elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was one of the four crew members who were all eye witness to the horrible fire which persisted directly under the aft cargo compartment door burning it to charcoal black oblivion. I find it extremely ironic that as of this writing no one from the company or union has contacted me about the incident. I realize that none of us has any training or expertise in determining the cause of the fire however out of the four of us we have over 120 years of aviation experience; some civilian and some military. All four of us performed an evacuation of the aircraft as it filled with smoke fumes. All four of us did a thorough walk around examination of the fires' aftermath. Several of us obtained videos; dozens of photos and eye witness statements which contradict the theory of the loader catching on fire. All four of us had an extremely difficult time sleeping that night. Several of us had throat Irritation from the acidulous; electric smelling fumes. All four of us met in the morning wondering when we were going home because we were told we were going to ferry an obviously severely damaged aircraft back to ZZZ that night. We were in constant question on how to prepare for our next legs crew rest.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported performing an evacuation of the aircraft at the gate during boarding when the cabin filled with smoke from an external fire in the vicinity of the aft cargo compartment.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout...passing 12;500' the right pack light illuminated. I continued to climb to approximately 14;000' and then immediately descended back to 10;000' MSL and initiated the QRH. As the QRH steps were accomplished and the outflow valve was opened; significant pressure bumps occurred. The cabin pressure never exceeded 10;000'. At about 10;500' MSL and leveling at 10;000'; the Cabin Altitude Warning light illuminated and horn sounded. The Cabin Altitude Warning light QRC was initiated but the cabin altitude was below 10;000' so the mask were not donned. The cabin altitude was climbing so I directed the First Officer to close the outflow in accordance the Cabin Altitude Warning QRH. After the cabin pressure was finally stabilized and return [to departure airport] was initiated. The Flight Attendants reported that a Passenger (small child) was experiencing a bleeding nose a possibly bleeding ear. An overweight landing...was accomplished at approximately 149;000 pounds.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported a Right Pack failure and loss of pressurization on climb out at 12;500 feet with subsequent return to departure airport after regaining control of pressurization.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSPD.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZSPD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent into ZSPD; ATC assigned us 3;600 meters. As Non-Flying Pilot; I read back 3;600 meters. While I was reading back the altitude to ATC; the Relief Pilot called out the meters to feet conversion from the chart incorrectly using the 3;300 meter equivalent of 10;800 feet rather than the 3;600 meter equivalent of 11;800 feet. After completing the read back with ATC; I glanced at the meters to feet conversion chart I had up on my iPad. I saw the called out altitude of 10;800 meters and did not notice that it was one line lower than the correct altitude of 11;800 feet. ATC called us about our altitude when we were approx. 800 feet low. The Captain who was Pilot Flying turned off the autopilot and returned the aircraft to the correct altitude.The Chinese [ATC] change you back and forth between Feet and Meters without notice several times during the same approach. It can get very confusing. The altitude set from the conversion sheet do not correspond directly to the altitude assigned and so it can be very difficult to look and see whether the correct altitude is being flown.Having the crew members reading the conversion altitude; wait until the radio read-back is complete before calling out the converted altitude might help all of the pilots be more involved in the cross check of the altitude.


Second narrative: Cleared to 3;600 meters and set corresponding altitude in feet for 3;300 meters box. [We were] approximately 1;000 feet below assigned altitude. Turned automation off and manually climbed back to correct altitude after resetting mode control panel. I was the Pilot Flying and we were going into Dumet on the Dumet 22L arrival.Difficult environment operating in meters and changing to feet and then setting corrected altitude in mode control panel. The group of us checked the meters chart and agreed to the wrong altitude in feet. Air Traffic Control brought this error to our attention and correction was made.Have to be more big vigilant when operating in meters and changing back to feet for altitudes assigned from Air Traffic Control.


