elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on a vector for climb out I was assigned to maintain 7;000 feet MSL and advised of crossing traffic at 8;000 feet. As I approached the assigned altitude I engaged the ALT HOLD function on the Century IV autopilot. Immediately following that I received an advisory of adverse weather ahead from Center. Following that conversation I noticed that the altitude was approximately 100 feet high; so I depressed the pitch sync (control wheel steer) to reset the airplane in a gentle descent. I was startled by the yoke violently coming to the rear and putting the airplane in a somewhat severe nose high attitude. I recognized the situation as a runaway trim and depressed the autopilot disengage and trim interrupt button. By the time I wrestled the airplane to straight and level flight and turned off the electric trim I was at 7;400 and receiving a call from Center to confirm my altitude.Most of the airplanes I fly the pitch trim wheel is on the side of the console and I routinely rest my leg against the wheel and note any unusual rotation. This airplane's pitch trim wheel is enclosed in such a way that you physically have to reach for it to feel it. I assume that the trim was rotating to pitch up while the airplane was leveling and overpowering the autopilot when I noticed the slow climb and disengaged it. I completed the remainder of the flight with the electric trim turned off and the airplane is in the facility now getting the necessary repairs.




Synopsis: A BE-58 pilot reported a elevator trim ran away at 7;000 feet in level flight with traffic at 8;000 feet.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Software and Automation; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Supervising a requalification of a Captain who has not flown in over 14 months. He was Pilot Flying. Given clearance to 'cross ZZZZZ at 8;000 [feet]; cleared ILS [Runway] XXC'. We had briefed ZZZ note about not flying glide slope until Final Approach Fix. Captain set 2;200 feet Final Approach Fix altitude and instead of pushing managed descent; pulled open descent. We were outside of ZZZZZ1 and I noticed the Flight Mode Annunciator and that aircraft was not going to level at 8;000 feet. I announced LEVEL OFF three times then intervened with Push to Level about 7;500 feet. I instructed Captain to climb to 8;000 feet as ATC said; '...I see you are going to 7;000; re-cleared to cross ZZZZZ2 at 7;000'; re-cleared ILS XXC.'Not having flown in 14 months; the muscle memory may or may not be there. We must always VERIFY what input we make and MONITOR aircraft for compliance; being ready to intervene if necessary.




Synopsis: A319 Captain Check Airman re-qualifying another Captain reported the Captain failed to comply with a crossing restriction issued by ATC during approach.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft we flew had four MELs on it. The GPWS system was inop; the cargo door springs were weak; the GPS was inop; and the FMS was inop. With these MELs the FMS is allowed to be used to the extent it is working; but RNAV1; RNAV2; and Q routes are not authorized. The FMS was however working and we were able to initialize and load the flight plan. We took off with PF in green needles and PM in white as backup; and we flew the entire first leg with VOR backups; cross checking radials and distances. There were no errors on the flight up. We tried having the PF in green needles for the flight but the aircraft continuously rolled from side to side and could not hold the VORs. So we used the FMS and backed it up with VOR. On the return flight; we did the same thing and were careful not to accept any clearances from ATC that could not be accomplished with a direct to VOR or off a radial. We were given the arrival and we both saw and discussed we needed GPS or DME/DME/IRU. Well we had the DME and the FMS had been accurate and we thought nothing of it. Somehow we both missed the note for RNAV1 on the chart; which is not allowed with the MEL we have. We should have been more vigilant at inspecting the chart we were assigned. We were constantly checking each other and paying attention to ATC instructions the entire flight; and then we missed this important detail. Part of the problem was the amount of zoom we both had to read the chart on our Ipad Minis. We had the notes cut off the screen. We need to be more proficient with the [electronic] charts and even though the notes are often times scattered about with no standard placement; we need to be looking for them. This is especially true for irregular operations with MELs we do not normally deal with.




