Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Assembly
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Uneventful evening leading up to pushback for departure.  We noted that the left engine started a little slower than the right but auto start was never interrupted and it came up on speed a few seconds after the right engine.The capt was flying as it was his leg; I was in the right seat and FO (First Officer).  No anomalies were noted during taxi out or upon advancing the throttles to takeoff power.  We were climbing via the SID talking to Dep and had just passed FL200.  We had used max cont climb earlier on the departure to ensure climb restrictions but had selected normal at least 5 mins before the engine event.At approximately FL210; we heard and felt a loud bang and the aircraft yawed left.  It was obvious that we had lost the left engine.  Capt continued to maintain aircraft control and fly the aircraft. The Capt directed myself and the IRO (International Relief Officer) to run the checklist.  We started with the Eng Fail L checklist which took us immediately to the Eng Severe Damage/Sep checklist as we noted high EGT (red Line) very low oil press; zero oil qty; N2 zero; and engine vibration of 5 on the engine instruments.  We were experiencing noticeable vibrations in the cockpit.  Capt slowed to 250 kts and began a descent to help control the vibration.  We requested vectors to the departure airport as our nearest suitable airport.Once we had the engine shutdown; Capt directed me to fly as he and the IRO made company contact; talked to the FAs (Flight Attendants) and ran the fuel dumping checklist.  I handled the radios and flying duties as they coordinated with ground and FAs.ATC directed us to descend us to 5000 feet.  I told them we needed to level at FL80 for fuel dumping and would like vectors or holding for the next 20 mins or so.  They vectored us for a while then cleared us present position hold for fuel dumping.  There was a little communication barrier as we told me we wanted the ILS and would let them know when we were ready for the approach.  They kept trying to turn us to intercept final.  We dumped all the fuel from the center tanks which left us ~45;000 lbs over weight for a landing weight of ~505;000 lbs.  We decided that we would accept an overweight landing.  I flew as Capt briefed the single engine flaps 20 approach and missed approach.  Capt took the airplane back and we then took vectors to final.  Capt flew a flawless single engine approach and landing.  We elected to clear the runway; leave the flaps extended; shut down and get towed to parking as we did not know the extent of the damage to the engine and related structures on the left side of the airplane.  Capt had me go the gear page to check the brakes and we noted them heating to 5 on two of the left outboard wheels.  We had not been directed to the checklist but we referred to it anyway.  The Hot Brakes checklist annunciated as we were looking at it.  Capt related the hot brakes to the ground crew.  They hooked up the tug and we were towed to the hard stand.  All brakes had cooled to the white zone by the time we arrived.We debriefed with entire crew; FAs included; on the airplane after the passengers had deplaned.  Extensive damage was noted to the engine on visual inspection to include shrapnel in the nacelle and burn marks on the tail cone.  Visible fluid leakage could be seen when the engine cowlings were opened. We proceeded to station operations where calls were made to the company.


Second narrative: During climb through FL210 the left engine failed suddenly with a loud bang; EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) above redline; oil quantity zero; oil pressure near zero; zero N2; and moderate vibration. As pilot flying; I leveled off to maintain airspeed and called for the checklist. While the F/O (First Officer) and Relief Pilot ran the ENG FAIL left and Engine Severe damage checklists; I continued flying; and requested vectors from approach back to the departure airport. I then gave the aircraft to the F/O and coordinated with Dispatch and operations. Dispatch agreed that ZZZZ was the nearest suitable airport. We determined that we would dump fuel and advised approach that we would remain at FL180 despite being cleared to a lower altitude. We were cleared in a holding pattern while we ran the Fuel Jettison checklist. The Relief Pilot made an announcement to passengers and communicated the information to the lead flight attendant.After dumping approximately 43;000 pounds of fuel; the center tank was empty except for about 3000 pounds; and the center override/jettison pumps on the fuel synoptic indicated low pressure. The ECL (Electronic Checklist) directed us to stop dumping when jettison was complete OR when center tank was empty. We were somewhat surprised by the verbiage (which later could not be found in the checklist in the flight manual or on another B777 aircraft ECL); but decided it was prudent to stop the dump and land overweight; with the potential of unknown damage to the aircraft or systems. We checked the Flight Manual required non-normal configuration landing distance and landing performance limit weight. We had requested the same from Dispatch but did not receive the information. Approach control was helpful despite minor language difficulties. As we began the approach we noticed a HYD QTY LOW L EICAS advisory message and we confirmed that left hydraulic quantity was zero. There was no ECL prompt. We performed the ILS with flaps 20 and landed at approximately 505;000 lb; which was 45;000 lb over the aircraft structural landing weight. We had requested airport emergency equipment to meet the aircraft. We used most of the runway. Once clear of the runway; we shut down the remaining engine and requested a precautionary tow to the parking area. Brake temperatures were normal for about 10 minutes; but as the tug was connected to the aircraft; two of the left truck brakes were slightly above 5. We advised the ground crew and accomplished the BRAKE TEMP checklist.We were towed to a hardstand and passengers were deplaned onto buses. We then debriefed the entire crew. The Door 2L flight attendant reported that at the moment of engine failure; a large flame trailed the left engine and illuminated the aft cabin through the windows. We thoroughly briefed the Duty Manager; Dispatch; and Maintenance Control; and ensured proper maintenance entries were logged.We began the Fuel Jettison ECL. After dumping 43000 pounds of fuel; when we returned to what we thought was the same checklist; the FUEL JETTISON MAIN ECL appeared. We did not realize that in fact we had an additional system failure in part due to the nearly identical checklist names. We were more concerned with terminating the dump and getting our disabled aircraft on the ground. We completed the FUEL JETTISON MAIN checklist; with the original Fuel Jettison checklist inhibited. A subsequent conference with Maintenance Control revealed a right main jettison pump failure and that maintenance had addressed the issue.


Synopsis: B777 Flight Crew experiences a catastrophic engine failure climbing through FL210. The engine is shut down and after dumping fuel the flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing. A fuel jettison pump failure during dumping caused some confusion due to its nearly identical title to the jettison checklist on the electronic checklist. HYD QTY LOW L was also annunciated on the EICAS during approach.