elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was making a visual approach into ZZZ. I had been making regular traffic calls since I was about 12 miles out on the CTAF. Hearing no one respond I continued my visual approach to set up for runway XX. The winds at the time were a direct crosswind. I continued my descent all the while making traffic calls. As I was just touching down I looked up to see Aircraft Y enter the reciprocal runway (XX1) and begin its takeoff roll. I thought about applying power and going airborne again. However; the thought of accelerating toward an oncoming aircraft seemed a worse choice then slamming on the brakes and full reverse on the prop. I was able to slow and exit the runway; Aircraft Y did see me at the other end of the runway and aborted its takeoff roll. At the end of it I was able to exit the runway successfully. In the future; at uncontrolled fields I will now overfly the field and rely on visual clearing as a primary means of clearing traffic with the radio/CTAF being second. Especially when the winds at the field do not dictate for certain which runway to use.




Synopsis: PC12 pilot reported near landing touchdown an opposite direction aircraft starting its take off roll.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I have recently discovered something that may be an issue in the CRJ-900 when flying between CLT-ZZZ(possibly to ZZZ1 as well). Today we were flying the usual route (BARMY3.NUTZE) and we were given a crossing restriction of FL230 at NUTZE. We were cruising at FL250 when I put the FL230 restriction into the FMS at NUTZE. We armed the VNAV in anticipation of the descent; but the FMS VNAV information showed that a climb was necessary to meet our crossing restriction. This made absolutely no sense at all; so obviously we intervened and made the restriction manually using VS mode. This is not the first time that this has happened to me on this routing. The first time I figured it was a fluke; but now that it has happened again it made me think otherwise. After passing NUTZE; the VNAV worked normally for further crossing restrictions.After consulting the FMS manual for the CRJ7/900; I discovered that the FMS assigned the NUTZE waypoint as a CLIMB waypoint since NUTZE is the last fix on the SID. All SID waypoints are initially assigned to be CLIMB waypoints. However; the FMS manual also says that the pilot can re-assign a waypoint to be a DESCENT waypoint by manually entering the crossing restriction (as we did). There seems to be an issue here with the FMS not allowing the pilot to override the CLIMB on this particular route/crossing. I would suggest looking into a possible software issue with this particular routing on the FMS. It could possibly lead to an altitude deviation if the unsuspecting flight crew does not catch it before they reach NUTZE. Even if this turns out to be how the FMS software is supposed to work; I would suggest a communication to the pilot group to warn that this may happen under certain circumstances.




Synopsis: CRJ900 Captain reported the FMC showed a climb vice a descent due to the designation of a climb waypoint on the SID even though the crew programmed a lower altitude.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During taxi on designated route; a fuel truck from the FBO pulled out in front of me requiring significant braking. In discussion later with the driver he talked about how he did not see me due to the setting sun.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot experiences a near collision with a fuel truck that failed to yield. The truck driver indicated the setting sun had blinded him causing the near collision.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LUK.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Night
Aircraft: Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operator: Other News Gathering
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D LUK
ATC / advisory: CTAF LUK
Second aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Reporter organization: Other News Gathering
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approximately one minute after takeoff; a jet (which the guy in the back identified as most likely a jet based on the field; (LUK)) overtook us from below and behind. No time for evasive maneuvering was available. We had been on frequency (118.7) for approximately five minutes; and neither of us heard any transmissions other than our own prior to takeoff.




Synopsis: Bell 206 pilot departing LUK using CTAF procedures; reports being overtaken by a corporate jet one minute after lift off without any announcements on the frequency.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During departure from Runway XXR while in the upwind; aircraft X reported that they had lost their engine and were making a turn back to the airport to land. They were given the wind and cleared to land on Runway YYL. I declared an emergency on their behalf and notified the Ground Controller to contact ARFF. I also notified the Supervisor. They landed without further incident and reported that their engine was running; but barely. They were able to taxi clear of the runway and back to the ramp.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an ATC declared emergency event when departing traffic advised ATC of a lost engine and was handled accordingly.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SCT; Class D MYF
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT; Tower MYF
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departed MYF under tower control on runway 28L. Prior to departure; I asked the tower to request flight following for me. Two minutes into climb out the tower passed me over to SoCal Approach.  Socal Approach immediately indicated I was in Class B violation. Why did the tower let me fly into the Class B airspace without clearance?




