Date: 201410
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Both the Captain and I are new to the aircraft (B-737); I had consolidated last trip with around 120-hours in type. The Captain had not yet consolidated; and had less than 100-hours in type at the time of this occurrence. We had discussed possible arrival scenarios; approach options; and reviewed available Jeppesen pages as well as flight plan information including ATIS and NOTAM's en route to destination. Extensive prior planning; did not mitigate what turned out to be a high workload scenario close-in to the terminal area. We were cleared for an approach via routing we had not expected; but managed this aspect professionally. During the transition to final; we were told to look out for traffic; a GA aircraft; which I had the impression was not under direct ATC control. About to intercept final; we were told the glideslope was OTS so we transitioned to an RNAV approach. As the pilot not flying; I setup the FMS; MCP; and DA's for the cleared approach; and quickly briefed the changes. Still new to the aircraft; I closely monitored the CDU and FMAs to make sure the aircraft was indeed doing what we had commanded. The GA traffic was still being called out to us; which effectively divided the cockpit. Starting down final approach; we encountered strong; gusty crosswind conditions. The Captain was flying the aircraft; monitor my actions; and looking for GA traffic. I was setting up the instruments; handling the radio; making commanded configuration changes; and when time permitted; I was looking for conflict traffic. We were nearing 1;000 feet on final approach. Our configuration at this time was approach ref for 15; gear down; flaps 25 and the Captain was hand flying. The Captain verbally made mention of the strong gusty winds he was encountering and said he was going to carry some speed. We were both still looking for conflict traffic and missed the erroneous altitude/flap configuration until below 1;000 FT. I called Flaps to complete the checklist. The Captain stated due to gusty crosswinds; he wanted to stay at Flaps 25. Flaps 25? I honestly had to think for a moment; can we land Flaps 25? I did not think so; but given our position; currently around 500 FT on final approach; I was conflicted with situational self doubt (had I missed something in training?; had there been another change to the 737 Bulletins/Ops Procedures that I missed?; had the Captain been taught something in training that I hadn't concerning handling gusty crosswinds?). Situationally; I felt that broaching the commanded Flaps 25 landing at that phase of flight; close-in to the airport on final approach; while the Captain had his hands full of aircraft; would have presented more of a safety issue for us at that time. We landed Flaps 25. We had speeds for Flaps 15 and landed Flaps 25; it was a hot landing. After clearing the runway; I asked the Captain; can we land the 737 at Flaps 25? Without question; I'm truly embarrassed; disappointed in my performance; and humbled by this experience. I failed in my duties and responsibilities to support the pilot flying and observed a situation that should have been brought to the Captain's immediate attention. Without question; I should have exercised the no fault go-around provisions we enjoy and regret not having done so in this case.


Second narrative: After last minute approach change and tower hand-off at just over 1000 FT AGL new Captain with less than 100 hours in seat was informed by tower of gusty crosswinds. He directed the First Officer to change pre-briefed 30 degree flap landing to a 25 degree flap landing IAW with the last aircraft gusty wind landing procedure (757/767) that he last flew for over a decade and to put in a valid Vref for the new flap configuration. First Officer; although a bit confused; went heads-down to find the speed; which doesn't exist; since only flaps 15; 30 and 40 are authorized landing configurations for 737s. Captain elected to land anyway. Mistake was realized on rollout.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports landing with a flap setting of 25 due to strong gusty winds which is contrary to the company's authorized landing flap settings. Low time for both pilots in the aircraft; ATC issues and weather were cited as factors in the incident.