elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PVD.Airport, RI
Aircraft: S-70/UH-60 Blackhawk/Seahawk/Pavehawk/Knighthawk
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C PVD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PVD
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: H60 IFR from GON to HHOTT for the RNAV 27 approach at IJD as part of a string of practice approaches. Weather was VFR; the H60 was IFR. The South Sector attempted to switch the H60 to my frequency at 030 over ORW a few miles from the airspace border. No communication was established on my frequency due to poor radio coverage so he went back to the South frequency. They held onto him a little longer then told him to try me again in 2 minutes with a back up frequency as well if that one does work. A few minutes later I was able to establish a broken transmission and the H60 reported they were over HHOTT commencing procedure turn. I informed him they were still 7 miles south of that fix and not yet near the final approach course. They turned back on to HHOTT so I cleared them for the approach. On the procedure turn inbound I attempted to switch to advisory with no reply numerous times. A minute later the H60 was tracking northwest bound through the final and descending below the crossing altitude. I attempted to reach the H60 on frequency with no reply. I broadcast a low altitude alert on my frequency and the guard frequencies; finally getting a reply as the H60 was now turning back to the final climbing out of 1;200 in the 2;100 MVA area. I ensured they were established on final again and successfully switched them to advisory via the guard frequency. If it is was not VFR conditions this could have resulted in an aircraft accident as they terrain in the area reaches just over 1;000 FT. Our frequency coverage in this area of our airspace is abysmal. It is a common occurrence to lose aircraft on the frequency. I new transmitter tower is supposed to go live this month which offers some hope of better coverage but in the mean time an immediate and real safety hazard still exists. To not be able to communicate with an aircraft in a hazardous situation due to known equipment limitations is unacceptable. Perhaps the approaches plates for these airports or a general NOTAM for the area would help to educate the pilots that this situation exists.




Synopsis: PVD Controller described a MVA event when communications with a helicopter conducting a practice approach was intermittent; the reporter claiming ATC radio coverage in the subject area is unacceptable.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger came to the back and informed me that I may need to check on my colleague. I asked what was the problem and the passenger told me he was hitting the seat back really hard. When I went up to check on my colleague; I noticed there was blood on his T shirt and uniform shirt. I informed the A Purser Flight Attendant. A doctor announcement was made. 3 doctors responded. I stepped back and let them tend to my colleague. I kept the Purser informed and got supplies that the doctors requested.Prior to what happened to my colleague; I asked him a question earlier in the morning; he said he could not hear me; so I repeated myself 3 to 4 more times; even writing down what I was asking him. He could not hear what I was saying or understand what I was asking him. He kept asking me what I meant; he could not understand and he could not hear me.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported being informed by a passenger that another Flight Attendant was having a health issue. The Flight Attendant in question had exhibited an inability to understand spoken or written questions earlier in the flight. Onboard doctors were summoned.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While descending on the CLASH Arrival just prior to EVRLY we encountered a wake turbulence event 2x in short succession with roll deviation. Autopilot disconnected; was immediately reconnected by the Captain (PF). He disconnected VNAV and initiated Vertical Speed mode to reset our descent path to be slightly above the previous aircraft path; to prevent a third event. About this time; ATC offered us a runway change from 35R to 35L; additionally they requested us to slow to 210 kts. The Captain went to reprogram the FMS for Runway 35L; I was confirming the Captain inputs at this time. The aircraft was still in Vert Speed rather than VNAV; neither of us noticed this and we descended below the STAR required altitude and did not slow to 210 kts. as directed. A query from ATC as to our speed brought us back to reviewing our flight path; at which point we leveled off and reduced speed. ATC made no further comments as to our flight path deviation and at that point broke us off from the STAR with a vector to intercept the LOC. No loss of ATC separation was reported to us.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported speed and altitude deviations on arrival into DEN; citing distraction from a wake turbulence encounter as contributing.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The airplane I am flying is an experimental type and is in phase one flight testing operating out of ZZZ. Returning to ZZZ after an hour personal flight. Wing tanks selected to BOTH feeding the engine. The right fuel tank would always drain more quickly than the left tank when the fuel selector is selected to BOTH. This is because the right tank has a little shorter routing then the left tank. Neither tank has a check valve in the fuel line so fuel does transfer back and forth during turns. Having done several takeoffs and landings at another airport with left hand pattern the right tank had been transferring fuel to the left hand tank in the turns since the fuel selector was on BOTH selection.On returning to land at ZZZ the engine quit due to sucking air from the right tank. I was high enough that a normal landing was made without further incident.I had assumed that by leaving the fuel selector in the BOTH position that the engine would draught fuel from the other tank if one was low. Wrong assumption.Check valves are being installed in the fuel tank lines to prevent cross ship transferring of fuel. Also; the POH is being changed to show tank to engine operation and not BOTH selection.




