elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon a Cat 1 approach into ZZZZ; we taxied to the gate. Upon arrival the ground crew opened the smoke curtain and immediately came to the flight deck informing us the hazmat can door was not properly secured and resting against the smoke curtain. I remember the hazmat can inspection very well. We had a lot of hazardous materials and a lot of separation issues but all were complied with; the hazardous materials folder was in compliance and the hazmat can was properly secured to line 2. I watched the handlers in ZZZ1 zip up the smoke curtain properly and properly secure the 9 G net. I did my final cabin preparation and flew to ZZZZ uneventful until the ground crew informed us that the door to the hazmat can was not attached.Cause: I never in a million years would have thought I need to make sure the door is secured to the hazmat can. We check the can; check the hose; watch the smoke barrier and 9 g net but I should watch them attach the door. This is a busy time of flight when we were getting the final and checking numbers but the safety concerns surpass all. Suggestions: Find time or wait and watch the hazmat can door being closed and secure. We had a full load of hazmat with incompatibles that had the correct spacing but all is mute if the door is not attached. From now on; I will watch the door being attached and check it is secure before they close the curtain and net.


Second narrative: After landing off load crew reported that the Hazmat can door was not attached and was found leaning against the smoke barrier net. Halon hose was attached to the Hazmat can. All hazardous material was still secure and tied down. Hazmat door was not in place or secured.Cause: Load crew in ZZZ1 did not attach Hazmat can door.Suggestions: Training. Follow up inspection. Change post load procedures.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported being notified on arrival by ground crew that the Hazmat can door was not properly secured.
Date: 202107
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Off Duty
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Never called [in] fatigue in my over 20 years with the company until now; but schedulers are pushing (we) reserve flight attendants to the limit since we are short staffed. It is unsafe for us to have 14 hour days or even more; with 4; 5; 6 legs a day during many consecutive days. We are not able to have a good rest; since all hotels are crowded and loud; in most places we stay at. On my 5th consecutive day flying; I experienced exhaustion due to the heavy schedules; heat; and lack of rest. I requested the schedulers a different flight; if possible; since they wanted me to fly for another 14 hour day period. They denied my request; saying that all schedules were over the same 14 hour on duty time or even more due to delays because of the short staffing. I told them it was unsafe for me to fly with the symptoms I was experiencing and asked to be removed. It took me literally more than 24 hours to get some recovery after what I experienced.Overworked flight attendants make our job unsafe. Just because [it] is legal in paper does not make right to be flying and perform our duties SAFELY or in an accurate manner.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported calling in fatigued due to scheduling and physiological issues. Reporter stated that reserve flight attendants were being overworked due to short staffing issues.
Date: 201909
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were slow to roll with traffic landing on an intersecting runway. On takeoff roll; the red lights came on. We verified takeoff clearance and were told it was caused by the landing traffic. We just saw the last lights of the automated system and honestly I believe it was safer to continue than to abort the takeoff at that point. At the time; I really couldn't remember if it was okay to go but no one said no. I'm still doubting myself and actions as I'm writing this report.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported the runway incursion red lights activated but they felt it was safer to continue the takeoff instead of aborting.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Starting descent the Flight Attendant called to tell us that we had a male passenger on board having trouble breathing. Oxygen was being given and a nurse was tending to him. While we were sending messages/making calls for paramedics I noticed the throttles way mis-aligned. The left one simply wouldn't retard. It was binding in the forward position. I turned off autothrottles but that didn't help. We looked and could not find a procedure in the QRH. While considering shutting down the left engine; the airplane was performing fine and I decided not to. The throttles were however severely binding and fighting one another. [We] decided to declare a 'double emergency' with ATC. (I hope one report will suffice?) First; for the medical problem and then for the engine. Told ATC what was going on; that we needed room to do a stable descent and they complied. Shot a normal ILS approach; and aircraft was stable. Upon touchdown I didn't want one engine at 1.25 EPR and the other at idle; so I shut down the left one on roll out. [We] taxied to the gate on one engine followed by fire and police. After the engine was shut down the left throttle did retard and froze stiff in that position. At gate all passengers complied as paramedics tended to the ill passenger. (He walked off on his on power) Passengers then deplaned normally and that was about it.




