elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TPF.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E TPA
ATC / advisory: TRACON TPA
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying left closed pattern; on my third landing; when the TCAS went off on left base for Runway 22. I saw nothing below the aircraft or at my 9 o'clock; 12 o'clock; or 3 o'clock position. A position report was made on left base and again while turning to final. While turning final I then was able to see a low wing light aircraft approximately 300 FT ahead and approximately 200 FT below my aircraft. I made a radio call at this time for a go around to Runway 22 at TPF. After completing my landing I was able to locate the aircraft and pilot parked in front of the FBO. The pilot was IFR and cleared for the visual to Runway 22 by Tampa TRACON. However; during our discussion I learned he was using the approach plate for VDF; not TPF. He made several transmissions on the wrong frequency; 122.7; when he should have transmitted on 122.72. The pilot was cooperative and clearly understood his mistake.We discussed the importance of proper frequency identification and verification when using instrument approach plates. We also identified using the sectional and airport facility directory as additional tools to properly identify CTAF frequencies at uncontrolled fields and the need for vigilance due to high volumes of flight training. Also addressed was the option of calling the airport by phone prior to departure if there is any confusion on correct frequencies. One other option airborne could be to ask the TRACON Controller to confirm correct frequency prior to frequency change. The TCAS function was working properly on my aircraft--this added safety feature is invaluable. My preventive action in the future would be position reports but with an immediate breakout of the pattern given a TCAS alert with no target in sight.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft who was using the wrong CTAF frequency at TPF airport.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MFR.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E EUG
ATC / advisory: TRACON EUG
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was on vectors for a GPS approach at MFR (this approach is to the airport not to the runway and not a precision approach). Aircraft X was issued distance from the final approach fix; heading 290 and 9000 feet until established. They read back direct and 9000 until established; which appeared would be essentially the same; so I did not correct them. Just south of the final approach fix the low altitude alert went off and I asked them to verify they had the terrain in sight. Initially they said no; but before I issued a low altitude alert they confirmed they had the terrain in sight. I issued the low altitude alert and gave the MVA (minimum vectoring altitude) of 8700 feet. They climbed to 8700 feet. I verified they were still established and re-cleared them for the approach.Tower should not advertise circling approaches due to terrain; most air carriers will not even accept this approach. Precision approaches should be used; unless visuals can be advertised due to terrain and complexity of the non-precision approaches. The airspace design does not allow precision approaches from the south.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on a heading to intercept an approach descended early and below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We discovered a red collared circuit breaker; 'auto spoiler retract' that should have been removed and reset with the 'auto spoiler inop' write up from a previous date. Maintenance was called; came out and performed the necessary steps to make this right and reset the circuit breaker.


Second narrative: During preflight; I happened to notice a circuit breaker on the P6 panel (sidewall; underneath observer panel) that was out with a collar. I looked closer and found the CB was labeled 'SPD BRK AUTO STOW'. I was unaware of any write up regarding the speed brake system (we had flown the airplane in the night before with nothing in the logbook prior to leaving and we had not experienced any issues with the speed brake system). I reviewed the logbook again and found two references to placards of the speed brake system under MEL 27-12. The most recent was a placard issued in late August and cleared the next day. A review of MEL 27-12 revealed that the maintenance action taken when issuing the placard was to pull and collar two circuit breakers; the 'AUTO SPDBRK' circuit breaker on the overhead P11 Panel; and this circuit breaker (SPD BRK AUTO STOW) on the P6 panel. The MEL also required disconnecting a cannon plot on the SAC in the electronics bay. The circuit breaker on the overhead P 11 panel referenced by the MEL was checked and found to be in. We called Maintenance who discovered that the SAC in the electronics bay was disconnected. Maintenance reconnected the SAC; reinstated the SPD BRK AUTO STOW circuit breaker and did the system test required by the maintenance manual. The evidence suggests that this aircraft has operated with a disabled load alleviation system since the placard was cleared more than a month earlier. MEL 27-12 contains airspeed limitations when operating above 221;000 pounds. We were below that weight on the one leg we flew; but it is unknown if any legs prior were flown in excess of 221;000 pounds. There was no indication in the cockpit (no EICAS message; annunciator light; or other indication) of this load alleviation system being disabled.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reports discovering during preflight that the 'SPD BRK AUTO STOW' circuit breaker on the P6 panel is pulled and collared. Maintenance is called and it is determined that an MEL that was cleared by Maintenance over a month ago was not properly accomplished.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; MEL; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Key pad to cockpit door not working. Maintenance tried to fix the key pad; they could not fix. They MELed the pad for 2 days. We would have no access to the cockpit during flight if something happened to both the cockpit crew. This is not safe.


