elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Received a fire/smoke ECAM for the Lavatories. It went off twice. There was a male passenger in the aft lavatory smoking. I asked for police to meet the flight. Made male passenger get off the airplane upon arrival to talk to police and customer service agent. Because the ECAM warning was causing the flight attendant call bells to ring constantly; I was not able to communicate with the lead flight attendant through the interphone. I had to get up and open the door to ask what was going on and if we had an actual fire.I have had several smoking incidents over the years and no one seems to care that a passenger has caused an issue on the plane and has created a condition that jeopardizes the safety of the aircraft by creating excessive work load for us in the cockpit; and in the back the flight attendants are distracted not knowing if it is a greater issue of fire or a terrorist trying to do harm. The passenger just stands on the jetway while someone scolds them and then they walk away without any consequences. Why do we not have a set procedure to deal with this ongoing problem? I don't see much guidance in the FOM.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported passenger was smoking in lavatory and activated the fire/smoke ECAM warning. Reporter stated dissatisfaction with the response to the incident.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This flight was designated as a quick turn. Once cleaners were off the aircraft flight attendants boarded and less than 30 seconds later three members of management were asking the crew if we can board the customers that were shoulder to shoulder with poor ventilation and no signs of social distancing on the jet bridge. I understand that safety checks must be done before door closure. It is extremely difficult to do safety checks during the boarding process of a full X type aircraft with the added pressure of the three members of management standing outside the boarding door. An in-flight Supervisor was standing in front of the flight attendant jump-seat; at door one left during the boarding; to have a look at the boarding process and kept asking how the overhead bins looked. As the A Flight Attendant; I discussed this matter with CS and would contact them when bins were getting full. To complicate things; we had an extra pilot doing a check ride so we had a total of three; we also had a maintenance issue with the aircraft and at one time I was pressed against the door at one right; as we had three pilots three mechanics two flight attendants and one in-flight Supervisor standing in the forward part of the plane along with customers boarding .  It was clear that everything that happened during the boarding process showed we need to do a better job during this COVID-19 pandemic and the quick turn needs to be updated to reflect that.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported social distancing problems/concerns involving passengers; crew and maintenance personnel during boarding on a quick turn flight.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDCS.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Center MDCS
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on climb out at MDSD on RWY HDG from RWY 17 in day VMC; and passing 1;800 ft MSL for 3;000 ft MSL during clean-up from Flaps 1 to Flaps Up at 219 KIAS; the Capt's PFD (Primary Flight Display) displayed red tape over the airspeed (above and below the depicted airspeed); the airspeed was rapidly fluctuating and the Capt's stickshaker was in and out of activation.  My instruments and indications were all normal and cross-checked off of the standby instruments.As soon as the Capt's stickshaker activated; he verbally announced to me 'airspeed unreliable'; in which I immediately cross-checked my AOA (Angle of Attack) indicator; and my flight instruments to the standby instruments.  After I told him the aircraft was in a normal flight regime; I finished the 'After Takeoff' checklist with no abnormalities noted.  The Capt then called for the 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist from the QRH.I ran the 'Airspeed Unreliable' checklist as the Capt maintained precise aircraft control while in and out of stickshaker.  After we finished the checklist determining that the airspeed was reliable on the FO's (First Officer) side and the standby airspeed indicator; we told Santo Domingo Approach that we had an aircraft instrumentation malfunction and we'd like to return to the airport  The Capt transferred aircraft control to me and made a call to the #1 FA (Flight Attendant).We ran the 'Descent'; 'Approach'; and 'Landing' Checklists in quick succession prior to being established on final.  I executed a raw-data visual approach to RWY 17 and made a Flaps 30/Autobrakes 3 heavy weight landing; approximately 15;000 lbs. overweight.  I touched down smoothly and softly on-speed; in the zone; with normal TR (Thrust Reverser) activation and braking upon landing roll-out.  During configuration to land; the Capt's stickshaker activated at least once prior to being established on final approach.We taxied the aircraft clear of RWY 17 to hardstand without incident and accomplished the 'After Landing' and 'Shutdown' checklists normally.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported the Captain's airspeed indicator malfunctioned shortly after takeoff. Flight returned to departure airport.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff roll after Flex thrust set ECAM warning BULK CARGO annunciated. Rejected takeoff. Speed at abort was 90 kts. RTO auto brakes activated and aircraft stopped on runway. Followed procedures for rejected takeoff. Taxied off runway and requested Fire Rescue inspect wheels/brakes for damage. The Fire chief informed me there was no damage to aircraft. Taxied back to gate for maintenance.




