elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DTW.Airport, MI
Weather elements / visibility: severe weather
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DTW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D21
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: We briefed the ILS approach for 22L prior to descent into DTW.  During the descent we were given a hold clearance which we programmed into the FMC. Just prior to the hold we were then given vectors for the arrival and told to expect the ILS 22R. We briefed the first ILS approach on the Jeppesen list for 22R (ILS Y 22R) tuned the radios and proceeded in on a vector to intercept.  The controller then cleared us for the ILS Z 22R and told us to maintain 4000 ft till established with a fix that didn't appear on our map. At that moment we both recognized that the approach that we loaded wasn't what we were cleared for and then we quickly re-tuned the radios; fixed the box for the ILS Z 22R and flew the approach without incident.Our biggest concern is that there is a HUGE difference between the 'Y' and 'Z' ILS approaches to the same runway (frequency; in-bound course; decision altitude; etc.) and when selecting the first ILS for 22R in the Jeppesen application and in the FMC you will select an ILS that is potentially different than the one intended by ATC. We were dodging severe weather and may have missed the 'Z' statement from ATC (our mistake) however because of the dynamic environment we were in it was a mistake that could easily have been made.I suggest that a note be put into the 10-7 pointing out the significant differences between the ILS's to 22R (Y and Z) so that another crew won't make the same mistake.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew had briefed an ILS approach prior to their descent. During their descent they were assigned a different runway and approach. Unfortunately; they briefed the wrong approach. They discovered their error and briefed and flew the correct approach. Reporter suggests a change be made to the 10-7 chart so others don't mistake the different ILS's to the same Runway.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Shortly after pushing back from the gate; FA (Flight Attendant) called to ask if the last 2 rows needed to be empty.  I said that we had no idea; that this was the first we had heard of a weight and balance issue; and that I'd ask about it.  We contacted Load Planning (LP); and they told us that the rows needed to be blocked.  After we departed; FA asked if the rows needed to stay empty; or if they could now be occupied.  Again I contacted LP; and they said to keep the rows empty.  I responded that we had no idea of the balance problem until the FAs brought it to our attention. According to the Flight Ops Manual; this information is supposed to be included on the final weights document sent by ACARS.  If the flight attendants had not asked about the rows we would never have known; and would possibly have been out of balance limits.  One picture is the final weight manifest; the other is the reply from Load Planning when I asked how we were supposed to know about rows needing to be blocked.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported they were not informed of Weight & Balance issue.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise; Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Fuel Crossfeed
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While at cruise flight; I noticed the autopilot kept increasing aileron trim. I mentioned it to my Captain and he immediately realized we had a 4;000 pound fuel imbalance. All four main tank fuel pump switches were in the 'On' position with the crossfeed valve in the open position. He promptly began balancing fuel. By the time we landed the fuel was balanced. We believe my Captain may have opened the crossfeed valve when he turned off the center tank pumps.I think there were many factors that contributed to this occurrence. Neither one of us flies the classic frequently. Therefore; there is a lack of familiarity with the aircraft. The fuel gauges are closer to the Captain and were not in my scan. The Captain experienced interference from the newer model fuel procedure and out of habit moved the crossfeed valve after turning off the center tank pumps. Also; if the system is functioning correctly; I believe the fuel system should have remained reasonably balanced. From the crew perspective; making sure to occasionally scan the fuel gauges and both crew members verifying each other's switch movements would have helped prevent this situation. From a procedure perspective; having like aircraft with different procedures opens the door to these mistakes. Also; flying another aircraft infrequently makes it difficult to include different gauges in your scan.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer attributed Captain's improper positioning of the fuel pump and crossfeed switches to differences in B737 models flown by the company and to the fact that the Captain and the First Officer usually flew the newer models.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On touchdown at ZZZ; spoilers came out and caused the nose to rise. As a result; we had a tail strike. Reported this to MX (Maintenance) Control. Green band on tail strike cartridge was still showing but paint was scraped off. FAs (Flight Attendants) in rear of aircraft also heard the strike. Also spoke with [Company Safety] and [Flight Operations].I realize this is mentioned in the FH (Flight Handbook). I will add this to the brief for now on. I have personally only experienced it once. We may also want to add this to the initial or recurrent sim training.




