elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Weather elements / visibility: cold
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: ELB / ELT
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ACFT arrived at gate with multiple write-ups in the logbook. My partner & I were dispatched to repair the items that the crew had written in the logbook. My partner & I repaired multiple coach seat issues & flight deck door issues. The logbook was signed and return to the flight deck. As we exit the acft the flight attendant called us back to the acft and mentioned to us that the ELT lanyard was unfolding. I removed the ELT from behind first class seats. I showed her that one of the water automatic release tape came unfastened. I mentioned to her to have the crew put it in the logbook when they arrived at the acft. I also mentioned to her that I am removing the ELT from the acft for repair and I will be returning with it prior to departure for re-installment to the acft. I went to the stock room at the hangar and to obtain another automatic release tape and res-secured the lanyard to the ELT. I immediately return to [the gate] to find out that the acft had already left without the ELT. I immediately notify my lead and he immediately notify the tower foreman. Tower foreman notify us that the acft was getting ready for takeoff and he was unable to have it return to the gate. Tower foreman mention to us that acft was scheduled to depart at XA:55. It left early at XA:44. Acft had already departed and the ELT was still in my possession. Flight attendant probably forgot to mention to the crew when they arrived to the acft. She probably became distracted while performing her cabin duties. Have the flight attendant put the discrepancy in her cabin logbook or remove the logbook from the acft. Upon returning to the acft; have the crew put it in the logbook




Synopsis: A Mechanic removed a component from the aircraft to perform a repair. In the process; the Mechanic notified the Flight Attendant to advise the Flight Crew to write it up. When the Mechanic returned to the gate; the aircraft had departed without the component.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I was enroute on an IFR flight when I observed a TFR displayed over our destination airport; delivered via ADS-B into a tablet EFB program. It showed as issued shortly before our flight; after I had gotten away from WiFi sources for the tablet. I queried ATC who said they showed it; but it was south of the destination airport. Looking at the text of the TFR; it showed the TFR as on the 'Chico VOR/DME ZZZ 080 radial at 43.3 DME.' However; the Chico VOR was decommissioned in Phase 1 of the FAA's reduction of VORs [that started a few years ago]. The VOR was located at the field; so the radial and DME should still work without major issues; and manually drawing the fix using the airport/radial/DME showed that the center of the TFR was in fact south of our destination.I reported the incorrect rendering to the company that makes the program; but also hope that this will encourage the creators of TFRs to ensure correct information is used in their production. If decommissioned VORs are used to describe TFRs; could that create issues for programs to render them? This is a good reminder to not trust the pictorial displays we see on EFB programs and built-in GPS's - the text needs to be verified to ensure the location is depicted correctly.




Synopsis: EA50 Captain reported seeing incorrect depiction of TFRs on EFB display.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During initial approach we selected flaps 1 and the flaps and slats both failed to extend. We declared an emergency; complied with the QRH procedure; advised company operations; sent a message to Dispatch via ACARS; and landed uneventfully with slats only. We cleared the runway; had both the ARFF and Maintenance check the aircraft for damage and/or hot brakes/tires; all of which were normal. Taxied to the gate.


Second narrative: No additional information was provided by the secondary narrative.


Synopsis: A B737-800 flight crew declared an emergency and landed safely following the failure of flats and slats to extend.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 5C1.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E SAT
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying VFR in CAVU conditions and had just leveled off at 4;500 FT on a heading of about 335 approximately 8 miles from 5C1. I was briefly going through the level off procedure of setting the throttle and prop and looked up and saw a light twin heading directly toward me. I immediately made a hard bank turn to the right and lost sight of the other aircraft. It is difficult to estimate how close we came because I lost sight but I believe if I hadn't taken evasive action I may have collided with the other aircraft.




Synopsis: C210 pilot experiences a NMAC at 4;500 FT shortly after level off while setting prop and throttle. A hard right turn is made to avoid collision.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Me and my student were on an IFR flight plan from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and were communicating with Approach. We were maintaining 4000 ft as assigned. At around XA:05pm approach advised us that there was a traffic on opposite direction; indicated 3500 ft; a Cherokee. At that time there were several other traffics in the area. We saw the traffic passing below us on the opposite direction with a safe separation; so we advise ATC that we have traffic insight. I also confirm with the ads-b traffic on MFD that they were at least 500 ft below us and would not create any collision hazard. Approach then hand us off [to another frequency]. While switching frequency on the MFD; I saw another ads-b traffic on MFD approaching us from the left hand side. The traffic seemed to be maneuvering; climbing rapidly; and converging with us at the same altitude. I immediately look up and see an aircraft passing underneath us from left to right. The separation would have been less than 200 ft. I then make an initial call to approach and advise them that we just had a traffic crossing beneath us almost the same altitude. The controller acknowledge but did not give us any other information. Approach did not advise us of that traffic either prior to handing us off. The converging identification was [callsign] as shown on the ads-b traffic.What I would have done different would be to keep my eye outside more; especially near the area with high volume of flight training activities. Multiple traffics in the area made it harder to judge which one is closer or heading toward us. I was busy setting up frequency and reading approach plate; where I loose sight of the outside traffic for a moment. I also wouldn't rely too much on ATC to provide traffic information in busy airspace even on IFR flight plan.




Synopsis: C-172 Instructor reported an NMAC event during a training flight. The Instructor reported the conflict to ATC who acknowledged the call.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: During takeoff roll; we received a windshear alert at approximately 90 kts. We rejected our takeoff. After accomplishing our checklists and checking our brake temps; we taxied back and attempted a second takeoff. We received another windshear alert at approximately 100 kts and rejected again. We accomplished the checklist items and checked brake temps again. We attempted a third takeoff and were able to takeoff with no issues.