Synopsis: B787-9 crew reported descending below cleared altitude due to confusion over the meters to feet conversion.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I had a flight the other day and this has been on my mind. When I approach a gate I always ask if we have any special passengers. On this flight I was told there were none by the agent. I received the pilot release form prior to shutting the door and it also showed no special passengers. We arrived at the destination and I was told we have 5 wheelchair passengers and 1 of them is an aisle chair. I watched the aisle chair passenger being taken off and he basically had very little body mobility. I thought this is very important info we as the pilots should know about in case of emergency evacuation. My next flight I was surprised to see under special passengers -- emotional support animal -- I thought this is ridiculous. I am given info about people basically getting a free ride for a dog; but I do not know about an aisle chair passenger. I brought this up to the ZZZ flight office. I was given an email saying this info used to be on the release form; but the pilots did not want it. I believe this is very important info for me as the Captain to have if I need to evacuate in an emergency. Please include this info for all special passengers; blind; deaf; aisle chair. Anyone who I would need to look out for in an emergency.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported that he was not notified of special needs passengers aboard his flight; causing a potential safety risk in the event of an evacuation.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ONT.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ONT
ATC / advisory: Tower ONT
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In position on Runway 26L; we were on centerline; with calm winds. Once cleared for takeoff; I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer (Pilot Flying). He called 'Set Standard Power' and as I did so; I noticed he was veering to the left of centerline. Before I could set the power; he said; 'Steer right; steer right; steer right!' I could feel the right rudder pedal was fully deflected. Simultaneously; I also applied full right rudder and reduced the power to idle. The aircraft still was not turning right; so I ultimately had to apply right brake to regain the centerline. We notified the Tower of our reject and they instructed us to taxi down the runway and turn left on [the taxiway]. As we proceeded down the runway; I checked the steering with both the tiller and the rudders. The FO (First Officer) also checked the steering with his rudders. The aircraft responded normally at this point; however; we returned to the gate for further troubleshooting. We are not aware of what caused this un-commanded left turn on the takeoff roll. Maintenance is currently working on the problem. On both taxi-out and taxi-in; the aircraft turned without issue or resistance. The following comments would not prevent this event; but we did discuss the reject procedure. It does seem that it would be advantageous in certain circumstances for the FO to call the reject. In this instance; I did not know that he was holding full right rudder and still turning left. We both thought this procedure should be re-evaluated.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported the aircraft started an uncommented turn to the left on takeoff roll which resulted in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 26L in ATL. During the takeoff roll; I observed a Caravan taxiing south on Taxiway D; approaching the runway. At some point above 100 knots; the Tower said '(call sign) cancel your takeoff clearance.' I initiated a rejected takeoff around 110 knots. We cleared the runway and taxied to the deice area on Ramp 6 to let the brakes cool; perform the QRH; and calculate the brake energy in the Optimum Performance Capable. I contacted Dispatch and let them know what happened; and we were doing a gate return. At the gate a logbook entry was made. Maintenance performed an inspection and signed off the aircraft off after a 90 minute cooling period. I kept the Passengers updated during all phases of the event.I would like to see a PA microphone hooked up to the existing jack on the pedestal. The 'remain seated' PA announcement would be easier and quicker with a dedicated PA microphone; considering the many different existing COMM panels.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Tower Controller issued a cancel takeoff directive to a Part 121 aircraft during it's take off roll prompting a high speed abort.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Furnishing
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: April 2015; A Hawker arrived in ZZZ for a scheduled inspection. Two days later; early A.M.; a Technician was opening cockpit floor boards for the inspection. When he opened the co-pilots floorboard he discovered a large 12-18 inch [long] screw driver underneath the rudder pedals and linkage. I was notified four days later of the event. The Hawker Quality Assurance (Q/A) Manager has contacted the Air Carrier Q/A department and [was] instructed to send the screwdriver to ZZZ1. Not sure where the aircraft was prior to coming to ZZZ1 but we need to find out. This could have easily ended up as a catastrophic event with the loss of life. This should have been seen by whomever was giving the OK to close the panels.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Manager reports an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) discovered a large 12-18 inch screwdriver underneath the co-pilot's rudder pedals and linkage while opening up cockpit floorboards for inspection on a Hawker-Siddeley HS 125-900 aircraft.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZUA.ARTCC, GU
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZUA
ATC / advisory: Center ZUA
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was working the Radar Assist Position; transferred out Aircraft X at FL400 at OATSS and Aircraft Y at FL400 at NATSS; utilizing degrees divergence in the transition from Radar to Oceanic Non-Radar separation. Advised the Radar Controller that Aircraft Y would need to be on the airway after NATSS as Aircraft X already was on the airway after OATSS to establish the required separation criteria and that they would need to wait until the fixes to terminate radar or establish them on the airways prior to the fix. The Radar Controller then cleared the aircraft to deviate direct to NATSS and OATSS when able; terminated them both and switched them to ARINC. I do not believe that the Radar Controller; nor many people at ZUA understand what it means to terminate radar and that it is our responsibility to establish the transition into Oceanic Non-Radar Separation.The training program here is dismal and does not properly teach the airspace and requirements of Terminal Radar to Enroute Radar to Domestic Non-Radar and Oceanic Non-Radar. It really just address's the Terminal Radar in the [simulator lab] and then it appears a lot of people here look for ZOA to tell them what we can or can't do when we transfer aircraft out.