Synopsis: Cessna pilot reported that ATC did not help him with Class Bravo clearance when he requested flight following on the ground.
Date: 201902
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Interior Door
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The security section of the Flight Attendant clearly states the lavatories are to be unoccupied and locked for cockpit entry/exit procedures. In training we are told to open the lavatory; visually inspect; close the lavatory; and then lock it. The flight operations manual section states that the flight attendants will ensure the surrounding area is secure including all lavatories. B777 pilots are being verbally told to lock the lavatories doors open; language which is not in the flight operations manual. This concerns me as it is contradicting to what our security section/training calls for. Most of the time during pilot/Purser briefing I am acknowledged and the pilots comply with the proper security procedures. While working [a recent flight] I briefed the Captain as to what is required by our training. He refused to acknowledge the procedures outlined in our manual and I was forced to leave the lavatory doors open during cockpit entry/exit. This action compromised the integrity of security and left the cockpit vulnerable; however; because he was the Pilot in Command I was forced to comply.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported some pilots are requiring cockpit entry/exit procedures that are contrary to Flight Attendant training.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise at FL220 the Red EICAS message appeared R ENG OIL PRES HI. We declared an emergency and followed the QRH procedure which had us reduce power on the right engine and monitor it to see if the pressure would fall within limits. Within a few minutes it did fall within normal limits. After discussing it with my SIC; I decided to leave the engine running at idle and keep it operational unless some other malfunction were to appear as there was no directive to shut it down. I decided to land short of our destination as a precaution as we were both very familiar with it. No further warning indications were observed through the shutdown of the aircraft.


Second narrative: [Narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A G-200 EICAS alerted R ENG OIL PRES HI so the QRH was completed and eventually the oil pressure returned to normal but the flight diverted as a precaution with idle thrust.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: FZY.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: UNICOM FZY
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: While taxiing the wings struck 2'x 2' posts that were between 42 and 44' long that had been installed along the edges of the taxiways and runways scuffing and damaging the wing from the leading edge to the aileron on both the left and right wing. These posts had been recently installed; having not been on the airport property in mid October. They are installed in pairs directly across from each other on approximately 80 - 100' centers on both sides of and the entire length of the taxiways creating a virtual 'gate' that planes must taxi between.The posts present a dangerous hazard to aircraft taxiing that have wings that are less than 42' above the ground. My wingtip measured 41' from the ground to the leading edge of the wingtip approximately 12' in from the wingtip. The distance measured from the post to the centerline of the taxiway was approximately 21'. The taxiway was measured as 20' from the edge to the centerline. My aircraft wingspan with the nosewheel exactly on the center line had less than 3' clearance between the wingtip and the posts.Note; that when I inspected the taxiways after securing the airplane there were several other posts that had been 'bent over' from being struck by other objects; probably another airplane; that may have also been damaged by these man installed hazards.