Synopsis: A widebody McDonnell Douglas crew rejected two takeoffs between 90-100 KTS after GPWS windshear warnings. The third takeoff was successful.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff; at wheel lift off; a momentary loss of electrical power for approximately 3-4 seconds occurred. At same time a loud 'clicking' sound from an electrical relay at the top of the P-18 Panel was heard. All the cockpit instrumentation and other lights on the flight deck were completely out (no Standby AC/DC power observed.) It was dark enough that I could not observe whether the instruments were actually operating; but light enough that the aircraft continued takeoff climb by outside visual reference. No other warnings; aural or visual occurred. The electrical power and instrument lighting was restored when the relay 'clicking' sound stopped. After analyzing the electrical system's status and reviewing applicable QRH procedures; and observing nothing abnormal; I continued the climb and routing VFR to destination. The electrical 'gremlin' did not return; but the flight remained in VFR conditions with enroute VFR alternates monitored. I informed Dispatch via ACARS and he relayed from maintenance no electrical history of that nature; reported maintenance entry occurrence to maintenance on arrival.




Synopsis: A B737-400 electrical system failed at lift off for 3-4 second and then returned to normal so the flight continued to the filed destination with systems apparently normal.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Starter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Approximately five minutes prior to the scheduled push time; I started the APU and placed the aircraft electronics on the APU generator. The APU Bleed was switched to on after operating for greater than a minute. Shortly thereafter; a Ground Crew Member asked if we had been cleared to start an engine; then stated an engine was turning; and there was no anti-collision light on. Both pilots responded 'no' to his question. I then saw the number two engine start switch was in the GND position and immediately moved it to the off position. The Ground Crew Member exited the cockpit.Maintenance had been performed on the number two thrust reverser prior to the arrival of the originating flight crew. Both pilots reviewed the preflight flows in the AOM; but found no requirement for either pilot to ensure the correct position of the start switches prior to starting and using the APU. I could find no requirement for checking the position of the start switches until the after engine start flows.




Synopsis: Maintenance personnel failed to ensure the right engine start switch was correctly positioned after performing maintenance on the thrust reverser. The engine began to motor when the First Officer started the APU and opened the APU bleed five minutes prior to scheduled departure.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MBT.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF MBT
Aircraft component: Propeller Blade
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxiing into a grass parking spot in a tricycle gear aircraft when the nose wheel went into a small depression that the pilot could not see and the prop struck the ground twice. The engine continued to run but was promptly shut down after the prop hit.




Synopsis: Piper pilot reported aircraft hit unseen depression in grass parking area and prop contacted ground.
Date: 201709
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: A page of the 22 SEP 17 revision (737NG Flight Manual) has a note that details a difference of 1000 feet between the certification of the maximum cabin altitude of the oxygen mask and the certified top altitude 'for operations' that Boeing has for the crew oxygen mask to be used. In the scenario of cruise at FL410 and an explosive decompression resulting in a cabin altitude of 41000; the fact that the manufacturer has certified the mask to work at 'an operating altitude of 41000 feet' means little when the crew oxygen mask is only certified to a maximum cabin altitude of 40000 feet. Time of useful consciousness is no more than 15 seconds or so. I guess that the FAA; Boeing; and Company are not worried about the slim possibility of an occurrence at the max certified altitude; because what are the odds; it will never happen?The NTSB and the lawyers will have to sort it out when the pilots try to don a mask that does not work at 41000 ft cabin altitude and it does not go well for them. Or it could just be that someone finally figured out that the mask was not tested above 40000 ft because earlier models did not have that service ceiling. Either way; it is surprising that we did not see a Pilot Bulletin with a decrease in the max service ceiling until such time as Boeing and the FAA get around to making the two numbers match and do the testing.




Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported that the aircraft has an operational ceiling of 41;000 ft; but the crew O2 mask is only certified to 40;000 ft.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On approach A Flight Attendant called about air quality. She sounded as if she had trouble breathing. I told her we were going to be on the ground in 5 minutes. She called again and was very distressed. I told them to go on oxygen; and also asked if they require medical attention. She said she and D Flight Attendant need medical attention. I called Operations and requested medics at the gate. On final B Flight Attendant called about possible; 'chemical smell'; I requested crash and rescue from ATC in the event there was a chemical spill and a potential for fire. Upon arrival at the gate; A and D Flight Attendants where removed for medical attention. Passengers where disembarked with only 2 flight attendants. Flight Attendants B and C also elected to go to the hospital with A and D Flight Attendants. In the flight deck there was no odor or indication of air quality. Dispatch and Flight Duty Officer were contacted. Maintenance Control was consulted for logbook write up.




Synopsis: Two B737-800 flight attendants required medical treatment after exposure to a 'chemical smell' during descent for landing. The pilots detected no odor in the flight station.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aileron Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Normal takeoff roll till we were near V1; [when] we received a spoileron roll caution message. We both acknowledged the message and the Captain elected to abort the takeoff. I let Tower know we were aborting the takeoff and they instructed us to turn off at the end and hold on the taxiway. We ran the QRH for the stated problem. We waited the required 15 minutes for an abort and then continued on to [our destination].The root cause was the spoileron caution message that popped up near V1 and having split seconds to decide what to do. The Captain elected to reject the takeoff and make sure all systems were normal.Suggestions for avoiding a recurrence of this event is realizing we only abort in the 700/900 in the event of an engine fire; failure; or warning.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reported the Captain rejected the takeoff near V1 after noting a spoileron roll caution message.