elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Arrived to preflight and found AC (Aircraft) with APU running but no bleed air or external air. AC was very hot and had a 'strong body odor'. Turned on APU bleed and cooled AC but FA (Flight Attendant) still complained about smell. Called Maintenance and they researched the smell but could not locate. They called their supervisor who also did not find the cause. They said it was just stale E&E (Electrical and Environmental) air circulating. Supervisors supervisor showed up with two other Maintenance personnel and did another inspection. They said that they could smell a faint smell but could not pinpoint or locate it and signed off logbook. FA called their supervisors to aircraft in which they said that they could smell the smell. They then took 3 of the 4 [Flight Attendants] off the trip to hospital. Then the head of Maintenance showed up and said he smelled the smell. He promptly called and had the AC removed from line and moved to hanger and also lined up a replacement aircraft. He stated that we were not going to fly that AC with a smell. My write up in logbook was about a strong odor aboard which was signed off OK by Maintenance. While we were retrieving our bags another Maintenance person a showed up and wanted me to write in the logbook refused aircraft. I did make the entry but the head of Maintenance had already removed the AC from the line.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported upon arrival to preflight that the aircraft had a 'strong body odor.' After Maintenance replaced aircraft; two Flight Attendants were treated for physiological symptoms from cabin fumes.
Date: 201702
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Over swamp and overwater routes present unnecessary dangers. General aviation aircraft receive IFR route clearances over dangerous areas when transiting to EYW. Prior to flights; pilots who attempt consultations with Miami Center; when seeking safe routing down V3; requests are arbitrarily rejected because of 'traffic conflicts.' Fact: the Western half of the southern end of Florida is a coastal plain non-riverine basin swamp covered with densely populated bald cypress and swamp tupelo trees in standing water that render the terrain virtually un-navigable on foot. Downed aircraft in the Okefenokee Swamp create legendary misfortune. Aircraft; after off-airport landings in the swamp; are virtually swallowed by the dense vegetation making search and rescue problematic; and death more likely than on dry ground. In addition; the large expanse of open ocean; stretching from the western side of FL mainland to the chain of islands constituting the Florida Keys; offers no refuge to downed pilots. Miami Center insists on routing GA aircraft south of MKY down the West coast of Florida toward EYW; and out over 25 NM of open ocean from the mainland to EYW. The only alternative is to overfly the East coast control zones under VFR above 7;000 MSL. That's only available in VMC. VMC is not always available.The coastline route from MKY to EYW violates SAFETY. Travel across the Okefenokee Swamp (Big Cypress/Everglades) violates SAFETY. Neither segment of the routing is necessary; yet Miami Center makes it mandatory. Airports in Eastern Florida; south of F45; use east-west runways that offer ample opportunity for GA overflights on north-south routes to fly directly overhead these airports without interfering with commercial arrivals and departures. ARTCC controllers can easily route GA flights; always over safe terrain; from VRB via V3 to Tavenaero Park thence VPLYY (never to DROWN) thence direct to MTH thence to EYW. Stay over safe terrain. Any other route is a death trap.




Synopsis: BE36 pilot reported ATC will not approve IFR flights to EYW via V3 due to 'traffic conflicts'; requiring flight along the west coast of Florida over swamp and open water. The reporter believes this is not safe.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LMO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: CTAF LMO
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a long base to final due to multi engine aircraft in front of us. Student was turning final and I just happened to glance at my iPad connected with ADS-B sentry (aircraft only equipped with ADS-B out).  I saw traffic turning at us at 200 feet above.  I believe he was on a right base.  I thought it might be a weird ghost reading; but checked to make sure. I reduced power angled right.  While checking I saw just above and slightly above and slightly in front an aircraft in front of us.  We called our final and he asked where we were that he didn't see us. We informed him that we were right behind him. Aircraft on extend downwind informed that we were about a 1/4 mile apart on final. The other aircraft broke off to the right and exited traffic pattern. I had full controls from my student at reduced power setting. We stayed on final and departed the traffic pattern on upwind without landing;  just a low approach so we could breath for a second. I believe the only thing that we could have done is to amend our base call to have said ' extended base' I'm not sure why traffic was on a right base for that runway. Possibly because there was a lot of traffic and they didn't want to try to find a spot between the 4 other planes in the left traffic pattern?  I believe without ADS-B in that I purchased on my own that it would have been a lot closer.




