elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Tower cleared us for takeoff as we approached the end of the runway; so I decided to do a rolling takeoff. We rolled on to the runway [and] as we straightened out on the runway; I brought the power up and then applied takeoff thrust. The AC started to drift to the right so I applied left rudder; it didn't help so I closed the throttles and turned the tiller to the left. We still we're heading towards the edge of the runway when I started to brake. By this time I had full left rudder and full left tiller and we skidded sideways off the runway into the grass.  The runway surface was damp from the rain that went on through out the night. I wasn't actively thinking about slick surfaces and take off performance degradation but I was aware of the moist surfaces. This did have an adverse affect on my steering of the AC. I have thought this through and these are my assumptions. If I had applied too much thrust when taking the runway; I believe I would have slid off to the left; that did not happen. So after lining up and applying TO thrust I applied the appropriate amount at the appropriate time. I do not believe that the right brake was dragging or malfunctioned and caused the AC to veer to the right as all braking and steering on the taxi out were normal. The only other factor that is relevant is that the right engine didn't spool up the same as the left engine; thus causing the asymmetric thrust vector towards the right side of the runway. That along with the wet/damp runway; degraded my steering ability. The only thing else I could have done different was pull the power back to idle sooner so as soon as it started to drift off the center line.First and foremost; do a standing take off thereby eliminating any variable of differential thrust since the AC would sit still while the thrust settles down before release of the brakes. Not very practical at times but a sure fire way of dealing with it.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported sliding off the runway at the start of the takeoff roll as a result of slippery conditions and asymmetric thrust spool-up.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After entering and verifying our cleared route; through a strict enter and read back procedure; we departed for destination. Enroute we were given vectors off course for in-trail spacing to destination. Before being returned to our planned route we discovered that instead of KD45U being in the FMS (clearance waypoint); KD54U was entered instead. Also; another KD54U waypoint was used earlier in the flight plan. The waypoint was corrected and we continued to destination uneventfully after a thorough review of the remainder of the  FMS flight plan.This situation occurred despite a full route review and read back by both pilots prior to departure. These two waypoints are also close enough together to appear to be a valid routing when viewed on the display monitor.I don't know any quick fix for this issue except continuous vigilance. It might be worth reviewing the waypoint numbering system to ensure similar waypoint names are not spaced so closely together. I'll bet this is not the first time this issue has reared its ugly head!




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reports discovering Enroute that NRS waypoint KD45U has been inadvertently entered into the FMC as KD54U. This is detected and corrected before a significant deviation results.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Airliner 99
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fire Protection System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On departure at about 300 ft. the left T-handle light illuminated. I immediately ran my memory items; checklist; set a timer; and continued my climb. I completed my climb checklist. At about 15 seconds; the light was still illuminated so I began preparing for an air return. At 20 seconds; it was still illuminated; this was at about 4500 ft. I informed departure that I needed an immediate return for a possible engine fire; [requested priority handling]. I was cleared for the Visual Approach; and switched to tower; and was cleared to land. I completed the rest of my checklists for landing; including single engine; because the left engine was still pulled to idle and ITT (Interstage Turbine Temperature) was stable. Landed without incident. As I pulled off the runway; the T-handle light extinguished.At about 300 ft. on my climb the t-handle was illuminated. Maintenance believes that the sensors/wiring had a malfunction. They were cleaned and returned to service. I ran my checklists. I stayed ahead of the plane by choosing to do them ahead of time; anticipating that the light might not go out. I communicated with ATC immediately; and decided the safest choice was to not be in the air should things continue to escalate.I don't really have control over this event happening again; however; you can always learn something to do differently or better. Now that I have an idea of what this type of event looks like; I would have also have done a precautionary engine shut down and had them send me on a downwind instead of a 180 into the runway I just departed.




