Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: It is important to note this is my best recollection of events during a very busy time in the cockpit. We were cleared for the Pucks Two Arrival for HOU; landing runway 31 (winds strongly favored this runway at departure). Descending via the arrival in VNAV; speeds and descent rate stabilized; located between SLYCE and GEAR; controller informs us that HOU has switched to runway 4 and asked us if we had the BAYYY2 RNAV arrival. My NFP acknowledged that we did; and the controller asked us to fly it.  Knowing the pitfalls of this kind of change; I immediately told the PNF not to accept that until we had programmed it and briefed it. He proceeded to attempt to load it in the FMS while I continued to fly; and at the same time told the controller we'd need a minute. He entered the BAYYY in the FMS; or so he thought. Meanwhile the controller asked us again if we were able to fly the BAYYY. At this point tensions are high in the cockpit - this was in no way anticipated.I had put the BAYYY arrival chart on my PFD to see if it was similar and where we might be on it. I realized that the fixes I saw didn't match what was in the FMS; so I suggested that he may have programmed the wrong arrival. As the PNF is new to the airplane he was confused as to what was happening; we asked for a heading and altitude from the controller and switched controls to him so that I could take a look. I found that he had entered the wrong arrival; so I fixed that; then proceeded to brief the fixes and all of that and between crossings and speeds. Controller asks again if we are ready during the middle of the process; and I pointed out the first couple of fixes to my partner on the chart; including the crossing at what was the next fix (FRDDY); he said ok; and we told the controller we could take it. In all of the confusion; we had then engaged the new arrival in the FMS but had the FCM still selected in the heading and had; of course; gone off of the new arrival. I am unclear as I was very busy (overloaded really) when we reset the altitude to 6000 from 13000 assigned but we did so to descend via the arrival. The controller mentioned about that time that we appeared to be off of the arrival - I think his assumption was that because the track of the arrivals are similar at that point that we could reengage and be on the new arrival.  Also; I had not had time to program all of the crossing altitudes or to make sure we understood all of the speeds. That was a mistake. I had briefed my partner (PF) that we needed to make the next fix; FRDDY; between 10;000 and 8000. He said he understood that. At this point I looked up to see that we were fast approaching FRDDY; and; after I had told the PF that we needed to be at FRDDY between 10;000 and 8;000; saw that he was descending through 7600 about 3 miles from FRDDY. I quickly pointed this out; and he; clearly flustered; disconnected the autopilot and began to ease the plane back to 8000. He later admitted that he had the wrong arrival chart up and had briefly lost SA. At this point the controller; as I recall; told us to just maintain 6000; then changed it to maintain 7000. We were also still working our way back to the course; we were south of it. I made a mental note; as did my partner; that ATC never recleared us to a point on the new arrival. I guess the assumption on ATC's part was that we just work our way back onto the profile as if nothing had happened. That may be part of the solution to this - as we discussed in our debrief - to re-clear us to a point down the road on the new arrival with a crossing altitude and speed.At this point I told the controller 'look; you have to understand when you guys do this; the box dumps the entire arrival; the crossings; everything. We have to reprogram it.' I didn't even mention rebriefing it - akin to reintegrating the crew. The controller said he did understand but didn't control the runway change at HOU. We rejoined the full profile by FIGGG and flew the rest uneventfully; albeit flustered. That was a mess there is no way to prepare for. I think it goes without saying that these new; complex RNAV arrivals require a thorough briefing and careful programming well before initiating the procedure. Sudden changes throw all of that CRM out of the window. The Garmin 3000 at this time does not put in any crossing altitudes but the lowest at each required fix in the current software load.  This may not be practical in an arrival change if we are much higher.  For ATC to change the entire procedure or transition as the airplane is committed to a speed; crossing; and descent trajectory at high speed; and the crew is in situation awareness in the current arrival just for their own convenience is unacceptable. To then expect that the crew reprogram; rebrief; and accept a new arrival or transition in this situation under intense time pressure (real or perceived) shows a fundamental lack of understanding on their part to the intricacies of flying these procedures from a cockpit and human factors perspective. Until we have procedures in place to limit ATC from doing this randomly anywhere on the procedure and training for the crews in how to deal with these sudden and wholesale changes while flying complex RNAV procedures; I will no longer accept a change on these arrivals from this point forward. ATC will have to issue altitudes; speeds; and vectors. In our debrief we agreed on this.




Synopsis: Business jet Captain explained the confusion and workload following a late HOU runway change which necessitated an arrival change from the PUCKS 2 to BAYYY 2 RNAV Arrival.