elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: snow on runway
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flaps 1 takeoff on compacted snow. Began takeoff roll with engine heat and wing anti-ice on. After V1 call Pilot Flying (CA) became distracted by anti-ice configuration causing him to miss the pilot monitoring (FO) rotate call. Pilot Flying rotated approximately 35-40 knots late.Main concern was close proximity to maximum tire speed limit. Last speed observed at lift off was 190 kts. Departure continued without any issues. Upon reaching cruise altitude contacted Maintenance control regarding close proximity to tire limit speed. Maintenance advised no action was required as a tire overspeed was not observed.


Second narrative: The Captain (PF) became distracted by the anti-ice on configuration right at the point I was making the 'rotate' call; requesting that I turn the wing anti-ice OFF (Wing Anti-Ice switch was in the ON position with the blue valve position lights illuminated indicating they had closed as designed). I repeated the 'rotate' call two more times in quick succession and PF rotated late.


Synopsis: A B-737 flight crew rotated on takeoff 35-40 knots late. The Captain was distracted by the aircraft's anti-ice configuration; causing him to miss the copilot's three 'rotate' calls. There was no tire overspeed and the flight continued as cleared.
Date: 202101
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: When arriving at gate for our ZZZ-ZZZ1 flight; the Purser told the CS agent we needed a few minutes so we could do our required Safety duties (FA briefing which is required per safety checklist. Safety checks (which company says can be done during boarding which isn't the safest during COVID time); be at the boarding door after putting our bags away; get customer wipes for customers company's COVID safety protocol. The agent was told by inflight Supervisor X;  ZZZ; to begin boarding  on top of the flight attendants boarding the plane. When questioning Supervisor X about not giving us time to do our required safety duties Supervisor X's answer was 'We can't hold boarding on a quick turn.'  I understand we all want an on-time operation but that shouldn't come at the cost of safety.  Even the Captain was amazed that we were not given time to do our safety duties.I would like to know if flight attendants are required to brief as stated on the safety checklist or not; and if we are required to brief why are we not given the time to brief when we ask for 2 minutes. If we are not required to brief then please alter the safety checklist.What happened to safety is our top priority?




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns with completing safety checks while passengers are boarding.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Forgot to arm thrust reversers on landing. Was very distracted. We got vector super high onto the approach. My FO was getting the glideslope back for a stable approach and once everything was good my FO recalls right when we called for the landing checklist Tower asked for bases. Just got very distracted. Also; this is my first trip after 85 days off.We got triggers and checklist. Just need to follow them and learn from this silly mistake!




Synopsis: Pilot reported forgetting to arm the thrust reversers upon landing and cited distraction and lack of flying as contributing factors.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This flight was at the end of a 3 leg trip. The first two legs were flown using the tail number as the call sign because we were going international. The last leg we used our assigned call sign. It was Sunday so approach control was closed at the airport and we had to shoot an approach with Center which did not have radar low enough to vector us for the approach. We were cleared for the full approach and told we could switch over to the CTAF. I used the tail number to make multiple calls during the approach. We were IFR till about 700 feet so we could not cancel with Center. I called FSS and canceled the IFR flight plan but since I was using my tail number I cancelled using that instead of my filed call sign. While driving home; I got a call from the FAA looking to make sure I was on the ground. At first I was surprised because I knew I cancelled but then realized I had used the wrong call sign to cancel. This was not a safety issue for our flight but it could have caused a safety issue for other flights trying to land at the airport and could not because our flight had not been correctly canceled. I think in the future; the best thing to do would be to keep the call sign standard through out the flight and day so that the wrong one is not accidentally used when it is necessary. Example either use the company assigned call sign or the tail number for the entire flight and probably for the whole day as well.




