elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I accidentally gave [aircraft] an assigned altitude of 2;000 feet when the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) was 2;400 feet in his current area. I intended to give the pilot 3;000 feet. I should have had more focus.




Synopsis: PCT Controller reported assigning an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had a somewhat complicated taxi route to runway 10L. This distracted the crew as we taxied out for departure.  It was a routine takeoff.  After takeoff the Captain called for flaps up and then the After Takeoff checklist.  I couldn't see the checklist from the second observer seat but the other relief pilot told me that the Before Takeoff checklist came up. It ends up that we departed without completing the Before Takeoff checklist.  I was focused on the taxi route and I could only see the Captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) from my seat but I still should have noticed that we had not completed the checklist before departing.During transition training our [instructor] taught us to leave the checklist displayed on the First Officer's inboard screen until the Before Takeoff checklist is complete.  I think this is a great technique.  The other relief pilot in the primary observer's seat told me that the flying first officer had put his display back to NAV after completing the After Start checklist.  If he had followed the technique of leaving the checklist displayed until completing the Before Takeoff checklist it would have been easy to see that the checklist still needed to be accomplished.




Synopsis: A B777 First Officer reported; due to distractions; that their flight took off without completing the Before Takeoff checklist.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [I was] flying with a brand new First Officer on first trip off of IOE on first IMC approach. On approach ATC cleared us to descend to 2;500; give a heading to intercept the course and cleared us for the ILS. It was IMC on the Approach; Clear below. 2;500 was selected in the alerter and we started descent. APP was selected on autopilot which armed the localizer (LOC) and glideslope (GS) and was observed. Standard calls were made of LOC alive GS alive. As we approached restriction a combination of things occurred. The Altitude Alerter was scrolled down to Field Elevation. (In Hindsight it may have occurred before we had captured the altitude); The First Officer disconnected the autopilot and I knocked all my approach plates off the holder on the yoke. I went heads down to gather all my charts which had scattered. In hindsight I must have missed the final approach call; because when I came heads back up we were well below GS. ATC called and confirmed altimeter setting with us and said we had a Low Altitude Alert. The descent was stopped and correction was made promptly to correct for the deviation. GS was promptly captured and we continued into VMC and then to landing. After being cleared for the approach and the autopilot signaled capturing the assigned altitude the altitude selector was scrolled down to field elevation prematurely. Simultaneously the brand new First Officer disconnected the autopilot and continued descent without capturing the GS even after it was called alive. In hindsight I missed the Final Approach call and when I came heads back up we were below GS.




Synopsis: Q400 Captain describes an ILS approach flown by a new First Officer that results in a low altitude alert from ATC. The reporter had become distracted when his approach charts fell to the floor nearing glideslope intercept. The MCP altitude may have been reset to field elevation prior to altitude or glideslope intercept.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On initial climb about 500-600 ft MSL; engine started detonating and power was intermittently dropping. I [advised] Tower and had just enough power necessary to make it back and land on the runway at the airport.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported a loss of engine power on initial climbout. The aircraft reversed course and landed successfully.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Handoff / Assist; Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y requested climb from FL370 to FL390. I looked at the data block for Aircraft Z; about 60 miles behind Aircraft Y; thinking this was the aircraft requesting higher. I assessed the traffic situation for Aircraft Z; and issued a climb to Aircraft Y. I was alerted to the loss of separation via conflict alert and traffic Aircraft X who was at FL380 opposite direction.


Second narrative: During a high volume session with bad rides and weather deviations Aircraft Y asked for a climb to FL390. He then climbed him from FL370 to FL390 but entered the data on Aircraft Z's data block who was about 40 miles behind him. During the transmission I was scanning potential conflicts and checking routes and did not catch that the data was entered on the wrong aircraft. Conflict Alert went off after the aircraft started to climb out of FL375 and the radar controller issued him a 20 degree left turn to give more room in between aircraft although they would have not collided. Busy workload and maybe a little bit of complacency or hearing what you want to hear may have played a role in this incident on both the radar and D side positions.I don't have any recommendations as to prevent it. I think it was an honest mistake during busy workload and just the one time is enough to make a person more vigilant and aware of possible mistakes.


