elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: DA42 Twin Star
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was on a cross-country training flight with a student where we experienced a partial loss of power on our right engine (approximately 50%); that was indicated. I took control of the aircraft; disengaged the autopilot; and established aircraft control. When aircraft control was established; I determined that we needed to divert to a different airport. I notified ATC of the partial engine failure. We were in the vicinity of ZZZ airport; in between ZZZ and ZZZ1; at 12;500 at the time of the failure. After the failure occurred and had control of the aircraft; I turned the aircraft back to the South and assessed my landing options. Ultimately; I deemed it safe to return to our home airport ZZZ2 due to the high altitude we were at; with adequate airspeed and performance. I chose not to land at ZZZ1 because I wanted to get the plane back to our home airport; and it wasn't beyond reasonable distance to fly the aircraft to ZZZ2. I then troubleshot the issue in an attempt to fix the engine. After proceeding with the appropriate checklists and personal assessments of the aircraft; I determined that the damage was done internally to the engine and could not be fixed in flight. However; I chose not to feather our right engine due to the issues on aircraft control that would present; and we were still receiving some power on the affected engine. I confirmed that the remaining engine was still producing some power by the performance that we were achieving; which was approximately 500 fpm climb and could obtain approximately 110 kias in level flight. On the way back to ZZZ2; I requested the ILS/LOC Rwy 13 approach into ZZZ2. Approach stayed with us the whole time on the flight and terminated our radar services approximately 8 miles North of ZZZ2 airport. They then notified me to inform once I got on the ground. After we were safely on the ground; I notified Approach that we were safely on the ground. Approach notified emergency services of the issue; in which they met us on the ground. I told them that we did not need any assistance.




Synopsis: DA42 CFI reported a power loss on one engine and successful return to departure airport on a night cross country flight.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After on speed; normal sink rate and flare touchdown on Runway 25L following a visual approach at LAX we immediately lifted back off runway approximately 5 feet; we were both surprised by this; we elected to go around....notified tower and they turned us left and climbed us to 2;000 feet; we noticed traffic at our 2 o'clock approximately 1;000 feet above us and 1 mile away that had just taken off from Runway 24L but was not a factor once we started our left turn. Requested vectors for a visual approach back to 25L which was uneventful. FO flew the go around and CAPT flew the final landing.Possible wake turbulence from preceding 777 which we were originally 6 miles behind or a strong wind gust down the runway or a combination of both.We were at 350 feet above ground when the 777 taxied off the far end of runway to the left. If wake turbulence was a factor then we could have given ourselves more spacing....if a very large gust impacted us at touchdown then there is really nothing more we could do.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported that shortly after touchdown the aircraft lifted off again; possibly from a wake encounter or a wind gust.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While taxiing into our DEN gate; we had a clear zone and were being marshalled in by Ground Crew. I then noticed a bag cart approaching from my right side in the designated ramp lane perpendicular to the [lead in line]. Instead of yielding to us; the cart appeared to speed up and drove right in front of us at high speed. I abruptly jumped on the brakes as it seemed to be the closest collision possibility that I have ever experienced. It was so abrupt that the FAs (Flight Attendants) all commented afterwards.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a baggage cart cut in front of the aircraft during taxi into the gate.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MMUN.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower MMUN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching the end of A [Alpha] taxiway for takeoff on 12R; monitoring Tower on freq 118.1; I instructed my FO [First Officer] to contact Tower for takeoff clearance. FO contacted Tower and what we believed was 'cleared for takeoff contact 118.6 for departure' was not our instruction; what Tower instructed us to do was to contact Tower on freq 118.6 for takeoff.My experience in Cancun was that when issued takeoff clearance; Tower clears you for takeoff and instructs you to contact Departure Control on xxx.x frequency. So when I heard what I anticipated to be takeoff clearance and contract Departure on 118.6; I assumed we were cleared for takeoff and freq 118.6 was our Departure frequency.It was during takeoff roll above 80 knots when my FO made contact with what we thought was Departure Control on 118.6 that we realized we were on a different Tower frequency and not on Departure frequency. Tower cleared us to continue and contact Departure Control airborne.


