Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OKB.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 9
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E OKB
ATC / advisory: CTAF OKB
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was the return leg of a personal pleasure flight to Oceanside; CA (OKB). I was the PIC pilot flying for the first leg and had swapped seats and was not flying on the return flight. Not being PIC for this leg; and despite being the more experienced aviator; I was relaxing and mentally disengaged with more of a passenger mindset; given I was with a properly rated; current and qualified pilot in the left seat of a single-pilot aircraft. We briefed the takeoff procedures after the run-up; and the PIC had verbally noted the 'fly friendly' noise abatement sign at the departure end of the runway; and I reiterated the sign text: follow the river to the shoreline. A C172 departed in front of us for closed traffic; and when the PIC began taxiing towards the runway immediately after they began takeoff roll; I recommended we hold for separation given our dissimilar aircraft. After the 172 had gotten airborne; we taxiied onto Runway 24 and departed. This was sooner than I personally would have departed; but I did not verbalize this and felt it would be a non-issue since they were remaining in the pattern and we were a west departure. In the moments after takeoff leading up to the event; I was enjoying the view out my side of the aircraft while casually glancing over to keep an eye on the traffic that departed in front of us. I noticed our courses diverging and made a call-out that the traffic was now at 11 o'clock; which was acknowledged. There was a scattered layer above us; which momentarily caused a level off. On my next glance I noticed the 172 had turned northbound and our courses were nearly perpendicular and we were co-altitude; so I again called out that the 172 was 11 o'clock; northbound; same altitude; which was again acknowledged; but no action was taken. As we continued westbound I saw the situation developing; and I issued another verbal warning to the PIC; which was acknowledged; but again no corrective action was taken and the aircraft continued to converge. I immediately looked inside and saw the PIC with his head down at the iPad and at that point I assumed the controls and initiated a pitch up and climbed the aircraft through a break in the clouds. Aircraft 2 passed below and behind at an estimated range of 400 feet diagonally. While I do not believe the situation was unsafe; the separation was not comfortable nor expected by either aircraft. I should have taken action sooner; and believe I would have had I been participating in the flight more actively. It is worth noting that I often fly into [an airport with parallel runways]; so I am frequently exposed to aircraft being closer than normal during arrival and departure; which may bias my opinion of whether or not a collision hazard existed. In those situations; however; the aircraft are typically on parallel or divergent courses; which was not the case here; and had I not taken action; a collision hazard would have certainly existed regardless of any subjectivity.As with most abnormal events in aviation; there were numerous links in the chain of events; and there were missed opportunities to break that chain sooner. This was a case involving both poor communication and poor CRM. During the debrief of the event; the PIC stated he was just flying straight out to the shoreline as he was used to when flying out of many southern California airports; and did not notice or follow the river; which turns slightly south; as the 172 did. I wish the PIC would have verbalized to me that he was overwhelmed; confused or unsure of the departure routing; and I would have been able to assume the role of a proactive crew member and help the PIC stay mentally ahead of the aircraft instead of just sight-seeing. If I had better situational awareness of my pilot's workload; I could have stepped in earlier in the flight to assist. While unable to see the river from the right side of the aircraft; I am still guilty of not querying the PIC when I initially noticed our departure coursesdiverging. We should have been following behind the preceding traffic which would have averted the need for corrective action. Additionally; had I pushed for additional separation between our aircraft on departure that would have given additional time to maneuver behind the preceding 172 when they began the crosswind turn over the shoreline; building additional lateral separation. The PIC; a VFR private pilot; mentioned during the debrief of the event that he was distracted by the clouds. This fixation likely contributed to the PIC's inaction and loss of situational awareness. The weather was reporting CLR at the field; had it been reporting clouds or had I personally looked at weather and seen the marine layer approaching; I would have filed for an IFR departure; we would have been able to climb above the traffic in front of us; and ATC would've been there acting as a third set of eyes for safe separation.While often mentioned; it is worth reiterating that cockpit technology serves to aid in our situational awareness; and is no substitute for true situational awareness of what's happening both in and out of the cockpit. This should continue to be stressed to pilots in training; and to experienced pilots who use this technology. The FAA is already in the process of realigning training to focus on decision making; task priority; and situational awareness in lieu of purely maneuver-based evaluation. Instructors also need training in these subject areas so students are properly educated. I support this shift and believe it could prevent future occurrences of events such as this. In addition to teaching standard traffic patterns; pilot training also needs to highlight the existence of numerous non-standard procedures that pilots will encounter; particularly at uncontrolled fields; and the importance of proper pre-flight planning to review and understand these procedures prior to stepping into the cockpit. I believe flight planning applications can sometimes be detrimental to the formation of good habits for proper pre-flight planning; because they can tempt pilots into a feeling of security with having all the information available on-demand at your fingertips. Instructors need to stress the importance of thorough pre-flight planning even more so with the advent of this technology.It should be general good practice that whenever occupying a crewmember seat that a rated pilot always stay engaged in the flight's progression and be ready to offer assistance regardless of who is pilot in command. I had made the trip to relax and get away for an afternoon; and my decision to disengage from the planning and execution of the return flight proved detrimental; and was a missed opportunity to act as a mentor to a fellow aviator.




Synopsis: General aviation flight instructor reported a NMAC after departure from a CTAF airport.