Synopsis: ZBW Center controllers reported that the Controller working radar assigned a climb to the wrong aircraft which lead to a loss of separation.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach; Final Approach
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I took over the position with 3 aircraft going inbound. The first two were pretty close where I had to watch and issue speeds to maintain separation. The 3rd aircraft was already 'on approach' which was shown by the data block. When I took the position I had expectation bias that the aircraft was given a crossing restriction at or above 6000 feet for the ILS approach. The reason you give that clearance is due to the Minimum IFR Altitude(MIA) being 5600 feet near that area and then going into a 4;700 foot MIA prior to the Initial Approach Fix at 3;000 feet for the ILS. So; as I was ensuring separation with the first two aircraf;t I then looked at the third aircraft and they were through 5;600 feet going into the 4;700 foot MIA. They were past the terrain and over the ocean. I figured if I stopped them at that point; it would be a very abrupt maneuver. The previous controller should have ensured proper MIA clearance by giving the appropriate approach or a vector around the MIA.




Synopsis: A TRACON Controller reported soon after assuming control of the sector they observed an aircraft which had already been cleared for an approach descend below the Minimum IFR Altitude due to the previous controller not issuing the appropriate crossing restriction.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Today after turnover I had 23-26 flights in the air at one time while also having about 6 flights that were out of the gate but not off the ground. During the time that I had all these flights; I had 2 flights inbound to ZZZ. I failed to notice that ZZZ's METAR was showing FZRA. Per our FOM; Operations are prohibited in moderate and heavy freezing rain. At the time I noticed; [one of the flights] was just about to touch down. It was too late to notify the crew about it. I did notify [the next flight] however they were very close to landing as well and ended up landing without further coordination with Dispatch. I feel this could have been prevented and these flights could have been diverted and avoided a potentially unsafe situation had Dispatch not been so overloaded with flights. Our workload far exceeds what any person can safely handle. It is nearly impossible to adequately flight follow when we have 23+ airborne flights. Our workload has increased substantially with every department in the [Operations Control] being short staffed. We are taking a high number of phone calls because [Maintenance Control] and the [Operations Control] manager do not answer their phones because they are too busy and short staffed. We are constantly having to call stations and check on gates because they do not have radios and do not answer crews. All of this has compounded to make Dispatch busier than ever before and we are having a very hard time safely monitoring all flights.Every department in the [Operations Control] needs to hire more people. We have added more and more flights over the past months to years and the staffing levels have been stagnant or even decreased. The Dispatch Manager has said many times that we have hired people and we have... however we have also had people quit. Today we have [fewer dispatchers than last year] and we are doing about 120 more flights per day.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported short staffing and high workload was a factor in the failure to advise two flights about freezing rain at their destination.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 70
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing; nose wheel steering disengaged during final portion of landing rollout. In this aircraft the nose wheel free casters when that occurs. We had rolled out to the far end of the landing runway and were making the 90 degree left turn to taxi to the FBO. Very low speed when the nose wheel kicked off. When it did so; the airplane began to yaw to approximately 60 degrees right instead of making the ATC agreed upon left turn. While regaining control of the aircraft; [the] following aircraft executed go-around instead of landing. We failed to advise ATC until we had regained directional control of the plane (about 15 seconds). Upon clearing the runway we resumed normal operation.I would have told ATC or had the PNF (Pilot not Flying) do so while I regain control of the airplane. Something simple like; 'Aircraft X stuck on the runway.' I do not perceive that doing so would have resulted in any action other than the balked landing by the following plane.


