elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As takeoff power was applied a dull thud was heard from behind the cockpit. All engine indications were normal and the takeoff was continued. While climbing through 10;000 FT the cockpit temperature became uncontrollable. At approximately FL280 the master caution warning illuminated with an altitude warning horn; the cabin altitude was above 10;000 FT and climbing at a rate of 1;000 FT per minute. All appropriate QRH items were completed and an emergency descent was completed to 10;000 FT. Passenger oxygen masks did not deploy. ATC was informed; and we returned to the airport. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified of the aircraft status. A flap 25; overweight landing was accomplished to a successful outcome. We returned the aircraft to the gate and the passengers were deplaned.

Callback: The Reporter stated that a stainless steel duct from the left Air Conditioning Pack ruptured partially on takeoff and then completely at FL280. This failure not only caused the loss of pressurization but the sound in the cabin was so loud that the Call Button Chimes could not be heard. The duct failure occurred at a weld joint which caused the duct to peel back like a banana.

Second narrative: As takeoff power was applied a dull thud was heard from behind the cockpit. All engine indications were normal and the takeoff was continued. While climbing through 10;000 FT the cockpit temperature became uncontrollable. At approximately FL280 the master caution warning illuminated with an altitude warning horn; the cabin altitude was above 10;000 FT and climbing at a rate of 1;000 FT per minute. All appropriate QRH items were completed and an emergency descent was completed to 10;000 FT. Passenger Oxygen masks did not deploy. ATC was informed; and we returned to the airport. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified of the aircraft status. A flap 25; overweight landing was accomplished to a successful outcome. We returned the aircraft to the gate and the passengers were deplaned.


Synopsis: A B757's left pack air conditioning duct ruptured slightly at takeoff; then completely failed at FL280; causing the loss of cabin pressurization. The crew declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise; Descent; Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While enroute; I began to experience communication radio failure. It started as heavy persistent static; similar to having the squelch pulled out. It then changed into the microphone being stuck. While attempting to troubleshoot this problem; I noticed that my ELT was activated. I reset the ELT and it remained inactive. I then decided to change my squawk code to 7600. As I looked down to do this I noticed that my alternator was not charging. I attempted to address this by cycling the field switch and the alternator circuit breaker; which had not tripped. At this point; with multiple failures; I decided that it was unwise to continue on. The nearest airport to me was where I chose to land. I kept my squawk code of 7600 and descended to pattern altitude where I circled the tower; looking for light gun signals. None were seen. I scanned the approach ends of both runways for traffic and set up for a left downwind. I landed and taxied over to the FBO. Once inside; I called the Tower to explain myself to them.




Synopsis: BE-35 Pilot reported experiencing a communications radio failure resulting in diverting to a nearby airport.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A ramp [employee] came up to the cockpit and reported that there were 4 boxes in the aft cargo; and he thought that one of the boxes might be a battery. I decided to go inspect it since batteries can be HAZMAT. When I went to the back of the plane and looked at the box; I was unable to determine what was inside. In the meantime; I noticed that there were 3 other boxes; and asked what those were. The ramp personnel showed me the boxes and I immediately noticed an 'Oxidizer 5.1' sticker on the side; which I didn't think we could carry. I went back to the cockpit and requested assistance from the on duty person who handles HAZMAT. He came out and confirmed that the two boxes that were labeled 'Oxidizer 5.1' could not fly; but he stated the other two boxes could go. I told him that I wasn't comfortable carrying the other two boxes of the shipment without further inspection since half the shipment was labeled HAZMAT; and we were not sure what the content was of the other boxes. I told him we could inspect the boxes further; or we could remove them. He chose to remove them. I then contacted the highest ranking person at the station to come out to speak with us. The FOM states they must be informed and file a report; so I made him aware of the situation and showed him the page in my manual. I then contacted a duty officer and informed him of the situation.  He said he would open an investigation; and we both agreed the situation had been resolved and normal operations could continue.The hazardous shipment should have never made it that far; but I commend the rampers for telling me and being suspicious; but again; the HAZMAT should have never made it that far. Obviously better training is the only thing that could have helped that from happening.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported ramp employee noticed some improperly loaded HAZMAT that was then removed from the aircraft.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was cleared for the visual approach to rwy 07R to LAS 6 NM behind Aircraft Y on the same visual approach. I was in the descent of 2400 feet per min on speed of 210 when Aircraft Y stated he could not get down and he was doing a right 360 to get down. Approach told me to level 8000 and turn to a heading of 070. I immediately rolled up the 8000 alt select stopped a 2400 min descent by turning off the Auto Pilot as I went through 8000 to 7700-7800 not sure all while turning in an aggressive maneuver pulling g forces. My CEO was not happy but I did what was needed. The controller yelled at me for not responding and I responded that I had a lot to do to stop the descent and turn so he could just hold on. I did nothing wrong. He went quiet and then asked if I wanted the Visual approach for 19R and I accepted to be put second to the airlines that should have been made to go around and get in sequence.




