elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground IAH
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Part 91 empty leg landed IAH RWY26L after dark. Issued taxi instruction via 'NA to WC ...'Without warning a lone fire truck (with red lights on) cut us off (coming left to right on WA). Both crew members saw this as I (pilot flying) braked to a stop. The fire truck made a wide 360 degree turn in front of us; departed the taxiway; turned off his lights and departed the area. I called ground for instructions and he responded with; 'sorry about that'.This is the 2nd time I have had to brake hard to avoid a collision with a fire truck at IAH. Both times the fire trucks were on a taxiway; traveling at a high rate of speed; by themselves; and did not appear to be involved in any type of emergency response. Also; in both cases; there was no warning from ATC; and the Fire trucks did not appear to be communicating with anyone on the radio.We see many service vehicles at IAH; and they have all been vigilant and have given way to taxiing aircraft. The exception is the Fire trucks. They do not give way to taxiing aircraft. They should also slow down. Both of these times I have had no warning from ATC; and have had to brake hard to avoid collision. I am more than happy to stop; give way or hold position for emergency vehicles; but heads up from Ground would be great.




Synopsis: G150 Captain reports having to brake hard to avoid a high speed fire truck that cuts in front of his aircraft without warning. The fire truck; with lights flashing makes a 360 in front of the G150 then departs and was apparently not responding to an emergency.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SJC.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Descent to SJC via BRIXX2. Entire descent maintained in magenta 'PTH' FMA mode. Vertical cross track error observed within 25-40 ft. Conditions VMC. Both First Officer and Captain baro altitudes set to 29.96. Perf data was .75/290 speed with 2.8 angle. During descent to 12;000 ft. descending via BRIXX2; OAK handed off (flight) to NORCAL approach. Request was made for RNAV Z 30L. (flight) was cleared join RNAV Z 30L from BRIXX2 arrival common waypoints except maintain 12;000 ft. Captain selected RNAV Z 30L common fixes (with altitude of 7;000 ft. on JILAN and 210/4800A on YADUT) with 'VERIFY' statement followed by 'ACTIVATE' statement from First Officer.Later; (flight) was then cleared to 7;000 ft. after freq hand off. Through descent; then cleared for the RNAV Z 30L off the BRIXX2 STAR. Altitude selector then set to 1;600 ft. for WOXAR while in PTH mode with APP armed (LNAV engaged /GP armed). While in PTH mode received CHECK ALT CONSTRAINT message ~200-300ft below JILNA of 7000ft with JILNA as active flight plan fix. ALT hold selected on guidance panel to prevent further baro altitude deviation by Captain.  Airplane was at baro altitude ~350-440 ft. below 7;000 ft. in ALT mode as the vertical deviations showed airplane high of VNAV path and growing at waypoint sequence constraint.  First Officer selected 210/4800 on YADUT for vertical direct-to on Flight Plan page. FLIGHT PATH ANGLE TOO STEEP message occurred. VNAV was then selected and remaining of RNAV Z 30L constraints followed per procedure. VNAV path computed a FPA not coincidental to 7;000 ft. altitude constraint in active flight plan at JILAN 7;000 ft. constraint on an RNP AR procedure outside the FAF. No discrepancies reported by ATC. Airport was visual so no missed approach conducted. Issues observed may prevent maintaining Ops spec approval of Baro VNAV system for RNP AR C400.




Synopsis: E175 F/O reported the FMC was not performing properly in VNAV and was a factor in their failure to meet charted crossing restrictions on arrival into destination .
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Thunderstorm; Windshear; 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A Westwind
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Narrative: 1) How the problem arose - under extreme turbulence we were cleared to initial approach altitude of 3;000 FT. The altitude was inadvertently set to 2;000 FT.(2) Contributing factors - extreme turbulence and hard to see the panel.(3) How it was discovered - Tower told us Approach reported a low altitude alert was given on our aircraft.(4) Corrective action - saw altitude was inadvertently set then reset to correct altitude and climbed immediately back to 3;000 FT for the initial approach altitude; then continued approach to landing.(5) Summary - due to a diversion because of weather and fuel situation after holding for approximately 30 minutes; the decision was made to divert. Turbulence was extreme on approach and the altitude was misentered for initial approach altitude; but was corrected when Tower advised us of low altitude alert.


