elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Sail Plane
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was doing a flight review. I was told to do a no spoiler landing. I put the plane in a slip nose high left wing down. On final heading north I was high so I increase my angle and started to come down faster. When I was low enough I started to straighten the plane out. I moved too fast and over-controlled; when the nose went too far it blocked airflow over the left wing and it stalled. I tried to recover; but the controls didn't respond. When we toughed down the plane was moving west and we were pointed south.To prevent a recurrence: practicing recovery from a slip at a higher altitude and at a slower recovery rate.




Synopsis: Sailplane pilot reported slipping the airplane on final and losing control effectiveness.
Date: 201311
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Pax
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During Operational Check of [passenger oxygen] 'Manual Mask Release'; several (more than 50) did not drop. After replacing solenoids; accomplished test again. Some dropped some didn't; with any rhyme or reason as to which ones dropped and which didn't. No single [Cabin] Zone and helter skelter on which ones dropped. Fear this may be a fleet issue and wanted to report in case anybody else had similar problems. Engineering Order (E/O) was issued.

Callback: Reporter stated the A330 was held over for three days at the hangar before they were able to fully accomplish the passenger oxygen 'Manual Mask Release' Check. Engineering had issued an Engineering Authorization (E/A); to redo the same Test; but that second test resulted in 38 Passenger Service Units (PSU) not dropping; that were not part of the previous 50 PSU units that did not drop during the first 'Manual Mask Release' Check. The aircraft is a wide body; twin aisle with a 2-5-2 passenger seat row configuration. Each PSU unit holds three or six masks. Reporter stated there is currently a belief that the small actuating rod that extends and releases the PSU door panel latch is getting dusty and the electrical signal to the actuator may not be of a high enough voltage to override and extend the dusty actuating rod to release the PSU door latch. If that is the source of the failures; that would be surprising; since he has been told the same PSU actuating mechanism is also used on the smaller Airbus A320 PSUs with very few problems. Their Engineering and Airbus are determining whether changes to the PSU mask drop check needs to be revised and just what actually contributed to the failures.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Inspector reports about the failure of 50 Passenger Service Unit (PSU) oxygen masks' doors that would not open on an A330 aircraft during a 'Manual Mask Release' Check. A second test noted that 38 different PSU doors failed to open. The wide body aircraft has a 2-5-2 passenger seat row configuration. Each PSU unit has either three or six masks.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Requesting [company] review Eng Out procedure for SFO Rwy 19 L/R. The original TPS 19 L had Flap Conf 1; but due to conversation with Dispatch due to flight planning; TPS Flap Conf 2 was used. It is a generic EO Proc; but Airbus Note #2 stipulates that if more than 15 deg Angle of Bank needed; then Flap Conf 2/3 will be required.  This Flap setting ensures 30 degree AOB available.  This was my first Takeoff on Rwy 19L in the A321; but we needed 30 degree AOB IMMEDIATELY after takeoff; even with the normal SID.  I was Surprised to see Conf 1 assigned by the Dispatch program!I cannot see how Flap Conf 1 would have worked on a normal takeoff SID; yet alone EO Procedures.  This seems critical only for Rwy 19 since there are 2000 ft hills in front of the rwy.  Dispatcher informed me there was no Safety Filtering in program to cover Airbus Flap restrictions.  Looking at our safety filters; this would get trapped last by crew knowledge of this Note. There is a generic note that EO Procedures exist on TPS for SFO rwys 28/01/19.Please add notes on TPS Conf 1 row - N/A EOP or CHK EOPPlease add a Caution on EO Procedures requiring Airbus Conf 2/3 selection onlyPlease add software filtering in Dispatch/ Loads to restrict EO RWYS requiring Conf 2/3 - TPS Conf 1 Unavailable!


