elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Light: Night
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A takeoff was performed with contamination on the wings (snow; non-sticking). The flight to ZZZ offered challenging winter weather conditions; but the Captain's skill and experience with the aircraft resulted in a safe landing at ZZZ. Once at ZZZ; the snowfall concerned me; but the Captain pressed for a quick turn. While he paid the FBO bill; I tried to prepare the flight deck for a possible next flight - weather permitting. I anticipated a pre-flight brief discussion the winter conditions; the need for deicing the aircraft and making a go-no-go decision as a team. Instead; I felt forced by the Captain to conduct the flight. The Captain closed the door behind me (I was prepping the flight deck) and got ready to start the engines. Before engine start; I expressed my concerns regarding the weather and received a snappy response. The Captain then started the engines and started taxiing in a rush without completing the required checklists; or acknowledging my concerns. During taxi; I expressed my concerns and received another snappy response. In the months prior; I had tried to convey to him my safety-related concerns and often feeling uncomfortable when flying with this particular Captain. I was scared to conduct the flight in those weather conditions; but it seemed that the Captain just wanted to get home. He wouldn't listen to me; and he conducted the takeoff for our flight. I felt horrible; scared; unsafe; belittled; and powerless. Nothing I said to him in a professional manner got through to him. I felt hijacked and taken along for a ride I did not want to be on. I felt intimidated by the Captain.




Synopsis: BE400 First Officer reported that a takeoff was performed with contamination on the wings.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 350
Operator: Other FERRY
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During vector to final and descending below overcast layer; we did not level off with autopilot engaged. We disconnected autopilot and proceeded in VFR to join ILS. Controller gave us a low altitude alert as we were correcting and we thanked them for being alert. This was the first trip for pilot flying using this particular avionics package. It takes a little longer to correct things when you are not familiar with them as you question whether you are interpreting information correctly. FMS and autopilot systems work similarly; but have different ways and locations for annunciators. It's easy to think you have set something properly and then be forced to correct. This rapid correction can also prevent you from going back to see if something was 'set' or 'captured' or failed to 'engage' or 'capture.'




