elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating under: Other unknown
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cleared for LaGuardia 5 Departure and flew initial heading 040 till 2.5NM then heading 180 and cleared to climb via; initially climbing to 5;000. Departure controller then assigned us to climb to 8;000 and turn to heading 020. Next the Departure controller told us proceed direct to JFK and climb to 16;000. LGA 5 Whitestone climb was not available in the FMS to load. Pilot not Flying (PNF) was assigned 16;000; he read back 16;000. Pilot Flying confirmed 16;000. After passing 12;600 a different controller notified us the assignment was 12;000ft. PNF stated the prior controller issued 16;000 to ATC and inquired if the error was ours or theirs. The controller didn't answer the question he said it wasn't a problem and could do 16;000ft. We read back selected and confirmed this. We climbed as instructed; seemed like a controller mismatch on controller handoffs. We immediately leveled and responded when asked.




Synopsis: Captain reported receiving different altitude assignments from ATC after a frequency change.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Luscombe Model 8/Luscombe 50
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was in cruise at 1000 MSL. Approximately 2.5 NW of airport; intending to enter crosswind leg for Runway XX (in use; several aircraft in pattern). Skydiving single engine appeared in windscreen; ahead; 11 o'clock; very close (100-250 ft.); in steep descent for Runway YY to land. I was listening on CTAF; but never heard his call(s).The skydiving plane rarely uses runway in use; instead preferring nearest available. Very dangerous when multiple aircraft are using another runway. Frequently 'cut off' others. Skydiving aircraft has a very steep descent angle and unpredictable path. My aircraft has hand-held radio only; reception is ok but transmission is poor. [I'd recommend] extreme vigilance. Better radio transmit/receive. Recommend the skydiving aircraft use same runway as others when more than one aircraft is in the pattern and be more vigilant/aware of others. Always enter pattern on the 45 downwind.




Synopsis: Luscombe 8 pilot reported entering the crosswind at an uncontrolled airport while another aircraft entered the pattern unannounced for the crossing runway.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback and engine start; my before taxi was interrupted when I noticed the squawk was not inputted. I left the flow to enter the PDC and retrieve the code. I had some difficulty with the box; and it took longer than expected. Once the code was retrieved and entered; my concentration was interrupted by ground movement off our right wing that I was monitoring. Then Ground asked us if we were ready to taxi and I said yes. Once taxiing; we saw that the flaps were up. We stopped short of the runway and accomplished the flow checklist and looked for other errors we could have missed. I was definitely rusty having not flown much in the previous 30-90 days. So; finish a flow; accomplish the checklist; and slow down when things are busy.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported taxiing out to the runway and finding items were missed during their before taxi flow checklist.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On climbout with an assigned altitude of 4000 FT the flying pilot (Captain) did not follow his command bars and allowed the aircraft to accelerate to 270 KTS. This appeared to be an automation and workload management issue. As I announced this deviation he was slow to correct which allowed the airspeed to achieve a maximum of 270 KTS betweent 3500-3800 FT. Shortly after this correction we were given a climb to 5000 FT. All normal altitude SOPS were followed but as we approached 4500 FT I could see that the flying pilot was again deviating now above the pitch bar and was not appearing to level. I made one verbal attempt to correct the condition with no results. I then; as pilot monitoring; pitched the aircraft over in order to minimize the altitude deviation. We achieved a maximum deviation of 180 FT. As I leveled I the aircraft at 5000 FT I gave full control back to the flying pilot. There were no conflicts or comments from ATC. At cruise altitude we performed a full debrief to include possible causes and remedies.


Second narrative: After dept on 360 heading; [we] entered clouds. As I approached my cleared altitude of 4000 FT'; I accelerated to 250 KTS. I was hand flying; attempting to slow the climb rate; and with the pilot monitoring on radio I ignored the flight director and got 20 KTS fast. Pilot monitoring pointed out the excess speed and we were given a climb to 5000 FT with a turn and a traffic report at 6000 FT. During the correction to airspeed I overshot my altitude by 180 FT leveling at 5180 FT. I was dealing with speed correction; turn; and level off without flight director guidance because of earlier deviation and thinking of the 6000 FT (as my clearded altitude vs. the traffic's altitude) when Pilot monitoring helped spot/correct Altitude deviation.


