elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the arrival; descending through about FL180; the Captain and I could see and smell smoke in the cockpit. It was definitely noticeable but not strong enough at that point to cause physiological issues. There were no audible or visual detector indications of fire or smoke in the cargo areas; just the sight and smell of smoke in the cockpit. We immediately donned our oxygen masks and notified the jumpseater in the courier area to do the same. As the Captain continued to fly the airplane; he [advised ATC] and requested priority landing. I ran the Smoke/Fire/Fumes QRH procedure and within a few minutes; the smoke dissipated. We left the oxygen masks on and continued for an immediate landing; just in case the smoke returned. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate. Fire personnel boarded the airplane to gather information about the event.It was not clear to us what caused the smoke. Maintenance asked if it smelled like an electrical fire; and neither of us thought so. To the Captain; it was more of a petroleum-based smell. The airplane came out of major maintenance recently.




Synopsis: Widebody cargo aircraft First Officer reported smoke of unknown origin in the cockpit shortly before landing.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Component problem: Failed; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed ZZZZ Runway XX. I was pilot flying and First Officer was pilot monitoring. On takeoff roll heard a loud noise from the right side of the cockpit. Looked over to see the First Officer's side window open. Glancing back at my airspeed we were now past 80 knots and I elected to continue the takeoff per the QRH. Very hard to communicate but managed to direct the First Officer to close the window. He struggled trying to do so and I realized that it was out of the track. I advised Tower through the noise that we had a problem and would need to return. The First Officer and I managed to complete the mechanical checklist via hand signals and gestures. We landed uneventfully on XY.  Maintenance later had to fly in a part for the window.




Synopsis: This B737 crew experienced an open First Officer cockpit window during takeoff above 80 knots. The Captain elected to continue the takeoff; and First Officer attempts to close the window were unsuccessful. Despite the difficulties with crew and ATC communications because of the loud wind noise a safe and uneventful return and landing were accomplished.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SFO
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: SFO runway closures are over however the airport diagram is completely wrong in the vicinity of 1L/R thresholds. We taxied for 1R via C; Z; B; E; A; A1. When making the turn on A around the south end of 1L threshold everything is completely different than depicted. To remain on A1 you have to taxi on A past 1L; then 90 degree left turn on A1 which subsequently makes a 90 degree right turn to 1R threshold. Signage is there but in complete contrast to diagram. An air carrier flight in front of us continued straight on A which goes south of the Runway 1R threshold and had a ground incursion. We saw this happening and taxied as instructed benefiting from the previous crew's confusion. Please send out safety alert to all pilots as soon as possible with new taxiway details. It would be nice if Jeppesen had this info but it is not a part of the latest chart update.

Callback: The reporter stated that the commercial airport paper diagram (Jeppesen) in use that day did not contain the physical taxiway configuration changes at the approach end of Runways 1L and 1R. Because of the EMAS runway ends; Taxiway A1 makes a hard left before the Runway 1R approach end and then intersects another taxiway requiring a hard right onto Runway 1R.His carrier has since received an iPad electronic update containing the correct taxiway configuration.



Synopsis: A pilot taxiing to SFO Runway 1R on Taxiway A1 subsequent to an A1 Taxiway configuration change; was confused because his EFB and paper Airport diagrams had not been updated to reflect the taxiway reconfiguration following Runways 1L and 1R EMAS installation.
Date: 202008
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After parking at the gate XY in ZZZ and passengers deplaned; the cleaning crew got on the airplane. Half of them were not wearing masks. After having been reminded all but one put them on correctly. The last person was reminded multiple times by me (Captain) that it has to cover both nose and mouth. She walked to the back of the airplane without covering her nose. One person had a mask on with a vent; which I reminded her was not allowed. She seemed surprised but changed her mask.




