elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This event took place during a revenue flight from TEB during our initial climbout on the RUUDY 4 SID off runway 24. Once airborne; TEB Tower instructed us to contact New York Departure. After switching the pilot not flying made sure the frequency was clear before transmitting. At 700 FT AGL the pilot not flying made the initial call to New York Departure reporting 'NY Departure Citation 700 FT climbing to 1;500 FT on the RUUDY 4 departure.' While this transmission took place; the pilot flying was in the process of leveling at 1;500 per the SID. New York Departure then responded with; 'cleared direct ELVAE climb and maintain 6;000.' The pilot not flying then read back the clearance with call sign. New York Departure did not challenge the read back. The pilot not flying selected 6;000 in the altitude select window. As ELVAE was not in our flight plan the pilot monitoring then proceeded to manually insert the waypoint. At 2;500 FT ATC queried us as to what altitude we were going to. The pilot not flying responded 'We were cleared direct ELVAE and climb and maintain 6;000.' ATC then responded 'Oh that was not for you.' Then ATC instructed us to climb and maintain 10;000 FT and fly heading 270. At this point we realized a misunderstanding had occurred between us and ATC. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Please be aware that we completed all preflight procedures per company SOP including briefing of the departure procedure.Any departure out of TEB puts a high workload on the crew. On previous and separate occasions we have received altitude clearances from ATC during climb out; which deviate from the published departure altitudes. Due to this; today's clearance did not appear out of the norm. We think the flight crew should always be allowed to complete the full departure as published in a dense area as this. This will allow the crew to adhere to what has been briefed and eliminate the potential for mistakes.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CE750 flight crew reports apparently accepting a clearance for another flight departing TEB on the RUUDY 4 departure and starting a climb to 6;000 FT direct to ELVAE.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Second aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our arrival into Houston; we heard a flap speed aural warning. Our flaps were set to 2 and our speed was approximately 220 kts for about 5 seconds. First Officer immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched up; while I returned the flaps to 1. On the arrival; we were assigned a speed of 210 kts and told to maintain 8;000 feet. Subsequently; we were given 7;000 feet and THEN reduce to 190 kts as we approached the Runway 8R localizer. At 8;000 feet; the First Officer reduced our speed to 190 kts and called for flaps 2. After the intercept; at about 20 nm we were cleared for the Runway 8R approach. We were following a larger aircraft and hit a little wake turbulence; I was a little distracted by it. The First Officer changed the altitude to 2;000 feet and the speed accelerated past 215 kts. At the gate; we wrote up the flap overspeed in the AML with Maintenance. We debriefed the event and agreed that; in that situation; 'green' FLCH would have prevented the overspeed. For me; personally; I should have been well aware that we were above the glidepath and would accelerate in PATH. I should not have selected flaps 2 before the descent.For my First Officer; we reviewed the protections that green FLCH offers us in the descent. For me; I should have been much more proactive and aware. There is really never a need to fly so close to the aircraft limitation. We could have used flaps 1 at 190. In the future; I will be much more cognizant of my position above or below the glidepath when being vectored for the approach.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-175 flight crew reported that distraction following a wake turbulence encounter resulted in a flap overspeed.
Date: 201606
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Smoke Hood
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: New aircraft [from delivery from Boeing]. Located at our maintenance facility. During pre-delivery modifications of aircraft after delivery from Boeing aircraft company. During these modifications; maintenance personnel are advised to remove and destroy as per safety regulations; the 11 on-board PPE or PBE's (Personnel Breathing Equipment) that came with the aircraft from Boeing; to be replaced with a different style that our company installs during the pre-delivery of the aircraft. During this destruction of the PBE the maintenance personnel are told to open and then activate the PBE's before disposing of them locally. While trying to open the sealed vacuum packing wrap around the PBE; nine (9) times the handle ripped off without opening the sealed vacuum packaging wrap. Only two (2) times did the handle open the PBE sealed package properly. Maintenance personnel had to use pocket knives to open the other nine sealed containers that did not open.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported factory installed PBEs were removed per company instructions; activated; and then disposed. Nine of the eleven PBE packages that failed during attempted opening were then opened with pocket knives.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RPHI.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A RPHI
ATC / advisory: Center RPHI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Company Policy; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Flying through Manila airspace is often colloquially known as being in the 'wild west' - HF and VHF communications are often spotty and irregular. Flight X and subsequent Flight Y were no different; but it was much worse than usual. On initial check-in with MNL after handoff from ZZZZ; we were told 'cell call unable.' CPDLC (Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications) didn't automatically transfer; and it took quite a while to get it to connect. Meanwhile; we queried if we should maintain a listening watch and were not clearly instructed to do so; this begs the question; if we *hadn't* done so; and with CPDLC disconnected; how would the controlling facility (MNL ATC) have been able to get in touch with us if necessary? No backup frequency was given. We were instructed to report a further fix; but by the time we arrived at that fix; no contact via HF was possible. Since neither I nor the Captain had flown MNL recently; we couldn't remember the usual VHF frequency; this was not available on the iPad Jeppesen chart over any of the nearby FIR (Flight Information region) Boundary comms boxes; so a mad scramble ensued that was finally solved when CPDLC connected and we were able get a frequency via the free text feature. Meanwhile; we were plowing into MNL airspace at night at 600mph. Let us say; this was not a comfortable situation. On the way from MNL to ZZZ; they didn't bother giving us an HF frequency at all - we were cut loose several hundred miles before the FIR; told there was no HF available; given no alternate communications procedures; and told to please contact ZZZZ over the FIR. It was a relief to exit their airspace; but it was an unsettling and; to my mind; unsafe situation. Of course; we could have texted Dispatch or asked SFO [Commercial Radio] to pass messages along; but this kind of comms loss happens too often in MNL airspace. It's unsafe.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported poor ATC communication when flying in Manila airspace.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Aircraft Y inbound to VNY from the east. He was VFR; and I pointed him out to FILR; who runs IFR traffic into VNY. FILR controller had me sequence Aircraft Y behind Aircraft X; inbound from the west on a Visual Approach. There were other IFR aircraft also inbound at the time; including Aircraft Z from the north. After sequencing and switching Aircraft Y to the tower; tower called over the shout line to say they had to break someone out. They broke out the IFR Aircraft X and turned him on a downwind; below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude); also putting him in proximity with Aircraft Z. If VNY needs to break out an IFR aircraft; have the plane fly over the field to the departure end before starting any turns. This will prevent any MVA violations. If they can also keep the altitude low they can avoid a loss of separation with any aircraft inbound to BUR on the ILS.




