elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Electrical
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After taxiing into the gate I noticed the APU hadn't started. The FO thought he hit the start button. After waiting; it appeared the APU panel was off; so I powered it down/up and began the start sequence again. The cabin door was open and a ramp manager said smoke was coming out of the APU exhaust port. I powered off the APU. Seeing no fire indications on our cockpit panel; I told the ramp supervisor to tie the prop and FA to begin deplaning without delay. There was no gate agent available after several calls. When the last few passengers were just about off; the APU check fire detect warning light illuminated but no fire light illuminated. I told the FO to call for fire trucks; depowered the aircraft; and got the remaining crew off. I confirmed the black smoke coming from the APU exhaust port which quickly dissipated. No fire had initiated; just smoke and the fire bottle and discs did not discharge.The APU starter/generator had a welded starter contactor that overheated and began smoking. It was a mechanical issue. We have significant APU issues amongst the Dash 8 fleet. Recommend better APUs and gate agents ready at the gate when we arrive. We took an unnecessary delay getting people off the plane because a gate agent wasn't there to receive passengers. Had we taken any more delay I was on the brink of ordering an emergency evacuation had it actually caught on fire.




Synopsis: Dash-8 Captain reported smoke emitted from the APU exhaust port after gate arrival. Passengers were deplaned and the starter contactor was later found to have overheated.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Post hurricane working Tyndall Approaches airspace. No radar. Multiple radio failures and alternate frequencies. D side training. Tower called for release of Aircraft X and a subsequent Aircraft Y. There was an attempt to release them utilizing the 45 degree rule and 2 minutes or Tower applied visual. OZR Approach at this time was handing off two more arrivals from the north; southbound descending below radar coverage direct the airport with no coordination. There are also no useable navaids within the airspace. No coordination was affected with OZR approach prior to Aircraft X's release. I couldn't climb Aircraft X into radar coverage as planned.  D sides tried to coordinate with OZR approach but they said they didn't have time and I was advised to keep Aircraft X out of their airspace. I had to turn the aircraft south. Soon after he appeared on radar well into OZR airspace without coordination. There is almost zero training for non-radar procedures. And real world scenarios are quite unlike laboratory scenarios because of the blending of ADSB and radar and non-radar. Also; there is a pervasive attitude that we should just keep pushing the aircraft like business was normal. OZR Approach has no letter of agreement regarding that airspace. At some point they seemed surprised that the sector was non-radar. I would recommend comprehensive training utilizing more real world scenarios (navaids missing or out of service; some aircraft ADSB; some not) also; the attitude all around needs to change in these scenarios. Non radar with no useable navaids is not going to be efficient.




Synopsis: Jacksonville Center Controller reported an airspace violation due to a busy TRACON and lack of non-radar procedures.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We remained at 11;000 feet until 25 miles off shore as a [another aircraft] was flying overhead. A climb to 13;000 feet was issued and a frequency change. We were then cleared to FL270. We were logging on to Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC); receiving ETOPS weather and in the process of dismissing the relief first officers. We were cleared to FL340 and ready to leave FL270 when we observed the pressurization system indicator appeared on the EICAS display. It was amber and the cabin altitude was 9;100 feet and climbing at 300 feet per min. The climb was stopped and ATC clearance obtained to 10;000'. All outflow valves were closed and all packs operating normal. The altitude horn sounded momentarily at 10;000'. The cabin then started to descend with the aircraft. ATC was advised of our intention to return to [our departure airport]. A heading was issued and then a direct ZZZ; with [the] arrival. Dispatch was informed of our problem. ATC authorized a fuel dump to begin and it was completed in 20 min; as we descended from 10;000' to 7;000'and 50 miles off shore. The max landing weight of 425;000 lbs and a 30 vref of 152k was accomplished.The aircraft had a deferral of AFT EE cooling overboard exhaust. The MEL required the valve to be closed and the Circuit Breakers (CB) pulled. However; on landing it was discovered that maintenance opened the valve and pulled the CB and therefore the aircraft would not pressurize. No emergency was declared and the flight landed normally.




