elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RDU.Airport, NC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 6
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C RDU
ATC / advisory: Tower RDU
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying my 12th airdrop relief mission post Hurricane Florence. Conditions on the ground were hectic and we were late in getting loaded. During my preflight; a [non aviation person] started asking questions.  Non-pilot people should not be allowed unsupervised access to the ramp. After the interruption; I finished my preflight. I was preparing to remove my pitot cover when interrupted. I apparently skipped that step. After normal taxi and rotation which showed an indication of airspeed; my airspeed froze at about 20 to 25 knots below normal. I looked out of the window and saw the pitot cover about half on and folded over by the wind (soft cloth cover). I climbed out; requested return to the field; was given priority; and landed without incident. I informed Tower of my omission; apologized for tying up airspace; and was re-assigned a departure slot. No flights were waved off to permit the landing. Despite the distractions; the mistake was completely my responsibility.




Synopsis: General aviation pilot reported an inoperative airspeed indication after takeoff due to the failure to remove the pitot tube cover during pre-flight.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On La Guardia 4 departure Whitestone transition during heading 180 experienced some jet wash [just as we were] starting to turn on [the] 040 heading at 2.4 DME from LGA. ATC called us and asked if we are in the turn 040 heading and we replied; 'yes we are in the turn [to] 040 also we [were] told we turned [at] 2.4 DME LGA.' After that ATC gave us another heading.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-700 flight crew reported deviation from Whitestone track due in part to wake vortex encounter.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after departing ZZZ; just prior to the first turn on the ZZZZZ SID at [around] 400 feet; we received an ECAM alert from the aircraft. After performing the SID turn and completing the After Takeoff Checklist; we coordinated with ATC to stay in the local area while we ran the ECAM. [We advised with] ZZZ ATC as we were near ZZZ1 and decided as a crew to divert. There was no abnormal pressurization indication; but as we were level at 3;000 feet; we did not expect to see a pressurization issue. We were well above max landing weight; and elected to burn gas as we had no indication (drag; controllability issues; etc) that would have deemed an immediate and overweight landing necessary. While burning gas; we coordinated with Dispatch; our Flight Attendant teammates; and ATC. We informed the passengers of the situation and our intent to land in ZZZ1. After reaching a GW of 142.2; we proceeded to land on [Runway] XXL. We had discussed making as smooth a touchdown as possible; given that should the cargo door be open; [we] were concerned of structural damage of the aircraft. A gentle touchdown occurred and taxied in without incident. Upon arrival; hub MX informed us that the Aft Cargo Door handle was in fact open. It was discovered that a significant issue with the cargo door latch mechanism was present and the aircraft was removed from service. After a plane swap; we continued to [destination] and successfully completed the flight with a delayed arrival.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate airport after receiving an ECAM alert related to a cargo door malfunction.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We received NOTOC. It was approved. Went on with remaining duties. Copilot read close out and with rarely getting NOTOC copilot missed the fwd. No. aft No. I did not check ground employee's work except aircraft weight then mind to runway then HW/TW. Cause: Both out of practice because the system is so reliable it almost always matches. Suggestions: continue to cross check close out with all paper work including NOTOC.


