elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Another Cabin Crewmember was on break; and awoke mid-break needing to use the lavatory. There were lights on in the bunk area; individual bunks are curtained off to provide darkness.  (The crew bunk area has a very low ceiling; so most people must walk bent over at the waist; which alters the center of gravity.) As she began to descend the stairs to the main deck; she caught her toe (on carpet?) and fell down the steep and narrow stairs; landing at the bottom with her left leg underneath her.  She suffered a bruised arm and back; and her left ankle was bleeding profusely from scraping; and the left foot was also badly bruised and swollen.  Nearby Flight Attendants (FAs) (not on break) heard her fall and extricated her from the stairwell.  One FA; who happens to be a nurse; cleaned the lesions on her ankle and dressed the wound.  The injured crewmember was unable to put weight on her left foot; and therefore was unable to continue her duties; she spent the remainder of the flight in a passenger seat with her foot elevated.  Upon arrival; she was transported through the terminal to the crew bus via wheelchair. After going to the hotel; I accompanied her (along with a third crewmember) to the local hospital; where she had her foot and ankle x-rayed; cleaned and re-bandaged.  The physician on duty informed us that there were no obvious fractures; but that she should see a physician on return to the US.  She deadheaded home on our return flight.




Synopsis: B777 Flight Attendant describes a fall by another Flight Attendant attempting to negotiate the steep stairs down to the main deck from the overhead flight attendant rest area.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Inadvertent Code 7500 message via Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) message. During the flight the Captain was discussing with the First Officer about the data link pages in the Multi-Function Control Display Unit (MCDU). One of those pages is the covert declaration of aircraft hijacking or Code 7500. The Captain displayed the page and explained how to read the page and then exited out of the page without entering any information or sending the page. Shortly afterwards our flight received a query from ATC asking if the aircraft was squawking a special code to which the crew replied no and confirmed assigned transponder code. Upon parking; the flight crew was informed by dispatch that a message with the default information from the Code 7500 page had been received and asked if everything was ok. Airport Security Manager also confirmed with the crew of their status.


Second narrative: Inadvertent Code 7500 message via Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) message. During the flight the Captain was discussing with the First Officer about the data link pages in the Multifunction Control Display Unit (MCDU). One of those pages is the covert declaration of aircraft hijacking or Code 7500. The Captain displayed the page and explained how to read the page and then exited out of the page without entering any information or sending the page. Shortly afterwards the flight received a query from ATC asking if the aircraft was squawking a special code to which the crew replied no and confirmed assigned transponder code. Upon parking at the gate the flight crew was informed by dispatch that a message; with the default information from the Code 7500 page had been received and asked if everything was ok. Airport Security Manager also confirmed with the crew of their status.


Synopsis: A Flight Crew reported they inadvertently squawked 7500.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Global 5000 (Bombardier)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: While finishing the Transponder Operational Checkout procedure the manual states to close all the probe heater breakers and to shut off electrical power to the aircraft which coincided with the beginning of the afternoon scheduled break. Upon returning from break the aircraft power was reapplied to verify several non-thermal circuit breakers were not in a 'locked' state and after 5-10 minutes noticed the #1 airdata and standby airdata information on their respective displays depicting an uncommanded steep decline in airspeed and altitude. After 20-30 seconds of this aircraft power was shut down and it was later discovered that all the airdata probes heated with no notice or warning. After evaluation; it was found the two probe test adapters and the two aircraft airdata probes were damaged and needed repaired/replaced.It was discovered after the incident that in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual in Chapter 12 there is a procedure to configure the aircraft for maintenance. Among the many items listed there is a warning which states that all probe heater circuit breakers should be pulled and collared; failure to do so could result in uncommanded heating that could result in injury and damage to the aircraft. I would suggest that the Chapter 12 Configuration of the Aircraft for Maintenance be accomplished AT ALL TIMES this type of aircraft is in for a maintenance event at our hangar. I would also like to suggest the aircraft manufacturer amend their maintenance manual to make technicians performing maintenance on the airdata system OR the activation of the weight on/off wheels procedures be directed to the Chapter 12 warning of the heater probes. I feel that one of these two actions could have prevented the mishap which we experienced.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician working on a Global 5000 reported that after accomplishing some operational checkouts and resetting some circuit breakers the air data probes heated and two probe test adapters and the two aircraft air data probes were damaged.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on approach and were fully configured at 1;400 FT flaps 30 with a green leading edge flaps full extend light. Vref was 118; target was 123; and aircraft was approximately 130 knots. We got the Leading Edge Flaps Transit light on the forward panel. I asked the First Officer to look up at the overhead panel to see what we had. He observed nothing out of the ordinary. While on speed; the red stall strip came up towards our Vref and touched it causing a momentary stick shaker (one second). I disconnected the autopilot and pushed the power up a bit. There were no indications of a stall or any other control issues. We also confirmed visually the leading edge slats were in the full extend position. We did get the #8 leading edge slat momentary on approach for one second. I decided not to do a stall recovery because the aircraft was fully configured before I received the LEF Transit light. Also; the aircraft showed no asymmetric flight characteristics. We continued and landed without incident.


