elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After landing Aircraft X was taxied to the spot 8 in accordance with local procedures and directives. The aircraft chose to argue on the frequency about what he thought would be a better taxi route and made several unnecessary transmission about 'I can see the gate' 'it is right in front of me' etc.  These extra transmissions are a distraction from the local controller's primary function and could make the frequency unavailable for a higher priority transmission. After pulling into the gate the aircraft was overheard on the Ground Control frequency still complaining about the local controller following the rules.These extra conversations are unsafe and they are distracting.The new LOA is a safety hazard. It comes packed with the expectation that the local controller will increase the number of landline coordination in order to achieve a logical flow of traffic into the ramp. I am unwilling to increase my workload and complexity to make additional landline communication; and I expect that pilots follow ATC instructions without complaining on the frequency that the rules do not make sense. The new LOA creates more 'traps' with aircraft taxiing reverse course on Kilo back across the exit path of the next arrival. The new LOA creates more 'traps' as aircraft now try to clear at November and Kilo 3 to reduce taxi times. Unfortunately ramp control now has control of the preceding aircraft turning off Kilo and will hold them without coordination. This creates a loss of positive control at those intersections. This loss of positive control causes controllers to take aircraft who have slowed nearly to a stop to continue down the runway at a slow speed causing compression issues with succeeding aircraft. Return to previous LOA and if it intent is to not cross traffic at November... simply say 'aircraft shall not cross at November taxiway' controllers are capable of receiving outbound traffic at spot 8 and taxiing to K3; L; or E via Kilo as needed to maintain an orderly flow of traffic.




Synopsis: A PHL Tower Controller reported of a pilot making comments about the taxi instructions. The pilot complained about the way he was to taxi to the gate. The reporter advised the LOA was a safety hazard and created traps.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This appears to be an ongoing problem; reported by a number of pilots I have talked with. This issue is that the route I filed appears to have been changed; and the departure clearance was to fly 'as filed.' However; that is not what ATC expected me to fly. This could lead to conflicts.I filed an IFR flight plan using Foreflight. The route was direct from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Within a minute of filing; I received a text message giving me a different route to expect. I entered this route into my Foreflight flight plan.When I called for my clearance with ground control; I was given the clearance to proceed 'as filed.' Since I had filed DIRECT; I entered that into the aircraft's GPS and planned that route.When I was cleared by the tower for takeoff; the clearance was 'Cleared for takeoff runway 4L; turn left direct ZZZZZ.' That seemed strange for the 'direct' clearance I was given by ground.Once airborne; I checked in with departure control and told them I was cleared direct to ZZZ1; and asked them to confirm that was the routing they were seeing. No; they said. And they gave me the full route (which matched the 'expect' routing I was texted).Fortunately; the sky was clear and I was not overloaded. In busy airspace; in IMC; getting a completely new full route clearance at 1;000 feet AGL could be a problem.It appears that the something is happening to the routing clearance; and the controller either is unaware that what he or she is seeing is not what was filed; or that information is available to the controller; and he or she is missing the fact that this is a new routing. Either way; the controller must not issue 'cleared as filed' when someone or some computer has changed the routing from what was originally filed.




Synopsis: BE58 pilot reported confusion with IFR clearance related to changes in filed route then cleared as filed.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other During Takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The cause of the Master Warning was a Rudder Configuration issue.  We are absolutely certain that the trims were green; takeoff configuration ok; and all checklist were run. Why the rudder trim was moved out of center on the takeoff roll is unknown; and the captain re-centered it; as well as checking its operation afterward.  As it did not appear to be damaged; broke; or un-operational; we believed it had been accidently bumped or stuck on takeoff.  After checking its position; another Takeoff configuration OK was given and we proceeded on. After running all the checklists and confirming 'Takeoff Configuration OK'; we were cleared for takeoff on 34R.  The First Officer advanced the thrust levers and called 'set thrust'.  Shortly after; approx. 20kts; a Master Warning 'Rudder Configuration' sounded and the captain aborted the takeoff.  The First Officer immediately notified the Tower of the abort and we exited the runway at the first taxiway.  The tower asked if we needed assistance and we declined.  After re-centering the rudder trim; we taxied back to the runway and departed with an uneventful flight. After any Master Warning; regardless of what or why it happened; should call for maintenance to review any past history of similar occurrences; to troubleshoot the issue if needed.