Synopsis: Small aircraft single pilot reported striking snow stakes planted along the edges of runways and taxiways at FZY with his wingtips. The wingspan is 36 feet and the distance between posts is 42 feet.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: As we turned on to the lead in line at gate X; we noticed self-park guidance indicated STOP in red letters. We stopped. We noticed two ramp service agents on both wing tips and a marshaller under the unit. We decided that we were expected to taxi down the lead in line with marshaller hand signal guidance and ignore the self-park guidance STOP signal. We parked without incident. On debriefing we (me and the FO) both agreed that taxiing down the lead in line with a marshaller issuing hand signals in the face of a self-park guidance STOP indication is a normalization of deviance that has crept into the culture at ZZZ and should not be accepted at company.During the debriefing the FO encouraged me to consider setting the parking brake; shutting down the engines and politely and professionally request a tow in. It should not come to that.It is lazy and sloppy. It is; of or pertaining to; an organization that because of COVID; layoffs; displacements; cash burn; disappointments; you name it; has taken their eye off the ball. It goes against the pilot culture of never accepting RED. e.g. flight deck indications; Runway Status lights; VASI/PAPI; Runway Stop Bars; REIL; PWS; yet on this occasion; I'm just expected; in the course of normal operations; to taxi to [gate] X at ZZZ with a self-park guidance red STOP indication.This is the second report on such an occurrence at ZZZ.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported taxiing into a gate with the use of a Marshall; while the self-parking guidance system was indicating STOP.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZUA.ARTCC, GU
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZUA
ATC / advisory: Center ZUA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Guam ARTCC has a habit of telling aircraft going into TNI to call GSN ATCT and cancel IFR; even though TNI is not in GSN ATCT (Air Traffic Control Tower) airspace. There is no procedure covered in the LOA and it is merely something that has been passed down unofficially in training. The ATM has told people to stop doing this last year; but since we have a few new people; no training order; and an SOP that is 8 years old it is obviously overlooked. Anyway; Aircraft X was cleared on a visual approach to TNI (uncontrolled airport that is located in ZUA airspace). About 20 minutes later; I asked if he had canceled and the R-side said 'I told him to call GSN ATCT to cancel IFR.' I called GSN; and they advised someone had called; but had no idea who it was (why would they) and that someone had said they had landed. Apparently; that is good enough for Guam ARTCC; so the R-side and the CIC took that as Aircraft X closed out their IFR plan about 30 minutes after he was supposed to land. The issue I have besides the fact of our lackluster procedures is that we don't put in the effort for airports such as TNI and GRO because the majority of folks here have no experience with an uncontrolled airport; the procedures of giving clearances or getting IFR cancelations. We give IFR clearances out of GRO on an old landline that says GRO FSS (even though they no longer exist); it is merely a line that goes into the FBO at the GRO airport and it's the guy that just put gas on the plane wanting to go give the pilot his clearance. People here believe it to be a FSS; even though it has been closed since the early turn of the century; but no one got rid of the line or briefed it here so people just assume it is a FSS.We are able to talk to aircraft on the ground at TNI and GRO; but because it is not trained on how to do these things out here; people come up with shortcuts and just do not do it correctly. Train the proper way to conduct operations in and out of uncontrolled airports.




Synopsis: ZUA Center Controller reported controllers use incorrect procedures to determine IFR cancellations of aircraft flying into uncontrolled airports.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: SR22
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Handoff / Assist
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working the D side and got a call from the approach control sector adjacent to our sector. They asked for an approval request to turn an aircraft off an airway and direct to ZZZ1. I for some reason assumed the aircraft was VFR; and therefore did not consider the MVAs in the area when approving the request. The aircraft was assigned 11;000; but checked in level at 9;000; and therefore my R side had to issue the aircraft a climb clearance to get above the MVA.


Second narrative: Was working the R-side at 1 [Sectors] X/Y/Z.  My D-side fielded a call from TRACON with an APREQ to send an aircraft direct to ZZZ1. I didn't hear the call from TRACON; only that he approved a guy direct to ZZZ1. The aircraft checked on climbing 8;800 to 11;000 direct to ZZZ1. Unfortunately he didn't climb quick enough to get above the MVA; which triggered a MSAW warning.Don't clear aircraft direct unless it is known exactly what the route is like and/or we can ensure the aircraft won't conflict with an MVA.


Synopsis: Center D-Side Controller reported they assumed an aircraft was VFR; approved a turn; causing an MVA Violation.