elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were flying the PAATS RNAV STAR at an assigned airspeed of 280 KTS. ATC then told us to cross HEDGE at 15;000 FT. The Captain selected level change (idle) and full speed brakes. The tailwinds were in excess of 100 KTS at that point and it looked like we would be high at HEDGE. The aircraft in front of us reported they would not be able to make the restriction due to the tailwind. The Controller said 'just do the best you can.' Then the aircraft behind us reported they would not be able to make the restriction; and the Controller said; again; 'Just do the best you can.' It didn't seem necessary to add to the already congested radios that we would also probably not make the restriction. We crossed HEDGE approximately 1;000 FT high. The Controller made no mention of it and we continued the remainder of the approach and landing without incident. Earlier in the arrival we saw that we were going to be tight making the expected altitudes on the STAR and requested a descent. Instead of a descent clearance we got a frequency change and by the time I was able to check in on the new frequency we were well above the descent profile. The new Controller gave us a descent with a speed restriction (280 KTS) but no altitude constraints. When the 15;000 FT crossing restriction at HEDGE was assigned we were already high on the descent profile; and that coupled with the airspeed restriction and the excessive tailwind; made it a clearance that could not be complied with.ATC must issue descent clearances earlier when strong tailwinds are present. Also; on my part; I need to clearly communicate to ATC; as soon as it is evident; when we cannot comply with a clearance. I was proactive in trying to get a clearance to start our descent but did not communicate our inability to comply with the subsequent clearance.


Second narrative: [No additional substantive information was included in the secondary narrative.]


Synopsis: High tailwinds and an ATC airspeed restriction caused the flight crew of an MD-11 to be unable to comply with the crossing restrictions on the PAATS RNAV STAR to PHL.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Tower conducts PRM procedures contrary to every other Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) approach we do and it is dangerous and confusing. Tower transmission is transmitted at the same time on the Monitor frequency. When we are listening to both as required the quality of the Tower transmission is very poor. We had to ask 2 times if we were cleared to land. Imagine listening to the Tower through a tin can with strings attached to both ends.Additionally last night the Tower controller was a female controller and just outside the marker a male voice directed us to slow to our final approach speed as were following a Heavy. It seemed to us that (because of the difference -male vs female voice and poor audio quality) the instruction had come from the monitor frequency. It is possible that it was the Final controller or a supervisor; but we could not tell and it led us to wonder if we should respond on Tower or Monitor frequency? As a pilot the ONLY transmission I expect to hear on the monitor frequency are breakout instructions.At [other airports]; we hear every transmission that the Tower controller is making on the Monitor frequency. I contacted the Tower supervisor on the way home via phone to express concern. I relayed all the information above and he thanked me for actionable information and stated that they receive many complaints about the quality of radio communication from tower during PRM approaches. Also called to ask ATC coordinator to intervene and try to promote corrective action. He agreed (based on his experience with setting up PRM approach procedures at [another airport]) that the only time we should hear any transmission from the Monitor controller is if they are issuing Breakout instructions.




Synopsis: A pilot reported poor quality radio transmissions while monitoring Tower and Monitor controllers while conducting a PRM Approach.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: DC-9 50
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working GC-N during a departure push. A DC-9 was waiting to taxi into the ramp. Since he wasn't moving; I asked him if he could get into the ramp. He said he couldn't get a word in to them so I asked him to wait for two MD-88s to exit the ramp before he went in. I taxied MD-88 1 and MD-88 2 out of the ramp and while the first one was exiting the ramp; I saw DC-9 taxi into the ramp. The two aircraft passed each other in the mouth of the ramp. I'm sure Ramp X cleared DC-9 in and he went in instead of giving way like he was instructed to do. This happens way too often at Ramp X. It is a seriously dangerous situation and I am amazed two [aircraft] haven't hit. Ramp X is famous for no notice ramp hold outs; usually when the plane is short of the ramp. I notified the Supervisor; but since management believes that Air Carrier X is their customer; they are hesitant to take any action. So this same situation happens all the time. It's happened to me several times. In a team training I was told Ramp X has been a problem for years and nothing can be done about it. I'm not willing to accept that. Either safety is a priority; or it isn't. The Ramp Towers should not taxi aircraft on the taxiways. Meter traffic in and out of the ramps. Everybody can't push back and depart at the same time while simultaneously trying to get the arrivals into the ramp.