Synopsis: SCT TRACON Controller reported VNY Tower broke an aircraft off the approach and turned it on downwind early below the MVA and into confliction with other traffic.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cardinal 177/177RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on an afternoon flight to practice maneuvers. I did steep turns; climbing turns; descents; slow flight and multiple landings. Landing configurations were normal; soft field and engine out in the pattern. Landings were 2 touch and go and 4 full stop before the gear up event. The landing configurations were changed based on other traffic in the pattern. During the time of my landings; two other planes joined the pattern work. One left the area immediately before the gear up event. Winds were variable and generally favored landing Runway XX. Two landings were to Runway XY as other inbound traffic lined up for Runway XX.The pattern work before the event included a normal takeoff; cross wind and downwind legs. The plane that left the pattern called on final while I was on the downwind. I did not locate the plane so when I was approaching abeam the number at the approach end of Runway XY I called and asked for a position report. The plane had already taken off and was leaving the pattern. At that point I pulled the power back to idle and began maneuvering and configuring for landing. GUMPS check completed with the gear down still to be completed. When field was 'made' I moved the gear handle to the down position and put my hand on the flaps. Lining up on final the flaps were moved to the full down position. Looking at the gear indication I did not see the amber gear up but I don't recall seeing the green gear down light. The gear horn did not sound to alert the gear was still up. Landing resulted in a gear up event.




