elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I filed my flight Plan from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and received the XXXXX departure procedure. I tried to reach the ZZZ Tower for clearance and they were still closed. Then I tried to reach ZZZ Clearance Delivery on XYZ.ZA while on the ground; no answer. Since ZZZ was VMC conditions; I chose to take off and get my clearance in the air like I often do from my home airport ZZZ2. Once airborne and on my departure procedure with auto pilot; I reached XYZ.ZA and was told to wait a minute. After a minute; I restated I am airborne and need clearance. I was told again to wait a minute. After a minute or so; I told XYZ.ZA I was approaching ZZZ3 airspace and needed clearance. I received a squawk code and was told to wait; again. While waiting; I inadvertently continued into the airspace; unfortunately.Once in the airspace I was asked to switch to Approach frequency. Which I did immediately. Approach vectored me north out of the airspace; and asked if I received clearance from ZZZ. I told them I did not; but was in communication with ZZZ Clearance Delivery and told to wait. He told me I can't do that and gave me clearance to ZZZ1 and a phone number to call upon landing. Which I called immediately upon landing in ZZZ1 and explained my mistake to stay on the XXXXX Departure Procedure and wait on ATC; instead of doing a u-turn and remain clear of the airspace; then wait on ATC. On a side note; upon entering ZZZ4 airspace and requesting RNAV XX into ZZZ1; ATC had me descend to 3;000 in preparation to land RNAV XX AT ZZZ4! I restated I need ZZZ1 as indicated in my flight plan and they had me immediately climb back up to 5;000. Then vectored me to the initial approach fix for RNAV XX ZZZ1 which I flew on autopilot without any further incident; landing safely and very happy to be on the ground.




Synopsis: Pilot reported encountering multiple delays from ATC while on an IFR flight and was given an approach clearance into the wrong airport.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower LGB
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I'm writing to call your attention to a potentially unsafe condition at Long Beach; CA airport (LGB). LGB's runway pattern consists of four about 6;000 FT runways formed in a rectangle bisected at two corners by a longer about 10;000 runway; Runway 30/12. Runway 30/12 is sufficiently long that its two end sections protrude well outside the 'rectangle' formed by the smaller runways; and are themselves sufficient to land a C-172 on. In this case I completed an ILS approach to Runway 30; landed at the numbers; and then turned off to the left at the first opportunity. This opportunity turned out to be the displaced threshold area for Runway 25L. The Tower noted very nicely: 'We don't do that here;' and gave progressive instructions to a connecting taxiway. I note the following: (1) there was no double yellow line prohibiting such a turnoff; (2) just beyond Runway 25L there is a taxiway parallel to Runways 25; however; the signage is dense and the directions of the taxi arrows are ambiguous; and (3) given traffic at LGB consists in good part of closely spaced jet traffic; it is a great idea to exit the 'active' quickly. I learned later; upon departing the next day; that both Runway 30 and Runway 25L are often BOTH active. Obviously; it is not a great idea to have aircraft taxiing through the threshold area for an active runway. Upon further investigation; I learned LGB is Number 5 in the frequency of runway incursions nationwide; so I'm guessing I'm hardly the first person to have expressed concern. Possible mitigations; none perfect; include:--painting a double yellow line across where the threshold to Runway 25L crosses Runway 30; --improving the signage; or worst of all; --closing Runways 25 when Runway 30 is active. By the way; this same situation exists at other corners of the 'rectangle' at LGB; too.




Synopsis: C172 pilot experienced a runway incursion at LGB.  Reporter stated confusing signage was a contributing factor.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EC135
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Attitude Indicator(Gyro/Horizon/ADI)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On startup of our EMS helicopter I noticed 'Batt Cal Due 0 Days' message on our ESI-200 Standby Attitude Instrument. I had reviewed all of our Company's maintenance tracking documents as I assumed the shift and there was no mention of a calibration inspection required for the standby attitude indicator. We did not have an AMT on duty at the base. Thinking this was one of the myriad of nuisance indications common to this Airbus product I elected to continue the flight. Landing at a sister base for fuel I asked their mechanic what that message meant. He was initially dismissive; but called the only other base in the company that has this attitude gyro installed and was told by that AMT that this message meant there was a calibration inspection required and that we had likely overflown the inspection.As I wait for the AMT to complete the inspection I have been reviewing what information is available to the pilot concerning this system. The only mention of this equipment is an out-of-focus; difficult to read reproduction of the face of the instrument in the STC included in the RFM. There is no other mention of this system in the RFM. The Maintenance Tracking Documentation software that the pilots are required to review; print; and carry with them in the aircraft does not mention this inspection requirement. An Internet search for 'ESI-200 Standby Attitude Indicator' leads you to the manufacturer's website; but there is no information available for this system on that website; the -200 apparently has been superseded by the -500. The -500 has a similar indication - 'CAL DUE' and it says 'the accuracy of the battery capacity meter may be degraded and require a calibration discharge cycle. The battery charging and discharging continues to work; but the battery capacity is unknown. A battery calibration is required to remove this indicator from the screen. Contact an Avionics System authorized dealer.' This statement is not particularly helpful; but to take the most conservative approach I've called the aircraft 'not airworthy' until someone can prove differently or complete the required calibration.




