elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The First Officer briefed the ZZZZZ SID Runway XXL; which has the same initial altitude then a turn to ZZZZZ1; as is listed for Runway XY. As we performed the Before Push Checklist we became distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X.  As we began the climb; we then noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL.  As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was the same flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no flight path deviation occurred.


Second narrative: During loading of the FMC route the runway was initially loaded as XXL; after verifying with the Ramp that Runway XY was the intended departure runway for the ZZZZZ SID; I began to update the FMC.  At that time the FA informed me of an issue that required the Ops Agent; therefore; distracting me from completing the runway change.  When I returned; in my mind I had completed the runway change.  I briefed the departure and we did not catch the error as the altitude of the turn coded in the FMC; and all the waypoints are identical for the two runways.  As we performed the Before Push Checklist we were also distracted during the runway response by the confirmation of receiving Report X.  We taxied out single engine and my focus was on starting the #2 engine.  As we approached the end of Taxiway G we were cleared for takeoff.  As we began the initial climb; I noticed that the FMC was setup for XXL.  As we passed 5;XXX feet; the FMC sequenced to turn direct ZZZZZ1; which was actually the intended flight path for a Runway XY departure for the ZZZZZ SID; therefore no lateral fight path deviation occurred.  Some additional external factors involved that led to additional distractions are the possibilities of furloughs related to COVID-19.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported loading the incorrect departure runway in the FMS but no track deviation occurred due to the flight path being the same. The First Officer reported distraction and COVID-19 job related concerns contributed to the event.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Stinson.  Ground loop on runway; taxied to the end of the 31C. Stopped at the FBO and [had an] A&P look over the aircraft. No damaged to the airplane then left the same day.




Synopsis: A Stinson V-77 pilot reported no injury or damage following a ground loop during landing. Maintenance examined the aircraft prior to departure the same day.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after arriving at the gate in our destination; the C Flight Attendant reported to me that she experienced symptoms and smelled an odor consistent with previous cabin odor reports turned in by other crew members. Her experience; as reported to me; occurred during takeoff and climb to approximately 10;000 FT. She stated that she smelled a dirty sock or musty odor and experience burning eyes at position 2R (A321) beginning at initial takeoff thrust application; with the smell and burning eye sensation gradually subsiding during the climb out; stating that she recalled not smelling the odor at about the time that I turned off the PED at 10;000 FT. Her only complaint beyond those was a sensation in the back of her throat throughout the remainder of the flight. None of the other flight attendants or the cockpit crew members experienced what the C Flight Attendant experienced. After receiving her report; I contacted Maintenance through Dispatch to report the odor occurrence. I advised the Flight Attendant to contact her Supervisor and get advice on whether she should seek medical care; and also advised the rest of the crew to do the same if they thought it was necessary. The aircraft was written up; an Aircraft Cabin Odor Report was filled out by me with the assistance of the effected Flight Attendant; and the logbook page and Odor Report were faxed to Maintenance. Our outbound flight was subsequently canceled; and at the time of this writing; the aircraft is awaiting Maintenance personal from a nearby maintenance station to trouble shoot the problem.




Synopsis: An A321 Flight Attendant reported a dirty socks odor and experienced symptoms during takeoff and climb to 10;000 FT. The aircraft was removed from service at its destination.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: Widebody Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On final for the visual 34L into SEA we were following a [widebody] being vectored for the approach to 34C. Being 5 miles behind the heavy jet; we were cleared for the visual and I even prudently asked for the separation and their speed to better adjust things on our end to avoid wake turbulence. Around 5-10 miles from the runway at approximately 2500-3000 ft; we experienced a roll upset from wake turbulence from the [widebody]. It was aggressive; but controllable. If I had to guess; the aircraft was quickly rolled to about a 20 degree bank. The event only lasted a couple of seconds before we corrected the upset and were easily re-established. The Captain adjusted the glide path to sit even higher to the glide slope as to avoid the wake turbulence; but within the stable criteria. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful and the landing and taxi to the gate routine. Upon reaching the gate and deplaning; one passenger stated 'thanks for not killing us' in a very rude disdainful tone. The second passenger asked if we dodged an airplane or birds. Neither were true. Due to the nature of the passenger concerns; I found it necessary to file an ASAP and crew report. After that the Flight Attendant-A informed us that the passenger didn't wear his seat belt even when instructed to. He was also the individual that stated his remarks to us. I also think that the [widebody] was high on his visual approach to 34C so it put the wake turbulence right at our altitude when we were flying a higher glide slope already; but it was dark and difficult to see the situation fully. I would suggest that the wake separation be increased for [widebodies]. Five miles was just barely adequate and any aircraft smaller might actually experience jet upset at a low altitude.




Synopsis: EMB-175 reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a widebody transport. Reporter recommended increased separation from this type aircraft.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon rotation received a 'peddle Steer Inop' glareshield message.  We declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing.The root cause of this event is poor maintenance on the EMB-120 by this Airline.  This aircraft has had this same issue multiple times.  Either the Airline is not technically capable of maintaining these aircraft or they are not attempting to actually fix the issues at hand.I suggest this Airline Maintenance needs to be examined for systematical issues pertaining to troubleshooting and repeat write-ups.  This is not a problem with a specific mechanic but comes from the top of our Company.




