elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passengers X and Y boarded shortly before door closure. They were sitting in seats X4 and Y4. They had two children with them. One was sitting in seat X6 the other was an infant. Passenger Y was changing her infant's diaper in the seat. I went to go speak to her about it and the passenger in seat X12; Passenger Z; stopped me to ask me to move seats because it was disgusting and smelled. I apologize to him and told him I was taking care of the situation and that he could move to seat Z12. I asked Passenger Y to change the baby in the lavatory because there was a changing table in there and she just looked at me and said that she was finishing.During the flight I had to repeatedly remind Passenger Y to keep her mask on and also her husband. She told me to quit bothering her about it. I reminded her about the face mask policy and didn't bother her again. Passenger X and Y continued to not abide by the mask policy. During the breakfast service Passenger Z came to me to complain [about]the family again because they didn't have their mask on. I assure him that I had spoken to them numerous times to no avail and that it was now in the company's hands at this point and they would be addressing it with them.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a family would not comply with the face mask policy and that it was disturbing to other passengers.
Date: 201305
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Other Dispatcher comm equipment
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: The ACARS functionality to alert all sector flights of an important message at the same time failed. Due to the [dispatch computer] outage we needed to quickly alert all airborne flights of the inability to receive ACARS messages and to contact Dispatch via Commercial Radio if needed. When I and others tried this; it sent the messages to other flights that weren't in our sectors and only to some flights in our sectors. Whilst this functionality is not an FAR requirement; it's indicative of a wider system failure of vital communication with company aircraft. Again; part of an increasing risk factor that could contribute to an incident.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reports difficulty with the communication capabilities of his dispatch computer system which he believes is symptomatic of wider problems with the system.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After leveling in cruise and performing Cruise Checklist and filling [in] the data; the airspeed indicator very quickly dropped to zero. I immediately verified pitot heat was ON and cross checked all the instruments to verify the aircraft was in level flight. Although no icing had been encountered; I also turned on the TKS system since there was no airspeed indication to assist in detecting ice. I contacted Departure and declared an emergency. I queried the Controller about the weather conditions at my departure airport to minimize 'head down' time. I also queried the Controller about the weather at my destination because in my pre-flight weather planning; the destination weather was forecast to be significantly better than the departure airport. I decided to continue the flight because the destination weather forecast was almost VFR compared to the departure which was almost low IFR and the aircraft was configured and trimmed to maintain straight and level flight. After several minutes; the airspeed came alive and the needle spun almost instantly from 0 to 160 KTS. I canceled the emergency with Center and continued without any further issues with the indicator.

Callback: The reporter stated that this aircraft was written up several times for this type event and Maintenance eventually replaced the pitot heat switch; the airspeed indicator and the pilot tube. He has flown this aircraft since that event without problems but also not in icing conditions.



Synopsis: A C-210's airspeed failed in IMC at 5;000 FT with the pitot heat ON so the pilot declared an emergency but continued because destination weather was near VFR. The airspeed recovered after a short time.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Autoflight Yaw Damper
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: The [flight] crew found the Number 1 Yaw Damper Computer to be inoperative and wrote it up upon landing from Flight ABCA. Mechanic X came to MEL and signed-off the write-up. He referenced the 'O' Procedures and chose to pull the Circuit Breaker (C/B) and collar it. He discussed this with the crew and we agreed that the MEL was unclear and confusing; and the most conservative action was to follow that 'O' Procedure.  However; Supervisor for Mechanic X; told Mechanic X that common sense dictated that the 'O' Procedure need not be followed because the MEL allows for one Yaw Damper Computer to be 'inoperative' if the other is 'operative.'  So Mechanic X was instructed to remove the collar and reset the Circuit Breaker.  Because MEL 22-2-2 refers to two scenarios and the 'O' Procedure did not describe which scenario it applied to; we were not sure what was legally binding. So we called Chief Pilot to clarify the situation. She agreed with the common sense argument; so to avoid further delay; we continued. The MEL did state one Yaw Damper Computer 'may be inoperative; provided the operative computer is selected.' And the MEL indicated that two computers were installed and only one was required for flight.  We contacted our Dispatcher for a new Aircraft Release with the MEL added. He understood our confusion; and agreed with the solution. We asked him to clarify the wording on the release so it indicated only one Yaw Damper Computer was inoperative.  Our recommendation is that MEL 22-2-2 be revised.One suggestion would be to divide MEL 22-2-2 into: MEL 22-2-2-a) and MEL 22-2-2-b). MEL 22-2-2-a) should say 'One may be inoperative provided the operative computer is selected. MEL 22-2-2-b) should say 'Both may be inoperative.'Another suggestion is for the 'O' Procedure be numbered MEL 22-2-2-b); this would clarify which scenario the 'O' Procedure applies to. An 'O' Procedure could be added for MEL 22-2-2-a) to instruct the crew to insure the other Yaw Damper Computer is installed and 'Operative'. Part 121.




