elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During my preflight; number two battery voltage was zero. After wiggling the rotary selector switch; I found it to be faulty in the number two position. Battery volts would read zero or 25 depending on moving the rotary selector switch. The Captain wrote the switch up in the logbook. The mechanic troubleshoots and determines the switch is defective. He leaves the aircraft and returns to tell us that the switch is not deferrable and the part is enroute. We are told sometime later by maintenance that the part in not enroute and the switch is in fact deferrable [using] MEL for a battery volts indicator and says Maintenance Control wants to sign off using this MEL. The Line Mechanic seems skeptical that this correctly addresses the problem. The Captain and I agree that it doesn't seem correct to us either. The MEL seems to address the voltage indicator and not the rotary selector switch. Later; Maintenance Supervisor presents us with the same MEL. The Captain and I still have the same concerns. The Captain had several conversations with ACPs (Assistant Chief Pilot) and maintenance personnel. Everyone agreed that the MEL was in a gray area. Maintenance signs off the aircraft using MEL. The Captain and I still were not comfortable with it. The Captain spoke with ACP once again and he suggested if we still were not comfortable with the sign off; write the switch up again being even more specific. Maintenance again signed off the write up.  Maintenance Control assured the captain this was a legal deferral and the ACP assured him that he had done everything he could do and that the aircraft was legally deferred. An AWR (Air Worthiness Release) was in the logbook and was signed.




Synopsis: Widebody transport aircraft First Officer disagreed with the applicability of an MEL maintenance used to defer the battery voltage selector switch.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had deferred Pack 1. During climbout; noticed cabin altitude climbing. A short time later; received a Pack 2 VLV CLSD EICAS message. During consultation of the QRH; received a BLD VLV 2 CLSD message. Altitude at the time was approximately 16;000 feet. While coordinating with ATC to secure a lower altitude; sending a message to dispatch; and complying with QRH procedures; aircraft entered precipitation; generating an ICE COND - I/A INOP warning message. Opted to advise ATC and received vectors clear of precipitation. QRH procedure did not correct the problem generating the warning message; however upon clearing the precipitation; the warning message disappeared. No ice accretion was noted on the aircraft. During this time period; aircraft was descending to 6;000 feet; then to 4;000 feet; with a TAT of +5; while returning to ZZZ. Aircraft reentered small pockets of precipitation; generating the ICE COND - I/A INOP a couple more times; disappearing each time the aircraft cleared the precipitation. Due to the deteriorating weather conditions in ZZZ; elected to perform an overweight landing. Airport was in sight 10+ miles away; with no precipitation between aircraft and the airport. Another check of the aircraft revealed no ice accretion. Landed approximately 4;500 lbs. overweight. Smooth and soft touchdown with descent rate at or less than 200 FPM. Landing and taxi in uneventful. Brake temperatures remained in the green range during taxi and parking at the gate.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported a loss of pressurization; resulting in a diversion.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAY.Airport, OH
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: CMH Approach declared ATC Zero. I took over CMH airspace as per the current plan; LTL had coordinated with CMH Approach thinking they were supposed to take the airspace. This wasted at least 3 minutes and created much confusion. I had an aircraft inbound to DAY within 20 NM of the airport at an altitude of 090 and descending. After wasting more time trying to figure out how to call DAY Tower my D-Side began to pass the inbound flight plan to the Tower. The aircraft was low and close to the airport at this time; I am unaware if Tower already had the flight plan. If they only got it from us they got it late. My D-Side then told me that the Tower called RADAR on the aircraft. I asked him 'Are you sure they said RADAR' he said yes; so I switched the aircraft over to Tower without issuing an approach or terminating RADAR. I would like to have some sort of training on how to correctly take over; and work CMH Approach airspace. This is the second time I have had to do so and I have NEVER been given any type of training on how to do this except a CBI on were to find the contingency plan; which I did NOT have time to find let alone read when I am told I have just acquired airspace I haven't been trained to work. I would like to see checklists at the sector on properly handling CMH Approach ATC Zero as well. A map of the airspace would really be nice. Plus recurrent training on working with VFR towers.