Synopsis: An EMB-120 glare shield message 'PEDDLE Steer Inop' alerted at rotation on takeoff so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport. Aircraft Maintenance is apparently lacking.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VVTS.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 7X
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center VVTS
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As this was my first trip to Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC); I had studied the applicable procedures extensively; and was additionally confident in the experience of my copilot operating in this region. Crossing from the Manila Flight Information Region (FIR) into the Ho Chi Minh FIR over MIGUG and communicating over VHF; the controller asked us to report MESOX. We informed him that we were CPDLC; and he instructed us to use CPDLC. My colleague suggested that since we had ADS-C; we didn't need to send a position report. I accepted his recommendation; and shortly thereafter we were in radar contact. We proceeded to our destination without incident. In retrospect; I believe that we should have sent that position report; and will use this experience as a lesson for the future.




Synopsis: Falcon 7X Captain reported he was unsure about reporting requirements in Southeast Asia using Controller Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC).
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Boston was departing on Runway 22R; winds were reported 260 at 13 kts with no gusts or windshear forecast. We planned a max power takeoff for departure on the HYLND4. At rotation; prior to establishing a positive rate of climb; the airspeed stagnated and the WAGS system sounded an aural Tailwind Shear alert and the flight director switched to wind shear guidance. Due to poor acceleration and climb performance; I advanced the throttles towards Firewall Power and we climbed out in takeoff configuration. The pilot monitoring notified Boston Tower of the windshear; and after windshear guidance was exited; Tower and departure provided vectors to HYLND; the final point of the SID. The power setting was reduced to max at about 1000 ft AGL and no exceedances were observed. With no evidence of damage or exceedances the flight was continued.Aircraft systems operated normally; windshear escape procedures were followed. Simulator training is very valuable in developing the reflexes for unexpected events such as low level wind shear.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported using firewall thrust to cope with an unexpected tailwind shear event during takeoff from BOS.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was pilot flying during this event. I was resting my arm on the flap lever; inputting information into the FMS. I felt the flap handle move aft; the aircraft 'raised up a bit;' and the flap position indicator moved from the up position toward the 1 degree mark on the gauge. I immediately moved the handle down into the detent position. I pulled back on the handle to ensure that it was completely in the correct position. This confirmed to me that the flap handle had not been properly seated after takeoff cleanup. We were at FL390; 0.79 mach and 240 KTS. This whole event lasted less than 3 seconds.1


Second narrative: In cruise flight at FL390; we received clearance direct to a fix on the XXX Arrival. I was making an address to the passengers at that same time. The First Officer as pilot flying entered the new fix in the CDU and as he pulled his left hand back his wrist or hand brushed the Flap Control Lever and it momentarily dropped back the Flaps 1 position. The aircraft bumped momentarily before the First Officer could return the lever to the Flaps Zero position. There was no aural overspeed indication and the Leading Edge Device (Amber) in Transit Light did not ever illuminate. We notified Dispatch via free text message of the occurrence and asked for them to advise Maintenance. We entered the occurrence in the logbook and radioed Aircraft Maintenance of the event upon arrival at the gate.


Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer inadvertently bumped the flap handle while entering data into the FMC during cruise; causing it to move out of the 'up' detent.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Control Valves
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed as normal; upon reaching approximately 400 feet received an EICAS message and warning for bleed 1 and 2 over pressure. Continued climb while cleaning up plane as normal. Leveled at 3;000 feet. I had the airplane and the radios; [Captain] began to run the QRH checklist. After completing the checklist the bleed 1 over pressure message went away but 2 did not. The captain decided to run the checklist once more with the same result. The checklist required us to land with one engine idle. At that time the captain decided to switch duties. I ran the single engine land checklist while he flew and had radios. After the checklist was completed we asked for vectors back to [departure airport] and proceeded to fly the visual. After landing we exited the runway. Everyone was fine and no other incidents occurred. Overall the [situation] was a success. We used CRM and the training we received. The only thing I would have changed was the decision to switch roles in between checklists. The captain had briefed that I would fly and he would run checklists as needed. The switch caused slight confusion on my end but we were able to handle the situation safely.




Synopsis: An EMB-175 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after receiving an EICAS message for dual bleed overpressure.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJU.Tower, PR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJU
ATC / advisory: Tower SJU
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Departed Isla Grande airport (TJIG) VFR approved for the (VFR) Tango Transition by TJIG Tower to TIST (St. Thomas). Was cleared for takeoff by TJIG Tower climb to 1;500 FT and fly the Tango Transition. I departed on 095 heading and waited for as always for Tower to transfer me to San Juan Tower; but they never did. I called San Juan Tower and checked in on the Tango Transition proceeding as approved to the Tower. I was informed by the Controller that I had entered Class C airspace without authorization. I apologized and stated that I was not handed over to Tower as usual. The Controller stated that I should have circumvented Class C airspace. I have always understood that once I was cleared for the Tango Transition and given a discreet transponder code that my authorization was already granted. I still believe that is the case; nonetheless I will in the future assure myself that I call San Juan Tower before proceeding. There were no conflicts with other aircraft; I was switched to San Juan Departure and continued my VFR flight. I will be more vigilant in the future.




Synopsis: SMA pilot assumed he had Class C clearance; Controller advised pilot that they had violated the airspace.