elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: An IFR aircraft operating at 11;000 FT reported GPS issues originally but seemed to be working fine when asked for a position report; however we unexpectedly lost RADAR at said altitude in an area where radio and RADAR are very limited. Pilot was informed RADAR contact was lost and he reported level flight and his position. I put the aircraft into coast track only when I tried to set his track first it didn't update and ended up around 15-20 miles behind where he reported. Pilot was also moving much faster then where his 'coast' flight path indicated. He had; as we came to find out later; lost his transponder and had to recycle it which is how we found him; however he was already around 20 miles into the next sectors airspace when he popped back on RADAR. Prior to asking pilot to reset his transponder we tried to call him around 12-13 times but were unable to receive a reply due to the fact he had moved beyond our radio coverage so were unable to get any reports on his position or make any attempts to ask him to reset his transponder since we could update where he is and coordinate with the next sector any information other then that he was for our purposes lost. We couldn't talk to him or see him on RADAR other then as we found later review a primary only target however even that was very intermittent and the airspace between the 2 sectors we were unable to even see his primary target on RADAR either. The pilot ended up calling on another frequency trying to re-establish communications with ATC and that's how he ended up on the next sectors frequency and finally able to get him to reset his transponder and finally see him on RADAR and re-identify him. Install better RADAR and radio transmitters so ATC is able to better establish communications and separation services for aircraft moving thru mountainous terrain so that at least in the event we lost RADAR we could still talk to the pilot or even better just not lose RADAR on aircraft operating around 5;000 FT above the MIA.




Synopsis: ZDV Controller described an airspace incursion event claiming the poor RADAR and radio coverage in the subject area was the primary cause of the airspace infraction.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFB.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C SFB
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Second aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: King Air departed off Runway 27R and a BE33 departed Runway 27C on diversion headings; problem is both aircraft on 2 different departure frequencies; on 2 different satellite's RADAR scopes; with runways less than 1;000 FT apart and the departure corridor for Runway 27C are in satellite's north airspace. Due to bad procedures in order for Sanford to move traffic and a poor Letter of Agreement with Sanford Tower to move traffic; a safety issue has shown to prove this is a bad operation. Sanford Airport procedures were designed for a 1 runway operation. Now they have 3 departing runways with 2 different Local positions to 2 different departures scopes; with a huge amount of traffic; this letter and old procedures are no longer safe and needs to be addressed. This has been a known problem with Sanford Airport and no one wants to address these procedures and now this has become a safety issue! There has been numerous close calls due to these procedures and the way Sanford Tower interprets there version of the LOA that they can depart southeast bound traffic off the north runway and northeast bound traffic of the south runway at the same time and then on two different frequencies and not be liable or provide a service to the pilot; in the mean time put added pressure on the F11 Controllers to be responsible to keep separation and put the aircraft on course. Being that Sanford Airport is a Class C airspace; there needs to be some kind of procedure for the Tower to taxi for direction or provide a safe environment for aircraft they launch into satellite airspace. Hopefully this will cause an investigation for a new and simpler LOA (and not a 10 page letter) with new procedures for a safe operation here at a very busy little airport; with smarter or more informed controllers. Bad and old procedures here at Sanford just rose its head and hopefully someone will finally have the guts to take care of this!




Synopsis: F11 Controller described an unsafe condition involving SFR departure procedures noting the addition of a Local Control position coupled with more runway procedures require the need of new LOA revisions.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew Scheduling called to assign the Reserve Captain a trip 21 minutes prior to push. The assigned trip pushed almost 24 hours later. I had my phone on at the time because I was talking with Maintenance (MX) Control. I let the call go to voicemail because of other priorities. The Flight Deck crew was working an ETOPS preflight at an uncontrolled field at [an early morning hour]. It was the First Officer's 3rd ETOPS Flight. Also; we were in the process of investigating an intoxicated passenger and having them removed for damaging an overhead bin. I was on the phone with MX Control to have the bin MEL'd and working an amended release with Dispatch. I got a chance to listen to voicemail thinking Mx control was calling me back. It was Scheduling with an assignment for the next evening and also gave a time reference. I returned the call to scheduling due to the specific time reference on the voice mail. I asked if they planned on giving me a [sick call] if I didn't return their call. My phone is usually off on the Flight Deck. He said I was on call 24 hrs a day. I ended the conversation and continued with my duties. Crew Scheduling at no point should be adding another distraction to the Flight Crew unless it pertains to the safety of the flight they are operating. This was not only unprofessional and unnecessary; but unsafe.Crew Scheduling calling the flight deck during preflight duties.Scheduling should not be calling the flight crew after report time unless it pertains to the safety or cancellation of the operating flight.




