elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SUU.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E SUU
ATC / advisory: TRACON SUU
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During climb out from runway 21R we were flying runway heading and cleared to climb to 10;000 feet. At about 3;800 feet ATC advised us of traffic at our 12 o'clock position and no altitude readout. At about that time we were showing a proximate traffic symbol on the Nav Displays. ATC then cleared us to turn right to a heading of 230' and again reported traffic at our 12 o'clock position. The proximate traffic symbol on our Nav Displays showed the symbol to the left of our Nav Display Track. I was searching for the traffic from our 11 o'clock to 1 o'clock position above; at and below our flight path. It was then the High Wing Single Engine Tailwheel airplane came into view at our 1 o'clock position about 500 feet above our altitude flying from right (North) to left (South) direction. I then took control of the aircraft and pushed hard forward; nose down; to stop the climb and initiate a nose down to below the horizon to avoid the High Wing Single Engine Tailwheel airplane of which we did by about 300 feet. In my opinion if we had not taken this evasive action we would have hit the High Wing Single Engine Tailwheel Airplane. The pilot of the High Wing Single Engine Tailwheel Airplane in my opinion did not see us because he took no evasive action. We advised Travis Air Force Base Departure Control of the near miss and then continued our climb and heading as previously cleared. We were then switched over to Oakland Center and also advised them of the near miss. After reaching cruise altitude I then satcom called [company] Dispatch/Operations and advised them of the near miss.


Second narrative: Suggest being able to use close in noise abatement departure procedure to be able to climb out at slower airspeed and to be able to get above the VFR traffic sooner.


Synopsis: A flight crew reported an NMAC with a light single on departure from SUU.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FYJ.Airport, VA
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZDC
ATC / advisory: CTAF FYJ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During the transition to landing in a C-172 at approximately five feet above the runway surface; two helicopters flying in loose formation; were also preparing to land in the grass field just south of the runway at West Point/Middle Peninsula Regional Airport. As the helicopters were making a descending right turn; the rotor vortices apparently were directed into the flight path of the landing runway (Runway 10). The wake vortex caused the C-172 to immediately bank left and climb without any input from the student pilot. At this moment; the instructor took control and executed go-around procedures to avoid going off the runway and impacting the terrain at a high rate of descent just north of the runway. Pilots in all three aircraft were in visual contact with one another. However; it does not appear any of the pilots in any of the aircraft involved were aware of the effects the rotor wash would have on the runway of intended landing. The effects of rotor wash from two helicopters flying in loose formation may have also contributed to the incident.It is my objective that pilots in all aircraft conducting approaches to landing understand the importance of maintaining proper separation from rotorcraft. There is a high volume of rotorcraft traffic in Virginia's Tidewater region. They frequently practice traffic pattern operations at uncontrolled airfields where many students are learning to fly. This incident could have easily resulted in an accident causing serious injury or death under slightly different circumstances. If a student pilot was flying solo; I don't think the outcome would have been the same.




Synopsis: C172 Instructor Pilot reported executing a go-around from low altitude after encountering rotor wash from two nearby helicopters.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Autel Robotics Evo II
Operator: Commercial Operator (UAS)
Operating under: Part 107
Mission: Utility / Infrastructure
Flight phase: Hovering (UAS)
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Person Manipulating Controls (UAS)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person UAS Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Contract Autel EVO II being used to inspect Antenna Structure Registration infrastructure and briefly contacted the Antenna Structure Registration lightening rod. Operation was being conducted by contractor with vendor oversight. Pilot immediately backed away from structure with no loss of vehicle control and landed for inspection. Extremely minor prop damage was observed; new props attached; field debrief accomplished;  and operation continued. UAS flight plan was changed by request of vendor to closer inspection pictures of the top radar antenna. The lightening rod on each corner extend above the top altitude of the radar antenna. The Remote Pilot in Command was relying on the UAS rear collision avoidance; which did not detect the narrow lightening rod. Due to geometry and distance of the structure made depth perception for Visual Observer not possible. 1)Vendor should include policy to land and brief if flight plan is changed 2)Vendor should include expected crew action in the event situational awareness with structure is lost or obstacle clearance is uncertain 3) In inspections of complex structures; crew may need to do walk around and locate best places for Visual Observer and potentially have more than 1 Visual Observer present.