Synopsis: C99 Captain reported false engine fire warning after takeoff.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a routine flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 conducting Re-qualification training for a former Captain returning to the aircraft FO seat we were only 30 minutes into the flight when ZZZ Center issued direct ZZZ1 and shortly thereafter we were issued direct ZZZZZ (on the ZZZZZ4 arrival which was our filed route).  For almost 2 hours; we were flying direct to the initial fix for the STAR we had been filed for.  In ZZZ1 Center airspace; the second Controller issued a descent clearance to FL240 (pilot discretion).  The PF (FO in training) had been descending in a cruise descent based on a previous Controller's issuance of 'Descend to FL300.' I was discussing what was happening to our speed due to the re-cruise with the low cost index when the Controller issued 'descend via the ZZZZZ5 Arrival' (which we had not been given as we had been filed/cleared via the ZZZZZ4).  I repeated the clearance and even set the appropriate altitude on direction from the PF.  Something seemed off but I did not query ATC.  Moments later; ZZZ1 Controller asked if we were turning towards ZZZZZ2 or 'It looks like you are headed towards ZZZZZ6 (which is on the ZZZZZ4).  I answered that indeed it appeared we were turning towards ZZZZZ6 and that I'd take a look.  We were given a heading and altitude (10 degrees left) and told to contact Approach and that they would have vectors.  Upon check-in with ZZZ1 Approach; we were told expect vectors to XXL and sensed all was fine.  The approach etc.; was non-eventful.  I believe; given the low traffic environment and ATC being so helpful a thousand miles or so earlier may have contributed to the confusion on descent as we should have been given the ZZZZZ5 arrival but were never issued the arrival change (as we passed through ZZZ2/ZZZ3/ZZZ2 Center.  Being cleared direct ZZZZZ so far out may have caused an assumption that a STAR change had been issued (ZZZZZ is on both STARS).  Traffic was light and no loss of separation occurred.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during arrival and cited communication issues with ATC as a contributing factor.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Departed on an IFR flight plan in VMC conditions. Tower switched me to Departure. Made contact and was cleared to 7;000 FT. At 3;200 FT I noticed my door slightly ajar. I requested to level at 5;000 FT; so that I could look more closely at the problem to allow me time to decide next steps. Level off at 5;000 was approved and they asked that I keep them advised. They game me an assigned heading of 050. As I was leveling at 5;000 the door started to open more; at that point I was concerned that it was going to come completely off the hinges. I kept my right hand holding the door; and I tried to contact Approach on comm 1; but no joy. The radio at that point appeared to also be having problems. At that point my main concern was the door and getting down as quickly as possible and that was priority. I canceled my IFR but not sure Departure confirmed. I went to 7600 on the beacon code; did an immediate 180 and went direct to the nearest airport. I switched to comm 2 which worked; got in contact with Tower; declared an inbound emergency and was cleared to land on without incident.




Synopsis: BE36 pilot notices his door ajar climbing through 3;200 FT and requests a level off at 5;000 FT. The door cannot be closed in flight and a request to divert is made to ATC; but comm 1 has apparently failed. Reporter squawks 7600 and turns toward the nearest airport and is able to communicate on comm 2 with the Tower prior to landing.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This aircraft has a long history of Left Engine Bleed Trips after takeoff. Despite this history; the Left Engine Pressure Sensor that is clearly causing all these in-flight Bleed trips; is still deferred and not fixed.  Why? And more significantly; why is this Left Sensor deferral NOT on the Pilot Dispatch flight plan. It is hidden in the paperwork so well; that had I not known the airplane had this history from a previous flight three weeks ago; I would have never had found it.  Is our goal to surprise crews at takeoff with such EICAS Cautions and issues ?  Is the goal here to have someone hide this rather extensive history from the crew and Dispatcher ?  The resulting Left Engine Bleed trips that have occurred to me and many other pilots on this item; require operational planning and consideration; as well as prior review of their associated check list (Bleed Off Engine Left)  Maintenance Control also told us that if the Bleed trips; (as it has in many prior flights on this aircraft) that we were authorized to reset the Bleed in flight. This is counter to the checklist.  The Fleet Technical advised against this reset. This leaves us with an Aircraft that is being only pressurized by one engine bleed on a 10-hour flight. Not a good situation on a long term basis. Airworthiness.




