elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was taxiing to [the FBO] in [a] King Air. We pulled onto [FBO] ramp and I saw our marshaller; who was standing under the canopy on the opposite side; waving for us to park under the canopy. I pulled straight in and centered the aircraft on the marshaller as he guided us in. I did not notice if there was another marshaller to my left but I know there wasn't one to my right. As we approached the canopy; he was giving us the 'pull forward' signals. Both pilots were watching the marshaller as he marshalled us in. As he was giving us the signals; the aircraft came to a sudden stop and veered to the right. We looked out the right window to realize that we had struck the first support beam of the canopy. I looked back at the marshaller who now had his batons in a X with his head hanging down. He was also receiving a pat on the shoulder from a fellow lineman as in a 'Sorry this happened. It will be ok' pat. I shut down the aircraft and asked if the passengers were ok. We then proceeded to exit the aircraft. I feel that I put too much faith in the Marshaller that he would verify that my aircraft was clear of all structures. If I would have requested the co-pilot to make wing tip clearance reports; we may not have hit the canopy. I also feel that if another marshaller would have been on my right side then that may have prevented this incident. [This FBO] may want to consider not parking aircraft so close to the canopy supports.




Synopsis: BE-30 Captain reported his wingtip struck a beam during taxi in under the guidance of a marshaller.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were vectored off of HILEY 4 Arrival for the LOC/DME 26R MIA. We had received numerous speed and altitude changes for B757 wake separation. [First we were] cleared to 4;000; slowed to 180 KTS. Next clearance was to cross HINKU at 3;000; cleared for LOC/DME 26R. After setting minimums in the MCP Altitude window and engaging LNAV/VNAV and [being] simultaneously slowed to 160 KTS for wake separation I; as pilot not flying; and the Captain; as pilot flying; went heads up visual on the B757 and the airport and did not verify that VNAV PATH ever captured resulting in a low altitude crossing at HINKU. The aircraft had remained in an MCP descent mode. We caught it at 2600 MSL and the Captain corrected.




Synopsis: A B737-800 flight crew; being given vectors and spacing altitude and airspeed clearances with respect to a B757 ahead of them; failed to insure VNAV mode was active after being cleared to maintain 3;000 until HINKU; cleared for the LOC DME Runway 26R approach to MIA. As a result they continued in an unspecified MCP descent mode to 2;600 prior to HINKU. A contributing factor was the setting of the MDA in the MCP altitude window prior to insuring VNAV was active.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Clearing Runway 22R at Taxiway G. EWR Ground instructed us to taxi 'G; A; contact Ramp.' I checked the commercially produced airport page and attempted to contact Ramp. After several attempts; LGA Port Authority replied that we were on their frequency. At that point I checked our tailored airport information page and found [the correct] Ramp frequency. When I contacted Ramp on that frequency; Ramp snapped back that we should have contacted them a thousand feet ago. We were still on Taxiway A; had not passed in front of any aircraft exiting the alleyways or ramps; or crossed lines demarking the non-movement area.




Synopsis: A B757-200 flight crew; after landing at EWR failed to contact Ramp Control in what Ramp considered a timely fashion and received a lecture in return.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Agents filled seats X2 and X5 which are supposed to be assigned when required for demand of seats on a full flight; not just because they want to upgrade someone. There is no shield between me and people sitting in those seats like the luxury the agents have with plastic shields. There were plenty of other seats for them to sit in besides X2/5. This is a constant occurrence on the commercial fixed wing. Agents taking advantage of policy change.   When I talked to agent her response was 'They are eligible upgrades and seats are available.' There will always be eligible upgrades; but these seats are not being blocked by the agents.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a Gate Agent filled seats that were not supposed to be filled.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Cowling
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After parking aircraft and setting parking brake; we shut the left engine down; then the right Eng. At that point I felt the plane rock a little and looked up and saw we had moved forward. [Aircraft departure] delay. Human Factors: Norms and Lack of Awareness.

Callback: Reporter stated he was in the Right seat watching the aircraft out of the cockpit windows and EICAS Engine display. He thought the Parking Brake was set. The Left Engine nose cowl was damaged. The B767-300 Parking Brake handle may seem engaged; but he has seen the handle move slowly away from the brake set detent in the past with the Brake handle light on. Mechanics and pilots have to really apply pressure to the brake pedals to properly set the brakes.

