elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I feel on this morning we were already behind the game with the late boarding due to Flight Attendant being very late to the plane. So between playing catch up and on top of that trying to rush to get everything done and be airborne in time to beat storms approaching our destination airport and with reroutes etc.; it was just one of those types of mornings. Everything from the ACARS not giving us the numbers to the taxi and clearance; it all just came together not in our favor.... The First Officer (FO) could not get the numbers because of the transmitting capabilities of ACARS from some terminal areas. So we held part of the checklist until out on taxiway where we could receive that data. About that time we were doing the after start checklist we were notified by ground to contact clearance and get new routing. My FO could not get a word in edgewise because they were so backed up giving reroutes due to weather. Ground said they would like me to taxi so we did. As I taxied; FO received clearance and was inputting it into FMS then moments later [ATC] said; 'Number 1; contact Tower.' FO and I reviewed new legs he put in; did the before takeoff checklist and the cleared for takeoff checklist; and started onto and down the runway.   After takeoff at some point we realized we never had numbers and the rotation speed called was probably from the landing reference speed last set in the box. Take off was without incident and we proceeded and landed safely.I have had this happen lots of times where you cannot get the numbers and have never once before this time forgot to come back to check that the FO got the numbers. FO also forgot as well due to a heavy work load. So again I say take your time if things feel rushed but maybe put a paper reminder in throttles if there is a break in normal checklist items due to a location that might not allow you to get those numbers.




Synopsis: Under time pressure and with several distractions; CRJ700 flight crew missed part of the checklist; failed to compute takeoff numbers; and took off using landing reference speed from the previous flight.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After receiving PA to prepare for landing; we received a call from Captain via telephone to prepare for possible emergency landing due to lack of flaps. Emergency Personnel on ground has been notified and preparing for our arrival we will be landing on a longer runway and coming in a lot faster than normal. Information from Captain as far as preparing was to do our 30 second review. We circled approximately 30-45 minutes. Captain made PA to passengers regarding the situation in a calm and reassuring manner. Approximately 15 minutes later we were on the ground without incident. Emergency personnel and equipment circled aircraft to check for any damage. Taxied in on our own power and deplaned passengers safely via jet bridge. However; I would like it to be noted our first aircraft we were to originally take (which we boarded all passengers) Maintenance was called after the original captain went in the forward lavatory and smelled an electrical burning smell (which intensified during inspection from Maintenance). Decision to deplane all passengers came after a period of time due to the inability of Maintenance locating a source. Original Captain asked if he should turn off electrical power. Maintenance said not necessary. However the burning smell continued to intensify as we stayed on aircraft awaiting decision. Ground Personnel informed us aircraft now out of service and they were in search of another aircraft. After a period of time; Ground Personnel informed us they found another aircraft that has maintenance issues but not as bad as the original aircraft. Our original cockpit crew were replaced with another (due to legalities) which were coming in from [another airport] in approximately 3 plus hours. Once in [our destination] and on our way to the hotel; I asked the Captain if the flaps were the original maintenance problem on this aircraft. He said no it was the anti-skid brakes. Captain said had they both failed it could have been a totally different result. Safety used to be a priority; but now I only wonder.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reports their flight experienced a flap problem which resulted in an emergency landing.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight for our first two legs both of us noticed the crew O2 was pegged past full which; in retrospect; looked out of the ordinary but neither of us mentioned it to the other. We ended up diverting to Ontario on our last leg due to weather at our destination. On the post flight we noticed the crew O2 was now pegged in the other direction; low; and called maintenance. The mechanic said there was a loose connection; possibly the cannon plug; for the cockpit indicator and that the actual bottle pressure was 300 PSI which was well below the 1;000 PSI minimum. To me; it appeared the airplane had flown for some period of time with significantly low flight crew O2 that was unknown to the pilots due to a faulty gauge. Had a situation occurred where we needed the oxygen it might have been a problem. I suggest putting some information out to line pilots about what a faulty crew O2 indication might look like; i.e. fully pegged past full and how often the crew bottle pressure is checked by maintenance. This may just have been a random event but if it happened once it could happen again.




