elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Staffing; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [This flight assignment] is unsafe as constructed. This leg requires augmentation. The extent of physical impairment was so severe that it put us at risk. We violated every facet of the CRM/TEM concept. During this leg the First Officer and I were in and out of microsleep. I would startle myself awake only to find my First Officer slumped over the controls. This is unacceptable. When the human physiology of sleep is denied; as in circadian disruptions; then there is absolutely nothing you can do short of taking drugs to stay awake. This is NOT just an all nighter. This is back side of the clock on the other side of the world. Circadian low point occurs 2 hours into the flight. And the flight starts off with sleep debt due to the all nighter to [a Far East Pacific crossing destination] followed by this leg to [another Far East destination about 6 hours away]. At the end of the flight we have been up for 24 hours. After we arrive ZZZZ and get to bed we wake up at 0200 local. This is the middle of our body clock day. The so-called nap before pickup is just staring at the walls since we are in our daytime body clock. By the time we launch we are now in circadian low; 0100-0400 body time. The sleep debt coming over also begins to rear its ugly head. We were just trying to survive the flight. Words cannot describe the physical toll this took on us and the effort needed to stay alert enough to get on the ground safely. We were shaking ourselves; reading checklists over and over trying to stay awake for the arrival. Worse were the lingering effects over the next couple of days. This doesn't just go away. The cumulative sleep debt and the reaction of the body to forcing it into sleep deprivation during this time have a long term recovery. You don't just go to bed and all is well. It takes several days to recover. This is borderline reckless to deliberately put ourselves in this physical state and then fly. Augment or change the departure times.




Synopsis: An international Captain reported extreme fatigue experienced by him and his First Officer on a non-augmented Far East leg following a Pacific crossing.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pax Seat
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was installing coach passenger seats on a B777-200 aircraft Aft Center Rows XX; YY and ZZ; with a Partner (Mechanic) on November 2012. I was working on the left side [of the Center rows]; Partner on the right. The left side installation went okay. But the right side seat track had debris inside and carpet that came close to edge of the seat track. Seat Row-ZZ was the most difficult to install and required two people install. One person to push on seat to align and the other to tighten shear pin. I was pushing seat into position while partner was tightening shear pin. Shear pin contacted edge of seat track and gave a false indication of applied torque. Seat came loose during a trip and was later fixed at a Line Station. Rows XX and YY were okay and no other problems noted. ETOPS aircraft.


Second narrative: I was working with a fellow Mechanic installing upgraded Economy seats on a B777-200 aircraft in November 2012. I was informed a month later that a Center row seat came loose. I do not know why the seat row came loose even though the other seats that we installed were properly installed and secured. The only thing that I can think of why the seat row came loose is because of the location of the seat; which is in front of the storage container; which made it visually not as clear as the other seats when it comes to visually observing the aft seat track attachment. I would also like to say that after we installed each seat [row]; we not only do a visual [check] to make sure it is secured; but also do a manual test by lifting; pulling and wiggling the back of the seats to determine if there are any discrepancies. When we did the seat row; there was nothing unusual; or out of the ordinary as to compared to the other seat rows. ETOPS aircraft.


Synopsis: Two Maintenance Base mechanics report how a false indication of applied torque to a seat row locking shear pin contributed to a B777-200 coach passenger seat coming loose from a floor track in flight.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Software and Automation; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: Received numerous ATC clearances via CPDLC while enroute. First cleared us down to 38;000 ft; was accepted by Pilot Flying.. Next was a route clearance. First line of free text said 'Cleared to NIKLS'. Pilot Flying changed the Legs page with verification from me. After a few minutes ATC sent another CPDLC that said descend to 34;000 ft and then another clearance came in a couple moments later clearing us to 31;000 ft. ATC then queried via radio '(Call sign) where are you heading direct to?' I answered NIKLS and was told that is not your clearance and was given an immediate heading. We then brought up our clearance and noticed the next line of free text said 'VIA LAYED FARLN NIKLS'. ATC then read this clearance and asked what altitude we were cleared down to. We noticed that the aircraft had stopped at 34;000 ft while we figured out our navigation error. We then descended to 34;000 ft and proceeded on the correct route.


