elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was told by my Captain we are to expect two FAMs (Federal Air Marshalls) and one LEO on our flight. When boarding commenced; one of them showed his ID and asked me if he could check in with the Captain. After doing so; I asked him if he was aware of 'the other two.' He seemed confused. I told him we were supposed to have 'two FAMs and a LEO. Are you the LEO?' He said yes. I told him we have two FAMs too; but I'm not sure yet what seats they're in. He said OK and sat in seat. As he walked away; my Captain called me into the flight deck and said LEOs aren't supposed to know about the FAMs; but the FAMs are supposed to know about the LEOs. I was dumbfounded and anxious because I thought all armed persons are supposed to know about each other; with the exception of FBI agents; which is not in our manual anywhere; but was told to me when I inquired years ago at recurrent. I asked if ever someone can be armed on our plane and not have to tell us. The trainer answered FBI only. In flight; I looked it up in my manual because I hate not being sure of a rule; and I needed to read it to verify. I found two spots referencing FAM discretion; and to me; it says LEOS ARE supposed to be informed about the FAMs. All armed persons are informed about each other. Is our manual wrong? Am I interpreting it wrong? I informed my Captain what I had found. He said the Company gate agent was the one who told him LEOs aren't supposed to know about FAMs.My thought is; what if the FAM steps in to help us and pulls his gun out and the LEO shoots him. It could totally happen; because there would obviously be a commotion; the LEO thinks he's the only one on board with a gun; it's his job to help.Later that day; I asked a different company gate agent what their policy was. I wanted to verify. She said if the LEO asks if there is anyone else armed; she will answer 'yes; but they are not in your category;' but she will not disclose the seat number(s). If he or she (LEO) does not ask; she (gate agent) does not tell.Unless I'm reading my manual wrong; I think we have a policy discrepancy. Please let me know what's correct so I may comply in the future.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported confusion relating to LEO's and FAM's onboard an aircraft and if they should know about each other.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MWO.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E MWO
ATC / advisory: CTAF MWO
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Skydiving was occurring at the field. I heard the jump plane on CTAF occasionally. The pilot who took off ahead of me called the jump plane on CTAF asking for the status of the skydivers and received no answer. I then heard that a group was being released from 14;000 feet. I had to do my run-up and checks; but I never saw them. While doing this; I heard another call for release of skydivers from 14;000 feet. I called and asked if the first group was on the ground and someone (not the jump pilot) answered that the only ones up were the ones that had just released. I thought I had a couple minutes before they would be down; so I looked around; didn't see any; and rolled onto the Runway to takeoff. As I was doing this; I heard the jump plane call. It was a very rushed transmission; so I couldn't make out exactly where he was; but I heard the Runway number and gathered that he was coming in to land. I expedited my takeoff; and as I started rolling I saw a skydiver appear from behind my wing. He seemed to be off to the side of the Runway and traveling parallel to it so I did not abort the takeoff as I wasn't sure where the jump plane was and wanted to get out of the way. Well; shortly after I lifted off; the skydiver turned right in front of me. I made a sharp turn to the right; just clearing the trees and ended up buzzing a neighborhood. I got away from the field; re-established a normal climb to altitude; and took a minute to breathe. During this; I ended up too close to final; looked up; and saw the jump plane filling my windscreen. More evasive action.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an NMAC with a skydiver and jump plane during takeoff and climb from MWO non-towered airport.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: M-20 E Super 21
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D BPT
ATC / advisory: Tower BPT
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a 3.5 hour flight back from Florida; I had to go around four times before I could land. I simply could not slow the plane down. On the third attempt on climb out I noticed a loss of power and had trouble gaining altitude. On final the fourth time I decided to pull the mixture and lo and behold she slowed down. After a squeaky landing; I found that the only way I could get her to the hangar was to use the mixture control as the throttle was ineffective. After pulling the lower cowling; I discovered that the Heim bearing at the end of the throttle cable was disconnected from the control lever on the fuel servo. The fastening bolt was found in the lower cowling. The castellated nut; washer and cotter pin were not located.