Synopsis: A B737-800 flight crew flew two legs before discovering their flight crew oxygen bottle pressure well below minimum upon completion of their final leg. The pressure gauge had been reading abnormally high which did not trigger further assessment earlier.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: L30.TRACON, NV
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent into LAS; the LAS ATIS initially reported landing runways 19/25. As such; we initially set up for 25L and briefed the 19L approaches. As we neared the airport; they switched runways to the 01/7 runways. On previous occasions; approaching LAS from the West; I have always received vectors for the 01L ILS and that is what we expected. As we crossed over the mountains to the west of LAS; we were told to expect the 01R approach with right traffic and began receiving vectors over the field. We quickly loaded vectors for the RNAV 01R approach and performed a hasty brief. We were following [another air carrier] aircraft that was getting vectors for a much wider traffic pattern. Initially; we expected to receive vectors over the same approximate geographic location as [the other aircraft]; but then realized that ATC was bringing us in for a tighter traffic pattern. Ultimately; ATC gave us vectors inside the FAF for 01R (KIBSE) at 5500 ft. With vectors activated; I armed NAV to join the final approach course; not realizing they had vectored us inside the FAF. NAV did not capture and I disconnected autopilot and manually banked the aircraft to join final. We passed through the final approach course and entered the 01L final approach course. There was no traffic at the time for 01L; but ATC did mention we might receive a RA regarding another aircraft. I banked further to bring us back to the course and received the 'Bank Angle' automation call. After stabilizing on course and continuing the descent to try and catch the glide slope; we realized we were within the 1000 ft stabilization criteria. Still high and fast; we initiated a go-around. We were vectored for 01L and they began setting us up for the same situation - high; fast; vectored inside the FAF. We called for the visual approach; got stabilized and landed uneventfully on 01L.Teach crew recognition of what it looks like to get 'slam dunked' in training. This was my first time truly unable to slow down and go down. We had all available drag out but still couldn't meet the stabilization requirements.




Synopsis: EMB-175 First Officer reported executing a go-around following an unstabilized approach into LAS.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus Undifferentiated UAS
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tail Rotor Blade
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Maintenance did a tail rotor inspection that morning; and needed me to do the run up to check the balance afterwards. They had done an RII (Required Inspection Item) inspection on the work. I did my preflight walk around and looked at the cowlings; latches; tape; wires; and track and balance equipment. I climbed in and started it up; running engine #1 up to idle. Since it was a track and balance; I expected it to not be a normal feeling tail rotor; but this was more vibrations than I would have expected. The maintainer said to shut it down and not even start the other engine. We shut the helicopter down; and used the brake to stop the blades. Upon inspection; one of the tail rotor blades had been installed facing the wrong directionIn the future; I will do more than a normal preflight walk-around following maintenance even if it had an RII. I knew the blades had come off; I held the blade while he was on the ladder. Why I didn't look at the directional of the rotors when I looked at them; I don't know aside from complacency and reliance on the RII. To ensure this won't happen again; I will be sure to verify all aspects of the work that was done with verbal confirmation with the maintainer present.




Synopsis: Captain reported that during a post maintenance engine run up the helicopter experienced excessive vibration and was shut down. It was discovered that the tail rotor blades had been installed backwards.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff from XXR at ZZZ.  Shortly after liftoff the Tower Controller advised us a B737 was going around and to report the traffic in sight (this happened at less than 400 FT AGL.)  The Pilot Monitoring and I both spotted the aircraft; which apparently was performing a go-around from either XYL or XYR and called the traffic to the Tower. We were told to maintain visual with the 737. At this point the traffic was approximately 2-2.5 NM laterally and 200 FT vertically separated looking at the TCAS. We were climbing out at Rated Takeoff power and at V2 + 10 (142 KIAS) and quickly were higher than the 737. The Tower Controller said a couple times 'stay low ' which honestly confused me for a second; and I was not positive if he wanted me to push the nose over and attempt to fly under the crossing traffic (we were still less than 1000 FT AGL.)  I elected to continue climbing out at V2 + 10 and Rated Takeoff power as I could see the 737 out my side window and ascertain that we were out climbing it. When the TCAS engaged we got an RA to 'Monitor Vertical Speed' while in the climb attitude. By the time we crossed paths with the B737 we were 800 FT above them. Once we received the 'Clear of Conflict' message is when I lowered the nose to a more normal climb attitude and reduced to climb power to prepare for flap retraction. Due to the fact that we were on different Tower frequencies; we did not hear any of the communications between the B737 and ZZZ Tower. I believe they ended up on the same departure frequency as us (a B737 flight stated they went around due to a 20 KTS tailwind at 100 FT but I did not catch the flight number.)  Should this happen again I would suggest issuing a turn to the south for the aircraft coming off Runway XX and a turn west for the aircraft coming off XY in VMC to try and get some lateral separation.




