Date: 202102
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ1
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise altitude FL380 approximately 40 minutes into the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 the Engine 2 HYDRAULIC PUMP LOW PRESSURE light illuminated. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) performed QRH Non-Normal procedure and selected the associated HYD PUMP switch OFF. No further action was required at that time. I don not remember exactly what Hydraulic Qty and Pressure values were at this time but I recall that they were relatively normal as the Electric Hydraulic Pump remained functional.Approximately 15-20 minutes later; the Engine 2 OIL FILTER BYPASS indication illuminated on the Upper Display Unit Primary Engine Indications page. The Captain performed the ENGINE OIL FILTER BYPASS QRH procedures. The OIL FILTER BYPASS light remained illuminated after closing the Engine 2 thrust lever which directed us to the ENGINE FAILURE OR SHUTDOWN QRH checklist and the required shutdown of Engine 2. We elected not to attempt a restart of the engine. As PF (Pilot Flying); I continued to fly the airplane. I disconnected the autopilot and auto throttles and hand flew the airplane; adjusting rudder trim to approximately 13 units of left trim in order to maintain wings level; yoke level.We advised ATC and requested a descent to FL240 due to Engine Out Altitude indication of FL245; and slowed to 233 kts. per the Engine Out speed indication. Center cleared us to descend; as requested. I descended in LVL CHG to FL240. Shortly thereafter were handed off to [adjacent] Center. Initially we elected to continue toward ZZZ1 and were cleared direct to ZZZ1 by enter. After approximately 10-15 minutes of hand flying and after reaching FL240 I engaged Autopilot A (Autopilot B was unavailable due to the non-normal events).The Captain communicated with the flight attendants; made a PA to the passengers; and coordinated with flight attendants to have a deadheading Captain join us on the flight deck as an additional resource/additional crew member (ACM). This was the Captain I had flown with from ZZZ4-ZZZ the previous day and we therefore had the added familiarity and comfort of having just flown together. The Captain attempted to contact Dispatch via both ACARS and on Comm 2 via a frequency that was received in an ACARS message. We could hear Dispatch calling us but they could not hear us talking to them (possibly due to our low altitude?). ACARS availability was intermittent in our location. At some point later on; Center informed us of the frequency that Dispatch was trying to communicate on. We told Center that we had been trying to contact Dispatch on that frequency to no avail; and asked them to relay to Dispatch that we probably had little additional information to share with them beyond what had already been successfully exchanged when ACARS was available and beyond what Center already knew about our situation. During this period of time; the Captain and I periodically exchanged communication roles as necessitated by the multiple overlapping tasks required to be completed; while the deadheading Captain also assisted with some communications to passengers; to Dispatch; and reviewed and confirmed the QRH procedures we had followed; as delegated by the Captain (PM).Approximately 10-15 minutes after shutting down Engine 2; performing associated QRH procedures; and dealing with intermittent communication issues with Dispatch; we discussed and confirmed the fact that ZZZ3 was actually the closest suitable airport and asked Center for direct to ZZZ3. Prior to that decision; given our location over the Gulf; our direct route to ZZZ1 had been taking us relatively close to what would have also been a direct route to ZZZ3. Therefore; there had been no significant delay in getting us on a course to our nearest suitable airport ZZZ3. Weather at ZZZ3 was procured; Dispatch was successfully notified of and supported the decision to divert to ZZZ3; Flight Attendants and passengers were notified; and ACARS divert communications were completed. Initially we had elected not to balance fuel but after the center fuel tanks were empty; we elected to balance fuel; opening the crossfeed valve and turning off Engine number 1 fuel pumps.The Captain discussed with me and the ACM Captain whether or not we would elect to exchange controls at some point and it was agreed upon that the Captain would fly the approach and landing. I recall that transfer of controls occurred while at FL240; approximately 10 minutes prior to descent to lower altitude. Non-Normal landing distance was calculated by me (and backed up by the ACM) and other One Engine Inoperative Landing checklists were reviewed. I made a PA to the passengers explaining that they could expect a relatively normal landing at