elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201208
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Data Computer
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 2 hours into flight during cruise flight at FL380 Airspeed Disagree Caution appeared. The First Officer airspeed display was stuck at approximately 235 KIAS/.74 Mach. After minor adjustments to cruise speed and careful cross checks; it was determined that the Captain's airspeed was properly functioning; but the First Officer airspeed was not. The flight used the satphone to call Dispatch and asked for a conference call with Maintenance to see if any additional information was available; solutions or ideas to correct it; or if any additional concerns might be warranted. Nothing was provided by Maintenance and Dispatch provided an updated VFR weather report for [destination]. As the aircraft began the descent the First Officer's indicated airspeed decreased through the red stall range to 45 KIAS (zero); and the First Officer Altitude Disagree Caution also displayed at this time.Shortly after both of the aircraft engine EEC's went to alternate mode and several related VNAV features and displays went blank; while Autopilot A reverted to CWS for pitch. The First Officer's altimeter continued to descend slower than the Captain's; and the First Officer's primary altitude indication at 8;000 FT MSL was approximately 800-900 FT higher than the Captain's. The flight declared an emergency during descent; and landed on a visual approach without further event. During final approach at approximately 1;000 AGL; the First Officer's instruments returned to normal readings. After landing the Maintenance Representative told us that the aircraft had experienced a similar event that occurred earlier in the month; but this information was not relayed until after the flight had landed. In addition the Maintenance Representative at [destination] had not been notified of the inbound aircraft problems. The logbook write up for the previous event was recorded in an older section of the active logbook; and was not mentioned by Maintenance when the flight called [Operations] requesting assistance.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported a number of Air Data Computer related failures or malfunctions; including First Officer's airspeed indicator; altitude disagree; EEC to alternate mode; and autopilot issues. Flight declared an emergency and on final everything returned to normal.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: DEN Approach cleared us on a vector to intercept the ILS 35R final at 8000 FT MSL; and cleared to cross DEANE at 8000 FT and contact Tower. I deleted the crossing restrictions of 9000 FT at DEANE and DRUMM since our clearance was at 8000 FT. We intercepted final at 8000 FT and set 7000 FT in the MCP ALT window which was FAF Altitude. After passing DEANE; PF announced and began descent to 7000 FT MSL. We had not passed DRUMM when DEN Tower stated; 'Low Altitude alert; the MVA is 7500 FT .' We initiated an immediate climb to 7500 FT MSL; passed DRUMM and then resumed the ILS 35R Arrival without further incident.When vectored below a fix required altitude; it would be a good idea to set that altitude as a hard altitude until the earliest fix we can descend from; which in this case was DRUMM. ATC's clearance led me down the path of deleting hard altitude requirements we were already below. DEN Approach Control could have also stated maintain 8000 FT until DRUMM which would have been a better clearance.


Second narrative: A better clearance from Approach would have been helpful. Perhaps; '...maintain 8000 FT till DRUMM; cleared approach'. We still should have stayed at 8000 FT until DRUMM.  My bad.


Synopsis: When they misinterpreted Approach Control's clearance to intercept 'the final approach course at 8;000 FT; cross DEANE at 8;000 FT' as a clearance to fly the DEN ILS 35R approach the flight crew of a B737NG began a descent to the glideslope intercept altitude after passing DRUMM.
Date: 201305
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuselage Skin
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Vehicle Driver; Ramp
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I just came off another flight and was assigned to load this flight. Belt loader was staged in forward pit and was chocked with bumper outside aircraft. I pulled a string of 3 foreman carts. After the first cart I pulled forward to the second cart. The sharp turn caused the second cart to turn sharply and hit the back end of the belt loader causing the bumper guard to push forward and upward making a small rip in the threshold. There were no guide men except for the ramper inside the pit. As soon as I heard the loud crashing noise I immediately stopped and checked for any aircraft damage. I asked a nearby aircraft Mechanic to check the damage and I also notified the ramp Supervisor. Area Manager was also notified by ramp Supervisor. After further examination by all parties the plane had to be put out of service for repair. Passengers on board were moved to another aircraft. Immediately; I was sent to the Supervisor's office to give a written statement of the incident. There were no injuries involved.




