elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B N90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We had a TCAS RA as were about to level off at our assigned altitude of 5;000 feet during our departure out of JFK. ATC told us that there was GA traffic at 5;500 feet. I asked the pilot monitoring to keep an eye on the traffic as I did not have it in sight. As we started to level off; we had a TA which turned into a RA. Turned off the autopilot and complied with the RA and followed the vertical guidance which was to stay level at 5;000 feet. Pilot Monitoring told ATC that we received a TA and then a RA. We got the alert most likely because of our rate of climb right before level off.


Second narrative: While on climb out of JFK we leveled off at five thousand feet per the SID. ATC then issued us a heading of 100. We complied; and while on that heading ATC issued us a traffic advisory of a single engine GA aircraft at or 1-2 o'clock at 5500 MSL. I was pilot monitoring in the right seat and spotted the traffic. Pilot flying didn't have sight of the traffic; and requested I maintain visual on the traffic. I kept visual on the traffic and stated that we might end up with a TA or an RA as a result of only 500 feet of separation. I said that I would take control if we get an RA because I had visual contact with the traffic and because PF (Pilot Flying) was in the left seat; and the pole between the windshields was blocking the view of the traffic from that seat. A short time later we received a TA and I notified ATC; to which they questioned if it was a TA; or an RA.  At that moment; it became an RA. I told PF; 'My Aircraft'; disconnected the autopilot; started a descent and told ATC 'We have an RA; I'm descending'. The traffic looked very close and passed right over the top of our flight path. I descended to roughly 4700 MSL until the TCAS system stated 'clear of conflict'. We then continued back to our assigned altitude of 5000 feet and continued the flight without incident. ATC gave us an intersecting heading with VFR traffic with only 500 feet of separation. This separation will trigger an RA every time.


Synopsis: Crew reported receiving an RA upon reaching assigned altitude and heading.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Second aircraft: A380
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: While flying an oceanic random route at FL380; we were overhead our first lat/long fix after our coast out fix. At this time; we were not using the standard lateral offset procedure (SLOP) due to our route being a 'random track'. Approaching ZZZZZ intersection and on an approximate heading of 311 degrees; we saw an Airbus A380 approaching us from the opposite direction and 1000 feet above us. This aircraft flew directly overhead us. Due to the recent Bombardier Challenger upset during a similar situation; we chose to deviate to the left because of the winds aloft which were coming from approximately 290 degrees.  My Co-Captain and I felt that if we offset to the right; as is the procedure; we would be subject to the wake turbulence being carried by the winds into our flight path. We chose to offset to the left which was upwind of the anticipated wake turbulence and did not encounter any. ATC then queried us via HF radio and told us that he showed us almost 5 miles to the left of our course. The Co-Captain replied and explained our situation then advised that we were back on course and that we would fly the SLOP for the remainder of the crossing. What I feel caused this problem was the reduced separation minimums not taking into account various types of aircraft and the potential wake turbulence. Even if we did fly the SLOP (1 to 2 miles right of course); I feel the winds aloft still had the potential to direct the wake turbulence towards us. I feel that more consideration should be given to opposite routings given to various aircraft types since the new RVSM rules took effect.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: G450 flight crew reported they offset to the left on an oceanic route due to an A380 1000 feet above them to avoid potential wake turbulence.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We got the aircraft down safely with no damage to people or property; [and] afterward; we all talked about what we could have done better. -The Captain didn't say a brace signal for instance. For the flight crew; time to communicate is at a premium and with the workloads and distractions; some things were missed such as typing out a letter to dispatch via ACARS.-The cabin crew has a very long list to read in small print on a folded cardboard paper; [which] in my opinion; should be made shorter and simpler. One stated that it was hard to read the print when the adrenaline was pumping. -I would like to see flight and cabin crew emergency training accomplished together someday here; to focus on building crew coordination when an actual emergency arises.