Synopsis: B757 Captain is informed of a passenger illness during descent for landing then notices that the left throttle has not been retarded by the auto throttles and cannot be retarded manually. An emergency is declared and ATC advised of the issue. With a minimum thrust setting of 1.25 EPR the engine is allowed to run through the approach and landing; and is shut down on the roll out.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Cruising at FL240 on the Ivane5. ATC cleared us to descend via the IVANE RNAV STAR. Looked at the next fix Mayos; and there was not a restriction set in the FMS. Set 6;000 Ft in altitude alert window. Began to pick up a little chop; and I said to First Officer (FO): I think I'll take the descent now. Engaged managed descent; trusting the FMS; and FO said 'I'll let him know.' So he called ATC out of FL240; and he said; 'You have to cross Mayos at FL240.' He then asked if we could get cleared down to FL220; and ATC granted this request with descend to FL220 and then descend via the Ivane5.' We had started down; but were about 200 Ft below FL240; or 23;800 Ft when we intervened and leveled off.Because we were at a lower cruising altitude; FL240; I think that the FMS didn't accurately sense a crossing restriction at the next intersection on the arrival; and therefore ACCEPTED my input of a managed descent. There was not a window altitude at Mayos this time. This would have been contrary to the star which requires us to cross Mayos between FL260 and FL240. Certainly updating the software to retain crossing restrictions; and to honor them in managed descent would be nice; regardless if already at cruising altitude. Now I must check the arrival's Jepp page when initially beginning a descent; and then continuously check it during a descent against the glass. I remember when I first came over to the airbus from the 737; and the check airman said; 'The glass never lies.' In this case; I'm finding out more and more; that the glass does indeed lie.




Synopsis: While level at FL240 prior to MAYOS on the IVANE RNAV STAR to CLT the flight crew of an A319 opted to initiate their previously received 'descend via' clearance; set their 6000 MSL bottom altitude in the altitude alert and selected managed descent. As directed; the Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC) initiated the descent despite not yet having complied with the minimum FL240 altitude at MAYOS.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final approach with flaps 20 and gear down I asked for flaps 25 from FO. He moved handle and flaps did not move. They remained equal at 20 flaps and we got EICAS message 'TE FLAPS DISAG'. Being very confident that flaps were at 20 and that was ok for landing we checked flaps 20 ref speed and set approach speed accordingly. Completed the checklist and continued approach and landing. I made the decision to land based on altitude (approx 1200 AGL) at the time of event; CFIT risk high in that area and IFR conditions above 2000 feet; heavy traffic in area as well. Landing was the least risk decision. We noted the discrepancy in the AML and told MX and [Dispatch]. Landing was uneventful. There was no time to run QRH-simply accept the flight confuguration we currently had and that was sufficient for a safe landing. System malfunction. Repeat write up on this jet for same problem.I think the only other course of action would have been to go-around and run QRH which would have driven us to use ALT flap system. However; in that environment I think the safer course of action was to accept the flaps 20 setting and land. We had a very long runway and data to give us safe outcome. The unknowns in the go-around were higher risk. No way to prevent this-aircraft sysytem malfunction.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a flap malfunction and the subsequent decision to land without reference to the QRH.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft X keyed up; unable to hold altitude. I gave him a descent clearance and asked if it was because of severe turbulence (we had no reports of severe but it was near the Rockies and we had light to moderate chop in places). He said yes. He leveled off at FL290 and diverted to Denver to check the aircraft for damage and reported no injuries.




Synopsis: ZDV Center Controller reported a pilot needed an immediate descent due to severe turbulence.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAU.Airport, IL
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: I returned from a break and looked at the 'numbers' for BAE sector and showed a yellow 26 or 28; I can't remember. I saw there was no one on break and was assigned BAE sector to let that controller go home. I asked the Supervisor about the lack of staffing and the high traffic count coming up at BAE. [The Supervisor] said hold-overtime was not approved. I plugged in at BAE and was getting busy. I had asked for a D-side. It was getting much worse and needed help right away. I asked at least 5 times for a D-side. It took maybe 15 minutes or so before I got one. The sector was near out of control. We had [a nearby sector] traffic from the low side. It was humid and aircraft were not climbing. Swap north was getting out of hand and departures opposite direction was a problem too. Most aircraft were complaining about chop/turbulence and was tying up the freq. I stopped taking hand-offs here and there from the low side and he couldn't take my hand-offs as a result.Where is flow in all this? How about hold-overtime? We had plenty of people that went home. I never complain about working busy periods; I enjoy it. And I understand we need to move aircraft but this was a totally unsafe situation. I ended up 2.5 hours on the position. I completely lost track of time so times are approximate. Please really look into this. Better flow! Better management with traffic volume forecast!