Synopsis: Experimental aircraft pilot reported the engine quit during approach due to it sucking air from the right fuel tank. Pilot was high enough on the approach to perform a normal glide landing.  Reportedly; the right tank transfers fuel to the left-hand tank when the fuel selector is on the 'BOTH' position causing the right tank to go low on fuel.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BVO.Airport, OK
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF BVO
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Approaching BVO for [a] fly-in; I recognized the potential for a crowd trying to land on Runway 17. I therefore circled to the west waiting for the congestion to die down. Once it seemed to be slacking off I entered mid-field right downwind for 17. On final; I saw that the airplane I was following started a go-around due to another airplane on a landing roll-out on Runway 35 (which I don't recall hearing on the radio). I also started a go-around; and with the help of another voice on the radio; we decided it was high time to start landing on 35 instead of 17. (Winds were out of the north; light; but predicted to increase in strength later). I saw that most of the others in the pattern were still in a flow for 17; but the radio talk still convinced me it was a good time to enter a short left base for 35. I could see one plane on final for 35; somewhere between 2 and 4 miles out. I'd also heard a report of a glider being cut loose above the airport in the same general time period. I didn't see the glider during my short left base turn; and thought my only traffic problem was the 2 plus mile final airplane; which I'd be well in front of. As I was flaring to touchdown; here comes the glider off my right wing; landing on the grass runway; which was immediately on the right side of 35. I'm not sure he ever saw me; and I didn't see him until I was practically on the ground. I can only surmise that he used his spoilers to drop from above me; while staying parallel and slightly right of me. I must not have looked up enough to see him; being also shaded by my ball cap bill. On hindsight; I do recall hearing the glider call final. I wish I'd broken out of the pattern and held west again; until the glider was definitely down and out of everyone's hair before poking my nose into the pattern again. Besides my temporary blindness for the glider; I'd also say it was bad judgment to be flying a glider into a high traffic situation with airplanes.




Synopsis: A pilot landing on BVO Runway 35 had a near miss with a glider landing on the adjacent grass.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 3
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: PFD
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise while I was IMC on the edge of icing conditions most functions on my PFD failed. I had no comms for 3-4 min.; no transponder; etc. All functions had an 'X' through it on the PFD. Shortly thereafter I lost the moving map on the MFD of the G1000. My autopilot continued to operate and I initiated a 180 degree turn back to [a suitable airport]. My COMM came back up and I was able to take vectors to the field. Warning sounds continued throughout all of this. I continued toward [the airport] where the ceiling was approximately 800 ft. I loaded the ILS approach and it seemed to load as I got a glide slope and perspective seemed to be working. I still didn't have a map on the MFD. The terrain awareness system started going off as I was on the approach telling me to pull up. I landed safely.I used a Mac to do a recent update. I may have some corrupt files as a result of using a Mac to update the data cards. In looking at the cards there were indeed two corrupt files on the cards that essentially caused the G1000 to overload and come close to locking up which is why I lost the functions I lost. It was trying to 'fix' the corrupt files. I have been flying the Cirrus for 2 years and had a Columbia 400 with a G1000 for 5 years prior and had never heard of the of the potential issue of using a Mac and the resulting corrupt files. I have two other friends who had been doing the same thing. It seems that Garmin; Cirrus or Jeppesen should issue some type of warning to pilots to prevent someone from getting hurt. This is totally avoidable. A lot of pilots I know use Mac based laptops etc. I hope by making this report it can help someone not get in the bad situation I found myself in.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reported losing most PFD functions. Reportedly; the problem may be related to updating the data cards using an Apple Mac computer.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Auxiliary/Standby System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was part of an originating (first flight of the day) crew for this aircraft. During preflight cockpit flows; placing either of the guarded hydraulic switches to standby failed to activate the Standby Hydraulic/Rudder System. This test of the Standby Hydraulic System by means of a Standby Rudder Check was a part of an originating preflight procedure at our Company from at least the time I was hired in until approximately six months ago when it was removed from our AOM; (Flight Deck Prep). On this particular originating preflight; my old habit pattern resulted in testing and subsequently discovering a complete failure of the Standby Hydraulic System. All the normal protocols involving Dispatch/Maintenance Control/Contract Maintenance and maintenance documentation were followed. When I left the aircraft; Contract Maintenance was still troubleshooting and had already determined that the electric powered standby hydraulic pump did not appear to be receiving power. Although I was not required to perform a standby rudder check; my concern is how long was this particular aircraft flying without a properly operating Standby Hydraulic System? How long would it be before a routine maintenance inspection would reveal the failure? Why was this check removed? What was the rational? Is it the feeling that we would have to lose both Hydraulic A and B systems to need the standby? As a high time Captain in the B737; it makes me uncomfortable knowing that I could have been flying this aircraft without standby rudder/hydraulics. Did we do the right thing by removing this check from our originating aircraft procedures?