Synopsis: Eurocopter EC-135 Captain reported over flying a required inspection of the standby attitude. He also stated that the guidelines regarding the inspection requirement were not clear.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As I was flying with a new-hire First Officer who had never flown into DEN and spent quite a bit of time briefing DEN procedures and threats; focusing specifically on the recent Ops Bulletin which detailed threats to RNP Z ops. As the weather was reasonable at the time; we built the approach in the FMC. We loaded the appropriate RNP Z and closed all discontinuities along with removing all extra waypoints associated with the ILS on the arrival. While established and descending on KIPPR5; we were re-cleared to the ANCHR4 and told to maintain 290 kts until ANCHR and then published speeds. We then rebuilt the FMC with ANCHR4 and RNP 35R and again removed all fixes south of DOGGG so that DOGGG connects with MSIMS as per Ops Bulletin. As we approached LANDR; we were then re-cleared to the ILS 35R. Now we quickly needed to reload both the STAR and Approach in order to have all STAR fixes south of DOGGG. With the aircraft decelerating and nearly full speed brake in; we dropped into VNAV SPD (as expected) as the FMC processed the change in both STAR and APP. As the new path was generated we passed LANDR probably 10-15 kts faster than the published 250kts; but decelerating rapidly.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a deviation from charted speed on the ANCHR4 arrival into DEN; citing multiple ATC clearance changes as contributing.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: M-20 K (231) / Encore
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Light
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landed on Runway 33 at night; ending a flight that had begun before sunset.  Had landing/taxi light switch 'on'; but upon touchdown discovered the lights were off.  Taxied down the runway looking for a taxiway turn-off; but with no lights could not see the yellow lead line to either of the turn-offs ahead of me.  I knew the last turn-off was at the end of the runway; but when I got there I could not determine where to start my right turn.  I turned too soon and missed the asphalt turn-off; rolling onto the grass beside it instead.  I then attempted a right U-turn on the grass; to get back onto the runway.  Halfway through the U-turn; when I was headed approximately 150 degrees; the nose wheel and prop impacted a plastic sign located in the grass.  The front side of the sign was lighted; but the rear side was not.  Approaching the sign from its rear; it was dark and impossible to see.The aircraft had just come out of its annual inspection; which required removal of the engine cowling.  To remove the lower cowling; the landing/taxi lights must be disconnected; and I suspect they were not reconnected when the cowling was put back in place.  Otherwise; it would be highly unlikely that both bulbs would fail simultaneously.This would have been discovered in a thorough pre-flight; but unfortunately this item was missed.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Mooney reported inoperative landing and taxi lights that resulted in a runway excursion and contact with a ground object. The pilot suspected that the lights were not reconnected when the cowling was reinstalled during the annual inspection.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Descent; Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Staffing; Weather; Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: There was weather to the south of MSP moving to the north. Overflight aircraft were already deviating and MSP departures were deviating. There were 2 streams of MSP inbounds coming into MSP from the east. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) came down to the area to tell us the Command Center wouldn't help us out; so 'there isn't a plan' and basically you are on your own. The controllers at the inbound sectors (R16/R06) are checked out at those sectors; but are still in training. Their D-sides are checked out on those sectors; but still in training. We didn't have anyone else. I'm at R10/11 (the sector north of MSP). TMU didn't work out a single stream going into MSP; so now the inbounds on both streams are deviating due to the weather. I called Area 1 to ask them to help Sector 16 by moving their MSP inbound over the north gate. I was told they already called TMU and was told they couldn't move the airplanes. I told him to do it anyways. They needed help. Now R6 aircraft are deviating and TMU says they need to go over LUCCY in my sector. I go into the hold with MSP arrivals so I can handle R06/R16 inbounds. Area 1 and Area 4 goes into the hold with MSP inbounds. My supervisor stopped R10 departures because of the volume.I recommend that TMU should not be allowed to come to the floor and say they don't have a plan and you are on your own. If the Command Center says we can't help you; then they need to come up with a plan themselves and not just wash their hands of it.With having the 2 arrival streams coming from the east our trainees do not get practice sequencing into one stream as we used to do. When the time comes when they need to; do not know how to do it.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Center Controllers reported the Traffic Management Unit failed to take any action during a period of known weather obstructions causing their sectors and workload to be unmanageable.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: DC-10 30
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Near top of descent we received a Level 1 alert 'Hyd 3 Elev Off'. The Captain noted that Number 3 Hydraulic quantity was slowly decreasing. We reviewed the Hydraulic 3 Fail Checklist just to be prepared in the event of further fluid loss. As a precaution; we declared an emergency and provided Approach Control with the requested information. The quantity continued to decrease and we decided to lower the gear around 20 miles out to prevent us from needing to use the alternate gear extension. At around 15 miles out we received 'Hyd 3 quant low'. The Captain flew a visual approach without further incident. Upon landing we elected to make a left turn as we had discussed due to possible limitations with the aircraft's ability to turn right. Once clear of the runway; we coordinated with Ground Control and told them we were capable of taxiing to the gate on our own. While taxiing in; we received 'Hyd 3 Fail'. We were able to taxi without incident to our assigned gate.