Synopsis: A C560 corporate pilot flew a series of legs using either N number or an assigned call sign. After landing at a CTAF airport he closed out his flight with his call sign but had filed under his tail number so later the FAA called looking for him.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In cruise flight; we encountered a potential fuel leak. We were cruising at 36;000 feet. We had been monitoring the fuel against the [planned burn] the entire flight. We had been down very little according to the [planned burn] but we were consistently at the same number. After we crossed some weather; we noticed a large fuel imbalance; approximately 800 pounds (left side low). The captain and I discussed our problem and began to run the Fuel Imbalance Checklist. As we [are] running the checklist; the imbalance became larger than 1;000 pounds and we got the fuel imbalance message. We followed the checklist; including ensuring that the cross feed valve is closed (it was). We monitored the total fuel quantity indication and noted that it was decreasing rapidly. At one point we were down about 2;000 pounds and received a Using RSV Fuel message. The Fuel Imbalance Checklist led us to the Engine Fuel Leak Checklist. We ran the checklist up to the point of engine shut down. We then called [Maintenance Control]; discussed it with them and [requested priority]. We were entering an area of the [mountains] that had few close; suitable alternates. We diverted to [closest airport].


Second narrative: In cruise at 36;000 feet. All systems were normal; we were approaching a cold front and received a reroute by ATC. Approaching the cold front; I had the flight attendants take their jump seats for potential turbulence. As we were passing the front; we noticed the left fuel tank quantity decreasing and eventually had an Imbalance alert. We ran the [Fuel] Imbalance Checklist as well as the Fuel Leak Engine Checklist. Totalizer and calculated fuel were decreasing at an accelerated rate. We received an FMC using reserve fuel message. We had a phone patch call with Maintenance Control. During discussion with Maintenance Control; imbalance increase subsided. At this point arrival fuel was approximately 1;700 pounds less than when the issue first started. Then; the imbalance resumed again slowly with left tank decreasing and imbalance increasing. We were advised Maintenance Control and Dispatch that we would divert before proceeding any further into the inter mountain west. We advised ATC and were cleared direct for an uneventful approach and landing.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported diverting after experiencing a fuel system malfunction resulting in a fuel tank imbalance.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TWM.Airport, MN
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G TWM
Second aircraft: Cirrus Aircraft Undifferentiated
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I taxied my aircraft across the east-west hard surface runway to the north-south grass runway. I saw no traffic on the ramp; runways or pattern. About half way down the grass runway I turned around for a north departure. The ends of the east-west runway cannot be seen from the position.Shortly after leaving the ground I crossed the east-west runway at about 200 ft AGL and saw a Cirrus leaving the ground and climbing my direction. He passed directly under me at 50-80 ft AGL. I kept my climb steep and elected not to make any turn because that would limit my climb rate.I know if I had started my takeoff from the far end of the runway I would have had the altitude to see the traffic earlier so that will be my practice going forward.The airport manager later told me that the Cirrus only appeared for one touch-and-go and did not seem to use the traffic pattern. I don't know whether he saw me or not. I have no radio in this aircraft so I don't know if he announced his intentions on the CTAF. If he had used the standard left traffic pattern he should have seen me taxiing and I should have seen him on downwind. I will always start my takeoff from the far end of the runway in the future and remain vigilant for approaching traffic.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported a near mid-air collision just after takeoff with an aircraft that had taken off from a crossing runway.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We arrived [at the airport] expecting a quick turnaround to head to ZZZ. Upon arrival; we were informed we would be changing airplanes. The aircraft was very recently out of Phase and was also flown and written up earlier in the morning for a brake malfunction. A preflight was conducted and no defects were seen or noted. We were originally scheduled for a 15 minute turn around but because of the aircraft switch; we were 30 minutes late. The First Officer was the pilot flying [to] ZZZ and everything went smoothly. It was a good landing and we made a 'quick turn' back. Upon arrival; the ramp agent handed me a Weight and Balance and unloaded/loaded the aircraft. We fired up and taxied to runway 6. Prior to departure; a run-up was conducted and the normal flows were completed and backed up by the checklist.  We departed runway 6 and noted sluggish performance almost immediately on climb out. We noted that although the Flap handle was in the up position; the flap indicator displayed about 37 degrees worth of flaps. We climbed to 1000 ft AGL; reference the QRH; notified the tower that we would be return to land and instructed the passengers of our intentions. The landing was normal.Scheduling demands led to a more rushed environment to conducting the normal walk around procedures. Had a walk around been completed; the flap issue would have been noticed. I take full responsibility for not conducting a walk around to notice the issue however I do believe had we not been scheduled for such quick operations this incident would have never happened.




