elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were waiting to pull in to the gate at the top of the J-line with the Marshaller repeatedly waving us in with NUMEROUS baggage carts clearly in the Safety Zone. A Supervisor was also present along with several other Ramp Agents. One Ramp Agent gave us a thumbs up to come in standing right next to one of the baggage carts clearly in the Safety Zone. The Marshaller continued to wave us in even while the Supervisor started moving carts and was in the middle of the Safety Zone walking to move some carts on the other side. Several Ramp Agents; a Marshaller and a Supervisor were all present and still we were being waved in with an additional thumbs up from a Ramp Agent with numerous obstructions in the Zone. If this had been at night or in the rain it may have been difficult to see more clearly and we would have hit one of the carts with our Scimitar winglets. A complete failure of the Ramp to follow Safety procedures. We made numerous radio calls to Operations and we refused to taxi until the Safety Zone was clear.Preventative Measures: Serious documented training and probation for all Ramp Agents involved. This would have caused a serious problem/damage to the aircraft if the Flight Crew had not parked at the top of the J-line and made numerous radio calls and hand gestures to the Ramp Agents demanding the Safety Zone be cleared properly before proceeding. This also caused us to sit there burning fuel and wasting time and delaying our Passengers.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported he refused to taxi into a gate area with baggage carts in the safety zone.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Lead Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Push out of Hangar.
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was asked to take [the aircraft] to the gate. Boarded aircraft got plane ready to go to gate. Tug driver gave signal to release brakes. Release brakes seen wing walker go to right. Plane is backed out of hangar; got APU running so I would have brakes. Plane was pushed back then we stopped; heard loud crash.


Second narrative: We began to push [the aircraft] out of the hangar for a gate. I was tug driver and [another maintenance technician was] right wing walker. The aircraft was pushed out of the hangar and due to the incline of the ramp entering the hangar the plane/tug picked up a little speed. This caused [the wing walker] to fall behind the plane where he lost visibility. I began to turn to angle the aircraft for departure to the gate when the right wing O/B (outboard) flap struck the lower fuselage below the F/O's (First Officers) side of [the other aircraft]; ultimately with the flap of lodging into the nose gear of [the other aircraft].


Synopsis: Four air carrier Maintenance Technicians reported that when pushing a CRJ-200 out of the hangar they lost control and the aircraft made contact with another aircraft.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Takeoff off checklist was completed 'down to the line.'  Below the line at Runway....checked; we realized that the wrong runway was loaded (Runway 35). As we were cleared for takeoff from Runway 17; I changed the runway; but was distracted by 'company message' on the ECAM and attempted to review and clear it. I can't remember if I had the [Performance] page up or not when we got the ENG THR LEVERS NOT SET. I advised the captain to set TOGA which he did and we continued the takeoff. Above; 80 knots now; we then realized that the V speeds were not displayed on the PFD so I called them out from the paper [performance calculations] for Runway 17. The remainder of the takeoff and climbout proceeded uneventfully.Approaching the runway I was distracted by a nuisance ECAM message (company message) instead of ensuring the V speeds and flex temp were set for the proper runway. V speeds and flex temp are deleted when a new runway is loaded into the FMS and the new numbers need to be confirmed or manually loaded. I should have caught this had I not been distracted by the ECAM message and perhaps a little too rushed to get airborne.


Second narrative: Was given a last minute runway change with a reduced power takeoff (FLEX). I was doing the takeoff and my First Officer forgot to change data. When FLEX power was applied; we had a red warning light that wrong data for the runway had been entered. I went to full power (TOGA) and the warning went away. The whole event lasted less than 3 seconds. Slow down and ensure proper data is loaded.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew forgets to enter a new runway and V speeds after ATC changes the departure runway. The error is not trapped by the before takeoff checklist due being distracted by a company message. Without a FLEX temperature setting; TOGA thrust is required and the First Officer calls the V speeds from the paper performance calculations.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: On short final to runway 27R at KORD; there is an LED light advertisement sign.  During nighttime operations; the light from this sign can be very bright; especially with mostly white light projecting from the sign.  It was observed to be most prominent from the First Officer's seat. Although our flight landed without incident; I believe it is a safety concern that needs to be addressed.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a very bright LED advertisement sign on final approach to Runway 27R at ORD. He stated that the sign is a potential safety hazard.
Date: 201409
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Parked Pre-departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During Preflight the relief pilot reported that his ship set was missing 3 binders - all the primary destination airport information. It was a weekend day; I called the [Systems Controller]; left a message.  Called Ops.  They reported that 3 other aircraft had the same problem that day; and that they were out of spare ship sets.  Captain called the [Duty Manager];  who informed him that 'there is a bulletin out on that; and that all the destination charts are being pulled from the relief pilot ship sets'  Yikes!  I could not recall reading a bulletin; looked around in the iPad and could not locate.  Three days later; the bulletin appeared; saying that the relief pilot ship sets had been modified.  Here is my problem with that:  we can't use the IPADs below 10;000 feet.  By removing the relief pilot's primary destination charts; we are essentially saying that his input with regard to ops below 10;000 feet (the busiest environment) is not important.  This essentially tells us that third pilot input with regard to navigation (especially during the ground taxi portion of the program) is not necessary.  It marginalizes the relief pilot role in safety; especially during ground ops when IMHO; it is critical.   We often go to foreign destinations where understanding the directions of the controllers and navigating the airport is very challenging.  Often it takes all three/four of the pilots to get a clear understanding of what/where we are going.  We need to keep all the tools available to help accomplish that mission safely.