Second narrative: On approach fully configured at flaps 30; ref of 128 and target 133. At approximately 1;300 FT AGL the Leading Edge Flap in Transit light illuminated. I observed no abnormal conditions on the overhead and visually confirmed with Captain that the slats were in proper position. While on speed; the red speed tape came up to meet our Vref and we received a momentary stick shaker. Captain disconnected the autopilot and increased power momentarily. He said that he did not feel any abnormal flight characteristics. The Leading Edge Flap in Transit light extinguished momentarily and then illuminated once more. This time I noticed the #8 Slat in Transit light illuminate briefly and then turned green. Again; I visually confirmed with Captain that the slats were in the proper position. [We] landed without incident.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew; fully configured for landing; reports a Leading Edge Flaps Transit light on the forward panel with no flap out of position on the overhead. The approach is continued and the light repeats but this time the number eight LE flap shows intransit momentarily then green and a momentary stick shaker is felt. A normal landing ensues.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CRP.Airport, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C CRP
ATC / advisory: Tower CRP
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y requested an opposite direction practice approach which was approved by the Tower. Tower scanned down 2 strips; one of which was Aircraft X. TRACON called back to ask if we needed to break Aircraft Y off of the approach; local control responded with no. I'm not sure how much time passed; Aircraft Y was well inside of the cutoff point per our local opposite direction operation procedures when Aircraft X departed on a 240 heading climbing to 3;000 feet.A supervisor was working Local Control. Our supervisors get the minimum amount of time needed to retain currency. Supervisors are not proficient in the tower. I do not have a solution to this problem; but something obviously needs to happen.




Synopsis: CRP TRACON Controller reported an opposite direction landing and takeoff occurred at CRP airport with less than the required miles of separation according to the local directives.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution Busbar
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Passing 10;000 feet; a flight attendant called and reported an electrical burning smell; but no smoke; throughout the main and upper deck cabins.  The crew discussed this smell and the Captain said that he could smell it also.  A minute after discussing the smell; the Right Util Bus EICAS message displayed followed shortly with the Left Util Bus EICAS message.  Accomplished the Smoke; Fire; or Fumes QRH and the Captain declared a mayday with [ATC] and requested vectors for a return to ZZZZ.  Crew discussed and decided not to dump fuel due to the nature of the emergency and the proximity of ZZZZ.  A message was sent to Dispatch declaring our Mayday; the nature of our emergency; our intention to divert to ZZZZ and land overweight.  Landing performance data was requested from dispatch and checked by the crew.  Radio called to ZZZZ operations to notify them of our emergency and return to ZZZZ.  Notified approach [that] we wanted the fire equipment waiting for us after landing.  The electrical smell had dissipated.  Uneventful overweight landing on RWY XXR with a turnoff near the end.  Cleared the runway and evaluated the brake temperatures and any other related problems and found everything normal.  Declared ops normal to ground control was given taxi clearance to stand.


Second narrative: I was PF. The Captain told me to turn the autopilot on and that he would work the checklists with the relief pilots. We elected to get the aircraft on the ground ASAP. I continued as PF while the rest of the crew called Dispatch and Station; coordinated with the Lead Flight Attendant; and worked checklists. We had an uneventful overweight landing at 745;000 lbs.