Synopsis: MD-10 First Officer reported loss of fluid in Hydraulic System 3 at top of descent. They declared an emergency and executed a normal landing.
Date: 201204
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Student was landing on the water and failed to retract the landing gear on amphibious floats. Airplane flipped on contacting the water.




Synopsis: Student landed amphibious aircraft with gear extended on water; resulting in the aircraft flipping.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D MYF
ATC / advisory: Tower MYF
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Local
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While working SDER I accepted a point out on aircraft Y for a visual approach into MYF.  At the same time I had another aircraft; aircraft X; on the MYF final ILS 28R.  It is standard procedure for SDNR to point out the 28R visual approaches to the SDER sector as the airport is very close to the airspace boundary.  I accepted the point out but did not exchange traffic information to the SDNR controller.  Typically the north controller will look to see what traffic the SDER sector has and ensure appropriate separation is maintained.  However; the responsibility to exchange traffic information with the north sector lies with the east sector.  I assumed that the north controller would be watching.Apply positive control.


Second narrative: Aircraft X was on the ILS 28R.  Aircraft Y was on a Visual Approach from the north with no coordination for IFR sequence.  They were talking to two (2) different controllers.  On initial call; Aircraft Y was ignored due to higher priority duties and was not observed as being IFR due to scanning the runways in busy traffic.  Aircraft Y called again; and I observed his position and that he was IFR and converging on Aircraft X.  By that time; standard IFR separation was already lost; so I restricted Aircraft Y to prevent him descending further until he could see Aircraft X.  In doing this; I also had to resequence several aircraft.  I attempted to contact SCT; but no one responded; a frequent occurrence.Normally; the two sectors involved (North and East) will coordinate if they request visual separation.  There was no coordination in this instance.  Unfortunately; I was not looking at the scope when Aircraft Y called in; or I would have taken action sooner.The control of aircraft making approaches is under two different radar controllers who are supposed to coordinate with each other.  Apparently; North did not look at East's traffic and did not coordinate the approach.  One controller needs to be in charge of all approaches into MYF.


Synopsis: Southern California TRACON (SCT) and MYF Controllers report of a loss of separation between two aircraft; in which the SCT Controller should have issued traffic. An assumption that another SCT controller was watching the reporting Controller's traffic was wrong. The Tower Controller had other priorities and didn't notice the loss until it had occurred.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The MEL/CDL/NEF (Non-Essential for Flight) manual preamble allows deferral stickers to be wrapped around circuit breakers should collars not be available. This seems to be a safety concern (using adhesive material (i.e. glue from deferral placards) on an item that is designed to release/'pop') insomuch as adhesives/glue would/could serve to hinder said design function.Remove such guidance from the MEL and allow operation without collars for a period of time like we used to do.




Synopsis: Airbus Captain reported that deferral stickers are used around pulled circuit breakers when collars are not available; which leaves adhesive residue on the circuit breakers.