Second narrative: While descending to 34;000 ft we received a CPDLC clearance to proceed direct to NIKLS VIA and then the rest of the clearance. We did not see the VIA part. We went direct to NIKLS. Then we received a descend to 31;000 ft. While still in the descent; ATC asked if we were going direct to NIKLS. We said yes. ATC said that we were not cleared direct. They gave us a heading; and verbally gave us the other fixes that came before NIKLS. As we were writing down the clearance; the plane leveled off at 34;000 ft. ATC asked if we were cleared to 31;000 ft. We said yes; and started to descend to 31;000 ft.


Synopsis: A Flight Crew reported a course deviation and failure to descend due to confusion recieving multiple CPDLC clearances from ATC.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Normal takeoff and initial climb through 3;500 FT Captain's airspeed indicator made a 30 knot jump to increased airspeed then back to normal (approximately 230 KTS). A slight wobble on altimeter as well but settled down through 5;000 FT. At level off of 8;500 MSL airspeed on Captain's side remained at 238 KTS; while Co-pilot's indication was increasing through 250 KTS to approximately 290 KTS. Made several power adjustments to trend airspeed/power settings; and confirmed with Captain's side ADC analog information on NZ 2000 that IAS was 40 KTS faster than indicated speed displayed on Captain's airspeed. Remaining VFR flight conducted using Co-pilot's information and display information from FMS; IDC read out. Normal landing with no issues on operation to ramp parking. Upon inspection of Captain's Pitot tube a 'thumb nail size' piece of carcass stuck in and around entrance of pitot tube area. Small bird possible; however no other sign of bird impact noticed. Maintenance removed pitot tube; cleaned [it]; and re-installed. Aircraft is scheduled for complete Pitot Static; RVSM re-cert and aircraft will not operate in RVSM airspace until all required inspections of system are completed.




Synopsis: HS125 Captain experiences unreliable airspeed indication climbing through 3;500 FT resulting in an overspeed upon leveling at 8;500 FT.  Post flight reveals that a small bird may have impacted the Captain's pitot tube.
Date: 202007
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: ELB / ELT
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my equipment check I noticed that the ELT in G2 was OFF (it should be in the ARM position)I notified the CA (Captain) and explained the discrepancy. He said he would call Maintenance. I'm not sure whom he contacted but they told him 'If the FAs (Flight Attendants) need to use it; they just turn it on; it's fine.' I explained how the ELT should work and he directed me to move the switch to the ARM position. After the ELT's quick self-test it checked out as ready to operate.I am concerned that however long the ELT had been OFF that nobody noticed during their prefight equipment check. I also feel that Tech Ops/Flight Ops should have a better working knowledge of the equipment; or be able to quickly reference the information. Had I not questioned it; the equipment would have continued; as it apparently had already; to remain OFF.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported ELT in the OFF position.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other 4 Days later
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On [date] Airline Cargo Safety sent a Weight Change After Takeoff alert email stated a [package] on this flight showing held off was actually scanned [on]. DSTG item 4; [package] for 6lbs; was held off for ZZZ1. This [package] contained a radioactive shipment. Since there was only 2 bags not 15 as required and the item was held off; we have an undeclared and unsecured DG.




Synopsis: Airline Ground Personnel reported an unsecured and undeclared Hazmat violation due to a communication breakdown.
Date: 201911
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Aircraft component: Engine Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X had an air return to ZZZ due to the fact that the No.1 Engine was under power. It was later discovered that the wrong PN (Part Number) ID Plug was installed. On the night I was assigned to the engine change Job Card XXX-00-01; I failed to verify the thrust rating. As my bid location of the engine shop for the last few years I am aware that Job Card XXX-00-01 is compiled in the engine shop when the engine is configured or an ID plug is installed. Normally I verify the thrust rating as I do the other Job Card XXX-00-01 to check EEC software PN. On the Job Card XXX-00-01 Configuration Verification on the ID plug I verified the pins configuration where correct and quick glance at what I thought was the part number since the ID plug had a stamp along the true part number of XXX-660-201-0. After engine change we verified the engine made the 65% N1 and all parameters where within limits. As per task; it does not require to take the thrust above the 65%.