Synopsis: A BE 350 Pilot operating with a new avionics package had an altitude deviation after the autopilot did not capture the selected altitude during descent for approach. Confusion about FMS and Autopilot functions and control locations contributed.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Before departure we were re-routed because of convective activity over ZZZ1. After airborne we were re-routed 2 more times and assigned the ZZZZZ2 arrival and 17;000 feet as a final altitude. Later we climbed to FL210 for a better ride. We had checked the arrival constraints while at our cruise altitude of 17;000 feet and after climbing to FL210 we didn't notice that we were now missing a published constraint at ZZZZZ Intersection. Just prior to ZZZZZ Intersection; we were cleared to descend via the arrival so we set the bottom altitude; confirmed it and started the descent. The First Officer noticed the constraint on the chart and brought it to my attention; so I leveled off and added the constraint to the FMS and shortly resumed the descent. ATC did not mention the early descent and we were unsure of how far off the published path we got.Cause - High workload; weather; lack of currency; failure to recheck descent profile after climbing. End of a long 3 leg day. Suggestions - Automation awareness during low altitude cruise operations.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported missing an altitude constraint during arrival and cited workload; fatigue and lack of flight currency as contributing factors.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Rain Repellent System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This is a general safety concern First Officers have experienced landing a newer model aircraft in heavy rain. In the past we had to execute a missed approach because visibility forward was obscured by water on the windshield. The wipers were working as fast as possible; but were unable to keep up. We could see out the L2 and R2 windshields; but not forward. There have been other reports in the past concerning this issue with the newer model aircraft. My understanding is that Boeing delivers a new aircraft that has a type of rain repellent coating on the windshield; but should be re-applied every 9 to 12 months. Since we were planning to take this aircraft into an airport with very heavy rain; I contacted Maintenance Control inquiring if there was a re-application of windshield rain repellent program. Maintenance Control and station Maintenance were not aware of any program. My question to Company is why not in the name of safety; service; and on time efficiency? Yes; if we do not see the runway; it is safer to go missed. However; if a diversion is required due to fuel; we have impacted service and on time efficiency.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported Maintenance was unaware of the aircraft's periodic windshield rain repellent treatment.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared to descend via the RAVNN 6 arrival and I had read the warning from the union about problems on this arrival. The aircraft reached FL230 at FZEEK. Constraint was displayed in the FMA indicating that the aircraft would stop descent and hold FL230. When the aircraft reached 200 ft above FZEEK; the autopilot reverted from managed descent mode to basic mode vertical speed. I quickly mashed the altitude button; forcing the aircraft to level off. The [FMC] shows that the aircraft will join the descent profile just before reaching FZEEK where a constraint altitude is set up. It shows the aircraft will continue the descent passing WHHTE. I think there must be a problem in the Jeppesen coding of the arrival; but this reminds me of other reports I wrote concerning the points DOWNE on the REDEYE 2 and SKOLL which is on the 24R approach. Both of the points are at 10000 ft; and the aircraft would sometimes continue the descent ignoring the 2nd constraint altitude.Pay very close attention to the automation on any arrival that has two consecutive points of the same altitude on an arrival/approach. There was a warning that was published years ago about the LAX arrivals for similar circumstances. As you can see; the way this problem was fixed (at LAX) was by rewriting the arrivals so that there were no two points with the same altitudes.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported a continued problem with the FMS complying with the altitude restrictions on the RAVNN6 Arrival into BWI.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was called at home and told that company Maintenance had disclosed that our flight had its oxygen shut off internally by Maintenance. So I can tell you that on my usual pre-flight; I turned on the [Crew oxygen] O2 with the cockpit switch. Pressed the 'Push to Test switch' on my mask and Jump-seat mask next to mine; and both tested O.K. Having not needed to go the Lavatory in flight; I could not tell that the O2 system wasn't working correctly. I have caught bad mask before; not working properly and had them replaced. Having been recently sick with the Flu; I am reluctant to put a mask on to test it during these epidemic times.


Second narrative: Have been told that the Oxygen on our aircraft may have been in the 'Off' or 'Close' position; possibly prior to our two legs with this aircraft. Per our FOM; Volume Two; Preflight procedures; I properly tested my oxygen mask and speaker before flight. It tested with the three test spurts of air and I observed the Oxygen Blinker show in its window. I always perform this test. Sounds like Maintenance had the oxygen system partially turned 'Off'; or it was completely 'On' during our legs of flight; because it worked normally for us.


Synopsis: Four pilots were informed the Crew Oxygen (O2) supply bottle handle on their A319 aircraft was found in the closed position by Maintenance.  Flight crews did not notice any oxygen supply discrepancies after two days of flying.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: SR20
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Brake System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After a normal landing we exited the runway. The student had trouble tracking the centerline of the runway as we taxied south to do another takeoff and he said that the plane was pulling to the left. I took the controls and confirmed that yes it did seem to be pulling some so [we decided] we would return to our home base; and have the Mechanic take a look. We turned onto taxiway C2 to enter the runway when the student said his brakes had totally failed. I jumped onto the controls on my side and got the plane stopped just as we were leaving the taxiway. The left main and nose wheel were in the mud although we had stopped 15-20 feet before we would have impacted a taxiway sign. We shut down the plane; got out and observed the right main smoking and saw small flames. I grabbed the fire extinguisher and attempted to put out the flames. It took care of most of it; but required additional retardant from the fire extinguisher supplied by the ground person that showed up to assist. The brake had failed and was leaking fluid; which had ignited due to the heat.So; everyone please check your extinguishers to make sure they are usable and full. You never know when you may need them. Also; if your aircraft is pulling some; it might be best to stop sooner and get out for a physical inspection.




