Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had just plugged in to the Final Monitor position to get the brief when only seconds into the brief I heard an Air Carrier on about a 7 mile final to Runway XXL declare an emergency. I took the position and heard the Local Controller send another Air Carrier in front of the emergency Air Carrier around; the Local Controller also cancelled the approach clearance on the Air Carrier behind the emergency Air Carrier and had him track the localizer; I believe he was issued 2;000 FT. I advised the Supervisor of the emergency and asked if we wanted to run the aircraft down the final and over the airport or pull them out; and we agreed to the pull outs. I coordinated with Local that I would pull the remaining aircraft off the final; the first two aircraft that I pulled out eastbound. There was traffic behind him inbound to Runway XXC and I decided to turn him 30 degrees left at 5;000 FT to maintain separation but putting him over the 4;000 FT traffic I just pulled out. At this time I started to get the feeling there was a communication breakdown. I believe a Final Controller and a Feeder Controller were not aware that Runway XXL would close after the emergency landed. There were low IMC conditions at the time and very strong winds aloft making control even more difficult. I vectored the three aircraft to the downwind and changed them to the Arrival Controller's frequency for re-sequence. I had limited time to talk since I was on the Local frequency and they also had the emergency going. The Feeder Controller; not aware or not sure why the aircraft were coming off the final; continued to vector towards a normal approach point which overwhelmed the Arrival Controller. The aircraft all appeared to be vertically separated but one of them handed off from the Feeder was slow in the descent. By the time the Arrival Controller realized he was not level at 6;000 FT; it was too late. The Supervisor in charge was competent. I have respect for the Supervisor. That said there was a complete meltdown with communication; coordination and guidance. When a runway closes in the middle of a rush; someone needs to make all the players aware; plan a suitable solution and voice this to all concerned. The pullouts were a major factor in this scenario but had they gone thru the airport and had an error on the Departure side; the obvious cause would have been because they weren't pulled out. Another factor conducive to this event was all the runway changes the Feeder had to issue. Initially they were going to [Runway] XXL with overflow only to [Runway] XXC. The Feeder Controller; who had some going to [Runway] XXC changed them back to [Runway] XXL. When he found out [Runway] XXL was closed he had to change them back to [Runway] XXC. For a long time now I've witnessed stressful situations on the finals with regard to coordination. We have at least two controllers and three during busier times. Often we'll have a medical emergency or someone that requires priority. During visual conditions it is not too difficult to find room to fit them in the flow. Instrument conditions are entirely different and to aid in the coordination between three controllers and possible trainees is an absolute must. Many controllers at this facility have low time without experiencing the complete myriad of off the wall occurrences that can happen very quickly. Pair that with inexperienced supervisors who understandably want to let controllers do their job; but need to know when to take the helm. Too often one Arrival Controller isn't sure what the other one is doing with the emergency and the operation becomes inefficient or worse; dangerous. I would like to see supervisors/CIC's help out/coordinate more when these situations occur.


Second narrative: ZZZ was running independent simultaneous ILS approaches to Runways XYR and XXL due to IFR conditions and low ceilings. Sequencing was difficult due to high winds from the south as well as Tower needs for full 3 miles in trail at the threshold; massive compression on final and high number of aircraft. I was controlling the XXL final which was full. An aircraft on a 5 mile final declared an emergency due to what I heard from other controllers was a flap problem. As is standard; Runway XXL was to close after the aircraft landed; with 4 jets on final following him. Final monitor took action to pull out the 4 on final following rather than cancel approach clearances and allow them to fly the localizer for re-sequence; in retrospect; this led to total saturation of my limited airspace. AR1 requires turning on final at 5;000 FT MSL; the aircraft were being pulled off final and vectored to a downwind at 4;000 FT; necessitating a climb. At the time the base leg which was full was being fed at 5;000 FT and standard down winds were fed at 6;000 FT. ACR X was on the base leg at 250 KTS when he checked on descending out of 7;500 FT. When he checked on; I misheard him and believed he was descending to 6;000 FT; when in reality he was descending to 5;000 FT. I was forced to vector him South away from final in order to make a workable sequence with the other aircraft who now had been pulled off the finals and needed to be re-sequenced to a new runway. A commuter jet who didn't respond to instructions was vectored to the other AR Controller; but took up time that was invaluable to the situation. At the time of loss of separation; ACR Y was on downwind climbed to 5;000 FT; and ACR X was turning South at 6;000 FT; however; the aircraft was descending to 5;000 FT (missed check on from above) as he was vectored South above ACR Y. ACR X had a TCAS RA as he was in conflict with the Northbound downwind ACR Y beneath him at 5000 FT turning West toward final. My best estimation of separation between the two aircraft was about a mile laterally and 500 FT vertical. The missed check on was crucial to this situation; and being more aware and getting the full content of an aircraft's check on could have prevented this; but more than anything the emergency that developed with the aircraft on final was the largest factor in this loss of separation as it created sector saturation that led to missed read backs and check ons and a workload that had become somewhat unmanageable. There isn't a way to foresee these events. Additionally; Feeder Controllers should be more aware of the situation of the arrivals they are feeding; and give a sequence that is workable; and make changes to effect that when a situation like the above develops. They have far more airspace to use for the purpose of sequencing than the AR controllers.


Synopsis: TRACON Controllers described a loss of separation event during a very busy and complex traffic period involving an emergency aircraft when coordination within the facility and needed direct supervisory intervention was lacking.