elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon initial departure from ZZZ Aircraft X was forced to return to the same gate due to a cargo loading issue.  Because of the issue; no final weight manifest was delivered to the aircraft; although we had a final DG (dangeous goods) summary. Upon return to gate; some passengers requested to disembark. Cargo was verified and the close out was completed. Departure from the gate was accomplished with the confirmation that no DG was loaded in the bulk pit.  Final weights were delayed due to a computer issue posting the weights to a now out of date flight on the second departure.  Once final weights were delivered; ACARS was unable to retrieve T/O (takeoff) data due to several issues. Re-initialization of ACARS was attempted to fix the problem; unsuccessfully. Dispatch provided final weights; T/O data; and the flight departed. During the flight; the FO (First Officer) requested a final weights manifest for the flight to compare against what he thought was the initial [weight manifest].  Since there was never an initial [weight manifest]; the comparison was against the same document; although a final DG summary printed with this request.  This resulted in a situation where the flight crew was not accurately informed of actual cargo loaded since we were informed there was no DG loaded in the bulk pit; yet still had a Final DG Loaded form with the [manifest].




Synopsis: B-767 First Officer reported during cruise that flight crew was not accurately informed of actual DG cargo loaded after a ground gate return.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Captain was flying when cleared for the visual approach. Around the outer marker; the Captain was so low that the Tower issued low altitude alert to our flight. The Captain made an adjustment and our flight continued on without incident to a normal landing. Fly the visual approach and back it up with the instrument approach.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported his Captain being very low at the outer marker. The Tower issued a low altitude alert and the Captain made the adjustment and continued to land.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We [took off] and asked for flight following. ATC couldn't see us under 2;000 feet; but we continued talking to them.  I told them we would climb to 3;000 and pickup following. Just getting ready to ask for following; we heard a [single engine aircraft] coming off ZZZ so we were looking and making the calls for position; altitude and intentions. We made another position and altitude call at 3 miles North.  Traffic Alerting System (TAS) picked him up and alerted when he was already a danger at 1 mile North of mid-field; and did not pick him up prior.  We started to break right to position when he reported he was 3 miles and 2;800. [The Captain] told him to stop his climb three times; as he banked right; I caught him crossing our nose so we banked hard left as he passed under; possibly just outside our right wing.  We were at 3;000 feet; 1;400 above TPA for a mid-field crossing direct to ZZZ1. [The Captain] checked our passengers and then asked the other pilot if they were ok. He stated; 'ya luckily the other guy saw us first.' I told him that was me; and etiquette would be if you don't have traffic in sight to delay your climb.  He apologized and stated he never saw us. [The Captain] said;' thank you; Have a nice day.'  We continued on to [destination] without further incident.  Fly at a higher altitude so as to be in radar contact with ATC for adequate flight following for separation and traffic. Upon hearing other traffic at an uncontrolled airport that we are overflying; make direct contact with them to ensure spacing and understanding of intentions.