Synopsis: UAS pilot struck an object while flying and landed safely.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Right engine would not produce calculated T/O (Take-off) thrust. Tried to move the right thrust lever up to produce T/O thrust. Thrust lever would not move. Due to safety concerns; I decided to reject the takeoff. I believe the speed was right around 85 kts. [I] noticed the situation before 80; but spent some time evaluating and deciding. Went through the reject procedure. After stowing the thrust reversers; I felt the FOD (Foreign Object Debris) that was left on the center area just forward of the thrust levers. It was an 8oz can of coffee that was standing up right. As the power came up; it impeded the right thrust power lever. Cleared the runway; notified [Operations] Control; and applied the proper brake cooling time from the brake cooling charts in the AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual). Got an [Amended Release] for T/O fuel also. Taxied back to Runway XXR; and performed a normal T/O.


Second narrative: Performed a low speed RTO (Rejected Take-off) when the right engine did not produce calculated takeoff thrust. A can of coffee was left in front of the control stand. When setting takeoff thrust; the right thrust lever hit the can which impeded the forward movement of the trust lever. This resulted in the right engine not producing calculated takeoff thrust. We cleared the runway; contacted [Operations] Control; referenced the brake cooling chart and obtained an [Amended Release] then departed. The Captain filed an Event Report.


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew reported rejected takeoff due to thrust lever issue.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; MEL; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew called in to discuss a vent door flag MEL (Minimum Equipment List); crew submitted MEL 52-10-01-XX and I placed it on MEL. After further research realized the crews write up he was referring to the door handle flag and not the vent door. I notified the Maintenance Duty Manager after realizing I might [have] misapplied the MEL. Thinking I should of used the CFI for the door flags. The aircraft was in flight but we grounded it in ZZZ and had it repaired. When arriving to work I found out that the door handle flag is not deferrable. Neither [I] nor the Captain was aware of this. The aircraft made one flight in this condition. Being unfamiliar with the aircraft and the crew referring to this as the vent door flag caused me to apply an incorrect MEL. My suggestion would be for controllers new to the fleet to undergo a gen fam on the aircraft they would be supporting. I believe if I was aware of the door flags and vent door I would have known the Captain was incorrect in his write up.




Synopsis: Flight Crew on CE-560XL requested incorrect Minimum Equipment List (MEL) be assigned to component.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FDK.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D FDK
ATC / advisory: Tower FDK
Second aircraft: Socata (Aerospatiale); Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was involved in a mid-air near miss on approach to Runway 30 at Frederick Municipal Airport in Maryland. I was flying into my home base of Frederick; MD after a .5 hour sightseeing flight from the South West at about 2;500 MSL. I made a radio call to the tower prior to entering class D airspace with my position; altitude and intentions. I was instructed to call 3 miles advanced of a left downwind entry for 30. A few moments later; [another aircraft] called 8 miles South of the field inbound for landing. He received the same instruction I did (3 miles call prior to downwind entry to 30). I made my call as instructed and received 'not in sight; cleared to land.' The [other] pilot then called in 2 miles south; received a #2 for the runway and relayed that he did not have me in sight. I gave my position as on left downwind abeam the arrival end of runway 30. The pilot of the Socata replied that he was 'searching'. It turns out; the [other] pilot was East of the field and was making a straight in approach for 30; and my turn from base to final approach put us on a collision course. The tower had the [other] pilot execute an evasive 360 turn to the right. He completed this turn in less than 40 seconds; rolled out of the turn on short final and I was then issued an expeditious runway exit instruction from the tower. I felt that the pilot's aggressive maneuvering; incorrect position reporting; and lack of judgment on entering a final approach vector as #2 with no visual contact with traffic ahead were contributing factors. My failure to identify the aircraft prior to the evasive instruction was also a contributing factor. Although I contacted the tower on my own accord after the event; I feel that this incident should have required a debrief for both pilots involved.




