elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GEG.Airport, WA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class C GEG
ATC / advisory: Tower GEG
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Upon departing ZZZ we pulled weather for GEG; it was 1000 rvr fzfg. We set up for the CAT III into Runway 21; at the top of descent we got the ATIS and the weather had improved WE NOW HAD 6000+ rvr and ovc 100. We decided to shoot the CAT III anyway for practice; we turned final at 10 miles out and had the runway insight. We continued down the approach with no anomalies; about 500 ft. we looked a little left of course but continued at around 200 ft. the FO (First Officer) announced that we were a little left. I disconnected the auto pilot shifted the aircraft back to the right and landed without incident. I feel we were about 100 ft. left of center line and would have hit the left edge runway lights had we not taken control of the aircraft. I hate to think what would have happened if we were in actual CAT III conditions as we probably would not have had time to correct the problem.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported during a CAT III approach in VMC the aircraft began tracking to the left of the course; requiring the Pilot Flying to disconnect the auto pilot and continue the approach to landing.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Fatigue; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was at ZZZ to change the Emergency/Parking Brake cable. I was on the crew that finished installing and adjusted the cable; working the adjustment of the cable. I had safe tied the two lower jam nuts below the bracket on the handle end of the cable to each other; then over the bracket to the jam nut on top of the bracket. I used the safety cable kit for this task. The brake cable being installed does not have the locking support tab to facilitate easier safety of jam nuts. On my way to work the next day as I was driving. It occurred to me that that safety cable would cut through the bracket over time due to movement of the cable as the handle is actuated. When I arrived at work I notified the supervisor of my mistake and the plane was removed from service. The manual is not very clear about how to safety this this jam nut for this location. I was using Emb-170 AMM task 32-XX-XX for my reference. [The figure] shows the technique for a nut and jam nut at location X which is not where I was working. I corrected the safety procedure of my location to illustration X and returned the aircraft to service. The task 20-XX-XX Typical safetying methods; does not cover this situation with the jam nut. It was getting close to the end of my 12hr shift and I should have thought this thru more carefully. I also think that the Embraer manuals should be more explicit when it comes to different types of safetying situations.




Synopsis: Technician reported not following procedures to replace a cable due to fatigue and confusion.
Date: 202004
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: It has been nearly a month without any Initial Operating Experience flights.  I understand there is no requirement which defines the amount of time between completion of simulator training/operating experience; check-ride and starting (or completing OE). However; I am very concerned about my diminishing level of proficiency starting IOE.Over the course of the last month (due to the COVID-19 crisis) the flight schedule has become so restrictive that the OE schedulers have been unable to execute many plans they have constructed for my flights and those of my classmates.  I suspect the significant delays also extend to other classes waiting to complete IOE; as well as transitioning pilots needing to complete OE.  LCA (Line Check Airman) availability has likely been further affected by other factors. Beyond completion of OE; I expect the schedule restrictions will delay consolidation as well. Although an FAA extension to the consolidation timeline will put an administrative fix on that particular issue; it does nothing to assist with the retention of skills and knowledge.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer expressed concern about the erosion of skills and knowledge while awaiting OE and consolidation flights. A restrictive flight schedule due to the COVID-19 pandemic was cited as contributing.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OMDB.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower OMDB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were being vectored [for arrival] by ATC in the Dubai airspace. Lots of planes on the TCAS NAV display so we just let ATC vector us around; OPS normal. We got vectored to intercept Runway 30 ILS final. The First Officer asked 30L or 30R. The Controller said Runway 30. We were told to descend to 2;000 cleared for the ILS. The airport was behind us some 20 miles or so. The First Officer and I both looked at each other and said something's screwed up. I got on the radio and asked if we were going to get another vector because the final course was behind us. The Controller must have thought we were all screwed up on situational awareness. He asked us where we are going. I said Dubai; OMDB in phonetics. He said that he has us filed for Dubai; OMDW. We quickly looked at the paper Flight Plan and it said OMDB. Both airports have a runway that lands course 300 degrees; but OMDB has a 30L and 30R. I said just take us to Dubai; OMDB because that's where I was used to going. Ends up; the other field [has] a cargo ramp too; although I haven't been there. Bottom line is that someone entered OMDW into the ATC system; and we almost got sucked into the wrong field by ATC just doing what they thought was our destination.Somehow the wrong airport; OMDW got entered into the ATC system; but it is still in the Dubai area.