Synopsis: The Pilot of an Air-Taxi operation reported a near-mid-air-collision with a single engine aircraft that was climbing out of a non-towered airport. The Air-Taxi pilot was making position reports; but the other departing pilot was not be making reports. The Traffic Alerting system provided notification which allowed for evasive action to prevent a collision.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: COS.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C COS
ATC / advisory: TRACON PUB; Tower COS
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was vectored in IMC at 9000 FT to the ILS 17L approach at COS by Pueblo approach then switched to tower outside of AWONE. Ceiling at COS broadcast at 1500 overcast 1000 broken.I set up the Garmin GNS 430 and NAV 2 (Navigation 2) for the ILS 17L approach and noticed on the Garmin OBS (Omni Bearing Selector) that the glideslope indicator was centered. Not realizing there was a problem I started down following what I thought was the glideslope.My problem; in hindsight was that I did not compare the Garmin OBS with the NAV 2 to verify they were agreeing with each other. I also did not double check my altitude compared to the intermediate fixes. I found that I broke out of the clouds at 120 AGL; much lower than expected. Also; I broke out too far away from the runway. Based on my research I believe one of two things occurred during my setup of the GNS 430. I either did not activate the ILS frequency 109.1 and/or did not verify that it switched from GPS to 'VLOC'. As mentioned; I did not compare the two OBS to determine consistency and did not verify location versus altitude. I did not receive a low altitude alert from tower; nor did I notice a terrain alert from the GNS 430. I am current with the necessary number of approaches and I wonder if the transition from a GPS environment to the occasional ILS/VOR environment causes confusion; especially in the heat of battle. I'm wondering if there may be some way to alter the functionality of future devices; or the training curriculum to help negate the inherent confusion to such a transition. I came back to the airport two days later to fly with a local CFI to help figure out what went awry. This along with my plans to go back up with my own instructor to refresh myself on proper techniques should help prevent this in the future.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported that he descended below the Decision Altitude in IMC due to improper instrument equipment setup procedures.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DRO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: CTAF DRO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our descent to approach at our destination; we made visual contact with the airport environment about 20 miles from the field. We received a clearance for a visual approach to the airport and began our descent to the runway. As we started our descent for the airport we both felt an urgency to increase our descent in order to be on a proper glide path for the runway. We increased our descent rate to order to do this; however we also attempted to match our descent rate in relation to the descending terrain below us as well. Our descent rate began to become greater than the slope; I noticed that we were getting closer to the down sloping terrain and became concerned with the possibility of GPWS issues. I requested that the flying pilot shallow out the descent to alleviate this threat and just as he was doing so; the GPWS gave out a momentary 'terrain/pull up' aural warning with no visual cockpit warnings present. Visual contact was still being maintained with the terrain; however we disconnected the autopilot and arrested the descent. There were no further warnings issued and the visual contact with the ground still showed us to have plenty of clearance and felt that this momentary warning resulted due to the rate of descent. We continued to configure our aircraft for landing and landed at our destination without further incident.We felt that the momentary aural warning was the result of an excessive rate of descent in conjunction with down sloping terrain. The setting sun in conjunction with some light haze may have played a part even though the visibility was reported as ten miles and the airport was in sight at twenty miles.One possible way to avoid such future events could have been to slow and configure the aircraft sooner in the descent and possibly use slight but gentle S-Turn maneuvers during the descent in order to continue to slow and allow time for the aircraft to arrive at a normal glide path without the use of a steeper descent rate that might result in a greater closure rate with the down sloping terrain.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain as the PNF; experienced a GPWS terrain warning during a day visual approach over downward sloping terrain. The PF shallows the descent and the warning immediately stops.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-4
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DEN
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I believe I may have inadvertently entered Class B airspace (Denver). While flying in the northwest quadrant of Denver; my GPS intermittently went blank. Instead of monitoring my flight path utilizing ground references; I devoted the majority of my attention to troubleshooting and regaining my GPS function. Turbulent conditions were also present; which added to the distractions. I will ensure in the future that I am more aware of my flight path anytime I am near controlled airspace; and for that matter at all times during flight.