Second narrative: [This report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: During approach an IAI Westwind 1124 operating under FAR Part 91 descended 1;000 FT below assigned altitude; generating a Low Altitude Alert from the Tower.
Date: 201202
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We] took off behind a B747 [at] SEA. [There] seemed to be plenty of separation; no concerns. [We] got 190 heading from Departure and multiple step-up climbs. Upon leveling at 5;000 FT; [we] encountered one violent 'jolt' of severe turbulence. Suspected wake turbulence from B747 as there was no other significant turbulence or convective activity (no other reasonable explanations). Autopilot disengaged. First Officer gained control of aircraft and leveled at 5;000 FT as instructed. First Officer sustained no significant obvious injuries. Captain hit head on projector above head leading to a cut/bleeding; stiff neck; headache and 'foggy' feeling. Continued to [destination] without further incidents. Captain went to ER to get checked out.




Synopsis: A Q400 Captain reported encountering a jolt of severe turbulence from a preceding B747 on departure from SEA. The Captain reported that he banged his head and sustained a concussion from the event.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSY.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: STAR changed due to weather at MSY; given a clearance of direct Tibby and change to OLEDD 1 Arrival. Looking at the arrival 'Tibby is spelled out as 'TIBBY.' It happens to be a VOR with an identifier of TBD. Since the spelling is a 5 letter word the crew attempted to enter this in the FMS as TIBBY. The system could not locate this fix. Once we figured out that this was a VOR and not an RNAV fix; we entered TBD and navigated direct. Pilots are used to the 5 letters of a fix being the norm on most arrivals we fly now. Most of the VOR's have longer names than 5 letters. Possibly a better clearance to this fix would be; direct Tibby VOR.




Synopsis: GV Captain reports being confused by a clearance direct to Tibby then the OLEDD1 arrival to MSY. Attempts to enter TIBBY into the FMC are unsuccessful until the crew realizes that Tibby is a VOR and should be entered as TBD.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I took over the sector from another controller. He had received coordination from ZMP that Aircraft X had requested FL065 due to unfavorable winds higher. When I took over the aircraft was non-radar and I thought the aircraft was VFR not IFR due to misinterpreting the data block. When Aircraft X came back on radar it was level at 065 entering a 070 MIA box. I was confused why it was flashing MSAW [Minimum Safe Altitude Warning] as a VFR and asked the pilot. The pilot said they were IFR so I climbed them immediately to 070 for terrain. I believe this was because it was easy to misinterpret a non-radar IFR at a VFR altitude as a VFR. When I gave a briefing to the next controller I told him the airplane behind Aircraft X; who was in a similar situation: level at 075 IFR non-radar; was IFR. Minutes after the briefing I came back and told him again just to be clear and he said 'Oh I thought he was VFR.' I should review Low Altitude Alert phraseology; it was not issued. I don't know what can be done about the easy of misinterpreting IFR non-radar assigned VFR altitudes as VFR besides either not issuing VFR altitudes or being very very clear about what is going on and making sure the next controller understands the situation.




Synopsis: Salt Lake Center Controller reported misinterpreting a data block which resulted in an IFR aircraft being below the minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MBB-BK 117 All Series
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While performing a maintenance flight on the ramp; a mast moment exceedance occurred. Aircraft was light on the skids and in a nose high attitude. Company aircraft was landing approximately 75 feet left of our aircraft. I momentarily glanced at the company aircraft and the warning 'gong' sounded. I glanced at the VEMD and immediately lowered the nose of the aircraft. Upon shutdown; the flight report showed an exceedance of the mast moment. I have performed this check many times before with no exceedances occurring. The fact that I went outside the cockpit for an instant was a major contributor to the situation. Another contributing factor was a slight (<10 knots) tailwind. At the time the check was being performed; there were five mechanics on board; close to full fuel; and additional weight to increase the gross weight of the aircraft. If the procedure could be performed in a hover; the risk of mast moment exceedance would be eliminated. Another alternative could be; tie the aircraft down when conducting this check.




Synopsis: In an apparent mast moment indicator check; a BK117 pilot was distracted by another helicopter landing nearby and momentarily exceeded the mast moment limit.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing through FL320 with autopilot 1 and autothrust engaged we encountered what we suspect was moderate wake turbulence causing approximately a 20 degree left bank. Immediately upon encountering the wake turbulence a loud bang was heard from the #2 engine with a simultaneous Engine #2 Stall ECAM. Pilot flying immediately retarded the #2 thrust lever to idle in accordance with the QRC memory item and the ECAM cleared. Pilot flying disengaged the autopilot and autothrust and called for the Engine Surge/Stall Checklist. Pilot not flying accomplished both the Engine Surge/Stall and Overweight Landing checklists. #2 engine parameters appeared normal. Pilot flying assumed radio duties and declared an emergency with Center; requesting an immediate vector to the nearest suitable airport in point of time. Center advised us of the weather and we relayed the souls and fuel on board. Pilot not flying sent a message via ACARS to company Dispatch of emergency and intentions. Pilot flying advised the Purser and passengers. Pilot not flying requested landing performance data from Dispatch which printed out moments later. We were given vectors for the visual approach. The approach and landing were uneventful; with a touchdown sink rate of less than 200 FT per minute. We exited the runway; and requested that the fire crews look over our #2 engine. No signs of damage or fire were observed. We then taxied to the gate and deplaned. During deplaning; several passengers informed us that they witnessed a bright flash from the #2 engine.