Synopsis: A pilot recommends a revision to the Beech 1900-D MEL 22-2-2 'Yaw Damper Computer;' to clarify as to 'when' an 'O' Procedure for pulling and collaring the Yaw Damper Computer Circuit Breaker (C/B) should apply.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While doing a flight over downtown City X; a large static noise came out of my headset and the GPS/Radios started flickering. I then looked at my alternator charge to see it at around 10 volts; well below the 14 volts needed to charge the battery. I decided to make a landing at ZZZ airport. While on short final; I told the Tower Controller that I just suffered an alternator failure and needed to land asap. He then asked if I was declaring an emergency which I replied 'No.' I landed without further incident.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an alternator failure during flight resulting in an expedited landing.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ASE
ATC / advisory: TRACON ASE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working as the Controller in Charge for the operation; I was over-viewing the operation on both sides of the cab. While the operation was occurring I was answering questions concerning new implemented Opposite Direction Operation rules that have been now changed twice in two days. The Approach Controller was vectoring two aircraft on a left and a right downwind to the final approach course. The approach controller was dealing with an aircraft operating 10 miles out on the localizer at an altitude unfavorable for a visual approach. While deciding to re-sequence the first aircraft back around; the Approach Controller had issued a descent to the second aircraft with a bad read back due to what I believe was controller bias. I also did not hear the incorrect assigned altitude. The Approach Controller issued a descent to 130 and the pilot read back 100 and was not reissued correct altitude to maintain. The attention of the controller and myself were taken away from the aircraft on a base leg descending through 130 and instead focused on the IFR arrival and VFR target. The Approach Controller observed the aircraft; Aircraft X descending through 124 and issued a low altitude alert and instructions to climb immediately. Aircraft X responded and reported field in sight requesting the visual approach. The Approach Controller issued the visual clearance to the requested runway. Aircraft X landed safely; no issues. I recommend better scan in the future and more being attentive to receiving positive read backs to control instructions. I should have limited the amount of tower distraction by pausing conversation about the new implemented rules and how they must be applied to keep the operation safe and directed my attention solely to the operation at hand.




Synopsis: ASE Controller reported missing read back error; resulted in aircraft descending in to a higher MVA.
Date: 201206
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Runway Awareness Advisory System (RAAS) directly interfered with radio transmissions from Tower and Ground.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reports that the RAAS annunciations directly interfered with radio transmissions from the Tower and Ground.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Software and Automation; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we taxied out to our assigned runway of XXL in ZZZ; we received several EFIS COMP MON [airspeed disagree] caution messages. They would only stay on for a few seconds; then disappear as I would reset the master caution that would accompany the ding. Once we were cleared to 'line up and wait' on our assigned runway of XXL I taxied on the runway; and handed the controls to the First Officer (FO) and we waited for our takeoff clearance. A few moments later; we were cleared to takeoff with clearance of 'RNAV to ZZZZZ Runway XXL; cleared for takeoff.'  The First Officer then initiated the take off sequence. As she pushed the thrust levers forward and we started to move down the runway; yet another EFIS [Electronic Flight instrument System] COMP MON caution came on with an associated ding and master caution warning. I looked to ED1 (primary EICAS) to find the caution and said aloud 'continue.' and the The First Officer continued with the takeoff roll. As soon as I looked back at the airspeed indicator tape; I saw we already were at V1 speed; and Vr speed. So I said aloud 'V1; rotate' as soon as we rotated the STALL FAIL caution illuminated on ED1. The stick shaker activated shortly thereafter; followed by a warbling tone to indicated a stall had happened. I look at my airspeed indication 'tape' and now saw both red 'barber pole' indicators starting to come together. As I saw this; I quickly looked at the FO airspeed indication and back at the backup airspeed indication. I noticed they both were reading the same thing and said aloud; 'looks like we have a stall fail caution; and my airspeed is showing incorrect indications.' I then began to run the QRC and QRH for the stall fail and loss of reliable airspeed indications. After running the QRH; we promptly returned to ZZZ without incident and taxied to a gate.  According to Maintenance; water entered into the left-side pitot tube and caused an erroneous airspeed error; and potential STALL FAIL caution.