Second narrative: Approaching runway hold short lines; I switched frequency to 118.6 and stated 'Company on the roll 12R' and got no response. Captain advanced throttles for takeoff stated 'set takeoff thrust' I stated 'thrust set'. The Captain said 'That must be our new Departure frequency'. I made my 80 knot call out; reached down; swapped frequency back to 118.1; Tower said we were 'not cleared for takeoff'; I stated 'we were cleared for takeoff'; Captain stated 'be quiet'. From that point on; there was no communication between us and Tower. We switched over to Departure frequency at 1400 feet; we were cleared to climb to FL 200; and then cleared to our next waypoint.Just want to point out that it was a very light day. No outside distractions; we pushed on time; we were not being rushed in any way; and the weather was good. When we got up to cruising altitude; the Captain and I talked about it and we both heard that we were cleared for takeoff.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported taking off without a clearance at MMUN following a confusing message from Tower.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: Tower MSP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the departure/arrival bank under 'Converging Runway Operations'; Ground Control North (GCN) became almost unworkable due to having every departure go to runway 30R. Also every aircraft that either landed 30R; 30L; or 35 had to get to their gate. There was numerous delays for arrival and departure aircraft trying to run Converging Runway Operations at MSP. It is becoming a coordination and volume nightmare. I was able to watch most of the operation working from flight data and I could not believe what I was seeing. There are more crossovers (departure aircraft that depart off 30R and need to turn south into 30L departures) now then there has ever been. The NTSB has said this is an unsafe operation due to a near mid-air collision that occurred back in 2009. And now it's becoming a part of the 'normal' operation during an already stressful; complex environment that Converging Runway Operations (CRO) has placed at MSP. I noticed the LCS controller having to take departure aircraft off the runway after a line up and wait clearance due to aircraft landing 35. The heavy aircraft had to exit at W2 (per the SOP we cannot do this); but this was the only option since there was another heavy that was on taxiway Alpha.Also LCN has to spend more time staring at the Tower Display Workstation (TDW) (DBRITE) in order to judge the 'double gap' they have to depart in. One gap for the 30R arrival and the other gap for the runway 35 arrival. CRO operations at MSP needs to stop. This airport is one of the few core 30 airports in the nation that has to depart and land on the same runways. Adding more complexity to the operation is not what MSP needs especially when the average experience level now at MSP is very low. Please send our concerns to the proper channels in the FAA and Air Traffic Organization (ATO). This is a very unsafe operation due to the increased complexity and volume.




Synopsis: A MSP tower controller reported of unsafe converging runway operations at MSP. The controller wants this type of operation to stop.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on a currency flight about 25 miles NW of ZZZ I called ZZZ Approach to ask if they had the time with the COVID-19 slowdown at ZZZ to allow a low approach. Approach cleared me direct ZZZ from my location; but asked me to divert west of the field to allow for landing IFR traffic. I complied; but shortly thereafter the Controller asked me to stay below the Bravo class airspace. I assumed since he directed me 'direct to ZZZ; set up for [Runway] XXR' I was cleared to enter Bravo. Upon his request I immediately descended below class Bravo and was cleared for the option after being handed to Tower. No further discussion of Bravo took place.




Synopsis: GA pilot had a Class B airspace incursion after assuming they were cleared through the airspace by ATC.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: EGLL.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center EGLL
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed EGLL [Runway] 9R on the GASGU 1J SID. While level at 6;000 near OCK a drone went under us between 5;000-6;000 just off our left side. While I noticed its large size; the First Officer said it was blue in color. Reported the sighting to ATC and then later in cruise to Dispatch. No evasive maneuvering was done. FYI - in the Dispatcher remarks of the FP: 'CAPTAIN CALL DISPATCHER FOR BRIEFING REFERENCE DRONE ACTIVITY IN EGLL/LHR AREA'. Conversation with Dispatch over the phone I was told the drone activity was between 7-10 ft.




