elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During engine start at a remote pad ground ramp agent asked me to release the aircraft's brakes. I did and told him I released brakes. I then asked him if we had tow bar hooked to aircraft. I asked him if aircraft was choked. He said no to both.I feel he had me release the brakes solely to get an on time departure. I feel this is very unsafe and should be discontinued. If we were a light aircraft we could have moved forward after both engine starts with possible injuries to personnel on the ground.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported the ramp personnel told him to release the brakes even though the wheels were not chocked and tow bar was unhooked.
Date: 201303
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Handoff / Assist
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Air Carrier ABCD and Company Air Carrier ABED were both on approach to Runway XXL and Runway YYR; both on frequency at the same time. A cautionary advisory was given to the trailing aircraft. [Same Company's flights] EFGH and EFIH were consecutive arrivals; no cautionary advisories were given to the pilots. Fortunately there were no hear back/read back errors in either of these instances. But since both aircraft were on approach and on Tower frequency at the same time; it would have been easy for one aircraft to take a landing clearance or runways crossing instruction intended for the other. This Company has known for a long time about similar-sounding call signs here and their potential impact on operations.




Synopsis: Tower Controller voiced concern regarding the continued use of similar sounding call signs by one company even after the company was notified of the potential safety factor.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C MDW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: In our heavy 737-800 on a warm Chicago Midway day; the performance takeoff data gave us a flaps 25; max thrust takeoff; with a Runway 22L stopping margin of 270 FT. It calculated bleeds ON. I wanted more takeoff margin; because I don't feel that 270 FT at MDW is adequate. Winds are constantly shifting at MDW; and I have no idea if that 270 FT stopping margin would actually be 500 FT or -50 FT; should we need to reject. The MDW airport is; generally; inadequate; the runways are too short; our aircraft are too heavy and fully loaded; and the weather is often gusty; stormy; snowy; etc. We Pilots make it work; because we have to. This is not the place to be playing with 'legal' numbers which provide almost no margin for error or incorrect data input.I called our Dispatcher; and they patched me to the Chief Pilot; who said that; as long as the stopping margin is positive; it's 'legal.' I understand that. But; is it safe? Why are we taking these risks? Have the software engineers ever had to stop a heavy -800 on that short MDW runway; in bad weather; after being on duty for 10 hours? To them; a 2000 FT stopping margin is the same as a 20 FT stopping margin; 'The data says it will work; so won't it?' At the end of the day; we have a tool at our disposal (bleeds OFF) which will help us improve our stopping margin; should it be needed. Yet; against the guidance in our own Flight Operations Manual; we have removed that tool. It costs us no extra to use bleeds OFF; yet due to a software program; it's taken away from us.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported that takeoff performance data limits the pilots options for a safe Rejected Takeoff.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing out on the ZZZZZ departure we had made the turn from ZZZZZ to ZZZZZ1. ATC asked me where we were going. I interpreted this as a possible inquiry as to our destination and I replied; ZZZ. He then asked me if the previous controller had given us a direct route to ZZZ. I said; no. He then gave us a heading to fly and shortly gave us direct to the ZZZ VOR.We both immediately began a scan of our instruments to figure out our error. When the Pilot Flying dialed in the new assigned heading and went into heading mode; he noted that our current heading was approximately 30 degrees off of the heading depicted on the departure chart. On both PFDs; the lateral deviation indicator was centered and on both MFDs we were tracking a magenta course line. On both FMAs LNAV was displayed in the lateral mode box. When the Pilot Flying typed in ZZZ and placed it on the top line of the MCDU he placed it over the ZZZZZ3 fix; which was our next fix enroute on the flight plan. Prior to that action the only time either one of us touched either MCDU was to make a radio frequency change and to call for weather at the destination airport. The flight continued to the destination with no other course deviations.The cause of the course deviation is unknown to me. All indications showed us we should have been on course.Double checking the required heading vs the course depicted taking into account reasonable wind correction could possibly help in this situation only because we had a charted point of reference.