Synopsis: The Captain of a Boeing 787 reported that they were unable to pressurize the aircraft in flight.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: As I was briefing the arrival; approach; missed approach; and engine out procedure it came to our attention that the SFO VOR being NOTAMed out of service could be an issue for our engine out procedure. On the Airbus; to fly the procedure; we put the SFO VOR in the RAD page. But; this is raw data. Neither the FO nor I could come up with a way to comply with the engine out procedure if we had an engine failure. We sent dispatch an ACARS Message and they came back saying the Duty Manager says use the pop up engine failure from the FMGC. I don't believe this is an option on our fleet or least not one we knew we had for SFO.Since 2 miles was easily seen on the fix page; we put the radial and distance in the fix page. I was told during training this month; that using the fix page is for INFO only and not operational in regards to radial and DME. When I got on the ground; I got a hold of the Line Captain that did my original training on the Airbus. He recommended building a point and coming up with as close as we could to the engine out procedure. Again; this is good info; but I'm not sure if the distance was SFO/2.3 and not 2.0 we would have been able to figure out where we would have been over the ground once we reached the 2.3 mile point. I think this needs to be looked into. I don't feel that on a fleet where we need raw data to compute this information (DME) we should be trying to guess where that point will be when we are in the middle of an emergency. If there is an easy way to use the FMGC to compute DME; it needs to be taught better; because in the short time that the FO and I had to plan for the arrival; we couldn't figure out how to do it.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported questioning the engine out missed approach procedures specified by his company which requires the SFO VOR which was NOTAMed out of service.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While enroute approximately 50 miles north east of our departure airport at approximately 17;000 FT; we received a left bleed duct warning. I immediately displayed the ECS synoptic page while the First Officer pulled out the Pilot Operating Manual Abnormal Checklist. We were about to try and change the bleed source due to a MEL L DUCT MON and the right bleed closed; leaving us in an unpressurized aircraft. We then donned our masks as a precautionary; declared an emergency and requested a descent to 10;000 FT. While the First Officer accomplished the checklists I requested direct to the airport. Once at 10;000 FT; we removed our masks and proceeded unpressurized. Flight attendants and passengers were briefed of the situation when we had time and continued uneventful to a landing to our departure airport. After arrival at the gate passengers were sent to the gate next to us with a plane ready. I stayed and filled out the maintenance log and talked to; Dispatch; Maintenance; Tower; and Approach. I then went to the other aircraft and departed about 30 minutes later.Possible memory item for a quick switch of bleed source; although I am not really in favor of flipping switches without following a checklist.




Synopsis: A CRJ-900 CAS alerted L BLEED DUCT with the L DUCT MON MEL'ed and simultaneously the right bleed closed. So with a depressurizing aircraft an emergency was declared; a descent commenced and at 10;000 FT the flight returned to their departure airport.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I released Aircraft X off of LGB Runway 30. By the time LGB tower departed the aircraft; there was a VFR aircraft within their Class D tracking south towards the departure corridor at 1;700 feet. When Aircraft X became airborne I reached out to him when I didn't get an immediate check-in. That is when Aircraft X checked in and I issued an expedited climb since he was converging the VFR target at 1;700 feet. When I noticed the VFR aircraft altitude appear to climb to 1;800 feet; I issued a 250 heading to Aircraft X to get him away from the unverified target. After Aircraft X was a safe proximity away from the VFR traffic; I asked him if LGB Tower had told him about the traffic. He said they had and that they were told the traffic was going to go behind him. I explained to him that this wasn't the case because they were in-fact converging.This is a common occurrence with LGB Tower. We will release an aircraft from LGB; which at the time the airspace is clean. By the time the aircraft gets airborne; there's usually a conflict to which we have to take evasive action to miss. This is because the Tower just gives a traffic advisory; clears the aircraft for departure; and then issue a frequency change without ensuring separation. My recommendations is to retrain LGB Tower on how to ensure separation of aircraft in their Class D and decrease the amount of time LGB has to depart aircraft (I think right now they have a 4 minute window).