Synopsis: ATL Controller described a conflict involving a 'Ramp Controller' area alleging the Ramp Controller issued inappropriate taxi clearances to aircraft about to enter FAA controlled taxiways.
Date: 201702
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Acrid] fumes filled the 1LR and 2LR galley at altitude of 7;000 feet. Same as former fume events. Acrid sweet dirty smell with irritation to throat. After landing; told the pilots. Was told it was deicing fluid. No; it wasn't. The plane had sat at the departure airport since the day before and we didn't deice. It was NOTHING like deciding fluid. I have been in 5 fume events. I am very familiar with the smell. We have this plane again tomorrow. Plane needs to be removed from service and identify the source of the leaking oil getting into air bleed system.




Synopsis: A330 Flight Attendant reported throat irritation after noticing an acrid fume smell in the galley in flight.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My FO mentioned something along the lines that he had some issues with his EFB and was downloading an App again. Since I had checked and prepared my EFB the night before; I thought 'that is strange'; but assumed it was an issue with 'his' EFB. Upon arrival at the airport we received a note stating that there had been some issues with the JeppFD-Pro update.I went into my duties checking the logbook; briefings; etc. Now; when I finally made it to my seat on the flight deck; I found out I had also been affected. My FO offered his EFB to be used by both of us. We flew into ZZZ; had an aircraft swap; and even the Operations Manager came up and offered that (based on some document he received) a 'hard reboot' may help. I tried it but it did not work. We took off and after reaching cruise flight I realized that I had incorrectly recalled information; i.e. I was in error thinking a 'loaner' was only required during dual EFB failure. Since we were (for all practical purposes) single EFB I bought a subscription to Company WiFi and by the time we landed my EFB was 'Up to Speed.'Even though I was 'unequivocally sure' of my thinking; it doesn't hurt; during 'rare' occurrences/events to 'double check' my thinking with our manuals.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported operating several legs with only one operable iPad which was contrary to company procedures.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were originally on the DEBBB Arrival into DFW changed by ATC to the JOVEM 1 arrival after TURKI intersection. We were then cleared for the JOVEM arrival. After TURKI; we descended via the arrival. Our last assigned altitude before the clearance was FL 350. We were instructed by ATC at 34;600 feet to maintain a new altitude of FL 340 while descending to meet the GLOKK crossing restriction of FL 240.. While descending into DFW with Approach we were then told to contact a number for a possible pilot deviation. The controller when we spoke to him believed we confused cleared for the JOVEM 1 arrival for descend via the JOVEM 1 arrival.Better coordination between sectors to keep pilot at set flight level prior to clearance for JOVEM. Literature on various possible RNAV arrival variations on clearances and their meanings.

Callback: The first officer; when asked; commented that approximately 50% of 'via' clearances require flight crew conversation or verification from ATC to ensure accurate understanding.

Second narrative: After speaking to the quality controller; he explained what they thought had happened. They believe we confused cleared via the JOVEM RNAV STAR for descend via.


