elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TYS.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C TYS
ATC / advisory: Tower TYS
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: While descending visually into TYS to an assigned altitude; my First Officer was descending at a descent rate that was too high for the aircraft to fully understand that we would be leveling off. The aircraft due to the old technologically that it has thought the descent rate would continue. During the level off at the assigned altitude the aircraft briefly gave a 'Terrain; Terrain' audio caution. [Suggest] newer aircraft with newer technology. Also; my FO could have used a shallower descent rate.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported FO steep approach angle initiated a terrain alert due to older technology limitations.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Apparently; the baggage handlers at ZZZ were unable to identify the 'smart' nature of the bag which they loaded onto the aircraft. The day began with a turn to ZZZ. We departed and arrived early and were greeted uneventfully by the ground crew. Our return flight also was uneventful from an operational standpoint. We arrived and passengers deplaned uneventfully. After sitting for a short break and while preparing for our next flight we were told someone wanted to see us. Supervisor; Ramp Operations politely introduced herself and informed us that we had just transported a 'Smart Bag' with lithium battery installed. She stated the bag was discovered while unloading baggage during deplaning and that no damage to the bag or aircraft was visible at this time. We were not told of the smart bag in ZZZ; nor were we aware that it was loaded into the cargo hold. Additionally; there was no mention of any 'non-standard' baggage on our [paperwork]. Proper training for baggage handlers on the 'smart' nature of certain luggage pieces which contain lithium batteries.




Synopsis: ERJ-145 flight crew notified of improperly transporting a Smart bag in cargo compartment.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLE.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B CLE; Class E ZOB
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was Pilot Monitoring giving 3rd leg of IOE to FO PF. At approximately 19NM from RWY 06L direct DUPAY at 6000' we were cleared; 'CROSS DUPAY AT OR ABOVE 3000' CLEARED FOR ILS 6L.' PF selected LVL CH and speedbrakes; and began descent to 3000'. As we leveled off at 3000' just outside of DUPAY; ATC notified us 'you have departed class B airspace and are reentering; now.' Our speed was approximately 230kts.We were unaware that we would be below the class B 15 miles from the RWY at 3000'.Closer study of the Class B chart would require 200kts below 4000' outside of DUPAY. Or Ride the GS down to DUPAY.




Synopsis: An air carrier 19NM from CLE Runway 6L was 'cleared to cross DUPAY at or above 3;000'; cleared for ILS 6L' and descended out of Class B airspace prior to 15DME at 230Kts.
Date: 201602
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The pilots informed purser they did not know how to operate the PA system so could not make an announcement about delay. They also did not know how to make interphone calls to FAs. I could not hear them on the phone. This has been an ongoing problem not just with this flight crew; but ALL [pilots flying aircraft new to them from the merger]. We were told they were trained on this aircraft by watching a Computer Based Training several months ago and have only just started flying the equipment. The training by the company is inadequate and must be addressed. If the PA cannot be used how are FAs supposed to hear 'BRACE; BRACE' during an emergency? This serious safety issue must be addressed.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported that since the merger with another air carrier several pilots have mentioned the training on the aircraft differences are insufficient; and they were unclear on how to operate the PA system.
Date: 201409
Location: EYW.Airport, FL
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Airspace: Class D EYW
ATC / advisory: Tower EYW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Local; Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Drone aircraft are operating with in the Class Delta Airspace without communication with the ATC Facility having jurisdiction.




