Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was the start of a three-day trip. It was also the initial takeoff and I was the Pilot Flying. We departed the gate just over 30 minutes late due to ground operations loading delays. I had been talking to both the agents and one of the Ground Operations guys trying to determine why we were so late when notified that the Ramp had called Maintenance to check a tire on the aircraft. We had no knowledge of this call. Maintenance looked at the tire and said it was fine and we rushed to start the push. Because so much coordinating between the Agent; Ground Operations and Maintenance occurred nearly simultaneously; I was rushed and subsequently rushed the departure briefs. Ground Operations then had head set issues which further delayed our push. Once off the gate; the engine start and taxi were normal. During taxi out; the autobrake light came on and the First Officer re-cycled the switch and the light extinguished. I believe he verbalized this as he did it. Arriving at the end we were cleared takeoff. All checklists were completed and I elected to use the HUD. We were flying an older model aircraft and power was set manually. Spool up was uneven and I focused on getting symmetrical power. The takeoff roll was on centerline and uneventful until approximately 80 KTS when the First Officer called out; 'You have an autobrake light on.' I did not state 'continue' as required and instead looked at the light to verify. The First Officer then reached towards the autobrake switch and said something like; 'You want me to re-set this.' He told me later he did cycle the switch. I'm not sure if I responded verbally to the First Officer or not. I then decided to reject the takeoff and started to abort and the First Officer made the call to Tower as we decelerated. As soon as I initiated the reject; I realized I had done so in error; but I was committed at that point and completed the stop. Once off the runway; we evaluated brake energy and determined that 62 minutes of cooling was required. We requested Maintenance and a gate. Operations assigned us a gate number and we taxied in and I put in two logbook write-ups; one for the autobrake inoperative and one for the rejected takeoff. Proper briefs and proper callouts would have likely prevented this chain of mistakes. I've also heard the advice to not rush; and it is the good advice I didn't take today and it's now my new Golden Rule. Also; don't ever let circumstances dictate the pace.


Second narrative: We were late pushing off the gate because of ramp activities. We weren't being kept in the loop by them but believed that they were delayed loading a mobility device. Eventually; the Agent informed us through the window that the ramp personnel had called Maintenance; without consulting us; to check the left main gear tire pressure. I had noticed on my preflight that the tires were showing the thread in line with the tire but not any diagonal cord and the pressure had been fine. The Agent surmised that ramp was just covering for their delay. The Captain had a word with the ramp agent stating that we appreciated that they were looking out for us but they needed to confer with us when an issue arose. After Maintenance came out; looked at the gear; and said everything was okay; we still couldn't talk to the ramp crew and pushed back from gate with hand signals. We ended up being 24 minutes late off the gate. It was hot so we started both engines but kept the APU on for extra cooling on the way to runway. On the taxi; I noticed the autobrake disarm light was illuminated; reset it; and notified the Captain. He acknowledged and we continued. As we approached the runway; we reconfigured the packs; and completed the Before Takeoff Checklist. We were cleared for takeoff and started our roll. At about 80 KIAS; I noticed the autobrake disarm light had illuminated again and announced it. My intention was to make the Captain aware that in the event of a rejected takeoff (RTO) we wouldn't have auto brakes. I believe the Captain directed me to reset it and I did. The light remained illuminated and; at that point; the Captain aborted the takeoff. The speed was just shy of 100 KIAS. We performed the RTO safely; exited the runway without event; called Ground; and returned to the ramp. After conferring with Maintenance on the radio; we returned to the gate. I realized that resetting the autobrake switch on the takeoff roll was a mistake but had done it in the heat of the moment. The Captain also realized that he had made the wrong call about rejecting the takeoff as we exited the runway and later said he had been in a hurry and hadn't gone over his normal pre-takeoff mental review of reject or continue options.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports a rejected takeoff for an autobrake disarm light above 80 KTS.