Synopsis: A Captain reports of a call from Crew Scheduling during preflight. The crew was already running late due to a maintenance issue and an unruly passenger. Reporter mentions the call was for a new assignment some 24 hours later.
Date: 202008
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We received a preliminary dangerous good print out after we initialized ACARS.  Then about 10-15 minutes to punch we received another preliminary dangerous goods printout that added more dry ice.  I looked at this saw the addition of the ice and my expectation bias led me to believe that it was the Final dangerous goods printout.  We taxied and waited for our weight and balance numbers.  When our final weights came the final dangerous goods also printed out and I said; 'Why did we get another Final dangerous goods report.'  I then looked at the two reports I had and realized they were both preliminary reports.


Second narrative: DG (Dangerous Goods) planning sheet arrived XA:52 at gate XX. We received the second sheet XB:07. Thought it was final with addition of dry ice. pushed XB:24. Final weights and Final dg sheet 23:36. We confirmed proper paperwork then continued.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported pushback from gate prior to receiving Final Dangerous Goods report.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DCA.FSS, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Windshear; Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: FSS DCA
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Flight Service
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working the In-flight position at the DCA AFSS hub monitoring the Miami AOR [Area of Responsibility] frequencies. There was a system outage which prevented me from having a graphical display to provide time-critical meteorological and aeronautical information to the crew of Aircraft X; during which time a multi-cell thunderstorm cluster that contained low level wind shear and severe turbulence was passing over the aircraft's destination (MIA). I alerted my supervisor and no corrective action was taken to compensate the system outage. We do not have a backup system which provides graphical information that allows us to overlay critical weather data in correlation to an aircraft's flight path. We do have AISR (Aeronautical Information System Replacement) as a system back up for flight plan data and weather information processing; however; we do not have a backup system with an accurate graphical display of the aircraft's flight path and severe weather. In addition to this my judgment became altered because we are understaffed at our facility and was under and immense amount of stress because I needed a break which was denied. Specialists are worked to the point of physical and mental exhaustion and are often denied breaks during times of increased traffic volumes which causes facility management to become agitated and angry to which they respond to the operational workforce with threats and intimidation which contributes as a significant safety mitigation factor by creating a hostile work environment. Many specialists are forced and compelled to brief pilots in AORs that they are not trained or certified to do so in by a threatening and hostile management staff. Our facility is operated under Company X and the non-adequate staffing coupled with malfunctioning equipment makes an extremely stressful and hostile work environment which is exacerbated by a vengeful and vindictive managerial team.

Callback: Reporter clarified acronyms and also described working condition as poor.



Synopsis: DCA FSS Specialist reported a system outage affecting flight safety and described their working environment as stressful due to staffing issues.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: AUO.Airport, AL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E AUO
ATC / advisory: CTAF AUO
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We made a call to take off from the active runway after someone called 'base leg'; assuming we had sufficient time without causing a traffic conflict; we also had a visual on them. As we were on our roll-out; they requested that the aircraft 'holding short' stop. We continue to take off; and they break off final and sidestep us. We never heard a 'final' radio call or saw them turn final before we made our take-off radio call and took the active runway.




Synopsis: C-172 Flight Instructor reports Near Mid-Air Collision during takeoff.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger report to me that she left a laptop in her bag and I asked if it had a lithium battery. Passenger is unsure and I tell my flying partner. She claims its fine and I decide to tell my Captain to be safe. Flying partner proceeds to ask the gate agents in which they state its fine. Flight Attendant proceeds to check the manual to see if laptop can be in the pink tag bag. Captain decides to get the pink tag bag and give the laptop to the passenger. The issue was solved.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a gate checked bag with Lithium Ion powered laptop was erroneously put  in the cargo.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft had a depressurization [event]. The aft Flight Attendant O2 mask door didn't drop. Upon opening the door; it was found that the O2 mask box was taped. If you do a mask drop on the hook you should still look inside each O2 mask door for any obstructions. Day Shift. Duty time eight hours.

