elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This is a Safety Issue addressing SID's in general and MEM specifically. MEM had 1 basic and simple SID since for as far back as I can remember. This all changed during the early May 2012 navigation update cycle. MEM went from 1 simple SID to 20 complicated SID's. This huge increase in SID options has created severe safety issues that must be addressed. 1. The SIDs are poorly understood by the pilots operating out of MEM. 2. The SIDs are poorly understood by ATC. 3. The SID's descriptions are extremely long and have way too many caveats that can be over looked and cause a safety of flight issue. Today I filed a flight plan from MEM via ELVIS.ETREE MSL. Clearance Delivery cleared the flight: ELVIS1 ETREE Transition Flight Plan Route. Once airborne off Runway 18L; I was given a turn to HDG 080 and told to join the ELVIS1 SID. I then requested direct to ETREE. Controller said that I needed to go ahead and intercept the MEM/098 radial inbound to ETREE as published because ATC expected me to continue on the MEM/098 radial once passing ETREE. The SID states 'Expect vectors to join assigned transition radial. Crossing the transition fix; continue on current heading; expect vectors from Memphis Center to join filed route.' There is a big difference between flying a radial and flying a heading. The Controller said the SID required me to continue on the MEM/098 after ETREE. The SID states 'Crossing the transition Fix; continue on present heading.' This may be a small point in the scope of things; but please take a look at how complicated we have made things for both the flight crews and ATC. The ELVIS1 SID is 3 pages long and chocked full of things that can result in a safety of flight issue. The ATC controllers at MEM will be the first to tell you that they do not understand all the caveats on the 20 new MEM SIDs they have told us this as we question them during the departure climb-outs since May. If they are still having problems; imagine a Citation departing MEM with a single pilot at night in the weather and trying to understand these overly complicated SIDs with multiple pages of descriptions. I request that the FAA take a look at this and redesign SIDs using the KISS principal of Keeping It Simple.




Synopsis: CE525 Captain laments the seeming complexity of the ELVIS1 departure from MEM and the lack of understanding by both pilots and controllers.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aircraft Logbook(s)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Logbook Entry; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Upon reviewing the Logbook history for  a B757-200 aircraft [while] in Operations; there were four write-ups the previous week about the Right Engine having hung start at 50% on the first start; with the second start as being slow to accelerate.  In addition; there was also one write-up stating the engine didn't start on two attempts on one of those days.  This Log entry was the only entry that had maintenance actions entered; since it was listed as a closed item under the Flight [Did Not] Operate section. The action for this Log entry was Replaced (RPL) the 14th Stage Bleed Converter Valve.  All of the other Log entries merely stated 'No further action needed per Line Maintenance Operations'.  A call to Maintenance Control revealed that they actually had replaced both Igniters; Fuel nozzles and done some rigging. They also told me that the aircraft was scheduled for more maintenance work when it returned.  I am asking why this maintenance work is not entered on the Log history.  Without these entries; it appears that there has been no maintenance action completed.  Since the Log History and the Deferred Item list are the only documents that we have to determine the airworthiness of the aircraft; all the maintenance actions should be recorded on these documents for review during preflight.  A call to Maintenance Control should not be required.

Callback: Reporter stated she was informed that Maintenance Control only logs Maintenance Actions in direct response to specific write-ups. The write-ups she had referenced were bundled with the original problem write-up for the Right Engine; but the additional maintenance actions that were accomplished were actually entered under a different section of their computerized maintenance database not generally accessible by pilots. That's why she had to call Maintenance Control to get a clearer understanding of the maintenance issues involving the Right Engine on their B757-200 aircraft. The engines were Pratt-Whitney PW-2000 series.