Synopsis: OMDB ATC attempted to vector an aircraft to OMDW vice nearby OMDB because somewhere the incorrect destination was entered in the ATC system although the flight plan was correct.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CVG.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CVG; Ramp CVG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While taxiing at CVG; we were initially told to a gate on the south side of Terminal A. When we arrived at the gate; Operations told us to taxi around the terminal to park on the north side of Terminal A. I taxied to the east to go around the northeast side of the terminal. Once we arrived on the northeast side of the terminal; I departed the taxi line to the north because 2 fuel trucks were too close to the taxi line and I didn't think I had clearance around them. I then noticed that ahead of the aircraft (taxiing westbound along the northern portion of the north ramp); part of the ramp is unpaved. It is a large dirt/mud area. Although there was room to turn toward the gate; this area is not delineated by any taxi edge or hazardous area markings.I strongly suggest that this area be delineated at least by the cones with the flashing red lights. This would be extremely helpful at night to recognize and avoid this area.

Callback: The Reporter stated that he has rarely taxied on Ramp Taxilane 1 north of Terminal A and so was very surprised to see the unmarked and unprepared surface. The Reporter suggested some sort of marking to indicate in advance of approaching that area that it is not a ramp or area acceptable for taxiing. The airport diagram also does not clearly indicate an unprepared surface.



Synopsis: A pilot taxiing westbound on the Ramp 1 taxiway north of Terminal A at night; taxied north off the taxiway centerline to avoid fuel trucks and discovered a large unpaved; unlit; and unmarked area; but was able to avoid taxiing on it.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: There are new deicing procedures at Boston where [aircraft] push back partially from the gate and then deice at the gate. This new procedure is not workable at Boston. This created such a huge backlog of aircraft waiting for gates that the entire Boston airport became clogged up with aircraft holding in the air. This flight noticed ATC making errors because of the ramifications.Deicing at the gate requires that gate space; tugs; and personnel are tied up during the entire process; creating delays for gates and ripple effects throughout the entire airport.Return to the previous procedure of deicing away from the gate -- at the 'JULIET' pad like before worked well.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported noticing problems arising from the new de-ice procedure at BOS.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was CFI during a BFR. Student; who is a private pilot; was the pilot flying (PF). Winds (5 miles away) were reported as 310@17G27. PF stated he was going to use flaps 20 and higher speed than normal for the approach and landing. The aircraft cleared the trees at the end of the runway; then the PF chopped the power and pitched the aircraft over towards the runway. Airspeed increased and when he flared the aircraft started floating down the runway. He finally touched down a little past 1/2 way down the runway with brakes applied. The aircraft was skidding. A few moments later a gust of wind lifted the right wing thus reducing braking. I looked ahead to consider a balked landing and saw power lines and a tree which I believed we would hit should a go-around be initiated. We finally went off the end of the runway; through a ditch; and came to stop on a road at the end of the runway. There was damage to the aircraft's nosewheel; prop; and left wing tip. Occupants were both unhurt.




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported the pilot flying the aircraft landed long and fast resulting in a excursion from the runway end and damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I flew a B737-700 aircraft. The following day; this aircraft would not give a proper test of the Oxygen System. It was reported by a Contract Mechanic that the valve on the oxygen bottle was not open. The bottle had last been replaced three days earlier. We did not notice any abnormal oxygen pressure readings during the preflight checks on the five legs that we flew the aircraft that day. I have preflighted an aircraft [before] with a 'Closed' oxygen valve. The pressure will read zero during the test and remain there. The facts of this event suggest to me that the valve on the oxygen bottle may have been only partially opened after installation. The inspecting Mechanic would have known this only if he attempted to close the valve as his first course of action during troubleshooting. [Recommend that] after installation of a new oxygen bottle; verification of normal pressure on the flight deck pressure gauge should be accomplished. The gauge will read zero until the bottle is opened. This may be [the] maintenance procedure currently. There is no procedure which; from the flight deck; which would necessarily reveal a partially opened oxygen valve.