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported an FMC/MCDU malfunction resulting in a route clearance deviation.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P50.TRACON, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A Westwind
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B PHX
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Takeoff clearance was given with a turn after takeoff. Before reaching 500 ft. AGL; an RA (Resolution Advisory) was received in the aircraft for another aircraft directly ahead so the turn was started early. Neither the Tower nor the Departure Controller mentioned the airplane directly in our path. Then upon reaching 9;000 ft. assigned; another RA was received for a plane at 9;000 ft. and less than two miles off the left of the plane. At that moment I was not sure whether the plane was coming toward our airplane or not.I disconnected the autopilot and initiated a climb and turn away from the direction and altitude of the RA alert and at a greater bank angle than the autopilot would perform. In doing so; I exceeded the assigned altitude by 1;000 ft. and then once I was clear of the other aircraft I descended back to 9;000 ft. on the heading assigned. The airspace was very busy and the Controller was handling several aircraft. He stated that I deviated from his assigned altitude. I explained I had an RA.I reacted aggressively to the second RA because the first RA was so unexpected just after takeoff and while being transferred from Tower to departure. If I had not been climbing faster and turning I would have quickly overtaken the small piston plane that was directly in front of us. Once that happened; when the RA went off again and I couldn't see the other plane and didn't know where it was coming from or going except that it was exactly at our assigned altitude and within the inner ring (our TCAS was set on 10 mile range) on the TCAS; I took more drastic action than might have been necessary as it turned out.The Controller was convinced there was no other traffic in our area and said as much; but we were not warned about either of those two airplanes. So he must have been seeing something different than what we were seeing inside the airplane.




Synopsis: WW24 Pilot reported taking evasive action responding to two Resolution Advisories after takeoff.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 1K1.Airport, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Pitts S-2 All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ICT
ATC / advisory: CTAF 1K1
Second aircraft: Military Trainer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed 1K1 Runway 17 and climbed out right traffic pattern 90 MPH northbound squawking 1200 Mode C and on CTAF 123.07. Just west of the airport at about 4;500 feet MSL I looked over my left shoulder and saw an T-1A very close heading west-northwest slightly behind me. Too late for evasive action and do not know if that aircraft ever saw us and evaded or not. Although I was VFR; I do not believe adequate separation existed between us.Contributing Factors: 1K1 airport operations conflict with the McConnell AFB A-683 Alert Area traffic pattern. I presume the T-1A was talking to Wichita Approach; but he may also have been on an extended VFR pattern for McConnell AFB and instead talking to their tower. It is not practical to be in the traffic pattern at 1K1 and be on any other frequency than CTAF.Corrective Actions: 1) McConnell AFB should be made aware of increased aircraft operations at 1K1 and avoid that area. 2) 1K1 traffic should be made more aware of McConnell traffic. 3) In the future I will exercise more vigilance when scanning for traffic and also utilize the aircraft smoke system periodically to make the aircraft more visible. Also will make better use of additional crewmember for traffic scanning.




Synopsis: Pitts S-2A pilot departing 1K1 reported an airborne conflict with a T-1A out of McConnell AFB.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Clear
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: DC Battery
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The maintenance facility did work on the aircraft before departure and said work was not documented. [Facility] re-charged batteries without our knowledge.




Synopsis: HS-135 Captain reported operating a flight without proper documentation after a maintenance procedure.
Date: 201907
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: The use of good judgment to identify potential unsafe conditions is the most important safety rule for all [company] employees. Today I'm writing to inform our concerns about the new XXXX 55-XX-XX-X rev X. We found this repair document to be unsafe. The temporary instructions in this document allows us to continue the aircraft in service if loose hardware (hi-locks; bolts; nutplates; etc.) are found to be partially blocking; or protruding through; a drain hole located in the Horizontal Stabilizer Trailing Edge balance bay Panels. Refer to XXXX 55-XX-XX-X Figure 1; or XXX 06-XX-XX for location.Inside the Horizontal Stabilizer Trailing Edge balance bay area. The two 'Elevators and Tab Control Systems - Balance Panels' are located. The elevator balance panel and tab mechanism decreases the force necessary to move the elevator in flight to keep the elevator in the neutral position. The presence of FOD (Foreign Object Debris) or any kind of hardware inside these areas may jam or restrict the operation of the Elevator and Tab Control System balance panel resulting in a Partial or complete loss of the elevator control. This may can cause damage to the aircraft during certain phases of flight; as well as cause an increase in maintenance and operating costs; but more importantly it is a threat to the safety of our passengers; employees and family 'members.I respectfully believe this Document should be removed from our approved documents.




