elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA42 Twin Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Departed VFR; remained under Class Charlie until clear of airspace; then started step climb to cruise altitude of 7;500 feet; with steps at 3;900 feet and 5;900 feet to remain under outer rings of Class Bravo; on a heading towards the destination. I was climbing at 120 knots; for 1;000 feet per minute and monitoring a TRACON frequency; though it is possible that I wasn't in that frequency's sector.It is an area of intense VFR traffic; due to proximity of training airports and various VFR corridors. The advisory traffic information system (TIS; not TCAS etc.) was tracking several targets; most of which I identified visually. Somewhere the G1000 issued a traffic alert of a climbing aircraft in close proximity (amber large target). I attempt several times to identify visually this target (a challenge in a low wing aircraft) while maintaining my rate of climb on the assumption that 1;000 feet per minute will outclimb most VFR aircraft below me.I was under the 6;000 foot - 10;000 foot MSL ring of Class Bravo; approaching the 8;000-10;000 foot boundary. It is possible I might have clipped the 5;999 foot ceiling just before its boundary while focused on identifying visually the traffic. I decided it could simply be a 'shadow' of own ship and recycle the traffic system (ON-Standby-OFF-ON) and it disappeared. I was by then well below the 8;000 - 10;000 foot Class Bravo ring; and leveled off at 7;500 feet. However I did lose sight of the Class Bravo 6;000 boundary for a couple of seconds while still in the climb; at 1;000 feet per minute I could have easily violated by 100-200 feet. I have revised my VFR procedures to use the autopilot for step climbs when in complicated airspace with lots of VFR traffic.




Synopsis: DA42 pilot reported they may have entered SFO Bravo airspace without a clearance while troubleshooting the G1000 traffic information system.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DVT.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Approach; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Enroute to DVT; we were told to descend to 7;100 feet from our cruising altitude of 11;000 feet. On our descent; we obtained the current weather and began our checklist for descent. Upon reaching our designated indicated altitude of 7;100 feet; Phoenix Approach contacted us with a low altitude warning of 6;800 feet. We immediately started a climb and realized we had omitted changing the altimeter from our current setting of 30.29 to the DVT area altimeter setting of 29.97. After a few minutes; Phoenix Approach told us to contact them at their local number for a Possible Pilot Deviation.Corrective Action: When obtaining current weather; always remember to set the current altimeter setting.




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported forgetting to reset the altimeter to the local setting resulting in a low altitude alert from ATC.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TIX.Airport, FL
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; 3
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E F11
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Orlando ATC [F11] kept us up too high as we approached TIX for landing and when they finally started our descent it required 2500 FPM in order to get down to start the GPS Z approach. We set up the approach and were told to expect the GPS Z but we were on radar vectors at that time. The controller first said to proceed to FATAD and we executed that fix; then he said go to CUTON; but we had already accepted FATAD and it was too late to put CUTON back in the FMS so there was some confusion but we were almost to FATAD by that time so we continued. About the time we reached FATAD we saw the airport and were cleared for the visual and to contact the tower. No safety issues were encountered. However; keeping us high so long; then giving us a rapid descent; then transferring us to another controller; who was trying to 'play catchup' and get us in a position for the approach; put all of us in a 'catchup' situation and in hindsight for our part we should have called a halt to the approach and slowed everything down. Too many controllers and airplanes in too small an airspace around Orlando.




Synopsis: BE20 Captain reported being held high for too long by ATC during a descent and approach into TIX.
Date: 201702
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During my check ride and while under foggles I had a near collision incident. My Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE) required that I make position reports and communicate with other aircraft at this non-towered airport. Acting as my safety pilot; the DPE didn't notify me of another aircraft's location or attempt to contact the other aircraft to avoid a possible mishap.On the approach inbound for the ILS; while under foggles; I made position reports starting at 10 miles. After my five mile on final position report; another aircraft reports entering the downwind; so I made another call inside of four miles. Then while I was near 2 miles from the runway at about 850 feet MSL; the other aircraft announces a turn onto base.I instructed the other aircraft of our positions being in conflict and asked what its intentions are. The other aircraft indicated it would turn out. I removed my foggles just above decision altitude to see the tail of the other aircraft as it was climbing away. It was about 50 feet to the left; around 1/2 mile away and 200 feet above my location.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Cessna 172 reported a near collision while flying under foggles.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On ILS; APPR was pushed for ILS; glideslope alive and LOC alive. Put in field elevation and did ILS. ATC called for low altitude alert. We doubled check altimeter setting and then corrected. If we had do the approach over again we would have leveled off first then put in field elevation.




