elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.TRACON, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was just assuming the sector after receiving a briefing from the controller I was relieving. Aircraft X was westbound level at 5000 feet IFR. The pilot of Aircraft X said 'We've finally got that Dash in sight'. I looked at the scope; thinking that he had gotten a DH8A in sight that was still at his 2 o'clock and about 9 miles but was caught off guard when I realized that he probably wasn't talking about that DH8A because it would have been difficult for him to see him at that point. I asked him to repeat and he did. I then noticed a limited data block descending through the altitude of Aircraft X southeast bound. I realized that the Final controller had descended Aircraft Y into my airspace without a point out and had not seen Aircraft X. I believe separation was lost between these two IFR aircraft.By the time I noticed Aircraft Y in my airspace he was already no factor for Aircraft X. He was descending below him and turning southbound away from Aircraft X. I did not need to issue evasive action. This was caused by the Final Controller allowing Aircraft Y to enter my airspace without approval and not recognizing the conflict with Aircraft X. The Final Controller should not enter another controller's airspace without coordination.




Synopsis: PHL TRACON Controller reported that a Controller failed to make a radar point out to the reporter's adjacent sector.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was notified by international recovery specialist the flight departed with undocumented Hazmat in position 6L. Ramp Agent noticed it after the flight departed. I sent an ACARS to the crew with the details of the Hazmat.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported sending the flight crew an ACARS notification of undocumented Hazmat cargo onboard aircraft without required Hazmat documents.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Visual Approach with both autopilots on; (CAT III showing) at approximately 3;000 feet aircraft excessively pitched nose down approximately 7-10 degrees following a false glide slope. Pilot flying (First Officer) disconnected the autopilot and leveled off at 2;000 feet as Tower called a low altitude alert. The aircraft glide slope recovered and showed a correct indication from the final approach fix to touchdown.  was written up and documented after shut down. Aircraft did not descend below 2000 feet prior to the final approach fix. Final Approach Fix altitude is 2;000 feet.




Synopsis: A300 Captain reported the aircraft pitched over abruptly following a false glide slope; resulting in a low altitude alert from the Tower.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B NYC
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Second aircraft: MD-11
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On approach to EWR; night VMC; following an MD-11. Issued a traffic advisory; we acknowledged the MD-11 in sight; were cleared for a visual approach for 22L behind the MD-11. At that time we were at 3000 feet and on a 170 heading toward TEB. I wanted to square the approach to maximize separation with the heavy; but also wanted the localizer and glideslope to capture. I disconnected the autopilot; selected 2500 feet; so that the glideslope would capture after the localizer had begun to capture. This is what ATC does when giving us a heading that would cause us to go above the GS before LOC capture. They give us 2500 feet to intercept the LOC. I started down to 2500 feet; then ATC instructed us to maintain 3000 feet until south of TEB. I reversed the descent; and began a climb back to 3000 feet. About that time; I also intercepted the LOC. Just south of TEB; we encountered the wake of the MD-11. It abruptly rolled our aircraft to the right between 30-40 degrees. I applied opposite aileron and rudder; and returned the aircraft to wings level. I also continued to climb to about a dot above the glideslope to reduce the chances of another wake encounter. I called the FA on the intercom to make sure she and the passengers were ok; and were told the cabin was ok. I continued the approach; reduced our airspeed to final approach speed; and continued slightly above the glideslope for the remainder of the approach. Landing was smooth and uneventful. At one point outside the FAF we were only about 2-3 miles in trail.Clearly; descending below the MD-11 flightpath was not desirable. The winds aloft were slightly right-to-left; but somewhat aligned with our flight paths and didn't move the wakes aside much. We were on our last leg of the trip; somewhat tired although not fatigued; and hadn't quite realized how close we were to the heavy.Suggestions: Clearly; not putting our aircraft in the same place as the preceding aircraft's wake turbulence would be a good idea. Just because ATC usually does something doesn't mean it's always appropriate.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to EWR while 2-3 miles in trail of an MD-11.
Date: 201203
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Texan T6/Harvard (Antique)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I made a right base turn to the runway and then a right out after a fly over the field. Upon turning out I passed under another plane which I did not see. I was on the wrong frequency for the CTAF and believed I was flying upwind but I should have not flown right turns. I realized after flying out of the area what a terrible mistake I had made and had a bad feeling in my gut. I evaluated the events that led to my lapse of judgment in not following standard pattern procedures. I was clearly not fully engaged (thinking through) and complacent; which also explains my not being on the right frequency. I can not understand how I didn't think through my actions enough to feel intuitively the risk to me and others to fly right turns. Then I received a call form an acquaintance informing me of the near miss. As a result I have grounded myself to take full stock of my actions; the events of the flight that led to this serious lap of attention. I now see a series of issues with the 45 minute flight that likely contributed to the situation; all dealing with me; the pilot; getting into the plane without thinking through/planning for the flight; then being inattentive and complacent in flying on a sunny day.




