elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I have operated Aircraft X with a deferred APU three legs this week. Every leg had a delay and/or stressful complication associated. I am going to highlight every error this week in this report to shed light on the trend I saw primarily with our maintenance practices. Incident 1During final preparations immediately prior to door closure a mechanic came on board to encourage us to get going as soon as possible to minimize delays in the blocks while starting via air cart. He then hastily and without communication with us communicated to ground crew to pull GPU power and reached on the overhead panel and turned off the external power. The airplane went to battery power; he then realized his mistake; turned the power back on just in time for ground personnel to pull the GPU plug. After a couple minutes we were able to restore ground power and started checking and resetting aircraft systems; ACARs and FMC inputs. Incident 2A delay was incurred while assessing an ice detection system while in the blocks; and due to the air start being required the delay was compounded. Incident 3Immediately after block in while preforming shut down duties maintenance pushed stairs to the aircraft and opened the door themselves. Within three minutes of block in while we were still in our seats filling out logbooks; sending on messages; and securing the flight deck a mechanic again reached up and without communication with me turned off external power. The aircraft went dark; the ACARs reset before the on message was sent. Two suggestions. Maintenance needs to be trained to respect our space while the flight crew is in operational control of the aircraft. It is not okay to just reach up and flip switches while a pilot in in operational control of an aircraft. Once I hand the logbook over they can perform their duties without any interference from us; just as I stand back and take a seat when I come on board an airplane and see them in the middle of their duties. Also there seems to be a real uptick in the trend of APU deferrals and repeat write ups on APUs in recent months at [Company].




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported that prior to flight there was a lack of coordination between flight crews and maintenance in regards to APU deferrals.
Date: 201405
Location: UUWW.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were flying into Vnukouvo (Moscow). I had asked the Controller for a QNH approach. With no response I was left to believe we were doing a QFE which is what they always force you to do in the real world. When we descended down to 600M which is 1;900 FT QFE we were too low. We were supposed to be at 2;660 FT QNH. But as I said; without proper response I was lead to believe we were getting the QFE as usual. The English proficiency of these controllers is extremely weak at best. Not even close to what ICAO standards require. Take that along with very dangerous situations and unfamiliar areas and you have accidents. Just look at how many occur on their watch with no repercussions what so ever. This really needs serious work. We were fortunate that the weather was clear and day time. Simple mistake by an experienced pilot!




Synopsis: A medium transport First Officer reported that on approach to UUWW the crew requested a QNH approach but when ATC; with poor English skills did not respond; they assume QNH clearance but determined later they were not cleared and had descended too low.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Learjet 55
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff roll at approximately 90 knots; we heard a bang and felt vibration. I looked out my left side window and saw chunks of rubber flying all over the place. I immediately aborted the takeoff and told the First Officer we blew a tire. I was rolling (on one tire still I assumed) off the right side of Runway 21 when I could tell by loss of forward movement; we lost both tires. I stopped; shut down the engines and told the copilot to run the checklist and check me. I jumped out of my seat right away and when I opened the door to see if I was correct and couldn't move I saw the left landing gear was on fire. I told the passengers to evacuate due to 'a small fire' and I immediately got out the rear fire extinguisher which I applied to the fire and the fire went out. Not more than a few seconds later; it started to smoke again and I was afraid it may relight so I went back into the airplane to grab the second fire extinguisher under the copilot's seat. I applied that one to the smoking landing gear and told the copilot to call Tower and get the fire trucks coming just in case it started back up again as I had nothing else left to fight it with. The fire remained out; the fire trucks showed up and once it had cooled sufficiently in their professional opinion; we retrieved our bags and things from the airplane.