Second narrative: Computer generated TPS had us departing on runway 19L with flaps 1 on a specific departure requiring a 30 degree bank turn to a 100 degree heading immediately after takeoff to avoid a rapidly rising terrain to over 2000' feet. Upon close scrutiny of the TPS during my takeoff briefing checkk airman discovered the discrepancy and thereby trapped the error that could have had serious consequences for the flight.  We contacted dispatch and got a revised TPS for a flaps 2 departure.A review of the computer generated TPS program might be in order to prevent this type of event from occurring again.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew received a TPS for departure from Runway 19L at SFO indicated flaps 1 was required. The normal and engine out procedures for this runway both required a 30 degree banked turn immediately after takeoff which required a flap setting of 2/3.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot flying. After takeoff and final flap retraction; we had a momentary stick shaker. We confirmed aircraft attitude and airspeed were normal. The Captain's display showed an Amber Spd Limit light and minimum speed bar. FO's (First Officer's) display showed normal indications. We informed ATC of our problem and returned to ZZZ. I remained the pilot flying. We completed the QRH for Unreliable Airspeed. Per the QRH; we were able to reengage the flight director and autopilot; but not use the autothrottles. We had extended vectors to burn off fuel so as to not exceed landing weight. As we got closer to the airport; ATC asked if we needed the fire trucks. We told them we did not need them. We landed without incident and returned to the gate.




Synopsis: B737 Pilot reported Captain's airspeed display unreliable.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A310
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landed with fuel in outer tanks exceeding limits. Weight and balance fuel was LO 6.5 LI 4.6 C .5 trm 0 RI 4.5 RO 6.5. Total 22.7 checked and verified. After takeoff at 5;000 FT AGL ECAM alert for fuel. Fuel page and overhead showed LO 6.5 LI 5.8 CTR .5 RI 3.3 RO 3.8. 19.9 total. Referred to QRH for fuel imbalance and cross feed procedures. Note in QRH warned against feeding both engines from one outer fuel tank. Outer tank to tank limits were not to be fixed. Captain chose to balance wing fuel load and accept outer fuel load imbalance on landing since we could never correct the problem in flight. Landing fuel LO 6.5 LI 1.2 C .8 RI 1.5 RO 3.7 total 13.7. Maintenance informed of situation and they found refueling panel configured incorrectly. Transfer valve switch was left on. This was cause of imbalance. Return flight on same aircraft with no issues. Improper refueling panel configuration. Emphasis on attention to detail. Plane wasn't refueled during turn. Fuel was only transferred.




Synopsis: A310 First Officer experiences a fuel imbalance shortly after takeoff which cannot be corrected. Flight continues to destination where Maintenance finds the Transfer valve switch was left on at the previous station.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TTN.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Tower requested our aircraft to extend the left downwind leg; and we would be #3 [for landing]. The new student I was instructing did not quite understand what this meant so I began to explain it to him in the aircraft. We were looking for the #2 traffic; to being following him towards the field. The student accidentally identified the #1 aircraft for the field as the #2; and we began a left base leg after reporting this to the Tower; who cleared us for the turn. We inadvertently flew in front of the #2 traffic; who did have us in sight. The Tower then asked us to 'verify the type of aircraft we were following'; at which point I noticed the type aircraft that we were supposed to follow on a long final. I took over the controls from the student; announced that we were flying 'base heading' and advanced the throttle to full to get as clear of the [other aircraft's] final approach course as possible. The Tower asked for a right 270 degree turn to rejoin final and we landed without incident. I was asked to contact the Tower upon switching to Ground frequency; and the Controller and I had a conversation about what happened.




Synopsis: While operating in the traffic pattern with a flight instructor; a student pilot did not comprehend the landing pattern flow and turned in front of an aircraft on a straight in approach. Following prompting by the Tower Controller; the instructor recognized the conflict; took over the controls; and extended the base leg. The Tower provided a clearance for a circle back to final approach for landing.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground LAX
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We requested to taxi for departure from the FBO at KLAX; ATC's initial response was for us to taxi via A; hold short of Taxiway F. While taxiing on Taxiway A; the ATC called us back and told us to switch and monitor the Tower frequency; as well as to expect the Runway 25L for departure. We were busy in the cockpit with taxi checklist. In this process; the pilot flying did not clearly hear the last part of the transmission. I called back the Ground asking to repeat the last part of the transmission. The Ground Controller responded indicating that we can expect to depart from the Runway 25L. I then switched to the Tower frequency to monitor. Shortly after; while we were still taxiing on Taxiway A; the Tower called us indicating 'continue taxi to Runway 25L; hold short of Runway 25L.' The clearance was read back. I continued to proceed with checklist items on the electronic checklist. When I raised my head; the aircraft was moving past the hold short line. When I saw this I addressed 'hold short' to the pilot flying; but it was too late. The aircraft lined up on Runway 25L and stopped on the runway. The Tower called us indicating that we were told to hold short and not line up.