Synopsis: A corporate aircraft departed ZZZ Runway XXR and took evasive action visually and using TCAS from a B737 after that aircraft's crew executed a go around from Runway XY because of winds.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Right before we start our landing service; Purser came to the AFT Galley and told us that a Supervisor will be meeting the flight and debrief us with the latest that one of the FOs was tested 'inconclusive.' After meeting with Supervisor; she explained that inconclusive does not mean it's positive; it is just inconclusive.  She said we're welcomed to get tested after we clear customs.  At this point; I would like to know the result from FO test today.  Maybe for privacy issue; they can't really reveal much; but some of us have trips in the next few days.  In fact many of us are scheduled to fly on the X'th.  How should we answer the health [related questions]?




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported wanting to know the results of a First Officer's COVID-19 test before upcoming trips due to concern about exposure.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X arrived at ZZZ. After opening cowling we found a cracked intersect duct and Bleed Valve with wiring damaged and PRSOV (Pressure and Regulating Shutoff Valve) bracket cracked. Parts ordered and next shift started working. Serviceable Bleed Valve; Intersect Duct; PRSOV Bracket were installed by other shift. I finished the installation of the PRSOV and it's ducting. There were problems installing the ducting to the PRSOV without using undue force. We had to remove and rotate ducting upline of the Valve in order to line everything up. We previously had the clamps clocked correctly; but apparently missed one after the final tightening of all clamps.  Possibly the Maintenance Manual could be written so that the final installation step was to check for proper orientation of clamps before closing cowling. i.e. 36-XX-XX-XX-XX X.C. (7) to 36-XX-XX-XX-XX X.C.(13). Steps outlined in Maintenance Manual could be written in better order. Such as making sure of correct clocking of couplings as LAST step prior to closing.




Synopsis: Technician reported difficulty in reinstalling engine pneumatic ducting and overlooked re-torqueing duct clamps.
Date: 201302
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This report summarizes the limitations and restrictions the iPad imposes during use as encountered during flight. While providing crews with electronic access to flight manuals; FOM; etc; it has multiple document viewing limitations that hamper use; and causes frustration and distractions within the cockpit. Limitations are; 1. Only one document can be viewed at a time. This is extremely cumbersome as it takes time to close down and open document; find the next document; look up information needed; close it down; locate the previous document; open it; and re-find the previous information. 2. Auto time out - this is currently set to auto lock the iPad at 5 minutes; and a maximum time out of 15 minutes before requiring re-entry of pass code. This causes distractions as one must stop and re-open the iPad if not touched within that time and if left longer than 15 min; the large pass code lock must be re-typed to open the device. This is unacceptable during critical phases of flight if a document page or flight plan has been called up for reference; and the auto system times out. This occurred numerous times during flight; and was a source of major distractions. 3. Multiple apps must be used to reference the applicable documents utilized during flight - one app contains the flight manuals and FOM; however to view the SABRE flight plans which can be downloaded; one must utilize the iBook reader or the offline browser. Unlike current paper cockpits; one can have the flight plan open for viewing; as well as a reference page from the flight manual; as well as an approach chart; and easily view all three. Not so with the current capabilities of different apps for different documents limitations of the iPad. 4. Inability to highlight; underscore; etc; sections of documents that may quickly be returned to later if needed. One can bookmark a page; but when switching between documents; this only returns the user to the last bookmark even though multiple bookmarks may have originally been selected; effectively rendering multiple page referencing useless. There is an index; but no way to quickly find one of the many pages one might have bookmarked.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer describes the limitations of his iPad EFB that he is now required to use; as he sees them.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger in seat XX3 was removed due to repeated requests and non-compliance with requests to use his mask; and then he cussed [at] the FA.  Other passengers confirmed his behavior; had customer service remove passenger.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported having a passenger removed from flight due to non-compliance with face mask policy.