Synopsis: B-757 Captain reported experiencing an airborne conflict with a drone during departure from Heathrow.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: I issued this MEL because I interpreted the MEL maintenance procedures 'Note' to mean aircraft location; meaning Overhead Bin at that location. Rather than using the phrase 'assigned location'; the phrase 'affixed brackets' would be more appropriate if the intention is 'Not to allow' deferral of this compartment. [Adding] a 'Note' in the MEL that states the exemption for deferral of the Class Divider compartment with safety equipment. [Adding] Condition B; maintenance procedures NOTE: Any item(s) that are stowed by means of a permanently affixed bracket or mounting (i.e. POBs; Fire Extinguishers; etc.); must remain in their assigned location. 1) Remove associated/affected door. 2) For an inoperative cabin or galley storage compartment door(s): A. Remove contents from compartment(s). B. Make and install a placard using tape to inform personnel that Bin(s) is (are) not to be used. Ensure placard is clearly visible and identified 'DO NOT USE'. 3) Complete placarding procedures. Operations Procedures: 1. Brief the [lead] flight attendant of the following: A. During the boarding process; include in the boarding announcement a reminder to the passengers that the inoperative Bin cannot be used and must remain empty. B. Coordinate with the cabin crew to perform an inspection of the Bin(s) prior to takeoff; landing and periodically during flight to ensure that the inoperative Bin(s) remains empty. 2. Review placarding procedures. Placarding Procedures: 1. Logbook entry MEL 25-28-01B; Control #; (Overhead Bin; Cabin; Galley) Storage compartment _____ Door(s) Removed. [Action]: Class divider Storage compartment was repaired in ZZZ1. Rail Guide Set [replaced].  Recommend changing MEL to 'disallow' deferral of Cabin L2 Door Storage compartment with emergency equipment because all of the equipment is attached to a sliding drawer/door. This compartment is easily damaged and should be relocated or modified.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller recommends changing their A321 MEL to 'disallow deferral' of Cabin L-2 Door storage compartment with emergency equipment; because all of the equipment is attached to a sliding drawer/door. Controller also notes the storage compartment is easily damaged and should be relocated or modified.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given a NOTOC (NOtice TO Captain) with 2- 1.4S packages [explosives] and 1 lithium ion battery as COMAT (company materials).  In order to be fully aware of what we were carrying I called Cargo OPS.  The gentleman who helped me out to go over it realized that no two dangerous goods could go in one compartment and ask me to have the lithium battery removed. I requested the Crew Chief to accomplish the above request and was told that it was good and I should go. His goal was to be on time; and although I can understand his pressure; safety is our priority at all times.  I asked to get it removed and was told that they have been sending airplanes like this in the previous days with no issues and I should just push. I stated that what other flights have done; is not a matter of discussion regarding this flight; and that per Cargo OPS; HAZMAT it needed to be removed otherwise I would not be pushing until it was accomplished.  I was told that they were going to call the Chief Pilot on me. I'm not sure if that was a tool of intimidation or not but I told them to please have them call me.  A few minutes later I received the call from Chief Pilot. I explained the situation and understood what was happening. At one point the Crew Chief wanted to place both 1.4S packages on the aft cargo which I told him not to do so. Eventually they removed the 1.4S cargo from the fwd cargo leaving the lithium ion battery on the fwd cargo and one package of the 1.4S on the aft.   We departed and operated safely to ZZZ1. [Caused by] rushing to comply with departure times and not listening to what our priority is: Safety. I suggest training for our colleagues so their main focus is open communications for a safe environment so we can have a safer operation.




Synopsis: A-321 Captain reported a successful resolution of a Hazmat cargo loading violation resulting in completing a safe transport of Hazmat cargo.
Date: 201304
Location: S50.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class G S50
ATC / advisory: CTAF S50
Second aircraft: RV-4
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Experimental RV4 flew straight in to S50 making only a single radio call ('Final 34; touch and go; helicopter in pattern say position'). Proceeded to enter the traffic pattern by flying directly over the runway south to north over slower departing traffic; without having the traffic in sight; and turning crosswind in front of that traffic. Since we were able; we slowed and stopped climbing (an airplane would have had to slow below stall speed). After landing; the RV4 took off again; passed downwind traffic at a higher rate of speed and descended in front of them to enter a base turn and land again (once again requiring us to slow to <50 KIAS). S50 is used for flight training by multiple flight schools; and non-standard traffic pattern entries by general aviation traffic puts all pilots here at risk for MAC. This risk is heightened when low-experience instructors; low-time students; or solo students encounter this erratic behavior. Auburn and the area between S50 and BFI are due for a MAC between airplane traffic not using the CTAF; not reporting or coordinating with other traffic; flying at a higher rate of speed than flight training aircraft; and at low altitudes.




Synopsis: Helicopter instructor pilot reports a NMAC with a RV4 that had preformed a touch and go behind the helicopter then over flew the helicopter on the upwind.