Synopsis: Captain reported cleaning crew came onto plane after passengers left; but most did not wear face masks as per company instructions.
Date: 201402
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: After parking at the gate; we were given the signal by the ramp crew that the aircraft was chocked (triple chocked confirmed by the ramp crew). Because of the weather conditions the parking brake remained set (per SOP). The jetway was moved into position (after shoveling the tires of the bridge free) and the passengers began to disembark. After approximately 12 passengers were off; the aircraft was affected by a gust of wind that 'weather vaned' the aircraft. The deplaning door of the aircraft moved about 5-6 feet away from the jetway.After deliberation; the jetway was moved back to the aircraft. Once there; it again moved another six inches away. At this point; we decided to attach a TUG to the nose gear and requested to have the nose gear sprayed with de-icing fluid in an attempt to anchor the nose gear. These efforts worked well enough to allow the passengers to disembark.




Synopsis: When the B737 boarding door was repeatedly driven from the jetway during passenger deplaning by weathervaning winds on a slippery ramp the flight crew improvised an anchoring method including leaving a tug attached to the nose gear and spraying the nose gear and surrounding ramp with deicing fluid to enhance the coefficient of friction. Following these efforts the passengers were successfully deplaned.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aeroplane Flight Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushback and engine start; we proceeded to do the required flight control check before taxiing out for takeoff. FO let me know that the flight controls felt stiff and they were not returning to the neutral position. We both did the flight control check for the ailerons. Both control columns did not return to the neutral position in neither directions and the ailerons and spoilers did showed displaced on the EICAS page.I called our dispatcher and we did a conference call with Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control asked me to do some troubleshooting to see if it would help the situation. After following what I was asked to do; the problem did not corrected itself. Maintenance Control told me to return to the gate. Our dispatcher said he would notify [destination] Ops.FO contacted Operations for a gate assignment. We returned back to the gate and passengers deplaned. I explained to the mechanics what was wrong with the aircraft. One thing that the mechanics did showed me was that after they disconnected the ailerons using the emergency aileron roll disconnect handle in the cockpit; they had no roll control using the FO control column. After about an hour; the flight was canceled.




Synopsis: An EMB-190 First Officer detected a stiff and displaced yoke during the pre taxi aileron/spoiler flight control check. After returning to the gate; Maintenance used the emergency aileron disconnect handle which resulted in the complete disconnect of the First Officer's yoke roll control.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: With our new pre-departure takeoff procedures; where we DO NOT brief takeoff performance; the flying First Officer DID NOT brief the takeoff performance. This is our new SOP. At the start of the takeoff roll; the Captain selected TO/GA; the throttles advanced normally with THR REF annunciated on the PFD; and the EPR settled on 1.37; with 90 % N1. I mentioned from the secondary relief seat that that was not enough thrust. The three First Officers all noticed immediately that this was not enough thrust for a normal reduced thrust takeoff. The flying First Officer immediately grabbed the performance data printout; read the thrust requirements to himself (1.46 EPR and 96 % N1; and advanced the throttles to the proper setting for our takeoff at roughly 820;000 LBS with flaps 20. The cause of the initial improper setting was that the flying First Officer; when selecting a reduced thrust temperature; inadvertently selected 54 degrees; which resulted in 53 degrees being displayed on the upper EICAS for the reduction. The correct number was 39 degrees from the performance data. This error happened as he read across on the performance data line and saw: 39 54/67/77; where 54 really means 154 KTS for V1; 67 means 167 KTS for rotation; and 77 means 177 KTS for V2. The two relief pilots; myself included; didn't notice it since there was no performance brief; which is oddly now our new SOP. What saved the day was the years of experience on the airplane; 14 for me alone (10 as an instructor); and knowing what normal takeoff EPR and N1 look like.




