elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LIH.Airport, HI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This report is to highlight a concern I have when landing on Runway 21 in LIH airport and what to do should one go-around from inside the MAP; or a rejected landing.  From the pilot's view; a go-around with the rapidly rising terrain looks daunting in good visual conditions but throw in weather; low ceilings; reduced visibility or night; and a go-around could be even more daunting.There is very high terrain just west of LIH.  Within five miles terrain goes from basically sea level to 2;310 feet MSL right on the Runway 21 extended centerline.  There is also an 799 foot Tower just to the left of the extended centerline; about 1 NM away and just beyond the Tower rapidly rising terrain from 1;000 feet MSL to the 2;310 feet MSL.  To the right about 30 degrees from the extended centerline is a 1;418 feet AGL terrain/obstacle at 1;418 feet MSL.  Further to the west within 10 NM is rapidly rising terrain reaching 5;244 feet MSL.The RNAV (GPS) Y Runway 21 has a MDA of 580 feet making a DDA of 630 feet. The missed approach point is JABDI; 1.0 NM from the 21 approach end.  Going missed approach at the DDA would not be a problem as turn would be over the water to NAGAI. But going around from inside the MAP or a balked landing could create an exciting moment! There is that 799 foot Tower (probably in the turn radius) and rapidly rising terrain to the south. To the west; northwest is the 1;418 feet terrain/obstacle at four to five miles. On Jeppesen 10-9A is a Runway 21 Runway departure procedure: climb to 550 feet then a left turn to 090 with a climb rate of 400 feet/NM to 4;500 feet; but who thinks to look here when landing.So my question is; does the Company have any procedures (I can't find any) on turn direction; bank angle; speed; when to clean up etc. It looks like a left turn would be the preferred direction as it puts you over the water quicker; but then there is that 799 foot Tower.  A right turn might be advisable but then there is also the high terrain/obstacle at 1;418 feet.  Throw in tower instructions; a tired Crew; or weather; and you [have] a recipe for problems.  Having a procedure would be very helpful to manage the risk and avoid a poor outcome.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported concerns with landing procedures to Runway 21 at LIH airport in go-around or missed approach scenarios.  Reporter cited terrain and tower obstacles as possible hazards.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MRI.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D MRI
ATC / advisory: Tower MRI
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: AMR Tower cleared our aircraft for left 45 degree entry for left traffic Runway 25. Upon entry into the traffic pattern; upwind traffic for Runway 25 turned early left crossswind. This action resulted in a traffic conflict causing both pilots to take immediate action to avoid a traffic conflict. Had the aircraft not turned an early crosswind; spacing would not have been an issue.




Synopsis: Small aircraft pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at MRI when another aircraft deviated from his clearance.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower PHX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a very short taxi out to 25R; we switched to Tower frequency and were immediately cleared for takeoff. Before even being lined up in position; the takeoff clearance was cancelled because an aircraft was on the go off of 25L. When that aircraft was clear; Tower asked if we still wanted to take off. I replied we did and we launched. During the takeoff roll; Tower gave the winds to a Company aircraft. That was the first time I realized the probable reason for the go-around and for the question whether we still wanted to take off. It was excessive tailwind. We elected to continue the takeoff as we were in a precautionary profile anyway and we were above 80 knots. During cruise; I calculated the takeoff winds and it was a 15-knot tailwind.Preventative Measures: I guess I could have asked Tower why he was asking if we wanted to take off. It was a very unusual situation.