Synopsis: Baggage tug driver reports a collision between a bag cart he is pulling and a belt loader; causing damage to the aircraft that is being loaded.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZZZ airport was at approach minimums however aircraft were not being able to complete the approach. As such; we had multiple aircraft holding in our airspace and Center had aircraft holding as well. Aircraft X opted to try the approach; went missed; and advised he wanted to wait. I felt the holding pattern at the initial approach fix was full. 6000 ft.; 7000 ft.; 8000 ft.; 9000 ft.; and 10000 ft. are our usable altitudes there and 8000 ft.; 9000 ft. and 10000 ft. were filled. Leaving 6000 ft. and 7000 ft. open allowed me to get overflights through and any arrivals in who wanted to try the approach. I didn't want to commit Aircraft X to a holding pattern at ZZZ VOR as I'd lose a lot of control of that section of airspace. Center had already been advised to hold inbound aircraft so I opted to use long legs and vectors to 'hold' Aircraft X for the time being. I suspected one of the aircraft in holding was going to divert soon and I would then just have Aircraft X take his place. This is about when the next controller relieved me. I did not communicate my plan; but informed him of the holding traffic and of Aircraft X who was 'holding' but on a vector. Shortly after our relief briefing overlap after I had left the room; Aircraft X penetrated the 7900 ft. MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) at 7000 ft. and I was called back to the operation to verify he did not have holding instructions. I realize now that I should have been more clear that Aircraft X was on a vector. My choice of phrase 'vector holding' may have confused the relieving controller into thinking he was in a holding pattern. Although I still believe the technique was an appropriate option; the operation could have been safer if I had climbed Aircraft X to 8000 ft. as this alleviates the risk of MVA penetration. I chose 7000 ft.; as 8000 ft. is a very popular overflight altitude and the arrival altitude of aircraft being delivered from ZZZ1.




Synopsis: Approach Controller reported miscommunication between controllers lead to an aircraft being below minimum vectoring altitude.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Training flight with multi student. Engine cut on takeoff roll. Student did not recover and couldn't gain directional control back. Cut mixture when I saw I wasn't able to get throttles back from student. Clipped right wing on ILS system on Runway XX. Needed to be stronger on getting throttles back and using more force to get back the control of the airplane from student.




Synopsis: PA44 flight instructor reported student lost control while conducting engine failure training striking ILS equipment.
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Balloon
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Second aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Lighter-Than-Air
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: For months [this cargo airline] has been descending through VFR airspace used by balloons during seasonal operations. The flight path and descending altitude vary greatly. Today the flight path was directly overhead on a VFR descent to ZZZ. As the balloons operate due to fog farther East this spacing gets much closer. We also operate near ZZZ1 and the spacing is closer. We have operated in this limited area [for decades] all most every day. The VFR Sectional Chart does not indicate [this area of heavy balloon traffic]; yet we have been there [for decades]. Turbine exhaust under the air wave of a large Boeing Jet at 800 to 1200 feet might collapse a balloon sending up to 18 passenger down.

Callback: Reporter requested a call back. Callback not completed. Three attempts; left message with employee. Calls not returned.



Synopsis: Balloon pilot reported a Cargo aircraft descended through the area of their balloon flight.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: SFO was in a 28/28 shoreline configuration. The winds were calm to light so aircraft were coming in staggered and fast. It was a busy departure and arrival hour. Normally with these winds we would be departing the 1's; however due to taxiway closures we were departing the 28's. I was working Local Control ready to depart off Runway 28R with traffic on a few mile final for that runway; when I noticed a CRJ going missed approach for Runway 28L. When queried; the CRJ said they never received a landing clearance. I told them to fly heading 265; then cleared the departure on Runway 28R for take off who would be departing on a west on a 280 heading. I told the CRJ to maintain 3100. The CIC said they thought they heard him read back 2100; but my Local Assist said they heard 31. Instead of telling the CRJ to contact Norcal Departure on 135.1; I said to contact Norcal Departure. Unfortunately; the CRJ stopped at 21; and went to the wrong frequency; with the CRJ going around; it through me off. I should have ensured the proper altitude and given the appropriate departure frequency. I did hold the rest of the aircraft until everything was straightened out; but should have taken more time ensuring everything with the CRJ. I should also add that frequency congestion could have been a contributing factor.