Synopsis: B737-900 Captain reported tail strike during landing.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Baggage cart driver heading northbound departed the service road towards my aircraft; drove under the tail section of the aircraft at a high rate of speed - nearly caused a collision with me as I was accomplishing the exterior inspection at the aft section of the fuselage.  I was wearing and using all appropriate safety gear; specifically issued reflective vest and flashlight. Event debriefed to Ramp Manager before departure. Cause - Potential driver inattention to operating procedures (operating vehicle at high rate of speed; departing service road toward an aircraft; driving under an aircraft; and nearly striking me while conducting the exterior inspection). Suggestion - Driver Training. Enforcement of standards. I am deeply concerned for the safety of all personnel operating and transiting DFW ramp system. It is not uncommon to see ground vehicles traveling at high rates of speed off of the service roads well within safety zone proximity to aircraft. This must be fixed before someone is killed or severely injured. I am lucky to be writing this today.  DFW is the most dangerous airport ramp I've witnessed in XX years of experience.




Synopsis: First Officer reported almost getting hit by a baggage cart vehicle while doing a walk around inspection of the aircraft.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Find a fix for this issue. It continues to happen on a weekly basis that we know of. I feel these fume events can lead to a much larger disaster with the effects it has on our bodies during the event itself; even though we were on 100% oxygen.


Second narrative: [Fume event]. Please fix it.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported recurring fume events during climb requiring flight crew to utilize 100% oxygen.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMGL.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MMGL
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on a passenger flight operating IFR to MMGL (Guadalajara) in a US registered aircraft; during the landing/taxi-clear phase; we experienced a traffic conflict. We received a landing clearance for runway 28. Shortly after touchdown; tower instructed us to land-and-hold-short-of runway 20; which intersects runway 28 halfway down the 13;123 foot runway. Although I thought the instruction was unusual (having already touched down); I was already decelerating and would be able to comply and held short of runway 20/02. A Piper departed runway 20 as we held short. Tower then instructed me to taxi Runway 02; hold short of A; contact ground 121.9As I began taxiing runway 02; I saw a Cessna 182 takeoff runway 20. The 182 overflew us as we held position on runway 02 just north of runway 28. Perhaps the tower controller wanted me to back-taxi the runway AFTER the departing Cessna 182; but such clarification was never made by ground. Feeling a little bit flustered; and having received an unusual taxi clearance; I missed the hold short of taxiway A and passed it by approximately 50-60 feet while still on 20/2 before realizing and stopping. I was instructed to do a 180 and turn left on A; and then A1. The rest of the taxi-phase was without incident. Contributing factor/Human Performance Considerations [were] single pilot; unusual landing clearance during roll-out; simultaneous communications in both English and Spanish. Unfamiliar airport.I believe FARs would require me to be in contact with a tower controller while back-taxiing an active runway; but perhaps ICAO rules require differently. I believe that I am required to follow the 'most restrictive' regulations when operating internationally; and from here-on-out will adhere to FAR in such circumstances.




Synopsis: A pilot was cleared to land on MMGL Runway 28; LHSO Runway 20. After watching a Runway 20 departure he was cleared to taxi Runway 02 exit at Taxiway A but became confused by a fly over departing Runway 20 and missed Taxiway A.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Clear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-7
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Other unknown
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cheetah; Tiger; Traveler AA5 Series
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I announced that I was taking Runway XX and would be departing the area to the west. Upon entering runway I announced that I was rolling on XX departing the area to the west. Approximately 500 feet into my takeoff roll as my tail came up I spotted a plane headed straight towards me taking off opposite direction. I pulled power rolled over to side of the runway to the grass as the other aircraft lifted off and quickly rolled to their left. After which I pulled back onto runway and completed my takeoff. Talked to the other pilot in the air. He stated that he did not hear my radio calls. His radio was very weak and scratchy when I contacted him.




