elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We pushed back from [the gate]... and started the engines after disconnect as usual. Upon both engines starting; we noticed the same push crew who had pushed us was in formation to marshal a plane into the gate we just pushed from. Normally this is the time we would run our after start checklist then call for taxi while stationary. However; trying to get out of the way to be courteous to the aircraft behind us; we ran the checklist as we were spinning out of the way to let them in. Because we were running a checklist and not thinking; we continued to taxi the aircraft to [the runway]. In our heads; and certainly with a lack of judgment; we were under the impression in our minds we had just communicated with ATC. As we crossed the non movement area line by about 100 ft; we stopped and noticed our radio was on tower and not ground frequency due to the radio call the tower gave us; 'aircraft taxiing...please identify yourself.' I identified our call sign and apologized that we had made the mistake of not calling for taxi instructions. We were in disbelief that we could do something so boneheaded and were embarrassed. It was just a mental mistake by the crew members. There was no safety at risk as we made sure the area was clear like we always do while the aircraft is taxiing. Because we have done this short taxi...a couple thousand times we got complacent and expected that was going to be our taxi instructions. Because we were verbalizing the checklist as we turned out; this was misconstrued in our minds as taxi instructions because that was the normal time to call and ask for taxi clearance. There are no excuses for our actions and it will be a learning experience to us to be sure all checklists are finished and proper communication established even though there might be somebody waiting on you.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ170 flight crew; distracted by a concern for clearing the gate for an incoming aircraft; failed to contact Ground Control prior to commencing taxi.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After advancing the thrust levers and verifying symmetric thrust; I engaged the auto throttles and monitored the advancement of thrust to the specified value. Engine 2 thrust increased to the value specified for the takeoff; 102 pct. With thrust levers matched; engine 1 thrust did not increase above 95 pct. I rejected the takeoff at about 50 kts. We cleared the runway; performed the [Rejected Takeoff] checklist; and returned to the gate. I sent an ELB entry describing the discrepancy.Based on review of this aircraft's maintenance history; the same or similar thrust discrepancy was squawked on the two previous flights. Before our departure; ZZZ Maintenance explained the history; stating that they had successfully run the engine up to about 90 pct N1 but could not test greater thrust on the ramp. They showed me engine data from the preceding takeoff indicating that the low N1 value was accompanied by low fuel flow; EGT; and N2 values. They replaced the N1 sensor and released the aircraft for our flight. With this information; it was not a surprise during our takeoff to see Engine 1 not developing the thrust specified on the takeoff performance up link.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a rejected takeoff caused by engine 1 not making required power.
Date: 201710
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Jet bridge Operations
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Bridge operation normal to the aircraft. As passengers deplaned a couple with a small toddler were stepping off the aircraft and the toddler lost his balance and almost fell through the opening. The opening is on the right outboard side of the floor where the bumper had been modified. The gap is approximately 8'x12'.




Synopsis: Air carrier personnel reported a small child almost fell through the gap between the jet bridge and the aircraft.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight was made earlier that day to ZZZ with high density altitude (8;500 feet) and similar weight. A stop was made at ZZZ for refueling; with the intent to continue on that evening to either [a nearby metropolitan] area or further west. A difference of eleven gallons of fuel (66 lbs) between the level of the tabs and full tanks drastically altered the performance of the aircraft. Even departing with a lower density altitude (8;400 feet); the aircraft refused to climb. With trees nearby; the decision to make an off-airport landing on a nearby highway was made. There was no damage done to the aircraft or any property; and there were no injuries to anyone. The local law enforcement escorted the plane back to the airport where a departure was made the next morning in favorable conditions. These events are always a chain of decisions; and a no-go decision made at any point would have prevented the situation. My decision making was influenced by the successful flight made earlier that day in similar conditions; combined with 'get there-itis'. This was definitely a lesson learned; and a mistake that I will never repeat again.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reports being unable to climb after taking off at maximum weight and a density altitude of 8;400 feet. With trees ahead the decision is made to land on an available highway; which is accomplished without damage or injury.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Embraer Phenom 300
Operator: Fractional
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: DC Battery