Synopsis: SFO Controller described a below-MVA event when traffic on final for Runway 28L initiated a go around absent a landing clearing with traffic departing Runway 28R; the reporter assigning the wrong altitude/frequency to missed approach aircraft.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Control
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was involved in a Horizontal Stabilizer jackscrew Remove and Replace (R/R). [The B737-700] was a late arrival. The R/R of the maintenance task was accomplished and the job was complete at approximately (time). When my portion of the checkout of the area of concern was accomplished; I remember physically grabbing the rod and shaking it to make sure it was secure. It is possible that the rod had been jammed giving it the appearance that it was secured correctly. It was discovered on a Heavy C Check that the rod was not secured properly. Aircraft arrived late; and had an early departure. I felt the pressures to get this Aircraft back in service in a timely manner. I believe fatigue played a factor in this event as I work the graveyard shift. In addition to physically grabbing the rod and shaking it; I should have paid more attention to detail. I was new to the Inspection department at that time. This event happened approximately 9 months ago and can't remember all the specific details.

Callback: Reporter stated that part of the B737-700 Job Card to Remove and Replace (R/R) the Horizontal Stabilizer is to disconnect the Stabilization rod (Secondary rod) and loosen up the Forward Cable Drum under the cockpit floor in order to remove the Horizontal Stabilizer Jackscrew Assembly in the tail compartment. The Stabilization rod attaches to the forward side of the Forward Cable Drum and is reattached after the Horizontal Stabilizer Jackscrew is installed and the Horizontal Stabilizer Manual Trim cable tensions are accomplished. There is only one rod on 'Classic' B737s.Reporter stated one of the issues with the Job Card is the five parts or steps with only one sign-off on the Job Card for the Forward Cable Drum installation. The bolt that attaches the Stabilization rod; lower rod end; to a clevis fitting on the forward side of the Forward Cable Drum was found installed but not secured. The B737-700 had been flying around for ten months until a Maintenance C-Check crew noticed the unsecured bolt.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector was informed that an attached bolt for a Stabilization rod to the Forward Cable Drum Assembly on a B737-700 aircraft was found not properly secured after he had performed an inspection of the Cable Drum re-installation.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: DC Rectifier
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL390 received 'battery discharge.' [We] landed at nearest suitable airport for repairs. [We had a] uneventful landing and recovery.


Second narrative: Received 'Batt Discharging' warning and diverted to nearest suitable airport.


Synopsis: MD11 flight crew experiences a battery discharge annunciation at FL390 and diverts to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [Another maintenance personnel and myself] were assigned to Aircraft X. After accomplishment of check on aircraft we read the [Document] to be accomplished on the Fan vibration of 8.8 No2 engine which referenced us to Airbus 319 Trouble Shooting Manual (TSM) 77-00-00-810-864. As a Airframe rumble was reported we were able to proceed to step. It asked to specify if aircraft was in icing conditions or not. [Maintenance was contacted] to get an answer at approximately XA00. Tech called dispatch who said the aircraft operated through a storm. He then told us to have our supervisor to contact [maintenance] for the answer if icing or not and have it put in the [Document] for us to continue. A Flight Recorder download card was generated that night for the aircraft to download the Flight Recorder data. We did not get a answer On if the aircraft was icing or not by the end of our shift. The reference 77-00-00-810-864-a requires inspections of engine and borescope inspections. Type of borescope depends on if icing or not. Also due to the fact that the engine vibe was 8.8 a requirement of inspection is fluorescent penetrant inspection of the Low Pressure Turbine Active Clearance Control (LPT/ACC) manifold. I do not believe any of these items other than fan balance was done to the aircraft in question. I tried to verify by having my shop stewards pull up the records they were Unsuccessful.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician working on an Airbus A319 reported that they were unable to accomplish a task for engine vibration due to a lack of information.