Second narrative: The cockpit keypad was inoperative. Maintenance tried to fix; but then they placarded it. Captain said it would have to be fixed within 2 days.  The ZZZ-ZZZ1 flight was scheduled for 5 hours. If for any reason the cockpit became incapacitated the flight attendants would have absolutely NO access to the cockpit. I did not feel safe in this situation. I did not feel safe for my crew; my passengers and myself. I was the #4 [Flight Attendant].


Synopsis: Flight attendants reported concerns over an inoperative cockpit door key pad that would have prevented access to the cockpit from the cabin during flight.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: No deviation occurred for this flight. We were cleared direct to SAYGE Intersection on the WAHUU Arrival into DEN some distance out. Approximately 90 miles from SAYGE; I decided to brief the approach with the Captain. We noticed the crossing restriction in the FMS over SAYGE was different than what was on both of our commercially provided plates. The FMS showed SAYGE at 250 KTS between FL210-230. Our plates showed SAYGE at 250 KTS between 17;000-FL190. We checked the FMS update again and it was valid. We checked our Ops binders for any plate revisions and there were none for this arrival. Both our plates showed the same effective date. About this time; we were cleared to descend via the WAHUU Arrival. We asked ATC if they could confirm the altitude restrictions over SAYGE. He stated that 250 KTS between FL190-17;000 were the correct restrictions as our plates showed. We had no idea why the FMS was not in tune with this arrival. All other points on the FMS arrival were correct. The Captain and I decided to split the difference and entered FL180 as a hard altitude since you cannot enter a 'between' altitude into this FMS. VNAV was re engaged and the aircraft descended normally. A determination needs to be made why our FMS database; even though current; is not accurate for this arrival. Had we assumed the FMS arrival data was correct; a major altitude deviation would have occurred.




Synopsis: A B737-300 flight crew; cleared to descend via the WAHUU RNAV STAR to DEN noted the charted crossing at SAYGE in the FMS database was different from that published on their commercially provided aero chart.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I worked a task card on Aircraft X which consisted of applying locktite to both ENG (Engine) start knobs on the overhead panel. This task card only has one block to sign for which caused me to be confused. The task card only had one space to sign off for removal and one for installation. This task card needs to be re-written and a space for a SECOND AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) needs to be added to prevent any future potential ETOPS violations.


Second narrative: I was assigned to work task card ETOPS. The task card states that the knobs are to be removed from the start switch and Loctite applied then install knobs and tighten set screws. I asked my lead for clarification since I had never completed this task. On the task card there is one line for an AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) signature and one line for an EV number. I completed the task card and signed the paperwork after calling Maintenance Control and receiving my EV number. I was informed by my supervisor via email that the task required 2 mechanics therefore I had incorrectly completed the task. If the task card was written correctly to include a space for 2 EV numbers and 2 AMT signatures I believe this could have been prevented.


Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported that a Task Card is missing a second Signature Block.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Second aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared by Ramp to proceed to spot and contact Ground for Taxiway XX; Taxiway XY to the ramp. As we began our taxi; an Airbus came out from the gates towards us at a 45 degree angle. They were merging onto our taxi line to also go to [the same spot]. I slammed on the brakes and if [I] would have continued we would have been T-boned by the Airbus. Following right after the Airbus was another that also almost clipped into us. I notified Ramp Control of the near incident and was replied with 'I don't have a visual on them and assumed they were already there. It's outside of my control.'