Synopsis: First Officer reports about the cause of a Master Warning sounding due to a Rudder Configuration issue on a CRJ-700 aircraft. Second takeoff attempt aborted when similar Master Warning sounded and 'Rudder Config' appeared. Pilot resets the Rudder Trim a third time and departs. Why the Rudder Trim moved out of center position uncommanded on the takeoff roll; is unknown.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: TPA.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Position Computing System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Manuals
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: After reviewing the maintenance history and log I noticed the Captains VOR head had been written up at least 8 times in the last 10 days. The auto/manual function was switching out at altitude. The deferral 34-XX-XX-XX-XX/XY for the Captains EFIS control panel; map and plan modes was in the correction action column for the most recent write up.Reviewing the DDG (Dispatch Deviations Guide) the Captains VOR head is not a deferral item for its part of the standby system. Why the EFIS control panel was being deferred was puzzling and required further explanation. After a couple of phone calls maintenance explained that deferring the EFIS control panel stop the head switching back and forth because it was in manual all the time. This is not a fix just a way to move the airplane. We were told that repairs were to be made in ZZZ now that Maintenance had a clearer understanding of the problem.Flying the plane in VOR mode on the Captains side eliminates all way points and course to be flown out of view. Not a desirable situation. Looking across to the First Officer side is not reliable way to operate for extended periods of time. The DDG is a [priority] and it should have been addressed. However the deferral continues to be extended. The operations requirements for this DDG needs to reviewed. In the current climate of RNAV flying redundancy is key. As an example; I would not accept this condition on an ETOPS flight.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported that company was using MEL to move aircraft instead of repairing it after noticing that the VOR head had been written up 8 times in the last 10 days.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 B/C Ranger
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Lever/Selector
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On a commercial pilot training flight; after a GUMPS check and gear down light confirmed; the gear handle came out of [down position] after landing resulting in a prop strike.




Synopsis: Mooney M20C instructor pilot reported the landing gear lever came out of the down detent on landing resulting in a propeller strike.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 7
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-10 30
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C OAK
ATC / advisory: Tower OAK
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor; Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The flight was the 5th for the new Captain on his IOE pairing. I was the LCA and the pilot not flying in the right seat. Night; the weather was 900 overcast with seven miles visibility. We were established on the OAK Runway 29 ILS; on tower frequency; inside MITOE just below 2;500 MSL. When the landing gear was lowered; we got a level 2 Anti-skid R Fail alert. The student Captain initiated a go-around to trouble shoot the problem and I told the Tower we were on the missed approach. By that time we were passing 3;200 MSL. The Tower instructed us to maintain 2;000 and runway heading due to traffic as we were passing 3;500 in the climb. I reported our altitude and Tower then assigned 3;000 and runway heading. I told Tower we would descend to 3;000 and maintain runway heading. We did not receive any TCAS alerts; or hear anymore about traffic conflict.We had enough time that we could have coordinated the go-around better between the pilot flying and the pilot not flying; and then given the Tower more heads up to de-conflict any possible traffic. The Captain student had been briefed by me to be the Captain and be decisive. He was cleared for the ILS and assumed that a landing without antiskid would be unsafe; and go-around via the published procedure was a correct response to trouble shoot the level 2 alert. In retrospect; we the crew could have taken a moment to both get on the same page; and also give the Tower some heads up of our plan to go-around and trouble shoot our problem.