Second narrative: B767-300 aircraft was returning from performing an engine vibration survey. I was assigned to direct the taxiing mechanic to gate.  Once he arrived at its designated spot; I motioned him to set the brakes and he motioned back to me confirming for brakes set. I verified the brakes as being set by the light indication on the nose wheel. I then proceeded towards the plane to connect Ground Power Unit (GPU) and isolation pin and chocks when suddenly the plane started rolling forward until it came to rest at the crew stairs.


Synopsis: Three Line Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMT) report about a B767-300 aircraft suddenly rolling forward after the Parking Brake set signal was given to the taxi-in guide. The Left Engine nose cowl had struck a previously positioned aircraft entry stand. Concerns raised that the Parking Brake handle pawl stop pin could rest against the pawl's lip rather than within the pawl's cutout; giving a false indication of full engagement.
Date: 201412
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Aircraft component: Cockpit Furnishing
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I want to make everyone aware that the new RAM mount for the iPad is dangerous and a threat because of the flawed design; making it unsafe to use by pilots shorter than the average height. I am short and while I am able to safely control the aircraft due to adjustable seats and controls; when it comes to this RAM mount I cannot view it without jeopardizing safety of flight. You see; in a proper seat position close enough to use the rudder pedals and grip the control yoke; the RAM mount is well behind me. Meaning that in critical phases of flight; particularly in low visibility approaches; I must turn away from looking forward and crane my head around to try to see the all-important approach plates. Not only is this obviously hazardous; pulling attention away from critical flight duties; it can induce the leans with all the head swinging. I have tried mounting the RAM on the front window but when doing so it blocks out enough of the forward view that it doesn't feel safe to me. For all the decades of flying I have clipped an approach plate to the yoke. In the air force I was able to strap it to my thigh. Now; I am being presented with no safe options to be able to view the information needed to fly a safe approach. Because of my height. Because my legs and arms aren't as long as the 'average pilot.' Which means shorter pilots will be forced to run copies of the approaches on a printer and bring them to work and hope they won't have to divert to an airport they haven't prepared for. Or; they will find themselves trying to memorize the approach instead of simply being able to view the plate at will; as it should be. Clearly this is a poor and downright dangerous design; and even more so now that one considers that it was designed and tested by those taller than the average person.




Synopsis: B747 First Officer laments the location of the iPad when it is attached to its mount. First Officer is short and cannot see the iPad well when the seat is in position to reach the controls.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 900
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Second aircraft: A350
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were descending on the FISEL 7 Arrival. Instructed to descend to 15;000 feet after FATHR waypoint. We experienced moderate wake turbulence. I contacted ATC and asked them what kind of aircraft is flying in front of us; they told us it's an A350. They said would we like to offset 10 degrees. I asked the Captain; then suggested we take the offset but he said we should be ok. ATC said the Airbus is 10 miles ahead of us. We could see the aircraft and it didn't look 10 miles away. We again experienced moderate wake turbulence; both times autopilot disengaged and the aircraft snapped to the right. It felt like a 90 degree snap bank. At this times I told ATC we encountered the wake turbulence again and need to offset at least 10 degrees. From that point on they took us off the arrival and gave us vectors. We were still following the aircraft on the ILS 10 L; and tried to stay a little above the glide slope since we were cleared for the visual. ATC did not mention caution wake turbulence on our initial descent. The only time we received the caution wake turbulence was after we were cleared to intercept the localizer and then cleared for the visual; and by Tower when we were cleared to land. Needs to be larger separation between heavy and corporate jets. Also pilots need to be informed of what kind of aircraft they are following.

Callback: Reporter expressed the strong opinion that separation between corporate and air carrier aircraft should be increased.



Synopsis: Falcon 900 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence that rolled the aircraft to a 90 degree bank while descending on the FISEL7 Arrival into FLL in trail of an A350.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Landing on runway XX at ZZZ on my last flight of the night; I was on my ground rollout between 50-60 knots. I noticed ahead of us there were at least 3 deer running out on the runway. I had little time to react; and I engaged maximum braking in an attempt to avoid making direct contact with them.One of the deer was struck directly by the nose gear at a speed of approximately 30-40 knots. The deer appeared to go under the aircraft's left front side; without making contact with either of the propellers. The aircraft came to a complete stop; and was shutdown on the runway. No passengers or crew were injured in the incident. The plane was deboarded on the runway. The passengers were shuttled to the terminal.