Synopsis: Pilot of an experimental aircraft reports possible Class B airspace incursion due to GPS malfunction and not paying attention while troubleshooting the fault.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was inbound to ZZZ from the ZZZ1 airspace. I verbally coordinated a 360 heading with the north controller because I was vectoring off the arrival for sequencing. I took a handoff on Aircraft Z at 10;000 feet direct ZZZ2; at the same time I had two ZZZZZ departures that I was worried about being a factor. I was vectoring Aircraft A off of the arrival as well as Aircraft B. I was trying to make sure there was enough room for Aircraft A because he was a heavy and [I had to] get Aircraft B behind them. I wanted to group the 3 small transports together and get them to final before the next set of arrivals. I turned Aircraft X. I then turned my attention back to the final and didn't notice Aircraft Y; who was controlled by the north controller at 4;000 feet inbound to ZZZ3. As soon as I noticed there was going to be a loss of separation i turned Aircraft X northeast and climbed them. It is very hard to get used to the traffic after Covid. This was the first day I had to take every aircraft off the arrival in years. I was so concentrated on my feed to final that it caused me to lose track of other aircraft away from the airport. I think there should have been stricter Traffic Management Unit (TMU) numbers in because both of my sessions I was vectoring over 20 miles off the arrival. If the sector was not combined that would have helped too.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported they issued a 360 degree vector for sequencing to an aircraft and failed to notice that it put the aircraft into confliction with traffic at the adjacent sector. The Controller noted a lack of proficiency at working busy periods due to the recent reduced air traffic due to COVID-19.
Date: 201401
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Rudder
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushback and engine start we performed the flight control check; all normal except for the rudder. With full rudder pedal deflection by the First Officer or me; the ECAM rudder position indication was of only half the required travel. We reported the issue to Maintenance and the decision was made to MEL this as an indication problem. I queried Maintenance Control on how the MEL's required external visual full rudder travel inspection would be accomplished. Initially Maintenance Control stated there were full travel markings on the tailcone but then rescinded that and told us there was only a rudder neutral marking. I asked Maintenance Control how they could determine full rudder travel versus 50% travel and I was told there was no way to guarantee that. We decided to refuse the airplane. I am very confused by this MEL item. The MEL states that full rudder travel must be verified visually. If the airplane has no markings and apparently there's no other way to measure full rudder travel from the ground. How can this be a legal and more importantly; SAFE; MEL?




Synopsis: An A320 Captain refused an aircraft after the full rudder throw flight control check yielded only half the required movement on the ECAM Rudder Position Indicator. The MEL allowed dispatch after a visual check but no rudder position indicators are installed on the empennage.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: B737 was on the 16R final for Seattle south flow. King Air was on departure north flow Runway 31L from BFI. We were using 'Split Flow' procedures; but no separation was ensured and best I could tell IFR separation was not maintained. This is a procedural issue. The Seattle final is descending to cross the marker (FINKA) at 1;900.  The BFI departure is climbing unrestricted to 2;100. The aircraft are on converging courses. Again no serparation is ensured in this procedure. The aircraft did receive a collision alert. I believe the aircraft lost 1;000 FT separation prior to diverging. A minimum of 45 degrees is required for 'divergence' and this procedure only has 30 degrees. The LOA says that BFI Tower will provide visual separation between the 2 aircraft until they diverge; but they are not talking to either aircraft; so that doesn't seem appropriate. Another prior example was Air Carrier Y on short final for Runway 31L at BFI and B737 on final for Runway 16R at SEA. If Air Carrier Y were to go-around; he would climb to 6;000 on a 285 heading; in other words he would climb directly through the SEA final. This is extremely unsafe. The LOA also says that SEA Tower will provide visual between the 2 aircraft; but since they are not talking to Air Carrier Y they can not immediately react to a go-around. This is also unsafe. A new go-around procedure for Runway 31 at BFI needs to be developed; or we need to build a hole.  Split flow is not a safe procedure and we do not have the protocol in place to ensure the safety of the fyling public. 'Split Flow' needs an immediate and thourough review. Recommendation; A departure or procedure needs to be developed. Releasing aircraft north off BFI (climbing to 2;100) while Seattle traffic is descending to cross the marker (which is right over BFI) at 1;900 is not in line with the 7110.65. A departure procedure needs to be developed off BFI which ensures IFR separation and/or divergence OR we need to build holes in a 'split flow' scenario.




Synopsis: S46 Controller described a conflict between a BFI departure and a SEA arrival aircraft. The reporter provided additional examples of potential conflicts when 'Split Flow' procedures are utilized; and recommended some procedural changes to BFI departures.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Hydraulic Quantity Low Warning in C Hydraulic System. [We] turned off center pumps en route to conserve fluid as per Maintenance Control. Turned pumps back on to configure for approach and landing. Very low fluid indications; but all systems operated normally. Approach and landing [were] normal. Aircraft checked for fluid leaks or external damage by Fire and Rescue; given the all clear. Completed 'After Landing' checks and taxied to gate.




Synopsis: A B767 developed a Center Hydraulic System leak and; in order to conserve fluid; turned the pumps OFF at cruise but declared an emergency. They turned them back ON for a normal landing using the remaining fluid.