Synopsis: A330 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at 90 kts when the bulk cargo door light was annunciated.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWB.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D EWB
ATC / advisory: Tower EWB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were approaching EWB for night landing practice. I heard Tower say; 'enter right downwind Runway 34'. After 2 minutes; my student asked where the runway [was]; which runway he was approaching. He pointed [to] the airport diagram. He said we should use Runway 23 and enter right downwind; because the wind was from 250. I suddenly got confused and tried to go right downwind Runway 23. Tower asked why we went there. I answered we entered it accidentally. I was totally disoriented. Traffic is clear. I tried to find where Runway 34 to enter left downwind. Tower cleared [us] to do right traffic then back to left; but I was unable to do that because I was disoriented. My student tried to fly back to left downwind before I figured [out] where we were. This was why we deviated [from] ATC's assignment. We need to study more about EWB (unfamiliar airport) before we go. I; as a CFI; should take control back to fly ATC assignment immediately.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot entering the EWB traffic pattern was questioned by ATC regarding positioning for the downwind; the reporter acknowledging unfamiliarity with the airport.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During single-engine taxi (wet taxiways); we were holding short of Runway 27R on taxiway Echo facing south. ATC cleared us to cross runway 27R. When power was applied to the number 1 engine; a delay occurred in engine spool-up. When the aircraft started to move forward; it suddenly veered right. Nose wheel steering input could not stop the right turning moment; so the number 1 throttle was retarded and the aircraft was stopped. The nose was now past the runway hold short line by several feet and ATC was notified of this. The number 2 engine was started and taxi clearance was requested and granted to cross runway 27R. Taxi to the takeoff runway (27L) was normal; and nose wheel steering functioned normally. The rest of the flight was uneventful.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported experiencing an uncontrolled turn to the right during single engine taxi as thrust was increased to taxi across an active runway.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival and during post flight walk-around; First Officer discovered ground crew muscling out of the cargo hold an electric scooter that was tagged as a gate check. Ramp estimated the scooter at 100-150lbs far in excess what a standard folding wheelchair weighs![Airline] must immediately establish procedures monitored by FAA oversight to deal with the handling of electric scooters and electric wheelchairs for determining their weight. In addition; a form should be created in triplicate that notifies the PIC of their presence and that the ground staff has properly verified their power source (battery) is approved to be carried aboard our aircraft.




