elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working sectors XX/YY/ZZ combined with D-side.  Cleared Aircraft X to cross 30 miles west of ZZZ at FL310. Thought I had an accurate readback.  I have not checked the recording yet. There was some frequency congestion with weather deviations and multiple frequencies.  Aircraft X later descended below FL310; when I queried the pilot he thought he had been cleared to FL300; and thought that he had read that back.  With the addition of a D-side; and the new requirement to wear a mask we are not able to social distance 6+ feet; I was required to in this case.  I fully support the safety measures; and appreciate the effort.  I don't know if wearing the mask also caused confusion in delivering the clearances (muffled sound; etc.)?Staff a full time Supervisor (FLM) rather than a CIC.  Open sector(s) more frequently if needed.  With the new mask mandate; perhaps opening sector(s) as opposed to staffing D-sides may allow clear communication without a needed mask.  On the other hand; one bad sneeze can really carry throughout the area; masks would most likely help reduce virus exposure under any of these circumstances; and a common mandate does help keep all under the same safety standard.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below what the Controller thought was the assigned altitude.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Oil Seals
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Number 1 Engine leak found on walk around by [flight] crew. Maintenance Control and Station notified. Maintenance Control wanted an engine run to check for leaks; crew agreed and was given a safety briefing by Maintenance Control. I then reviewed with the Contract Mechanic what was going to happen and safety issues; including that Maintenance Control's instructions were; after engine was stable at idle; it was to be run for 3-5 minutes. Started engine and when idle reached [I] started clock; at 0:40 seconds the Mechanic said to shut down engine. I thought he had found the leak so I shut it down and stopped the clock at 0:57 seconds. He returned to the cockpit and said all was good; no leak. I asked why he didn't let the engine run for the required amount of time? He replied that he did. I pointed to my clock and said he clearly did not. Did I want to do it again? Yes. This time I asked a pass riding company Mechanic if he would assist and make sure everything was done properly. On second engine run; the leak became clearly visible about the three minute mark. Flight cancelled.

Callback: Reporter stated the aircraft was an A319 and the oil leak involved the engine starter oil seals on a V-2500 engine. The Contract Mechanic was fully aware of the required 3-5 minute engine run time after engine idle was stable to verify possible location of the oil leak. The Contract Mechanic had no explanation for directing him (Captain/Reporter) to shut down the engine after less than one minute of idle run. Reporter stated if he had not challenged the Contract Mechanic to perform another engine run; using Maintenance Control's criteria of a 3-5 minute leak check; he could have had a more serious engine oil loss on takeoff or in flight and had to divert. The flight was canceled due to excessive oil leaking noted during the second engine run and parts had to be flown in from one of their maintenance bases.



Synopsis: A Captain reports about a Contract Maintenance Mechanic who did not perform a full three to five minute Engine Run on their A319 aircraft to determine cause of an oil leak found under # 1 Engine by the flight crew during a walkaround. Flight was canceled after second engine run due to excessive oil leaking and lack of parts.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / Allegro
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After dropping my son off; within 5 minutes after takeoff; and climbing through about 2;500 FT and a heading of about 280 degrees; I smelled smoke in the cockpit. I immediately started a left turn back and turned off my Avionics master and Master switch. I knew there was traffic to my left so I stopped the turn until I acquired the slower traffic. During that time the smoke and smell left the cockpit. At that time I had a decision to make; it's a clear day and the aircraft is running and flying fine; should I continue to head away from a busy airspace to my home airport; or should I possibly make a no radio landing at a busy towered airport. I decided to continue my flight. I then used my compass to head generally west toward my destination. I thought I should let the Tower know what was going on since my transponder was off below the Class B Airspace; and I had started the turn to the south somewhat abruptly. I turned electrical components on one at a time to isolate the problem and report to the Tower why I turned and the transponder went off but within 5 minutes I smelled something again so I shut all electrical off. By this time I was outside of the Mode C veil and headed back generally west and had more time to navigate back using my iPad and GPS. About this time I noticed several parachutes at about my altitude and about one half mile north of my position and abeam or slightly behind me. I continued the rest of the flight without avionics uneventfully. Did I make the right decision? I'm not sure; the smoke did very much get my attention but that was solved quickly. What bothered me more was that I inadvertently flew into an area where there was parachute activity while trying to solve the electrical problems and did so because of lack of communications.




Synopsis: A M20 developed smoke and fumes after takeoff so the pilot secured all Master Electrical Switches and continued flying spending a short while under Class B Airspace with the transponder OFF.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Oceanic
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was training my developmental. The aircraft was requesting FL360 and ZNY Center said they were unable so was recoordinated at FL350. It was properly strip marked. We moved on to our training. Later after the Radar Controller had terminated the aircraft and the aircraft was passed the fix ZNY called and said the aircraft checked in at the wrong altitude and needed to be descended for traffic. We had the Radar Controller check and he was still on frequency and we were able to issue the descent.I recommend that ZMA take airspace from ZNY now that we have increased radar separation; and believe aircraft are being over restricted by having to adhere to non-radar rules and separation when they are well within radar airspace.




Synopsis: A radar sector reported coordinating an altitude for an aircraft to enter another sector's non-radar airspace. The sector failed to assign the coordinated altitude.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLE.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The 10-9 for CLE specifically prohibits taxiing from Spot 2 to Spot 5 along Inner J Taxiway for aircraft with wingspans of 118 FT and greater. The 737 wingspan is 118 FT. Ramp Tower continually gives clearance to taxi from Spot 2 to Spot 5 along inner J Taxiway. This is prohibited. I have found no NOTAM or pilot bulletin allowing the 737 to do this. I refuse and take alternate routes. Other planes illegally take these instructions. This needs to stop.




