Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Drinkable/Waste Water Syst
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The Relief Officer reported to the aircraft for the flight prior to the Captain and the First Officer; who were conducting flight planning duties in operations. Shortly afterward; a Flight Attendant informed the Relief Officer that she smelled 'a strong burning odor;' in the rear of the aircraft. The Relief Officer went to the back of the aircraft and verified the odor as electrical and smoky in nature and then directed the gate agent to suspend boarding. The Captain and the First Officer reported to the aircraft and were informed of the problem by the Relief Officer and the flight attendants. The Captain verified the burning odor; which she judged to smell like burning plastic or electrical fumes. The Captain called for Maintenance to come to the aircraft while the First Officer pre-flighted the cockpit. The cockpit crew inspected the aircraft logbook looking for possible causes of the odor and noted that the aircraft had just emerged from a 'B' check. The Captain and several Line Mechanics began to troubleshoot the issue as the burning odor persisted. The Captain asked the First Officer to go to the back of the aircraft to verify the burning smell and he noted that the odor of burning plastic/electrical fumes was extraordinarily strong and began at row 25 of the aircraft and increased as he moved rearward. At this point a Mechanic Supervisor arrived at the aircraft and communicated directly with the Captain. The line mechanics had noted that several cargo panels had been replaced in the cargo compartment. The Captain had asked the line mechanics if the new cargo panels were the source of the fumes and the Line Mechanics stated that in their opinion they were not. However; the Supervisor immediately asserted that the smell was due to the presence of the new plastic panels in the cargo compartment. When the Captain noted that the fumes were electrical and smoke-like in nature; the Mechanic Supervisor stated that 'he had been doing this work for a long time; and that this smell was definitely neither smoke nor electrical' in origin. The Mechanic Supervisor was now informed by the line mechanics; in the presence of the Captain; that the aircraft had just been through a 'B' check. The Mechanic Supervisor; based on this information; and then stated that the smell was the cleaning fluid used to clean carpets and aircraft seats. The Captain; based on her experience; disputed this claim with the Maintenance Supervisor and physically smelled the aircraft carpet and several of the seats; noting to the maintenance personnel that the fumes were clearly not emanating from the carpet or the seats. At this point; the Maintenance Supervisor noted that the aircraft had failed a water quality check and claimed that the odor resulted from the chemicals placed in the water system in order to bring the water system into acceptable parameters. Throughout this process; as the Supervisor's explanations changed; it was clear to the Captain that she was being pressured by the Supervisor to accept each explanation for the fumes and that she was expected to accept the aircraft. It was equally clear that the Maintenance Supervisor did not know the source of the fumes; but was merely attempting to convince the Captain to accept the aircraft. After consultation; the three cockpit crewmembers decided that they would not accept the aircraft unless 1) the source of the fumes was conclusively identified; and 2) the aircraft could be ventilated so that the fumes were no longer evident. At this point; the handful of passengers who had already boarded was taken off the aircraft. The entire cockpit crew and cabin crew also disembarked. The fumes had worsened in intensity and were now clearly evident throughout the entire aircraft and also began to permeate the cockpit. The Relief Officer began to feel nauseous as a result of the fumes; and at least one Flight Attendant also reported feeling unwell. The Maintenance Supervisor then received a call from a Line Mechanic. The Mechanic informed the Supervisor and the Captain that the source of the fumes was a compressor pump for the water system. The pump had overheated; was too hot to touch 'burning itself up;' and had discolored the paint on the surrounding shroud and that the burning paint and the overheating pump were emitting the fumes evident in the cabin. Shortly afterward; the Mechanic Supervisor disappeared from the aircraft; leaving the Captain and several of the line mechanics. The Relief Officer's condition and that of one of the Flight Attendants worsened; and the crew decided jointly that these two crewmembers needed medical attention. Company personnel drove the two ill crewmembers to the airport medical facilities. Maintenance Personnel told the Captain that the pump would be deactivated and the aircraft ventilated. Ramp Control informed the Captain that there was 'no other airplane' available to take the flight. At this point; other crewmembers; including the Captain and the First Officer; began to suffer symptoms of varying severity from the fumes and the crew decided that all crewmembers needed medical attention. At this point; about one hour and forty-five minutes had passed since the Relief Officer had first reported to the aircraft; and most crewmembers had varying exposure to the fumes during this time; with the #1 and the #3 Flight Attendants having the least exposure and the cockpit crew and #2; #4; and #5 Flight Attendants having the most. The First Officer's symptoms including difficulty breathing and a sore throat; the Captain's throat felt sore and she was somewhat woozy; and at least one other flight attendant experienced symptoms consistent with exposure to poisonous fumes. All remaining crewmembers were transported to the airport medical facility for treatment. All crewmembers were found to have been exposed to noxious fumes. The First Officer and one flight attendant were noted to have breathing difficulties on a Pulmonary Function test; were given medication; and declared unfit for duty by medical staff. The Captain spoke to Flight Management via phone and provided the Chief Pilot with a summary of the events above. The cockpit crew later learned that the original aircraft was replaced by other equipment operating a flight inbound.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B757 potable water pump overheated during preflight filling the Cabin and eventually the Cockpit with noxious fumes causing all crew members to seek medical attention. A Maintenance Supervisor attempted to push the crew to fly the aircraft.