Synopsis: A CRJ-900 flight crew inbound to DFW at FL350 was cleared via the JOVEM RNAV STAR. Shortly after beginning their descent to cross GLOKK between FL280 & FL240 ATC advised them to stop their descent at FL240 as they had not yet been cleared to descend. During a post flight phone call to ATC it became apparent they had been 'cleared via'; but not yet cleared to 'descend via' the arrival.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I am not sure if ZZZ Departure is short staffed with COVID flight reductions; and controllers are being over worked so stress levels are higher; but I really can't believe the reaction and unprofessional attitude that was demonstrated on ATC's part.  If flight numbers are starting to be increased; Controller staffing needs to be increased back to normal.  I can't see any other reason that would stress a Controller to the point of reacting this way to a very normal situation when radios get busy and a clearance isn't given right.  Taking off from ZZZ; Tower handed us off to Departure.  After switching to Departure frequency; I heard an Air Carrier Y flight check on with Departure.  ATC responded to Air Carrier Y's check in with a clearance for our call sign.  Given the incorrect response to Air Carrier Y; I checked on with Departure as I normally would and remained on my original PDC departure clearance until receiving further instructions.  I did not receive a response.  I then tried to check on two to three more times; but never received a response from ATC.  At that point I requested 'radio check.'  After two 'radio check' attempts I finally received a response from ATC.  It was the most unprofessional reaction I have ever experienced in XX years of flying.  The Controller was basically yelling and said 'Air Carrier X; DO WHATEVER YOU WANT!'  I responded by saying we were 'looking for a clearance.'  At this point we were level at 5;000 feet flying the ZZZZZ Y Departure.  Without a fairly prompt continued climb clearance; it would be very hard to meet further climb restrictions on the departure of ZZZZZ at or above 15;000.  After two attempts asking for a clearance; ATC responded by saying 'Roger.'  After several minutes; the Controller issued us a climb clearance and the flight continued as normal.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with Departure Control and made reference to Controller possibly being overworked or stressed out due to COVID-19 staffing levels.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cardinal 177/177RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight following from Approach; assigned descent to 2;500 MSL and told by Controller to turn 10 degrees right (approximately 160 degrees) to avoid Class D en route to a Class E airport for final landing at my planned destination. Experienced complete electrical failure; attempted to squawk 7600; but unable to communicate. Remained at 2;500 MSL and proceeded to my destination without further incident.




Synopsis: A Cessna pilot experienced electrical failure while using flight following enroute to his destination. Reporter elected to continue to destination using last assigned altitude and heading; landing without difficulity.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were set to execute the ILS 28C which is what the ATIS was reporting. After contacting Chicago Approach; they informed us to expect the RNAV (GPS) 27R. We updated the FMS with RNAV 27R and briefed the approach. VOR updating was turned off. While on Radar vectors; we were given Direct Welev to join the Final for 27R. After joining the final; I notice that my LNAV was indicated full left defection. The VNAV was full up defection; which would be normal since we were below the crossing altitude.At this point; I heard ATC questioning the aircraft ahead of us about their tracking. I took a look at [the] First Officer indication and saw no LNAV/VNAV indication. We both were baffled and could not figure it out. While discussing the matter with FO; aircraft ahead of us did a go around. Shortly after that; we did the same and requested the ILS 28C. Rest of the flight was uneventful; ILS 28C was executed with no issues. After further discussion with FO; we determined that we were perfectly setup for the RNAV 27R approach. Not only did the aircraft ahead of us go around; but so did the aircraft behind us. ATC called me to ask what occurred. I told them what is on this report. They were not sure as to the problem with this approach. ATC controller asked if I thought this was related to 5G. I told him that I did not know.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around at ORD after experiencing autoflight anomalies possibly related to 5G interference.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Safety Instrumentation & Information
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: This event occurred while taxiing out for takeoff. It was near midnight and near the end of our duty day. When running the Final Items on the Before Takeoff checklist; the Captain stated he could not find the Take-off Warn Test Switch. We held the taxi; increased the cockpit illumination and we still couldn't find the switch. At that point; I searched the Flight Manual (FM) for the switch and the configuration check procedure. I was taken aback when I didn't see any language that would say something along the lines of; '...for tail #(s); the Take-Off Warn Test Switch is located...' I was in a bit of disbelieve that the aircraft may not actually have the switch. I couldn't recollect any operations notes that may have addressed the issue of aircraft not equipped with the switch. That said; I pulled out my flashlight and carefully scanned the entire control panel for the switch. Once we concluded that indeed there was no switch; I looked in the FM for the configuration settings covered in the Take-Off Warn system. I found the list on FM 3.90.9 which we used to manually check that the Speed Brake; Trim; Flaps/Leading Edge devices were in the takeoff positions along with ensuring the parking brake was off. After this manual check; both the captain and I felt we had complied with the intent/function of the switch and felt that we were completely safe for takeoff. Now; at least speaking for myself; in the back of my mind I was thinking that this had to be a known issue that was being addressed in the background or that somehow; the switch was there somewhere and we were missing it. I'm sure that some fatigue contributed to that thought and to the lack of follow up other than this [Report].


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Boeing 737 flight crew reported being unable to locate the takeoff warning test switch.