elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201201
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Runway 10 was in use; and the aircraft FMS was set up to use Runway 10; as a defined waypoint. After receiving clearance to taxi; ATC issued a clearance to use Runway 28. Runway 28 requires defining the location in the FMS; as it is not a runway that is in the database. The Captain; the non-flying pilot; defined the runway; entered it and defined other points for the departure. He then taxied out; received takeoff clearance; and I performed the takeoff. Once airborne; we began accumulating ice. The anti-ice equipment was turned on; we lost communication on Comm 1 and Comm 2. We then noticed that we had no data on our PFD's. The only NAV data available was VOR data. I set up my NAV data for direct to the VOR and followed the flight plan using VOR NAV data and airways. I instructed the Captain to update the IRS position over the VOR. This action was performed successfully. What appears to have happened is that the Captain entered the wrong coordinates when he entered the runway change. After the coordinates were entered they should have been checked and approved by all crew members. Then the appropriate checklist should have been performed. It is my opinion that the Captain should have allowed the flying pilot to modify the flight plan and that all crew members present should have verified the clearance with the data in the FMS; particularly the defined way points. The taxi checklist should have been performed after the changes per our approved procedure.




Synopsis: An MD11 crew took off into icing conditions. All communication was lost when anti-ice was turned on. PFD route data was unavailable. The crew used VOR for navigation and updated the IRS crossing the first VOR.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X cancelled their IFR about 10 miles from the airport approaching Runway 10. Aircraft Y was waiting on Runway 28 ready for departure. I told both aircraft about each other and released Aircraft Y at their discretion. Aircraft Y waited until Aircraft X was very close before departing. I thought Aircraft Y would wait until Aircraft X landed; but instead they pushed it and got close enough to Aircraft X that the pilot of Aircraft X called the Center wondering what was going on.The pilots need to talk to each other on local frequency and should know that if they go VFR; controllers will pass along their information; but they don't separate them from other IFR aircraft in the terminal environment.




Synopsis: ZDV Center Controller reported he was advised by an arrival to an uncontrolled airport that another aircraft had been given a departure clearance by another controller to departed opposite direction and too close to them.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Inspection Authority
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A part 135 rotorcraft was involved in a ground event involving a main rotor overspeed. The aircraft was removed from service pending the airframe and engine manufacturers recommended inspections. During the time period it was found that another rotorcraft was overdue an airframe inspection and also was removed from service. Management had a job scheduled with the second aircraft and decided to remove all the current rotating components; including engine; MR (Main Rotor) blades; gearboxes; etc and install them on the rotorcraft that had the overspeed event.The components were transferred; airframe inspections were completed; ground and flight checks were completed. A log entry was generated with a list of discrepancies and compliances from a work order. The aircraft was dispatched for the job. The rotating components and other items have definite hourly service life and component limits recorded on individual component cards.These component cards were not completed and no record of remaining service life intervals were posted to the dispatched rotorcraft. There also was no current airframe; accessory and engine AD (Airworthiness Directive) record posted in the company's tracking program for the aircraft that experienced the overspeed. Since it is a part 135 aircraft; these intervals are required by CFR pt 135.439 and are currently not complete. In researching prior record entries by prior Maintenance; it was found that no research was completed and the currently available records in the company's tracking software did not reflect the current aircraft configuration.Initially the aircraft was returned to service and was being operated without documented component/inspection records per the manufacturers inspection/life limit requirements in order to complete the production job. However; the records are now in research and being updated.




Synopsis: Aircraft Inspector reported that an Aircraft Repair Station did not properly update maintenance inspection records for an aircraft that was subsequently dispatched into revenue service.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLT; Ramp CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Entered CLT ramp at E14; received instructions to taxi to D terminal via the south line and report various spots with appropriate ramp frequencies. Sky was dark; ramp surfaces were wet and shiny; and ramp markings at CLT are generally poor; damaged; or non-existent. At Spot 25S we continued straight on to Taxiway M rather than making the left-hand jog to remain on the ramp. We turned left onto Taxiway C and re-entered the ramp via C-10 and proceeded to the gate.This event occurred because CLT does not deem it necessary to apply; maintain; or repair ramp and taxiway markings so as to be visible to unfamiliar pilots at night or in the weather. It seems to be a point of perverse pride among local operators that the ramp at CLT is a goat rope navigable only by locals. Markings are often invisible or missing altogether. Dark airplanes with no navigation lights are parked in poorly marked and totally unlit sections of the ramp called 'hardstands.' Locally-based crews taxi across ramp areas without regard to what few painted lines exist. It takes at least three radio frequency changes to move from Ramp West to Ramp East. The airlines and CLT share in the responsibility for addressing these issues.Paint some lines on the ramp! Install some intelligible signage when a section of straight dark ramp stops being ramp and starts being an ATC-controlled taxiway. Judging from comments made by other non-local pilots new to the CLT ground ops (especially those [predominately] operating from [other areas] who almost never see CLT during daylight hours); this has been a longstanding issue and no one is in any hurry to get it fixed. So here are my mitigating recommendations:1) Provide local-knowledge 'pilots' in the jumpseat to guide unfamiliar crews.2) Have ramp control provide progressive taxi instructions.3) Assign follow-me vehicles to late-night crews entering or exiting the ramp.4) Paint some lines and install some signs.This is a potentially serious issue and I know I am not the first pilot to report these deficiencies.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain unfamiliar with the CLT ramp reported a taxiway incursion incident. Ramp markings were cited as contributing factors.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight training with safety pilot who pulled power to one engine. Aircraft descended below glide slope while pulling the checklist for the simulated emergency.Had visual clearance above the terrain by hundreds of feet.