Callback: The reporter states that the Company has clarified the use of iPads below 10;000 feet; which applies only to the pilot flying since the iPads do not currently have mounts; but soon will have.



Synopsis: B777 First Officer is informed during preflight by the relief pilot that charts for primary destinations are missing from the shipset. A call to the Duty Manager reveals that the paper charts have been removed and iPads will be the primary method of storing and displaying charts.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: EICAS announced RIGHT ENGINE OVERHEAT condition. We immediately proceeded to the QRH and the checklist directed to turn the affected engine bleed off and slowly reduce thrust on the affected engine. Since we were in cruise we expected not to maintain altitude. We declared emergency with Center and requested direct to a suitable airport that at the time was only 40-50 miles away. We also called the IRO to return to the cockpit and subdivided the work between us to brief the flight attendants; send diversion message to the company; and set up for single engine approach. By the time we got to the shut down part of the checklist later in the descent the overheat message disappeared; hence we chose to keep the engine running at idle all the way to the ground. We setup and executed one-engine inoperative approach and landed without any further incident.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer experiences a RIGHT ENGINE OVERHEAT condition at FL380. The QRH is consulted and a diversion to the nearest suitable airport is planned. Before the engine is shut down in the descent the overheat warning goes out and the engine is left at idle for approach and landing.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA20 Undifferentiated
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing nose gear failed; neither the CFI or student were injured.




Synopsis: DA20 Flight Instructor reports a nose gear failure upon landing with no injuries.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL; Procedure; Aircraft; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As noted in the aircraft maintenance release from an engine generator had failed on the previous flight. The maintenance release from indicated that it had been trouble shot and returned to service. Also in the maintenance release from was the failure of the APU control.  The checklist was run for associated generator; a reset was attempted and not successful the APU was started. A crew meeting was initiated and a call to [Maintenance] and the Dispatcher was initiated. As the checklist tells you to run the APU if available the Dispatcher gave us a figure of approximately four thousand pounds. As discussed by the crew were uncomfortable with the remaining fuel at destination with expected weather deviations. A call through Dispatch with the 787 Fleet manager ensued and a plan agreed to by all was to use the APU only when needed ie. galley power. We thus continued the flight; but all were uncomfortable with the amount of time still remaining and whether the APU selector would fail again and as mentioned would the APU function normally for the remainder of the flight.




Synopsis: B787 Captain reported misgivings over procedures following a generator failure in flight during ETOPS operations.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification; Workload; Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Flight departed after dark local time with a 9:20 hour duty day and 8:02 flying time (originally scheduled for 7:50 flying time). This aircraft had no crew rest seats for the crew or proper seating areas for working crew to sit during down time in-flight. Flight is a true 'all-nighter'; but crew was not given the opportunity for any rest. If crewmembers do not take a break (thus sitting in crew rest seats); then the available jumpseats to use during the flight is one short in both cabins (four flight attendants in Business Class; but only three jumpseats and five flight attendants in Coach with only four available jumpseats - two jumpseats are located mid-cabin in the middle of the aisle in darkness; which makes them not usable during downtime in flight). Upon arrival in Europe; crew was physically exhausted. My concern is over the lack of crew rest and the effect on the crew's ability to evacuate should it become necessary at the destination. Flying time should not be the factor to when crew rest is given; but rather duty day duration and time of duty (day or over-night flight). In this situation; there was only a ten minute difference between whether or not crew rest was scheduled. The time of the flight was not taken into account; which is what made the situation as difficult as it was. Our current agreement for crew rest only looks at flying time. Over eight hours; crew seats are given. Under eight hours; crew seats are sold. Crew rest should be given on flights over seven hours especially if the flight is an over-night flight and duty day should also be taken into account (flights under eight hours; but which have a maintenance issue which extends the duty day).




Synopsis: A B767-300 Flight Attendant reported that on a night flight to Europe with over eight flight hours; the flight attendants were not given adequate cabin seating to rest and may be unprepared for an unplanned evacuation.
Date: 201305
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Once again I was alerted to a need for a radio number (callsign) way too late in the process by [the Dispatch Computer]/Dispatch View. Despite the release notes for Dispatch View (version 1.1) saying the radio number conflict alert issue was resolved; it clearly was not! My flight [123] pushed on time. Unknown to me there was a late inbound [123] ETA 20 minutes later. I was alerted by the system just four minutes prior. So two [123]'s in the airspace at the same time; both in sterile cockpit. I sent a message to my outbound [123] to make him aware and told him to use extreme caution for next few minutes until the other [123] was on ground and at gate. This needs to be fixed ASAP before we have an accident!




Synopsis: Dispatcher reports that his dispatch computer does not alert in a timely manner when flight delays will cause two aircraft with the same flight number to be in the same airspace.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During landing I applied the short-field landing technique due to a relatively short runway distance. I also apply a maximum braking force. The aircraft then began to veer off to the left and I was unable to bring it back to centerline. The aircraft stopped on the runway pavement edge with all wheels on the grass; and unable to move. After shutdown engine I found out that the left main tire was flat. I immediately made an announcement on CTAF and called Approach to let them know about my aircraft; and have them issue a NOTAM. With the help of local people; we were able to push the aircraft off the runway area onto the grass; but I decided not to cancel the NOTAM due to the aircraft tail still [being] near the runway area.The probable cause for a flat tire could be that I applied the brake too hard on landing without realizing that the wheel was locked causing the tire to [fail]. The feeling of locked wheel was hard to notice especially on [the] rough runway surface.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported loss of directional control and a runway excursion after landing due to a failed tire probably related to heavy braking.