elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed on a western heading off of BDN to go southbound. The aircraft was in a shallow climb and was approximately 085 MSL climbing to (I believe) 130 MSL in the area designated to have vectors below the MIA. The MIA they were in was 090 MSL and within about 15 miles the terrain would elevate to about 121 MSL. I felt the climb was too shallow and instructed the Certified Professional Controller In Training (CPC-IT) to turn the aircraft north. CPC-IT issued a 310 heading which was not enough for my comfort. I told CPC-IT to issue a 360 heading to ensure that the aircraft would completely miss the higher terrain.After the aircraft completed the turn and it was able to meet the 090 MSL MIA within the minute. The reason for the report is that we were very close to the boundary of the 'Vector below the MIA' and I cannot guarantee that we didn't spill out as the aircraft completed the turn. I have not had the opportunity to review the session as I had other work related obligations to attend to before the end of my shift.Next time I will tell the CPC-IT what heading to issue rather than a vague 'turn that aircraft north' suggestion.




Synopsis: ZSE ARTCC Controller reported an unsafe situation involving an aircraft that may have been below the minimum IFR Altitude.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC; Class B BWI; Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC; TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Descending on the ANTHM STAR under Washington Center Control; we were cleared to descend 'via the ANTHM' arrival.  We had the ATIS; but because Washington does not assign the runway transition; we set 11;000 in the MCP; which is the lowest we can go without a runway assignment.  When we were switched over to Potomac Approach; reporting altitude passing; descending via to 11;000; and the ATIS; the response we got was '33 Left'.  No 'continue descent via 33 Left transition'; or 'Maintain 11;000 ; expect 33 Left'; or 'continue descent to X thousand; expect 33 Left'(or some variation thereof).  After a few moments; I queried the Controller if we were cleared to continue descent via the 33 Left transition; at which point he responded; 'Continue via the 33 Left transition'.  We continued without further incident. To me this exchange was confusing and could lead to a misinterpretation of the approach clearance. This is the second time this has happened to me and on advice from the Chiefs I am filing this report because this confusion needs to be addressed.  Standardized phraseology needs to be used.  I think the Controllers are assuming that we will fly the transition because the ATIS has the active runway information.  But I don't think this is correct.  The Controllers need to be specific.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain experiences confusion during the ANTHM RNAV to BWI due to the late runway transition assignment by PCT Approach; and their reluctance to issue the transition on the initial check in.
Date: 202006
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Dealing with COVID for 3 months now and platooning was helping. However; since platooning has ended social distancing has become very difficult and certain people are more cautious than others. I recently found out I have been in contact with someone who was positive (yet I wasn't named) when I went to management I was advised I would hear from HR if I came up in the investigation. The problem is who can remember who exactly and for how long they've come in contact with for 14 days? I am concerned about my health; my family's health and potentially causing harm to those around me. Tables have signage; temperatures are being checked; but at the end of the day we all have to work in close proximity to others. We don't have the tools readily available to prevent spreading the virus. There are no Clorox wipes anywhere; we share room computers; we all touch the same door knobs; we all use the same fridge for our lunch; etc. If Person A tests positive for it; the company is only investigating and notifying people Person A remembers they came into contact with. Then they contact Person B; C; D that were named; However; they don't speak to the people B; C or D came into contact with until B; C and D test positive. So all of the days in between we are constantly out in the open potentially spreading to everyone.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported concerns with being notified that someone he had contact with tested positive for COVID-19.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: A321
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A B757 was on a right downwind for ILS 10L at 4;000. He was turned in to follow another aircraft; join the LOC and cleared. An A321 was on a right downwind following the B757 but for the ILS Runway 10R. The B757's descent performance from where he was cleared from 4;000 to 3;000 was at least lackluster. The A321 was turned base behind the B757 for [Runway] 10R; however; apparently there was a 'wake remnant' from the B757 for [Runway] 10L that according to TARP was at 3.9 miles.  The lackluster descent by the B757 along with the descent clearance of the A321 led to a 'wake remnant' situation. One change in the procedure at PDX is that usually aircraft are told to expect runway assignments that are closer to their gate. This is to help expedite arrivals to their gate and to assist the Tower in preventing problematic taxi situations. Since the runways are almost the same length; it might be best to put aircraft on a north downwind to the north runway and the south downwind to the south runway. This would help avoid runway crossover situations such at the event above. In addition; in STARS; there is no tool/ software application to measure 'wake remnant' of any aircraft. It seems there should be a tool for controllers to be able to judge where the remnant is such as a 'bread crumb' trail with an altitude associated with the last 'crumb' so that controllers can avoid this situation. Wake turbulence can be a serious issue and if it is necessary to measure performance via programs such as TARP; it would seem that prevention of the potential safety issue should be addressed and prioritized to provide controllers with capable tools to measure this.




