elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Captain started taxiing before we had clearance to do so. There were many other Company aircraft requesting taxi and push clearance. I knew he shouldn't have been taxiing; but didn't respond quick enough to question; to stop him; before Ramp Control asked what we were doing.


Second narrative: Getting ready to taxi to Runway XX from Gate YY in ZZZ. Several aircraft were pushing and getting ready to taxi at the same time; the radios were congested. Captain thought my FO had called for taxi clearance; and that Ramp had cleared us to taxi to follow an aircraft on the right that was passing behind. Captain initiated a turn and was called by Ramp that we had not been issued a taxi clearance. We were subsequently cleared to taxi and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I will listen more carefully to clearances in the future. As a general note; with the greatly reduced flying due to COVID-19; this was my first trip (second day) in over a month. Long layoffs and infrequent flying are causing my proficiency to be lower than normal and little things are occasionally slipping through the cracks. I am sure that I am not the only one.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported they began taxiing out without clearance. Captain stated lack of flying was a contributing factor.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Our flight release and our fuel slip said we were planned with a ramp fuel of 40;000 lbs. The flight plan portion of our flight information packet said we had a planned fuel load of 39;657 lbs. I in fact wanted to have 40;000 lbs for extra taxi fuel that may be required for EDCT (Estimated Departure Clearance Time) delay to ZZZ1. I was confused why our paperwork had two different ramp fuel numbers so I called Dispatch to ask why the difference. The Dispatcher told me that he bumped our fuel up to 40;000 lbs; but the computer wouldn't update the flight plan numbers. This seemed wrong to me. I told him that it then makes all of our fuel planning numbers in the flight plan inaccurate because it is based on a fuel number 300 lbs less. I was then told by Dispatch to just add 300 to everything. I could do that; but would be just guessing on how that changed any of the times associated with those new numbers.I suspect the flight plan numbers can be updated; and either Dispatch is not informed on how to use the program; or there is some other reason they have to not want to update them. If in fact the flight plan fuel burn numbers cannot be updated when fuel is added; then this in an inadequate software program and [the Company] should consider a new vendor.Also; although 300 lbs does not make a huge difference in our performance; larger changes would. Having to just do my best guess on how much time 1;000 lbs extra versus 1;300 lbs extra gives me doesn't seem like a great policy. Dispatch running these numbers allows pilots to perform other duties. If Dispatch can't provide these numbers with any changes; expect delays as crews run the numbers through performance charts in addition to all their other preflight duties. That way we can get accurate numbers that should be provided by Dispatch versus just guessing.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported not receiving correct Fuel On Board (FOB) numbers in flight plan.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During pushback; tug driver was having difficulty maneuvering the aircraft because it appeared the left wing tip was very close to an airport fence. At least 3 times during the push the left wing walker stopped the push with crossed wands; walked up to the tug driver; communicated something to the tug driver; then went back to left wing position. Tug driver then pulled aircraft a few feet forward then pushed aircraft back a few feet. This occurred 3 times. At this point tug driver pushing aircraft again when the tow bar broke. Tug driver advised me to set brakes; which I did. He said he needed to get another tow bar. I advised him we would need maintenance to inspect nose gear prior to moving the aircraft. I was then advised by flight attendant that a passenger stated he believed the left wing tip struck the fence. I asked tug driver if the aircraft had hit the fence and he did not respond. FO then called maintenance to advise we required a nose gear inspection and also determine if there was any damage to left wing tip. Maintenance advised me that the left wing tip had damage and aircraft would be out of service. Pictures were taken by station personnel. Maintenance advised that nose gear was safe for tow back to gate once station completed their investigation. Pushback began at XA:24 and we arrived back at the gate at XB:16. Passengers were deplaned and another aircraft assigned to the flight and we departed.Once parking checklist was completed voice recorder circuit breaker was pulled by flight crew. I made 3 log book entries; possible wing tip damage; possible nose gear damage; and voice recorder circuit breaker pulled by flight crew. I did observe pictures taken by ground personnel. During flight; flight attendant advised me that she was experiencing some shoulder and neck pain from bumping her shoulder into forward closet when tow bar broke. She was met by flight service personnel. I am not aware of any passenger injuries as a result of this incident.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew struck an airport fence during pushback braking the tow bar.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Had a MEL deferral for L engine N3 indication; and on climbout received numerous brief L ENG BLEED EICAS messages as the N3 indicator went to zero for a few seconds; then returned to normal reading. Eventually the N3 indication failed; and the L ENG BLEED EICAS came on and stayed on. We ran QRH for L ENG BLEED; and noticed cabin pressurization fluctuating somewhat; but functioning properly. Approximately 5 minutes later; passing FL300; the cabin pressurization failed and we got a cabin altitude warning horn and EICAS message. We performed the phase one procedures and immediately descended to 12;000 feet (for terrain). Both of us felt mildly hypoxic; but after a few minutes of breathing 100% oxygen we felt our SA (Situational Awareness) return and continued on to [destination]. Landed uneventfully. FO (First Officer) did a fantastic job.Apparent failure of the right PACK; or cabin altitude controller. TBD based upon maintenance findings.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported loss of cabin pressure related to either pack or cabin altitude controller failure.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: FAI.TRACON, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E FAI
ATC / advisory: TRACON FAI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X coordinated northbound and at MVA for PAR approach at FBK. After being vectored past traffic; the trainee turned Aircraft X to 070 and MVA according to LOA. This was not the coordination and I reminded the trainee that. The trainee then coordinate[d] the new heading and altitude with FBK and switche[d] Aircraft X to FBK. After a few miles FBK calls to say that they don't have Aircraft X on frequency. I broadcast to Aircraft X to climb to 040 because he is now in a higher MVA. Aircraft X did not respond and eventually contacted FBK and cancelled IFR.Establish cutoff points for transfer of communications. The LOA states that 070 and MVA is how aircraft are to be handed off to FBK without coordination. The LOA does not dictate a change of communications point other than common sense. While I did not provide an abundance of time to FBK to give their approach; Aircraft X not contacting FBK in a timely manner was a key factor. FBK would have had 2-3 mins to issue the turn.