Synopsis: M20 pilot experiences three go-arounds due to his inability to get the aircraft to slow to landing speed. On the fourth attempt the mixture is pulled on short final and a normal landing ensues. The throttle cable was found disconnected from the fuel control lever.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Logbook Entry; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We arrived at the aircraft to find the mechanic performing a GPS test and indicating he was extremely busy. He was working on two different aircraft; and had already performed an ETOPS check; changed the AC (Aircraft) O2 bottle; changed a brake and a main gear tire. He was now working a GPS write-up.Once a successful GPS system test was conducted; the logbook was presented to the ship's Captain with an Airworthiness Release sign-off; a signed DI (Deferred Inop) Log with no deferrals; no DI stickers were placed in the AC; and the crew was informed that the AC was ready for flight. An ETOPS sign-off had also been entered in the AC logbook.The mechanic returned to the AC shortly before departure time and stated that he had swapped MMR's (Multi Mode Receivers); that Maintenance Control had advised that this was not an approved procedure; and that he had subsequently swapped them back to their original locations. After doing so; he performed another GPS test (which extended beyond our scheduled time of departure). After a successful test; we were advised that the AC was again ready for departure.Departure was uneventful. About an hour into the flight; we received an ACARS message from Flight Control asking to confirm an added MEL and a change to our ATC flight filing. This was the first time we were informed of the presence of an MEL relating to our flight.The Captain reviewed the aircraft maintenance log and discovered that the mechanic had signed a deferral for the GPS system but had not completed the process by entering it in the DI Log; placing a DI Sticker; notifying the Captain during the Face-to-Face consultation (and; it appears he did not notify Flight Control until after our departure).




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported that a mechanic did not complete the proper maintenance records before they departed.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Operations delayed our Aircraft X without informing Dispatch prior to posting the delay. They ended up putting a 58 minute turn on the flight which is way more than [company policy]. Once again; [company] gate agents do not exercise operational control and should not have access to post delays on our flights. Who is to say that crew was legal to operate the flight given the delay? Who is to say the TAF in ZZZ1 at arrival was legal with the new ETA? Operations has no idea about these issues and thus should not have a say in when a flight departs. [Company] must change this policy. It goes against the very fabric of Dispatch the FAR's created.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported being out of the loop when departure station operations delayed an aircraft.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Main Frame
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During accomplishment of Engineering Order (E/O) EM-53AD-2231; Part-D; Section-B-1) it was discovered that the bolts (4 each) that I installed were mistaken for the new bolts that should have been installed.  During a previous step in the accomplishment instructions; Part D; Section A-2); it is outlined to remove bolt Part Number (P/N) NAS6405A18. At some point; new bolts with the same part number were requested and signed out from the Parts Department and stored near a certification containing Part Number MS14181-05020L. On the Engineering Order (E/O); the step to install the lower Eyelet Fitting is on the next page at the top of the E/O and says to install the Fitting using bolts Part Number MS1418105018L or MS1418105020L.A review of all previous steps was done to verify that all previous steps were complied with and signed-off before moving on to the installation of the bolts. When I installed the bolts; I retrieved the bolts from where they were stored; verified the Part Number (P/N) that was on the certification matched the E/O paperwork; however I was unaware that the bolts that were issued did not match the certification.  [Recommend that] if the steps on the Engineering Order to remove a bolt and install a new bolt were integrated into one step; this would greatly reduce the chances of inadvertently installing the wrong bolt. An example would be: Remove bolt Part Number NAS6405A18 and discard and install bolt Part Number MS14181-05020L. Another suggestion would be to ensure when hardware is issued; it should be issued in the bag containing the correct certification at all times until the moment of use; to eliminate mismatching hardware with [different] certifications. Inquiry by FAA into accomplishment of an Engineering Order. Possible incorrect hardware used. Flight delay. Manager Line Maintenance.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Manager was informed he had installed four incorrect replacement bolts at the lower Eyelet Fitting for the cockpit windshield center-post to the forward fuselage on an EMB-145 aircraft. He had verified the Part Number (P/N) on a certification sheet had matched the Engineering Order (E/O); but was unaware that the bolts that were issued did not match the certification.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Center had cleared us to descend from FL310 to FL240; as we started to go down both autopilot and autothrottle disengaged; at that time the altitude alert went off; because the MCP showed 50;000 FT; I tried to regain the MCP back but all functions were frozen: Heading; speed; [and] course. I looked for a warning light to give me an indication of what the problem was; but there were no warnings; the FMC's had a disagree indication between them; also the map mode was degraded showing some movement then it would freeze; then the FMC gave us another disagreement indication. We informed ATC that we had lost all automation and could we go down to 10;000 FT; at this point I declared an emergency even though we were VMC; but I needed another set of eyes to help guide us while we worked on the problem.Both flight directors went off and we were unable to regain them back; as we continued to descend because the altitude window had 50;000 FT in it we kept getting altitude alerts (very annoying). ATC asked for SOB and fuel; and that they were setting us up for the ILS approach with the trucks standing by; we continued to work on the problem not knowing which side had failed. I tried to switch both on 1 or both on 2; for the control panel; FMC; IRS; etc. with no luck. The First Officer was manually flying the aircraft following ATC's instructions. I had set up both navaids for the approach; I was unable to get an Ident on the frequency however when I reached the gate and set the parking brake; the Ident came on.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported losing FMS capability. He declared an emergency and a safe landing ensued.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the loading; Supervisors Inspection of [a] ULD container; she found that box containing DG had a strap over the top but was not secured good enough so that it wouldn't move. The strap was loose. We called the Warehouse Manager and she sent agent out to ramp to fix.