Synopsis: Captain reports about a B777 aircraft with a chronic history of Left Engine Bleed Trips after takeoff. He questions why the Left Engine Pressure Sensor that is causing all the in-flight Bleed trips remains deferred and not fixed? Also; why was the Left Sensor deferral NOT on the Pilot's Dispatch flight plan; instead of being hidden deep in the paperwork?
Date: 202008
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was sitting at [seat] XX. We are taxiing to takeoff; and there was no Flight Attendant sitting at XY!  I sat in my brace position wondering what happened to the other FA?  After it was safe to get up from our seats; the other FA walked up to work in first class. I asked where she was? She said she was sitting in the back; XZ.  I told her she is supposed to sit at XY; and she said okay.  On our descent to ZZZ; she sat at XY and I'm sitting at XX in my brace position. I looked towards my left and there is a passenger near me!  I told him to go back and sit down; but I could see we are seconds from touching down. I told him to buckle in the seat next to me.  He said he was feeling sick from the turbulence.  We arrive at our gate and disarm our doors and received the ALL CALL.  The Customer Service Agent knocked on the window waiting to get the thumbs up to open the door. But the FA cracked the door open at XY!!!  I told the FA she is not supposed to crack the door open; she pushed the handle down and the Agent was able to open the door. The CS Agent made eye contact with me and we both gave each other looks of shock.  All of the inflight crew were working the same plane back to ZZZ1. We all waited on the jet bridge as the airplane was cleaned.  I took the opportunity to discuss with the FA how nervous she made me feel. I wanted the other crew members to listen to the reasons as to why this FA made me nervous. I did not get any input from them.  I asked the FA if she went over the operations of [aircraft type] door. She said she had not flown [for over 5 months]; but she knew what she was doing.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant who reportedly had not flown for over 5 months; sat in the wrong seat for takeoff and did not follow procedures for opening a door.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEE.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D SEE
ATC / advisory: Tower SEE
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Working Local South; runway 27L (our pattern sector). 4 in the pattern on runway 27L. During the session I heard a call that was not understandable. I requested the pilot to say again. The second call was interrupted by another pilot. I heard another call that I was unable to understand; I keyed up and said aircraft calling either you have a stuck mic or I can't understand your request. I then was informed that an aircraft was on final for runway 9R (opposite direction). My first instinct was to look at my final where an aircraft was on a 1/4 mile final (Aircraft Y). I sent the aircraft around and instructed a second aircraft on a mile and a half final to start a climb and go around. Apparently Aircraft X had engine issues and made a 180 on the upwind and land on 9R. No loss of separation was had and Aircraft X exited at the end of 9R. There was not much I could personally do to avoid the situation; I believe the lack of English proficiency played a major role in the incident. If I were to understand the pilot and his intentions I would have been able to better prepare and execute a better plan to avert sending an aircraft around on a 1/4 mile final.




Synopsis: SEE Tower Controller reported an aircraft on upwind had engine issues and turned back to the runway. Two aircraft on final were issued go-arounds.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We were] on departure from Runway 24 out of Teterboro; NJ. The Captain flying performed an autothrottle takeoff. The Altitude Selector was set for 1;500 FT and LNAV was armed. After a normal takeoff; the pilot not flying Captain; raised the gear and at four hundred feet selected flaps up; engaged manual speed 200 KTS and armed FLTCH. The pilot not flying Captain became task compressed with switching to New York Approach; communicating; setting autospeed and preparing to set 10;000 FT MSL in the selector window from 2;000. Both Captains failed to see that autothrottles were not engaged. At the same time; the flying Captain flew the command bars to level off at 2;000 before TASCA with engines still at rated power which allowed the G-IV to exceeded 250 KTS in an instant. Both pilots both noticed the airspeed increasing over 300 KTS. The Captain flying immediately pulled the power levers to idle got the airspeed to 250 KTS and continued our departure climbing to 10;000 FT MSL. After the flight; the crew debriefed the scenario and concluded that automation can lead to a false sense of comfort assuming automation would maintain airspeed. On subsequent flights; the pilot not flying will call out manual 200 set and state whether autothrottles are on or off and the flying pilot will concur.




Synopsis: G-IV Captain reports exceeding altitude and speed restrictions departing Runway 24 at TEB on the RUUDY4 departure. Autothrust was thought to be engaged to maintain 200 KTS but was fixed at takeoff thrust.