Synopsis: Fairbanks TRACON Controller reported of an aircraft that did not transfer communications in a timely manner and was below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. Aircraft eventually contacted ATC again and then cancelled IFR.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 15 minutes after takeoff [while] we were climbing out of 9;000 FT when the Number 2 HYD ISO VLV caution light illuminated. At that point we noticed the Number 2 hydraulic quantity was at 0.7 QTS. No other lights illuminated and pressure on the Number 2 system remained normal. We ran the Number 2 HYD ISO VLV Caution Light Checklist and determined we should return to the departure airport. As pilot monitoring; I called Dispatch via the SATCOM and told them of the situation; they also agreed returning to ZZZ was the best course of action. After notifying the Flight Attendant that we were returning to the field (no brace signal); we then declared an emergency with ATC and gave ZZZ Approach souls and fuel on board. The First officer and I switched roles so he could perform the alternate landing gear extension easier from the right seat. We performed the alternate gear extension and landed without incident. After clearing the runway we asked the emergency equipment to verify that we weren't leaking anymore fluid; which they confirmed we were not. We taxied to the gate where Maintenance met us and noticed fluid leaking from the Number 1 nacelle. We shutdown the aircraft and deplaned.It is unclear as of right now as to why the event occurred.




Synopsis: A DHC-8-100 Number 2 HYD ISO VLV caution light illuminated with 0.7 QTS remaining during climb; so the appropriate checklist was completed; an emergency declared and flight returned to the departure airport where fluid was found dripping from the Number 1 engine nacelle.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter FOD; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxiing our to [runway] at ZZZ; crossing Rwy XY; a Mylar 'party' balloon drifted into our path and was ingested by the Number 1 engine.  Number 1 Engine failed immediately.  Secured the engine and returned to the gate for maintenance.The aircraft was removed from service.  All passengers were accommodated on the next hourly shuttle flight.[Caused by] trash on the field.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-190 flight crew reported that an engine ingested a balloon during taxi.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Challenger 300
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At the time of the event I was training; we were looking for a NORDO VFR aircraft; passing an inbound to their destinations Tower; other D-Side functions; and as a trainer; I was taking notes for us to discuss later. I had prompted the trainee to point a CL30 out to the neighboring Center. After the point out was complete; the RADAR Controller climbed the CL30 to FL230 and began a hand off to the high sector. The climb placed the CL30 in a possible conflict with a PA46 level at FL190 southbound. The neighboring Center had the hand off on the PA46 and the Data Block was no longer displayed on our RADAR scope. My attention was consumed with training and looking for the NORDO VFR and I was unaware of the possible conflict. I noticed Conflict Alert activated and observed a possible conflict. I advised our Supervisor of a possible loss of separation. Reflecting back; having the sectors split would have been helpful. The complexity increased since the 40 minutes pass from the start of our shift.