Synopsis: A B737 pilot refused taxi clearance at CLE between Spots 2 and 5 because the Airport diagram restricts aircraft with wingspans 118 FT and greater from the Inner J Taxiway between the two spots.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 103
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were taxiing to runway 25R for departure in trail of a B767.  I said to my FO [First Officer] 'Let's make sure we have spacing behind the heavy'.  We started our before takeoff check and the 767 began its takeoff roll; we started our clock.  An aircraft landed and we were clear for takeoff.   We took the runway and I asked for additional 30 seconds to make sure we had at least 6 miles (I tend to be conservative).  The controller informed us we were 8 miles in trail and there was an aircraft 2 miles behind us.  Since 8 miles was more than enough space we departed.  Checking with departure we were told to call tower on landing and given a phone number.  I should have verified the proper spacing before taking the runway thus adding to the controllers stress and potentially creating a hazard.  For some reason I didn't think about the 767 again until we lined up and thought 'Oh; we need spacing' and then asked for more time (I think the Before Takeoff Check hogged my short term memory).  I looked at the clock and we were around two minutes and thirty seconds which was plenty of time; and I think 3 minutes is only required for 757.  The controller advised us of 8 miles separation and I departed because the margin was plenty and there were no exaggerating factors for wake.  I think my instinct for more separation for a departing heavy is a good thing; I just need to ask sooner.  I thought the spacing was not sufficient I would not have departed causing a go around.  Also; lining up on 25R usually has no pressure from final; but 25L closed two days ago and I know the controllers are getting adjusted to blending departures and arrivals from one runway.  I knew there was traffic on final; but did not think it was that close.I called the phone number and spoke to the tower representative and they said there was no record or any notes for Aircraft X.  I asked if I should leave my number and they said 'Nope'.  He advised they are frustrated in the tower dealing with the 25L closure.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of discussion with his First Officer about getting more spacing between them and the previous departure before they take the runway. When they take the runaway they ask for an additional 30 seconds for separation. The controller advises the distance they already have and they depart.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PNE.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D PNE
ATC / advisory: Tower PNE
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Aircraft Y] was on a practice VFR ILS 24 approach at about a 5 mile final and was instructed to break off the approach and make a right 360 to follow [Aircraft X]. [Aircraft X] was on a 6 mile final for a visual approach. The helicopter [Aircraft Y] was breaking off the approach and flying to the northeast north of the 24 approach course. [Aircraft X] received a traffic alert saying the traffic was 200 feet below so they began to climb. The helicopter was north of the approach course at that time. Break the helicopter approach off sooner and do a wider 360 so the TCAS does not go off in [Aircraft X].


Second narrative: While on final approach approximately 8 miles out Tower told me about a helicopter ahead. I told [them] I was looking and I did not see him but had it on TCAS. [ATC] told me to continue and report 6 miles out; I am not sure if [ATC] had cleared me to land yet or not. [ATC] then told the helicopter to depart the area as I was coming in. Shortly thereafter I got an aural warning of an aircraft at 200 feet below me and at a very close distance; then it went to 100. I took evasive action to avoid a collision; I never saw the helicopter. [ATC] apologized and had me call the tower when I landed. [ATC] apologized again and said [they] would need to file a report. I gave [them] my information.


Synopsis: PNE Controller and transport pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter while on visual approach.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Aircraft component: System Monitor: Indicating and Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This event occurred during Takeoff roll on Runway 27R in ATL. Captain and First Officer received a predictive wind shear warning between 80-100 kts; during calm wind conditions. Other weather conditions/reports did not constitute a wind shear event ie: convective activity; strong winds or microbursts. The ATIS was reporting calm winds and no other aircraft that were taking off or landing reported any type of wind shear activity. We believed this to be an erroneous alert because the message lasted approximately 3 seconds and then extinguished. We continued the takeoff and experienced no wind shear during climb out. We believed the message to be erroneous because the weather conditions were not conducive for wind-shear activity. There could've been a glitch in the system. Also being very new to the aircraft and it's systems could've played a part. During training were only trained on wind shear events during poor weather conditions. We have a flow chart that we use to determine if wind shear conditions exist. There were no conditions that even led us to the chart nor any weather reports or ATC/Pilot reports of any kind of possible wind-shear. The AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) states we must reject the takeoff for any predictive wind shear message prior to V1. However; due to the fluid nature of the situation we deemed it safer to continue the take-off. Perhaps understanding our own human factors and incorporating guidance found in the AOM in a more timely manner; this could've been prevented.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported continuing the takeoff even after receiving a predictive wind shear warning because the calm ambient conditions seemed to preclude the possibility of wind shear.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ABQ.Airport, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ABQ
Second aircraft: Airliner 99
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were being pushed back to exit the ramp at F3 with our tail to the southwest. Our engines were running. During the push; we stopped abruptly and the push crew told us that they had to stop because an aircraft had just taxied behind us and was actually under our horizontal stabilizer. The aircraft in question was; I believe; a Beech 99. There was no physical contact of the two aircraft; but I am reporting this event because it seems to me to constitute reckless operation on the part of the pilot of the BE99. It seems more like reckless operation than error to me. Pilots should operate their aircraft in such a manner as to ensure safe separation from other aircraft during taxi.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reports a sudden stop during push back that is explained by the tug driver as being caused by a BE99 taxiing behind their aircraft.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While descending into ZZZZ; the First Officer saw a silver or white colored drone at approximately 6;500 ft. MSL and within less than 50 ft. from our aircraft. The drone passed off our right side as we were on a vector for arrival. ATC was informed and we relayed the pertinent information.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain report an NMAC event during approach with a drone within 50 feet from aircraft.