Synopsis: A pilot reported a near mid air collision when another aircraft reported an incorrect location and failure by both pilots and ATC to identify the conflict.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working all locals combined and I launched the second aircraft a bit too close.  I ended up having to give the 2nd guy a couple of turns to get 3 miles.  As soon as I had it I shipped them both.  The first guy didn't take the switch and then the 2nd guy sped up a little about 10 knots and the TRACON Controller wasn't able to talk to the first guy and I'm pretty sure we lost the 3.  It was all around a bad call on my part and I should have just waited on the second guy or run him out on a different heading for longer or stopped his climb or anything like that.In my defense; I was working all locals combined which I'm not super proficient with because while we were on COVID schedules.  I will also note the following:1.  I was working LCW combined with other locals which is supposedly not safe per the district because we can't see the runway.2.  No OT used and we are operating with 3 CPCs and an FLM when normal numbers are 8 and an FLM due to quarantine from a COVID positive. 3.  The ATM WILL NOT USE TMI [Traffic Management Initiative] for staffing because of political pressure not because it isn't needed. TMI for staffing have been definitely needed especially this week with 15 ish controllers out of 25 on quarantine.




Synopsis: Tower Controller working 3 Local positions reported an airborne conflict between two departures.
Date: 201708
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: INS / IRS / IRU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL390 the autopilot kicked off and we noticed our heading; attitude; navigation system on both the Captain and F/O (First Officer) side went blank as well as standby HSI had off flags. We looked up and noticed the right IRS (Inertial Reference System) fault light was illuminated. At approximately 100 miles from [the departure airport]; we elected to turn back around and returned. We [advised ATC]; due to lack of navigation system and no heading information. I was getting no-gyro vectors from ATC as F/O ran the IRS fault checklist. Upon completing the checklist we were able to get an attitude and heading information back; however; we still were missing our navigation data. With help from ATC we were able to safely navigate back to [the airport] where it was VFR and landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: Upon level off at FL 390; the autopilot kicked off. As we looked at our instruments; we noticed that we had lost our attitude; heading; and navigation displays on both the Captain and FO's side. Our Standby heading compass had off flags and all we had for navigation purposes was our standby ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) and our Whiskey Compass. As we continued to investigate; we noticed we had a right IRS fault light and referenced the QRH for this problem. Due to the fact that we could not safely navigate and [the departure airport] was VFR; we elected to coordinate with ATC to return. We request no-gyro vectors back as we began to run the steps of the QRH. Upon completion of the QRH steps; we were able to get main ADI and heading display back on the Captain's side but still no navigation displays. The FO's side still remained blank until we put both IRS's to left as the last step in QRH. With the help of ATC and great crew coordination; we were able to land uneventfully.


Synopsis: While level at FL390; B737NG crew reported a failure of the right IRS which resulted in the loss of all navigation and flight instruments. After completion of the QRH checklist and recovery of flight display data the crew returned to the departure airport.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our cockpit set up prior to the flight; I noticed at least 11 different--but seemingly related--aircraft maintenance status messages on the aircraft Status page; which is sometimes encountered as the aircraft 'boots up' after power-up. The aircraft had very recently arrived at the gate. As a crew; we were made aware that the aircraft was late inbound and that we had [to] be subsequently scheduled to depart 15 minutes later than scheduled. We had typical distractions prior to departure; which affected and interrupted our cockpit setup; such as COVID-19 wipe-down of aircraft cockpit; Flight Attendant interaction; passenger interaction and routine preflight discussions regarding possible departure runways and configurations.  I also needed to leave the cockpit to conduct a walk-around inspection. After reentering the cockpit; other distractions like a very lengthy Dangerous Goods manifest and maintenance release verification took place. Finally; we briefed our departure and pushed back approximately 11 minutes later than scheduled. It was only after we departed and were climbing through approximately 27;000 feet that we discovered all 11 maintenance status messages still were present on the Status page. We quickly contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control to disclose our issues. The aircraft had no issues whatsoever--no warning lights; no chimes; nothing. The EICAS did not indicate the word 'STATUS'. But; upon selecting the Status page; those status messages were still present.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that the aircraft had multiple maintenance status messages before departure which were inadvertently not cleared before departure due to a series of interruptions during pre-flight.