Synopsis: Pilot of an AT-6 reports a lapse in judgment and/or complacency during a recreational flight. The wrong CTAF is used to alert other aircraft in the pattern and the wrong pattern direction is used to the wrong runway resulting in a NMAC with another aircraft.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Narrative: While climbing out of FL280 we noticed the oil quantity on the right engine went from 12 quarts down to eight. We immediately ran the QRH for oil quantity. The QRH said that it was likely that the oil cap was left off and that oil should stabilize around 4 to 6 quarts. We called company on Commercial Radio to let them know the possibility of us having to divert and also what they recommended. The oil quantity [was] about five quarts when we declared an emergency and deviated to a nearby airport. We elected to keep the engine running as long as parameters were in acceptable limits. The pressure never dropped and the oil temperature never rose higher than the left engine. The Captain updated the flight attendants and passengers while I continued to fly and monitor ATC. We ran the diversion checklist and other appropriate checklists and landed at the diversion airport. We transferred the controls in the terminal area and the Captain made the landing. After we came to a stop on the runway we shutdown the right engine and had the airport fire department look at the engine before proceeding to the gate. We landed with approximately three quarts of oil. We wrote up the airplane and Maintenance later advised a seal had broken allowing oil to escape close to the starter.


Second narrative: I did ask for the controls on approach as we received a wind check and wind was near my low time in type First Officer's crosswind limitation.


Synopsis: While climbing out of FL280 a MD83 crew noticed the oil quantity on the right engine went from 12 quarts down to eight. The crew diverted to a nearby airport where Maintenance later advised a seal had broken allowing oil to escape close to the starter.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GPI.Airport, MT
Aircraft: SR22
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was inbound to GPI from the southwest.  He was passing through a 9500 ft. MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) area.  I inadvertently cleared him to 9000 ft.  I was on the tail end of a busy session where I had been working multiple GPI approach/departures in addition to activities on the east side of the sector including Aircraft Y that needed a reroute and numerous deviations.  I did not have a D-side until very shortly before the incident.Have more staffing; make MIA numbers larger.




Synopsis: ZLC Controller reported descending in error an aircraft below the MIA.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: M03.TRACON, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MEM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: VANZE 1 Arrival.  Set up for 27 because winds 250 at 16. 18L/R; 27 in use. Taken off arrival immediately with vector and slow to 290 knots. Descend to FL240. Cleared to VANZE descend Via except maintain speed. Shortly given Another Vector and slow to 280 knots; then 250 knots; then 210 knots. Descend to 7;000 given very early on vector and expect RNAV to 18L in Box to change. Then given another vector (aligning with last leg of VANZE arrival). Then cleared descend via VANZE 1< maintain speed 190. Working in FMS and noted Pilot Flying (PF) put in 3;000 ft which is what I expected. Then realized we were still short of MEBEE (cross above 8;000 feet). Not cleared to MEBEE. Decided to have Pilot Flying (PF) stay at 7;000 feet until crossing since aligned with; and ask for better clearance; but given frequency change. Next controller cleared us to 3;000 feet alleviating concern. Noticed he was giving ILS (LOC clearances). Put in FMS. cleared for visual in the end to 18L.Need more planning ahead on ATC part. Not necessary to give all of the changes and keep on an RNAV. One or the other would be preferred. Too much time spent in FMS on a relatively clear day.  More accurate direction given earlier would be appreciated.Less mixing of procedures would help. RNAV and Training fine and Understood. So many changes vectors; airspeeds; altitudes given should revert to manual arrival with final vector and altitude with airspeed. Cannot pass off arriving aircraft as safely by putting back on an arrival after changing everything without very explicit clearance.