Synopsis: EYW Tower FLM reports of a drone that violated Class Delta airspace.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL390 the aircraft had a Left Bleed Air Duct Master Warning. The Captain said 'Cancel; and Identify; I have the Controls and Radios; Reference the QRH for Bleed Air Duct Warning'. The Captain asked for a lower altitude of FL240; initially since we were flying on only one operative Pack. The First Officer referenced the QRH and completed the checklist. The Captain stated that he has had this scenario before; and stated that the other Bleed Air valve will close; we are going to be without pressurization. The flight crew both then donned our quick donning oxygen masks; in anticipation of losing both packs. The First Officer continued the QRH checklist; and the Captain then [advised] ATC and requested to descend down to 10;000 ft. Initially we were assigned a lower altitude of FL240; but the Captain requested 10;000 ft. We initiated an [expedited] descent down to FL240; then were given clearance down to 10;000 ft.; and about that time we lost both packs and pressurization in the aircraft was lost. Soon after we received a Cabin Altitude Warning Message and the oxygen masks were deployed in the cabin. We continued down with the descent and completed the checklists. Once arriving at 10;000 ft. we contacted Dispatch and all agreed to continue on to [destination] as planed at a cruising altitude of 10;000 ft. Before making the decision to continue; we reviewed and calculated all of our performance and fuel calculation; and deemed it was safe to continue on. We landed with 3100 LBS of fuel onboard. We then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance control and wrote up the aircraft.The [manual] should have a procedure where the bleeds are switched on to the operative side as soon as possible manually; to help prevent the working bleed valve from closing. This will help you by still giving you at least one operative pack so the chance of diverting are less; since we are able to operate with one pack at FL250.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 First Officer reported receiving a Left Bleed Air Duct master caution; followed by loss of both packs. An expedited descent was executed; and the flight continued to destination.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We diverted enroute due to a specific bomb threat to our flight and aircraft. I was pilot flying and Captain handled all the non-ATC coordination with station Operations; Dispatch; and Ground Emergency personnel concerning evacuation and deplaning concerns. He informed ATC and Operations at least 20 minutes from landing of the need for air stairs since our aircraft would be shut down in a remote area of the ramp near the end of Taxiway C3 just south of the departure end of Runway 26. Divert; flying; landing; and taxi in were uneventful. Kudos to Center; Approach and Tower for expeditious handling of our divert.Upon landing; fire and rescue crews; to include bomb squad; police; and Company Ramp and Maintenance personnel were at the ready. However; no air stairs or transportation was ready for our crew and passengers. The details of the bomb threat were unknown to us so we had to assume that an expeditious deplaning of the aircraft was warranted. It took a full 20 minutes from stopping until the stairs arrived. We were close to declaring an emergency evacuation through the front service door with slides. Although it was 115 degrees F on the ramp; we felt the passengers could have been escorted into the shade or inside the building at the Executive terminal; which was a short walk away. There was confusion amongst Airport personnel on the status of the stairs and bus transportation. From the time the Captain notified airborne to the arrival of the stairs was over 45 minutes. I felt this was an unacceptable delay; and could have endangered the safety of the passengers and crew. Better coordination amongst Airport; Emergency Response; and Company personnel in the event of bomb threat diversion. Time is of the essence. Air stairs should be at the ready on a quick call for use in these types of situations.




Synopsis: ATC; Emergency Personnel and Company Personnel handled a B737 very well after the crew diverted following a specific bomb threat but airstairs to remove passengers and crew arrived twenty minutes after the aircraft parked at the remove spot.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cargo Restraint/Tie Down
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At the beginning of the takeoff roll (well below 80 KTS) crew felt a loud 'thump.'  It felt like running over a seam in the concrete.  It wasn't an unusual sound.  On climbout; the cabin crew called to say they smelled a faint odor of burning rubber in the cabin.  The cockpit crew noticed the same odor.  The odor dissipated within a few minutes.  No other abnormal indications were noted.  We began to think we may have blown a tire on takeoff roll.  The crew made a call back to the Tower to advise and have them inspect the runway.  Also called Maintenance to advise.   We consulted the QRH; which advised continuation to destination.  A call back from  Maintenance confirmed the runway was found to be free of debris.  We elected to continue to destination; and encountered no further complications.   Upon arrival; Maintenance inspection revealed that a cargo pallet in the forward compartment had broken loose and slid aft; damaging an air duct.


