elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X; DFW departure ELD transition checked on I issued a clearance to climb to FL330 but put a temporary altitude of FL310 in the data block.  That was my intention to climb the aircraft to flight level 310 because another aircraft was an overflight from the northwest southeast bound I projected the aircraft would be in conflict west of EIC (Shreveport; LA).  The whole time I thought I issued flight level 310 to the pilot.  As I went to transfer communication to Aircraft X I advised him to expect higher on the next frequency but my transmission was blocked by another aircraft.  I observed Aircraft X mode C change from 310 to 312 I called the next sector ELD-H to inquire if they climbed Aircraft X; the aircraft had not checked on frequency yet. The controller broadcast to see the pilot was there they acknowledge the controller advised the pilot to maintain FL320 the mode C indicated 322.I have no recommendation I simply made a mistake I knew for sure I issued FL310 but was totally wrong.




Synopsis: ZFW Controller thinks he issued a lower altitude to an aircraft and put that altitude in the data block.  Controller ships aircraft to next sector and observes aircraft climbing above altitude that he thought he was assigned.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given clearance to cross AKBAR at 28;000 FT.  I set the FMC but failed to set the MCP.  We received the question; 'Are you going to make the restriction?'  I looked at the FMC and mistook the distance to the fix as distance to TOD.  We started the descent knowing it was going to be close; so we asked for a vector.  The Controller said no problem and gave us a new frequency.  On the new frequency; the new Controller; prior to AKBAR; gave us a new altitude to descend to.  It was odd there was no 'reset MCP altitude' or 'unable to make altitude restriction.'




Synopsis: B737-300 First Officer set up the FMC; but failed to set the MCP for a crossing restriction on descent. Failure to make the crossing restriction was attributed to mistaking FMC distance to the crossing fix for the distance to Top of Descent.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Sectors 3 and 4 were combined at 4. Before I came back from my break; the Sector 4 Controller removed strips on an air carrier aircraft. When I got back from my break I was asked to split Sector 3 off and did so. During the briefing we had multiple Salt Lake departures; one of which requested higher while still in Salt Lake Approach's airspace. The briefing also included an overview of the traffic we were dealing with at that time; but nothing was mentioned of the unidentified air carrier. As soon as the briefing was over my attention was drawn to the departures; and to coordinate with Approach to climb an aircraft in their airspace. I didn't notice unidentified air carrier fly through the other side of my airspace. At this point the unidentified air carrier had no data block and would have been an intruder on a discrete code at FL310. Denver Center then called and asked about the intruder in their airspace. I asked my Supervisor about the code and he found out who it was. I then called Denver Center back informing them of who it was and verifying the frequency that they wanted the aircraft on.We have a 'fail safe' built into our system to prevent controllers from inadvertently removing strips on the wrong aircraft; it doesn't work. As in this case; the average controller never looks at the crud readout; they simply hit y to remove strips. I can't help but wonder of people would be more careful without this built in safety net? Or; maybe the 'fail safe' needs to be more of a safety net. Maybe after the computer asks if you want to remove strips on so and so; and you hit y; then the computer could ask; 'Are you sure; do you really want to remove strips on so and so.' And then you'd have to hit 'Y' again.


Second narrative: Trying to catch up with scan and inadvertently removed ID strip. Begin briefing Sector 03 to split 03 from 04. [I] didn't catch the error (removing the wrong ID strip which was now an intruder).When the pace picks up; slow down. Scan and follow through.