Synopsis: ZAU Center Controller reported their session was out of control due to traffic and no flow control from the Traffic Management Unit.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at cruise altitude; I opened the company issued iPad and selected the [normal] icon. The iPad displayed the usual [company] logo but did not continue to the menu. After several tries; I shut down the iPad and restarted it. After the iPad re-booted; I again selected the [normal] icon. [The menu] did open but I found that all material was deleted. Under all menu selections; 'No Content' was displayed. We reverted to single iPad procedures as per the FOM. All other information on the iPad and other applications are operating normally. I notified the [Duty Manager] via ACARS of the inflight failure of my iPad and that I would need a replacement iPad for my next flight; as per FOM. The Dispatcher responded via ACARS with an authorization to operate inflight with a single iPad.




Synopsis: A320 Captain discovers his iPad database containing charts and other necessary in flight information to be deleted. The flight continues to destination using the remaining iPad; where the faulty iPad is replaced.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Level cruise at 16;000; clear day.  Total electrical failure.  Reverted to manual Direct Law flight; no communication.   Immediate action item of ACCESS TRANS executed and reestablished electric power with APU and Number 2 generator.  Multiple ECAMs and failures indicated.  Tried to communicate with Dispatch through VHF; bad transmissions.  Initially had no ACARS or communication radios.  Confirmed to continue to destination and land.  Landing normal.  Initial diagnosis by Maintenance showed faulty TR 1.  However the total loss of Comm 1 was unexplainable; and that there was a total electrical failure with 2 engine generators and APU generator operational.  Review QRH more frequently and remember the memory items.

Callback: The Captain states that initially the electrical failure was total; resulting in no displays; no lights; no radios; no fans; and direct law flight controls.  He cannot remember if the essential bus switch was pushed or if there was a fault light displayed; but the APU was started.  Before the APU came online; the Number 2 Generator picked up the load and the lower ECAM and some flight displays began to power up.  When the APU came on line; it picked up the number one AC bus and most systems returned to normal.  The RAT did not deploy indicating that power was being sensed on at least one AC bus.  The reporter also states that Direct Law was surmised by the way the aircraft felt; but when the power came back on the aircraft was in Normal Law.  Post flight revealed over 30 failures in the maintenance computer; and repairs required replacing seven relays; TR Number 1; and installing a 'kit' required by an AD for this fault.



Synopsis: A319 captain experiences total electrical failure at 16;000 feet during day VMC cruise; resulting in no communications and Direct Law.  Power is eventually restored using Generator 2 and the APU.  Flight continues to destination for landing.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 1
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This is a general complaint about performance software. In ZZZ we were IFR at night; with -FZDZ falling. Used performance software for takeoff with full aircraft and alternate with 15;000 pounds of fuel. Deiced with Type 1 and Type 4 fluid. On takeoff roll performance software set power at 83.4% N1. We had a very long takeoff roll and clawed our way into the sky. This takeoff felt very bad and the aircraft was extremely sluggish until I called for full climb power at 1;000 feet. I believe this power setting was too low for the IFR/ Deiced conditions. The problem is there is no middle ground with [the] performance software. I could have over-written the reduction (assumed temperature was 59 degrees) but then I would have been guessing at the trim setting. I also could have; and will next time; use max power whenever using Type 4 anti-ice. Performance software is setting takeoff power too low on most takeoff conditions. On a later flight this same day; with 20 knots of crosswind; but no LLWS being called; the same low power was used for takeoff. We were lighter and the sky was clear. But still a big gust or airspeed drop at liftoff could have been a problem. We have very little power margin with 83% N1 on takeoff. Performance software has us setting takeoff power too low on most takeoffs. We; as pilots must return to a safer place; when determining the power setting for the actual weather conditions. After deicing and having low weather at night; we should not allow [the] performance system to set static power conditions which are not appropriate for safe flight; just to save on maintenance [costs] and engine wear tables. Performance system needs a button that returns a minimum of 90% N1 reduction in certain conditions (or something in the middle). Two settings; max or put-put slow are not good aviation.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported concerns with takeoff data settings being too low.