elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Ops Agent brought down two unaccompanied minors (both with the same last name). I sat them together in row 2. The Ops Agent placed one of their items in the overhead bin. It looked like a skateboard in a soft carrying case. One of the children said it was a hover board and to be careful with it. I asked the Ops Agent was there anything new regarding transportation of hover boards because they were previously banned from travel. He said he would check on it and came back with a supervisor right away. The supervisor and another [company] ground employee came on the aircraft and explained to the children the hover board would not be able to travel with them and that it would need to be left in ZZZ. The supervisor said they would contact the drop off guardian to retrieve the item. The unaccompanied minors were ok during the flight. Upon arrival in ZZZ1; both unaccompanied minors were signed off to their father who was aware of the item being left in the departure station.




Synopsis: B737-700 Flight Attendant reported a communications breakdown with Gate Agent while boarding unaccompanied minor with banned battery powered Hoverboard. Hoverboard removed from aircraft.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: 1K1.Airport, KS
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G 1K1
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft was descending into 1K1 on an instrument approach and executed an unplanned go-around due to numerous men and equipment on the runway. The airport was called and the Airport Manager reported that construction was being done on the runway and that he did not issue a NOTAM.




Synopsis: ICT Controller witnessed an unexpected go-around by an aircraft on an instrument approach into 1K1 reportedly due to men and equipment on the runway; no NOTAM was issued by the Airport Manager.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departed ZZZ and 30 min later we were notified via ACARS that there was Hazmat cargo on board that was not documented while we were on the ground. We were presented with incorrect paperwork and had no way of knowing about or capturing the error. Event was caused due to incorrect procedures by ramp personnel.


Second narrative: After departure notified via ACARS by Dispatch that the ramp failed to list 79.6 kg of dry ice in position 1 on the Dangerous Goods paperwork.  Paperwork provided by ramp prior to departure stated 'NO DG ON BOARD'. Error by ramp personnel.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew and Dispatcher reported being notified of unmanifested Hazmat cargo after departure.
Date: 202008
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: Ramp MCO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Five minutes prior to scheduled departure time we were waiting for ramp to close the forward cargo door. A female voice came over the flight interphone informing us they were about to close the cargo door and said once the door was closed we could release brakes. Once the door was closed we completed the Before Pushback Checklist. The female ramp employee called the flight deck again and said they were ready and asked for the brake release. As soon as she said that a male voice got on the interphone and said 'ready for pushback and brake release.'The female was not our tug driver but a ramp employee trying to get an early brake release. I informed our tug driver this was against SOP; dangerous; and should not happen again.Unfortunately; this is not the first time this has happened to me.




Synopsis: Airline Captain reported an unknown individual asked the crew to release the aircraft brakes for pushback; resulting in a ramp safety issue.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pack 1 deferred inoperative.On climb out aircraft could not pressurize to maintain a normal cabin altitude. Received cabin altitude ECAM. Initiated a descent from FL275 to return cabin altitude below 10;000 ft. Flight Crew went on O2. Got vectors for an approach. Highest observed cabin altitude 13;900 ft. Notified F/As and asked them to make a diversion announcement. In IMC conditions during descent from 16;000 ft. to 1;500 ft. agl. Approach and landing uneventful.On climb out we got an indication of an unusual cabin altitude with a flashing cabin altitude indication on the lower ECAM passing approximately FL260. We looked for unusual configuration that might have caused the indication. We initially asked ATC to level off and then asked for a descent to FL180. Flight crew donned O2 masks.The cabin altitude continued to climb and we got a Cabin Altitude ECAM.  Asked ATC for clearance to descend to MEA of 13;400 ft. Notified F/As of problem and asked them to make an announcement of diversion into [an alternate airport]. F/As reported feeling a little lightheaded. Most of our communication was through Senior Attendants in the back of the airplane. Descended into IMC conditions and asked Center to verify MEA altitudes and altimeter setting. IMC conditions from 16;000 ft. through 1500 ft. Requested radar vectors to an ILS approach. Approach and landing were uneventful.The highest aircraft altitude was FL275 and the highest observed cabin altitude was 13;900 ft. The oxygen masks in the back of [the] aircraft did not deploy. No passengers complained of any issues other than the aircraft being warm. With the malfunction that caused the cabin pressurization problem; we also lost control of aircraft temperature. Highest cabin temperature 92 degrees.We deplaned passengers after conferring with station operations. Conducted an extensive debrief with [Maintenance]; who completed the write up. Maintenance troubleshooting uncovered a loose clamp on Pack 2 ducting. Flew the aircraft [after repairs] without incident or further problem.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing difficulty maintaining cabin pressure.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 25
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on approach at 1;500 MSL we had a near miss with a C172. ATC called our traffic one o'clock and a half mile. I called the traffic in sight and the Controller switched us to the next frequency. At that time our TCAS system gave a traffic alert and I looked up and saw the C172 headed for a head on collision; I pull back on the yoke and banked left to avoid the collision. The traffic I thought was the C172 was another aircraft several miles en-trail.




Synopsis: A pilot was alerted by TRACON about traffic at his altitude but mistook another aircraft for the reported traffic then took evasive action from head on traffic; missing by about 50 feet.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DFW.Tower, TX
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During descent we input left rudder trim. When we released the trim knob the trim knob started to slowly turn back to the right removing the trim that we had input.  We tried a second time to input the trim and the trim again moved back on its own.   We decided to leave the trim in its last position; notified maintenance and landed. Maintenance personnel lubed part of the trim system and cleared the logbook. [On the subsequent flight] during descent; we had the same problem with the rudder trim.   After landing; I called [Maintenance Control] and informed them of the problem.  The aircraft remained out of service for an extended period of time




Synopsis: Following a write up for a rudder trim problem; maintenance was performed and the aircraft was returned to service.  Unfortunately the problem was not fixed and the flight crew experienced the same problem into the next station; where the aircraft was held from service.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBAA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Beijing control gave late assignment of the STAR. It caused increased cockpit workload. Also; the STAR that was assigned was not in the FMC (GITUM 7B). The STAR was loaded by the relief pilot reading the points to the flying First Officers (FO) so that they cold be loaded manually. This is a significant distraction. I believe that we properly adhered to our clearance.