Synopsis: Inspector reported they failed to verify the thrust rating after an engine change resulting in the aircraft returning to departure airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 6
Light: Night
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the PIC and had a fellow commercial pilot with me to act as an additional crewmember. We had flown up to TEB earlier that evening to pick-up the owners of the airplane and fly them home. Prior to our passengers' arrival I had filed an IFR flight plan for the return flight. My co-pilot and I printed/briefed the departure procedures while still in the FBO. Upon boarding the passengers; we received the current ATIS and obtained our IFR clearance. We were then cleared to taxi to Runway 24. We had been cleared for the RUUDY RNAV SID to the en route structure. I told the pilot not flying to brief the departure while I quickly reviewed it as well. We had printed both the Teterboro SID and the RUUDY RNAV SID; even though we expected the RUUDY. Upon takeoff from Runway 24; we flew the Teterboro departure; rather than the RUUDY. We soon realized the mistake when ATC queried us.I inadvertently flew the wrong departure procedure as we had both procedures in the dark cockpit. I was not careful enough to set the TETERBORO 8 SID aside so as to not mistake the two textual procedures. We missed the fact that we had flown the incorrect SID until we were informed by TRACON.




Synopsis: Although cleared via the RUUDY RNAV SID from Runway 24 at TEB; the pilot and 'additonal crewmember' of a PC-12 inadvertently flew the Teterboro SID until alerted by New York Center.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to installation of Thrust Reverser Hoist Assembly:1) Checked out Thrust Reverser (T/R) Hoist Kit; from Stores. Item was located in the Engine Change Build up Kit. 2) Inspected hoist equipment available in T/R Hoist Kit. Items available in T/R Hoist Kit was:  A) two sets of mount bolts; (2 each; same size and length).  B) one each Hoist chain assembly with mount. As is; Installed equipment available for T/R removal. Mount bolts were tight and re-checked before T/R removal. Bolts remained tight. T/R was removed and moving toward the T/R shipping crate; by fork lift. At the time the T/R dropped; I was in the process of getting some covers for the engine anti-ice duct; and was walking away from the incident. But heard the impact of the T/R hitting the floor.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about a Thrust Reverser Assembly from a B757 engine that was dropped on the hangar floor while being moved with a forklift to a shipping crate. A Thrust Reverser Hoist Kit only included mount bolts and hoist chain assembly.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise we got a center hydraulic low quantity alert. Status page showed .47 and decreasing. We alerted [company operations] and conveyed that center hydraulic fluid would be very low or empty when we arrived. We declared an emergency with Approach Control. As we began configuring for landing; we received intermittent center system low pressure EICAS messages. Center fluid was .09 to .14. We followed checklist and landed [with] flaps 20 and rolled to the end with emergency equipment standing by. We entered the ramp [and] were towed from there to parking.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported receiving an alert for low quantity in the center hydraulic system. Crew declared an emergency and landed safely.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 6
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream G100/G150 (IAI 1125 Astra)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Established on the GIBBZ2 RNAV arrival at 6;000 feet approaching GIBBZ we were advised to expect the ILS 1C approach.  Initially we were expecting the ILS 1R so we had to reset the FMS to the ILS 1C approach.  Resetting the FMS also enables the Localizer to auto-tune the correct frequency and set the inbound course.  After resetting for the ILS 1C we were just crossing the GIBBZ intersection. The FMS was updating the route with the new ILS when were just about to make the turn to continue to follow the arrival for landing North at IAD.  In the process of this FMS updating the LNAV (Lateral Navigation) mode of the flight director and autopilot disconnected.  The aircraft then  proceeded straight ahead and did not make the turn to follow the STAR south as is required for landing North at IAD.  During this time the cockpit was busy as I was re-briefing the approach for the ILS 1C and confirming the localizer frequency and minimums that were set. We did not notice that the aircraft left the LNAV course and had not made the turn.  ATC advised us that we had missed the turn at GIBBZ and gave us a heading to follow.  They then advised us to expect the ILS 1R.  Now on vectors we reset the FMS again for the ILS 1R and re-briefed the approach.  The approach and landing were normal. As the Safety Officer for the company I will review this at the next safety meeting.  I feel that if the ILS assigned is changed it greatly increases workload for the crew when close to the airport.  It would help in future if runway or ILS assignments were provided well in advance.  It would also help if they were not changed after they have been assigned because the crew has already set up for that approach and briefed it.  I will ensure all our crews will better monitor the RNAV STARs and also keep a sharp watch of the FMS and autopilot modes during changes to STARs or approaches.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: G150 flight crew reported they deviated from cleared track on arrival into IAD; late runway changes were cited as contributory.