elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While descending via the ZZZZZ2 STAR into ZZZ; we were given a direct; followed by a heading and a descent to 6;000 feet and a request to fly our best forward speed for spacing.  In complying with the instructions; I descended below 10;000 feet at 300 knots.  At approximately 9;000 feet; I recognized the error; leveled off and slowed to 250 knots.  We continued the flight to an uneventful landing.Although I had gotten a full night's sleep the night before; I was feeling somewhat fatigued by the time we began the flight to ZZZ.  I had been flying long days from the previous 4 day trip that started with a very early commute on the morning.  Compounding this is the fact that my recency of experience is lacking.  I had flown very little during the previous 3 months due to a problem with my international qualifications.I believe that if I had not gotten distracted with the revised clearances from ATC this would not have happened.  I had been flying in VNAV; but opened the speed window when a higher airspeed was requested by ATC.  My improper monitoring of the automation led me to descend below 10;000 feet at a speed above 250 knots.  Unfortunately; my First Officer did not catch the error either.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 feet during descent. Captain cited fatigue and lack of flying as contributing factors.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Changes to HOST programming have caused filed flight plans with the routing BNA.RMG4.KATL to require a manual update via a route amendment message or a URET entry to correct the actual flight plan for this flight. The HOST deficiency indicates to the controller a 'red or blue' routing; a PAR; is required for the flight. The flight is currently flying the RMG4 arrival; no need to reroute other than the fact that the computer system is BROKEN! This problem is exacerbated by two other existing anomalies currently plaguing the ZME AREA 5 HOST software without resolve. 1. The failure of the AUTO HAND-OFF for Sector 63 to Sector 62; ATL landing traffic over BWG. Previously reported. 2. The loss of the reroute key function DIRECT RMG. Previously reported. 3. Today's latest and greatest. Since the last tape hang-up; aircraft routed BNA.RMG4.KATL indicate a 'blue-routing' BNA.ERLIN9. In other words; Area 5 must manually intervene to correct the computer deficiencies once again. In the interest of safety; one would expect solutions to these problems beyond our manual interventions. Quite frankly; I find it repugnant that the ERAM excuse will be the savior of all.




Synopsis: ZME Controller voiced concern regarding recent automation changes that have added additional controller workload and confusion.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Shorts SD-360
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: To do my job as Captain I must inspect and declare my Hazmat to my Dispatcher. Before my flight I filled out a Hazmat form given to me by my company to declare Hazmat. On this form I am obligated to declare how many boxes; contents; how much of each Hazmat; hazard class; their location in the airplane and various other Hazmat information. Nowhere on my company given form is there a space for the packing group of each Hazmat. When I called in to my Dispatcher on the phone to let them know all the information I had written on the form the Dispatcher told me that I was released for flight. Upon landing at my destination I was ramp checked by an FAA Hazmat inspector. She informed me that it was odd that my packing groups were not declared. I told her the truth that I did not tell my Dispatcher the packing group information on the Hazmat and that I only told the Dispatcher what was on my form. She asked me how the Dispatcher could get this information and I told her that I regularly mail in each individual Hazmat slip that contains all the Hazmat information for each individual box including packing groups. It is company policy to mail these slips and forms in and I follow our policies. After this encounter I went to my company FOM and found nothing pertaining to declaring packing groups on our FOM page describing how to fill out our Hazmat forms.




Synopsis: SH-360 Captain reported FAA ramp check upon arrival that cited missing 'packing group' on Hazmat company form that submitted prior to receiving flight release.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Discontinued takeoff due to configuration warning.  N1 never came up to takeoff thrust; discontinued at about 70 pct N1.  Never noted EPRs.  Exited runway.  Scanned cockpit; found flaps up.  Upon discussion; we never ran the before takeoff checklist.   Ran before takeoff checklist; taxied back to RWY XXL at G intersection and departed without further incident.My first and Capt's 2nd trip to this airport.  Not familiar with taxi route or normal flow of operations.  During performance data briefing; planned XYR primary and XZR backup for takeoff numbers due to NOTAMs and Capt's one previous trip (XYR was available in the past). Given runway XXL upon push clearance with ground.  Made runway change during pushback; briefed per company procedures.  Upon being given taxi clearance; given Intersection  departure; for the 4th run thru takeoff numbers that trip.  Elected to check the V speeds while rolling down taxiway because runway change in FMS not required. Also dealing with Panasonic toughbook EFB which has no keyboard; therefore the task took twice as long.  Approaching [intersection] taxiway by the time I was finished verifying the new numbers; at which point got into discussion as to whether I should ask ground to go to tower or whether ground would send us.  Ground sent us to tower at that moment.  Tower cleared us to takeoff upon check in. Ran the 'below the line' portion of the before takeoff checklist; but never the above the line portion due to distraction.Bad call to do new numbers on the move at an unfamiliar airport.  There was no reason we could not have stopped and briefed everything over again per company procedures; then resumed taxi with a normal flow of things.




