elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SBAZ.ARTCC, FO
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center SBAZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: North of ARVUM at FL360 in continuous moderate+ chop we requested FL340. Amazonica initially denied our request but subsequently cleared us to FL340. Upon reading back our clearance to FL340; Amazonica confirmed our clearance to FL340. Almost immediately Amazonica re-cleared us to FL360. Pop up traffic opposite direction appeared at the limits of TCAS 40nm; level at FL350. We were approaching 35;200 feet as we climbed back up to FL360 and assumed a right 1 mile offset. We were never closer than 30 miles to the opposite direction traffic before leveling at FL360. No TA or RA was received. While Amazonica has radar coverage throughout their airspace; their radios for the most part are atrocious. Constant vigilance is necessary and my alert copilot safely and smoothly maneuvered us to a safe altitude and course. Communication is extremely important in our profession and while read backs; and confirmation are necessary operational procedures; good radios are of paramount importance! A better means of communication must be found to mitigate communication errors; especially in remote and oceanic areas.




Synopsis: A B777 aircraft received a clearance to descend to FL340; and almost immediately were re-cleared to FL360. They noted pop-up traffic on TCAS at FL350 at 40 miles away.  The reporter notes the poor condition of Amazonica's radios.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DAY.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B DAY
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Second aircraft: Other
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing through about 8;000 ft. ATC advised us of VFR traffic at our 1 o'clock; around 3 miles away. It was maneuvering erratically. I immediately saw it. It was performing aerobatic maneuvers. It seemed to me to be rapidly coming towards us from our 1 to 2 o'clock position; so I told the FO (First Officer) to turn left away from it. It was getting very close doing erratic turns; dives and climbs. The FO didn't respond which lead me to believe he didn't see the traffic; so I took the controls and began a sharp climbing left turn. I thought we had cleared it when the FO said he saw it; it was coming back towards us again; at which point I then saw it going straight up; at our altitude; just in front of us. I immediately pulled the aircraft up into a much sharper climb; momentarily at about 30 degrees up. We flew past it within a few seconds. I returned the controls to the FO; took a deep breath; and advised ATC what took place. The aircraft was not in radio contact with ATC.




Synopsis: Captain reported flight crew was forced to take repeated evasive action due to another aircraft maneuvering near them without ATC contact.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Data Computer
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During initial climb noted altitude miscompare ALT alert on Captains PFD instrument.  At this time I cross checked my baro setting and altitude to the FO and seemed normal.  Passing thru 3000 FT I noted the FO altitude miscompare also.  I asked the FO to put autopilot on due to previous maintenance write up for CADC2 failure and suspected Airspeed Unreliable.  We were now well above the overcast cloud layer in VMC.  Ran Airspeed Unreliable checklist.  Determined that CADC2 was bad and got numerous altitude and Airspeed edification checks from ATC.  Stopped climb at FL330 and notified ATC that our altitude and Airspeed were Unreliable and inaccurate due to equipment malfunction.  Got block altitude clearance of Fl320-FL340 and leveled off using vertical speed 0 at FL330 and [advised ATC] due to safety concerns and degraded capability.   We also got wind shear det fail and IAS miscompare alerts.  ATC confirmed our altitude as FL331 which agreed with the CA instruments.  We noted/checked and verified our pitch and power settings for each phase  and configuration of flight and all seemed ok after selecting CADC1 as good.  We also got our altitude selector window back and PROF.  After contacting [Operations Control] we determined that best option was to continue to destination as weather was VMC and we could descend VMC to landing per the checklist and they had parts.  We received priority handling from ATC and did a long slow straight in ILS; Captain did approach and landing; to successful landing.  FO did a great job with the checklists and backing up configuration speeds and verification checks with ATC.Event caused by bad CADC2.  We ran the Airspeed Unreliable checklist and completed flight using good CADC1.




