elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201603
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While performing the inflight service; I noticed that a passenger had a cannula tube in his nose. I asked if he was using oxygen. He said; 'No; it's a Portable Oxygen Concentrator (POC).' Per the Flight Ops Manual; a POC can be used inflight if it is FAA approved. I asked if there was a sticker or anything he had to indicate this was an FAA approved device. He was angry at being asked; since he says he used the POC on a connecting flight and he said he already discussed the matter with the agent at the gate. After he looked through his paper work and found nothing indicating FAA approval; I asked him to show me whatever paper work he had shown the agent. At that point; he said he didn't show the agent any paper work. He just asked if he could board early because he had a POC. The passenger never showed me an indication that it was FAA approved. He was able to find a Special Services Handling card from his connecting flight that indicated that he had a POC; but this card only listed POC. It didn't indicate the brand or that it was FAA approved.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reported on some confusion about whether a Portable Oxygen Concentrator was FAA approved.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Aircraft component: Altitude Hold/Capture
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the Milton Four arrival we were given a crossing restriction of LIZZI at 11;000. We were also given a clearance to hold at LIZZI as published. Upon arrival at LIZZI the autopilot began to enter the hold but continued the VNAV descent past 11;000 FT. As pilot not flying I immediately verified that 11;000 was the altitude selected on the flight guidance panel and the MCDU. It was. As the pilot flying the First Officer pressed the TCS [Touch Controlwheel Steering] button and began a climb back to 11;000 FT. Around this time ATC queried us and I responded that we were correcting back to 11;000. Maximum altitude deviation was 250 FT. We turned once in the hold and continued the flight uneventfully. This event may have some relation to the OPS memo that deals with the ELDEE arrival into IAD. This event may expand the problems we have been having with the latest EPIC load. I am particularly concerned that the autopilot continued the descent past the altitude selected in the altitude selector. It seems the CAMI principle is as important as ever in making sure automation is doing what it is supposed to do.

Callback: The reporter states that he has not had any feedback from the company concerning this issue.

Second narrative: I confirmed the altitude and the FMS insertion with Captain per SOP. We started to descend via the VNAV mode as soon as the VTA slop guidance was activated.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain describes an altitude deviation while entering holding at LIZZI. With 11;000 set in the flight guidance panel and the autopilot engaged; the aircraft continued the VNAV descent. The deviation is quickly detected and corrected using the TCS button.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a normal approach; fully configured and stable by approximately 1;400 feet; at 400 [feet] pilot monitoring called a little slow (3kts) added a little power. A late flare/pulling too much resulted in a firm landing at normal landing attitude. After main gear on the ground aft yoke pressure resulted in the nose pitching up. No tail-strike indications in the HUD (Head Up Display) or abnormal aircraft feel on de-rotation. On post flight; maintenance found tail strike indicator popped and a slight scrape of paint on tail skid. No damage to aircraft fuselage.Did not adequately account for heavy aircraft; approximately 304;000 [lbs] and high pressure altitude. Late flare or pulling power too quickly resulted in a firm landing. Poor situational awareness immediately after landing lead to late recognition of nose pitch up after touchdown. I feel like a poor outside scan of horizon during flare and subsequent de-rotation allowed this to happen. Fixation on the HUD velocity vector resulted in poor outside scan of horizon.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 crew reported a tail strike on landing due to a late flare and back pressure on the yoke during landing.
Date: 201809
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight dispatched with BLEED 1 INOP.  Cruising at FL200; received BLEED 2 FAIL. Received ATC clearance and descended to 10;000 feet. Handled the BLEED 2 FAIL IAW (In Accordance With) QRH.Cabin pressure did not rise above 10;000 feet.


Second narrative: Aircraft was dispatched with Bleed 1 inoperative. During cruise flight the anti ice system activated at 20;000 feet. and caused the Bleed 2 Fail message to appear. Cabin began climbing as we could not maintain pressurization. Asked ATC for immediate descent and were cleared for 10;000 feet. [ATC was not advised]. Ran QRH for messages and continued flight at 10;000 feet to destination with no further issue.


