elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BNA.Airport, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Pushback
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: BNA is in desperate need of a Ramp Controller. On this flight; we had four airplanes pushback simultaneously; unnecessarily crowding the alleyway. I wish I had paid closer attention to which gates had pushed; but we pushed; in essence; tail 'NW at a 45' from Gate XX; another aircraft pushed from the opposite side of the alley effectively blocking us in; and then two aircraft pushed off the end of the terminal effectively blocking the both of us in. All this while there was an aircraft waiting on the south side of the terminal trying to get into the alleyway. We are setting ourselves up for failure (late pushes; delayed departures) or worse yet; an incident or accident. And this was day VMC. Add a few additive conditions and we are in trouble.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that four aircraft pushed back simultaneously; causing some of them to be blocked in the alley at BNA airport.
Date: 202011
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During thrust reverser cycling #2 eng inadvertently started causing over temp to 821.5 to 28 seconds. As per MM 71-00-00-800-804-f00; [it] will require boroscope due to temp going into area C of chart. I did not notice that the APU bleed was left on and I did not pull ignition circuit breakers. [I] had 2 techs clearing around engine.




Synopsis: Inspector reported omitting steps during a borescope for engine overtemperature.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Right-Hand (RH) Aft Overwing Slide Squib would not test. While following MEL Procedure 25-66R; slide deployed. Test box was not available at Terminal-ZZZ. Alternate MEL Procedure 25-66R didn't specifically state to pin slide bottle.


Second narrative: We were tring to Defer (DF) the Aft Right Overwing Slide Squid; using an MEL 25-66X Deferral (DF) procedure. We were on Step-6; trying to get the 22-34V Volts from the [Squib electrical] connector. The other Mechanic was opening and closing the door and I was tring to get the correct volts when the slide blew.  We did not read the entire Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 25-65-00/501; and we did not pin the slide. Not ETOPS.


Synopsis: Two Line Mechanics report a right-hand Aft Overwing Escape Slide inadvertently deployed on a B757-200 aircraft while they were performing an MEL deferral procedure involving a Voltage Test of the Slide Squib connectors. The slide safety pin was not installed.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Staffing; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Our aircraft had no APU so we needed to start the number 2 engine prior to pushback with the GPU connected. An orange vest ramper kept asking to pull the GPU and I told him no. I asked for the ramp supervisor and told him we need to start 2 since we have no APU. He cleared the area and cleared us to start 2. At this point; gate to our right started sending passengers out to board their aircraft. Because of the close proximity; I aborted the start and signaled to him about the passengers and he sent another person to hold them at the door while we started. I proceeded to attempt to start number 2 again and noticed the Nh (high pressure compressor speed) climbing very slow. It's when I noticed the ramper had disconnected the GPU without my signaling. The battery start was clearly going to lead to a hot start so I aborted again and signaled to the supervisor to reconnect ground power. They reconnected ground power and we started number 2 without further incident. We wasted almost 15 minutes after door closure trying to get this situation organized so we could start the engine.No organization of gate area to provide a safe at gate engine start. Aborted starts multiple times for safety reasons. Better supervision and understanding of procedures is needed.




Synopsis: Dash 8 Captain reported terminating engine start twice due to miscommunication or lack of training of ground personnel causing a 15 minute delay.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MKE.Airport, WI
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Latitude (C680A)
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C MKE
ATC / advisory: Tower MKE
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I spotted a drone which appeared to be a quadcopter go right underneath us on the localizer. It appeared to go underneath us a hundred feet or so going the opposite direction. I was right off the coast over Lake Michigan off the 25L localizer MKE.Always keep an eye out at low altitude.




