elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Galley Furnishing
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We ferried an aircraft to ZZZ. We noticed that the galley carts were still on the aircraft and checked and secured them. Upon arrival to ZZZ; the FO made an uneventful landing; and when he applied the brakes; a galley cart; that had somehow become unsecured; rolled all the way from the back without hitting anything; made the slight jog to the left at the front; and then crashed through the flight deck door; causing considerable damage to the door and surrounding area. It is a mystery to both of us; as to how that cart became unsecured; and how it managed to make it all the way down the aisle and through the door. We feel fortunate that neither one of us was injured in this situation.




Synopsis: A321 pilot reported that a galley cart crashed through the flight deck door when brakes were applied during landing.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Thunderbolt II (Warthog A-10)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Tactical
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Trainee; Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A flight of four A10s requested a flight break-up prior to arrival at their destination. I was training an R-Side developmental. Neither of us had done a flight break-up in quite some time. I feel that the operation was completed safely; but in retrospect I realize that I may not have had my trainee use the proper MARSA phraseology. I feel that operations such as this need to be part of a regular training/simulation cycle as a part of continuing education. I recommend a yearly classroom/simulator training on things like flight break ups; non-RADAR; etc. to keep controllers fresh on less common procedures. CBI is NOT an effective means of continuing education in our field. A hands-on classroom/simulator class would be more effective for helping this information 'stick.'


Second narrative: Had a flight of four A10's level at FL200 crossing my boundary asking to break up; landing at the base. Squawked up and RADAR identified all planes. I had three planes fly 270 headings assuming they were still MARSA and gave the second a descent clearance to 11;000 FT. Leaving FL170; I issued the first a descent to FL180. Once the first left FL190 issued a descent clearance to the third to descend to FL190. Thus all four planes where not vertically separated. While performing flight break up both me and my trainer weren't entirely sure if done correctly. Could not find information in the 7110.65 in a reasonable time to be able to make sure technique was correct. Recommendation; I would recommend that a flight break up would be easier to find in the 7110.65. My trainer was taught differently than me to do a flight break up. I would recommend a single technique or a CBI refresher once a year.


Synopsis: Enroute Controller providing OJT described a confused military flight break up event; noting unfamiliarity with the break up procedures and suggesting more frequent Controller simulation training for this operation.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were given Line up and wait for Runway 10L/DD. We accepted the clearance and checklist was completed by then. Tower then gave us clearance to fly Runway heading. As the Captain advanced the thrust levers; I was monitoring the EICAS parameters. Around 50-60 KIAS; the Captain started to abort the takeoff. I looked at him and ask what was wrong. He responded by saying that the Runway Red Center Lights had come on. I advised tower we were aborting and then made a PA to 'remain seated'. As we were exiting the runway; Tower asked why we aborted and if we needed any assistance. Captain replied that the SMGGS (Surface Movement Guidance System) had come on and that we did not need assistance but we needed a place to park and run some checklists. The Captain also asked what had happened with the SMGS. The Tower replied that an [aircraft] had crossed the Runway Hold Short Line and triggered the SMGS. After exiting the runway we continued running the Aborted Takeoff checklist followed by the Before Takeoff. After discussing everything that had happened; we were again ready for takeoff. Chicago is always a threat due to the complexity of the airport and the volume of traffic on the ground and in the air.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that the Captain initiated a low speed rejected takeoff when the Surface Movement Guidance System (SMGS) lights illuminated on the runway.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 300
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Left engine failed to accelerate on takeoff which resulted in an abort.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CL-300 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff after the left engine failed to accelerate on the takeoff roll.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ABQ.Tower, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Flight to ABQ was uneventful; though very bumpy in the descent. We broke out at around 11;000 feet and it was VMC below. The ATIS was calling winds around 210/10. We were cleared the visual; but flew the RNAV Y 21 ground track for lateral and vertical guidance. We configured and turned base. We were cleared to land and the winds were then reported at 180/7G45. Shortly after the wind report; we received a PWS warning 'go-around; windshear ahead.'  We went around with Tower. Tower gave us a climb; and a turn to the west; and had us contact Departure. We checked-in with Approach; and they asked our intentions. We checked on the field conditions. We were told things were calming down. We said we would try again. It also sounded as though another aircraft was going in front of us. We configured and turned base again. The winds were reported at 210/7G45 (what happened to calming down!). Once again; we received a windshear warning. (In all truth; neither the First Officer (FO) nor I are sure whether the second one was a GPWS warning or a PWS warning). We went around again.  Now we were less than 4;000 pounds; with a low fuel warning. I ran the Low Fuel Checklist; and declared minimum fuel.  We quickly looked for AEG (Double Eagle) information on the flight computer or in the Jesppesen Approach section; but discovered there was no info available. Meanwhile; Approach said the winds were continuing to swing around the west and were now 280/7G45.  They were offering to change runways as the microburst had moved north and the wind was swinging West/North.  We slowly swung around to land on Runway 3. By the time we were configured and cleared to land; the winds were called 280/7; with the Southfield winds calm.  We landed on Runway 3; and shut down with 3.3.The plan showed forecast winds gusty down the runway and calming to 10 knots for arrival.  No talk of TS; CB; or windshear. The 5.3 arrival fuel was legal. However; our closest alternate would be Roswell. Divert fuel is 3.0. Followed by ELP; at 4.0. KAEG and KSAF; though available pieces of concrete; are not in any of our 'books.'  We had a plan; and it involved landing at Double Eagle; if the final approach didn't work; but it is not a plan I liked. I accepted 5.3 arrival fuel.  That is just not enough with no good alternatives around.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported landing with 3;300 lbs of fuel after two go-arounds at ABQ triggered by windshear warnings.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Narrative: I was with my student practicing landings in Aircraft X; as we were taking off of [Runway] XXL around XA30-XB00 I had noticed another C172 taking off on the parallel runway XXR. As we were passing through 1;800 ft.; getting close to turn left crosswind; it appeared the other C172 (Aircraft Y) was a little too close for comfort and then they decide to make an early left crosswind directly underneath us after they were instructed by tower to fly straight out. It appeared that they were with in 100 ft. of us. I then announced over the radio to Tower saying 'We have another Cessna underneath us'. I do recognize Aircraft Y as a local plane that is based out of ZZZ.