Synopsis: A320 Flight Crew reports altitude and speed deviations during departure with the Captain hand flying and not precisely following the flight director commands.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 25 minutes after departure; the flight called [Maintenance Control] directly to advise of slat handle that would not retract. Crew was unable to increase airspeed to SR speed also. [Operations Control] was not advised until after the call ended. The flight decided to return to ZZZZ. Fuel dump required due to over MAX LGW. I sent an ACARS to the crew advising them that we were aware of the air turn back and to advise location / amount of fuel dump. Crew advised over SATCOM that the fuel dump valves were malfunctioning and that fuel dump was very slow. Crew had DISAG on left fuel dump valve. Crew had to extend landing gear and speed breaks to increase burn while holding until below MAX LGW. Tech pilot brought onto the call at request of crew to see if there was any way to clear the stuck slats or fuel dump system. No help; best course of action was to continue holding and return to ZZZZ when under MAX LGW.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported MD-11 flight crew encountered slat handle stuck in the extended position.
Date: 201508
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was assigned to work on aircraft to troubleshoot deferrals [Deferral No. 1] and [Deferral No. 2] per FIM 27-62-01. I attempted the operational test per AMM 27-62-00-715-002. This test failed. I then performed the B.I.T.E. of the SAC. This test has 2 levels one being the auto test; the other being the rig test. The rig test failed. At that point I re-deactivated the auto spoiler system as it was when the aircraft arrived. I was not aware of MIB 6-27-15-08 which explains the rig test bite of the SAC. Consequently the spoiler handle was restricted the spoiler handle movement to 50% travel. I had tested the spoiler handle operation prior to troubleshooting but neglected to do so after troubleshooting.




Synopsis: B767 Maintenance Technician was assigned the task of clearing a spoiler deferral; but was unable to do so. The MEL was reinstated; but the spoiler handle was not tested and the aircraft was dispatched with the spoiler restricted to 50% of normal.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Conducted a monitored CAT 1 LDA approach. Upon breaking out at minimums I took the controls from the FO and attempted to align the aircraft with the runway. Upon doing so; the right wingtip and right outboard flap made contact with the runway.During this event we had the threats of offset approach; IFR conditions; and mountainous terrain.