Callback: Reporter stated that during descent; they experienced uncontrolled rolling movement to the left.  The crew turned off the auto-pilot; left wing spoiler Number 2 was up and in amber; was deployed and not stowed.  Right panels 2-5 were up and yellow. The crew successfully landed. Aircraft was down for a couple days and reporter stated that reporter flew the aircraft later and read maintenance report; stating aircraft computer was finally replaced after many various test to the aircraft.

Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported a flight control malfunction and un-commanded flight spoilers.
Date: 201811
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I have written to you in the past in regard to Company placing broken service carts on board the aircraft. These service carts have no brakes and are a safety hazard as well as being dangerous to cabin crew and passengers. I have recently submitted three reports to the company about 4 broken carts with no resolve. In these reports; I have provided the company with pictures and serial numbers of the carts involved. In one incident; while serving; two passengers had to assist me with controlling a run-away cart. My most [recent] report involved 2 carts without brakes; 1 cart without brake pedals on one side of the cart. I wrote a report about this cart on [before]. I tagged this cart as broken without brake pedals; yet in just a little under 1 month; the cart shows up on the aircraft without brake pedals. The continuance of negligence in regard to placing carts without brakes on the aircraft is a safety hazard to fight attendants and passengers as flight attendants cannot control run-away carts; it is extremely difficult to maintain control of a cart without brakes at 35;000 feet. The blatant disregard of Company in placing carts without brakes on the aircraft is horrific; there are carts without brakes placed on airplanes every day. When is it going to stop? I am writing to you as a last resort for all else has failed; broken carts are so prevalent that flight attendants have just given up. We place the red stickers on the carts in hopes that they will be fixed but the same carts show up time after time without being fixed. I am earnestly asking you to look into this matter. Thank you for reviewing my report.Catering should check the carts for working brakes before placing them on the aircraft.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Flight Attendant has written this report plus several others over service carts being placed on aircraft without operating brakes.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During departure; gear up; flaps up; engine (80 HP Rotax) lost power; checked fuel shutoff valve and fuel gauge which were normal; cycled gear to down position; gear did not reach full extension before aircraft settled back to runway; aircraft slid on fiberglass boat hull and protective keel guard a very short distance to a stop on departure end of runway. Raised airplane; extended and locked gear down; taxied aircraft to hangar. Minimal damage and no injuries.

Callback: Reporter stated power loss was traced to a small hole in the fuel line that allowed air to be drawn in; causing loss of power at takeoff power setting.



Synopsis: Pilot of a light sport amphibian experienced (Rotax) engine failure at low altitude during practice go-around. He landed straight ahead with partial gear extension.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had a basic 757 (unable RNAV SID; STARs; and approaches). Flight Plan filed non RNAV SID. CPDLC said revised segment SID X. Accepted it and called clearance on taxi out and said NO RNAV. He said OK and gave us SID Y. Tower said Line up and wait and I asked FO to confirm SID Y with Tower. She said no; SID X. I said no; can't do it. Taxied off Runway and got SID Y and took off. I do not remember if we were ever cleared for takeoff and it is now considered an aborted takeoff.For months; basic 757s have not been allowed to do RNAV. We file correctly; they change it. We then told them we can't do it; they change it back. Tower then tells us to fly something we told them TWICE we cannot do. How many times am I expected to change other people's mistakes? This event occurs because computers do what humans used to do. Dispatch files a non RNAV SID and some ATC computer says no one else is doing that; you're not going to either. Why have a navaid strip on the flight plan if no one looks at it? On the way to ZZZ1 we were filed the non RNAV STAR. Twice; we were told to intercept the RNAV STAR. Again; why have a flight plan if no one is going to keep us on it? I suggest a note; email; or heads up from Dispatch to ATC to not change routing of these aircraft when they file a flight plan.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported that ATC assigns RNAV routes to basic B757s that are not allowed to do RNAV.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft gate return after vertical stabilizer pitot static cover was spotted from another aircraft at airport. A walk around check was accomplished [early in the morning] during heavy fog and limited visibility condition after the aircraft was wet washed during the early morning hours pitot cover flag was facing out the grey dark color side that made it harder to spot installation on aircraft.