Synopsis: Q400 First Officer reports receiving a low altitude warning from ATC during an ILS approach. The field elevation had been set into the MCP prior to the autopilot capturing the assigned altitude or the glideslope.
Date: 201210
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When configuring for landing while on Expressway Visual approach to Runway 31 at LGA; the flaps remained at 20 when flap handle was selected to 25; resulting in the 'Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree' EICAS message. We performed a go around; coordinated with ATC and completed the associated QRH checklist. We found the checklist confusing in regards to the required configuration for landing. Based upon [minimal] fuel available for diversion and considering the runway length at LGA; a decision was made to lower flaps electically to 30 and land LGA. The landing was uneventful. Upon debrief; we agreed that it may have been prudent to consider [the possible performance reduction due to] slow electrical flap retraction speed in the event of the need to perform an engine out missed approach.


Second narrative: The checklist seems to direct you to use 20 flaps for landing. But number 7 on the checklist says to select 'required' flaps. We believed flaps 30 to be safer on this short runway so flaps 30 were used.


Synopsis: The flight crew of an unknown Boeing aircraft performed a go around at LGA when they received a TE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message. They performed the associated checklist and opted to land with flaps extended to 30 degrees using the alternate electrical flap extension procedure.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departing JAC; [the] SIC (Second in Command) and I were given the clearance of the Geyser 5 departure procedure: NALSI; MLD; then as filed - J158 ZZZ ZZZZZ - climb and maintain 16;000. SIC and I briefed the departure on the ground in JAC and discussed the nearly 180-degree left turn at NALSI and agreed the aircraft would likely start that turn early. We briefed expediting our climb up to 16;000. We didn't anticipate any issues with that departure as the MSA on the departure procedure read 15;000. The highest terrain on the departure read 13;676. Upon departing from Runway 01 and climbing through 14;800 on autopilot; past GIYER and CFCFD on the 017 radial from JAC outbound to NALSI; the aircraft started a left-hand turn; as anticipated; to intercept the course to MLD. This turn took place approximately 10 miles from NALSI. SIC let Salt Lake Center know we were beginning the turn. The Controller said; Ok; do you have the terrain in sight; my minimum vectoring altitude is 15;800 in that area." He then said 'low altitude alert.' We were passing through 15;000 at that point and were about to enter IMC. We told the Controller we were about to enter IMC and he said expedite climb; which we did. The Controller on the next frequency gave us a phone number to call for a potential pilot deviation."




