Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Duchess 76
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the initial take-off of a multi-engine training flight; the instructor retarded the mixture of the left engine to simulate an engine failure on takeoff.  As the flying pilot; I executed the first two steps of the published emergency procedure (1. Throttles to IDLE; 2. Apply maximum braking) upon aural recognition of the loss of power along with a significant (45-60 degree) yaw to the left. To counteract the left yaw; full right rudder and differential braking was applied. The aircraft responded to the control input and swerved back to approximate alignment with the runway; but by then had deviated far enough left that the left main tire was off the hard surface and into the grass.  The aircraft again yawed slightly to the left and the nose tire left the hard surface. Once the main and nose tires left the runway; additional control inputs to correct to the right were ineffective and the aircraft came to a stop in approximately 75 feet.  Attempts to return to the pavement from the resting position were ineffective and the aircraft was shut down. Upon exiting the aircraft; the nose wheel was determined to be buried nearly to the top of the tire in a muddy rut which was 30-40 feet long.  With the assistance of airport personnel and maintenance personnel from the flight school the aircraft was tipped back toward the tail far enough to raise the nose wheel out of the mud and put a 3X5 foot board under it to support its weight.  The aircraft was pulled back onto the runway and towed to the flight school using a standard tow bar.As for a root cause analysis of the events leading up to the incident; I think there are several:1. Relative inexperience of flying pilot: I had 5.9 hours in the aircraft and this was my third flight with this instructor.  Two previous flights occurred with a different instructor at a different school; the most recent being 35 days prior to this incident.  I had to switch schools as the aircraft at the original training site became unavailable due to long-term maintenance issues.  This was my second-ever engine failure on takeoff practice.  The maneuver was not briefed by the instructor; though I assumed it was likely to occur.2. Slow reaction time: I noticed the change in engine noise just prior to the onset of adverse yaw.  I believe I hesitated for a second or less prior to pulling the throttles to idle.  This exacerbated the yaw which ultimately led to the runway departure.3. Misunderstanding of the written emergency procedure: I applied significant braking as I attempted to control the aircraft and prevent it from exiting the runway; to include differentially applying heavier braking to the right main.  During a debrief with the instructor and flight school owner; they explained that the heavy braking may have reduced directional control of the aircraft.  I saw no evidence of locked brakes; but I am not an expert in such matters.  As a low time multi-engine pilot; I suppose I have to defer to the instructors' experience. Given the discussion surrounding the potential negative impact of applying maximum braking during this procedure it seems that the phrase 'Braking-As Required' or similar might be better than 'Braking-Maximum' as written in the flight school's current checklist.4. Failure of the instructor to back me up on the controls on only my second exposure to this maneuver.  As mentioned; I may have hesitated briefly before retarding the throttles to idle. It was suggested that this may have allowed the situation to develop into and unrecoverable maneuver; but at no point did the instructor physically touch either throttle or verbally indicate I needed to take different actions.


Second narrative: While doing a multi engine training flight there was a loss of directional control on the runway. When performing a takeoff; the engine failure on takeoff maneuver was being performed. The mixture to the left engine was closed to simulate an engine failure shortly after applying power for takeoff. There was a momentary pause by the student ~ 2 seconds before the throttles were closed. As the throttles were closed the nose of the aircraft was pointed roughly 45' to the left side of the runway. While trying to regain control of the aircraft; the student at the controls applied max brakes to get the aircraft to stop. With the aircraft pointed towards the side of the runway; and max force being applied to the brakes; little usable rudder force was left for the instructor's rudder pedals. The nose was slowly pulled to the right; but the momentum of the aircraft caused the plane to come off the runway. The left main gear and nose gear were off the side of the runway in the grass with the right main still on the runway. Within the past 24 hours there had been substantial rainfall at the airport. The turf next the runway was wet and waterlogged. When the nose gear of the aircraft left the pavement; it caused the nose to sink into the grass ~ 12-14 inches. With the reduced clearance of the nose gear; and the right engine still over the runway; the blade of the right engine struck the pavement. After coming to a complete stop both engines were shut down and the aircraft wasn't moved until maintenance inspected the aircraft. After reflecting on the events that lead to this occurrence there a few lessons I have learned. First is having a more open communication with the student about what is expected of them during the recovery of a maneuver such as a single engine failure on takeoff. A more thorough brief should be discussed on what the corrective action looks like during this maneuver and what does directional control mean on the runway. A demonstration of the correct recovery done by the instructor might also be performed so a clear standard is set.


Synopsis: Instructor and student pilot reported a planned engine out exercise resulted in a runway excursion.