Synopsis: C172 Flight Instructor reported a NMAC with another aircraft while both were taking off from parallel runways.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other All Phases
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight; Pre-flight; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: As a pilot; I am not required to wear a mask in the flight deck; because of the potential safety consideration of not being able to don my oxygen mask quickly enough and degradation of communication. But yet I have to watch the flight attendants wear a mask continuously throughout our duty day. I have had many flight attendants complain of fatigue and headaches due to wearing the mask. I fear this could cause a safety issue- degradation of communication with passengers; unable to communicate effectively in the case of an emergency; slower reaction time in an emergency.I would also argue that ground personnel should not be wearing masks. As I conduct my walk around the aircraft; the noise of the APU and airport in general prevent normal conversation. Yelling and hand signals have to be used. Many; many times I have been unable to understand what is being yelled at me; and have to move within 6 feet of the other person to understand what is being said. Ground personnel are also throwing heavy bags constantly; in all weather. The WHO does not recommend wearing masks during heavy exertion; and a wet mask is a worthless mask.The front-line workers of the airlines were forced to wear a mask based on the potential that the mask would prevent transmission of a virus. I argue that not enough research and consideration was made into the potential harms of wearing masks in and around aircraft. OSHA recommends mask fit tests; education; breaks from masking; and studies into the effects of mask wearing in workplaces. I do not believe cost benefit analysis were conducted.We should not be masking children younger than 5 years old. This is a recommendation by the World Health Organization.I would like to see a survey or study done on the effects of mask wearing on employees in the aviation industry. I understand a study was conducted on mannequins in regards to viral transmission on aircraft; but this is inadequate.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported safety and health concerns with personnel having to wear face masks.
Date: 201407
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout at approximately 5;000 feet ATC queried us to reset our transponder.  I reset the transponder and at that time the Captain's display units started to fail.  Next the First Officer's display units started to fail.  The Captain continued to fly as I got out the QRH.  Passing through 13;000 feet we asked ATC to level off so we could evaluate the situation.  I read the QRH checklist to determine which checklist applied.  I looked at the Display Failure Checklist first and that did not seem to apply.  I next checked the Displays Control Panel Checklist and then the Display Source Checklist and neither seemed to apply. There were no yellow or red lights on the overhead panel; glare shield or instrument panel that would give an indication of which checklist to use. The Captain declared an emergency and we received vectors back.  The Captain was flying with his standby instruments.  We had no airspeed; altitude; autopilot; or FMA on our primary display.  SPD and ALT and TCAS fail were displayed on the PFD.  In addition; the MCP was not working; none of the buttons were lit; and we could not select VNAV; LNAV or heading select.  The autopilots would not engage.  Further; there did not appear to be any circuit breakers popped. I briefed the flight attendants that we had a system failure and we would be returning and to prepare the cabin for a normal landing.  I then briefed the passengers that we had a system failure and would be returning for a normal landing.  ATC continued to give us vectors to return to the airport and I began to program the FMC for the approach and tune the radios.  We were in and out of IMC conditions; finally we were able to see the field and we were cleared for a visual approach.  During the approach some of the First Officer instruments returned.  The Captain made a normal approach and landing using his standby instruments.


