elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: August 2013; ZZZ Maintenance called in with a Number 2 Flight Control Computer (FCC) faulting the on-side Stick Shaker motor during the Auto Flight System (AFS) Return to Service Check to maintain the Lower Landing Minimums (LLM) status to CAT-3. I talked with the Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) about the fault he was having; and he advised that the Stick Shaker Test passed for the Number 1 FCC. Each FCC will test both stick shakers during their individual AFS tests. He also had an FCC-2 fault; which is deferrable item requiring further troubleshooting and requiring a detailed measurements test for the FCC in question. The Number 2 Autopilot (AP) was placed on MEL 22-10-01 based on the fact that the AFS Test faulted the stick shaker motor during the AFS test only. The FCC was not FAILED; which is a non-deferrable fault. This event developed due to the misinterpretation that the Stick Shaker motor or the FCC was at fault. These items were operational; the stick shakers are tested by both FCC's during the AFS Test. The FCC tests several components that make up the Autopilot and Auto Flight System. If the stick shaker motor was FAILED; then it would not pass the Number 1 FCC AFS Test. If the FCC was FAILED; or the stick shaker motor would not test individually; then using the Autopilot MEL would be incorrect. Maintenance Support. Maintenance Control Manager.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Control Manager explains why an MEL deferral of Number 2 Autopilot on a DC-10 aircraft was allowed with a Number-2 Flight Control Computer (FCC) fault.
Date: 201306
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Several months ago the weather overlays in Flight Explorer were changed to eliminate redundant products in what I understand to be a cost saving measure. One of the changes was to our Worldwide IR Sat image (we no longer get cloud top data in terms of altitude). Also; our World Wide Lightning Data overlay was now provided by WSI. As it turns out WSI has no coverage for lightning data in South America at all and that was in no way communicated to the Dispatch group. After seeing a highly unusual number of what appeared to be very quiet days over the equator in recent weeks; I finally took it upon myself to compare our data with the WSI Meteorologists data. It appeared to be the same. I thought it was unusual to see so many Convective Sigmet boxes with no lightning anywhere on the continent. They agreed. A call was made to the WSI offices and they confirmed that they have no coverage in South America. I asked if it is indeed their data we were using in Flight Explorer for world wide data. They did not know. I sent an email to the management group who confirmed that WSI was our provider for lightning data world wide.  I informed them they never had data for South America which they didn't know. Cloud top data combined with lightning data is the only reliable way to provide crews with information in regards to thunderstorm activity in areas where there is no weather radar coverage. The lack of lightning data and the fact that the Dispatch group was never informed that this region no longer has coverage has caused many flight crews to be led to believe that there was very little activity enroute over South America when that has not been the case.  As a result; FAR 121.601 a and b have not been properly complied with. During the flights; I did not provide the crews with information that may affect the safety of the flight such as thunderstorms because the decision was made to switch to a product that was not equal to the previous one and I was never informed. I was led to believe they were equal.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher realized that his dispatching tools did not provide South American cloud cover and lightning data overlay information which prevented him from complying with FAR 121.601 (A)(B) regarding pilot/dispatcher weather briefing about convective weather.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During approach I thought I smelled an 'oily' scent. No one else in the crew complained of any unusual smells so I thought it might just be my imagination. Being curious; I asked the F/O (First Officer) if he noticed anything unusual. He said he caught a whiff of something. We were on final approach and landed the aircraft. At the gate I asked our #1 F/A (Flight Attendant) if she noticed any unusual scent and she said no. I then asked the F/A working in the back of the aircraft and he said he smelled a chemical odor during descent.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported smelling an 'oily' odor in the cockpit which was also reported by flight attendants in the aft galley.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SYR.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SYR
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We were] cleared for takeoff on Runway 28. While on the takeoff roll I noticed the IAS flag appeared on my airspeed tape around 60 KTS for about 1 second then went away. While going through 80 KTS the IAS flag re-appeared and I noticed it was also on the First Officer's PFD as well. I decided to execute a rejected takeoff at approximately 90 to 95 KTS. Contributing factors included: Weather and icing conditions [on previous leg]. Since we were heading back into possible weather and icing conditions I felt it was safer to abort and call Maintenance for guidance.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain aborted takeoff when IAS flag appeared twice on his tape; the previous leg was flown in icing conditions.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Stratofortress (B-52)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I came in to relieve the R-Side; he had no D-Side at the time. However; the R-Side was too busy to give a relief briefing. I asked if he could use the help of a D-Side and he said yes. I stepped in on the D-Side to help out; but was never given a real briefing. At the time a B-52 was breaking off from his flight with his partner who was refueling. The B-52 was requesting the local MOA. The airspace was scheduled to be active on the hour. The R-Side asked me to coordinate the use of the airspace and make the airspace active right then; and also request the MOA to be active on the hour since it wasn't scheduled until then. I called the surrounding sectors and got the airspace; at the same time I was trying to update the B-52's flight plan so that he was routed into the airspace and so that he had a delay in the flight plan. Around 10 past the hour an adjacent sector called to ask if subject area was active. I replied that it was; and at that moment realized that during the confusion I neglected to coordinate the use of the airspace with them. I would dare say that most; if not all controllers; have done like I did and just stepped in on the D-Side to help out without receiving a proper briefing. I also know that I will no longer do that; and I will be sure to receive a proper briefing before doing any coordination or any other control function.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described an airspace infraction event alleging a hurried attempt to help a R-Side Controller by assisting at the D-Side without a proper briefing caused the event.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-500
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On departure; we put the gear up and the left main gear indicator remained in the down green indication. We ran appropriate checklists; burned off fuel; and returned uneventfully.




