elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Weather was VFR severe clear; pilots had been reporting the airport 20 miles out for the visual approach. A PA32 requested a no gyro ASR Approach. I know from experience that ASR (Airport Surveillance Radar) Approaches are time consuming; especially no-gyro ASR's. I worked to prepare my other traffic so I could devote more attention to the ASR. I gave the PA32 vector to the Runway 28 final and began no gyro vectors near the final. I was in the process of giving the PA32 the information; MDA and other information. The ASR to Runway 28 has a step down approach procedure; 900 till 3 NM final and then 400 with a missed approach point 1 NM final. I was concentrating on giving all the information correctly but I also descended (gave the pilot the MDA) of the PA32 early which conflicts with the MVA. The Low Altitude Alert went off. Other controllers commented I was slow to respond since I did not think that the aircraft was in proximity to even warrant an alert. I realized later that switching between scopes to my right my perceived mileage even though it was monitoring it was incorrect. I thought the PA32 was near enough to the fix; descent to the MDA should have started and continued with the approach. An unexpected VFR helicopter passed through the flight path of the PA32 and I did issue that traffic. The Local Controller had told me about traffic I just did not expect traffic to pass in front of my aircraft. The approach continued with the PA32 centered with the runway on the final. I did not get the pilots intentions for a touch and go until very late in the approach. The PA32 did a touch and go as a B737 departed before this aircraft. A cautionary wake turbulence call was probably necessary. I did not feel as confident working this approach as I use to feel when I worked them all the time. I generally work only about one a year for REAL; and not via simulator. I was not certain on how to phrase the step down MDA so the pilot knew the information. Give the ASR Approach duties to a stand alone position. Prepare completely make necessary calls to tower about the approach to Runway 28 sooner. Ask pilot for his intentions and give tower the information. Issue Low Altitude Alerts. My actions for this situation were clumsy and slow. I am capable of much better.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described the issuance of a 'no gyro' ASR Approach; noting his/her unfamiliarity with the procedure and failure to complete some required actions.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SMO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D SMO
ATC / advisory: Tower SMO
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Lost GPS reception to GARMIN 530 and 430 while landing at rooftop helipad of [an LA hospital]. Looked at satellite reception page and only one satellite was available with minimal reception. Shutdown and started 10 minutes later and GPS's reacquired with no problem. No loss of reception when departing.

Callback: The reporter stated the approach path to the hospital is over fixed ground track and that the signal disruption begins a short time before landing so that by touchdown the GPS display automatically transitions to the satellite acquire page where no satellites are shown. After landing the signal slowly return. He believes some type of interference is radiating from the facility; but when he inquired was told there was no equipment operating the GPS L Band.



Synopsis: An Air Ambulance pilot reported the simultaneous loss of his Garmin 530 and 430 GPS signals while landing on a hospital helipad but the signals were reacquired with 10 minutes with normal operations during departure.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: RIC.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C RIC
ATC / advisory: TRACON RIC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: From the SPIDR3 arrival; which ends at DEEER; we were cleared for the RNAV RNP Y RWY 16; DEEER transition. The last hard altitude on the STAR is SPIDR at 8;000 [feet]. The first altitude restriction on the approach is DEEER; 9 miles after SPIDR; at 4;000 [feet]. The FMS showed a hard altitude of 4;000 [feet] at DEEER. The vertical profile showed a hard altitude at DEEER depicted with the magenta lines above and below the number 4;000; and the aircraft was in VNAV mode; on PTH. Without any 'unable next altitude' message; the plane crossed DEER at 5;700 [feet] (while the vertical profile depicted us precisely on PTH and at 4;000 [feet]) and continued towards the next fix SOOBY which was correctly depicted as at or above 4;000 [feet]. Upon realizing the error; we overrode the automation to expedite the descent to 4;000 [feet]; then re-engaged VNAV. The Controller never mentioned our altitude; only conversing nearly continuously with a VFR aircraft just west of our course; trying to keep them and us constantly aware of each other's position. As far as we can tell; this was an automation error. We were able to duplicate the altitude assignments after blocking in; and reprogramming the FMS for the arrival and approach. It once again depicted SPIDR at 8;000 [feet]; DEEER at 4;000 [feet]; and SOOBY at or above 4;000 [feet]. All correct. Contributing to the automation error may have been the large descent required from SPIDR to DEEER; dropping 4;000 feet in just nine miles. Our understanding is that if the FMS thought this was not possible; we should have gotten an 'unable next altitude' message; OR the Vertical profile should have depicted us high at DEEER. Neither happened. Please correct us if it is apparent that there is something about RNAV approaches or FMS usage that we do not understand. Otherwise; please consult with the designers of this arrival/approach to change the altitude restriction at DEEER to 'at or above.'