Synopsis: B747 Relief Pilot describes a takeoff; initially using an incorrect assumed temperature; producing a 90% N1 indication while 96% was required. Takeoff performance was not briefed per recent changes to SOP.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: PFD
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On descent into ORD on a complex RNAV arrival; we received a dual MFD [Multi Functional Display] failure. Both screens went blank at the same time. We continued normal ops using our CDI and remaining screens. Upon arrival in ORD; we wrote up the issue and it was quickly reset.This was the second time in two days I have experienced a dual MFD failure. Many of the airplanes I have flown on this trip have history of single and dual MFD failures. This significantly raised our workload and vulnerability to making errors in the terminal environment. Much of our attention was focused on complying with restrictions on the complex RNAV arrivals. Fortunately it was a clear day; and we didn't require radar. The good flight conditions allowed us to accept the increased workload without our MFD screens. Although we are good pilots capable of maintaining situational awareness without a moving map; it's unacceptable to me if they are failing on a regular basis. I would hate to lose both screens on a flight where I need radar or TCAS. This should be concerning to everyone.I do not know what is causing them to fail; but every MFD failure I've had in this aircraft type (dual or single) has been in the terminal environment with a complex arrival loaded in the FMS and displayed on the map.The company and aircraft manufacturer should determine what is causing these failures and implement fixes to prevent them from happening.In the meantime; there should be a company and FAA approved reset procedure developed so that we can recover use of one or both screens in the event that this happens when the screens are needed for safe flight.




Synopsis: Crew of CRJ-700 had MFD (multi functional display) failure; and report that it is a common occurrence in that airplane.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am a student pilot who had an incident this morning at ZZZ. I was flying solo and preparing to takeoff. I taxied behind the hold-short line while two aircraft landed in succession. After watching the second aircraft land and move down the runway (approximately three minutes); I radioed my takeoff intentions; rolled into position on the Runway (XX) and scanned for the aircraft that had just landed. I watched it in distance continue to move down to the end of the runway. I was unaware the aircraft had to taxi-back and began my takeoff. When I spotted the aircraft taxiing back (approximately 1;200 feet horizontal) I began lift off and maneuvered to the right of the runway. As I passed by the aircraft from the air; it was not on the runway; but crossing from the runway to the taxiway. I was approximately 750 feet above the runway.I should have waited longer but it was difficult to see the aircraft at the other end of the runway and I assumed they had exited the runway; but hadn't radioed their new position. I also should have known they had to taxi back and the time I waited for them to clear probably did more harm than good.




Synopsis: C172 student pilot reported taking off while an aircraft was back taxiing on the same runway at a non-towered airport.  The pilot continued the takeoff and took evasive action by maneuvering to the right of the runway.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While unloading the plane; some boxes were found that had the diamond-shaped 'BIOHAZARD' placard.  They were not otherwise labeled and no shipper's declaration paperwork was given to me. [The company] says it does need paperwork since it had the diamond-shaped placard so we left the boxes behind. There seems to be a lot of debate about the nature of biohazard.  Better education about the specifics of what biohazard needs paperwork and what doesn't would help prevent this from happening.


Second narrative: While unloading the plane some boxes were found that had a diamond shaped 'biohazard' placard. They were not otherwise labeled and no shipper's declaration paperwork was given to the Captain. The Captain called [the company] who said the shipment originated from [a specific station]. That station told them that biohazard does not need paperwork; but [the company] says it does need paperwork since it had the diamond shaped placard. We left the boxes behind.


Synopsis: Flight crew reports discovering a biohazard shipment onboard at an intermediate stop which has no paperwork. The shipment is left behind.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RNT.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing; Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower RNT
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: The ATIS continues to report non-standard and faded markings on runway 16. This condition has been in place for about a year and there are no visible signs of correction.There will never be a better time to resolve these marking issues and no apparent reasons for them to remain. My students and those of my colleagues are at risk during this unrealistically protracted project.There is no need for me to notify the tower of this discrepancy as they report it on the ATIS every hour.

Callback: Reporter stated a bridge is being built at the north end of the field which for some reason is affecting the Runway 16 repainting. The real problem is for student pilots landing at night with runway markings which do not contrast with the runway. Reportedly; students have difficulty finding the Runway 16 centerline at night. Reporter stated the repainting is taking too long.



Synopsis: An instructor pilot reported that RNT Runway 16 markings are faded and do not contrast with the runway surface. This environment causes his students difficulty landing on centerline at night because they cannot see it.