Synopsis: Learjet 55 Captain reported leaving runway during rejected takeoff for tire failure. Flight crew discovered fire in gear area and used portable extinguishers to fight it prior to calling for assistance.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Robinson R44
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Instrument training flight conducted at night in VMC. Student under the hood. Altitude is approximate we were descending; and my eyes were outside the cockpit. An instrument student and I...were not on an instrument practice approach but simply practicing aircraft control on the way back to ZZZ; while I provided headings for the student to follow. We had been in contact with Center for VFR flight following; but had just canceled flight following to contact CTAF for our full-stop landing. Before canceling flight following; Center informed us of two aircraft between our 11 and 1 o'clock. I reported both aircraft in sight; as I was able to spot them. Center then issued a general advisory that there were multiple targets around ZZZ. After the traffic reports; we switched to CTAF and I made a position report. One of the aircraft Center had given us was flying the opposite direction on our right; so I took controls (as the student was still under the hood); and started a left turn to give more space between us. This traffic was no factor. As I turned left; I saw an aircraft fly directly beneath us. Due to the lack of light it is difficult for me to say how far above the other aircraft we were. My best estimation is between 100-300 feet. We were heading southbound; the other aircraft was heading west-southwest. At this time we were approximately 4-5 miles north-northwest of ZZZ. Another airport is approximately 10 nm north of ZZZ; with a 5 nm radius Class D airspace. The aircraft we flew over attempted to contact us on CTAF moments later and according to them had just switched from tower to ZZZ CTAF. Traffic congestion near airspace boundaries-Fixation on the traffic in sight. What can be done: Continued attention brought to the need to see and avoid other traffic. Careful route consideration for entering and exiting airport environments. Maintaining vigilance.




Synopsis: An R44 instructor pilot and his student suffered an NMAC with another aircraft as they were approaching their non-towered destination at night.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After departing the pilot flying called for gear up. After several seconds elapsed a Crew Alert System showed on the Multi Function Display as 'LG lever disagree' and all three gear indicators were red. The crew followed the QRH procedures and the landing gear remained in the down and locked position with three green gear indications. We changed our destination to our base airport and landed and taxied to the factory repair facility with no other problems.




Synopsis: A BE55's landing gear failed to retract after takeoff so the crew diverted to a nearby airport where maintenance was available.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Recirculation Fan
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During flight; pilots noticed unusual noise from what they thought was the air conditioning system. Noise sounded like a loud whine and continued to get louder until stopping suddenly. VENT EXTRACT FAULT ECAM message appeared concurrently with switch fault light and strong electrical odor/smoke in cockpit. Pilots donned oxygen masks and established communication with each other and cabin crew. QRC was accomplished as well as reference actions and checklist for VENT EXTRACT FAULT ECAM. First Officer flew plane to the divert airport while Captain ran checklists and managed situation. Captain directed First Officer to continue descending at 300 KTS below 10;000 FT to expedite arrival at the divert airport. After visual scan by Crash/Fire rescue personnel; aircraft taxied to gate. Cabin crew was briefed during descent and two PA announcements were made to passengers to keep them updated. Captain's overall impression is that everyone did a great job. The First Officer performed admirably; the Lead Flight Attendant stated during the debrief his complete satisfaction and thoroughness in the Cockpit/Cabin communications. ATC provided expedited handling and the ARFF crews were by the runway during our landing.


Second narrative: During cruise flight; noticed a noise followed by a VENT FAN ECAM. Cockpit immediately filled with an electric; burning type smell. Did not see any smoke. O2 mask donned; crew communication established. Ran ECAM; no effect. Started to divert; I stayed on controls and handled the radio. Captain ran Smoke/Fumes Checklist. Smell did not dissipate. Descended through 10;000 FT and briefly kept speed up above 250 to expedite in case smell turned into actual smoke or fire. Cleared for visual 1L; uneventful landing with masks still on. Crash; Fire; Rescue inspected aircraft; no signs of smoke.


Synopsis: An A320 developed an air conditioning system noise followed by a VENT EXTRACT FAULT ECAM and a strong electrical odor in flight. An emergency was declared and the QRH complied with including a diversion to a nearby airport.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: High speed reject initiated by me at approximately 110 knots. Takeoff warning horn; Takeoff configuration EICAS observed. FO later stated he saw the main cargo door light illuminated. Safely exited the runway and returned to ramp.Pressure door in main cargo door determined to be out of rig. Cargo door latches determined to be sound and secure. MEL applied and flight resumed. Second leg operational flight for new hire FO. He did a great job throughout evolution and contributed significant support both procedurally and knowledge based.