Synopsis: The instructor pilot of a taxiing SR-20 assumed control from his student and was able to bring the aircraft to a stop when the brakes failed.  The left main and nose gears came to rest in the mud to the side of the taxiway and leaking brake fluid had ignited due to the heat of the brakes. The flames were extinguished with fire retardant.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was on duty when I was informed Aircraft X diverted to ZZZZ. The aircraft was overweight on landing and required a repetitive maintenance inspection accomplished prior to each departure. We have no approved maintenance providers in ZZZZ; and I could not locate a proper phone contact number. After a while we found a mechanic who could work on the aircraft; provided he give us his information so we could fill out a Provisional Approval form. Management constantly pushed me to worry about getting the aircraft out of ZZZZ; They said the provisional approval could be done after the aircraft left. I finally spoke to a mechanic; told him what we needed and sent a Provisional Form for him to fill out. I also told him that before the aircraft leaves; he must talk to me before signing of the log book. He needed to work under my direction and guidance. I was informed that the aircraft was signed off. At this time I told management and the flight dispatcher that the mechanic must sign off the log book with my name and number before it leaves. We still had no information on this mechanic except for his name. I repeated this to no avail to several Maintenance Operations personnel. They said we would worry about it later. I said we were in violation of several policies. No one seemed to care except for getting the aircraft out of ZZZZ. Cause - Management pressure to get the aircraft out of ZZZZ before all proper procedures were accomplished.We need to follow published procedures even if it means cancelling a flight. Management need to stop pushing us to violate our company policies and procedures. When an issue is brought to their attention; they need to respond to the situation properly; instead of ignoring the concerns of the [maintenance technicians] involved.




Synopsis: Technician reported that a Boeing 777 made an unscheduled landing at a non-maintenance station and required a repetitive maintenance inspection. Proper documentation procedures were not followed.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On board the airplane were 3 juvenile delinquents in restraints each with an escort; who were not Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) and not armed. During descent the Flight Attendants (FAs) called to say that one of the juveniles had started an altercation with the escorts. He was head butting and body shoving them into the seats and overhead bins. 2 of the escorts had managed to restrain the juvenile in his seat but where having to physically hold him in place. Because of the way they were doing this they were partially blocking the aft FA jump seat. The FAs said the escorts would hold him in place for landing and that they had Able Bodied Passengers (ABPs) willing to help if needed. I called ahead to have law enforcement meet the airplane; made sure the First Officer was ready for landing and the called back to the FAs. I asked the FAs to make sure the escorts would be ready for landing while restraining the juvenile and checked with the FAs to make sure they were ready. They both stated it would not be safe for the aft FA to occupy the aft jump seat as the juvenile and escorts were in the last row and partially blocking it. They said there was no open passenger seats and asked me what I wanted her to do. Since the situation seemed to be handled; no other passengers appeared to be involved and ABPs willing to help; I had the FA sit in the flight deck jump seat. At the gate; all passengers were deplaned before the juvenile was escorted off by law enforcement. I failed to remember that a level 2 threat required a lock down of the flight deck. I was too focused on the FA's safety for landing and not the possible repercussions of; even momentarily; opening the flight deck door.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported an altercation in the cabin involving a juvenile prisoner and an escort; law enforcement personnel met with the aircraft.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E D01
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) advised to 'climb via SID'. This means up to FL230. Filed altitude was 16;000 feet. After initial altitude restriction of 10;000 feet was met; Captain verbally stated we can now continue climb up to 23000 feet; which coincided with the SID procedure. As Pilot Flying I verbally confirmed this and set 23000 feet in the [flight computer]. We continued to climb per the SID. Upon reaching 16;600 feet ATC advised he had 16;000 as our final. I immediately stopped the climb and descended to 16;000 feet. Flight continued uneventfullyRote memory caused both pilots to fly the SID per the PDC. Neither pilot is accustomed to flying low altitudes as a final. Both forgot; due to the short flight; a lower altitude was filed. Brief any assigned altitude that is lower than the SID as a threat in the Pilot Flying briefing. Also; to verify on PDC of final altitude assigned when putting a higher altitude in the Flight Computer.




Synopsis: An air carrier reported exceeding their final altitude request while departing on an RNAV SID because the top altitude of the SID was higher than their requested final altitude.