Synopsis: Bombardier BD-700 flight crew reported crossing the hold short line of the runway while they were preoccupied with the checklist.
Date: 201907
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon exiting the lavatory; I observed the Flight Attendant against the bulkhead by the Flight Attendant jump seat looking at her link device. I informed her that she needed to be behind the cart; looking down the aircraft aisle and guarding the cockpit. She gave me an annoyed look and moved to her position behind the cart. I thought that I had missed a change to the Manuals since this has become a common occurrence on my flights. I would estimate that 25 to 50% of the time; when I exit the lavatory; the Flight Attendant is in the galley; sitting down on the jump seat or in a corner playing with their device. I subsequently asked several newer flight attendants if procedures had changed and they assured me that no; proper procedures were being taught and that they were instructed to stand behind the cart. This type of event; coupled with the fact that flight attendants continue to knock on the Airbus door for entry; refuse to turn the entryway light so they can be identified presumably because they don't want to disturb the passengers and flight attendants not identifying themselves when they answer the interphone tells me that training is insufficient or complacency has set in. In addition; I have had flight attendants put their hand up to cover the keypad while I was trying to enter the code and even found one Flight Attendant IN FRONT of the galley cart. I take cockpit door security VERY seriously. Perhaps we all need to listen to the cockpit tapes from [September 11th] to realize the importance of security and get over our complacency. I have begun briefing the flight attendants on cockpit door security procedures; as well as Airbus specific procedures. This is not my job and I shouldn't have to do this. Additionally; those who do know the proper procedures (and fortunately that is a majority of flight attendants); look at me as if I am insulting them and I get that. But the number of flight attendants who either don't know their job or have become so complacent is sufficient that I feel I need to go over those procedures. Please reply to this report and let me know if my experience is an isolated one; or if this is; in fact; a rampant procedural lapse at this company.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported flight attendants have not been following security procedures when a pilot exits the cockpit.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MHT.Airport, NH
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: When preflight planning; there is no way to accurately know which runway to expect at MHT. There is no digital ATIS. Weather for preflight planning is by a METAR.  This does give us the weather but not a runway.  Sometimes it is easy to know which runway to expect; but when the winds are light or calm there is no way of knowing. This would not be too much of a problem for many airports; but MHT uses complex RNAV arrivals with a branch point. We brief ahead of time. VHF ATIS is not in radio range at the normal time of our briefing. En route when the VHF ATIS is obtained it is sometimes necessary to change the runway which changes the arrival from the branch point. This is usually done while on the arrival in a high workload environment. Without the digital ATIS coupled with complex RNAV arrivals; we have the possibility of errors due to debriefing and reprogramming the FMC.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported MHT airport's lack of digital ATIS makes it difficult to properly prepare for the approach.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SAT.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C SAT
ATC / advisory: Tower SAT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The captain was the flying pilot as we were approaching SAT runway 22 from the east.  We were slightly left of course and intercepting final with about a ten degree angle.  On about a ten mile final we received a TCAS traffic alert showing an aircraft at our right 3 o'clock about 700 feet above us and descending.  Looking out to the right I saw a aircraft; approaching form the west; on a right base turn to final also to runway 22.  His trajectory would have had him intercepting final at the same place and time that we would intercept final. Being that he was slightly higher and belly up to us I don't think he could see us.  As we gently turned away from him I noticed he had made a sharp turn away from us; turning back toward the west.  We had already switched to tower frequency; he was still on approach frequency so there was no direct communication between us.  Querying the tower controller we were informed the other aircraft was supposed to be following us.  We continued the approach to landing having never received an RA.  At the closest point I estimate the distance between the two aircraft was less than 800 feet laterally and 100 vertically.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of being on final and another aircraft coming very close to their aircraft and then it is turned away from them.  The aircraft was supposed to follow their aircraft.