Synopsis: A new DC10-30 Captain obtaining IOE initiated an immediate go-around when confronted with an antiskid inop message upon extending the landing gear while about 2;500 AFE. The go around created a traffic conflict for ATC and a quick resolution of conflicting actual versus appropriate altitudes had to be made quickly.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During last 1500 feet of approach to 28L in visual conditions; wind reported 180/11; tower cleared a 747 to cross 28L; hold short 28R. Then tower warned us about possible jet blast from the 747 at the threshold. The 747 did not pull up close enough to 28R; and I commented in the cockpit that their tail was a bit close. I was hand-flying; fully configured; on speed; and fighting a changing strong left crosswind that was also a bit of a tailwind. I commented again that the tail was close; that they should pull up; but didn't advocate to the First Officer (FO) to say it on frequency. She instead suggested staying slightly high; which I think I grunted agreement to; but at about 500 feet there was a strong wind push from the left which drifted us closer to the right side of the runway threshold. At approximately 200 feet I got the jet back on centerline; a little high; and the FO said 'Go around.' I said 'what? Go around?' and she said 'tower said go around; traffic' and she was talking to ATC and spinning in heading and altitude parameters. I hit the Go Around switch and started the climb; then called for flaps 20; check thrust; during the time the mic was hot while the FO was talking to tower. The remainder of the go-around was completed in chopped up steps between communications; but was completed safely. We were vectored for a tight downwind; did the after-takeoff checklist; gave the cabin a brief PA about the go-around; and were on the runway about 10 minutes after the go-around. We were never sure if the traffic was the 747 or someone else.The most unusual aspect of all this was I never heard the tower give us the go-around; nor any of the heading and altitude parameters. And until I got the jet back on autopilot on the very brief downwind; I only heard about 10 percent of what ATC said; being fully engaged in the 'Aviating and Navigating' part of basic flying skills. It felt like the few words coming out of my mouth were molasses-coated; while grappling with the initial part of the go-around.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a go around at SFO initiated by ATC for unknown reasons.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Recip Eng
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While turning right base to final at ZZZ for Runway XX; Pilot Flying and I noticed what appeared to be a quad-rotor drone off our right wing approximately 500 feet away; and 100 feet below our altitude. We believe the drone was at approximately 600 feet altitude. This was reported to ZZZ Tower via radio and subsequent phone call to the Tower Manager. He took a lot of information from us about the events for a report on his end. A drone was flying in controlled airspace near final approach for Runway XX. It didn't appear to be in cooperation with ZZZ ATC control.




Synopsis: Air taxi pilot reported a UAS passed by their aircraft when approaching to land. The pilot continued the approach and landed normally.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 46U.Airport, WY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class G ZLC
ATC / advisory: UNICOM 46U
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: On a family trip from ZZZ to 46U; I landed at Alpine Airpark on Runway 13 just after my host for the weekend. My host exited the runway to the left at the end and waited in the run-up area for me. As I exited in his direction he began to taxi toward his hangar along a taxiway leading from the runway. As he moved he radioed over the airport UNICOM for me to follow him to his hangar. I did so; falling in behind by approximately 50 yards. As I exited the run-up area transitioning to the taxiway a gate rose from the ground just in front of my nose wheel causing it to collapse. Subsequently; the prop struck the taxiway causing damage to the propeller and resulting in a sudden seizing of the engine. The aircraft came to rest on top of the gate just aft of the lower antenna; causing damage to the nose gear; nose gear doors; lower antenna; and skin of the lower fuselage. There are no NOTAMS or remarks on the Alpine information page which mention a gate of any kind. The gate is not depicted or described in the taxi diagram. There are no signs or lights warning of the gate from the runway side. There is no optical or pressure sensor prevent the gate from raising as an aircraft approaches. The motion of the gate is controlled by residents of the air park via remote controls that resemble garage door openers. Also; there is no warning at all; e.g. lights; etc.; that barrier is being deployed; nor does there appear to be a delayed deployment of the barrier.




Synopsis: Pilot reported taxiing across an unknown gate that came up from the ground causing damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201808
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The move team was bringing in Aircraft X and didn't even notice that they nearly clipped the wing tip on Aircraft Y. They left without noticing their error. When the move team brings in an aircraft to the gate; they are not required to have wing walkers but when maintenance brings in an aircraft; ramp comes out and guides the plane in and has wing walkers. The mechanics are the most experienced to move aircraft since we have been doing it for many years. The reason why it was given to ramp was the cost to move. If a mechanic moves an aircraft; we are required to have one man in the cockpit; one on each wing; a tractor driver and guide man and one more at the tail. Supposedly too costly for us doing it. Now the move team does it with two people and no guide man.I don't have a solution because someone over rode; the way maintenance moves aircraft to a cheaper way not considering the safety factor. Give it back to the mechanics since their way of moving aircraft is safer.




Synopsis: A maintenance person reported that a move crew towed an aircraft into a gate without marshalers and nearly clipped the wingtip of an adjacent aircraft.