Synopsis: A flight instructor providing instruction on base leg at a LMO non-towered airport reported a near miss with another aircraft in the pattern.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After extensive deicing to remove ice buildup from the airplane we waited three minutes to open the bleed air supply. As we were about to start the number two motor we got an aft cargo smoke warning.  I asked the FO (First Officer) to check and see if there was evidence of smoke in the rear of the aircraft. He stated there was a fog/mist in the air in the fuselage of the aircraft. We ask the tug driver to tow us back into the chocks and asked ground control to send [ground personnel] to check out the smoke.    The APU was running when we deiced and I believe the requirement for extensive deicing caused an accumulation of the deice fluid in the APU intake. Training the deice crew to avoid the APU intake. Knowing the amount of deice fluid applied to the airplane we could've waited longer than 3 minutes to open the bleed valves.


Second narrative: I am unsure how the fluid exactly entered the conditioning system. The required time limits post de-icing were inadequate in this case.Due to the extensive de-icing of the AC a longer wait time in these circumstances might be prudent.


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported receiving a cargo smoke indication during pushback possibly due to deice fluid in the APU intake.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on the initial climb out taking off [runway] 31 at LGA with Right Turn (RT) 360 on the LGA5 SID; WHITE First fix. Shortly after the right turn 360 we were cleared further RT 220 and climb to 7000. As we reached 6000 we were cleared to 12000'. ATC also called for VFR traffic at 7;500' that we observed on TCAS. While the Captain/Pilot Monitoring (PM) was looking for traffic at 7000'; I responded to a TCAS RA to level off. I complied with the level off RA command by leveling off and rolling out of the bank to follow the Flight Director guidance. We were in climb power setting when I rapidly leveled off to follow the TCAS RA and I didn't override the auto throttle (A/T) fast enough and airspeed read 275KT IAS for a brief moment before I overrode the A/T to reduce speed back to 250 KT IAS. The PM properly communicated that we were responding to an RA but didn't have an opportunity to call out my deviation and I called for correcting airspeed when I caught the airspeed deviation after responding to the RA.The PM was looking for traffic while I was responding to the RA; I focused on the flight director and decreased my scan and for a brief moment and let airspeed increase. I didn't exceed aircraft limitation but let airspeed increase beyond airspace restriction of 250 below 10;000. As the PM was busy looking for traffic he was not able to call my deviation. I made the mistake of over relying on automation in this event. I should have anticipated the A/T lag and manually reduced power in the rapid level off.I believe that with more experience; I would have reduced power at the same time that I leveled off when responding to the RA command. I am now more aware of the A/T lag to adjust power settings.




Synopsis: First Officer reported exceeding 250kts below 10;000'; while complying with a TCAS resolution advisory.
Date: 201807
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Airspace: Class A ZDC; Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Staffing; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Weather
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While working a sector; I was put into unsafe situations by management and TMU (Traffic Management Unit). They over loaded the sector by volume and complexity with no help. The sector became unmanageable because of frequency congestion and altitude restrictions.We can not count on management and TMU to protect us. This is a sad statement; but a true one. We need to be able to have confidence that they will not allow a sector to become unsafe by overloading it with rerouted aircraft because of weather. They need to provide us with in-trail restrictions; shutting off departures and such.




Synopsis: ZDC Center Controller reported the Traffic Management Unit did not effectively manage traffic flow during weather deviations allowing the sector to become overloaded.
Date: 202007
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flight Crew Harness
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute ZZZ-ZZZ1; the five point connector popped out of place and could not be twisted to allow the seat belt to be removed. This essentially trapped the Captain in his seat if the seat belt continued to be used. We had never; in XX+ years of aviation; heard of this failure. Last time I had experienced this was in a dunk tank in Navy flight school; where I technically 'drowned.' I did connect the waist belt through the shoulder harness connect points; where the quick release actually worked; so I was able to rig a partial system. There is no information on what to do in this situation; nor after a consult with the Chief Pilot was there any company support. If this is a more common occurrence than I am aware; some information should be disseminated to the pilots. But in all likelihood if not; the Chief Pilot; Maintenance; and other resources in headquarters should be able to get together in an expeditious fashion and at least come up with some ideas in the last 90 minutes of a flight. Either way; the actions resulted in SOP violations and use of emergency authority to circumvent the procedures using the Captain's judgement of least risk in the situation.