Synopsis: During preflight of a B757-200 aircraft logbook history; an outbound Captain questioned Maintenance Control as to why the maintenance actions for four previous logbook write-ups about hung starts on the right engine were not available to the Flight Crew for a preflight airworthiness review.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing through FL 280 we got a cabin altitude warning horn. Cabin was at 10;000 ft and AUTO FAIL and STBY ON lights illuminated on pressurization panel. Accomplished immediate action items; [advised ATC] and the FO flew the emergency descent profile down to 9000ft. Communication with the FAs was extremely difficult during the descent. Turns out the FAs couldn't hear us or understand that we were accomplishing an emergency descent; not because O2 masks were interfering with the communication as we assumed but; rather it was because of air noise near L1 door. (We had assumed Passenger masks had deployed but learned later that they had not. I observed an amber light near pass O2 switch illuminated. It was the engine LOW IDLE light which I thought was the O2 mask light.).After arriving at 9000 ft with a more clear communication with the cabin; we learned the O2 masks had not deployed; and that the loud noise around the L1 door started shortly before we got the cabin altitude warning. I don't think the Passengers knew something was amiss until I told them they could take their masks off and we were returning to ZZZ. Returned to ZZZ below 9000 ft in MAN DC mode. Approach and landing was uneventful.After discussing event with Maintenance we discovered the aircraft has a recent history of pressurization write ups relating to the L1 door. We both reviewed the logbook prior to flight but only went back to the last airworthiness sign off. So; when the FAs mentioned the loud door noise we were not familiar with its history.




Synopsis: While climbing through FL280; a B737 CABIN ALTITUDE warning horn sounded along with the pressurization AUTO FAIL and STANDBY ON annunciations. An emergency descent was completed to 9;000 ft and the flight returned to the departure airport where the L1 door seal was discovered failed.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were fully pushed back from Gate XX to Taxiway X tail east per ATC instructions. We are cleared to start from ground crew who were using the new remote headset. Push back was normal and per SOP. After my clearance to the ground crew to disconnect the headset; I was given the salute and I acknowledged that with taxi light per SOP and announced it to the First Officer. After engine start and accomplished after start checklist; I asked First Officer to review the bleed configuration because of the deferred MEL item that caused the air conditioner Master Caution light. As we were reviewing the maintenance release procedure; I heard a couple of banging. Not sure what the noise were; I looked outside the cockpit and noticed two ground crew were driving away from the airplane and gave us a quick wave. First Officer asked didn't we already receive the salute; and I reaffirmed the salute and after start sequencing with him.I am guessing that the ground crew returned to the airplane after giving us the salute and realized that they either forgot to remove the 'remote jack' for the headset system or the panel was not fully locked and closed.Either way; we were surprised by their presence at the airplane and not communicating to us or leaving without letting us know other than the bang we heard.This activity is actually reckless and unsafe and breaking all SOP and protocols for ground station operations. I asked First Officer to inform operation control to relate to them what had transpired. They acknowledged our report and we began our taxi for takeoff.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that ground crew approached the aircraft a second time after giving the all clear signal; resulting in a violation of SOP and a safety risk.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JYO.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E JYO
ATC / advisory: CTAF JYO
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While on approach to JYO; I (pilot flying) was monitoring the CTAF and regularly reporting my position northwest of the airport as well as my intention to enter the traffic pattern. I was accompanied by another pilot (not flying). I heard the pilot of a Cirrus report his straight in approach for Runway 17 followed by an aircraft on the ground query his IFR status. The pilot on the ground expressed his agitation with the pilot of the Cirrus because he had been forced to wait for his IFR departure clearance until the Cirrus pilot cancelled IFR. After a short exchange between the two other pilots; the pilot of the Cirrus reported short final and no other CTAF calls were made by either pilot until the Cirrus reported clear of the runway.At this point I was 2 miles northwest of the airport on a 45 degree course relative to Runway 17 to join the 17 upwind and execute a left traffic pattern. I was distracted with the before landing checklist when a TCAS alert warned me of traffic and the pilot not flying called my attention to an oncoming twin engine turboprop on a reciprocal course climbing 200-300 FT above. We proceeded and landed without further incident. Neither myself nor the pilot not flying heard a departure announcement on the CTAF from the turboprop; and we were unaware of its position until the TCAS alert. I had reported my position relative to the field less than a minute prior to the incident.




