me utilizing the same runway. I had landed at ZZZ 20 minutes previously utilizing Runway XX. There was no doubt that Runway XX was being used by all of the landing; departing and pattern aircraft at the time. The offending pilot did not respond to radio calls from me either while on the roll (warning) or after I passed the aircraft; clearing it by 100 feet. I am not sure how to locate the pilot operator; however; he should be counseled or cited for this runway incursion.




Synopsis: PA-28R Cherokee Pilot reported an NMAC event during takeoff roll with a nordo aircraft that initiated an opposite direction takeoff.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were delayed 5 hours due to aircraft maintenance. When we taxied out for departure we extended our duty day as we were probably going to exceed the FAR 117 duty limit of 19 hours. Shortly before takeoff a pack failed requiring us to return to the gate for maintenance action. That took an additional hour to resolve. Just before we were to leave the gate the second time the Captain asked each of us if we were still willing to continue. We each said yes. By the time we were ready for the descent/approach and landing in Asia I was exhausted and having difficulty with my concentration; situational awareness and listening ability. The weather was VFR and the flight had been smooth with no passenger issues or aircraft maintenance issues. I was flying relief so I was not at the controls during the descent and landing and had been up for the last 7 hours before landing. However; I was impaired due to being on duty for 21 hours at the time of landing. The FAR limit for 4 pilots and a class 1 rest facility is 19 hours and we extended for an additional 2 hours - I will not ever do it again because; I was well rested before the day began and rested well for 6+ hours in the bunk and considered myself unsafe at the time of landing. In my opinion; the ability to extend an FAR 117 duty day puts pilots in a terrible position of having to forecast their condition 20+ hours in the future which cannot be done with any reason of certainty. Given my experience; I will not do it again in the future. If we had had to deal with poor weather at the destination or a major system malfunction of the airplane the chance for compounding critical pilot errors would make the operation totally unsafe.




Synopsis: An International Relief Officer reported extending his duty day beyond 19 hours as allowed by FAR 117 for a four pilot crew; then prior to landing recognizing his extreme fatigue.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [En route] I reached up for the flight plan; which was resting on the glare shield. We were using the heavy Boeing gray clipboard to hold the flight plan; and as I picked it up it off the glare shield it slipped out of my hand; falling and striking the Right Engine Fuel Control Switch; knocking it into the CUTOFF position. The Captain (PF [Pilot Flying]) executed the Engine out drift down procedure with me backing him up; descending and offsetting 15 nm right of course; and after the aircraft was established he handed control of the aircraft off to me while he looked up and executed the Engine Fail R checklist. We also woke up the FO (First Officer); who was on his break; requesting he come to the cockpit. We stabilized at FL310; knew exactly what had happened; and after discussing it together; followed the checklist by returning the FCS (Fuel Control Switch) to RUN; and the engine restarted. We discussed the situation with Dispatch; [Operations Management]; and the FO (who had returned to the flight deck by this time and was occupying the center jumpseat) and all agreed that we could safely continue the flight to ZZZZ; which we did after coordinating with ATC and [Operations Management.] We did not declare an emergency as we were too busy running the checklist and backing each other up; by the time we thought to we had already restarted the engine and stabilized the aircraft.


Second narrative: The crew called on SatCom to report that a clipboard had accidentally been dropped on the fuel cutout lever and the engine shut down. The crew descended from fl400 to fl310 and restarted the engine successfully. They said they were back on route and were going to request a climb back to fl400. The current fuel was compared with the flight plan and there was no significant discrepancy and the crew and dispatch determined continuing to ZZZZ was not a problem. The crew declined to talk to [Maintenance Control]. No emergency was declared. The crew spoke to [Operations Management]. No announcements were made to the passengers.


Synopsis: B787 flight crew and Dispatcher reported the right engine was inadvertently shut down when a clipboard was dropped onto the right engine control switch.
Date: 201407
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Approach Coupler
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We] briefed RNAV approach. After cleared; protected; established (we both take pains to verify) set MDA in FCP; all magenta in FMA. Aircraft immediately started to descend ignoring hard altitudes remaining. 7 NM prior to the FAF at flaps 15; got brief gear warning as we were setting V/S climb. After reestablished at 1;900 FT again selected prof and jet descended; this time Tower called 'altitude alert.' We have reviewed extensively and I can't determine what happened but getting low in marginal conditions is concerning. My theory is this: when being vectored for the RNAV if you don't leave the TP then the aircraft (at least the older generations) can't keep up or they at least are confused and it initiates an 800 FPM descent while it thinks. If you know what we corked up please advise. In any case; this scenario ought to be part of training. I think joining the RNAV course inside the IAF (but seven plus NM outside FAF) and clearing TP creates a hazardous scenario as the jet descends without warning or alert. RNAV ought to be our primary approach unless weather bad.




Synopsis: MD11 Captain experiences an early descent during an RNAV approach with the autopilot engaged in prof. As the aircraft is climbed back to the correct altitude a brief gear warning is heard. A second attempt at engaging the autopilot results in another inappropriate descent and a low altitude alert from the Tower.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Aircraft component: Radio Altimeter
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At approximately 6000 ft. MSL on the EAGUL6 arrival into PHX near BASSL; the FO (First Officer) had two RA fail (Yellow RA on the FO PFD) indications that each lasted approximately 1 second. The CA (Captain) had no RA fail indications.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported their radio altimeter malfunctioned momentarily while on the EAGUL6 STAR into PHX. The pilot suspects 5G interference.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching 300 feet AGL after takeoff I experienced engine roughness and a significant loss of power. I decided to abort the departure and return to land. I radioed to tower what I was experiencing; and tower radioed back to me 'cleared to land'. I maintained aircraft control; landed safely and taxied onto taxiway where the engine stalled completely. The aircraft was towed to [FBO].The cause of the engine loss of power in the air and eventual failure on the ground was a result of water contamination in the fuel. I did not check the fuel sumps and in doing so I failed to properly preflight the aircraft which led to the event.As required by my flight instructor I will receive remedial training in preflight procedures; federal aviation regulations; aircraft systems; and safe aircraft operations.




Synopsis: C152 pilot reported loss of engine power after takeoff that was later traced to his failure to drain water from the fuel system.