Synopsis: C402C Captain reported after takeoff that while the flap handle was in the up position; the flap indicator showed 37 degrees down. Crew returned for normal landing. Captain indicated a walk around had not been completed.
Date: 201808
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: ACARS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: ACARS on every one of my flights in [my rotation] has been NO COMM when descending into congested airspace. Doesn't matter where or aircraft type. During critical phases; a primary Safety tool is out of service. Spotty WiFi makes retrieving landing data nearly impossible. A divert would be an unnecessary challenge to legally pull off.

Callback: The reporter stated that the ACARS 'NO COMM' occurs very often in congested airspace. The reporter stated that it's due to the lack of bandwidth. The reporter stated that normally when the frequency is congested; ACARS will find another frequency to acquire the data; not so since the latest updates. The reporter also stated that if the ACARS is a 'NO COMM' you have to get the data using WIFI (and that signal is iffy at best) or calling dispatch for the information (which is very slow and not very efficient). The reporter stated that there used to be a work around by going into the diagnostic pages and coming in the 'back door' to get a usable frequency to acquire the data. The reporter also stated that if you get a late runway change it takes more than 20 minutes to get set up with the proper procedures for the SID or a STAR arrival due to ACARS 'NO COMM.' The reporter stated that in the past they used a laptop that they carried with them for this type of information; but it was discouraged.



Synopsis: Air Carrier Pilot reported that ACARS displayed 'NO COMM' when descending into congested airspace.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During our climb from FL320 to FL410; we encountered a moderate wake turbulence event which caused us to momentarily lose control of our aircraft. We experienced a sudden roll to the left of approximately 30 degrees; followed by a sudden roll to the right of approximately 70 degrees before regaining control. Our TCAS only identified one target which was located 12 NM at our 12 o'clock position and 1500 feet above us. We queried ATC as to the type of aircraft that was ahead of us and Los Angeles Center identified it as a B767. The winds were indicating 40 kts from a quartering tailwind position. Apparently; the [B767] was in level flight crossing from our right to left. Their wake turbulence had drifted from a position right of our course to one directly in front of us; causing this event. We continued our climb once control was regained and had no further issue. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injuries to passengers or crew aboard.




Synopsis: Gulfstream 100 Captain reported a momentary loss of control in climb at FL320 from a wake turbulence encounter from a B767 crossing in front of them.
Date: 202003
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Load Planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: The Ramp Lead was proactive; and called me as he was initially planning the flight. He advised me that it was extremely unlikely that we would get 15 bags for this flight; as there were only 4 passengers checked in for it. We agreed that we would have to hold off DSTG Item 2; a 2 piece Quickpak shipment classified as UN3373 Biologicals. I told him there was no problem with DSTG Item 1; which was SLS code LHO (live human organ / blood); which doesn't have the 15 bag requirement. I held off item 2; using the OTH (Other) code. I advised the ramp lead to let me know if he somehow got 15 bags for the flight; and I'd remove the holdoff on the item. I also advised the ramp lead to let his cargo people know about the holdoff; as the item could likely go on a later flight; as they don't have the 15 bag limit for UN3373 items. I later looked at the flight schedule ZZZ-ZZZ1. Aircraft X is operated by Airline X; which does not accept UN3373. Aircraft Y at XA:20am is operated by Airline Y; which does accept UN3373; so the item should be able to move on that flight. There are no more company Mainline flights today ZZZ-ZZZ1.Aircraft X closed out with only 2 bags; so we weren't able to move Item 2. The Ramp Lead and I correctly followed the 15 bag limit SOP for UN3373.My safety concern is related to the light passenger and bag loads during this time of a National Health Emergency. My concern is about the 15 bag limit and holding off Quickpaks. I know it has been happening frequently; although this is the first flight of today where I've noted it.My biggest concern comes from my previous work on the ramp. I know that many of these Quickpaks come from [two different labs]. They're going from smaller or medium sized cities to larger; more specialized labs in larger cities. I also know that [two labs] are now doing Coronavirus testing. I really don't want to see these shipments delayed with patients having to wait for diagnoses. Perhaps cargo has already addressed this and I'm not aware of it. I fully support safely carrying properly secured dangerous goods. However; these items have limited risk of spillage; and really need to move during this critical time.




Synopsis: Ramp personnel reported concern regarding unnecessary delays regarding Hazmat (Biologicals/Blood) cargo from Coronavirus Testing. This cargo has a limited risk of spillage.