Synopsis: Corporate Jet Captain reported he had to level off rapidly when the airliner on a visual approach to LAS in front of him did a 360 degree turn to get down.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GAI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-12
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF GAI
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: GAI has published two NOTAMs that express the following information:TAXIWAY F; E; D; TAXIWAY PARALLEL TAXIWAY ADJACENT RUNWAY 14/32 BETWEEN TAXIWAY F AND TAXIWAY C CLOSED.  XX SEP XA:22 2017 UNTIL YY XI:00 2017.And:TAXIWAY ALL BETWEEN SELF FUEL RAMP AND RUNWAY 14 THRESHOLD CLOSED. XX SEP XB:34 2017 UNTIL YY XI:00 2017The NOTAMs only address the taxiways. No mention of the runway exits to the taxiways. NOTAMs lack any real actionable detail. Unfortunately; the A/FD (Airport/Facility Directory) diagram of the airport does not show any of the taxiway designations - only shows the actual taxiways; not the labeling. Hence; a landing pilot cannot know that all of the runway 32 taxiway exits other than the first one are closed (for which; any aircraft other than a STOL aircraft won't be an option). These exits are closed; literally with zero asphalt. Hence; landings on either 32 or 14 require a taxi back at landing or departure with no ability to exit the runway at any other point than the start of 32 (which is not described in the NOTAMs).Here; I landed on 32 and because the taxiways were not available; I needed to taxi back. However; another aircraft was behind me on final. While I pulled off into the grass to avoid a possible on-runway conflict; the pilot in the twin behind me executed a go around successfully. The core issue here is the appropriateness of how construction at this airport is undertaken. Without any taxiway (runway exits specifically) available; the potential for a realized conflict is much higher than it needs to be. The airport should have planned the construction in appropriate phases to avoid the unavailability of at least one exit at each end of the runway (regardless of the taxiway availability; minimally provide exit space to resolve a possible conflict); reducing the real possibility of an incident or accident. Given the very high traffic level at this airport; the approach to construction and closures was not well thought out in respect to flight safety.




Synopsis: RV12 pilot reported that after landing on Runway 32 at GAI; the taxiways were not available due to construction. He was forced to taxi onto the grass due to an aircraft on short final.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Night
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: In the North area this applies to 53 Brunswick; 54 Jekyll; 73 Allendale and during the midnight shifts they handle all the airports. Specifically during the daytime when an aircraft calls for clearance and the controller has to read the flight plan. There are five airports in the 53 sector that planes can call for clearance from. Nahunta (which almost never happens; Jesup; which is infrequent; Jekyll which is also infrequent and Brunswick and Golden Isle which are busy. When a flight plan has to be found in the departure list of the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) there could be dozens of flight plans in there. Sometimes there are so many planes in there that it makes it time consuming to find the one plane you are looking for. Instead of just seeing planes for Jesup; Nahunta; Jekyll; Brunswick and Golden Isle there will be flight plans that populate from MYNN; CHS; ILM; OMN; DAB; EVB; AVL; MIA; FLL; PBI and numerous other airports. Yes the setting can be changed to show flight plans from departure points. However there are still dozens of other flight plans showing up that the controller will never issue a clearance to. There are even flight plans that show up in the departure list for all 3 of the ocean sectorsHave the flight plans from planes departing the airports that are just within the boundaries of the sectors being worked populate in the departure list.




Synopsis: ZJX Controller reported of a search function while using user request evaluation tool had too many aircraft in the list. Controller reported of seeing too many aircraft and aircraft from other sectors displayed in the list.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Other Photo Mission
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Photo Shoot / Video
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Again TRACON and Tower management is forcing controllers to accommodate Aircraft X and the photo taking work that this aircraft wants to make for the next two months. The workforce is screaming that this operation is unsafe and this scenario is just one example. I was on departure. Aircraft X was east bound at 1;900 feet. I can see on the ASDE that Aircraft Y is takeoff roll. As Aircraft Y tags up they are climbing through 1;000 feet and Aircraft X is within half mile of Aircraft Y converging course and tags beginning to merge. Aircraft Y checks in as the Captain is alarming on my scope. My Operations Manager is in the room at the time and bring this to his attention and again state we should not be conducting this operation. As mentioned above nothing is done about it and we are being forced by management to accommodate this. This NAS is built for the SAFE AND EFFICIENT movement of aircraft. If someone is requesting to conduct an operation that takes away from either of these principles then it should not be allowed! I assume in the scenario above Tower is providing visual separation. Even if that is the case departing passenger jets quite literally into someone crossing the departure end is an operation that is simply not acceptable and should not be an operation that is mandated by management to conduct. There are a lot of constraints on the ATC system just because someone asks for something does not mean we should have to accommodate; especially when it degrades the principles of the ATC system. There should be a serious look into how this operation is be handled by the Management of TRACON and Tower. The workforce is uncomfortable with this operation. It is creating delays; safety situations and causing much distraction to controllers.




