Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Logbook Entry; MEL; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were scheduled to fly to ZZZ. The aircraft had MEL 36-X-X on it when we picked it up. Flying across the ocean for a week; with such a significant MEL; violates the whole spirit and intent of the MEL concept. I can see using the MEL to get the airplane to a maintenance base. But to cross the Atlantic with a known deficiency and only one backup? The very next day; that one backup failed; as the APU bleed duct on this airplane blew a clamp. Hundreds of passengers were then depending on only one bleed source. This was a marginal operation from the beginning. And I knew it. There were multiple fume events in the previous 10 days. There was a FAM crew on the airplane the night we refused the airplane and they told us several days later that there were bad fumes all through the flight to ZZZ. The MEL specifically mentions restrictions based on 120 minutes ETOPS; FL230 or below if other bleed system failure and icing considerations. PROCEDURES NOTE:APU and APU bleed air supply systems are operate (not on MEL). APU does not have to be started or operated during any portion of the flight unless the remaining engine bleed air supply system fails. In this case (failure of a second engine bleed air supply system); start the APU and use the APU bleed after descending to FL230 or below.A. Do not operate flight on ETOPS flights in excess of 120 minutes.B. During cockpit preparation1. Ensure associated ENGINE BLEED on overhead AIR panel 225VU pb-sw is selected OFF.2. Refer to ECAM Non Normal Supplemental Manual ABNORM BLEED CONFIG procedure.3. Ensure CROSSBLEED valve on overhead AIR panel 225 VU is selected OPEN.4. Consider the severity of forecast icing conditions. If the remaining engine bleed air supply system becomes inoperative; the wing anti ice will be lost.C. In flight1. In the event of the remaining engine bleed air supply system failure or associated engine failure accomplish the following: Apply associated ECAM procedure; then refer to QRH Dual Bleed Loss procedure.CAUTION:Reset ENG BLEED pb-sw as requested by ECAM procedure even if the ENG BLEED pb-sw is placarded inoperative per MEL.(DP) PROCEDURESA. Do not dispatch flight on ETOPS flights in excess of 120 minutes.B. Plan flight at or below FL370. The weather was deteriorating in ZZZ and icing was anticipated in clouds and precipitation. There was turbulence on the tracks we would not be able to climb above due to the altitude restriction. We felt that it was not the prudent thing to do in the interest of safety; to cross the North Atlantic with these restrictions. Then to add insult to an already stressful situation we were informed by crew tracking that we would be removed without pay and given a missed trip if we refused. This is an outright threat. Never; and I mean never; in my 35 years at Company X have I ever been threatened with my paycheck or possible disciplinary action for making a safety call. The chief pilot was very supportive but in the end he regretted to inform me that we would not be paid for being a Captain/crew and making the tough decisions that crews are tasked with on a daily basis. This is in fact what you pay me to do and when I do it I am financially penalized. The irony in all of this was I refused an airplane last month for the very same MEL and was paid for the trip. But this month the company is requiring that a trip be cancelled in order to be paid for it. This is holding a financial hammer over the heads of pilots and saying if you take an airplane with known deficiencies you will be paid. If you don't; you will suffer the financial consequences. Classic pilot pushing. This has to stop and now before we lose an airplane and 300 paying passengers. But it seems the company only worries about their own time or cancellation numbers not safety. So disappointed. Airplanes break. Quit holding the financial hammer over pilot's heads!Have adequate spare parts on hand. Fix the airplanes. Fly people on safe airplanes. Except now that this crew has been punished for doing the right thing no future decisions will be made without being; at least subconsciously; run through our 'what is this going to cost me financially to make this decision' filter. Every one. And they think this is not putting money over safety. One burning question I would really like to know the answer to is did scheduling threaten the reserve crew that was called out the same way we were threatened? It could be as subtle as you're the last crew available or something more sinister like you're going to get a missed trip and a call from the chief pilot if you don't take the broken airplane.




Synopsis: A330 Captain reported refusing a flight due to safety issues related to an MEL and ETOPS noncompliance.