Synopsis: Flight Crew did an Air Tun Back after the aircraft Electronic Flight instrument System computer failed and they lost all air data.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HII.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G HII
ATC / advisory: CTAF HII
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a normal takeoff; I announce my intentions to taxi to take off on Runway 32 since the wind was calm at the moment. Before reaching the runway's beginning; I announced I would enter the runway to take off. Before entering the runway; I announce myself one more time with a call sign and intentions for departure and direction of the turn. After turning into the runway; I notice at the other end of the runway; approximately 200 ft in the air; the landing lights of an aircraft taking off. At the moment; I see the airplane already beginning its right turn out at no time where both of the aircraft were in immediate danger or close to collusion. Still; neither of the aircraft realizes the intentions of the other aircraft or position. It is unknown if the other aircraft notice me on the opposite runway since they were on a climb and no radio call acknowledge me. As for my part; I did not hear any radio call or notice the aircraft until turning into the center of the runway and only notice due to the landing lights reflection.




Synopsis: Pilot reported observing traffic on climb out opposite direction not on CTAF; resulted in pilot delaying departure.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Radar East; 2 [military aircraft] departed with a request to use IR-080. My data coordinated with the surrounding approaches and sectors and I cleared the aircraft into IR-80 maintain 10 thousand. The pilot read back 1000 for the altitude and also asked for a 270 to lose altitude. I heard 1000 with the read back and just assumed he was descending to 1000 AGL for maneuvers in the route and didn't issue a correction. I was unable to accomplish a manual or automated handoff with [another] approach(the next facility on the IR route) either due to altitude or the routing on the strip; since my data had accomplished all of the coordination in reference to blocking for the IR route; I called the with the last known radar position and asked if it was ok to have the flight call them at checkpoint B on the route just outside of ZZZ airspace. They approved. I was notified after my shift that [the other TRACON] had called and advised that the flight had possibly violated approximately 8 different sectors across two separate Centers and it was possibly due to other facilities not knowing the flight was IFR and/or thought they were supposed to be on a different route(IR-079) (IR-079 and IR-080 are shown as the same within our airspace on the IDS).I believe that lack of knowledge of MTRs led to the event. It was the first time myself or my data had ever dealt with clearing anyone into an IR route. I thought we had done everything correctly and was surprised to get the call after work. More in depth instruction on the coordination required for the use of IR routes. If the route ends multiple facilities away how do we verify that everyone down the road is notified appropriately before we clear an aircraft to use it. Do we have to notify all affected facilities prior to clearing the aircraft in.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described multiple airspace incursions resulting from his unfamiliarity with IR route operations.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Coming over the marker 27L at ORD on a visual approach I commented on strong x-wind at alt and the large crab we had in. Winds were 190/46 and questioned why we don't use 22L/R anymore. AT 750 feet we received an aural warning with a too low gear. We were at flaps 2 and 170. I then called for gear and flaps [and] landed normal.  We should have gone around at the aural warning and even though the landing was normal it was not the SOP. Looking back on it we must have also missed the 1;000 feet call out. If not we would have seen the abnormal configuration.


Second narrative: Cleared for visual approach about 20 nm from runway. Wind strong out of south at 42 to 48 knots. Severe clear; excellent visibility. Monitored Pilot Flying (PF); handling crosswind. Reached GPWS RA without realizing gear was not down and flaps at 2. Should have told PF to go around at that point but for unknown reasons; on command put gear down and flaps full. Approach was otherwise stabilized. Landing was normal.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported being alerted at 750 feet AGL that gear and flaps were not in landing configuration. Flight crew continued to an uneventful landing after properly positioning flaps and gear.