Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final approach into Boston Runway 27; we were configuring for landing. At approximately 1;800 feet; the First Officer Called for gear down. I put the gear down as instructed. He then asked for flaps five; landing checklist. I put the flaps to 5 as instructed [a landing setting but not full]. At this point we were at approximately 1;400 feet and I began reading the landing checklist. After reading the altimeter line on the checklist I got to the EICAS line. Upon looking at the EICAS screen I noticed that two cyan advisory messages had come up on the EICAS screen. I communicated this to the First Officer and explained that after finishing the remaining two items in the Landing Checklist that I had already begun; I would go in the QRH and address this problem. He concurred.After finishing the Landing Checklist; I opened the QRH to the Index and began looking for the BRK LH FAULT & BRK RH FAULT EICAS messages. On page 2 of the INDEX I found what I thought was the correct page but was actually the BRK RH/LH FAIL procedure which is not what we had. My eyes mistakenly picked that page since the titles of the procedures are so similar. I went to that page quickly to see what the guidance was for this failure. Upon arrival at that page I realized that this was a significant failure [could lead to an] emergency and changes to our configuration before landing. I was about to inform the First Officer of this and call for a go around when I realized that I was on the wrong QRH page. I was reading the instructions for a failure when all we had was an advisory message for a fault. In my task loaded; time pressured state; I reverted to my systems knowledge of the aircraft and remembered that an advisory message on some systems can indicate a loss of system redundancy as opposed to a system failure. I believe I was thinking of the various aircraft systems where we get a fault advisory message if one channel in a two channel system fails. I began to feel self-conscious that I was diverting my attention away from monitoring the flight path of the airplane at a critical time in order to reference the QRH for something that was not important and could be more safely dealt with moments later on the ground. I believed that if I found the correct page of the QRH; it would take me to the back of the book; where it would state that one channel or one redundancy had been lost. I informed the First Officer that I had been reading the wrong checklist and I believed this to be a loss of systems redundancy and that we should continue and land. He was actively flying the airplane and relying on me to diagnose this correctly. He concurred with my assessment. In the back of my mind as we continued the approach and landing; I was processing what I would do if this loss of system redundancy would degrade our stopping ability. Silently; I was preparing myself to use the emergency brake as a last resort to bring the aircraft to a stop. We had a strong headwind on a 7;000ft runway which in the back of my mind I believed to be adequate in the dry conditions we had. We landed safely and the aircraft stopped normally. We taxied to the gate without further incident and upon arriving at the gate I wrote up the two EICAS messages BRK RH FAULT and BRK LH FAULT.The following morning; I took out the QRH at the hotel and took a second look at the BRK LH/RH FAULT EICAS messages in the INDEX. I realized that the FAULT messages took me to the back side of the page I mistakenly gone to yesterday. Importantly; the message didn't take me to the back of the book for the non-critical failures which is where I assumed the cyan advisory message would take me yesterday. When I realized my mistake; my heart skipped a few beats! In a time critical phase of flight; I pulled out the QRH to deal with what I thought was a very minor loss of redundancy. I mistakenly looked up a failure instead of a fault. Upon realizing my mistake; I became convinced that this fault was not something that required my attention until after landing. Had I looked up the correct fault message from the beginning; I would have seen that we [might have had] an emergency; land flaps full and check stopping distance with a Brake Fault.The underlying reason why this event occurred is that the warning system on the E190 triggered cyan advisory messages for this brake issue. As soon as I saw them while running the landing checklist; I assumed that since they were advisory messages; they were not critical issues and that we would continue and land safely and deal with the problem at the gate. Unfortunately; these advisory messages were very critical and had I gone to the correct page in the QRH; I would have realized that; called for a go around; [let ATC know of the problem]; and followed the detailed QRH instructions.I made two critical mistakes in this situation. One was going to the wrong page in the QRH. This was a simple clerical error since the EICAS messages are almost identical; their position in the index is right next to each other; I was task saturated and I was prejudiced by the 'advisory' level to think this was not a critical issue. The second was upon realizing I was on the wrong page; not going and finding the right page. In the moment; I decided I was using the QRH inappropriately given the nature of the failure and the phase of flight. In fact; the QRH would have saved me from this error had I just taken the time to go find the correct page. Even if my initial assumption that this was a loss of redundancy had been correct; the QRH would have told me that and I could have made a better; more confident decision to land at that point.One issue could have been a problem if we had followed procedures correctly. If I called for a go around upon realizing the severity of the situation; we would have cleaned up the aircraft according to a normal go around profile. With this fault message; the QRH specifically says; 9 steps into the checklist; 'do NOT attempt to retract the gear unless required for obstacle clearance.' If we had executed a go around at 1;100 feet when we should have; we would have done so in order to have time to run this checklist; but we wouldn't have run it yet. Therefore; we may have exacerbated the situation by retracting the gear.Perhaps a new profile for a 'precautionary go around' where we do not make any non-essential configuration changes would have solved this. Perhaps more emphasis during training on the potential for cyan advisory messages to be very critical and [lead to an emergency] would be beneficial. Perhaps re formatting the QRH so that FAIL and FAULT stand out more when read next to each other in the index. These are just recommendations; I understand my failure in this situation and take full responsibility for not using the QRH correctly.




Synopsis: EMB190 Captain experiences BRK LH FAULT & BRK RH FAULT EICAS messages after the gear is extended during approach with the First Officer flying. The QRH page for brake failure is accessed initially before realizing a fault is the listed anomaly. With time running out and believing the fault to be a redundancy issue; the Captain elects to land without reading the QRH procedure.