Second narrative: During landing rollout the nose wheel steering turned off. We came to stop on the runway. We were able to reset the steering and clear the runway; but not before causing an airliner to go-around.I had already switched to Ground Control. It would have been better to be on the Tower frequency to let them know what was happening.


Synopsis: Learjet 70 flight crew reported a malfunction with nose wheel steering during landing rollout resulting in the aircraft landing behind them having to execute a go-around.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We experienced VHF data packet bursts interfering with primary communications during landing. We were in the last stages of a night visual approach into DEN on final for 35R. Our altitude was between 200 and 300 feet AGL transitioning to the landing phase. The aircraft was fully configured for landing. VHF comm 1 was selected for both receiving and transmitting and was tuned to Denver Tower on 133.3. VHF comm 2 was tuned to ARINC and deselected. VHF comm 3 was in its normal data mode and deselected. All other settings were per SOP. The data bursts were easily heard on the active comm 1. There were three bursts total; similar in sound; each lasting less than two seconds and occurring successively. One burst blocked a portion of Denver Tower's transmission; however; the transmission was not intended for our flight. The other two bursts occurred during radio silence between transmissions. The bursts were consistent with the sound of ACARS transmissions or other VHF packet bursts. We didn't experience any other radio anomalies during our two legs that day on that specific aircraft. This is not the first experience I've had with these bursts; merely the first that I tracked data for. Previous experiences occurred in nearly identical positioning of the aircraft on final approach into Denver.




Synopsis: A319 pilot reported VHF communications were interrupted by data packet bursts on short final at DEN.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our preflight duties the final weights were printed off of the ACARS. The Captain tore it off of the printer and was reviewing it. Since I was already in the performance page I just asked him what the weight was. He gave me a number and I put it into the FMC. A short time later we got our takeoff data and we bugged the speeds. Once we began the takeoff roll and I had called rotate; I noted that the airplane did not seem to want to fly. The Captain simply allowed the airplane to fly itself off of the runway and we climbed out normally. A short time later it hit me what had happened. I looked at the final weight manifest and saw that instead of reading me the TOGW; I was instead given the ZFW. This number didn't raise a flag with me at the time since I primarily fly the 757-200. For a full 757-300; that number was entirely too low.




Synopsis: B757-300 First Officer reports being given the zero fuel weight by the Captain when requesting the takeoff weight for V speed calculation. The aircraft does not rotate or lift off at the predicted speeds; but does takeoff and climb normally once the required speed is obtained.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was routed via an RNAV Arrival. A large force exercise was in place with multiple hot airspaces covering over half of the sector. Because of this; aircraft were being rerouted via unusual routes and getting opposite direction routes from adjacent facilities around the airspace and along an adjacent sector. Aircraft X was initially on a vector around the airspace and then direct to a fix where he would have needed a point out to an adjacent sector.However; the radar data block flashed at that sector and I took it back. This; of course; puts a carrot symbol in the time shared block next to the Computer Identification (CID); but I did not think about it at the time. I pointed out the aircraft to the sector at some point after that. Shortly thereafter; Aircraft X violated a sectors airspace in the next facility. The Handoff position trainee on sector took a call from the facility and informed me to ship the aircraft to them. The Handoff position trainer noticed the aircraft was not handed off. I then handed the data block of the aircraft to the next facility and transferred communications. I was simply busy and did not notice the carrot in the data block (Evidently neither did the training team).Partly this was just a missed handoff. However; I do take issue with the new placement of the carrot (^) next to and time shared in the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) data block. I haven't had an event like this to voice my concern; but the new placement is much harder to discern and easy to miss; particularly when it is time shared with an 'R.' When busy; it is easy to see any character in the data block and mistake a '^' for an 'R.' It has happened to me frequently since the change. The carrot above the call sign was much easier to see and much more salient.




Synopsis: ZMP Center Controller reported an aircraft had not been handed off to the adjacent facility due to new symbology in Center radar data tags.