Synopsis: B747 crew described a return to departure airport for an electrical burning smell a Flight Attendant noticed.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Myself and another mechanic working [aircraft] removed and replaced an actuator; valve; and FMC. The parts removed were drained of any residue fuel and boxed up to be given to stores for transportation. On [date]; the parts were given to ramp workers and they were notified that they were fuel parts. They asked if the parts were to be sent back to ZZZ1 and we said yes. They were loaded into the forward cargo bay along with our tools. The plane flew a ferry flight back to ZZZ1 for reposition. Due to not being aware of the procedures manual regarding shipping HAZMAT items and not being aware of handling the situation at the moment. Verify with [Maintenance Control] or consulate with procedures manual on proper handling of fuel related items.




Synopsis: Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported Hazmat aircraft parts were incorrectly packaged and shipped following an aircraft field service repair.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: SoCal TRACON (SCT) called to APREQ higher on Aircraft Y 'reference all the departures' with my D-Side. I heard the communication because I got on the line to listen to the coordination taking place. The D-side released the requested altitude of FL220 to SCT in reference to Aircraft Y and essentially placed the aircraft on a 265 heading to parallel the eastbound departures before vectoring the aircraft N/NE towards SLI. SCT shipped me Aircraft X leaving 140 for 170 essentially. I climbed Aircraft X to FL230; and called traffic on Aircraft Y being 'worked by SCT.' I did not receive communications on Aircraft Y until enroute separation was obtained between the two aircraft. Additionally I APREQ'D Aircraft Y direct LHS to further separate the aircraft from jets proceeding SLI..POM..DAG.Due to SCT rules and procedures regarding separation and diverging courses; I did not believe an 'event' took place until after the supervisor brought this to my attention. As such; I have reviewed my own Falcon and am honestly still not positive whether this constitutes a loss of separation based on the 7110 and the understanding the SCT can hand off aircraft 3 NM and increasing with speeds. There are many instances where SCT will transfer communications of an aircraft less than 5 NM above their stratum of 130 on either diverging courses or a faster aircraft in front.




Synopsis: An ARTCC Controller allowed a TRACON Controller to climb an aircraft into their airspace reference traffic the Center controller was working. The TRACON Controller transferred communications of their aircraft to the ARTCC Controller. The two aircraft were separated according to TRACON rules; but not Enroute (ARTCC) rules.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just passing MEM; crew discovered that point KM360 was not correctly loaded into FMC route. Route was non-standard and manually typed into FMC on ground. Both pilots noted KM360 being loaded to route page; but neither verified correct route after route activation. Turns out that KM360 was not in database and had to be manually entered using LAT LONG. Crew received direct to VXV negating need to proceed to KM360. This mistake caused by crew not verifying route page two against filed clearance after route activation. Contributing factor was fix not being pre-programmed into database.




Synopsis: An air carrier crew manually loaded the FMS with a company non-standard route. Enroute ATC notified them about a track deviation because KM360 was not in the database. The crew did not verify the route against the clearance.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Receiving vectors to land XXR; ATC asked us to slow to 210 KTS. Extended slats; autopilot and autothrottles disconnected and slat disagree light illuminated; unable to slow to 210 until we referred to QRH checklist. Told ATC that we were still 230 KIAS and Controller lost his cool and changed vectors for us to land on XXL. We calmly told him that we had an indication of a flight control malfunction; couldn't slow to 210 KIAS and were working a checklist. Controller made mention that he had to annotate why we refused to slow down. As we started the QRH checklist; slat disagree light extinguished; AP/ATS were reinstated; QRH said to continue with normal procedures and we slowed; landing uneventful. If we tell a controller we're unable to slow to 210 KIAS then there probably is a good reason for it. We were busy diagnosing a problem; referring to the QRH and briefly told the Controller we couldn't slow. A little leeway on his part would have been appreciated.


Second narrative: Unfortunately; the Controller seemed rather upset that we hadn't slowed to 210 KIAS and immediately took us off the XXR approach and changed us over to XXL (further increasing our workload) and rather abruptly informed us that he had to annotate the reason we didn't slow. I informed the Controller that we were working a flight control malfunction and referring to checklist-in other words; we had our hands full! This ATC event didn't occur over minutes but only seconds. Maybe the Controller had us too close to other traffic? Is that our fault?


Synopsis: An MD-83 flight crew was unable to comply with a speed restriction given by Approach Control when the slats failed to extend when selected. ATC acted peremptorily and assigned them to another runway; thus increasing their workload at a time their attention to a flight control issue was their first priority.