Synopsis: RV7 Pilot reported a critical ground conflict during the takeoff roll and took evasive action.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon shutdown; the A FA (Flight Attendant) was unable to open the forward entry door due to the aircraft still being pressurized. At that time the Captain and I realized the pressure controller elevation for landing was still set at the departure airport elevation from the previous leg. We then manually opened the outflow valve. There was no noticeable pressure change (that we felt physically) and the A FA was able to open the entry door without any other issues.Things were going smoothly and the Captain and I went through the checklist quickly. I feel like I am usually very good at crosschecking all of the switches/settings while reading the checklist; however; this time speed and complacency got the best of me. I was pretty frustrated with myself for missing this and will work hard to not make the same mistake again. When completing the Before Start Checklist; and checking the pressurization; maybe the response could include the altitudes that are set in each window (cruise and landing) to help draw attention to it. In this case I feel we saw the correct landing altitude in the window for the airport we were departing from; and at quick glance thought it made sense. Drawing more attention to those settings (like reading altimeter settings or V-Speeds) would ensure they don't get overlooked. If not made into procedure; this would be something I would personally do for myself to ensure I don't miss this again.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported a Flight Attendant reporting that the aircraft was still pressurized at gate arrival because the pressurization control panel was not set properly during departure preflight.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Over an hour after departing a check weights message appeared in the MCDU scratchpad. A check revealed that the computed weight was approximately 20;000 heavier than ECAM displayed weight. We then discovered that the load closeout indicated a Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) of 103;130 and Total Souls on Board (TSOB) of 29. The actual TSOB was 137.Prior to gate departure; we discussed the takeoff performance. ACARS indicated a Proposed Takeoff Weight (PTOW) of 155.5; RWY XX; CONF 3; APU ON; and 12 knot tailwind. V speeds based on this message were inserted into the MCDU.We pushed off the gate and taxied to a holding point to wait for the load closeout. When it arrived; the First Officer inserted the required data into the MCDU. He noticed that the weight was different than planned and pointed this out to me; but it was a performance advantage and the ACARS message was valid. We took off on Runway XX using CONF 3; APU ON; and calculated V speeds.The event occurred due to an error in finalizing the load closeout. Flight crews no longer verify the actual passenger count against the load closeout as a matter of procedure. The inherent flaw in this policy is that a barrier is removed that in all likelihood would have trapped this error. Since the takeoff was accomplished using this performance data; the potential risk involved was mainly in setting the stab trim from the erroneous data in the load closeout.The company should consider adopting a policy that specified a limitation on a discrepancy between the passenger count reported by the gate agent and the load closeout.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported responding to a 'Check Weights' message in flight and discovered that there was a discrepancy in the weight and balance information. They were approximately 20;000 pounds heavier because of a mistake in the total souls on board.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I can't begin to even express the level of frustration experienced last evening; with both engines up and running; in a line-up with a slot and flow control; and a thin margin on reserve fuel when my iPad became a literal boat anchor as it began to auto-download 1. A large JeppFD-Pro update 2. A Pilot mobile update 3. An update to HOT application. Adding to the stress level; it's night; unfamiliar airport with already complex departure procedures; thin geographic taxi margins; and rising terrain in all quadrants. Not to mention leg 3 of 4 on an already long day. As the Captain; my plate rapidly became full. I unsuccessfully attempted to stop the download in order to have departure SID; and remembering that we would be down to one iPad (FO); I needed to probably get approval from the [dispatch manager]. The iPad wasn't broken but it was at 50% capability and the extra flight bag didn't have a complete set of plates for [departure airport].We pulled out of the lineup and into the penalty box. I called [dispatch] and quickly related my frustration and pointedly expressed my need for a flight waiver; and I needed it five minutes ago. We received verbal approval and written follow up and we left the box and got back in line. Aside with having to return to the old school approach plate procedures; which felt like wearing borrowed cleats; the remainder of the flight was uneventful.As a side note; normally I wouldn't have had the internet up; but I had to use the back panel electrical outlet to recharge my iPad while we did our ground turn. Since I had just downloaded the flight plan forecast package; the iPad was still in the cellular data mode when I plugged in to begin charging; then left the jet to continue my pre-departure tasks.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported departure was delayed when an iPad began a download during taxi out that inhibited access to the departure plate.