Synopsis: The Captain of a CRJ200 reported missing the notes on an electronic chart that made the clearance in conflict with the aircraft MEL restrictions.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C PDX; Class E P80
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE; TRACON P80
Aircraft component: VHF
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were descending via the HHOOD 2 RNAV Arrival into PDX. ATC asked us to try and call an aircraft on 121.50 that was having an emergency. I tried to contact them but got no response.  Captain called Center to tell them we were unable to contact [the aircraft] but had a hard time contacting [Center]. After some more effort; he was able to contact [Center] and [Center] switched us to Approach; I believe. We were never able to contact ATC again on that frequency or any other that we tried. We both tried on both radios with no success. We checked our intercom switches and handheld microphones for stuck mic also. We were coming up on the end of the arrival at SHAFR. I told him we need to execute the lost communication procedure on the arrival; which stated for a west operation for Runway 28 to proceed from SHAFR to NACIY and execute the ILS to 28R. The Captain squawked 7600 and we did exactly that and landed on 28R. We tried Tower; Ground; Approach; etc. all the way in on both radios with no success. After landing and clearing the runway; we taxied to the gate but were never able to contact anyone on either radio.  I don't know what Maintenance was able to find wrong; but I have read some things about the aftermarket yolk switches failing or having communication problems. I'm not sure if it was a failure of a switch or radio etc.; but if it is something that is happening frequently it needs to be looked at.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reports lost communication with ATC during the HHOOD 2 RNAV arrival to PDX. The HHOOD 2 lost communication procedure is complied with and the crew lands at PDX and taxis to the gate without communication.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was doing pattern work; normally to a full stop each time. I was cleared to take off after an aircraft departing the pattern. I don't remember the Tower advising of traffic to follow in the pattern. I climbed to about 700 ft. MSL and initiated my crosswind turn. I didn't see other traffic; but soon after the turn heard a call from another aircraft that said they were cut off in the pattern. Initially the Tower called a different aircraft in the pattern for the parallel runway so I still didn't realize I was the one that cut off the other traffic until I finally saw them off to my left (I was on a right downwind at that point) and the tower figured out they needed to talk to me. The tower had me climb 500 ft and extend my downwind. I was then sequenced back in with no other issue.I have a couple of take-aways. It's easy to get lulled into assuming if the Tower normally provides traffic advisories to follow traffic that there isn't a traffic concern if they don't say anything. It's important for us pilots to remember the Tower is only providing runway separation so no air traffic advisory doesn't mean there's no traffic. On the flip side; inconsistency in advisories from ATC makes it easier for pilots to fall into this trap. The other point is that the aircraft I was flying has a much higher climb rate than the other aircraft. So I reach an altitude where I can turn crosswind much sooner. I delay the turn so I'm flying a 'normal' pattern; but lower performance aircraft sometimes have to fly a somewhat extended upwind to reach the minimum turn altitude so fly something a little more elongated than they might otherwise. A combination of everyone doing their best to be in an expected location along with a wider scan to look for variations from that is needed.




Synopsis: Citabria pilot reported a near mid-air collision with a Light Sport aircraft while turning crosswind in the pattern.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Second aircraft: B747-400
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: West operation in ATL. Special movement activities adding an element of non-standard procedures around the room as an added distraction. Reduced supervisory coverage in the room also adding additional problems. Air Carrier X departed Runway 26L ATL on the DAWGS RNAV departure. Air Carrier Y departed Runway 27R on NUGGT RNAV departure. These departures intersect at MPASS. Appropriate lateral separation must be applied. In this case it was not. As with prior events; these departures converge after the 27R departure passes CPARK. I believe it was an operational error by ATL Tower since both aircraft had been RADAR identified; and visual separation was not being properly applied. I was working DR-S at the time with very light traffic. Air Carrier Y didn't call DR-N until approximately CPARK waypoint. The Controller on DR-N immediately assigned a heading to the Air Carrier Y to apply some type of separation and applied visual separation between the aircraft. This isn't a new problem. It is my opinion that the Tower has a problem of 'one hand not knowing what the other is doing' in regards to this (the north and south side tower positions don't directly coordinate); and that there is little if any understanding of how the RNAV departure procedures work more than 2 miles off the departure end on the runway; so 'out of sight; out of mind' applies in this error. . 1- Also; it is my understanding that the controllers working the departure runways have no access to RADAR displays in the Tower. There is one display for two positions; and typically the arrival side of the airport 'trumps' the wants and needs on the departure side of the airport. This problem must be addressed by ATL Tower NATCA and Management. 2- Evidently the last time two aircraft got too close; the training the Tower received wasn't good enough. I again state my request that an actual A80 Controller (NOT a staff specialist that isn't proficient in the operation) provide a briefing to ALL PERSONNEL at ATL Tower on what happens on the departure side of the airport. While these two aircraft weren't in a position to collide; it proves that dumb luck saved the day again.