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported a lack of agreement between the SPDR 3 RNAV arrival termination fix and the mandatory altitude at the IAF of the RNAV (RNP) Y RWY 16 approach into RIC airport.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I'm having a difficult time with wearing a mask for so long everyday.  A passenger came back and tattled on another passenger that his mask wasn't on.  I asked if he was uncomfortable with that and he didn't reply.  He just said it wasn't on.  I said something like I guess I have to act as 'the sheriff.'  I can't force someone to do something that is making me literally and physically sick myself; so I asked my flying partner to wake him up and ask him.  It was done immediately.  On a separate flight during this trip we had a medical situation and I realized communication was not happening with masks on.  It was horrible to try and talk with a muzzle on my face.  The doctor that ended up helping us explained the science on how useless these masks are.  So again; I don't understand why a policy that can end up making us sick when we weren't is still in place.  After I was on a plane for 3 days full to capacity; I get on a bus that they won't fill up due to social distancing!!  How insane is this to watch after flights are full and social distancing is a joke.  Then we ask to deplane separately after cramming in a full flight.  It is absolutely embarrassing.  And obviously if it did anything; we would actually follow it.  I keep praying this is over tomorrow. I have the lawyer that is saying this is crimes against humanity.  I am absolutely worried about the bacteria on the mask; especially after speaking with the doctor.  If I end up with strep or staph infection or anything bacteria; it will be occupational as I am forced to wear this.  I barely eat or drink; cause god forbid someone takes a picture in between sips and I know already the company will not back me up.  We are so fearful for our jobs; it is insane.  This needs to change now. We are all feeling anxious because of this every flight.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported multiple concerns with wearing a face mask.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Other Flight School
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Briefly we were three on board; a flight instructor and 2 private pilots on a Piper Cherokee. We were cruising at 2;000ft MSL over the shore line. We experienced a sudden power loss. As I applied more power settings I realized that the engine was not responding to the throttle lever at all. We were descending about 200ft/min on the VSI gauge which means 300ft/min rate of descent as we did a cockpit instrument checklist before taking off and we've noted the VSI reading 100ft/min above.With engine running at a constant rate of 1;200 RPM. I maintained the best glide speed possible; while trying to figure out the cause of the problem. I made a decision to land the airplane somewhere on the shoreline sand. While we were gliding; we followed the emergency check list including the complete power loss procedure with no success. We were partially successful using electric fuel pump by turning it on and off causing an initial increase in the RPM and successively decrease in the descent rate to 100ft/min on gauge. The electric fuel pump was able to increase the RPM for few seconds which led me to constantly switch it on and off to minimize the loss of altitude as much as possible. Eventually I felt comfortable to turn back after the option was offered by Approach. At About 300ft over the runway; I leaned the mixture all the way down; Secured the engine and we finally were able to land safely on the runway.




Synopsis: PA28 Instructor reported engine lost power and was unable to maintain altitude during a training flight.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed and about a minute or two later; received call from Number 1 Flight Attendant about loud air leak from forward entry door which became louder as we climbed. [I] declared an emergency due to need to land overweight and returned. Maintenance adjusted lower door hinge seal and conducted overweight landing inspection. Aircraft was refueled and we again departed. Flight attendants could be made more aware of what an improperly closed or sealed door would look like.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain is informed shortly after takeoff of an air leak around the forward entry door and elects to return to the departure airport for an over weight landing. Maintenance adjusted lower door hinge seal and the flight again departed.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Wing Access Panel
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In ZZZ I began removing a wing panel from the right wing. I peeled off a corner of the panel and realized that it was a fuel tank. There was no fuel leak at that time. I resealed the panel and replaced the screws. Since the aircraft was based in ZZZ1 and the owner needed to return to ZZZ1 he elected to fly the aircraft to its home base with half tanks in case there was any fuel leak. Upon arriving and refueling two days later [in ZZZ1]; a small leak was noted from said wing panel. What caused the problem was my lack of experience and haste in removing the panel. To mitigate this in the future I will exercise more caution when removing panels. The panel is now being repaired at the home airport.