Second narrative: O2 System checked normal.


Synopsis: Two pilots report about the Crew Oxygen System on their B737-700 aircraft that would not give a proper test after they had flown the aircraft for five legs. Contract Maintenance had reported the oxygen bottle valve handle was not open.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Clearance LADYJ4 departure maintain 5;000 feet. On departure; ATC gave clearance to climb via the SID. I put in 8;000 feet. upon turning to MLIBU ATC said if we were aware of the restriction at MLIBU. We passed it at about 6;500 feet. We both had the VSD (Vertical Situation Display) up but do to the limitations did not see the restriction or an unable to make on the FMC. VNAV was on when we took off and the altitude change was well before altitude of 5;000 feet maybe 2;000 feet. Pay better attention to the aircraft and when it is not doing what it is supposed to do turn off the automation. Make sure every change to the aircraft you confirm with the other pilot. Which is what we both thought we did. Continue monitoring to make sure it is still doing what it was programmed.


Second narrative: [Narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight crew reported automation did not capture appropriate altitudes and rate of climb during departure.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While shipping engine; the engine shifted and fell causing engine damage. Engine preparation for shipment is too general and vague in that it is not engine specific. There are not any pictures provided to specify which cradle mounts and locking pins need to be checked; installed and safetied. Also step 3 final installation check for security; safety and general condition is not thoroughly explained by not providing enough information as to all requiring to be checked. I suggest that form provide specific engine and cradle pictures labeled as to the positioning of all required hardware. Also specify in separate steps the check required for each of the categories referring to the check for security; safety and general condition. Further explanation is needed to fully understand step c and e.


Second narrative: Engine change card requiring lowering the engine from the mounts to the cradle and engaging forward cradle arms and support arm on turbine rear frame requires 4 separate individuals performing this task while this step only allows for 1 individual to properly sign off the step. The engine arrived to ZZZ in the engine cradle shifted having moved within the cradle causing damage to the engine I suggest that card separate each critical item of the left forward cradle arm; right forward cradle arm and support arm that connects to the turbine rear frame. this way each individual can sign off each task separately.


Synopsis: Technicians reported aircraft engine found damaged during shipping.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RNT.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E S46
ATC / advisory: Tower RNT
Second aircraft: Robinson R44
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This was a typical VFR approach to my home airport. I was in contact with the tower who called two aircraft targets for me. Both were within class delta; one for Renton and the other for Boeing field. I thought I saw the first and confirmed. Then I saw the second one and reported that I had identified it as the first one. There was no follow up on the target that was heading directly at me until I reported that a yellow helicopter had just passed immediately below me as I was over the east channel bridge. The tower confirmed that was the traffic they had called to me. It was seen by my passenger and had just emerged from the Boeing [Field] class delta at approximately my 2 o'clock. This bridge is just outside the junction of Boeing and Renton class delta's. I don't fault the tower controller as I had initially confirmed that I had that airplane in sight; however; in my 15 years of flying into that airport; I have never come that close to another aircraft. The helicopter coming out of Boeings airspace was not in contact with Renton or with me and I think that is a problem with the vfr pathways in that area. The mercer island vfr departure from Boeing field often takes aircraft very close to the vfr approach to a south landing at Renton. The crossing point is the east channel bridge (I-90 east of Mercer Island).




Synopsis: C182 pilot experienced a NMAC during a VFR arrival to RNT over the East Channel Bridge. The R44 traffic was departing BFI and was pointed out by RNT Tower; but not detected visually until it was too late to take evasive action.