Synopsis: MD11 Captain reported a Central Air Data Computer 2 (CADC2) failure on climbout that resulted in unreliable airspeed and altitude information.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: [Procedures Manual] XX.XX.X XX indicates cabin 'the security seals/stickers are installed by cabin appearance or authorized contractors. The exemption is the life vest compartment security seals that are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. All security fasteners are installed by Aircraft Maintenance. During pre-taxi walkaround; we frequently find improperly sealed and/or packed life vest on aircraft economy class seats. Cabin service gets notified by management to reseal the life vests. As per the [Procedures Manual] referenced above; 'all security fasteners are installed by aircraft maintenance.' Is it proper to have non licensed personnel to perform this type of work (1) on live airplane (2)undocumented? The aircraft mentioned in this report used as an example.




Synopsis: Aircraft Maintenance Technician reports that company violates procedures regarding security seals and stickers.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution Relay
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; MEL
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: With APU already running for entire flight segment per MEL 24-04A; on taxi in we shut down right engine. Thinking that Maintenance had properly placarded for the previous write-up; we were both surprised to see the right GEN AC BUS go dead along with the First Officer gauges and all other right AC powered items.  My question is; would we have been single generator (Left AC; no Cross Tie) in flight IF we had lost right engine?  I.e. Multiple emergency situations? Was placarding the AC Crosstie Inop the right solution to the previous write-ups about APU not picking up Right AC BUS on shut down? And has replacing the AC Crosstie Relay solving the problem now? If so; then perhaps jet should have never flown with crosstie relay on placard. To my mind; it really wasn't a crosstie issue since APU does not crosstie on the ground anyway. But APU was consistently failing to pick up Right AC BUS.  I do not claim to be the systems expert; however it does concern me that perhaps if we had had the right engine fail; we could have also been single generator ops if the APU did not pick up the Right AC BUS.




Synopsis: An MD-83 was dispatched under MEL 24-04A because of an AC CROSS TIE fault with the APU continuously operating but while taxiing in after landing when the right engine was shutdown the Right AC BUS lost power.
Date: 201911
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We have been having lighting issues over at the hangar spots with no lights. Company has put only 2 light towers out to provide limited lighting over some of these spots. Supervisors have been asking employees turn on light tower equipment who have not been trained on this piece of equipment. Supervisors who are not trainers have been going as far as to show employees how to turn on equipment when employees say they don't know how to use the equipment. Last week; a supervisor said on the radio that 'no one touch one of the light towers due to the fuel leaking'. Every employee who use equipment should be sign off on that equipment and know how to do a user check on that equipment. Not just shown how to turn equipment on. If someone went and electrocuted themselves by not knowing how to do a user check on the equipment or turn on the equipment with the fuel leaking and the light tower caught on fire or even themselves on fire from leaking fuel can end up in a bad result from injury to even death.




Synopsis: Ground personnel reported lighting issues and training issues resulted in a safety hazard.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I conducted a visual pattern and approach to runway. I had planned one touch and go followed by a full stop landing. The one minute weather reported the surface winds at 220/6; yielding approximately a 5 knot crosswind component. I conducted a wheel landing and touched down on speed at 70 mph; on centerline; in the touchdown zone; and on the right/upwind wheel. After I lowered the left wheel; the aircraft immediately and uncontrollably veered sharply to the left. I applied full right rudder and immediately held the stick full right and aft to keep the aircraft from ground looping or cartwheeling. I was unable to control the aircraft and we departed the runway to the left and proceeded to impact two of the four PAPI lights. The prop hit a PAPI light causing the engine to quit. The aircraft continued and came to a stop approximately 50 to 100 ft off the runway. There were no injuries to myself (PIC) or passenger. I proceeded to secure the aircraft and survey the scene. I am extremely well trained in tailwheel operations and very familiar with this aircraft as it has been in my family for years. Nothing like this has ever happened. I was alert; well rested; and thoroughly enjoying the beautiful day. I immediately suspected that a brake had locked on the left wheel. This is supported by marks on the runway and grass as well as wear marks on the left wheel. I fully believe that my knowledge; experience; training; and safety minded professionalism prevented this from turning into a disaster. That being said; I urgently desire to know the root cause of the suspected brake/wheel malfunction to allow for future focused training and information sharing in the tailwheel community.