Synopsis: Aircraft Maintenance Technician reports that a Maintenance Manual procedure is unsafe.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we turned a base leg to final for the Visual Approach to Runway 28L; I advanced the thrust levers to maintain an assigned altitude of 3000 feet MSL.  I noticed the number two engine was not spooling up to match the number one engine.  After analyzing this problem I determined I could not get the engine to accelerate beyond 52 percent.  We were now on final and I instructed the First Officer to accomplish the Engine Failure in the Landing Configuration Checklist and ensure we could land using flaps 15 on Runway 28L.  We ran the checklist and continued the visual approach. I landed the aircraft with the flaps 15 configuration without any further incident.  The communication between the First Officer and me was perfect; only due to the fact that we had the intercom switches locked into the talk positions.  We discussed later how difficult and dangerous this situation would have been if we had not accomplished this configuration of the intercom system.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported noting a low thrust condition on #2 engine during approach. Landing was made at reduced flap setting.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Other / Unknown; Fatigue; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At approximately XA17 local; I departed ZZZ airport for ZZZ1 on an IFR flight plan. I landed there without incident; loaded passengers on board; and then departed back for ZZZ at XB09. Upon reaching 5000 ft headed to ZZZ2; I was getting ready to perform the turbine trend for the day when I noticed that oil temperature was out of limit on the hot side; by 10 Celsius. After doing a quick scan; I found that all other engine parameters were normal. I notified ATC; canceled IFR. I stayed on their frequency while monitoring CTAF. At the time there was a broken cloud layer with multiple areas of scattered up ahead. I began a descent; to get to more solid VMC through one of the holes; but also in a bid to cool the engine. It did work; as the oil temp did slide to just above redline. We continued on to ZZZ and landed without incident. Upon exiting the aircraft I discovered what was left of the cowl plugs; the intake was gone; and the oil cooler cover was right where it had been left the night before. I had missed them on final walk-around; even after pulling the prop wind bungee off. To break down what happened after giving this some serious thought; here is what I believe happened. I actually did do the walk-around; but for some reason I didn't remove the plugs; while removing the prop bungee. While I did come to the nose of the plane; I didn't come all the way to the front. If I did; I know for certain I would have seen them. So doing a better 360 walk-around would help; especially when flying alone. Also I usually wrap the cowl plugs around the propeller for this very reason; so that instead of potential damage I just do a walk of shame. So being consistent in that would prevent it from ever happening again. And ultimately; having situational awareness on the ground as well as in the air is crucial. I take full responsibility for my imprecise piloting and this will not happen again.




Synopsis: C-208 Captain reported emergency air return due to an incomplete preflight.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MJD.Airport, MS
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: CTAF MJD
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Leaving MJD; I departed parallel Runway 18 and stayed out of and to the west of R-4403. Upon passing R-4403 I turned to a 160 heading and was flying at approximately 750 FT to abide by recommended altitudes as well as stay below a 20 KT headwind that was prevalent at higher altitudes. Shortly after passing R-4403; I noticed two boats maneuvering in a waterway below me. I looked down and then looked back up. As I looked up; I noticed a small drone aircraft with a wingspan of about 5 FT; painted white; flying at about 30 KTS and in the same direction at the same altitude as I was just off to my right and slightly above me. I did not have time to take evasive action since I was traveling at approximately 120 KTS ground speed and overtook it very quickly. There was no transponder on the drone; as it was not showing on the traffic alert system installed in my aircraft.Human Factors: The drone was very small and painted white; blending into the background of the mid morning sky. Where the drone was in my line of sight presented an extremely small to almost non-existent cross section with which to visibly locate and identify it. The lack of a transponder gave no advance warning that there was traffic in my vicinity.Prevention: The drone activity was taking place within 15 miles of three airports and using very small aircraft with no transponder. Equipping the drone with a transponder would present the plane on traffic avoidance equipment. The drone was operating at altitudes where private and commercial aircraft regularly fly. Possibly operating at lower altitudes would lessen the exposure to manned aircraft. The drone was painted white and blended in with the background of the morning sky. A potentially more 'unnatural' paint color or scheme would serve to help visually identify it if there is no transponder on board.




Synopsis: A Helicopter departed MJD and after passing R-4403 at 750 FT had a near miss with a UAV painted white and very difficult to detect against the background.