Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after push; and prior to engine start; received EICAS message HYD PUMP DEMAND C-2.  Called local maintenance and was told to come back to gate. Was eventually given a MEL for this failed Hydraulic Pump that did not involve crew action or performance penalty. When I investigated this MEL; and talked to local mechanics; I then discovered that it was not the correct MEL for the air driven pump we had issues with. ..and that mechanics had also pulled circuit breaker on electric pump C2 in same center system. Upon a discussion with Maintenance Control; and local Maintenance; we discovered that wrong MEL was being applied.  I began to doubt if Maintenance Control or local maintenance understood the problem; let alone how to fix or properly secure broken pump. I have also had several prior MEL issues in the preceding weeks that have given me concern that I was not getting the real information I needed to make a good decision about accepting this aircraft on a 10 hour flight.  In all three of these cases I was given false information from Maintenance Control about the history and condition of the airplane.  Based on these prior MEL's incidences and deferral; as well as the constantly changing MEL's of this flight; I did not feel comfortable with accepting the airplane. I told this to Duty Manager and Dispatcher.  The Duty Manager then connected me to the B-777 Tech Department who told me that he believed aircraft was safe to accept with the MEL that he was given (29-11-B). I continued to debate this with my crew; as well as the Duty Manager about taking airplane; but just when we began to feel more comfortable with the idea of taking aircraft; with this MEL; the mechanics would do a test and find something else.  Up to 4 different MEL's were issued to us in the course of the evening.  I explained to the Duty Manager and the B-777 Tech Department that this was more of issue to me than just the original EICAS message and this one MEL. They kept telling me that this was the only issue.  I also explained that I was sitting in the cockpit and hearing and seeing a lot of things that caused me to doubt if this was merely a single bad pump; or possibly several bad pumps; or even a pump that may not turn off and possibly overheat. But the cell phone connection was very poor; and there was a lot of talking in the cockpit as the mechanics performed all their checks; which I was watching very closely; and not liking what I was seeing. This coupled with these prior recent MEL issues that resulted in multiple systems failing once in flight; on several prior flights; gave me pause for accepting airplane. But the Duty Manager and the B-777 Tech Department did not agree with this.  There were constant calls and ACARS coming in from crew scheduling; the Duty Manager and dispatch as well. The gate agent also was asking me to 'make a decision and or to cancel the flight' which I told her was NOT appropriate at this time. All of these people constantly badgering and arm twisting me and my crew; played a role in our fatigue. But the core issue was that I did NOT feel comfortable taking airplanes knowing the potential for other pumps and systems failing or overheating on such a long flight; especially given my recent history with Maintenance Control and local maintenance in the last few weeks. Eventually; since local maintenance could not fix the pump by the time we hit our Crew Critical Off-Time (CCO) time; and had told me they would not be able to do so within next hour or so; we agreed that we would be too tired to waive. As we came closer to the CCO; the dispatcher asked us if we would waive; and we all agreed that we were too tired to safely begin a 10 hour flight this late.


Second narrative: The three of us reviewed the flight plan as well as the weather. There were thunderstorms in the airport area and along the first hour of our routing with tops over FL600. We also discussed arrival weather as there was a probability of thunderstorms at the destination starting one hour after our scheduled arrival time. After a thorough briefing we left Flight Planning and arrived at the gate. We were informed by the gate agent that although the gate has been open the aircraft was still at the maintenance hangar. We were finally able to board the aircraft about twenty minutes prior to scheduled departure. We finally pushed off the gate 35 minutes late. During pushback we got a status message about the C2 demand pump. I coordinated with Ramp Control while the Captain (CA) and First Officer (FO) talked with maintenance. Maintenance requested a gate return. Maintenance Control informed us we could be released under MEL 29-11-D. The technicians complied with this MEL. While the CA; FO; and I reviewed the flight crew duties connected with this MEL the CA realized it was not the correct MEL for our condition. We had a C2 Demand pump failure and the MEL had the technicians disable our C2 electric pump. We finally got the maintenance techs back out to correct the improper MEL and troubleshoot the actual problem. After; extensive troubleshooting the Status Message went away. During this time we had two passengers deplane and our Ramp Agents had to remove their bags. We and the Flight Attendants (FA) were unaware two passengers had decided not to fly. We tried contacting operations via VHF and could not communicate with them. I then tried calling the phone number listed but got a recording they had terminated operations for the night and to leave a message. We later found out the radios had gone down and that is why we could not communicate with local maintenance or operations. We finally received confirmation two passengers had deplaned. Now it was raining on the field and with the APU fuel burn we needed new takeoff data to include wet runway. As we reran the checklist for push back the Status Message for the C2 demand pump returned. The mechanics worked tirelessly trying to troubleshoot the problem again. We received an ACARS request and the CA received a telephonic request to extend our Crew Critical Off-Time (CCO) he respectfully refused to extend. We talked with the maintenance guys and discovered the correct MEL would be 29-11-B. It requires a complex test needing 30-40 minutes to complete followed by extensive crew action before and after takeoff. The lead gate agent came up to the cockpit and informed us we were going to extend our CCO time and take the aircraft with the MEL. The agent also told us we now had about 15 passengers in the jet bridge contemplating not going on the flight. Apparently; Crew Scheduling decided for us we would extend our CCO 30 minutes and were taking the aircraft with the MEL. We were going to require the 30-40 minute maintenance procedure; bags removed for the passengers not wanting to continue on the flight; and on top of that with APU fuel burn we would require refueling. It was clearly evident the flight was not going to depart in a timely manner and we all three were feeling too fatigued to continue for another 10 plus hours. The stresses of dealing with an incorrect MEL that would have left us in an undesired aircraft state; unknown complications with the C2 demand pump not operating correctly; extensive ground delay; the agent repeatedly coming onto the flight deck demanding answers; and pestering from Crew Scheduling to extend and to just take the aircraft was exhausting.


Synopsis: B777 flight crew receives an EICAS status message during push back indicating the C2 Demand Hyd-pump had failed; and returns to the gate. The pump is deferred using the wrong MEL; which the crew detects; requiring a great deal of extra time and effort on the part of maintenance and eventually resulting in flight cancellation due to crew fatigue.