Synopsis: A TRACON Controller reported management forced  the Controllers to accommodate a photo mission aircraft that flew into confliction with airport traffic.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SVH.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF SVH
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were a Beechjet 400A charter flight with 2 passengers out of Statesville Regional Airport ready to start our taxi to runway 10. We made the call on CTAF 123.075 for our intentions to taxi to runway 10. We didn't hear any traffic on the frequency and we started the taxi to runway 10. Before we entered runway 10 we gave a call again on the same frequency saying our intentions to depart on that runway; we checked before we entered to the runway for any traffic and we didn't see any traffic and nobody [made] any reports either. We entered the runway and after our last checks for the takeoff; we started the takeoff roll and about 5 seconds later we identified traffic on short final for runway 28; we aborted the takeoff and expedited our exit off the runway. We did taxi back on the taxiway to take runway 10 again; we saw the [other aircraft] clearing the runway without any call at all. We did the same procedure and took off out of runway 10. The next day we flew back to Statesville Regional Airport to drop off one of our passengers and were able to talk to the person who was in charge for line service. He talked to us what he witnessed the day of the incident I just described; and mentioned the same facts and airport activities. He also stated he was able to talk to the Pilot of the [other aircraft] involved; saying he was giving a call on a frequency not published on the current charts but a frequency of 20 years ago; the Pilot also mentioned that he never saw the Beechjet on the runway or any other traffic on takeoff roll. I understand there is a lack of information gathered from the [other aircraft] Pilot before flight as a result of a runway incursion and that could be prevented with the correct preparation for the flight; situational awareness improvement and traffic surveillance on runway selected for landing.




Synopsis: Beechjet 400 Captain reported spotting unannounced traffic on short final lining up to land from the opposite direction on the runway which they had just started their takeoff roll. Takeoff was aborted.
Date: 201710
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Other Load Planner
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was in the process of planning this flight. There were 2 carts of mail planned. One was 56 pieces at 1;015 lbs; the other was 55 pieces at 962 lbs. The ZZZ ops agent called; asking to put both items in Pit 4. I advised the ops agent that both items would not fit in Pit 4. I advised him that Pit 4 does not go all the way up to the door on the A319; as it does on the A320. Therefore; both mail items would not fit. The ops agent said 'ok; we'll split them then.' I finished planning the flight. I put the 1015 lbs of mail in Pit 4 with 27 bags planned. The 962 lbs item I put in Pit 6.This is a daily call from ZZZ. They want to put a large amount of mail in Pit 4; sometimes with some bags. This indicates to me that there is a lack of knowledge there about the A319. Despite many communications to the field; some locations do not 'get it'. By 'it'; I mean the fact the Pit 4 on the A319 is very small. When I worked the ramp (1989-2015); I did notice that the nets on the A319 were often moved around so that Pit 4 and Pit 5 were combined. Now that I work load planning; I see the hazard of doing this. The pit limits can be exceeded when the pits are 'creatively combined' in this fashion. Plus; we aren't providing accurate balance to the flight crews when we send final weights.The 'new' philosophy seems to be 'let's give the ramp some flexibility' and 'control' over the loading process. Sounds great as a slogan; but lack of knowledge (or overconfidence in supposed knowledge) such as this will continue to create safety concerns in the future. Getting the mean; old; inflexible load planners out of the process may create a 'feel good' atmosphere on the ramp; but in no way adds to safety. ZZZ is hardly the only station with the misplaced belief that Pit 4 on an A319 is a large pit and can accommodate heavy loads. I'm not accusing ZZZ of moving the nets; but the unshakable belief in a large Pit 4 is based on the 'culture' of moving the nets.




Synopsis: Air carrier Load Planner reported confusion and nonstandard procedures being used by ramp employees while loading cargo.
Date: 202005
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: As we were cleared for departure I realized that I had forgotten to brief the over the wing passengers prior to pushback. At 10;000 feet I got up and briefed all four passengers individually. It has been nearly 3 weeks since I last worked; with so much new information; and procedures changing daily I got caught up and distracted from my original duties.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported forgetting to brief the over the wing passengers until at 10;000 feet.