Synopsis: Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during climb-out from JAC airport.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Interphone System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Off Duty
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Interphone system was discovered inoperable. Captain insisted they could still fly without it. His alternate protocol was to open the flight deck door during takeoff and landing. Flight Attendant X was very uncomfortable with this and was saying it is against what her manual says. She was peer pressured and guilted by the Captain into operating all four flights with the flight deck door open. The company has taken on more contracts than they can handle with their fleet and amount of crew members. Aircraft have fallen into disrepair; and those who complain about it are punished; those who operate flights illegally get more money in their pockets. This Captain is notorious for flying any aircraft and allowing crew scheduling to manipulate his hours so that he can work more than what is legal for a big chunk of money. I contacted manager of inflight; Chief Pilot; Director of Operations; and Director of Safety prior to flying this morning. I showed them that the manual says 'an aircraft cannot depart if the interphone system between flight deck and cabin is inoperative.' I contacted another Captain who showed me that even on the MEL list; at least 50 percent of cabin interphones must be able to reach flight deck. None of ours did. I only received a reply from our Director of Operations saying that 'In certain circumstances it can be done.' He then stated he did not find it safe for a Captain to take off and land with the flight deck door open. However this Captain will never receive any questioning about his protocol because the company is just relieved the flights operated.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported aircraft interphone was inoperative and the Captain continued the operation with flight deck door open.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: Orion (P3)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Sector D2; an Orion P3 departed on a silent clearance (per LOA with NGF Approach) with IFR flight plan; Kaneohe 1 Departure; South Kauai Transition. NGF Approach manually handed the aircraft off to me; I asked if he had pointed aircraft out to HNL Approach Sector H and they responded 'affirmative.' I also inquired if they had pointed out to Hula Dancer; (the controlling agency for the next airspace that this aircraft would travel on his route; before the aircraft got to my sector); and they said no; and asked if I wanted them to do it. I said no; I would take care of it. I called Hula Dancer; and pointed out the aircraft to them through their airspace (W189; active surface to FL600); on the Kaneohe One Departure; South Kauai Transition; and they said point out approved. Shortly after I hung up; the P3 turned on their own; without clearance to a 320 heading and Hula Dancer inquired as to what the aircraft was doing. The aircraft responded that they were turning north to stay over water; on a 320 heading. We coordinated that aircraft would be on a 260 heading; and Hula Dancer took RADAR contact on the P3 and worked through their airspace. We used to have a departure from Kaneohe Airport (NGF) that would allow aircraft to avoid HNL Approach airspace and keep them off shore of the island; and also well clear of a very heavily used parachute jumping area on the north shore of Oahu. The Kaneohe Departure is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The Mugge Departure; in its previous form had a transition to SOK that cleared all dangers and was great. The Kaneohe Departure; which replaced the South Kauai Transition is very bad; takes them over land (which some aircraft are required to avoid per military restrictions) and I don't know how close it comes to the parachute jumping area; because it is not depicted on the departure procedure; nor is the departure depicted on any of our maps; paper; digital; or on the scope.




Synopsis: HCF Controller voiced concern regarding the Kaneohe SID and associated required coordination. The reporter noted the Mugge SID was safer with regard to clearing parachute activity areas.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Motor
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climb at about 9;000 FT; the hand flying First Officer noticed that the electric trim stopped working. Wondering if the autopilot circuit would work; we found that the autopilot wouldn't auto trim. We got a block altitude nominally at 13;000 FT while we looked for an operator error. None could be found.The QRH directed a divert; so we notified ATC; ARFF (Air Rescue and Fire Fighting); and dispatch. I accomplished the QRH trim inoperative and appropriate normal checklists. Manual trim worked normally. I gave the number 1 Flight Attendant an [emergency] brief and notified the passengers about the problem and that safety vehicles would look us over.The First Officer did a normal flaps 15 landing and we stopped clear of the runway for inspection and escort by ARFF. I asked the passengers to remain seated. We taxied to the gate with no other abnormalities. Upon gate arrival; maintenance met us and started trouble shooting. Initially; the electric trim wouldn't work. I don't know what was then changed; it didn't appear to be anything we did wrong; but the trim started working again.




Synopsis: Boeing 737 Captain reported that they were unable to electrically trim the Horizontal Stabilizer using the 'pickle' switches or the Autopilot.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on short final to 33L we received a HYD 3 LO PRESS caution message. The Captain (CA) performed the QRH items as able. On touchdown spoilers deployed and another caution message; which I believe related to nose wheel steering; appeared. At approximately 80kts the CA called for control of the aircraft. He reported poor braking and difficulty steering. We were able to exit at taxiway Q and brought the aircraft to a stop. We informed tower that we'd need to be towed to the gate. While parked; we performed the tow aircraft supplemental procedure from the QRH. An operations vehicle reported leaking hydraulic fluid under the nose wheel while we were waiting to be towed. The aircraft was towed to the gate without further incidence. Apparent loss of hydraulic pressure on system 3 on short final.A maintenance crew was flown in to repair the aircraft. While speaking with them; they reported that they had been seeing this issue quite a lot lately.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reported loss of #3 hydraulic system on short final; commenting that the mechanics meeting the aircraft stated they had seen this failure 'quite a lot lately'.