elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on the ZPLYN 3 RNAV Arrival for Runway 17R; but then DEN Approach changed the runway to 16L and maintain 280 KTS or faster. We proceeded to change our runway in the FMC. The box was little slow for some reason [and] that left us little high at JPAGE Intersection. JPAGE crossing was between 17;000 feet - 15;000 feet and we were at 17;900 feet. We did inform the Controller about it and she said it was ok.




Synopsis: B737 NG Captain reported failure to make a crossing restriction on the ZPYLN3 RNAV arrival into DEN following a late runway change.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PVD.TRACON, RI
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The RADAR Controller observed numerous false targets throughout the airspace. These false targets contained beacon codes and altitude read outs. It was determined soon after that switching from FSL to ESL the false targets were eliminated. PVD initiated an ATC Alert due to automation trigger and continued to work in STARS ESL mode. Tech Ops disabled the feeds from adjacent RADAR sites (BDL and QVH) and the false target issue was resolved. PVD canceled the ATC Alert and normal FSL operations continued. After discussion with the Tech Ops personnel; it was apparent that while BDL and QVH RADAR maintenance was being conducted; it affected PVD RADAR processing. Luckily; the traffic at this time was considerably light and not complex. If it had been at a busier time and/or during the summer busy traffic months a much larger issue could have taken place. With more traffic; it would have been extremely difficult to determine what targets were actually there and which targets were false. Working in ESL also caused a considerably higher workload and co-ordination; as every aircraft needed to be manually handed off through our every sector and to adjacent facilities. Ensure that when maintenance is being conducted; it will not affect (or at least minimally affect) 'live' traffic.




Synopsis: PVD Controller observed numerous false targets when maintenance was being conducted on one of the RADAR sites. The reporter indicating ATC must be assured prior to any release that maintenance activities will not interfere with RADAR returns.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 140 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing Rollout
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We touched down on Runway after an uneventful approach. As soon as I applied brakes and deployed the thrust reversers; the aircraft exhibited a strong pull to the left. I was able to maintain centerline using about 3/4 of full right rudder deflection and maximum right braking. Braking performance was noticeably degraded; but not to a degree where I feared an overrun. I exited the runway on a high-speed taxiway and the aircraft appeared to handle fine at that point; so I slowly taxied to the gate and we deplaned. On the MFD (Multi Function Display) Hydraulics page; I noticed that the RH IB (Right Hand Inboard) brake temperature was completely cold; the RH OB (Right Hand Outboard) brake was warmer than normal for after landing; and both LH (Left hand) brake temps were normal. This indicated to me that the RH IB (Right Hand Inboard) brake had not done anything during my landing; which explained the hard left pull I felt when braking. This was my crew's last flight before heading to an overnight; so I told the gate agent to hold boarding; I called maintenance; and I explained the situation to the inbound crew.Sudden large yawing moment upon touch down. It felt similar to the engine failure before V1 drills in the sim; so in the heat of the moment I suspected some sort of thrust reverser issue rather than a failed brake. The brake temperature indication is how I later 'detected' that it was a brake issue. A few hours later I spoke with the Captain who swapped into the plane; he told me that maintenance had found that the RH IB brake had a 'loose' brake line. I found that I was able to maintain centerline and decelerate at a reasonable so); so I simply maintained the required inputs. Given the potential severity of an unexpected brake failure; I would suggest a more thorough review of brake hardware after work is performed on it.




Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported experiencing brake failure during landing rollout.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On takeoff roll; Runway XX; with gusty left crosswinds; the aircraft suddenly and without warning; 'skidded' left. Corrected the ground track and continued the takeoff without further incident.  FAs (Flight Attendants) reported being aggressively shoved sideways in their seats.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported the aircraft suddenly skidded to the left during takeoff roll due to gusty crosswinds requiring corrective input.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our originating aircraft was towed from remote parking to the gate. I observed no pitot covers on the aircraft; but the probe heat switch streamers were attached to probe heat switches on the overhead panel. This led me to consider that the pitot tube covers had possibly been removed prior to the aircraft being towed from remote parking; which would require further inquiry. About ten minutes prior to push; Ground Ops personnel tapped on the side of aircraft to notify us that the pitot tube covers were removed. I inquired if they were removed prior to towing the aircraft from remote parking. I was advised that no pitot tube covers had been installed overnight due to a shortage of pitot tube covers in ZZZ. I called Dispatch/Maintenance to discuss this in reference to [document]. Chief Pilot was also advised. We decided to have contract maintenance inspect the pitot tubes to ensure no wasps had built any nests overnight. We pushed 29 minutes late due to the lack of probe covers in ZZZ to enable compliance with [document].From a Safety perspective; if wasps are still a concern in ZZZ; why were pitot heat covers not installed in accordance with [document]? If we had not made careful inquiry; we would have never known that pitot tube covers had not been installed and the first indication of wasp nests would have been with an IAS DISAGREE alert on takeoff; which would have required either a reject over 80 knots (possibility of aircraft being unsafe to fly) or flight with Airspeed Unreliable with an overweight landing or burning off approximately 25;000 lbs. of fuel to allow for landing within landing weight. It seemed to me that Ground Personnel in ZZZ were not clear on the requirements of the [document]; not only because the pitot tube covers were not installed; but also because the Ops Agent seemed to be confused on whether or not the probe heat switch streamers were to stay on the aircraft or with Station Personnel.




Synopsis: Captain noticed that pitot/static covers were not installed per policy documents and requested maintenance perform a visual inspection of the pitot tubes and static ports for wasps.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TWF.Airport, ID
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TWF
ATC / advisory: Tower TWF
Second aircraft: AG-CAT Turbo
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were engaged in primary flight instruction and doing touch and goes on Runway 25 at TWF. Runway 25 is the primary runway at TWF and was the runway in use. A turbo Ag Cat was returning from aerial application northwest of TWF. Wind was reported at 300 degrees at 5 KTS. The Ag Cat told the Tower he would make a right downwind for Runway 30. (Runway 30 is a secondary 'crosswind' runway and is used primarily by Ag aircraft.) (My remembrance is that the Tower approved that approach for the Ag Cat; but did not suggest it.) We were climbing from Runway 25 when I noticed the Ag Cat crossing our departure path at about 400 FT AGL. We passed below and behind the Ag Cat. I did not believe that we were in danger of colliding at any time; but I'm sure that our separation was far less than required in the traffic pattern. After we were well past the Ag Cat the Local Controller told us that the other pilot had us in sight. (I do not remember the pilot saying that on Tower frequency.) I felt that this was simply an attempt to justify the situation. I told the Tower that we had the other aircraft in sight also. I do not believe that the Local Controller should have allowed the Ag Cat to overfly the runway in use. The Ag Cat was not at the usual pattern altitude (5;000 FT MSL) but at an estimated 4;450 FT MSL. I believe that the Local Controller should have either cleared the Ag Cat for a downwind approach to Runway 25; or instructed him to do a 360 degree turn for spacing. Had we been in a higher performance aircraft with a higher rate of climb the situation could have been critical.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor pilot departing Runway 25 at TWF reports a NMAC with an Ag Cat on a visual downwind for Runway 30. Both aircraft were under Tower control and no evasive action was necessary.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at 6500 MSL the CO2 alarm went on for approximately 3 seconds. As I looked up the checklist; the alarm came on again a few minutes later for a few seconds. I turned air on (air was off) and opened the vents. CO2 alarm went away. I landed as a precaution.




Synopsis: SR22T pilot reported the CO2 alarm activated during cruise and he landed as a precaution.
Date: 201710
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp DEN
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushed off our gate and received clearance to taxi west; ahead of a line of regional jets. We were told by ramp tower to be aware of a B737 that was angling to southwest towards [a] taxiway heading west. We were NOT told anything about the company 737 that was crossing immediately behind us! I powered up and spun the aircraft around and was stunned to see our [company] aircraft so close! I got on the brakes killing the built up momentum; requiring a higher power setting; pointed in the direction of our push crew; the very event I had tried to mitigate. The B737 [we were advised of] was 1;000 feet away; definitely NO FACTOR! Our [company] B737 was inside of 100 feet away and no mention!? The ramp tower in Denver is going to get someone hurt. Not my first [safety report regarding] the procedures there.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported a ground conflict with a company B737 on the ramp at DEN.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Aircraft X descending via the LDORA STAR for 34R and Aircraft Y descending via the BOSSS STAR. Aircraft X did not execute the STAR correctly and went through the localizer and was pointed right at Aircraft Y. I turned both aircraft and Aircraft X advised he was in TCAS RA and was climbing. Both aircraft were given the ILS 34R. If replayed [another B737] who was two planes ahead of Aircraft X did the exact same thing. At the time I was watching Aircraft X the whole way in since the sequence was going to be tight. There was no possible way I could have reacted any quicker. We have an RNAV 'descend via' structure that connects to ILS transitions. We also use RNP AR approaches from the downwind. We need RNAV transitions from the RNAV STARs to RNAV approaches for the short side stars. If the structure was RNP AR descent rate would be more efficient and more accurate than an ILS transition that is probably being hand flown. Aircraft routinely come off the ILS transitions and we watch the crew try to figure out how; or tell them how to resume it. This causes us extra workload and makes it more difficult to run the sequence. We very rarely see blunders off an RNP AR if the crew was expecting the procedure. Making an RNAV structure that works like the RNP approaches from the downwinds would mitigate or solve this issue.