Synopsis: B757-200 First Officer reported beginning takeoff roll with flaps up; before takeoff checklist not run due to distractions and workload.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Potable Water Storage; control; indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; MEL; Aircraft
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: We had a Potable Water System Pressurization Air Compressor on MEL. During Removal/Replacement (R/R); found [Air] Pump and Cannon plug very hot to touch. MEL does not require a Circuit Breaker (C/B) to be pulled or the Cannon plug to be removed. I think this creates a fire hazard.  If pump is seized; as this one was; an overheat condition is possible.  This is much more likely on the ground as the pump is only powered when the APU and engines are 'Off'; but if the timing was right; a fire could start and remain undetected until after take off.

Callback: Reporter stated the Potable Water System tank is located in the Lower Lobe Forward Cargo compartment left-hand sidewall; outboard of the cargo pit sidewall panels. Smoke detectors are installed in the cargo area; but not the sidewalls. Reporter stated no cargo tape is applied to the cargo pit sidewall panel butt seams. Instead; thin metal strips are installed where cargo tape would normally be. Halon is the Fire retardant. A Pressurization Air Compressor pump failure is not a common occurrence. But; reporter still feels the overheated seized pump motor and Cannon plug are good reasons to add a Maintenance (M) Procedure to MEL 38 for deferral of the Potable Water System Air Compressor pump. Removing the Cannon plug as part of the MEL deferral requirement would reduce the potential for a fire to develop. Reporter has twenty plus years in aircraft maintenance.



Synopsis: A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about a potential fire hazard that could develop in the Lower Lobe Forward Cargo compartment outboard sidewall on MD-11 aircraft. Reporter found a deferred Potable Water System Pressurization Air Compressor pump and Cannon plug very hot to touch during Removal/Replacement (R/R) of the deferred pump. MEL does not require a Circuit Breaker (C/B) pulled or Cannon plug be disconnected for the deferral.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise flight at FL360 we got a green hydraulic quantity low ECAM. The ECAM had us shut off pumps. Then the ECAM cleared itself and I turned the pumps back on. This happened several times so we complied with ECAMS. The quantity indicator overhead pointer was fluctuating on the red dot (the low qty indicator). The ECAM display quantity indicated on the low line. We advised Operations and Maintenance Control and diverted to a nearby suitable airport; declared an emergency and made a normal approach and landing. We were able to clear the runway and had company Maintenance tow us to the gate.




Synopsis: An A300 flight crew followed their ECAM procedures; declared and emergency and diverted following a loss of fluid in the green hydraulic system.
Date: 201408
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: It is a recurring problem that some personnel use nonstandard verbiage to describe aircraft. The use of slang; is not only not appropriate in an aircraft operational environment; it could very well be dangerous. When Ramp Control uses slang to describe traffic to an aircraft underway; the crew of that aircraft must ASSUME that they know what the Ramp Controller is talking about. For instance; my aircraft while in ORD was directed to taxi around the 57 on the Bravo Line via the Charlie Line and then return to the Bravo Line on taxi out. My First Officer responded with B757. So the instructions and response/readback did not even match. An aircraft behind me received equally unclear instructions and also responded with the correct FAA type designation of the traffic that that crew ASSUMED was the traffic in question. Similar slang usage goes on at other airports; with '37;' 'Guppy;' 'Whale;' '400;' '67;' '57;' and other non standard phraseology being used by ramp controllers; pilots and maintenance alike. Even the taxi in stop marks are not painted in standard designations. Ground crews must deal with such designations as 673; 400; 572; 573; etc; as well as FAA standard designations. When we have an accident and the public finds out about all the nonstandard jargon and lack of direction regarding standardized phraseology we will look like proper fools. But if an observer looks within the mixed cultures at this airline; that non standard phraseology would be found embedded within other; very influential environments where it should not be; such as schedules; training doctrine and fleet designations. Get rid of it. The verbiage used by ramp controllers; pilots; maintenance and internal publications should exactly match that of the FAA.