Synopsis: A B737-500 left main landing gear indicted down and green after the gear was raised on takeoff.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While in cruise at FL380 the flight attendants called to let us know there was an unusual smell that several passengers had alerted them to that we quickly smelled. It did not last long and while looking at the overhead panel I noticed the gasper fans showed off with no EICAS or status message. The Captain and I checked the QRH and found no checklist. The flight attendants called and said the smell was quickly dissipating. We felt this was something that overheated and had shut itself off. The other First Officer who was on break was awakened and asked to check the cabin for any signs of smoke. While he was looking we attempted to use SATCOM to call Dispatch and get patched through to [Maintenance] which took almost 15 minutes to accomplish. The other First Officer who was to be the flying pilot for landing called back and said the smell had returned and several passengers were complaining about it. By now we were talking with Dispatch and [Maintenance] as well as each other and all three of us decided since the smell returned no need for further risk and we diverted to [a nearby alternate]. Before we descended the other First Officer switched seats with me and I resumed the position of relief officer. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate airport after flight attendants and passengers noticed an unusual smell in the cabin that may have been associated with the gasper fans.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Arrived in ZZZ; upon opening door gate agents informed us that we were losing the aircraft. Said I knew aircraft was next door. New crew was on my jet bridge and stated they had a fume event. Event was logged and crew sought no medical help. I wandered over to that aircraft; can't remember tail number and contract was on aircraft. He stated that [Maintenance Control] called and said his run crew had arrived. He explained that they were doing a partial burn out procedure; which included running engines and packs. Also #3 brake was sticking and pulling right according to crew. I never heard a word about an aircraft change nor maintenance procedure until the door opened. I inquired with Dispatch and they said they informed the gate we would be changing aircraft 45 minutes to 1 hour prior. Gate says they were told upon landing. In none of this did I ever hear from or speak with [Maintenance Control] or Dispatch. I informed the Contact Maintenance that I would not run the aircraft without proper airway and eye protection. After about 2 hours; [Customer Service] called and offered hotel rooms that had us reporting back in 1.5-2 hours. None of us accepted; we felt we would spend more time traveling. Assistant Chief Pilot called and asked me about my fume event. I explained it was not mine; and I would only run the aircraft with the proper protections. As you can see; I was never in the loop on anything.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported communication breakdown between flight crew and Maintenance regarding a fume event which required a 'partial burnout procedure.'
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Traffic Watch
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Local 2 and helicopter position combined with no local assist. There is currently one runway closed on the north side of the airport; which I was responsible for; leaving one runway for arrivals and departures. I had a big enough hole on final to get two departures out. The second departure was Aircraft Z; a B350. Props are issued a 271 degree heading off if they are going northbound; but in the interest of time I did not issue this with the takeoff clearance; but was going to issue it once airborne. There was also a helicopter I approved a transition through the Class B airspace northbound at 1500 feet. As Aircraft Z was beginning takeoff roll Aircraft Y on approximately 2 mile final and announced a go around. I advised Aircraft Z to fly runway heading; instructed Aircraft Y to maintain 2000 feet and fly runway heading. Aircraft Y was approximately 900 feet at the time. I recognized the helicopter transitioning at 1500 feet was in conflict with Aircraft Y and immediately instructed Aircraft Y to stop climbing. Aircraft Y leveled off at approximately 1100 feet. My initial focus of attention was on Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y; since this was the most apparent conflict. I then realized Aircraft Y was in conflict with the helo transitioning at 1500 feet and took actions to deconflict. I recommend VFR helicopter transitions and loitering in the vicinity of the runways at any altitude be prohibited. Over the years there have been many close calls with helicopters and go arounds and these operations are unnecessary. There are other options like circumnavigating the Class B airspace to the east. Mixing helicopters with jets and sharing altitudes is unsafe; especially with unplanned go arounds.




Synopsis: A Tower Local Controller reported an aircraft initiating a go-around was in confliction with a helicopter transitioning the airspace.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the CLIPR2 RNAV arrival into DCA we were instructed to maintain 310 kts and cross CLIPR at 12;000 ft. Roughly 20 miles from CLIPR our instructions were amended to cross CLIPR at 280 kts and 12;000 ft. In order to reduce airspeed we had to reduce our rate of descent. The rate of descent was reduced to an angle that allowed the speed to be achieved but kept us high on altitude. We crossed CLIPR at roughly 13;000 ft and were informed by ATC to cross 5 miles north of BAL at 11;000 for traffic clearance which was accomplished. In retrospect; utilization of the speed brakes to increase rate of descent as well as notifying ATC of our inability to accommodate the amended clearance would have been more proactive.




Synopsis: EMB-170 pilot reported not crossing a specified intersection at the correct altitude due to a speed reduction by ATC while on the CLIPR2 RNAV arrival into DCA.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 170
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On second approach for landing; after both main wheels touched down; the aircraft moved diagonally from the center of the runway to the left edge; applied right rudder to correct the move left; reorienting the direction of the aircraft back toward the center of the runway; but the left wing dipped and the aircraft felt as if the landing gear wanted to go right; while the mass of the aircraft was going to keep going left; in a twisting motion. I initiated a go around. I did not have sufficient airspeed to correct the left wing dip with ailerons. Before the aircraft achieved sufficient airspeed to lift off directional control was lost and the aircraft ground looped coming to rest on the nose; right main gear and right wing. Winds at the time were reported as 040 @ 10. Pilot and non-rated passenger were both able to escape the aircraft without injury.




Synopsis: C170 pilot reported loss of directional control after touchdown; resulting in a ground loop with the aircraft coming to rest on its nose.