Synopsis: D01 Approach Controller reported a track deviation occurred on the LDORA STAR arrival into DEN. Reporter stated this is not unusual and stressed the need for RNAV transitions from RNAV STARs to RNAV approaches to minimize these occurrences.
Date: 201412
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Tower cleared [us] into position on runway. Aircraft behind us reported smoke and contained flames in the area of APU. We requested fire equipment investigate. There were no indications of fire in the cockpit or cabin. Fire department confirmed fire. Extinguished the fire and we taxied back to the gate and deplaned passengers.


Second narrative: There were no indications in the cockpit. The APU had been shut down for approximately 10 minutes; and read 7 ITT and 0 RPM.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew holding in position on runway reported they were advised by an aircraft behind them their APU was on fire; although there were no confirming cockpit indications. ARFF was called to the scene.
Date: 202105
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After parking at gate; flight crew were informed of damage to left horizontal stabilizer.  It appeared to have been struck by a tall ground vehicle.   I considered the aircraft inoperable after reviewing the damage.  The FO noted no damage during his external inspection; and felt that he would have easily noted the damage had it appeared during that time.  We concluded the damage was likely caused by a catering truck at ZZZ; after the walk around was already complete.  The crew was not informed of the damage and continued the flight to ZZZ1.  We had no idea.A failure on the part of service crew in ZZZ to notify the flight of damage when it occurred.  This resulted in the flight continuing when not air worthy.  The flight and landing went without incident; until ZZZ1 reported the damage to the flight crew after arriving at the gate.It is impractical for the flight crew to perform an external inspection after all external service equipment is removed and the cabin door is closed.  The last opportunity to look over the aircraft is the push back crew.  Perhaps wing walkers could walk all the way back to the tail on their respective sides and examine the airplane for anything unusual.  This information could then be forwarded to the tug driver; who would in turn forward to the flight crew.  Something like 'external equipment clear; inspection complete; no damage noted.'




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported they flew an unairworthy aircraft after it had been struck by a catering vehicle on the horizontal stabilizer pre-flight.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On descent; received ACARS message from Dispatch stating VIP movement at airport and there may be a 10-minute delay. After checking weather; no delays were noted; weather was clear. After contacting Approach was advised to hold at KADDY Intersection; expect 25 minute in holding. I sent ACARS message to Dispatch notifying of hold. We had 35 minutes of hold fuel in release. I also notified Dispatch that I would burn down to arrive [with] 4;000 LBS fuel and if not released to [destination] by then would declare minimum fuel.After reaching our EFC; asked Approach how much longer. They stated at least 25 minutes. My First Officer and I discussed this and decided to declare minimum fuel. Approach stated 'sorry we can't help you'; and that we should proceed to our alternate. I again sent a message to Dispatch asked about alternate airports. Dispatch stated that [a nearby airport] was approved for 757/767 only and that we may have to declare an emergency to get to [destination]. After several minutes my First Officer and I decided to declare emergency and proceed to [destination]. We notified Approach; [and] were given direct airport. Landed [and] taxied to gate. No further problems. VIP movement was supposed to be completed by an hour before; but this did not occur. Dispatch had hold fuel for delay; however additional holding was not expected. Approach did not honor minimum fuel request for priority handling. This forced us to declare an emergency.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported minimum fuel to Approach while holding for VIP movement on destination airport. When that did not produce the desired result; he declared an emergency and landed at destination.