Synopsis: P80 Controller voiced concern regarding the 'Wake Remnant' issue and the fact that controllers are expected to provide separation when no tool is avaiable to detect same.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C AUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON AUS
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Staffing; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While descending out of 6;000 ft for 4;000 ft; we noticed an aircraft that appeared close to our altitude but slightly lower and appeared to be climbing. I made sure all of our outside lights were illuminated including turning on our landing lights. We then received a TCAS TA alert of proximity and almost at the same time as this received a Traffic Alert 'Climb 6;000 ft and turn 15 degrees right' command from ATC (Approach Control). I then saw the other aircraft turn on his landing light in response to seeing me turn on mine; which told me that he probably saw us too. Shortly thereafter we received a level off command;(RA alert) at which time we did level off. I saw the aircraft passing behind us and returned to the STAR immediately after knowing we would be clear of the conflict. STAR arrival this low and close to such a busy airport should be better protected. Maybe expand the airspace around Austin Airport as it is very busy. I also feel that our air traffic controllers are way over worked and facilities undermanned. ATC does a fantastic job considering but we are expecting too much from these controllers and it will put aircraft and lives at greater risk.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with another aircraft while descending on arrival into AUS and suggested that the STAR airspace should be better protected.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSY.Airport, LA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground MSY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi out we were cleared from parking to Runway 19 via E; D; S; cross Runway 10. We responded correctly; put the taxi instructions in the scratch pad of the FMS; but misread the taxi diagram where 'D' appears to follow the ramp due east. I did not recognize or notice the diagonal taxiway with another 'D' north of Runway 10. We noted our error when Ground Control told us to turn left on Taxiway F; cross 10 and join Taxiway D. I read back the instruction and apologized. ATC responded 'no problem; that's what we're here for. Both of us missed Taxiway D on the parking diagram; thinking instead that D ran eastbound parallel to Runway 10. Neither of us fly to MSY often. Judging by ATC's reaction this might be a good place for a 'hotspot' note.


Second narrative: Cleared to taxi from parking to Runway 19 via E; D; S. Responded to clearance traced route in highlight on [airport diagram] and input route in scratch pad of FMS. The [airport diagram] has Taxiway D labeled on Taxiway E east of the actual D Taxiway. When I highlighted the route I drew through the letter D not the actual taxiway then followed the line past the intersection. Ground notified us when past D Intersection and recleared via alternate route. No further discrepancies occurred. Fix the chart. Take extra time even when the route and airport layout seems easy.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew misunderstands a taxi clearance at MSY and believes that Taxiway E turns into Taxiway D; when in fact D is the diagonal; due to the location of the D near Taxiway E on the airport diagram. An electronic display of the airport diagram was being used for taxi and the assumed route had been highlighted.
Date: 201411
Location: LAS.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing on TRALR5 out of LAS.....PDC said climb via SID.......we climbed via SID to 13000 [feet] as it CLEARLY states from TRALR climb to FL190. The way PF read it was stop at 13000 [feet] and after TRALR climb to FL190. ATC was a little upset and not helpful about it so we climbed to FL190. I would like to point out the chart of the TRAILER5 is not very clear; and the top altitude is hidden at bottom of page and NOT in BOLD print....very easy to miss. I think ATC has put too much weight on Climb via SID and not putting the top altitude on the PDC which would make it easier and safer for the pilots who are trying to depart a complicated and busy terminal area such as LAS. I noticed IAH has started to put TOP ALTITUDE on the PDC as well as EWR etc.....why can't LAS? Also it is hard to catch on the iPad Jeppesen pro as it is NOT in bold print as it should be!