Synopsis: Two ZLC sectors were combined and while attempting to catch up; an experienced Controller removed a transiting aircraft's ID strip but the error was not seen until the aircraft entered ZDV airspace when ZDV called wanting flight information.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Three months ago I flew an aircraft on which the alternate stabilizer trim switches (the manual switches on the center pedestal; left of the throttles) were inoperative. I occasionally use those thumb switched to trim nose up or down when hand flying the plane. These were completely dead and I wrote them up when we landed at our destination. They were repaired; but there is no telling how long they had been inoperative. Since that event; I've begun using those switches or the manual STAB TRIM levers; as installed; prior to taxi to check operation of the system. On this day; I ran into another malfunctioning stab trim system simply by operating the levers as they were designed. After running the After Start checklist; I moved the STAB TRIM levers forward and aft to watch the stab trim index move as it should. When I did; and in both directions; we received an UNSCHED STAB TRIM light on the overhead panel with the corresponding EICAS note and aural warning. (This is the correct response on this aircraft when the autopilot is engaged.) We then received a MACH SPD TRIM light on the overhead panel and corresponding EICAS message and aural warning. After discussing the problem on the phone with Maintenance Control and pulling and resetting circuit breakers at his direction; the problem remained and we returned to gate where line maintenance was unable to troubleshoot the problem and the plane was taken out of service. I spoke to Maintenance Control the next day and it was discovered a wire was broken/disconnected in the center pedestal which was necessary to send a signal to the stab trim control box (at least that's how I remember it being explained). Again; this is the second aircraft in three months on which I had an issue with this system and there's no telling how long this system had been broken when I found it. Two planes in three months is a pretty small sample size.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reports discovering two aircraft in three months with malfunctioning alternate horizontal stabilizer trim switches.
Date: 201207
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: During cruise; First Flight Attendant called to notify me of a significant amount of small mosquitoes swarming in the front part of coach near the forward bulkhead and in the back of the airplane. They appeared to be small; newly hatched mosquitoes. He also informed me that several of the passengers were getting somewhat uneasy due to the number of mosquitoes; the recent media reports of West Nile Virus being spread by mosquitoes; and the fact that they were continuously swatting mosquitoes on their persons and on the cabin walls. I called Dispatch and notified him of the situation; that the airplane would need to be fumigated at destination before allowing further passenger flights; and that I would be making a report of the problem with insects. I also increased the airspeed to expedite the flight. Just before descent; the First Flight Attendant informed me that the mosquito problem had gotten much worse and that there were now several spiders that were seen and killed by passengers in addition to the huge number of mosquitoes. He also let me know that although passengers were actively swatting and killing as many mosquitoes as possible; he and the other flight attendants were able to keep the passengers calm and in good spirits. As I began coordinating shortcuts to expedite landing; I decided to declare an emergency with ATC for priority handling; which would allow us to proceed direct to the runway of choice so we could land; get to the gate; and deplane passengers as quickly as possible. My First Officer flew the airplane while I accomplished appropriate items in the Emergency Landing Checklist. After coordinating with the company; the stairs were lowered upon arrival at the gate and nearly half of the passengers were routed down the stairs and escorted back around and up the jet bridge stairs. Although there were likely many mosquito bites; I'm not aware of any injuries to passengers and everyone appeared to deplane in good spirits.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant informed MD82 Captain of a large number of mosquitoes swarming in the cabin during cruise flight. Flight crew declared an emergency to expedite ATC handling to the destination airport.
Date: 202001
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: The Dispatch Release included MEL 21-51-01 which requires the performance data to include 1 pack clsd bleeds inop in the TLR data.  This data was not indicated on the Dispatch Release and was not detected by myself nor the Captain.    The Event was detected upon a routine review of the releases during my shift.  The Control Center has been understaffed due to sick calls and lack of dispatch staff.  In recent days I have managed as many as 78 releases during a normal shift; with as many as 16 releases in an hour being not uncommon.  In addition; the Captain shares responsibility for the safe and efficient conduct of the flight.   In this event there was no communication between the Captain who could have drawn the Dispatcher's attention to this data omission.  In addition to the Dispatcher there are two people in the cockpit who presumably would have viewed the Release and noticed this missing information.  I believe that we could hire more dispatch staff to prevent excessive workload on those in the Control Center.  We also should stress the importance of adhering to Dispatch and flight deck procedures ensuring that all required data are included in the flight release.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a failure to place a MEL item on the flight release and neither the crew or dispatch corrected the error.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On Day 0; I operated Flight ABC from ZZZZ - ZZZ. I was the Captain assisted by [the] First Officer and the IRO (International Relief Officer). We had additional deadheading flight crew.  The flight was uneventful and we landed in ZZZ.  On Day 4 I received a call from the company informing me that my crew and I had been exposed to someone who had tested positive for COVID-19.  I inquired as to who the infected person was; but she would not give me any names and stated they could not discuss any details with me. I immediately called my first officers and they both reported that they had received the same notification call at approximately the same time.  Next I called the jumpseaters.  My first call was to Jumpseater A who informed me that he was pulled from his flight on Day 1 by the company.  He specifically stated that he was told he was being removed from his flight on Day 2; 'due to him being possibly exposed to a person who has been tested for COVID-19.'  His notification occurred before our departure back to ZZZZ so we are curious why we were not shown the same abundance of caution and removed from our flight assignment since we were in close contact with affected jumpseater. Instead we were only notified after we returned to ZZZ on Day 4 after having potentially exposed more jumpseaters and the good people of the neighborhood who we intermixed with during the ZZZZ layover.  The FO in question did test positive for the virus and I am now showing secondary symptoms which I pray is not related to a COVID infection.  In closing;  I personally believe that if there was a possibility that a crew member was potentially COVID-19 positive; we should have been removed as operating crew and tested!