Synopsis: A B737-300 Captain discovered the Standby Hydraulic/Rudder System inoperative after inadvertantly performing the system preflight check which had been removed as a preflight requirement about six months prior.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DFW
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We received a clearance to taxi and were told to follow a MD80 in front of us and to taxi to the active runway via a specific taxiway. While following the MD80; it became clear to us that the taxiway in question was really a very large ramp area containing two taxiways that intersected with three more; all of which are poorly marked. Once we determined we were following the MD80 on the wrong taxiway; we corrected and moved to the middle of the ramp area (which contained our taxiway) and continued to our assigned intersection without incident.




Synopsis: A Corporate pilot was directed by DFW Ground to follow an MD80 and discovered he was on a large poorly marked ramp which comprised two taxiways with three poorly marked intersecting taxiways.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: (Lithium Battery) [loaded by cargo warehouse] without a booking. [Other item] was also [loaded] by [cargo warehouse] without a cargo booking.




Synopsis: Airline Ground Personnel reported Hazmat cargo listed for air transport without proper cargo documentation.
Date: 202109
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Cabin Crew Seat
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Jumpseat Issue: Risk of Flight Attendant Injury or IncapacitationI was working position 5 on the B767 where my assigned jumpseat was OWE (Over-wing Exit). I am over 6 feet and due to my height; I was unable to get into proper brace position because the bulkhead wall in front of the wall is too close to the jumpseat. My knees were pushed up against the bulkhead wall and I could not get my feet under my knees. My feet were pushed back underneath my legs in an uncomfortable position that made it hard to even have my foot flat on the floor. This is a safety concern because I am unable to get in proper brace position. I felt unsafe and feared that I would be incapacitated during an emergency. In my professional opinion as a dedicated safety professional; I have concerns that this issue would cause injury and more likely incapacitation to the flight attendant. Flight attendants who are unable to get in proper brace position; are at higher risk to be injured/incapacitated. This conclusion is based off of my experience in this jumpseat as stated above.




Synopsis: B767 Flight Attendant reported the over wing exit jumpseat does not allow tall individuals to brace properly in case of an emergency.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: Heavy Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While descending through 10;000 on the PRTZL3 into IAD we got moderate wake turbulence from a heavy jet in front of us. As a result I climbed and turned 20 degrees off course. We were able to get delay vectors back on course and returned on the arrival. ATC said that we were 12 miles in trail and asked if maybe it was just some turbulence. I had the TCAS band on 5 miles. I estimated the heavy jet to be about 7 miles ahead of us. I'm 100% sure it was wake turbulence. Give us more separation and let us know when we are following heavy traffic. I find that wake turbulence is more of a problem on descents and not so much on approach. Seven miles with a 20 knot head wind is not enough space.




Synopsis: An ERJ-170 Captain reported encountering moderate wake turbulence following a heavy jet into IAD.