Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Weather [was] slowly deteriorating in LAX due to a low level onshore flow that was covering the Los Angeles airport property. Tops were approximately 500 FT MSL. On descent we had briefed a Category 1 ILS approach and followed it with a summarized Category 3 ILS approach briefing in the event the weather dropped below CAT 1 minimums. The Captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying. On descent; during his brief I had placed 'NO' in the radio field of the approach page of the MCDU to be pro active if we had to commence a CAT 3 approach. Not realizing the Captain still wanted to plan for a CAT 1 and only change it to CAT 3 if we had to. He questioned my action and I apologized to him because I had mistaken his explanation as a direct instruction. I re-entered the original CAT 1 minimums in the BARO field. On the Downwind for Runway 24R we heard a general ATC call of the RVR reports for Runway 24R. I recall the touchdown being reported as a 1;000 FT RVR and do not recall the other two. We were given our base turn around MERCE and cleared for the ILS 24R approach. Tower was contacted slightly late and inside of the FAF (JETSA) due to the fact we were running a checklist. Tower quickly responds with a landing clearance and the RVR reports. I recall the RVR reports to be: 1;000-1;200-1;400. [We were] clearly below CAT 1 landing minimums. Right about 500 FT and prior to us entering this layer of IMC the Captain turns off the autopilot and begins hand flying. In flight visibility was CAT 1 while RVR reported visibility was less than the minimum required to commence a CAT 1 approach. We land and ATC says; 'XXX cleared to exit any taxiway'. s the Captain departs the runway centerline I truly believe he is intending to take the first forward high speed taxiway Runway 24R has to offer which has the runway lead off lights in accordance with the SMGCS charts. However; his intention is to take the reverse taxiway just before the one that was more suitable for the conditions present. I respond to ATC; 'Looks like we'll take the forward high speed.' The Captain makes a comment here stating; 'that was a 1;000 right there bro' which I attributed to the fact that he acknowledged the reduced visibility; therefore knew to take the proper taxiways to the gate. There was another aircraft who had exited on that forward high speed taxiway that was holding short of Runway 24L. I queried ATC thinking maybe he would instruct us to roll down to [Taxiway] AA; which is another approved taxiway with lead off lights in accordance with low visibility operations. However ATC replied; 'He's going to move in 10 seconds.' My concern was due to the limited space between runways. Had we have held short of [Runway] 24L behind the traffic already holding short we would have been occupying an active Runway (24R) when there was another aircraft behind us on approach. The Captain shut me down and didn't care for what my concern was and responded by saying I was talking too much. We crossed Runway 24L on a reverse taxiway with no CL lights when airport RVR was less than 1;200 FT. We joined Taxiway E and than took D10 to the gate. Taxi speed was slow due to the reduced visibility. It is very important that I take a moment to discuss the personality and style of command this Captain elects to take. Before flying with this particular Captain; I knew his reputation and personality type. He is an over the top Type A personality that I compare to that of a High School bully. He makes comments that are intended to be harmless but sometimes inappropriate given the audience present. He lacks discretion at times. His personality and the comments he has made toward me were very demeaning and reminded me of old school 'Korean culture' where the Captain is GOD and his authority should never be questioned. These comments referenced age; lack of rank; experience; and had no factual evidence or credibility to support his argument.Where our communication had broken down was on the runway when I told ATC what exit we were going to take since they were unable to see our position from the Tower Cab. To me; it appeared as if he was taking the most suitable taxiway off the runway; than I realized he is intending on taking the reverse that is unlit. I question him by saying; 'I had told him that we were going to take the forward; and do you want the reverse.' I was hoping he would have taken the forward since that was the proper taxiway to take for the conditions present. His reply was; 'yeah dude; I have no idea. I guess if you want to take command go ahead.' Even though I know ATC said any taxiway was fine; I still believe that we should have abided by the SMGCS charts and followed the standard routes due to the visibility being what it was. After all; the airport was NOT in a CAT 3 configuration when they should have been due to the RVR. Just because they are not familiar or not following procedure doesn't mean we have to follow that same path. It was my job to question and query situations that present abnormal circumstances. Due to the leadership and hard headed personality of the Captain I was flying with; I felt he would have completely disregarded what I had to say and that it would only bring conflict at an extremely critical phase of flight. When I apologized at the gate for the way he had interpreted my response to ATC as me making his captain decisions; he began a childish rant; wouldn't accept my apology; provided me no credible facts or evidence to his argument; and ultimately told me to get lost. Looking back at this situation; I realized all the mistakes that we made that should have not been made. All I could think about was remaining conflict free long enough to get on the ground safely. At first I felt there was a lack of commonality present in our personalities. The more I thought about this; I realized I go to work everyday and I commonly don't share the same personality types with other co-workers however I'm always able to find a way to respect my co-workers and find a common ground to get the job done successfully and safely. I feel that as an airline pilot in command; one must always remain humble to the fact that; 'It could happen to me' and 'I don't make these decisions alone'. I didn't see this trait on that given day. I feel that most of the time; our CRM training is rather humbling as they usually include case studies and previous pilot reports. However; clearly based off of the story above they may not always reach the strongest personalities. Every first officer is well aware that the captain is the final say so aboard the aircraft. However; sometimes we undermine first officers and expect them to not share the same responsibilities as a captain. As much as a respect the captain; I didn't become an airline pilot to remain a first officer the rest of my life. I would be lying to you if I said I don't feel guilty when things go wrong or communication breaks down. I feel just as responsible. I may not be; but my heart is in the right place when I say I am.




Synopsis: A First Officer descibed a failed CRM relationship during a low visibility approach and landing at LAX.