Second narrative: The ATIS information was not updated prior to us reaching the end of the runway. All the information we had indicated that this would be a normal crosswind takeoff. It was only during the takeoff roll that we first had any indication that tailwind may be an issue. When the aircraft went around; we could have queried the Controller but it didn't seem all that unusual. About the only thing I feel we could have done differently was to ask the Controller why the aircraft had gone around. If it were due to tailwind; then we would have the most current information regarding the winds.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported taking off with a 15 knot tailwind because they were never told about the current conditions.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight XXXX at FL340 in cruise flight; cleared direct to ZZZZZ intersection to join the XXXXX arrival to ZZZ and cleared to cross ZZZZZ1 at FL270. Just after top of descent in VNAV when the throttles powered back for descent a loud bang came from the left side of the aircraft followed by significant airframe vibration. No EICAS messages were observed at this time however a check of the engine synoptic revealed high vibration coming from the Number 2 Engine. I brought the Number 2 Throttle to idle but the vibration continued and severe damage was determined. We ran the severe damage checklist and secured the engine and then requested a slower speed from ATC to lessen the vibration and advised ATC. The slower speed made the vibration acceptable and the flight continued to descend on the arrival via ATC instructions. The FO was dispatched to the main deck to visually survey damage. He returned with pictures of obvious catastrophic damage of the Number 2 Engine and confirmed no visible damage to the leading edge or any other visible portion of the left side of the aircraft. The impending three engine approach; landing and possible go-around were talked about and briefed as well as the possibilities of leading and trailing edge flap malfunctions. A landing on Runway XXC followed and the aircraft was inspected by personnel before proceeding to the gate. After block in; inspection of the Number 2 revealed extensive damage.A mention of the exceptional level of competency and professionalism exhibited by FO [Name1] and FO [Name] is in order; their calm demeanor and practical thinking should be attributed with the safe termination of Flight XXXX!




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a loud bang when throttles were reduced for descent. The flight crew visually confirmed an engine was damaged and; after securing it; made an uneventful landing.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Data Computer
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot flying in the left seat receiving dual instruction from the type rated ATP pilot in the right seat. Approach cleared us down to 4;000 ft and was vectoring us for the visual approach. Approach assigned a speed of 200 kts and an altitude of 4;000. I was at 200 kts and then noticed that the indicated speed started climbing; so I started pulling back on the throttles. As I kept pulling back on the throttles; the pilot in the other seat then noticed that both our speed and altitude were off of the assignments. Just as he asked me 'What are you doing?' and I was answering 'Maintaining 200 kts and...' The warning annunciations started going off like crazy. We both looked at my screen and then his and quickly realized that everything I was seeing on my #1 screen was wrong because the #1 ADC had failed. He then directed me to flip the 'reversion' switch to revert the pilots instruments to the #2 ADC. As soon as I did that; the indications came back correctly. Right then ATC inquired as to our altitude; which was now showing 4;300. We told them that we were having indication problems with a failed air data computer. They asked if we needed further assistance or a vector; which we didn't at that point; because it was working fine after reverting to the non-failed ADC. The really scary part of this incident is that the annunciator panel (and my screen) didn't know that the ADC had failed for some unknown period of time. It wasn't until there was a very significant difference between reality and what was being shown on the screen (and what was being shown on the copilots instruments) that it finally recognized the failure and annunciated it. I still do not know why it took the plane so long to recognize the failure and tell the pilots.




Synopsis: C525A pilot reported altitude and airspeed deviations resulted from the failure of the #1 ADC.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Second aircraft: Cessna 150
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We made a long final on the practice RNAV XX approach. We were on CTAF for ZZZ; and we heard Aircraft Y in the pattern. We made radio calls multiple times on final.Aircraft Y was on a left downwind. We passed on final as they appeared to be turning to a left base for Runway XX. We lost sight of the aircraft due to having no rear window. The other aircraft was above us on final. We asked on the radio multiple times if he could see us. Aircraft Y did not reply; so we started to add power because we lost sight of the aircraft. Normally [we] would easily out speed Aircraft Y; but we were slow for final approach.Suddenly; we see Aircraft Y out of our left window and behind us. He was about 100 feet away from us and closing in. He did not appear to have any flaps in (or very little). He was above us; but we could clearly see the head of the pilot inside; so we knew it would be possible for him to see us.We made a go-around then came back for landing. We tried to talk to the pilot on the ground. However; he thought we were behind him on a 5 mile final even though we called a 2 mile final. We tried to talk further with the other pilot; but there was a language barrier. He appeared to have a very hard time speaking English or understanding it. I believe this is why he didn't make any changes when we told him we were in front of him and below him on final.We are aware that we did not enter the traffic pattern as suggested; but we were lower on final; and thus had the right of way. However; the right of way was of no concern to us; all we cared about was not getting into a collision with someone which is why we made a go around as soon as we knew we were in potential danger.After departing Bridgeport; we hear another guy on 1 mile final for Runway XX. Right after; Aircraft Y announced he was taking Runway 18. We could see him on the ground from a left crosswind. He did not appear to check final for traffic. The other guy (unknown tail number) made a go-around from their short final due to Aircraft Y taking the runway.




