Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Fighter
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Refueling
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Second aircraft: Fighter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the 43/44 RA position. We had information on an ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) that would be traversing through our airspace. The ALTRV included Flight X (6 military fighters); Flight Y (5 military fighters); and a military refueler. Flight X would fly through first; join up with Flight Y and refuel; and then break up. Flight Y would circle back and meet up with the refueler. This would all happen in the block FL180-FL230. The airspace where this would traverse is the southern end of the Chicago South Departure Climb Corridor. The actual airspace is owned/controlled by sectors 58 and 57. Per SOP; sectors 43 and 44 have permission to enter this airspace at or above FL190 with Chicago (C90) departure aircraft. To protect for this; sectors 58 and 57 are required to point out aircraft from FL180-FL230 to sectors 43 and 44.The ALTRV was to enter the 'shared' airspace in the southwestern corner near SPI. 58 called me at 43/44 to point out Flight X; FL180-FL230. There was 1 data block the flight plan read 6 fighters. There was an unpaired LDB (Limited Data Block) on code XXXX near the data block; and bunch of primaries; all grouped within a 4-6 mile diameter. I queried the transferring controller as to whether this was a standard or not standard formation (nonstandard); then I asked if the XXXX code was the trailing aircraft (yes; with some reservations/uncertainty). I was uncomfortable with the coordination; but ultimately said 'point out approved. This is a very heavily traveled corridor. A tremendous amount of coordination was required to climb departures above the ALTRV; and while I am confident the entire situation was safe and separation was never lost; I believe separation was based entirely on an assumption of where aircraft were in the formation; rather than separating from radar identified targets.Subsequently; the Refueler approached the airspace about 20-30 minutes later. 58 called again to point out the flight FL210-FL230 with control to FL180-FL230. I asked again if it was a standard or non-standard flight; and the response I got was 'I don't know. I'll find out and call you back' (58 already had the hand off at this time and didn't know the status of the formation). They called back and said it was a non-standard; and the back aircraft was 6 miles in trail. There was no other LDB like the previous flight; so I asked if they were going to have the trailing aircraft turn on their transponder; and they said 'I guess I could'; to which I responded 'I'm just trying to figure out how I will separate from this flight'. The response I got was 'well; do you just want to work him then'; so I said radar contact.It is my interpretation of the rules that I am responsible to use standard separation from all aircraft involved in a non-standard formation flight. To my knowledge; there was no clearance or restriction issued to either of these flights that non-standard was approved within 'x' amount of miles of the lead; meaning; all 5 or 6 aircraft could move around as they wish. Even with the Refueler; when I was told 6 in trail; when the last aircraft finally turned on their transponder; the in trail ranged between 3-4.5 NM. The separation never seemed constant. Also; extensive primary clutter on our scopes (which is standard) made it very difficult to differentiate between all of the involved aircraft. The attitude and lack of professionalism demonstrated by the transferring controller was very disheartening. The formation flight was in their control and they didn't even know what form of separation they were required to use (standard vs. non-standard); resulting in them pawning off their unwillingness to work on us.There was an ERC (Event Review Committee) response to similar mishandling of military formations that resulted in a 'refresher' type training piece at ZAU a few years ago. The training that was put out wasn't very in depth; and no follow up continued. We have obviously had turn over since then; and I believe there is a need to have this training be on going. We work military aircraft on very rare occasions; so experience levels remain low as memories fade. Education is the only way to combat this. Additionally; there seems to be a larger interpretation gap regarding the requirements of non-standard separations. One Operations Manager told me that all I need to hear is 'nonstandard within (x) miles'; and then separate by '5+(x).' I asked if that is a clearance; and I got a run-around answer saying that the pilots would stay within that distance unless they advised me otherwise. I haven't been able to find any text so far that states such a rule. When I asked about 'miles in trail' he said 5 miles from the front and back aircraft; and connect the two circles. When I pointed out that his response assumed all the aircraft were in line; and that isn't necessarily the case; I got no response.This is a safety sensitive job. We are governed by orders. It seems that everyone involved in this thought they were smart enough to not need orders. There needs to be clear direction on this. This entire situation was filled with assumptions and people 'winging it'. This is something that occurs rarely; but often enough where clear expectations should be set and made readily available for reference.




Synopsis: ZAU Center Controller reported that another Controller was unsure of how to separate a flight of military aircraft. Reporter wanted to confirm a few things with the Controller who was handing off the aircraft; but the other Controller did not know the answers.