Synopsis: C402 Captain reported a deer strike during a night landing.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HUM.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D HUM
ATC / advisory: Tower HUM
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approaching HUM in VMC; we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 36 and handed off to the Tower. As has been the case occasionally in the past; the Tower Controller was constantly giving out helicopter clearances leaving no time on frequency for us to check in.There were numerous TCAS targets all around as we continued our visual approach from a 5 mile final approach. Still unable to check in due to constant radio chatter; and approaching short final; we noted a helicopter above and at 12 o'clock and another one parked right in the middle of Runway 36. TCAS supported our visual observations and alerted accordingly.The Captain immediately initiated a missed approach; deviating to the left to avoid the airborne helicopter. I called 'XXXXXX going around; aircraft on the runway'. The Controller seemed genuinely surprised by our presence and told us; 'When we are busy; stay away from the airport'. I explained that we were IFR; cleared for the visual approach and were unable to contact the Tower due to no breaks in the issuance of clearances.We landed after making left traffic as per ATC; and the Controller told us 'sorry that we are so busy sometimes'.This has happened before at HUM; I have had to go around because they are so busy issuing helicopter clearances; but this instance was especially disturbing as clearly the Controller was so engrossed in other tasks that he did not seem to have any idea that a fixed wing aircraft was inbound. This resulted in a number of hazards: Not being able to communicate with the Tower; a runway incursion and a conflict with an airborne aircraft.HUM desperately needs an additional controller during these busy times. It is just too dangerous for one controller to try and do all that work.




Synopsis: Although cleared for visual approach by New Orleans TRACON; a congested Tower frequency at HUM prevented the flight crew of a BE20 from making timely contact. A traffic conflict with one of several helicopters operating at the airport resulted; followed by a TCAS RA and a go around by the reporter's aircraft.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While established on the localizer for the approach to Runway 22L in Boston; the GPS signal was lost numerous times (more than 3) from 20 miles out from the runway to 5 miles out. Each time the GPS failure message remained for approximately 10-15 seconds before signal returned. The weather was VFR and navigation was not affected.




Synopsis: C402 Captain experiences a loss of GPS signal on three or more occasions; from 20 miles out to five miles out; while flying the localizer to Runway 22L at BOS.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The SUUTR 2 has a known problem that is highlighted on the Weather Brief first page but that note should be more specific; and better yet; the STAR redesigned correctly. Currently the note says that 'several flights descending via...for unknown reasons' were high on arrival. How about the STAR is jacked up. We were on PATH and Speed at TRLOC (at or above FL290) we were at FL290. The VNAV PATH immediately defaulted to VSPD and we were 1200 ft high. The problem appears to be the 'at or below FL210 at FOOLZ' combined with SUUTR between FL260 and FL240. Those two restrictions don't work when combined with the prior at or above FL290. Stop filing and flying this arrival until it gets fixed or; failing that; accurately identify the problem to crews so they know when and where the STAR and VNAV and ATC's descend via are going to try and mess them up.

Callback: The reporter stated the B737NG FMC design is part of the issue because it does not identify the difficulty of meeting the descent constraints in advance. If a pilot were aware of this before the descent then initiate the descent immediately at TRLOC; the aircraft would probably be a little high but not by 1;000 ft or more. Local knowledge or an ATC alert would certainly provide a heads up. Occasionally ATC will issue a FL240 constraint providing another trap because if Altitude Intercept is not selected when cleared lower; the aircraft will again level off. In the end; this arrival should be redesigned to accommodate modern clear airframe aircraft.



Synopsis: B737NG Captain reported while flying the SMF SUUTR2 RNAV at FL290; the FMC indicated on path until the top of descent (TRLOC) at which point the FMC alerted they were 1;200 ft high on the descent. The FL210 FOOLZ crossing restriction is too low and close (23.4 NM) to meet the restriction.