Synopsis: Loading Supervisor reported Dangerous Goods incorrectly configured for air transport.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Other Maneuver
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon completing my clearing turns southwest of the ZZZ airport; I noticed no traffic factors and began to commence steep turns at 55 degrees of bank.  My final steep turned ended at a heading of 180. As I began to roll out of my steep turn on a heading of 180; I immediately noticed a dark blue single engine turbocharged aircraft between 500 and 750 [feet] in front of me at the same altitude flying rapidly in a perpendicular fashion from west to east. I immediately pulled the power to idle; turned promptly westward and descended.




Synopsis: C-172 student pilot reported an airborne conflict while accomplishing training maneuvers.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was Pilot Flying on flight to ZZZ. The flight went normally. After I called landing gear down; a few moments later we got anti-skid inop on final approach. We elected to continue the approach to landing on Runway XX in ZZZ which was 10;000 feet long and dry. We had a normal landing and didn't use the brakes until between 80 and 90 knots. Then we got a PSEU [Proximity Electronics Unit] light as we cleared the runway. We taxied to the gate normally and shut the engines down; then the PSEU light extinguished.Next; the First Officer notified us of damage to the left main landing gear door assembly as well as a landing gear door panel was missing from the aircraft. During our flight; there was never any indication at all. During takeoff; cruise; descent; or approach and landing; there was [not] any issue or concern with the left main landing gear.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported finding the left main gear door and door assembly missing while conducting the post flight check.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MRI.Airport, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: E-3 Sentry (AWACS)
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Tactical
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D MRI
ATC / advisory: Tower MRI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I had just been relieved of Controller in Charge (CIC) by the Front Line Manager (FLM) when the LC1 stated turned to the FLM to advise him that Anchorage Approach (A11) called with a 'red light' as an E3 flew over Point McKenzie (the northwest boundary of MRI airspace). The LC1 told A11 that we had been 'red light' for the past 2 hours. It is like an afterthought on A11's part. I just do not know if it is a lack of training; a lack of controller proficiency; complacency or disregard for safety. It may be a combination of all those factors.This same situation happened the day before. However; I will be submitting safety problem report on that once I review the recordings.This has become a dangerous trend where A11 controllers leave us with a 'red light' for hours on end. A11 does not understand that our single engine aircraft rely on a deviation across the water (Knik Arm / FAR Part 93). Sometimes a couple extra hundred feet can mean the difference between life or death. Alaska's cold waters are not forgiving even if rescue and recovery are immediate. A11 and MRI need to revisit the LOA which addresses 'red / green light.' Both parties need to check their pride at the door. The complaint needs to be viewed from our single engine user's point of view. Their safety depends on it.




Synopsis: MRI Tower Controller reported the Approach Control was not complying with an automated point out procedure causing unnecessary delay and flight time over water for aircraft.