Callback: Reporter stated he doesn't know what caused the depressurization event on the B737-300 aircraft when the aft Flight Attendant jumpseat; ceiling O2 oxygen mask panel door did not open. Further troubleshooting indicated the O2 door latch release solenoid had failed and would not release the door panel. That is when Maintenance also noticed masking tape had been holding the Flight Attendant's O2 masks inside; not allowing the masks to drop. He was informed that he had performed and signed-off a 'Full Drop' Check on the same aft O2 panel approximately 18 months earlier during a 'C' Check. He noted that he could not have satisfied the requirement of the 'Full Drop' Check if he had taped the mask up inside the mask unit. Reporter stated that he believes a Fuselage Upper Crown Inspection had been accomplished at some point after the 'C' Check he was involved with had been completed. The Crown Inspection requires removal of the Vertical Stab Dorsal Fin forward lower fairing. Bolts that secure the lower fairing have to be accessed by removing a ceiling panel above the aft Flight Attendant's jumpseat that also holds the Flight Attendant's O2 mask unit. When that panel is reinstalled; a 'Full Drop' Check and deployment of the O2 door and masks must also be accomplished. But; if the same ceiling panel was removed under a Maintenance write-up; than the requirement to do a Full Drop Check of the O2 masks may not have been accomplished. His Air Carrier is currently reviewing their maintenance records. He has thirty years experience in aircraft maintenance.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed about a depressurization event on a B737-300 aircraft where the aft Flight Attendant jumpseat O2 oxygen masks ceiling door did not open. The O2 masks were also held inside with masking tape. Oxygen masks were not available to flight attendants.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower MEM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 36 right as we initiated the takeoff roll (power about 45%) rolling about 20 kts; Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance due to a visual sighting of a coyote on the runway. We pulled power to idle and stopped. The tower could not declare the runway clear for some time. Since we had only rolled 500 ft we recomputed the data; changing the V speeds; and setting the flaps at 14.5 as the new takeoff data stated. When the coyote was observed clear of the runway; we were again cleared for takeoff. As the throttles were advanced got an aural flap warning; so we again rejected the takeoff and cleared the runway. Speed was estimated at 40 kts so minimal braking was used. After recomputing the takeoff data and reconfiguring the aircraft; we neglected to input the new flap setting into the MCD. Practice double aborts in the sim.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported the Tower Controller canceled takeoff clearance due to an animal on the runway. During subsequent takeoff attempt; the crew received a takeoff configuration warning and rejected the second takeoff attempt.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While taxiing back to the hangar the landing gear collapsed. The gear handle was down; green light. Possible mechanical problem. Replacing landing gear screw jacks.




Synopsis: An experimental aircraft's landing gear collapsed while taxiing after landing with the gear handle down and three green lights illuminated. Possible gear screw jack failure.
Date: 201703
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: At cruise altitude and flying PIC while captain and other FO on break we received a couple SIGMETs reporting convective thunderstorms with tops at FL540. I plotted the coordinates and saw the lines was anchored on our routing. We requested what looked like best option and 125 miles right of course which was approved. While on this cleared deviation it became apparent we needed more distance to circumnavigate this solid line. I asked to increase another 25-50 miles as needed to work around and through the weather. The request was denied and we were told the best that could be done was 128 miles. So based on my options and my ability to navigate in a clear opening rather than through a massive red return on radar I chose to [use PIC authority] and stay clear as possible and follow emergency weather deviation procedures. We advised ATC and weather deviations after climbing 300 ft we continued and then after clear returned back to clearance and did resequenced of waypoints and reported back on route with ATC. We also SATCOM'd our flights dispatcher and advised of all related information. We returned to course and landed without further events. The event occurred while relief pilots were flying and assigned captain and first officer on break.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B777 flight crew reported the necessity to deviate around weather while in cruise; but only after using PIC authority for the safety of flight.