Synopsis: SCT TRACON Controller reported an NMAC with an IFR departure off of Long Beach and a VFR aircraft within the LGB Class Delta airspace.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BTL.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D BTL
ATC / advisory: Tower BTL
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Reaching 8 NM due south of the BTL airport; Tower was tuned in and it was fairly busy we made contact about 6.5 from airport we were directed to proceed to left traffic for 23L; about reaching 3 NM from the airport ATC alerted us to traffic that departed 23L was at our 12 o'clock opposite direction; same altitude; and suggested that we turn westbound to avoid; traffic was immediately noted; instructor pilot took controls to avoid; we were approximately 300-500 feet from the other aircraft. Aircraft never showed up on flight watch; Traffic Information System (TIS); and there was no communication that could be heard from that aircraft departing while we were on frequency to indicate that they were going to be southbound.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot inbound to BTL reported a NMAC with a departure aircraft that did not display on traffic information service.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I approached ZZZ airspace. I made my initial call to Tower and he told me to 'make left traffic for [Runway] XX' and report at the river. At the river; the Tower asked me to look for traffic on my left headed for [Runway] XY and to follow as #2. I did not confirm. At this point I looked for the traffic but could not confirm. After looking and not confirming the Tower asked if I had traffic; when I did see traffic headed for [Runway] XX I confirmed only that I had traffic. I failed to confirm the new Runway XY.As I made the turn to line up for [Runway] XX; a landing aircraft passed below me in my direction. I called the Tower to confirm my landing position and they confirmed clear to land. When I stated I had close traffic they informed me I was lined up on the wrong runway. I made a go around. After landing; I was asked to call the Tower on a possible pilot deviation. I made the call and we discussed what had happened.After reviewing the radio traffic; it is clear I was distracted attempting to locate the traffic I was to follow and my failure to read back the new runway caused me to miss the Tower change and continue on my original assigned heading. I need to improve my confirmation skills on the radio going forward to avoid confusion. Also confirm instructions or changes by writing them down.




Synopsis: Piper pilot reported an NMAC event during final approach to landing due to lining up on wrong parallel runway.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During an initial flight lesson with a student; I was landing on Runway XX with a slight crosswind. Upon touching down; right at the point of adding brake pressure; a gust of wind picked up the left wing. The wind also caused us to drift aggressively to the right of the center line and pointed the nose off of the runway. I felt that I did not have enough energy to go-around; but also felt the aircraft was moving too fast for an aggressive left rudder input. I decided that the best option was to apply maximum braking in hopes of stopping before reaching the runway edge. Unfortunately; I was unable to stop the airplane before it struck a runway edge light and rolled approximately 10 ft. off of the asphalt. The aircraft nor anyone on board received any damages or injuries. Upon reflection of the event; I suspect that my failure to apply full opposite aileron for proper crosswind correction once touched down may have been a leading factor. If I had made that input; the initial uplifting left wing may not have occurred; which would have kept the aircraft pointed in the right direction. I do not regret my judgement in solving the problem after it had occurred. I believe that an attempt to go around would have caused us to strike multiple objects off the side of the runway; and an attempt to steer back towards center line could have causes the aircraft to skid/flip.




Synopsis: Instructor reported winds pushed aircraft off of center line during landing and caused aircraft to run off the runway and strike a runway light.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach to landing at ZZZ the amber leading edge transit light came on and stayed on. Diverted to ZZZ1 after running the appropriate checklists; 'TESTS' [Requested Priority Handling] and ran the flaps 15 abnormal checklist and landing data for flaps 15 landing (manual version and data from dispatch). From our holding fix (ZZZZZ) ZZZ1 was approx. 40 nm closer than ZZZ2 Captains emergency authority was used. Landed at ZZZ1 flaps 15 without further events.


Second narrative: On approach into ZZZ received Leading Edge flaps transit light and stayed on. Performed missed approach. [Requested Priority Handling]. Ran quick reference handbook LE TRANSIT checklist. Talked to Flight Attendants with TEST and to people. Talked to Dispatch. Ran the non- normal performance landing check list for LE transit light in the performance chapter FOM. Entered hold and decided to Divert to ZZZ1. ZZZ1 was chosen as diversion as it was closer then to divert to ZZZ2. Landed flaps 15 not further events.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported emergency diversion due to Leading Edge transit illuminated during landing approach.