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being notified by the company of a possible exposure to COVID-19 through another crew member. The Captain expressed concern that deadheading crew was notified before the on-duty crew and suggested that they should have been removed from duty sooner.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CZEG.ARTCC, AB
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival to runway 35L transition we were told by Edmonton Center to descend and maintain 12;000 feet. Prior to receiving this altitude clearance we were given no other instructions on altitude such as 'descend via the arrival;'  'cross ZZZ at 13;200 feet and then maintain 12;000 feet or even 'comply with the published altitudes on the IGVEP3 arrival.' At approximately the time we were crossing TULOS on the arrival we were told to stop our descent at 13;000 feet (even though we had previously been cleared to 12;000 feet). We were then informed that we needed to comply with the altitudes on the arrival even though we were given no such clearance and had been previously cleared by Edmonton Center to descend and maintain 12;000 feet.The root cause of this event is a difference in terminology between the U.S. Air Traffic Control and the Canadian controllers. After we were cleared to descend to 12;000 feet we were under the impression that we should descend and maintain 12;000 feet.If there is a difference in procedure between the 'descend via' clearances in the United States and Canada; all pilots operating between the two countries should be made keenly aware of the differences before operating in Canadian airspace; perhaps by way of a notation on the dispatch release or in the '10-7' airport familiarization chart.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Fist Officer reported confusion on altitude assignment on arrival to CYYC; citing differences in U.S. and Canadian ATC terminology with respect to 'descend via' clearances.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: 7FL6.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF 7FL6
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Mist built on windscreen in flight. Called DAB approach for vectors (125.8); but very busy. After 3 calls; transferred to 7FL6 frequency. Opened the canopy to locate airport. CTAF advised several ultralights in pattern without radios. Had a non-pilot passenger looking outside of canopy for traffic. Hazy; smoke; with windscreen misted over. 3 to 4 Traffic reports for Runway 23 and several others on frequency argued should be Runway 5. I called Runway 23 stating 'looking for traffic; please advise.' One pilot stated behind me; no worries. Heard a vehicle state crossing the active runway. Landed looking outside of windscreen due to mist on windscreen. Taxiing out noticed stop sign; watched carefully for any vehicle traffic and there was none. It was when I was turning towards tie downs that I noticed a very faded X.The extremely faded X on this runway and the combination for Runway 23 similarly located is a hazard. Three local pilots stated they did the same thing; one was last week. I do not have GPS; this would have helped; however I am purchasing one today. This airport is on my personal minimum list of 'NO FLY' unless I have perfectly blue skies and a pilot as a passenger for traffic alerts.

Callback: The reporter stated that because of the aircraft windscreen obscuration and environmental issues; it was simply not possible to see the runway clearly. Until the aircraft passed the faded X; the reporter did not know for certain if the aircraft had incurred the runway. Airport Management knows a problem exists because past taxiway incursion. The reporter is familiar with the airport; but the combination of factors lead to this serious error.



Synopsis: GA pilot on approach to 7FL6 Runway 23 reported landing on the east-west taxiway while confused by haze; smoke; and a windscreen obscured with mist. The deactivated runway extremely faded X was detected while taxiing to parking.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb the 'Brake On' light illuminated at approximately 10;000 FT. At a safe altitude and workload we contacted Dispatch who connected us with Maintenance who determined it was likely an indication/sensor problem. As a crew we decided the safest course of action would be to declare an emergency at our destination and have CFR standing by in the event the brakes were; indeed; set. We flew an RNAV approach to the runway after which the landing and rollout were uneventful with normal breaking. Upon clearing the runway we terminated the emergency and taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: Despite Maintenance Control's belief it was an indicator problem; an EMB-145 flight crew declared a precautionary emergency due to the illumination of the 'Brake On' light climbing through 10;000 MSL. The subsequent landing with CFR standing by was normal.