Synopsis: Captain reported his five point harness system malfunctioned; trapping him in his seat.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Instrument and Control Panels
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While enroute we received an alert 'Via Fail.' A look at the QRH [provided] not much information. A few minutes later display units 4/5/6 started flashing on and off then after about 15 minutes they all went dark. I asked Dispatch to give Maintenance a heads up about our situation and for the weather in and around our destination. I discussed it with my First Officer and we decided to deviate to a nearby airport; but the Duty Manager preferred we go to a convenient airport with maintenance capabilities. We landed there with no further problems.




Synopsis: A B717 flight crew diverted when three cockpit display panels went dark.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After completing the parking check we began to prepare the aircraft for the return [flight]. After initializing the ACARS we began receiving ACARS messages associated with the normal pre-flight sequence with the exception of the ACARS message confirming both of us as Fit For Duty (FFD)! Neither one of us had yet made that declaration via ACARS or any other method. We had not even got out of our seats yet. I sent an ACARS query to both my Dispatcher and the Duty Manager asking how this was possible. My Dispatcher replied that it was probably done when I accepted the release?! Accepted the release? I had not even seen the release let alone accepted it. The Duty Manager thought that the gate agents had possibly declared us FFD via a beta test program that exists whereby they have that capability. How is this even possible? I'm shocked that this occurred in the first place and even more so that a gate agent can have access to my record and able to insert themselves and afforded the opportunity to circumvent the rule and intent of FAR 117 by declaring me FFD!




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain arrived at the gate and prepared the ACARS for the next flight. While doing so he found someone else had declared him fit for duty without his knowledge or permission. Dispatch said a Company beta program may permit gate agents to declare a pilot fit for duty without the pilot's input.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Turning from downwind to base leg for ILS Runway 07 observed winds at 2;000 MSL to be approximately 240 at 35 knots. ATIS and subsequent Tower reported surface winds were 140 at 24 gusting 32. Cleared for approach and commenced with dual autopilot and auto throttles engaged. Assigned airspeed 160. Approaching GS we heard on Tower; a flight initiate go around for 'wind shear'. At approximately 1;700 feet MSL the autopilot pitched down approximately 10 degrees; airspeed varied by +/- 10 knots and moderate turbulence was encountered. Though not yet into the wind shear warning altitude envelope; I felt it was imminent and executed a go around. During the go around the turbulence became worse and airspeed fluctuations continued up to 30 knots; therefore precluding a reduction from Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) power. This resulted in a flap/slat over speed. When the turbulence began to stabilize; power was reduced and flaps and slats were retracted. Continued climb out in moderate turbulence and commenced coordination of ATC clearance for divert to [a nearby airport]. Landed at [alternate airport] and documented over speed occurrence in Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML). Debriefed Maintenance personnel; and contacted Dispatch.Though above 1;000 feet when go around was initiated the turbulence and wind conditions precluded the use of 'soft' go around thrust. The autopilot may have initiated an altitude capture at 2;000 feet prior to further climb instructions by Tower; causing acceleration.Go arounds are rare; especially in conditions experienced here. Any/all additional time practicing during recurrent training cycles would be beneficial to crew experience.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The flight crew of an A321 reported that on final approach they encountered severe turbulence; so they executed a go-around. They had continuous turbulence associated with wind-shear.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Earlier in the evening one of the mechanics was slightly injured on another aircraft and was in the office.  Since he was part of the crew; and I was assigned the oils I thought I would help out by finishing quickly then going up to do part of the interior check. After cleaning the APU; I checked the oil quantity and noticed it was down a pint. After servicing it I was placing the cap back on when the oil bowser fell from the lift and started to leak oil. I quickly picked up the bowser and cleaned the area. I ran the APU then closed the door [but] did not verify if the cap was fully closed. This happened at gate shortly after midnight. No other mechanic was involved.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician neglected to ensure that the oil cap was securely repositioned on the APU oil tank after servicing.