Synopsis: Flight instructor reported that a communication breakdown and language barrier at a non-towered airport contributed to an NMAC.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BFM.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E BFM
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Houston Center was providing Approach Control service. I was receiving vectors for the ILS 32 at BFM. I was given the final turn and told to hold that heading (about 300 degrees) until intercepting the localizer and cleared for the approach. As I continued the approach; it became obvious that I would not intercept the localizer outside the final approach fix. When my DME showed me inside LURDE (the final approach fix) I called Houston for vectors to try the approach again. The turn they gave me was back toward the localizer; which I did finally intercept; 2 miles inside LURDE. Had I not gotten the vector toward the localizer; I estimate that I would have intercepted over the airport. I fly this route often and when the ILS is required; it is typical to have vectors inside the FAF and have to try again.




Synopsis: IFR Cessna pilot voiced concern regarding ZHU's handling of vectors to the ILS for BFM; noting that frequently the subject vectors are too shallow and the intercept is inside the FAF.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushing off the gate at ZZZ; we were waiting to single engine taxi with the #2 engine and the APU running. The #1 generator SOURCE off light illuminated followed by the APU GEN OFF BUS lights. Simultaneously we detected a strong electrical fumes odor in the cockpit. We donned oxygen masks and established Crew communications. We then shut down the APU and received a call from the flight attendants regarding fumes present in the cabin. We shut down number two engine as well and made a PA to the passengers to remain seated. The Flight Attendant then indicated that the fumes were dissipating. We requested a tow back to the gate; ran the Fire; Smoke; Fumes QRH and requested Crash Fire Rescue to inspect the aircraft. We then evacuated the passengers at the gate through the forward entry door.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that an electrical malfunction and fumes in the cabin resulted in a return to the gate.
Date: 201208
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Lifevest/Jacket
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight; In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The passenger pointed out that there were no visible red life vest tabs at his and his wife's seat. I tried to open the compartment to verify whether there were actually any life vests inside but could not open it. I had the Purser call for a mechanic. He opened the compartment up to check they were there and pulled out the red tabs so they were visible; the same with other seats. Having already taken a substantial delay due to cleaning issues we departed. However it then became apparent shortly after take-off that other seats in the Business Class cabin also were missing the red tabs. If we had been in an emergency ditching the passengers in those seats would not have had a life vest to put on as they wouldn't have been able to open the life vest compartment. This is a safety issue that needs to be addressed. Flight attendants are not responsible for checking every seat is equipped with a life vest!


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B777 passenger observed that no red life vest tabs were visible thus preventing the vest from being removed for use. On examination several other coach and business class life vests were similarly unusable.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Received the preliminary dangerous goods notification prior to push. We had very few passengers so station was ready to push early.  Upon pushback I then remembered that we hadn't received the final dangerous goods notification.  We then contancted OPS and waited to start and taxi until we received it.


Second narrative: Was advised we have some HAZMAT to be loaded. We pushed from the gate about 10 [minutes] early; then realized we had not received the final HAZMAT loaded report. We called ops; told them we were waiting for it to be sent to aircraft. After we were pushed back; we did not start the engines until the report was received that we were carrying HAZMAT.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported pushing back from gate without receiving required final Hazmat report.