ZZZ3 with the exception of possibly seeing fire trucks there as a precaution. Below 10;000ft. I completed the portion of the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist for configuring for a Bleeds Off landing. Despite having calculated non-normal landing distance; normal landing data was also procured (as suggested by the ACM Captain) in order to determine whether or not any special engine out missed approach procedures existed; which did reveal a missed approach procedure of flying runway heading to ZZZ VOR.While on a final base leg vector to final approach for the ZZZ3 ILS at 2;000 ft.; the Captain called for Flaps 1. However; the flaps did not extend when selected. We discussed why that might be occurring; trying to determine whether or not it might be associated with our original HYD LOW PRESSURE situation which had initially been resolved by turning of the engine drive pump and utilizing the remaining electric pump. We informed Approach that we had a flap issue and requested vectors away from the approach. I selected the SYS page on the Upper Display Unit to observe Hydraulic indications and saw that System B Hydraulic Qty was 0 or close to 0 and Pressure was low; if not also 0 (I do not recall the exact value). In post flight discussion with the Captain we discussed that there may have been a time (when flaps 1 was selected?) that a Master Caution light illuminated; we both looked up at the overhead but did not notice any new lights illuminated that were not already part of our previous non-normals. The Captain also recalled that when I had performed the Master Caution Recall as part of the After Start Checklist; the annunciator panel lights had not necessarily all illuminated without one or both of us having to push on the panel; as is often the case; and therefore it is possible that when/if the Master Caution light illuminated during the high workload single engine approach phase of flight; we may have failed to see a HYD indication on the annunciator panel or if it did illuminate; we might have considered it to be associated with the original HYD LOW PRESS non normal. Postflight; we discussed the possibility that it was the demand placed on the hydraulic system by the selection of flaps in conjunction with some other cause of a leak that caused the hydraulic quantity and pressure to go to zero at that time. In any case; given confirmation of 0 HYD QTY on the SYS page; we now performed the LOSS OF SYSTEM B QRH checklist and procedures which eventually directed us to the Alternate Flap Extension procedure.Once we had completed and reviewed the LOSS OF SYSTEM B QRH checklist and procedures; and the Captain discussed his plan for configuring flaps (taking into account the additional time required for alternate flap extension); I asked the ACM to reference the deferred items (e.g. landing checklist) for ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE APPROACH AND LANDING while I referenced the deferred items (e.g. landing checklist) for LOSS OF SYSTEM B; to make sure they were the same or comparable and that we did not miss anything; given that I could only run one landing checklist and we simultaneously had two separate non-normals with deferred items. When ready; we were cleared for the approach. We successfully extended the flaps to 15 usingthe alternate flap extension procedure. Upon contact with ZZZ3 Tower I informed them of our special request in the event of a single engine missed approach per the landing data information.The approach and landing by the Captain were excellent. He stopped the aircraft on the runway with manual brakes per the QRH procedure. ARFF equipment came to the runway and personnel examined the aircraft prior to our taxiing to the gate. We left the flaps extended in case Maintenance wanted them in that position and informed ops and station maintenance of their position. We discussed with a mechanic some of the details of the non-normal events. We had to wait for customs to get ready for us; which caused a delay in deplaning. I took advantage of that time to go to the cabin to talk to the flight attendants and First Class passengers to see how they were doing and talk a little about our situation and answer questions while the Captain continued discussion with mechanics and Chief Pilot; etc.One final note I would like to add is that we received outstanding; professional support from all ATC facilities during the flight and from Flight Operations (Chief Pilots; Safety Committee; etc.) postflight; and our flight attendants were totally professional and did an outstanding job. Utilization of the deadheading Captain's input and support was extremely helpful; too. Thanks to everyone who supported us.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported an inflight engine shut down and loss of hydraulic fluid resulted in a diversion.