Synopsis: Light transport aircraft pilot reported a brief deviation below glideslope after safety pilot simulated a single engine approach.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: SF 340A
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Propeller Assembly
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the lead mechanic for a propeller build-up during which #2 and #4 blades were swapped. When the prop was finally put on a plane a month later; the airplane experienced excessive vibration. This is when the prop was inspected and found that blades were installed in the wrong locations. I think the blades were installed improperly because too many people were involved in the build-up. Blades #1 and #3 were installed first so I think we just got confused as to which side #2 went on. Inevitably after installing #2 incorrectly; then #4 would also be incorrect. I think we also failed to double-check our work like we did when installing #1 blade.




Synopsis: A lead Maintenance Technician reported a process failure where propeller blades were installed in the incorrect position during build-up; resulting in vibration when the assembly was installed on an aircraft.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: Tower ANC
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the return into Anchorage; ATC cleared us to land on 7L following in trail Aircraft Y that was cleared to land on 7R. After landing Aircraft Y exited 7R at Taxiway Golf. Aircraft Y was holding short of 7L when ATC cleared them to cross at G and contact Ground on the other side of 7L. We were on a visual to 7L at about 230-300 ft. AGL when myself and the Captain prepared to execute a go-around because of the traffic conflict. Lucky Aircraft Y pilots declined the crossing instructions and held short of 7L at G until we landed. ATC issued no further instructions or information following the incident to either aircraft.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a potential ground conflict while approaching to land in ANC.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sail Plane
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Aircraft component: Elevator Control Column
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Glider
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I took off in a (glider) Schweizer 2-33A being towed by a Cessna 150. After realizing I did not have full forward elevator movement; I climbed in tow to 1;000 FT AGL; released from tow; and returned to the airport. I had a normal landing. The reason for not having full forward stick movement was that the rear seatbelt had been secured around the yoke. I failed to observe this in the preflight check; and did not confirm full forward elevator movement before flight. [I should] be sure to perform a through preflight walk around and before takeoff check with checklists. Be sure of full control movement (free and correct).




Synopsis: Schweizer 2-33 pilot noted limited forward stick movement during in-tow takeoff; released from tow; and returned to land. Pilot found rear seatbelt secured around control stick.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We] received an Oil Pressure Low annunciator light with decreasing oil pressure indication on pressure gauge. Event occurred on climb out approximately 10 minutes after departure. [We] leveled off at 15;000 declared emergency. Shut down left engine per QRH. [We] returned to the airport for landing. Executed go around on first approach due to being near maximum landing weight and need for excessive aileron input needed to maintain level flight.


Second narrative: During CLIMBOUT [we received a] 'L Oil Pressure Low' Light with gradual drop of left oil pressure drop to ZERO. During final transition to landing configuration became aware of more than normal aileron required and along with near maximum landing weight. [We] decided early to Go-Around. Selected fuel cross-feed; rechecked configuration; and a second approach was completed. AS REQUIRED for fuel management and CROSS-FEED procedure; may not be strong enough. RECOMMENDED would offer better guidance. A quick landing was planned but at near Maximum Landing Weight - any out of balance fuel can create more than anticipated control issues.


Synopsis: A MD83 L OIL PRESSURE LOW alerted during climb so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where a go around was executed on the first approach because of an excessive aileron requirement and the overweight condition.
Date: 201903
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft X has history of NGS (Nitrogen Generation System) faults troubleshoot from behind desk; no help. Found NGS filter housing cracked. This is a recurring issue; the same part was being robbed from Aircraft Y for Aircraft X same part cracked. An [Engineering Order] needs to be issued to inspect our 757 fleet.Issue an [Engineering Order] to inspect this part on our 757 fleet; also not have someone try to repair the crack with epoxy to get the aircraft out.




Synopsis: Aircraft mechanic reported the Nitrogen Generation System filter housing was found cracked and is a recurring issue.
Date: 201910
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; MEL
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During the final cockpit preparation we received takeoff data from the FMC and ACARS for Runway 28. However we were unable to get info for Runways 32 and 34; the longer runways in use. I called Dispatch and learned that this MEL had been applied to our aircraft due to local maintenance discovery. The First Officer did not notice this on his walk around. Dispatch advised that we were not legal for takeoff on any runway due to the severe weight penalty. The company canceled this flight after exhausting all possible relief from this MEL.My concerns and questions:1) Why did the flight crew not receive an alert regarding this change to the original signed release?2) Why did we receive takeoff data for Runway 28?3) Why does the [release] not print in sequential page order?




Synopsis: B787 Captain reported that an MEL weight penalty resulted in a maintenance action and flight cancellation.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While working Sector 14; I was involved in a conversation regarding miles in trail requirements with the on duty FLM; which quickly escalated into a performance based discussion. As both of us attempted to explain our difference of opinion to one another; the conversation eventually became a distraction to me as well as other controllers working in the area. While the distraction did not lead to the loss of separation or aircraft incident; the FLM's disregard of safety; significantly impacted my ability to communicate with aircraft in a timely manner. It is my opinion that this conversation/debate over procedures should have been conducted outside the control room area; not while I was working the sector. Abide by guidelines set forth in local/national orders addressing the importance of reducing distraction in the workplace.




Synopsis: ZDV Controller voiced concern regarding a controller/supervisor conversation that escalated into a significant distraction impacting communications with aircraft at the sector.