Second narrative: Before takeoff; we both had a TCAS fail. At 7;000 feet ATC lost our transponder and we had a fail light on the transponder. At 13;000 feet Captain and First Officer's instruments each lost all the numbered information on PFD's and ND's. The MCP lost all functions. We declared an emergency; accomplished checklists and returned.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports loss of all number information on their PFD's and ND's along with MCP failure during initial climb. An emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight checks did a Standby Rudder Check.  Rudders stiff and unresponsive.  Overhead panel indicated both Low Pressure light and Standby Rudder On light on.  Reset switch and tried another Standby Rudder Check with same results.  Checked for potential circuit breaker popped; but could see nothing.  Called Maintenance.  Mechanic checked circuit breakers and went to wheel well to look at hydraulics.  He returned; after lengthy discussion with Maintenance Control; realized he hadn't checked Standby Hydraulic Pump-Alt at P6-12-A-8 and Standby Hydraulic Pump-Norm at P6-11-A-8 behind First Officer's seat and at very bottom of circuit breaker panels.  Once reset; the standby hydraulic check was normal.  I'm not sure anything was written up in logbook.  I cannot remember.  I am making this input because it was brought to my attention by my most excellent First Officer that the standby rudder check is no longer required.  Well; I'm glad I did it that day and I will continue to do it in the future. At a minimum; we should inform our Pilot Group of the circuit breakers and their location.  We were close to swapping jets because of this event.  Also; I'm not sure why this ten-second check of the standby rudder system was deleted from our AOM; but it is my opinion it should be placed back in the AOM as a preflight item; at least at the start of the day and done by pilots when they exchange aircraft.  And; oh by the way; it would have been challenging to say the least if we'd gotten airborne and had a problem requiring use of the standby hydraulic system for our rudders.  Just food for thought!




Synopsis: A B737-300 Captain was unable to perform an acceptable preflight Standby Rudder Check and maintenance found Standby Hydraulic Pump-Alt and Standby Hydraulic Pump-Norm circuit breakers out. This preflight system's check is not required so the Standby Rudder capability may have been unavailable for some time.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Caravan 208B
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My student and I were in the traffic pattern; taking off and landing Runway XX; which the winds were favoring at the time. No other traffic was in the area at the time of traffic pattern entry. We did our first lap in the pattern and made all position reports on the CTAF. On the second lap; we heard a hang glider; who acknowledged us in the pattern; and waited for our arrival on Runway XX. Initial contact with this individual was made during the final leg. I made a final leg call for touch and goes; for Runway XX. No other traffic (other than the hang glider) had made any calls at this point. After landing; a Cessna 208B calls in the CTAF and states that they are taking off Runway XY. As we accelerated for takeoff; we see the Caravan coming straight towards us from the departure end of the runway. The hang glider warns us that there is another aircraft taking off. Right as we lift off; I make a left turn; to side step the runway and we see the Caravan pass by right underneath us. On the upwind; I ask if the Cessna heard us on frequency; and they stated that they did not; as they were not listening. I made calls during each leg of the pattern; and the hang glider confirmed this during this conversation. We departed to the east to exit the airfield.




Synopsis: Flight Instructor reported that a near mid-air collision occurred just after liftoff when another aircraft departed from the departure end of the runway and flew directly under them at a non-towered airport.