Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was on Clearance Delivery in the middle of reading a clearance to a carrier when the ASDE-X issued an alert for an 'opposite direction taxi'.  Being on Clearance Delivery; I wasn't entirely sure what could possibly be causing the alert.  I looked up at the ASDE and could see an aircraft departing Runway 8; and what appeared to be a target marker moving in the opposite direction on the runway.  I was aware that this time of night was typically when the city performed their runway inspections; and I had heard discussions between controllers on the front line and the FLM regarding which runway the vehicle was currently inspecting.  We have had numerous false ASDE alerts triggered by reflections off snow berms and this was my first assumption on hearing the alert but the fact that the target was moving was alarming.  At first everyone seemed as surprised as I was that the alert had gone off; and I immediately looked at the ROS and noted that it was unlit; which put me a little at ease because I felt that it was more likely just a false alarm; while still trying to process the fact that the target I had seen was moving; and I'd never witnessed a false alert from a moving target before.  Seconds later I heard the Local East Controller say that there was a truck on the runway; and the pilot had seen the truck while on takeoff roll.I watched this happen from another position; and while I can't give the most accurate blow by blow of the events leading up to it; I can say from 11+ years of working in Control Towers that it is extremely important to the individual Controller to have some kind of memory jogger for an unusable runway.  Of course every facility has their own procedures to standardize this; but ultimately the individuals concerned have to have a standard way of doing things that works for them.  There are some who; while following facility directives; also have their own standard procedure; which works fine as long as it is strictly observed.  In other words; whatever you have to do; just make sure you do it every time and make sure it works for you.  The ROS is our standard facility procedure; and from anecdotal evidence after being at PHL for over a year; I've learned that some people don't like it; or don't necessarily 'trust' it...meaning; they use their own personal procedure in addition to the ROS.  I don't think that should be discouraged at all; as long as the facility standard is also being used.  But more troubling is the tendency among a few people to have complete disdain for the ROS; whether they are acting as CIC's or controllers and sometimes not using it as prescribed in the SOP.  In my personal opinion; while the majority of the facility strictly observes the use of ROS; there are enough people who take it lightly enough that events like this can happen.  Just as numerous false alarms can deaden the response to an ASDE alert; or a CA/CA or low altitude alert; simply being in the operation with people who think nothing of leaving the ROS on after the vehicle has left the runway; or not turning it on at all; diminishes its effectiveness; especially when this is accepted by everyone in the room. A raised awareness of the importance of its use; whether or not it 'works' for you; needs to be impressed.  I personally find the ROS to be cumbersome.  The remote control is often annoying to use; as it doesn't always work until you've pointed it at exactly the right angle and pressed the button at least four times.  The scrolling marquee is easily visible but also usually partially hidden unless you happen to be sitting or standing in exactly the right place.  Then again; the PHL Tower Cab is an extremely crowded place; with equipment shoehorned in any available place.  So while the location is not great; it is likely as good as it's going to get; unless we get into something that will block the already poor view out of the windows.  It isn't perfect made the decision to strictly observe its use; even if itmeans getting the remote myself and turning it on or off if I feel the FLM/CIC isn't making it a priority to do so.  In the meantime I experimented with other memory joggers; such as putting a tag on the TDW at the approach end of the affected runway or making sure I tagged the vehicle that was conducting the inspection on the ASDE.  The latter is not foolproof however because the tag often drops off for reasons unknown to me.  In sum; the ROS isn't perfect; but neither are we; and I believe we need to strictly observe its use until we can come up with something better.  It may not be perfect but I think it would have helped prevent this incident.




Synopsis: Controller reports ASDE-X alarm going off; while not observing a target.  Aircraft departs and reports a vehicle on the runway.  Controller then makes suggestions as to how to fix the false target issue and memory joggers that could be used.