Second narrative: The threats into this airport are the offset LDA to the runway; IMC conditions; Mountainous terrain; and the upslope grade of the runway. The right wing being low during touchdown was an undesired aircraft state.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported striking a wing tip and outboard flap in the landing flare.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Clear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA; TRACON LSV
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was on a flight to TRM via BTY vor to TNP Vor using GPS with a moving map on an MDX 20.  I asked for flight following from Oakland Center.  During the course of the flight I was consistently lost on Radar and asked to contact the next ATC station 50-75NM down the way.  Each time I told ATC my route; no one advised that I would violate Restricted Airspace.  I asked Nellis Control if Shoshone MOA was hot and was told negative.  I was handed off to Los Angeles Center and told them my destination.  I could see on my moving map that I was going to miss R-2502E by a safe distance.  I did not see R-2502A.  Nothing was said to me until the controller told me I was getting close to restricted space and suggested a turn of 10-15 degrees left; which I did immediately.  A minute later he came back in a panic and asked me to turn to a heading of 075 which I did; then he asked me to call center upon landing. I wasn't positive what the problem was as according to my GPS I did not enter restricted space; but apparently radar says differently.  I called Center and had a good discussion with the Supervisor.  He volunteered that they could have done more to assist me; and that their radar is not that accurate.  I realize that as PIC that it is my responsibility to avoid this airspace.  I either missed it on my GPS or my software is faulty.  I also had a current LA sectional chart I was using and I must have missed it on there; although the chart is currently in my plane and I have not reviewed it.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of possibly violating Restricted airspace while under flight following.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Downloaded the [Flight Plan] for [the] flight. This aircraft had MEL 52-XX-X applied for the inoperative keypad on the flight deck door. While the MEL was applied correctly there were several items in the procedure that raised concern.First; the MEL states the door keypad is deactivated and the deadbolt lock is to be used in flight. The placard next to the deadbolt states that it is for ground use only. The MEL should address this discrepancy and note that the placard no longer applies under this MEL. While I was told the MEL allows us to operate against the restrictions of the posted placard; this seems in direct contrast to our MEL preamble stating.Secondly; the MEL directs you to the FOM which tells you 'USE ALTERNATE FLIGHT DECK ACCESS PROCEDURES. REFER TO FOM FLIGHT DECK ACCESS / FLIGHT DECK SECURITY AND DOOR PROCEDURES / FLIGHT DECK ACCESS PROCEDURES / FLIGHT DECK DOOR.' While the information is on this page in the FOM; it is hidden within the normal procedures and does not have its own alternate header making it difficult to reference.Finally; there is no real guidance on the use of the deadbolt in flight. This should not only include a description of the operation of the deadbolt with warnings of the key inoperable position; but also a briefing. This briefing should include the entire crew on the operation of the deadbolt in normal and emergency operation with each Flight Attendant verifying they have their key.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported discrepancies on the application of an MEL procedure.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JNX.Airport, NC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF JNX
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on the ground at JNX with my student pilot getting ready for a soft field takeoff. The pattern was very congested with 5 aircraft in the pattern in various places. An aircraft had just landed; and there were a few other aircraft on downwind. A downwind aircraft stated that they were extending their downwind for departing traffic. I told my student that after the landing aircraft had exited the runway to be ready for immediate departure. The exiting aircraft called clear at this point and I told my student to make the radio call and take us out. As we were taxing out the aircraft that had said they were extending downwind was now on a 1.5 mile final. I told the student to accelerate and a radio call over the CTAF said go-around. I took the controls from my student to avoid a confliction with the aircraft going around. The aircraft going around side stepped to the right to avoid conflict. At no time was a G1000 traffic advisory issued; and no aircraft came close to contact. The overpopulated pattern with 4 aircraft doing stop and goes and my aircraft trying to find a spot to get out was a contributing factor to this issue. After the aircraft sidestepped; they immediately departed the pattern; and we continued our takeoff and entered left closed traffic to continue landing practice.


Second narrative: Myself and a student who is currently working toward his CFI certificate went out for a training flight. After an hour of practicing maneuvers we approached JNX to practice takeoffs and landings. During our final approach into landing on Runway 21 at JNX my student made a call to let the other traffic in the pattern know of our position and our intentions; shortly after this call another plane pulled out on to the runway in frontof us. We made the decision to go-around and commenced a turn to the west so not to be on a collision course with the downwind traffic. We then proceeded to climb and leave the area.


Synopsis: GA instructors on different aircraft reported conflicting with each other at JNX non-towered airport.  Reportedly; one of the instructor's aircraft took the runway for takeoff as the other was on final prompting a go-around and sidestep to avoid a possible collision.  Traffic volume at the uncontrolled airfield was cited as a contributing factor.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Center cleared us to climb to 15;000 on a heading of 180 with a current altimeter setting of 29.55. The First Officer was flying and we received a TCAS Traffic Advisory at 14;600 MSL climbing. Immediately we received a TCAS 'Adjust Vertical Speed' Resolution Advisory. The First Officer turned off the autopilot/autothrottles and followed the command bars leveling at 14;900 MSL. The traffic was in sight and level at 16;000 MSL. We informed Center that we were responding to a TCAS RA. The First Officer turned on the autopilot when we were level at 15;000 MSL. I then called Center back; again informing him of the TCAS RA. Center responded there was a possible pilot deviation and to copy down a [phone number]. The First Officer followed the TCAS guidelines in the non-normal section of the QRH and we properly responded to the TCAS event.


Second narrative: The Captain notified ATC we were responding to a TCAS RA; but got no reply. I leveled the aircraft at 15;000 feet (our original clearance limit altitude) after the RA terminated. I visually spotted the traffic above us at 16;000 feet and called it out to the Captain. The Captain once again advised Center that we had responded to a TCAS RA. At no time did we bust through our 15;000 feet altitude limit while responding to the TCAS RA.


Synopsis: When a B737-700 flight crew responded as directed to a TCAS RA Center advised their required compliance with the TCAS commands may have resulted in a deviation.