Synopsis: CE-680A Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV on approach to MKE Runway 25L.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aft Flight Attendant; appeared extremely fatigued. Upon completing her cabin service in the main cabin she put the cart away then proceeded to row XX and slept in seat XX for remainder of the flight until I made the before landing PA announcement. During the time she was gone; I was taking care of my first class passengers and trying to keep watch on the main cabin. After making my before landing announcement she did the cabin check in the main cabin as well as collect trash then she sat in the aft jumpseat for landing. I believe she was extremely fatigued or very ill.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant experienced illness or fatigue; causing her to be unable to perform her duties.
Date: 201901
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: [Following] a medical emergency [involving a crew member in the airport terminal]; we felt overwhelmed with stress and anxiety and Fatigue. The [Lead Flight Attendant] was on the phone with [her] team and her Supervisor explaining what occurred and we would not be safe to fly our evening departure. We; all crew members; also received calls from [Company] preventing proper rest before flight and ignored when told we were not fit to fly. We were asked to persuade others (bullied) to fly even when [we] felt it was a safety issue. [Another Flight Attendant] gave them a definite NO; [that] she was not safe to fly; we were scheduled to fly anyway.


Second narrative: On our layover in a public bathroom I heard a loud noise and moans coming from the mens room. I knew Captain was the only one in there so I asked if he was OK and if I could come in.  I yelled for the rest of my crew to come fast.  I found Captain was on the floor; he had passed out and hit his head. When he came to he wanted to stand so we let him with support at which time he fainted again.  I called 911 while the other crew members were assisting him prepared to perform CPR.  He was going in and out of consciousness. We kept him alert talking to us until paramedics got there.  He was taken by ambulance to the hospital.  Our FO; #1 and #4 were there with me.Our #1 contacted her supervisor immediately and the certs team. We were later in touch with our supervisor letting her know how shaken up we were.  We were due to fly later that night. I asked if we could swap crews with the later crew as now their flight is delayed 12 hours because of this event as Captain was their Captain.  We were told no.Our #1 told supervisor she was not safe to fly due to stress and fatigue. I told supervisor I'm not feeling safe to fly and she suggested maybe I would later on.  I felt bullied in to taking our red eye back.  I was up for 22 hours straight and not fit to fly. I was falling asleep on the jumpseat.When a cabin crew has been stressed with a medical emergency they should not fly until rested and feeling better.  Supervisor should not persuade us to fly.  I was never contacted upon arrival to see if I was OK; only #1 was contacted.


Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendants reported the cabin crew was pressured to work the flight following a stressful medical event in the airport terminal involving another crew member.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BNA.Airport, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C BNA
ATC / advisory: TRACON BNA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: We were cleared for the RNAV RNP Z 20R from JOGLO. Approach Control had been advising another Company aircraft landscape north on 20L of a small aircraft that had penetrated the Class C and advised them that the aircraft's location was on final to 20L tracking west. We knew that aircraft would be an issue for us and I (PM; Pilot Monitoring) began to scan for the traffic. Approach then advised us that after 90 degrees the aircraft would be on/near our course. I spotted the aircraft and advised the PF (Pilot Flying) to arrest the rate of descent and they used V/S. As they did we got a TA and then immediately following an RA to not descend. The PF never got sight of the traffic but I felt the corrections were proper. In my estimation the traffic flew 200 feet below us on the approach course; and with Approach Control's help and the RA; this would have been a near miss. On landing we received an FAA phone number and after we had parked the aircraft I called and reported my recollection to them.I am unable to provide insight because this was an aircraft that wasn't talking to ATC. The traffic was a threat and we all worked together to maintain safety of flight.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC on approach with aircraft that penetrated BNA airport airspace.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Had been issued a block altitude clearance and been changing altitude as needed within that block (related to turbulence) for several hours. Requested deviation around weather. ATC granted 50 NM. During deviation; descended from FL370 to FL360 due to turbulence. When ATC requested that we confirm altitude; signaled that something was amiss. Reread the deviation message...both of us had previously missed the cancellation of our block clearance- we both thought we still had one. Climbed back to FL370 and flight continued normally to destination.There were several [causes]; speaking only for myself. This was my first flight after nearly X months off due to COVID. I still feel confident; but out of practice. [I] was in seat 5+ hours when event occurred; energy was waning a bit. New to the X type aircraft fleet and just consolidated prior to extended time off. Had only crossed Ocean X twice and unfamiliar with 'the norms' (Didn't know that ATC tends to cancel block clearances in conjunction with another instruction/clearance over Ocean X.) Expected that an altitude clearance/cancellation would be communicated on its own; not included with weather deviation. Due to aforementioned factors; regrettably didn't register the block cancellation. Captain evidently didn't either.I admit and sincerely apologize for the error; however; altitude clearances are critical to our safety and should be given separately from any other clearance or instruction. One CPDLC message sounds (one chime in the flight deck) - I believe it's human to expect the message to address one thing; not two. It's easier to miss the 2nd item if clearances are combined; especially after many hours sitting with low activity. My suggestion is to send the weather deviation clearance as one message (one chime) and the block altitude cancellation as a separate message (2nd chime.)