Synopsis: C177 pilot reported that a lapse in procedure resulted in a gear up landing.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ROA.Airport, VA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ROA
ATC / advisory: TRACON ROA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Received a GPWS aural alert during our descent into ROA while complying with Tower assigned heading and altitude changes in VMC; while visually clear of all terrain.Out of an overabundance of caution; I leveled the wings; increased power; and brought the nose above the horizon; at which point the aural alert immediately subsided.


Second narrative: Flying into ROA for visual into Rwy 24 approach gave down to 4;000 heading 250; FO (First Officer) had terrain on my side and we had the terrain visually. We still received a GPWS warning. The Captain who was flying disconnected autopilot; and climbed up to 4;500 before continuing approach.It was dusk [and] at night we can't do advanced RNAV's to 24; we requested RNAV's 06 but told unable. Allowing us to fly RNAV's 06 would have kept us on an actual approach away from the terrain.


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported a GPWS terrain alert on a night visual approach into ROA.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower HOU
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [We] departed Runway 15L at IAH. During takeoff roll; we noticed a Regional Jet on 15R conducting a simultaneous takeoff roll; just slightly ahead of us. As part of our takeoff clearance; we were assigned a left turn to a 120 heading. Most traffic departing 15R was being assigned right turns to northeasterly headings; long way around turns of greater than 180 degrees. Our two aircraft were wing tip to wing tip until leaving 400 FT. While it may be perfectly legal; this simultaneous; close parallel takeoff procedure is extremely disconcerting for the following reasons: Tower did not advise us of the parallel traffic; a loss of an engine or a flight control problem on either aircraft could have been disastrous for both. The long-way-around turns assigned to 15R departures can easily result in inadvertent; unintentional turns into the 15L aircraft. If we had been aware that a Regional Jet would be simultaneously departing; we may have chosen to briefly delay our departure. This practice may be legal; but with the runways so close together; its safety is questionable. Suggestions; IAH Tower should consider staggering departures off these closely spaced runways.




Synopsis: Air Carrier departure from Runway 15L at IAH voiced concern regarding traffic departing Runway 15R simultaneously without and ATC notification; the reporter recommended staggering departures in these types of operations.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On departure from SEA; ATC warned us that a drone had been sighted at approximately 6;000 feet at the cloud tops in the vicinity of our flight path. Both my First Officer and I maintained a lookout. Climbing through 6;100 feet; I spotted the drone about 200 feet off my right side; about 100 feet below our altitude. Due to the clouds and small size of the drone; I spotted it less than one second before we crossed its position. Had there been a conflict; I would not have had enough space to execute an avoidance maneuver. The drone near miss was promptly reported to ATC with the recommendation to not send any aircraft through this airspace. There were no TCAS indications of the drone. A timely report from ATC alerted us to that hazard; but ATC did not provide any specific instructions to avoid the traffic.ATC knew a drone was operating in the vicinity of NEVJO; but continued to send aircraft on the SUMMA 2 departure. A simple vector on departure would have eliminated this potential threat to our aircraft. The drone was large enough and our rate of closure was great enough; that if could have caused significant damage to our aircraft had there been a midair collision.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC with a drone during departure from SEA airport.
Date: 202105
Location: PGSN.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D PGSN
ATC / advisory: Tower PGSN
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Since Typhoon Yutu in Saipan; the PAPI lights have been out of service. After advising the company last year; the Jepp chart was finally changed. However; it now says there are VASI instead of PAPI (but there is no visual guidance). After I made several queries with SPN ATC; they said there is no plan to install any visual guidance lights (PAPI or VASI) on Runway 07. There is a plan to replace the PAPI for Runway 25.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that charts for PGSN airport advise there are VASI lights; but there aren't any and there is no plan to install them.