Synopsis: EMB-190 flight crew reported a bleed valve condition which compromised cabin pressurization; necessitating a descent to a lower altitude.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PVD.Airport, RI
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 0.75
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower PVD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: PVD Field Condition (FICON) was 5/5/5 with thin snow; weather on ATIS was 1/2 mile SN. Braking report from previous 757 was good. Upon braking out of the clouds we saw an all-white runway with areas that looked as if it had previously been plowed in the center but which was now covered with snow. Landing occurred with Auto Brakes 3; but during rollout I overrode the brakes by gently pressing harder. However no matter how hard I pressed on the brakes the aircraft only gradually slowed down. Tower asked me if I could expedite to the end as only taxiway open to depart the runway was at the departure end. I said NO as the runway felt pretty slick to me. I reported medium braking both to the Tower and via ACARS to Dispatch. A follow on light corporate commuter aircraft reported good braking.I was a member of the Takeoff And Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Advisory group and am intimately familiar with braking action physics as well as the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). There was absolutely no way the braking was good or the snow was 1/8th inches in depth or less.I would like to please ask if the data can be collected from the aircraft and if our Company could ask the OEM to analyze the aircraft braking coefficient. If possible it would also be of value to ascertain the delivered brake pressure versus the commanded pressure for this event as there can sometimes be a large disparity in friction limited landings. I think that Pilots do not really know how to give braking action reports and I don't think the airport wanted to take my report of medium braking seriously. I also think Pilots need to know how to use the RCAM to evaluate probable runway conditions that may differ from the FICON. Additionally; there is no such description as 'thin' in the RCAM. None of the FAA ACs that include the RCAM have thin snow as part of depth description. I would please ask if these areas could be addressed.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported the field conditions and PIREP at PVD did not accurately portray the braking action he encountered.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft was located in hangar bay with the nose of the aircraft within a foot of the stores department central accumulation area. This area contained 55 gallon drums of flammable and hazardous liquids/materials. The nose of the aircraft was also positioned 5 feet away from hangar wall. This aircraft required a weather radar receiver/transmitter operational test per work card. This work card references AMM which has several warnings not to operate the system within 50 feet of fuel spill; fuel; or open fuel cells.The AMM reference step (6) instructs the system to be turned on; which allows full operation of the weather radar system; until you reach step (9) where you are told to put the system in test mode. This sudden burst of power is a concern as the system is in full operation mode before step (9) in close proximity to the hazardous/flammable materials/liquids and conditions.I let Management know about the safety warnings in the Maintenance Manual and said I couldn't complete this task while it was in the Hangar. Management told me I could perform the task as the AMM does not specify not to operate near hazardous and flammable materials.Please clarify whether the weather radar sys can be operated near hazardous and flammable materials in a satellite area and so close to the hangar wall.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Maintenance technicians were directed to conduct weather radar test inside hanger and within 50 feet of flammable liquids.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushback; started Engines 1 & 3 in normal sequence without incident. When starting Eng #2; parameters indicated a delay in engine light-off. There was an abrupt change in RPM when we briefly discussed aborting the start attempt. Crew in aircraft behind us advised ramp tower that our aircraft had a tailpipe fire on number 2. We complied with the QRH; coordinated a [return to the ramp] (straight ahead due to our GW (Gross Weight) and only 2 engines available for taxi. Made AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) entry; Maintenance inspected; did an engine run and signed off discrepancy. Compounding the issue was an MEL for #2 Fuel Flow indication and weak APU. Subsequent start was normal.Weak APU and lack of fuel flow information to crew during start sequence. Recommend maintain APU's to peak performance.




Synopsis: Cargo aircraft Captain reported an engine tailpipe fire during the engine start sequence.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFB.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SFB
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My aircraft; had landed and cleared Runway 27R at Intersection 'R'. Ground control first cleared me to taxi to the ramp via 'B' (parallel taxiway) and 'Kilo'. She then changed her mind and cleared me to taxi via Bravo and Lima (perpendicular to runways) to hold short of Runway 27C. She then (among instructions to several other airplanes); said 'taxi via Lima and Kilo.' I took this to mean I could enter the edge of Runway 9/27 center; and turn right onto Taxiway Kilo one; which is an extension of Runway 9/27 center.  The Tower then told me I had taxied on an active runway without clearance. No conflict with other aircraft occurred. I consider that this deviation was caused by a very busy ground controller giving unclear; confusing instructions. I.e. there is no Taxiway Kilo at that end of Taxiway Lima. Turning left would be a seldom-used Runway 9/27 Center and turning right is Taxiway Kilo One; all the same strip of concrete. An additional possible cause is a ground controller with a slightly foreign; hard to understand accent.