Synopsis: B757 Captain laments the use of 'jargon' by ground crewmen; Ramp Control and Ground Control to describe various aircraft types when issueing instructions. Even gate markings do not match standard FAA designations.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DSV.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ROC
ATC / advisory: TRACON ROC
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: VFR flight from to DSV. Aircraft is equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In and Out. During both flights and multiple times each flight Traffic Information System (TIS) traffic was not displayed in spite of the receiver indicating a good ADS-B signal. I spoke with a radar technician at ROC TRACON and inquired if there had been any equipment malfunctions with TIS. He checked the equipment logs and advised that the Hornell ADS-B Ground Station (4G6) indicated frequent data loss. I found no NOTAM issued by ITT as required. ITT did not notify ROC Tech Ops as required. Situation went unresolved until at least [two days later].Contractor (ITT) should be compelled to notify all users when a malfunction occurs.




Synopsis: C150 pilot expressed concern that ADS-B outages are not always NOTAMed properly.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BGR.Airport, ME
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BGR
ATC / advisory: TRACON BGR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the Pilot Monitoring on this leg. Upon the arrival into the terminal area; Bangor Approach was giving us radar vectors for the ILS 33 approach. We were eventually told turn to a heading of 360 and to maintain 2500 feet until establish [and] cleared for the ILS 33 approach. At the time; we were in between CUVOT and ELSUH still on the assigned heading when we received a 'terrain terrain; pull up' with a ground proximity caution message on the PFD. The captain proceeded with a go-around procedure. I contacted ATC and we were given a heading and altitude to fly. We then performed all necessary procedures to come back around and land safely. We asked ATC what the possible cause of the alert was and he then advised us that his minimum vectoring altitude was 2100 feet in the area (we were at 2500) and that he has seen it happen before to aircraft due to a hill between CUVOT and ELSUH. Escape maneuver followed by an uneventful landing and arrival to the gate. Request to join the localizer at a higher altitude in IMC conditions


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew was receiving vectors for an ILS approach when they received a GPWS Terrain warning and conducted a miss approach and landed without incident.
Date: 201302
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EC135
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Skid
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon landing; pilot was met by FAA Inspector for a ramp check. Inspector noticed that left rear skid shoe was missing two bolts. Missing bolts were not noticed on pilot's preflight inspection. Bolts could have departed aircraft during flight. Skid shoes inspected and found to be worn through to the skid tube which was found to be worn out of limits. Aircraft grounded immediately. Preflight checklist calls for landing gear and step condition inspection. Bolts very difficult to see and skid shoes cannot be inspected fully unless the aircraft is jacked up. Aircraft used for training a lot and skid shoes get more than normal abuse. Perhaps an inspection after a lot of training would help. Changing checklist to include the above items would also help.




Synopsis: FAA Inspector points out worn skid shoes and missing shoe attach bolts to EC135 pilot.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: O69.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Taxied out to the departure end of runway and called for clearance. Was told to wait 10 minutes as an aircraft was having an issue overhead and we could not be released. Called back and received clearance; and began takeoff roll. Just before V (rotation) around 85 KTS; a small group of birds took off in front of the aircraft. One hit the right wing; another hit the tail; and another was ingested by the left engine. The left engine sounded unhealthy. I chose to abort; brought throttles to idle; and began braking. The right tire blew out; further down the runway I locked the left tire. The aircraft stopped in the overrun about 80 FT from the end.  I believe the delay waiting for clearance was a factor in this event. The birds had time to become comfortable around the runway while we waited at the end. In similar situations in the future it would be helpful to taxi down the runway first in order to clear away wildlife.




Synopsis: EA50 pilot is instructed to hold for release from an uncontrolled airport and call back in ten minutes. When released birds are encountered on the roll and the takeoff is rejected; resulting in a blown tire and stopping in the overrun.