Synopsis: A80 Controller described a conflict event involving two Air Carrier departures off Runways 27L/R; the reporter cites concerns regarding the lack of coordination within the Tower.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FRG.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D FRG; Class E N90
ATC / advisory: Tower FRG
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On visual descent to FRG I was flying under class Bravo at 1;500 feet on a 140 heading direct to FRG. My TAS was approximately 140 knots. Winds were 270 at 10 knots and sky was clear with smooth flight conditions.  Heavier aircraft noted above and ahead on approach to runway 22 at JFK.  A 757 heavy was noted in a descending turn from E to W approximately two miles ahead and at least 500 feet above when he crossed my position.  Shortly thereafter I was struck by a tremendous burst of downward force with a rolling moment of 45 degrees to the right.  I was wearing shoulder and lap harnesses but was smashed into the headliner with enough force to suffer extreme pain in my neck and upper body causing a brief period of disorientation.  I was able to recover the aircraft and ultimately make an uneventful landing.  I reported the encounter to FRG Tower and was told that this was becoming more of a problem as ATC was now providing lower altitudes to incoming traffic on approach to runway 22 [L/R] at JFK.  Pilots need to be more aware of wake turbulence as it presents a greater threat to GA aircraft than collisions alone.  I believe that this wake turbulence could be potentially unrecoverable and possibly fatal to some types of aircraft.  Maybe a danger zone could be depicted on moving map displays that is activated through ADS-B when potential conflict are forecast by local conditions.  Similar to taxi collision shading seen on many of the Safe-Taxi charts.  Contact and traffic avoidance instructions from ATC is simply not sufficient especially if their workload does not permit.




Synopsis: BE36 pilot reported wake vortex encounter on approach to FRG from a B757 inbound to JFK that resulted in a hard hit and a 45 degree bank.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly prior to initiating our initial descent the First Officer (FO) Pilot Monitoring (PM) noted that our hydraulic pressure was indicating very close to the red line 1750-1800 (red line was 1850). I noted and recorded the pressure on the gauge. I then requested him to run the appropriate checklist for high Hydraulic Pressure. After completing the abnormal checklist; we came to a consensus on our best alternate option and then requested a diversion to utilize the longer runway and have emergency equipment available to us. We briefed our arrival.  The passengers were asked to come up to the cockpit where I briefed them on a possible emergency landing; the plan of action and the hand signals from the crew that would be used to note time to touchdown. We [assumed] the worst case scenario; if we had to land without hydraulics. The abnormal checklist allowed us to utilize the hydraulic pressure when required; and we were able to utilize the hydraulics until completion of the flight.


Second narrative: Before descent I Pilot Monitoring (Pilot Monitoring) noticed hydraulic pressure was around 1800 PSI. Pilot flying told me to run the checklist for it and completed as so. We both figured it'd be best to find a long runway and deviate there. So; we agreed to [the alternate]. After we had the checklist run; the Captain briefed the passengers of the situation and updated any time we could. Meanwhile; as an emergency aircraft; we weren't sure if there would be any other complications so we requested runway XY. [Runway XY] is a long runway well over the the extra we would need had all hydraulics been available. Hydraulics were available per the checklist.


Synopsis: A Hawker 400 flight crew reported abnormally high pressure in the aircraft's hydraulic system. Pilots successfully diverted to a suitable airport.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GSP.Airport, SC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C GSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON GSP
Second aircraft: Light Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a developmental when he had a few arrivals into 2 different airports. Aircraft X was inbound from the North into GSP and there was another arrival from the West landing at a controlled satellite airport. The controller working the East sector also had 2 arrivals into the satellite airport. Originally Aircraft X was given a decent to 5;000 and a 190 heading to keep him clear of the other controllers arrivals. The controller at the satellite airport called over on the shout line and was switching runways when one arrival was on a short final. After coordinating the runway change with the other East controller; the trainee went to descend Aircraft X; but I told him to descend another satellite arrival. Since I was talking; I missed the altitude assignment and read back for Aircraft X; but I incorrectly assumed the altitude assigned was 4;000. The trainee descended him to 3;000 in a 3;500 MVA with Aircraft Y within 3 miles at 3;000 slowly descending into the satellite airport. I missed the altitude assignment because I was telling the trainee to do something else. I have no overreaching recommendations; but for myself I will not tell the trainee something while they are giving a control instruction.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported they were distracted and did not hear their Trainee assign an aircraft an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.