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported an altitude deviation after descending to avoid turbulence. The crew thought they were still cleared to a block altitude; but realized they were not after ATC asked them to confirm their altitude.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Tower, FO
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: It was a clear night and the co-pilot was flying by hand using the flight directors and started accelerating out of 10;000 FT from 250 to 300 KTS and I was doing SOP's when I felt G's and looked up to see the pitch on the attitude indicator going through 20 degrees and the speed dropping through 260 KTS. I yelled; 'Your pitch is too high; I got it.' I pushed over without negative G and stabilized the climb. The copilot said he was looking outside and must have gotten a false horizon since we took off to the north over the water at night. He was now fine and he continued to fly the next two legs flawlessly. He has always been in the top 25% of the pilots I have flown with and is very sharp; but couldn't remember anything like this happening before. He has always espoused that the younger pilots don't do enough hand flying to keep up proficiency; but in this case it was the opposite of not relying on flight director and instruments. I thought I should report this since it shows how it can affect even the highest skill level late in an airline career. What will never be known is when he would have discovered his visual disorientation and if he could have recovered. I remember an Airbus 320 accident similar due to the Captains disorientation at night visual over the water after takeoff that occurred a few years ago in the Middle East.




Synopsis: B777 Captain took control of the aircraft when the First Officer exceeded 20 degrees pitch with decreasing airspeed on a visual; hand-flown departure. First Officer attributed the pitch increase to the perception of a false horizon over water at night.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Power was set to TOGA for takeoff by pilot flying (Captain) and set thrust call was made. Pilot not flying (First Officer) has personal technique of touching the side of the thrust lever to confirm thrust set. As the pilot not flying moved his hand to 'touch' the side of the thrust lever he inadvertently bumped the flap position lever from the desired 20 degree position to the 8 degree position. This caused a Configuration Warning and takeoff was discontinued. Runway was cleared and aircraft was stopped on taxiway as we discussed the incident. A second Before Takeoff Checklist was completed and second takeoff attempt was completed without incident. First Officer needs to modify his technique of touching thrust lever when confirming thrust set!


Second narrative: My Captain had advanced thrust levers to takeoff. Called 'set thrust.' I had my left hand on left side of my leg with my thumb on top of my kneecap. I reached up to confirm thrust lever in takeoff position by touching thrust lever; then looked up and confirmed thrust setting on N1 gauge; calling out 'thrust set.' I brushed the flaps lever with my hand [and] did not realize that I knocked the flaps from the 20 degree position into the flaps 8 degree position. We got the takeoff configuration warning. I realized what I had done and looked up and said 'the flaps now at 8 degrees.' I realized what I had done. We discontinued takeoff. I put flaps back in flaps 20 degrees. We exited runway; re-ran all checklists; told flight attendants what had happened. Told ATC and passengers we had indication error; re-set problem; and would be on our way. We departed again no problems. It was my fault totally and I apologized to my Captain for my mistake.


Synopsis: A CRJ-90 flight crew aborted their takeoff when the First Officer accidentally moved the flap lever from 20 to 8 while checking thrust setting on the roll.