Callback: Reporter stated work was being accomplished under a supervising (I/A) Inspector who had directed that the upper wing access panel be removed as part of an Annual Inspection for the Piper PA46-310 non-turboprop Malibu. The Piper Aircraft Maintenance Manuals (AMM) are not very informative and the IA didn't realize the access panel was actually part of the wing fuel tank.Reporter stated the reference to peeling off a corner of the access panel wasn't about the actual panel; but the sealant under and around the panel known as Bee-half (B-1/2); also known as B-one over two or B-one-half adhesive. While trying to lift the panel away; the adhesive was stretching but not separating; indicating there may be more going on with the panel than immediately known. Reporter noted having the Airframe and Powerplant (A/P) certificates for less than a year.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was directed by an I/A Inspector to remove an upper wing skin access panel on a Piper PA46-310 Malibu for an Annual Inspection (A/I). During removal; AMT realizes the panel was part of the right wing fuel tank. Inspector and Technician believe the Piper Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) is not very informative or detailed for the Malibu aircraft.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-34-200 Seneca I
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGB
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was instructing an instrument student and was cleared to intercept the ILS.  I armed the approach on the autopilot and when the autopilot commanded a turn to final we started to descend.  I was expecting the autopilot to descend and did not check immediately that we were on glideslope.  When I saw we did not have the glideslope and our position; I instructed the student to climb and at that time ATC reported an altitude alert and directed a climb.




Synopsis: The pilot and instructor of a PA34 experienced a premature descent when the autopilot had not yet captured the glideslope. The instructor advised a climb just prior to ATC reporting an altitude alert.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Landing Runway 15L and 15R at BWI. Numerous jet traffic on approach landing the right side on visual approaches. Had a Citation Excel on visual approach to the left runway with the field in sight. I turned the aircraft to a heading of 180 and cleared him for the visual approach. The aircraft widen out to the right 210 heading to join final. TARP recorded this as a loss of separation. The new rule is a turn to intercept final no greater the thirty degrees. Once I cleared the aircraft for the visual; I was unaware that the aircraft widen out to join the final. This new thirty degree rule to intercept final for visual approaches is very labor intensive for the Final Controller. Especially at BWI where we only have one downwind. This only makes things more complex. Essentially you are running an ILS approach; instead of the aircraft turning a 4-5 mile base; it's now a 8-10 mile base. At BWI final you are not only working final but MTN departures and arrivals plus 3 other satellite airports. Even if the aircraft has visual with the parallel runway traffic; the thirty degree rule still applies. BWI does not run opposite bases. We only have one downwind! I guess what I'm trying to say is the rule should be exempt at airports like BWI. I truly believe we will see more errors due to forgetting to turn 30 degrees to join final; because of the distractions of the position.




Synopsis: PCT Controller voiced concern regarding the thirty degree intercept rule during Visual Approach procedures noting BWI with one downwind does not benefit from the new requirements.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AUO.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZTL
ATC / advisory: CTAF AUO
Second aircraft: Travelair 95
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing rollout
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the landing rollout in Aircraft X on Runway XX; the Beechcraft 95 Baron nearly missed Aircraft X on a go around after attempting to gain spacing through S-turn. Prior to the near collision; the Beechcraft had been seen doing aerobatic maneuvers near ground level and performed a 50 foot low approach at 190 knots indicated according to the pilots radio transmission. After the excessive maneuvering and the low approach the aircraft nearly missed another aircraft in the pattern while attempting to enter the downwind.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC while on landing rollout.