Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was acting as a Check Airman performing training for a First Officer for an ETOPS line check. The First Officer and I showed 30 minutes prior to the rest of the crew for a pre-brief. I had requested that the dispatcher send me an advance copy of the release to use in the pre-brief. My advance copy of the release included a note stating that the 'Grid MORA (Minimum Off Route Altitudes) Check - Failed'. That is; the flight planning system concluded that the route of flight and aircraft weight were such that we did not meet single engine drift down criteria for that segment of the flight over the mountains. The release did not include a drift down alternate. I sent a text to the Captain to advise him of the discrepancy so that he might check his final copy of the release for the same error. I then called our Dispatcher and sought clarification on the APU cold soak request; which was also on the release; but failed to ask him to correct the drift down issue. I then proceeded with training the First Officer. Later; I queried the Captain on this point; but failed to check the final copy of the release to see if it included the same error. As the Check Airman on this flight; I should have pressed the point further. Instead; I left it to the Captain to follow up as I worked with the First Officer on the preflight process. Several lines of defenses were penetrated. First; it is puzzling to me that flight planning software would permit a release to be completed without an error message requiring that the drift down calculation be resolved by either 1) the filing of an alternate; or 2) rerouting the flight. Second; the Dispatcher apparently did not know of the failed Grid MORA check or did not act on it. Does the flight planning software flag a failed check? The remaining defenses were the members of the flight crew; and me; the Check Airman for that flight. Although discussed; I failed to close the circle on the concern and ensure that the release was amended. A failed Grid MORA check is rare in our carrier's operations. Therefore; it is not at the forefront of pilots' minds. However; the flight profile of a heavy 757 in the mountain west increases the chances that this will be seen again. I recommend a communication to the crews on this point for awareness. The flight planning software is a tool. As such; its output should never contain such a flaw that puts a crew in the path of failure and regulatory non-compliance. This next point is key: The human element - dispatchers and pilots - can fail to correct an error in a release due to workload; distractions; and training; as this event shows. The strength of software is that it can include reliable defenses that will not readily fail. I suggest a fail safe feature be written into the flight planning software that will not permit the Dispatcher to complete a release unless the Grid MORA check is resolved.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Dispatcher and flight crew allowed a heavy B757 to depart even though the flight planning software determined the Minimum Off Route Altitudes (MORAs) could not be met crossing the mountains.