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I am captain qualified; but was the SIC on this flight. When starting the aircraft we experienced a STBY HTR FAIL message on the Pilot/Copilot PFD's. This was a repeat write-up and previously addressed by maintenance. I do not know the reason this system failed; from my limited experience in the Phenom 300 this aircraft does not perform well after sitting cold soaked overnight. This aircraft was in the hangar prior to our flight; but I believe it was left outside overnight on the original failure of the system. The Airplane Flight Manual says: NOTE: If the battery has been cold soaked for 2 hours or longer at ambient temperatures of -10C or lower ; it must be preheated to -10 or above prior to engine start.  The AOM Engine Start; operators are directed to start the engines with a GPU when OAT is at or below -10C. At the beginning of this trip I noticed the conflict between the Airplane Flight Manual and the AOM. Knowing I was going to a cold weather area I called the Assistant Chief Pilot for clarification on this procedure. He explained to me that we should get a hangar when possible when cold temperatures were expected; if the plane is to remain outside overnight; we should get a GPU as directed in the AOM. He also said there is no way to tell what temperature the battery is; as there is no indicator on the plane. So operationally; it wasn't feasible to comply with the NOTE in the AFM. This is one of two occurrences this trip having faults with cold soaked Phenom 300's. Always park the plane in a warm hangar if conditions indicate it will be cold soaked. Comply with the AFM NOTE when the plane becomes cold soaked. Develop a procedure for testing the temperature of the aircraft batteries so that the NOTE can be complied with. Maintenance should audit cold soaked Phenom aircraft maintenance faults. Complying with the AFM by parking aircraft inside a hangar and warming batteries will probably lead to less failures and a higher maintenance availability rate.




Synopsis: Phenom 300 First Officer describes problems that arise when the aircraft battery is cold soaked below -10 C.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: OKV.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF OKV
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landing Runway 14 in OKV [and] touched down prior to [Taxiway] C; which is the second taxiway from the beginning of the runway during the rollout. As we started to approach Taxiway C my FO and I both noticed a plane landing the opposite direction on short final. I immediately made a radio call announcing we were on the runway and asked the aircraft to go around. [This] was met with no response; [so] I decided the best course of action; instead of stopping on the runway; was to hustle to the next available taxiway and if that was not going to work we were going to taxi off into the grass. The [other] aircraft touched down and then they must [have] noticed us because they then proceeded to do a go around as we cleared at the next taxiway. All our lights were on and working. I was told by the employees in the FBO that the aircraft had been flying around all day and must not be equipped with a radio as they have been trying to talk to him for a while. As far as I know no calm wind runway is listed in the AFD or on the Jeppesen plates to designate either runway as a calm wind runway. The winds; although calm; and the windsock agree that runway 14 should have been in use since the designation of the calm wind runway does not exist.




Synopsis: PC-12 Captain reported an aircraft landed opposite direction at OKV then immediately executed a go-around after noticing the reporter's aircraft still on the runway.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I was conducting an NVG training session and check ride. The next morning I was notified that there was tail rotor damage to the aircraft. I began dissecting the flight to determine how the damage could have occurred. I drove to the Airport and inspected the damage to the tail rotor. I decided that the damage must have occurred while I was evaluating the steep approach to a confined area landing into the training site. The landing sequence was normal and there was no abnormal control feedback for the duration of the flight at the completion of the maneuver. I did not detect any damage during the post flight inspection even having rotated the rotor blade from the tail rotor for hangar spacing. I proceeded to the training site to determine if I could find the impact source to the tail rotor. I found an 8 foot sapling that showed 'trimming' on one side in the approximate area that we had landed. The largest part of the strike looked to be just smaller than the diameter of my thumb but we could have very easily been into the thicker part of the tree. I was familiar with the LZ and routinely conducted training operations there. The Pilot on the controls was NOT familiar with the LZ. Weather; illumination and LZ condition were NOT a factor in this incident. The deviation to the specific landing touchdown area was minimal but resulted in contact with a sapling standing approximately 8 feet in height. The angle of approach appeared to insure clearance to the intended touchdown area but the visual limitations of the helicopter and the difficulty seeing the dormant (for the winter) 8 foot sapling directly resulted in the impact and subsequent damage to the tail rotor. Again; there was no abnormal feedback through the controls that a strike had occurred and post flight did not indicate obvious damage. Performing a clearing turn would NOT have been recommended in this case due to the confines of the LZ. Instructing the Pilot on the controls to a SPECIFIC 'safe' landing touchdown WOULD be an acceptable solution. The actual touchdown area is relatively safe EXCEPT for the 8 foot sapling that neither pilot saw.