Second narrative: During climb to cleared altitude of FL360; we encountered what we suspected to be wake turbulence passing FL320. The turbulence encountered was light to moderate in intensity; lasting approximately 5-10 seconds; resulting in a very slow; uncommanded roll to the left of approximately 20-25 degrees. Concurrent with the roll; we heard two loud 'POPS' from the right side of the aircraft; followed immediately by an ENG 2 STALL ECAM.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported a wake vortex encounter in climb at FL320 that resulted in a 20-25 degree roll and #2 engine stall. Crew declared emergency and diverted to nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Second aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Aircraft X called for taxi and I gave him taxi instructions to the departure runway. I spoke with the aircraft multiple times and did not hear the callsign any differently; nor did the pilot try to correct me from my knowledge. As the aircraft was cleared for takeoff by the Local Controller; the pilot must have made his callsign out more clearly to him than it had been to me; because the Local Controller turned to me and advised that it was actually Aircraft Y [a company callsign with a one number difference] on departure roll. Very similar sounding callsigns; very similar aircraft types. We should advise the company that there is no reason to have such similar callsigns with proposed departure times only 10 minutes apart.




Synopsis: JFK Controller reported two aircraft with nearly identical call signs caused the wrong flight to be coordinated.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed empty on a quick-turn repositioning leg. I was PM (pilot monitoring). Shortly after a normal liftoff and commanding gear retraction; crew noticed a red 'R GEAR' lamp on the instrument panel. About the same time; the Tower radioed us and let us know our right main gear appeared to be fully extended; with the left and nose gears retracted. (all 3 green gear lights were extinguished). We continued our IFR departure and were handed off to Departure. ZZZ Tower had already informed ZZZ1 Departure of our gear issue; and Departure asked our intentions. I requested a level off and we referenced the 'Abnormal' checklist which directed us to lower the gear and land. I requested a change in destination to ZZZ1. During cruise to ZZZ1; I took the flight controls and became PF (pilot flying). The remainder of the flight and landing at ZZZ1 were normal. Visually checking the main gear after landing revealed no apparent problems. Gear locking pins were all accounted for and had been removed prior to our flight. After landing; I telephoned the Tower to gather more information. The Tower Controller re-confirmed that it was 'apparent' to him that the right main gear appeared to be fully extended while the nose and left had retracted.




Synopsis: HS-125 Captain reported right main landing gear failed to retract resulted in return to departure airport.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CID.Airport, IA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/General
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight we found that the aircraft oxygen was at 0 PSI. We contacted Dispatch; Maintenance; [and] the Chief Pilot's office and made an entry into the AML. A decision was made to ferry the aircraft to SGF to have the problem fixed. We again contacted Dispatch; Maintenance; and the Chief Pilot's office in regard to flying the aircraft with no oxygen. Our question was. What do we do if there is smoke or a fire? The EPC checklist has a procedure for this type of an emergency. Oxygen masks on 100%; smoke goggles on; crew communication establish; recirculation fan off. A few suggestions were made on how to conduct this flight. All of the options that were discussed to fly the aircraft with no oxygen were not feasible. The result could be a dead crew and a crashed aircraft if there were smoke or fire. One of the suggestions was to go fly with no oxygen because it's been done before. Is that really what we want to do here at our Part 121 carrier? If it is; I would like a list of other situations that effect the safe operation of our aircraft that do not have an established procedure to follow [we could ignore]. We simply do not have a procedure for an aircraft to be flown with no oxygen nor should we. I highly value my life and that of my crew. The parts to fix the aircraft were flown in from SGF and contract maintenance fixed the aircraft. Thank you for your help in creating a safe working environment.




Synopsis: When the emergency oxygen level was discovered at zero during preflight the Air Carrier Captain refused to ferry the aircraft 280 NM from its current location to a company maintenance facility because emergency checklists required the flight crew to use oxygen in the event of an inflight smoke or fire event. The necessary parts were ultimately flown from the maintenance facility to the aircraft where they were installed by contracted maintenance.