Second narrative: During preflight we received a NOTOC for restricted articles in the forward cargo compartment. After takeoff approximately halfway to [destination] noticed that the load closeout did not show R/A FWD-YES. Cause: the time between receiving the NOTOC and reviewing the load closeout was lengthy. When reviewing the load closeout I did not remember/catch the error. Suggestions: going forward I will make a note to remind myself when restricted articles are onboard.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported discrepancy between Hazmat NOTOC and pre-release Hazmat documents.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Caravan 208A
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After landing on Runway XXR at ZZZ I taxied onto taxiway 1.  Ground instructed to taxi to parking via [taxiway] 2 [and] 3. I read the instructions back and proceeded to 3 via 2. This flight was part of my IOE with a more senior company pilot who; out of habit; directed me to turn onto 1; which was closed by NOTAM. I assumed I must have been in error and turned. ZZZ's ground controller immediately intervened and corrected our improper turn.  I made a right 270 to continue down 2 to 3. The main incident occurred as I made the slight right turn to the SE Ramp from taxiway 3. The plane's turn radius to the right was too large and I noticed my left wingtip approaching a parked 53-foot trailer. I was already applying full right rudder with no brakes; and then I applied right brake pressure but the turn did not increase. Seemingly suddenly; the airplane pulled to the left and pointed the nose directly at the trailer.I then applied full brakes on both sides; but there was little or no braking. I applied full reverse thrust and it brought the plane to a full stop in a few feet. The plane stopped at approximately a 60-degree angle to the left of the intended direction on the taxiway center line. Me and the other pilot decided to shut down and exit the aircraft. The nose wheel was at the maximum left turn position after we were out of the plane.The plane is being inspected for any mechanical issues related to the gear and brakes.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a taxiway incursion and issues related to the aircraft's braking system.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working East RADAR with 4 to 5 aircraft on frequency and departures coming; Supervisor called and said he was going to CENRAP PLUS for maintenance. RADAR screen went blank with loss of primary and secondary and did not return. I called upstairs to see if coordination with System Engineer had taken place and also found out the RADAR control unit had been changed to CENRAP instead of being left on LIVE as needed for CENRAP PLUS. I had them return to normal RADAR which came back after a total of 2 to 3 minutes. After coordination had been done with the System Engineer and ensuring the control unit left on LIVE; I did the entrees to go to CENRAP PLUS which transitioned without incident. Before taking action to transition to CENRAP; personnel need to be aware of the proper procedure. Transition should be done during time of low traffic when able and not when departures are coming out. Maintenance should be done at times of lower traffic (preferably mid shift) not in the middle of the day.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a confused transition from normal operations to CENRAP resulting in RADAR data losses; noting the coordination between supervisors; controllers and maintenance personnel was lacking.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After watching a demo of fogging the aircraft for possible viruses with a new procedure I had noticed that the fog would enter into the forward and aft cabin temp sensor module. The fog is a wet fog that coats the surfaces to disinfect. The fog will easily enter the module that are in the PSUs. The power for these comes from your P6-4 power panel and controlled from your 115v AC bus that is still powered with your ground service bus. These Temp sensors have had issues in the past on all fleets with dirt and dust coating the sensor and giving false reading of cabin temp. Example; the pilot write up might say Aft cabin temp hot or cold this is due to the temp bulb dirty in most cases.  This is a procedure we are doing and we had talked about this to the others that were giving the demo of our concerns. Also with the smoke detectors in the cabin and cargo. There are similar systems on several aircraft types that operate in the same manner.   Either pull the circuit breaker in the systems before you spray the cargo or cabin or clean the sensors after spraying the cabin and or cargo in accordance with the manuals. This would avoid any delays to the aircraft departure and discomfort to our passengers and cabin crew members due to any delays or hot or cold cabin temps or false smoke warnings.




Synopsis: Technician reported that the residue film left from fogging the aircraft for COVID-19 may affect temperature sensors.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was IOE for 1st time Captain upgrade. In day VFR conditions; we accepted a visual approach. Student set himself on a 4 NM downwind; then set 2100 feet in the altitude window. This was the FAF altitude; which is just under a 4 NM final. Unfamiliar with the field; the student elected to take a slightly longer final. Just prior to turning base at about 8 NMs from the field; the Tower Controller stated; 'Low altitude alert. The MSA in that quadrant is 2500 feet. Climb to 2500 feet.' The student then selected 2500 feet in the altitude window; and climbed in V/S from 2100 feet to 2500 feet. [The] rest of the approach was uneventful.[The cause was] unfamiliarity with the field on the Student Captain's part; and perhaps lack of information on the company pages or reference pages of Jeppesen; because it is fairly common for pilots to descend to the FAF altitude on a visual approach if inside of the IF or IAF.