Synopsis: A321 First Officer reported no required Hazmat documents provided to flight crew regarding electric scooter in cargo compartment.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I started work of a 3 day trip.  1st day 13 hour duty day so almost 15 hours with mask on!! I tried to take several masks (maybe 15).  She said I could only take so much and I replied it gets wet so often I need to change it; especially if airline requires me to talk to people as much as we do.  She finally gave me more.  If I am required to wear something that I know is harming my health at least let me do less harm by changing it constantly. Then I was denied access to the bus because of social distancing.  Airline must pick and choose which guidelines it would like to follow because every seat is taken and there is no social distancing on an airplane; but I can't even get to work to get to the packed airplane cause I need to social distance.  This trip had 2 legs with severe turbulence.  I am the one that has to sit in a passenger seat.  I don't get the harness to keep my body from slamming all over the place.  Yes; people were crying and screaming; that is how bad it was.  But unfortunately our pilots took off without asking if we were okay.  Wow; but the next flight into ZZZ1; she screamed over the PA to sit immediately!!!  First officer made sure we were safe and apologized forever on how bad she felt with the last minute notice.  I again was thrown to my seat and no harness.  It is difficult to pass information on to each other that the passengers probably shouldn't hear; but there is no choice if I need to know.  The FA in the back has to yell to me; not only because of a mask; but because I am so far away.  Again; safety and security is tossed aside.  After the 13 hour duty day my head was throbbing.  I again get severe headaches the longer I am masked.  These days are just too long wearing a mask and now they put out an article to the public about the safety of wearing a mask on a plane.  I can do the same and say mask wearing does nothing.  Both articles would be correct; because they aren't peer reviewed science.  Science doesn't lie; people do.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns with having to wear a face mask for so long throughout trips.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In level cruise flight at FL320 on the arrival; received a clearance from ATC to descend to FL300; leaving FL310 turn right 30 degrees; 'S' turns for spacing. I read back the instructions and we initiated the descent and turn.Approximately 30;400 FT; ATC issued instructions to climb to FL320. I inquired the climb instructions and ATC confirmed the altitude. I asked if he still needed the 30 degree right turn; and he issued instructions to go direct to a VOR; reaching FL320. We complied; and I reported when level and direct to the VOR. Shortly after; we noticed [a regional jet] check in on frequency. The First Officer and I discussed what happened; and we both agreed we heard our call sign and flight number when issued the descent and turn. We believe the controller meant to issue those instructions to [the regional jet]; as he gave them similar instructions shortly after they checked in. I wanted to file this report; in case I did make a read back error and accepted a clearance for another aircraft. ATC did not make any issue of it and we continued on. Threats were unawareness of a similar sounding call sign and the potential for a read back error. Although we believe we were in compliance with ATC instructions; an UAS (Undesired Aircraft State) occurred as it required a change in altitude and direction.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The flight crew of an Embraer reported that due to similar call signs they complied with instructions from ATC for a different aircraft.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FAI.Tower, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Second aircraft: PA-31P Navajo P
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Three aircraft were in line for the approach into FYU. A Caravan went in first. We had been told that we should slow for him to avoid holding. We slowed to approximately 150 KTS (groundspeed). The Navajo behind us was told to expect a hold. He was Number 3 for the approach. The Caravan broke out on the approach early; and cancelled IFR. We were then cleared for the approach. We also broke out earlier and cancelled IFR. While on a 7 mile final; we then heard Aircraft Y report 9 miles. There was some discussion in the cockpit as to his location and how this would work out. Another Captain reported five miles. The pilot of Aircraft Y also reported 5 miles and that he was 'passing off our left hand side' (please note we were on final; and had stated such multiple times for Runway 4). Both the Captain and myself looked to our left and saw Aircraft Y very close to us (less than 200 FT); and passing us. I queried Aircraft Y as to what his intentions were. He stated he was going to pass us on final and land on Runway 4. I asked him if he thought that doing this maneuver would give him adequate time to back taxi before we landed. The pilot of Aircraft Y responded by saying he would just 'fly a pattern then' and it was 'no big deal'. Aircraft Y continued to midfield then entered right downwind (the Alaska Supplement shows left traffic for Runway 4). We landed without event; and the Captain performed a 180 deg turn on the runway in order to back taxi to the ramp. When we turned around; Aircraft Y was on a VERY short final and came very close to landing over the top of us. We exited the runway without event. When on the ground; our passengers were very upset that the other aircraft was so close. They were confused and made comments that we should 'report the other pilot.'Poor piloting by the pilot of Aircraft Y; as well as deviation from the following regulations. 1) Passing on the left hand side of an aircraft. 2) Flying too close to other aircraft. 3) Cutting ahead of another aircraft on final. 4) Flying right hand traffic for Runway 4. 5) Not judging his base to final turn correctly.




Synopsis: PA31 First Officer reports being passed on a five mile final to PFYU by another PA31. With the need to back taxi after landing the other pilot is encouraged to enter the pattern and land when the runway is clear. This is accomplished but with little room to spare.