Synopsis: AS350 Check Airman was notified after a Night Vision Goggles training flight that tail rotor damage was detected. Check Airman returned to the area where training had been conducted and found evidence of a tail rotor strike on an eight foot sapling.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: My First Officer and I had a scheduled daily block of 8 hours and 11 minutes; which nears the 9 hours of maximum allowable flight time per FAR part 117. Flight was originally scheduled to take place from XB:00 ZZZ local time to XD:48 ZZZ1 local time. The actual flight pushed back at XA:51 and blocked in at XE:07; which is 16 minutes more than the original scheduled time. These times were confirmed by onboard ACARS; a screenshot of which is attached. As validated by Dispatch; ACARS times are instantaneously transmitted to operations. Due to our concern about our legality; my FO (First Officer) and I continuously monitored our actual hours on only on multiple programs; neither of which reflected the actual flight times for [the] flight throughout the entire day. Upon checking the hours on the next day; the schedule is only partially adjusted; and continues to show an actual block; shorter than what was transmitted by ACARS to operations. I'd like to reiterate that based on historical performance; and as validated by Dispatch; times are updated instantaneously. However; as this is not the first occurrence of such nature for me; this shows a deliberate attempt to manipulate blocks to reflect shorter than the actual times in an effort to adhere to 117 legalities on paper. Besides from the obvious ethical concerns regarding crew compensation; this raises very serious concerns regarding actual legalities of the flight crew as actual times should not be manipulated by company to meet operational goals. Although based on actual times; we never did violate the 9 hour maximum limitation; our times remain incorrect going forward; allowing the company to schedule us based on incorrect numbers and setting us up for possible violation of part 117 limitations.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported concerns regarding FAR 117 limitations.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: TE Flap Disagree EICAS message on approach. Upon arrival into our destination; with the selection of Flaps position 1; the TE Flap Disagree EICAS illuminated. Aircraft position was inbound to the initial approach fix at 5;000 feet on the ILS 25 approach. Approach Control was then notified that the approach needed to be discontinued and vectors straight ahead at 5;000 feet were issued. Aircraft vectors to the south of the airfield were issued. Aircrew conducted the TE Flap Disagree Checklist; which was completed using the QRH. The Captain conducted the checklist while the First Officer flew the aircraft and communicated with ATC. Each pilot in turn read and confirmed the checklist procedures. Dispatch and Maintenance were contacted. Maintenance confirmed our procedures and Dispatch confirmed our landing data. The flight attendants were advised and the passengers briefed on our aircraft condition and intentions. An emergency was declared and the ILS 25 was flown to flaps up landing; with the Captain now flying the aircraft having switch roles with the First Officer. LE slats were extended and TE flaps were found fully retracted on post flight inspection. Landing was uneventful and aircraft taxied to the gate. ATC Approach Control and Tower were very helpful.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B757 EICAS alerted TE FLAPS DISAGREE on final; so an emergency was declared; the QRH complied with; and the landing completed with LE Slats extended; TE Flaps fully retracted.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Fuel System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was tasked a Periodic Service Check with a removal and replacement of Fuel Control Unit of the APU on [the] aircraft. After completion of PS Check; I removed and replaced APU Fuel Control Unit referring [to] AMM. While performing Operation and Leak Check; I observed flames emitting from APU exhaust. I called to cockpit to notify of fire; then proceeded to extinguish fire and call to notify fire department and Lead. Subsequent to fire being extinguished; an inspection was performed on APU compartment and APU exhaust with no damage noted.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Maintenance Technician reported that while performing an operational check on the APU; flames started coming out of the exhaust.