Synopsis: Captain laments the current ATC philosophy of using RNAV arrivals then making changes to the airspeed and altitude restrictions; then vectoring off and back on the arrival without a clear altitude assignment.
Date: 202001
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Captain had the mechanics out to repair the aft jump seat in ZZZ3; the jump seat was not springing up as it should. The chemical coil pod was used for the repair. The fumes from the product were so strong and not dissipating; I developed a headache; mouth tingling and burning eyes. The Captain had the mechanics back out in ZZZ to see if they could do anything. It was determined it would take several more hours for the fumes to dissipate. Since further exposure to these fumes would hinder my ability to perform my flight attendant duties I sat in row XXc for takeoff and landing. Strong chemicals that produce fumes should never be used in the cabin. The Maintenance Department should have a list of prohibited chemicals that should not be used inside the aircraft. The poor air quality / fumes were noticed by all crew members and passengers.




Synopsis: B737-700 Flight Attendant reported a fume event caused by chemicals to repair a FA jumpseat. The FA reported experiencing physiological symptoms.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This APU was deferred due to a large hot air leak in the APU exhaust duct. The leak was only found because the APU needed oil; and the leak was found while adding oil. There is a fire loop here that apparently never detected the leak. This duct leak was NOT new. It looks like it had been there for at least weeks; perhaps months?




Synopsis: A large hot air duct leak was discovered on an MEL'd APU during an oil servicing that was not previously detected by the nearby fire loop.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our PDC clearance was to fly the RNAV Departure and climb via the SID except maintain 4000 feet. When we checked in with Departure Control; we stated; 'Company # checking in at 2000 feet; climbing to 4000 feet via the TERPZ6.' The Controller responded; 'Roger; climb via the SID.' In my mind; we WERE climbing via the SID and I wondered if we had just had a change to our clearance. I asked the Pilot Monitoring to confirm the altitude we were cleared to and the Controller said; '17;000 feet. When I say climb via SID; it deletes all previous restrictions.' This may be true. It may be right out of the ATC Controller's Handbook. But it's the very first time I've ever heard it. Every other Controller I've ever heard modify a climb via clearance states something like; 'Roger; climb via the SID to 17;000 feet' or 'climb via SID; delete the 4000 feet restriction;' etc.; something that makes it patently clear that a new altitude has been issued.As I said; this may be entirely correct terminology; but it seems unwise to just decide; out of the blue; to start using a new way to clear that most of us have never heard before; and expect crystal clear interpretations. With something as Safety critical as an altitude clearance in congested airspace; I think it would be wise to ensure clarity in such clearances. I think it would also be wise to prescribe a climb via clearance that is issued the same all over the country. Presently there are at least half a dozen different ways such clearance show up on our PDC's. It shouldn't be a creative writing attempt. There should be a formula followed by all ATC facilities.




Synopsis: A 737 First Officer reported being unsure of their assigned altitude climbing out of BWI on the TERPZ6 SID due to the phraseology used by ATC.
Date: 201508
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: An unsafe condition exists when window cleaners clean windshields without safety harnesses. I have cleaned the windshield; myself; so I know how dangerous this task can be.  On more than one occasion; I have asked operations for window cleaning with a proper maintenance stand. I was told the station does not have stands to wash windows. The unsafe procedure of a cabin service person sitting on the open window sill; without a safety harness device; is a poor practice. The cabin service person is holding on to the inside of the aircraft with one hand while cleaning the window with his other hand. If his hand slips off the aircraft; he or she will fall out of the window. As I have cleaned the window; 75% of my body weight is outside the window. A fall from that height will seriously injure a person; or kill them; if they land on their head. A safety rope or harness should be used by personnel hanging out of aircraft windows; holding on with one hand. Pilots should not clean windshields hanging out the windows. Maintenance should clean the windshield using stands or a bucket truck; similar to the deicing trucks; especially at major hubs. Cleaning the windows from the ground with a long stick is ineffective; badly streaks the windows and leaves a film on them.




Synopsis: An A319 Captain described the unsafe practice around washing an aircraft's windshield from inside the aircraft while partially out a side window. Windshield wash stands should be available to prevent injury or death from a fall out the window.