Synopsis: B747 First Officer reports receiving a late assignment of the GITUM 7B by Beijing control. The GITUM 7B is not part of the FMC database and must be programed point by point from the arrival chart.
Date: 202109
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skydio 2
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 107
Flight plan: None
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Cruise; Return to Home (UAS)
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Aircraft component: Com Link (C2) (UAS)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person UAS Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Lost Link (UAS); Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned to Home (UAS)
Contributing factors: Software and Automation; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: 2 Pilots were inspecting their third bridge on a construction site while operating under the BVLOS waiver from [government agency]. The drone lost link/connection and initiated the return to home function from which connection was regained. Most likely due to bridge obstruction interference.

Callback: Reporter stated this was a test flight to find limitations of Skydio 2 flying BVLOS underneath a bridge.



Synopsis: UAS Crew reported they were testing a UAS when lost link occurred while flying around different structures. Connection was regained on the return home.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out through 11;000 feet; the # 2 engine driven hydraulic pump low pressure light illuminated and the B hydraulic system quantity quickly decreased to 45%; then continued to decrease very slowly. We requested clearance back to the departure airport. Per QRH for the low press light; we turned off the #2 engine hydraulic pump. No other lights or indications. Since we still had normal pressure and quantity was pretty stable; and we were by that time on final approach; we configured the aircraft for a flaps 30 landing. Normal landing; rollout; and taxi in followed.


Second narrative: During climbout; leaving 15;000 feet; noticed depleting system B hydraulic quantity followed quickly by the system B engine driven pump hydraulic low pressure light. QRH completed; #2 engine; engine hydraulic pump moved to off. System B hydraulic quantity stabilized at approximately 45%. We requested return. With stable quantity we determined we did not have a total system B loss and elected to request a final such that we could configure and monitor. Quantity stable when fully configured as was pressure. Landed with normal rollout. Cause of the event was a partial loss of system B hydraulic quantity which precipitated the engine driven pump low pressure indication.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew notices depleting system B hydraulic quantity followed quickly by the system B engine driven pump hydraulic low pressure light during climb out. The engine driven pump is turned off and the flight returns to the departure airport for a normal landing.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was asked to replace the potable water fill line elbow hose on Aircraft X. The original line was punctured and the potable water system placed on MEL (Minimum Equipment List). I replaced that line. I cleared the MEL and the aircraft was taken to the gate and released. We usually drain the potable water system in the hangar in colder weather before it goes back to the gate.At the gate; the ramp service noticed the 'DO NOT SERVICE' placard was still installed on the potable water service door. They contacted the hangar and were told that the aircraft was ok to service. A short while later the Lead asked me about it and we determined that the potable water system had not been fully restored as per the MEL procedure. The galley shut off valves and lavatory shut off valves were not returned to the open position. Our line mechanics tried to go to the airplane but it had already pushed back and they were unable to open the shut off valves. Our supervisors were notified that the potable water system had not been fully restored; the flight crew was contacted and were able to open the valves.I failed to completely understand the procedures before restoring the potable water system. When I was asked to change the line; I was working on another aircraft and had to finish the maintenance on that aircraft before I could work on Aircraft X.When ramp noticed the sticker; I was taxiing another aircraft and was not able to immediately talk to my lead about the restoration of the potable water system. I had a lot of tasks to complete on multiple aircrafts and was rushing to complete the assigned tasks. In the future I will try to completely understand maintenance procedures and utilize my time to compete the task at hand and to not allow myself to be rushed.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported potable water system was not properly restored per MEL procedure.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter 407
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Training
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I may have inadvertently violated CFR 14 65.81 by supervising the installation of a First Surface Vinyl wrap on the exterior of a Bell 407 helicopter. While I have applied many First Surface Vinyl decals and 'N' number registration numbers in the exact same way; this is sort of a gray area. During a routine conformity check; a member from the Certificate Management Team (CMT) inquired as to how we obtained information for the installation of this vinyl wrap and did not seem satisfied with the descriptive sign off and reference of the CFR 14 part 43 appendix A paragraph(C) item 9. The CMT member questioned my abilities to install a large sticker on the exterior portion of the aircraft that did not require removal or disassembly of any primary structure or operating system. In hindsight; I could have used CFR 14 part 43 app A paragraph (c) item 10 instead since there is no published data saying that the first surface vinyl is not permitted on those areas or considered contrary to good practice.I believe the major issue; as is with most CFR's; is the opinion of the administrator and the intent of the CFR. Ask 5 different [inspectors] their interpretation of a CFR and you'll end up with 5 different opinions.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported during an FAA routine conformity check; there was ambiguity in the translation of FARs regarding the instillation of vinyl decal on the exterior surface.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BJC.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter function: Observer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I do not know how to report an incident witnessed around [a] federal prison at XA:45 am [on] DATE. [One] plane was actually chasing another plane a few hundred feet above the ground and literally a few yards apart over a residential neighborhood near Lakewood; Colorado. At the corner of Street and Street1. The tail plane was right on top of the other plane for a good 10 minutes before it veered off and let the 1st plane return to the BJC airport in Broomfield Area Colorado. Both planes were extremely low and this act was very scary to witness.




Synopsis: A concerned individual observer reported witnessing two small aircraft maneuvering erratically while flying too low over a residential neighborhood.