Synopsis: PA28R pilot reported NMAC on approach to JYO airport.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During cruise; Number 1 Flight Attendant contacted me informing me a passenger was suffering a heart attack as verified by a physician on board. We elected to immediately divert to ZZZ for medical assistance. As a result; we landed overweight at 159.0 lbs. We completed all appropriate checklists for the situation and landed uneventfully. Taxied to gate and had passenger taken off by paramedics. Maintenance informed and overweight landing inspection was done.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew was notified by flight attendants of a passenger with a medical emergency. The flight was diverted and an overweight landing was made.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While level at FL370; both 'LOW PRESS' lights in right tank began to flicker; eventually staying on continuously. Ran appropriate QRH checklist. All engine indications and fuel quantities were normal. Contacted Dispatch and conferred with [Maintenance]. Based on conversation and normal indications; decided to continue. During descent; at approximately 22;000 ft; the right engine spooled down. [Advised ATC] and began turn towards [destination]. Engine restarted on its own shortly after we began our turn. Engine ran normally until maneuvering to final when it again spooled down. Ran checklists as appropriate and landed uneventfully. Taxied to gate and deplaned the passengers. At the gate our fuel indicated 3.19 [in] tank 1 and 4.28 [in] tank 2 at gate arrival. Total FOB 7.5. Prior to departure during the before starting engines checklist release fuel was verified at 26.4. In-flight fuel logs were kept and all checks were normal. Maintenance logbook entries were completed.


Second narrative: [Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported right fuel tank 'LOW PRESS' lights illuminated and right engine spooled down and restarted several times during descent and landing.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Company Operations Manual
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Snow and overcast conditions prevailed at departure. As I reviewed the paperwork I checked the temperature in DEN which was less than 10 C for arrival. The performance documents did not mention ice accretion penalty applied. I called the Dispatcher to ask why and his response surprised me. His training manual claims ice accretion penalty is applied from TOD on down to landing. We conferenced the Chief Pilot who concurred with my assessment. The correct manner to define the ice accretion penalty is 'when icing is encountered during any phase of flight and the landing temp is below 10C.' I'm concerned our company is dispatching flights outside of FAR 121 compliance.


Second narrative: Shortly after beginning my shift; I received a call from the Captain [on a flight to] DEN. He asked if ice accretion had been applied to the landing weights for DEN due to the icing conditions what he would experience during climb out from [departure airport]. I said it had not; and that per the Dispatch Operations Manual (DOM) we should only consider icing from the top of descent onwards unless the flight is very short.The captain then identified himself as a check airman and said that was an incorrect policy towards ice accretion; and the Chief Pilot subsequently agreed with him. I haven't been able to find a reference to ice accretion in the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) or 737 Flight Manual (FM) (the Captain said it had been removed 6 months ago because it's a dispatch function); but I did find references to using the entire route for determination of VREF ice usage in the FOM.


Synopsis: A B737-800 Captain and his flight's Dispatcher have different opinions about applying an ice accretion weight penalty to the landing weight when ice was only encountered during climb and the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) does not provide clear guidance.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other after flight completion
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During preflight while attempting to load the flight plan into the FMS from the downlink; I received a FMS message that the flight plan was only partially loaded. After looking at the legs page; I realized that the fix preceding our destination was missing. I attempted to load the missing fix manually; but received a message that the fix was not in the database. I called our dispatcher and asked him to refile us with an alternate fix. A few minutes later I received an ACARS message from him stating that he refiled us using a different fix. I checked the new routing and it was 1 mile less than the original. I then requested and received our [departure clearance] which matched the new routing; and the rest of the flight was uneventful. During preflight preparation for our return to trip to ZZZ1 after our ZZZ layover; I noticed a second unsigned release for the flight in question. When we got to ZZZ1 I called the duty officer to explain what happened; and I requested to speak with the dispatcher. The dispatcher told me that he had sent a second release after he refiled us; but I was unaware of the new release so it was never signed. I was unaware that a new release was sent. [Operations]/flight crew coordination when a new release is issued after the original release is signed.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported being unaware there was a new flight release for the flight resulting in an active flight release not being signed before departure.