Second narrative: On the takeoff roll I was the PF and noticed around 110 kts the red 'main cargo door' light lit up. Before I was able to say anything the takeoff configuration warning horn started to sound and also got a red EICAS message. The captain took controls and called for the abort. We aborted; taxied off the runway and parked on a taxiway to run checklist and try to figure out what happened. The main cargo door light was no longer on at that time. The airplane had brake temps which were all in the 2-3 range. The chart showed that we weren't in danger of melting any fuse plugs. We taxied back to the ramp and Maintenance took a look at the cargo door. One of the pressure vents was faulty and cause the indication. They confirmed the door was locked; safe; and MELed the system. We departed without any further issues. Faulty vent or sensor on the main cargo door causing main cargo door indication during takeoff roll. From a flight crew perspective nothing could have been done differently. All doors were closed and locked prior to pushback and remained that way until the faulty sensor caused the issue during the takeoff roll.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported aborting their takeoff around 110 knots due to receiving a red EICAS message regarding the main cargo door.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flying the lateral portion of the STOCR arrival into CLT. It is very common for ATL center to descend aircraft; change speeds; and give exceptions to this published arrival. Given the arrival starts at FL290; it is common to receive descent clearances as low at 14;000; then a descend VIA clearance is given. On this leg; we were descended to FL210 over the course of the last many miles; stepped down from cruise and disregarding the published altitudes on the arrival. We were at 320 knots as we were significantly late. NO objections on the speed from center. Level at FL210; we were between the FLLGG and FFNSH intersections. ATL center cleared us via the STOCR arrival landing north. Set 6;000 feet in the MCP and verified VNAV armed. The next published speed was 280 knots at FFNSH. The airplane was armed to slow to 280 at this fix. Prior to reaching FFNSH; ATC asked if we were 'flying published speeds'. Stated flying 320 and would slow to 280 as published at FFNSH. There was no loss of separation; but apparently they didn't have the in trail they needed. Told us to slow to 250; then 'resume published speeds at FFNSH'. Later gave us a vector for additional spacing.Like many of the other arrivals in CLT; if ATC would just use the published arrivals and let the aircraft fly them; it would prevent issues like this. ATC gave us no other speed clearances. This is also very common landing to the east in PHX. After this happened; CAPT and FO discussed and both expected to slow to 280 at FFNSH and not prior.ATC makes exceptions to published arrivals; then re-clears onto the arrival. ATC should keep us on the arrival. Or redesign the arrival.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported that ATC did not keep them on the published arrival.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Electric stabilizer trim fail. We completed the required checklists in the QRH; declared an emergency; utilized ATC to provide delay vectors so the checklists could be properly completed. All normal and non-normal checklists and procedures were completed; an overweight landing was executed without further event.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B737-800's Electric Horizontal Stabilizer Trim was inoperative after takeoff so an emergency was declared; the QRH procedure completed and the aircraft returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P31.TRACON, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E P31
ATC / advisory: TRACON P31
Second aircraft: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I relieved a trainer and trainee but was unsure of how their plan would work with a 100 knot overtake and 5 miles closing to 3 between an MD80 and a Bell Helicopter. I was asking questions expecting a post overlap briefing but the trainer left the position. Tower called to ask if they needed to turn out the helo on a practice approach in VFR conditions was being overtaken by 100 knots and I said yes turn him out now. Tower waited for a mile or so because they had traffic in their pattern. The helo finally turned out on what appeared to be a 010 heading instead of a 080 heading as he was assigned. I think the wind was a factor. He appeared to be head on with the MD80 and I asked the helo to level off at 800 feet which is below the MVA of 1700 feet. I did this to avoid a collision with the MD80 and the helo. I am filing this report because I felt by asking the helo to level off at 800 feet for a couple seconds in his departure climb that it would avoid a collision with an MD80. I don't understand why the FAA no longer requires an overlap from a controller giving another controller a briefing to assume the position they have been working. I also will not take on a situation with an impending separation error again and instead let the controller work out their plan whatever that is; then assume the position after all separation errors have been resolved.Bring back the post 2 minute briefing and don't expect controllers to immediately assume a position just because it's time for the current controllers break. 5 minutes can make a huge difference in an imminent situation that the current controller is much more familiar with as well as has already executed whatever plan was in their mind.




Synopsis: P31 TRACON Controller reported an unsafe situation where a jet overtook a helicopter on final.