Second narrative: [No additional information]


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew detects a thump during the initial portion of the takeoff roll and continues.  Once airborne a faint burning rubber smell is detected and a tire failure is suspected but cannot be confirmed.  Post flight inspection reveals that a pallet has broken loose and damaged an air duct.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Chronic problem occurring consistently for approximately 6 years or more.Please reference report X for my most recent report on Aircraft X; as well reference report Y for a similar chronic malfunction of Aircraft Y and current actions from maintenance.On takeoff; I observed both the red Minimum Operating Speed (red checker on speed tape) and yellow Minimum Maneuvering Speed (yellow bar on speed tape) at speeds between 35KIAS and rotation; while on the ground.  I also observed the same tapes after landing from touchdown to about 35KIAS while slowing.  In both cases; those speed tapes should be inhibited while on the ground.  This presentation occurred only on the FO display and presented normally on the CA side.  The discrepancy was written up after the flight.Also of note is that prior to the previous leg a malfunction was observed with the FO stall warning stick shaker not testing on the ground.  It was cleared using [procedure X].  This is similar to Aircraft Y.  During their repair of that problem a discussion was had where one of the mechanics noted that there is a timer on the WOW circuitry to prevent multiple On/OFF events from occurring with a bounced nose-wheel.  He wondered if that might affect this Weight on Wheels problem.  Per reply from [Maintenance Technician]; he felt this stall issue was related to the FO's side of the plane not knowing it is on the ground; would also affect the inhibit function of the FO speed tape features.As it appears to me this is primarily a failure of the weight on wheels functions of the FO side and not necessarily a failure of the stall warning computer; as I believe that has been replaced previously.




Synopsis: First Officer reported that he has observed a recurring problem with the Minimum Operating Speed and Minimum Maneuvering Speed speed tape indications erroneously appearing during takeoff and landing rolls.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This leg was a Part 91 ferry flight. When I called Ground for taxi clearance; I was given Runway XXL as my departure runway. I taxied to the hold short position and notified ZZZ ATC that I was ready for departure.  The Controller provided me with a heading to fly and cleared me for takeoff from Runway XXL. As I am gaining speed; I hear the Controller call an Airport Operations vehicle on frequency; but I don't remember the conversation; as I was at rotation speed; I saw white lights coming from the departure end of the runway. Not knowing whether this was an aircraft or a vehicle; I elected to continue my takeoff so I can gain altitude and turn if necessary. I queried the Controller on the radio if there were vehicles on the runway; with no response from the Controller. As I flew overhead; there were two vehicles approximately 10 feet on each side of the centerline and 1;000 feet from the end of runway; facing the direction of runway 5 (opposite direction to me). I would estimate that I passed those vehicles at approximately 200-300 feet above. The Tower Controller switched me to Departure Control without ever answering my question about those vehicles on the runway. The departure end of the runway is not visible from takeoff position. The ATC Controller could have told me to abort my takeoff when he realized there were vehicles on the runway; instead of trying to contact the vehicles.  Those vehicles could have been on the ground frequency; which did not allow me to hear their response; if one was given.




Synopsis: Single Pilot reported seeing lights on the runway while departing which ended up being two vehicles that the controller did not acknowledge knowing about.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OMDW.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Whilst taxiing onto stand under Ground Control instructions; taxiway signs appeared to be clear to crew but were actually misleading resulting in an incorrect turn. Ground Control then provided further taxi instructions to take aircraft back to appropriate ramp; but then advised an incorrect turn which crew were unable to validate as correct/incorrect at the time due to the poor positioning and layout of signs. Ground Control apologized for the layout of the taxiway to the ramp and said that the error was not the crew's error. On stand; the Ground Safety Manager met aircraft and also stated that we were the 5th aircraft to make this taxi error in the last 36 hours. He also stated that the signs and layout were known to be a hazard/poor and airport was looking to change the situation. Crew debriefed and reviewed taxiway hazard along with the ground safety staff. Details of incident and taxi caution to be added to form for OMDW.




Synopsis: Corporate jet Captain reported a taxiway incursion at OMDW airport due to sign layout.