Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Other All
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other All
Flight phase: Cruise; Climb; Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: At approximately XX:15 am the GTK radar site was out of service and no targets appeared on the screen. First safety issue: Greater than 90% of ocean area only has secondary radar. We don't have primary radar. The point may be moot in this scenario but should be noted and addressed. At approximately XX:18 am we had lost the entire GTK frequency site which includes 126.45; 125.1; and 135.2. Second safety issue: At this point 2 entire sectors (62 and 63) do not have any radar services; primary or secondary; or any direct radar sites to communicate with aircraft. In short; there are approximately 35 planes and 7;000 people that cannot be seen or communicated with; and 102;480 square miles of airspace that is completely unworkable and as dangerous as the National Airspace System could possibly be for more than 10 HOURS!Controller relayed through aircraft on the nearest frequency site (ZIN) to relay on guard to separate aircraft in conflict within the 102;000 square mile zone of equipment failure. Third safety issue. The ZIN site used for sector 43 to relay to the 102;000 square mile dead zone had only 1 of the 2 working frequencies! 126.45 on ZIN transmitter was working but not the receiver.Coordination was accomplished with all surrounding facilities to include; Santo Domingo; San Juan; adjacent ZMA sectors; and Miami Approach to ground stop aircraft. ZWY Center was called to reroute planes through different ZMA sectors and SJU (San Juan) Center. At approximately; XX:45 am the ADE with ZWY (New York Oceanic Airspace) failed and 0 flight plan information was being transmitted to ZMA from ZWY. At this point; I shut off all ZWY flights to ZMA and requested every single plane being rerouted out of ZMA entry points to Jacksonville Center. Fourth safety issue: Complete ADE failure with New York Center and 0 flight plan information transmitting between Centers.It is only by the grace of a higher power that there weren't any TCAS alerts; RA's; or even worse an aircraft accident. If the recommendations and solutions presented in this report isn't taken seriously or implemented in any capacity there will be loss of life...'. This should be prioritized as immediately. Some sort of backup frequency site should be established for sectors 62; and 63. There have been plans for a second frequency site at MBPV. A second site in a different location would have meant the world to this area that day. Although; we would not have radar; the Controllers in this area have been trained and know the procedures to successfully and effectively work under non radar conditions; providing a working frequency is available.In comparison; CONUS (Continental United States) airspace has BUECS (Backup Emergency Frequency) sites to help with theses types of failure; along with other multiple back up options. These two sectors and all others in the OCEAN area literally have zero backup options. We desperately need backup options and more over lapping frequency coverage. Although; I understand that this may be expensive and that foreign territory is involved; the monetary price to pay now will pale in comparison to the eventual punitive damages forced to be paid to the families of the affected. The GTK radar site fails and is listed out of service at a staggering rate. This site is completely unreliable; and is the reason that the OCEAN Controllers are so well trained in non-radar procedures. The solution would be allowing radar feeds from SDO; or any other feasible facility with ZMA. Also; prioritize space based ADS-B that didn't meet the efficiency criteria due to an approximately 98% accuracy rate; or the ground based ADS-B as long as it is not collocated with the faulty GTK radar site. It must be separate to allow for one failure to not affect both systems.In conclusion there is so much more that can be done in ZMA OCEAN area; there is not weather radar; primary radar; backup frequencies; a working EBUS (Enhanced Backup System) or dark system (backup radardisplay); accurate altimeter stations; etc... These 2 solutions to problems encountered on Date; are about as important a safety issue as there can be. If the agency truly believes safety is the number one priority; these issues will be resolved as if life depends on it because it actually does.




Synopsis: A Controller reported a complete loss of radar and communications due to communication and radar site failures in Miami Center's Oceanic Airspace area. The reporter states a radar site routinely fails and there are insufficient back up communications sites in this airspace.