Synopsis: A King Air 90 pilot reports a confusing clearance to taxi via Lima and Kilo while holding short of Runway 27C on Lima at SFB. The clearance is interpreted as Lima and Kilo 1 which is not correct and the reporter is admonished by the Ground Controller for a runway incursion.
Date: 201210
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 900
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SFO
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [At SFO; we] received taxi instruction from the Ground Controller; Taxi to Runway 01L; right turn on Charlie; Zulu hold short of Bravo. I was confused how we would join taxiway Zulu from Charlie; so I read back the taxi clearance for verification; the Controller than gave us additional clearance to hold short of C1 on Charlie. While we held short of C1; we received additional clearance to continue taxi via Z; we did not realize that Zulu taxiway begins in the intersection between C; C1. In addition there are no signs to provide situational awareness that we were leaving Taxiway Charlie and joining a new Taxiway Zulu; looking back the only indication we had was our heading indicators. As a result; we made a left turn on Charlie 1 and crossed the departure end of Runway 28R and joined Sierra 3. Recommendations; when taxing Northwest bound on Charlie; to join Zulu; the heading reference should remain 281 degrees until passing Charlie 1; after this point; the headings should begin to gradually decrease slowly to about 270 degrees; followed by a heading to about 190 degrees until abeam the departure end of the runway. A sharp turn to about a heading of 170 degrees from Charlie to Charlie 1 will head the aircraft to cross Runway 28R. Taxiway Zulu becomes Taxiway Bravo at B1; when heading Southeast on Bravo; Taxiway Juliet and Foxtrot can be easily confused; and both taxiways will take you across Runway 01L; once again a heading reference must be made. This area needs additional signs and indications.


Second narrative: [No additional information provided in narrative 2.]


Synopsis: Falcon flight crew experiences confusion at SFO after receiving instructions to taxi via Taxiways C; Z; and B. A turn is initiated at C1 and a runway incursion results at the approach end of Runway 10L.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: AC Generation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: I was given task to look into a Generator 1 deferral. After reading the discrepancy I went to the MEL book and noticed that Mel 24-11-01-02 G states the same side AC motor pump (ACMP) must be operative. A deferral was in the logbook for #1 ACMP and #1 generator. The way I interpreted MEL 24-11-01-02; both #1 and #2 ACMP's must be operative with the cross side switched to the on position. I found the error in the log book with both MEL's applied to this aircraft.  Suggestions: Make a change to the MEL to make the requirement easier to interpret.




Synopsis: Due to a confusing MEL; a previous Maintenance Technician appears to have incorrectly deactivated multiple systems.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After pushing off the gate and taxiing for departure the aft Flight Attendant called to indicate that she heard a pop in the galley. She described this as a 'blown fuse' and indicated that she smelled an odor from the coffee pot area of the galley. The Captain and I decided to taxi into the runup area to address the situation with Maintenance. While on a taxiway short of Bravo we received another call from {one of} the flight attendants stating that she smelled and saw smoke and that she heard the popping noise again. The decision was made to evacuate the airplane in the runup area due to the smoke. I declared an emergency with Ramp Control and asked for fire/rescue assistance. We told the flight attendants that we would be evacuating the aircraft. We parked the aircraft in the runup area and ran the on ground emergency QRC. The Captain made the evacuation announcement and I opened the main cabin door and lead the passengers upwind of the aircraft. At this time fire/rescue vehicles arrived.


Second narrative: We were met by Crash Fire Rescue personal immediately who took care of the passengers as well. Upon opening the cockpit door we noticed no signs of smoke and no passengers commented on any signs of smoke.


Synopsis: After a Q400 Flight Attendant twice reported a popping sound accompanied by an odor and smoke in the aircraft's aft galley; the Captain parked the taxiing aircraft; declared an emergency and evacuated the passengers.