Synopsis: ZAU Center Controller reported the Radar Controller did not follow proper procedures to ensure required non radar separation criteria were met for the receiving facility.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: During pushback tug driver announced 'Breakaway; Breakaway' so I applied breaks forcefully to stop aircraft from rolling back any further. This caused aircraft to come to hard stop. Flight attendant was standing in first class galley and was thrown to ground injuring her. After stopping I contacted cabin crew and was told [Flight Attendant] was injured. No other injuries were reported. We contacted Operations and told them we were coming back to gate and would need [medical personnel]. I asked tug driver what happened and was informed the pin popped out of slot. He then towed us back to gate. I informed passengers what was happening. I then verbally briefed [Chief Pilot] and Dispatch. A logbook entry was made. I requested chief pilots office come to gate. [Medical Personnel] removed [Flight Attendant] and a replacement flight attendant was sent to aircraft. Maintenance performed inspection and signed aircraft off. I discussed situation with Flight Manager and Dispatch and we all agreed it was OK to continue.


Second narrative: During the pushback; we were pushed approximately 100 ft. from the gate. Suddenly the ramp personnel driver of the tug shouted a command 'breakaway; breakaway'. The Captain immediately applied the brakes using the foot brakes then followed by setting the parking brake. This caused the aircraft to abruptly come to a stop. The Captain asked what happened the tug driver said 'the pin popped out'. The flight attendants immediately called and said a flight attendant had fallen and injured herself during the aircraft coming to an abrupt stop. We coordinated with Ramp; Operations; [Chief Pilot]; Flight Manager and Maintenance. We returned to the gate. [Medical Personnel] aided to the flight attendant and a replacement flight attendant came on board. We had maintenance inspection completed. Received a new [release] and proceeded without any further incident.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported an abrupt stop during pushback due to tow pin failure resulted in a flight attendant injury.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B727-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the pilot not flying during our approach to the runway. We were vectored for the ILS; reported the field in sight and then were cleared for the visual approach. ATIS winds were reported at 030/10G14. During the approach brief we decided to plan on VREF+10 for our landing speed and I would get a current wind report on short final. Flaps 25 and the landing checklist were called for around 1;200 FT. I called '1;000 FT; cleared to land' and started the landing checklist. At approximately 800 FT during the landing checklist it was discovered that the TE FLAP DISAGREE light was on and both flaps were indicating 20. The wind check reported the current wind at 030/8. I asked the First Officer if he was comfortable continuing the approach with the intention of landing with flaps 20. He said 'yes and we already have a higher Vref speed set.' The flap handle was repositioned to 20 to match the indicated flap position. At 600 FT we decided to continue the approach and did not reference the QRH. The GPWS did report its' 'FLAPS-TOO LOW' warning on short final several times. The warnings were attributed to a known reason - as not having the flaps set at 25 or 30 for landing - and not having run the checklist to override the GPWS oral warning system.




Synopsis: B727 Captain discovers a flap disagree light during approach with the flaps selected to 25 and indicating 20. With Vref set at plus 10 for a crosswind the crew elects to continue to landing without referencing the QRH. The GPWS flaps warning sounds several times prior to touch down.