Synopsis: Piper pilot reported a runway excursion following a crosswind landing.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Narrative: I was flying Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 via direct on an IFR flight plan; level at 5;000 ft. It was a charter; empty out. One soul; 3.5 hours of fuel on board. A little over halfway to my destination; my fuel flow gauge began to rapidly fluctuate between 100-450 pph (pounds per hour). I turned my ignition and fuel boost on and checked both fuel tanks on; my fuel flow then began to fluctuate between 300-450 pph; no other indications; annunciations; or failures at this time. I simultaneously requested to return to the ZZZ airport and requested a higher altitude out of caution. I added power and initiated a climb to 8;000 ft. During my climb to 8;000 ft. my fuel flow began fluctuating again between 100-450 pph accompanied by an oil pressure fluctuation between 85 and 100 psi. Oil pressure unstable but maintaining within the green arc. There were no other failures or annunciations at this time. Given my inability to remedy the fluctuating gauges as well as the introduction of an oil pressure instability; I deemed it most appropriate to [request priority handling.] I landed safely at ZZZ airport approximately 45 minutes after my departure.




Synopsis: Caravan Captain reported fuel flow and engine oil pressure anomalies and elected to return to departure airport.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On approach into Chicago O'hare and cleared for the visual approach for Runway 28R we were given an intercept heading of 310 (approaching from the southeast) and cleared for the Visual Approach to Runway 28R. Once cleared for the approach I armed the approach mode on the glareshield; less than 2 seconds later the autopilot had captured a false localizer and began a left turn; I then disengaged the approach mode and selected heading mode to return to the proper intercept heading. I had held off on re-engaging the approach mode to ensure that it would not capture the false localizer again. I maintained a visual contact with the airport and landing runway. I also kept monitoring the PFD to see if the localizer would come 'alive'. There was no movement. I had taken a fast peek to ensure that we had set up and briefed the proper approach and we had. The localizer frequency of 111.1 for 28R was in the proper radio and the 28R approach was loaded in the FMS as a backup to our visual approach. I was rather shocked that the localizer wasn't moving just then I looked up and noticed we had closed in on the runway quicker than I had expected at which point I disengaged the autopilot and rolled into a 40 degree bank to avoid an overshoot. At which time the Approach Controller had transmitted that it appeared I overshot the localizer but there was no traffic on the parallel northern Runway; 27L; we were still outside WILLT Intersection. The localizer had captured prior to seeing an actual movement on the HSI until we were literally right on top of the course when it quickly moved to center. There was no TA or RA and the rest of the approach was uneventful. Hand flying with a greater frequency using pilotage and not relying on automation. Maintaining better situational awareness.




Synopsis: Regional jet Captain reports being cleared for the visual approach to Runway 28R at ORD and intercepting a false localizer before returning to heading select; then overshooting the real localizer because the approach mode had not been rearmed.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A Westwind
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on final [and] upon gear extension we received one unsafe light on the nose gear and illumination of the left/right hydraulic low pressure annunciators. We requested delay vectors to troubleshoot; and were granted a low pass for a Tower visual gear inspection. On short final; the gear light went green; all annunciators extinguished; and we advised Tower that we would like to return to land instead of delay vectors. We continued to land without incident and all hydraulic systems functioned normally and our information was taken down by airport operations regarding the irregularity. Upon post flight inspection; we discovered a low level of hydraulic fluid in the reservoir and evidence of a leak on from the left engine cowling. We advised our Company Maintenance team and requested maintenance to inspect and add fluid. After servicing; we cycled the engine to try to pinpoint the leak. We found it to be coming from a small plug in the pump housing. [Maintenance] procured a gasket for the plug; installed it; and we cycled the engine again. No leak. This process was on the heels of a week-long maintenance delay due to a fuel truck colliding with our aircraft en route to fuel us. There was severe weather in the vicinity as we repositioned empty; as well as schedule pressure for an early departure. In the course of events; I failed to actually write-up the squawk for maintenance to sign-off; and the work performed was not noted in the aircraft log. My error was not following procedures for performed maintenance. After a difficult week of coordinating our passengers' alternative transportation arrangements; overseeing our aircraft repairs; dealing with the poor weather and our mechanical irregularity; I only wanted the problem to go away so we could get home. I gave due attention to the corrective actions required; but failed to have them properly documented.




Synopsis: A Westwind 24 Captain reported that he failed to properly document a hydraulic problem in the maintenance log; citing the pressure of a long assignment away from home as a factor.