Synopsis: Pilot reported slamming on the brakes to avoid a collision with an aircraft taxiing out.
Date: 202012
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR; Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At the new X gates. We have a new self service kiosks the passenger can print a bag tag and is told to leave the bag on the bridge. If the gate agent does not see the bag tag and the passenger does leave the bag on the bridge the passenger has not been asked the hazardous materials questions such as ion batteries etc. Also if the ramp agent picks up the bag they would think the questions have been asked. I would think this could lead to potential safety issues. I am concerned that hazardous materials could be unknowingly be placed on an aircraft without the questions being asked.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported passenger procedures for self serve kiosk; located at boarding gate; in need of revision.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Beautiful evening; EWR approach to 22L. Level at 8000 over DYLIN on the PHLBO3. They gave us 4000. I verified because we normally get 6000 after DYLIN. ATC said 4000. We went down to 4000 and were on a heading for the RWY. Abeam the airport we were given a heading of 90 degrees and told to keep our speed up and to descend to 3000. Shortly after that we were told to descend to 2000 and keep our speed up till reaching 2000 then we could slow. We are about 6 miles from the RWY on a 90 heading and ATC asked if we had the RWY in sight. I was shocked because they cleared us for a visual. We were INSIDE the marker; BUZZED on a 90 heading; fast and close in. We did a steep turn; put the gear down; slowed as fast as we could; went through the LOC then under the glideslope. We were not even in a good position to do a go-around. It all happened so fast. We did land safely but I was pissed. There was no reason for ATC to vector us and give us such an unsafe approach.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported an issue with a late clearance to a visual approach resulting in a marginally stable approach.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Do 228-100/200
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just after starting engines I was running my after start flow when I gave the command to disconnect the power cart. The ramper acknowledged with the disconnect signal. As I finished with my after start flow and called for the after start checklist; the First Officer and myself felt the airplane tug to the right. We stopped with the checklist and as we were trying to figure out what happened the aircraft once again shook. From my seat I was unable to see the cord still attached but [the First Officer] was able to see and advised me of what was going on. I tried to get the ramper's attention any way I could and as he looked back at us he realized the power cart was still attached. He came over to the aircraft; saw the damage and told us to shut down. After shut down I advised Maintenance.


Second narrative: While getting ready to run the after start checklist with the Captain a sudden jerk was felt by myself and [Captain]. After looking to each other for an explanation; we felt another tug and I looked out the window and saw the start cart trying to drive away with the power line trailing behind it.


Synopsis: DO228 flight crew reported aircraft damage at the gate resulting from the power cart not being disconnected before it was driven away from the aircraft.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This event had to do with both Primary Flight Displays airspeed indications giving crew error readouts. The aircraft had been sitting outside during the snowstorm we had in the northeast. We followed deice and anti-ice procedures per Cold Weather Ops. Checklist. Passing through 210 kts (211) both IAS indications turned red indicating we were in a overspeed indication. Both landing gear and flaps/slat were verified up by checklist usage and visually from the cabin. With our resources we verified IAS were correct even though they were indicating in the Red. We ran appropriate checklist and verified aircraft performance charactertics utilizing all aircraft instrumentation. We advised the maintenance (coordinating with cessna) and agreed continuing on to destination would be the right decision with our situation. Both of us agreed with solution and agreed we we're safe to continue. Upon slowing in to ZZZ at 210 kts both Primary Flight Display IAS indications returned to Green Normal color. We landed with all normal indications. With my XX years of aviation commercial experience; I don't agree with the Cold Weather Checklist. It tells us to extend flaps to 35 for de-ice and 0 degrees for anti-ice. My experience has always kept Flaps up during both these procedures; so to prevent fluid getting on full flap area that sits under wing when retracted. Selecting Flaps once nearing runway so to prevent snow and slush from getting on Full Flap area would be a better practice; while protecting a major portion of flap area from icing conditions waiting to takeoff.Suggest looking at how we perform de/anti-icing procedures on the fleet.




Synopsis: First Officer reported during climb out both airspeed indicators began giving erroneous readings.