Second narrative: A CL30 was northbound about to level at 150. I made a point out to the neighboring Center to approve a climb. After completion of the point out; the R-Side cleared the aircraft to climb and maintain FL230. At the time I made the point out and the climb clearance was given; there was no Data Block for a PA46. The PA46 was on a southbound route at FL190 and had fallen off the scope. Upon the CL30 reaching FL190 in his climb the PA46's Data Block reappeared and the Conflict Alert went off. Recommendation; better situational awareness as to the position of all aircraft at all times.


Synopsis: Several Enroute controllers described a loss of separation event involving a dropped Data Block.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream III (G1159A)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B STL
ATC / advisory: Tower STL
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After debriefing with the non flying pilot regarding a wake turbulence event followed by a go around; I realized that I should submit a NASA ASRS form so that others might benefit from our experience. While being vectored by Approach Control for the final approach to Runway 30R; the crew encountered two events of wake turbulence. After the first apparent encounter with wake turbulence; the crew inquired what kind of aircraft was ahead. The Approach Controller informed the crew that they were following a B737 that was six miles ahead being vectored for the same runway. It was unsure of what the descent path was for the B737 as they prepared for the visual approach ahead of us; but did encounter wake turbulence for the second time as a result of being too close under the weather conditions. The Approach Controller did not give a wake turbulence warning nor was the crew aware of the B737 descent profile. The weather conditions were VFR and the winds were 5kts. The crew elected to go around after the second encounter with the wake turbulence. I told the non flying pilot to report to ATC that we were going around. The non flying pilot later informed me that he tuned in the wrong tower frequency to report the go around. After a delay of communication with the Tower; we were given vectors for a close traffic pattern to be sequenced back for another visual approach. A greater spacing between the B737 ahead under the weather conditions could have prevented the wake turbulence.  The crew is more aware of the potential of wing tip vortex characteristic conditions in busy terminal areas. The crew also is ensuring that the proper ATC frequencies are complied with for timely communication.




Synopsis: Gulfstream III Corporate Pilot reports several wake vortex encounters in trail of a B737 on approach to STL that led to a go-around decision.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Parked; Taxi
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Technician; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After removing the nose wheel pants [fairings] under supervision of a Mechanic who had previously done the work; we did not reinstall the fork bolt; which passes through the fork and strut together and also holds the wheel pants on. The reason for leaving it off was that with the wheel pants removed; the bolt was too large; and according to the Cessna Service Manual; it was 'the bolt securing cover plate and fairing to strut.' I flew the airplane following Maintenance without difficulty prior to returning the aircraft to service. After the flight; the aircraft was returned to service; but a later look at the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) showed that this bolt connects the fork and strut together in addition to the press fit of the fork and strut. The airplane was beginning its taxi to the runway when we called it back to the hangar and reinstalled the bolt. The fact that I checked the IPC after the Maintenance [work] indicates that I failed to clear my doubts of the work I did. While I did follow the Cessna Service Manual instructions; I should have been referencing the IPC along with the Service Manual before returning the aircraft to service. A contributing factor was the failure of the supervising Mechanic to thoroughly check my work since this was my first time working on a nose wheel.

Callback: Reporter stated the Cessna 150 Service Manual does not direct the Mechanic to also look at the IPC that would show a more detailed view of the nose gear fork and strut assembly along with the fork bolt.



Synopsis: A Mechanic working under supervision of another Mechanic; reports he failed to reinstall a fork bolt that secures the fork and strut assembly including the nose wheel pants on a Cessna 150 aircraft.