Second narrative: After being cleared for a visual approach; the PF (Pilot Flying) descended to the FAF altitude for the corresponding RNAV approach while on a downwind leg. Prior to turning base; Tower called with a low altitude alert indicating that 2100 feet was below the sector altitude we had just entered. We immediately climbed to 2500 feet; which was the sector safe altitude according to Tower. We completed the rest of the approach and landing without incident. Pilot descended to FAF altitude but then flew past the FAF on downwind a little too far before turning base; entered a sector where a tower drove up the min safe altitude higher than FAF altitude but pilot didn't realize the safe altitude had increased until prompted by Control Tower. If descending to FAF altitude on a visual approach; stay within a couple miles of the FAF; otherwise stay at least at 1500 feet AGL on downwind and paying close attention to radio altitude and charted terrain to ensure 1500 feet AGL on downwind.


Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from the Tower during a visual approach.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Shift Manager was informed of the [Control Center] being overstaffed and was told to send people home by upper Management. The Manager made the decision to leave because there was another Shift Manager that was working in Dispatch that could fill in. That; somehow; became my problem when the Shift Manager; working Dispatch at the time; was pulled to the podium to work as Shift Manager and the flights on their Dispatch Desk (Mountain Desk) were added to my desk; both sent and unsent flights. The flights I had sent on my Dispatch Desk were left on my desk; but my flights that were not due yet were sent to the IROP Desk. This created a few issues. I do not feel properly trained for the Mountain Desk having never worked it. I also had 18 flights in the air while trying to work up a full bank load of flights; making it impossible to flight follow with any level of detail. At one point; I had 32 active flights on my desk and another bank needing to be worked up. This is a major safety issue and should not be taken lightly. If this had happened during busier banks; there could have easily been closer to 40 flights in the air at a time.The [Control Center] was overstaffed and the company sacrificed safety of flight to save paying an additional person. I am sure someone could have been sent home without affecting Dispatcher work load if better procedures were followed.This cannot happen again; Mountain Desk especially. If the [Control Center] is overstaffed; a plan needs to be in place before the shifts begin. I started my shift at 2pm. There was plenty of time to spread flights and increase each desk by 1 or 2 flights before they started; rather than increase my work load; and the work load of the IROP Desk by 20 plus flights.The company cannot allow a couple hundred dollars in payroll to affect the workloads so much that it becomes unsafe.




Synopsis: Dispatch Supervisor sent staff home and dispatchers were over worked and understaffed.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This morning; we got an RA on the approach landing in [our destination airport]. Our clearance on the ILS was; 'Maintain 4000 ft. to ZZZZZ; cleared the ILS'. (The weather was calm winds; 10 miles visibility.) The autopilot captured the localizer; and soon after we were descending on the glideslope. Outside of ZZZZZ1 I switched to Tower and was given a landing clearance. Approaching ZZZ airport we got a 'Traffic' TA. It went to 'Monitor Vertical Speed'; and soon after instructions 'Climb'. The Captain responded and I let the Tower know that we were in a climb due to an RA. Tower responded with something along the lines of 'Roger; I believe that is a Gulfstream departing ZZZ.' As he said this; I visually saw a white Gulfstream off our right side (it appeared to be climbing through our altitude) and flying away from us to the south. Tower asked if we were able to continue the approach. At that point we were visually clear of the traffic; not in a landing configuration (yet) and felt comfortable continuing the approach. We got back onto the glideslope and were stabilized for a normal landing. The Gulfstream was on a 90-degree angle to our flight path; but like I said; appeared to be climbing well through our altitude as we were established and descending on the glideslope. When my Captain called Tower; the Controller said that he was unaware if ZZZ had given him a hold down altitude. Either way it was a mistake somewhere and for once not on our end. I hope that the details of this report are followed up with. I would be interested in knowing what altitude he/she was cleared to on that departure from ZZZ.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported deviating while on an ILS approach due to an RA from an aircraft departing a nearby airport.