Second narrative: Departed LAS Runway 1R on the TRALR5 SID. On the routing part of the plate it states 'From TRALR via transition. MAINTAIN FL190; Expect filed altitude 10 minutes after departure.' We climbed and crossed RIOOS at 13;000 [feet] and leveled off with the intent of climbing to FL190 after TRALR since the MAINTAIN FL190 followed 'From TRALR via transition.' The controller said to continue climb to FL190. Not aware of any ATC conflicts although the controller seemed agitated.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports leveling at 13;000 feet crossing RIOOS on the TRALR5 with the intention of climbing to FL190 after passing TRALR; as stated in the routing box. ATC is not happy with this interpretation of the verbiage and the crew is told to continue climb to FL190.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We received the close out; pushed back and departed ZZZ. Inflight; we received a message from Dispatch saying ZZZ Operations had contacted them to make sure we were aware we had dry ice on board. I looked at the close out and realized I did not receive the auto [Dangerous Goods Form]..I got complacent and looked over the close out but missed that the close out included SPCL DRY ICE; RA/HAZ. I must be more intentional in paying attention to each and every line on the close out.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported Hazmat transported without required crew verification.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 0.5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B MDW
ATC / advisory: Tower MDW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After deicing with Type One and Type Four fluid; we ran the appropriate checklist and waited one minute to turn on the engine bleeds (both engines were running). Almost immediately; a fog started to form along with the fluid smell. We decided to turn the bleeds off because we were [planning] to accomplish a no bleeds takeoff. Approximately five minutes later we were cleared for takeoff on 31C. Once airborne; the cockpit filled with the deice fluid fog to the point I couldn't see my instrument panel. The Captain was the pilot flying and seemed to have better visibility on his side; so we decided to reconfigure the pressurization panel prior to retracting the flaps (gear was up) and the fog dissipated rather quickly. After flaps were retracted; the Captain called the flight attendants and spoke to the passengers to reassure them. We continued to our destination without further incident.




Synopsis: B737-700 FO reported the cockpit filled with de-ice fluid fog shortly after takeoff. Fog cleared and flight continued to destination.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: While performing the sampling of uplifted fuel for the Fuel Freeze Testing the sample hose slipped and caused a minor fuel spill which soaked my lower pant legs and boots. (No spill report necessary). This was caused by there being no valve on the fuel truck to control the flow of fuel into the sample jar. There is no valve on the sample hose either. You plug the hose into the quick disconnect and have immediate truck pump pressure. We are required to crimp the hose by hand and aim it into a bucket to catch the 1 cup of fuel necessary to perform the test. This is a major fuel spill waiting to happen.Suspend the fuel freeze sample test until all the fuel trucks are refitted with on/off valves at the sample point.




Synopsis: Mechanic reported that lack of proper equipment may lead to a major fuel spill when obtaining the fuel sample for the pre-flight fuel freeze test.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While descending on the arrival we had both engine bleeds trip off while passing through FL390. We received the Cabin Altitude warning and did the emergency action items and QRH. We asked for an emergency descent to 10;000 FT. We were able to keep the cabin altitude around approximately 10;000 FT. The passenger oxygen masks did not deploy. Using the QRH we were able to reset both of the engine bleeds and the cabin altitude returned to normal. I was informed that most of the passengers were not aware of the situation until I informed them during the descent. I am not aware of any passenger issues as a result of this event.




Synopsis: A B737-700 flight crew declared an emergency and initiated an emergency descent when both engine bleeds tripped off. During the descent they conducted the associated QRH procedure and the bleeds resumed operation. Passenger O2 masks were not deployed.