Synopsis: Line Technician reported a B737 returned to the gate due to a pitot static cover not being removed prior to departure.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Powered up for takeoff roll and as the thrust levers hit the detent; received the EICAS message: BLD VLV 1 FAIL. As this was prior to 80 KTS (don't think airspeed even registered yet) I decided to abort. We alerted Tower who gave us taxi instructions. As there was no problem taxiing the airplane; I accepted the instructions and notified Maintenance. [I] was advised to call Maintenance Control at headquarters which I did and was talked through a runup that failed to yield the desired results. I was instructed by Maintenance Control to return to the gate. We called Station Maintenance then called Operations and notified them. Received a gate and returned. Operations didn't want to deplane until Maintenance checked things out. Maintenance said it was a cracked high stage valve. It was replaced and we left this time uneventfully. The piece just happened to break at that time. I don't believe anyone was at fault here; sometimes mechanical things just break and I'm just glad it was a low speed event.




Synopsis: An ERJ145 Captain performed a slow speed reject because the EICAS alerted BLD VLV 1 FAIL and at the gate the cracked high stage bleed valve was replaced.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SRQ.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON TPA
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken

Narrative: While descending through 10;000 ft. an object was spotted directly in front of us and no more than 200 ft. above us.  Given our speed; we estimate the object was not moving.  The object was black and red; wider than it was thick; about a meter across.  We saw it no more than 2 seconds.  I have seen party balloons while airborne before.  While it could have been a balloon; its shape caused me to believe it was a drone.  Seen while looking out the windscreen in my normal VFR scan. It was above us and very little time to react anyway. I don't doubt the FAA believes this is a problem and is working hard to mitigate this risk.  I don't have a good solution.




Synopsis: Small Transport Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV while descending through 10;000 feet.
Date: 201711
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: External Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Conducting maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: While troubleshooting the Aircraft left and Right window anti-ice and ECAM messages; I turned power off from the flight deck; external power button and battery 1 and 2; from inside cockpit. After 5 minutes; I turned power on and batteries on. After the airplane rebooted; my messages had cleared. All system were active; and I waited in flight deck; to see if window anti-ice messages returned. After approximately 5 minutes; I saw smoke at 12 o'clock; outside Aircraft. I disconnected external power; and ran outside to nose. I saw a small flame and thick smoke at external power cord to aircraft connection. I pulled power cord off the aircraft; and smoke abated. No fire. I inspected left forward and aft electronics and equipment bay; right electronics and equipment bay; and nose electronics and equipment bay. No further smoke noted. I immediately informed the supervisor and lead. Cause pointed to worn gate power cable; per engineering.




Synopsis: Airbus 320 Maintenance Technician reported that external power cord malfunctioned.
Date: 201604
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: An Aircraft had a job card assigned on a through trip. In the process of performing the assignment which was a Navigation (NAV) Data Load; I found that the reference for the process was indicated as being for a Boeing 737 instead of Airbus. The Maintenance Control Website did not have the NAV Data identification numbers listed and the Disks provided by management had part numbers that were altered manually with a pen and no initials for penned corrections. I questioned the legality of using these disks but management directed me to use them anyway and verify compliance later in the MCDU. Following that directive the aircraft did not accept the download of said disks and I could not accomplish the download. Aircraft was put back to original software data and a significant delay occurred. Quality Control of NAV Data Disks in the Maintenance Department for these events is questionable. Quality Control of NAV Data Disks and reference material has to be improved immediately.




Synopsis: Technician reported he was assigned to update the navigation database of an A320 using a navigation database for a B737.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After departure; company informed us a family member of Passenger X had received a positive test result for COVID-19. Passenger was isolated; questioned and denied any knowledge of the test or its results. Flight Attendant took all Medlink instructions to task. We were told CDC would meet us in ZZZ; all to remain on board until released by them. We left cockpit closed until released by CDC. Have no information on outcome.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being advised after departure that a passenger's family member had been exposed to COVID-19. The crew followed proper CDC protocol at destination.