Synopsis: ZID Controller voiced concern regarding the lack of training regarding contingency operations; describing a recent CMH's declaration of ATC Zero and the confusion that ensued.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the LAN Sector which is 11;000 FT to FL230. An E135 departed FNT requesting FL240. Due to traffic at 16;000 FT; I stopped the E135 at 15;000 FT. I had 150T in the Data Block with the aircraft level. I started the flash at Chicago Center by pressing 'g cid'. Sparta Sector (g22) is 11;000 FT to FL190. Pullman Sector (g25) is FL200 and above. The automation starting flashing the Data Block at g25 even though that sector floor is 5;000 FT above the interim altitude and Pullman took the hand off almost immediately; which made me think that Sparta took it. Interim altitudes do pass between Cleveland and Chicago Center. Sparta then starting flashing a GRR departure CRJ2 head on with the E135 leaving 11;000 for 15;000 FT. I called Sparta and told them to stop the CRJ2 at 14;000. Sparta then said they didn't have the hand off on the E135 and then called RADAR. The automation issue has been a know issue for years and needs to be fixed. The automation issue with flashing to the wrong sector needs to be fixed. Pullman should have called to ask if the aircraft was flashing by accident instead of taking the hand off level 5;000 FT below their floor.


Second narrative: An E135 was stopped at 15;000 FT for traffic. I did not initiate the hand off. ZAU then flashed us a hand off climbing to 15;000 FT. The R-Side immediately got on the line and asked the ZAU Controller to stop his aircraft at 14;000 FT. ZAU then called back and apologized to me; because he did not see a limited Data Block on our traffic; it was then that we realized that the hand off flashed to the wrong sector. The E135 flashed to the high sector at ZAU because he was requesting FL240. The hand off needed to be directed to the appropriate sector; we did not pay attention to the flash; the fault was ours and we need to be more diligent in these situations.


Synopsis: ZOB Controller described an adjacent airspace incursion when the automated hand off feature initiated the hand off to the inappropriate sector without controller corrective action.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Stearman
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was in a congested area and started to taxi and can see nothing in front of me in a Stearman tail wheel aircraft. You need a little speed to S turn and just as I got that speed and started to S turn I collided with Aircraft Y that was parked. I slammed on [the] brakes but too late; minor damage to the Stearman. I will need a new propeller and minor [damage] to Aircraft Y; it will need a new stabilator. Lesson learned I will always use an aircraft marshaller with a Stearman in a small congested area.




Synopsis: Pilot reported taxiing in a congested area resulted in a collision with a parked aircraft where both aircraft were damaged.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working the CIC position in Area 2 when the R29 Controller informed me that Aircraft X had descended unexpectedly into GSO Approach airspace. He called the GSO Controller and made a point out after the aircraft had already descended into their airspace. He had already transferred communications to CLT Approach when the incident occurred. Aircraft X was a RDU departure on the KELLS 2 OPD arrival into CLT. The aircraft was vectored off course then turned direct MAJIC and instructed to 'descend via the KELLS 2 Arrival; South transition.' The aircraft should have crossed MAJIC at or above 13;000 FT per the KELLS 2 descent profile. When I was notifying the watch desk of the incident I noticed a strip for Aircraft Y; also off of RDU; on the area desk with 'KELLS descended to 12;600 FT' written on it from approximately 4 hours before. I called the day shift supervisor and he informed me that it was the same situation; which the aircraft had descended below the published altitude at MAJIC after being vectored off course. There is an obvious safety issue here that needs to be addressed ASAP. Suspend KELLS operations for RDU departures until the problem can be identified and resolved.


Second narrative: Aircraft X was inbound to CLT via the KELLS2 OPD arrival from RDU. Prior to being issued the clearance to descend via the KELLS2 arrival; Aircraft X was RADAR vectored for spacing. When that was complete; Aircraft X was cleared direct MAJIC intersection and then cleared to descend via the KELLS2 arrival; South transition and communications changed to CLT Tower. A minute or so later I observed Aircraft X descending through 12;600 FT about 8 NM NE of MAJIC. I called GSO Tower to point out the traffic. I then advised Management. I then observed Aircraft X at about 11;700 FT and watched as they climbed back to 13;000 FT. It seems obvious that this air carrier has not implemented this procedure (either pilot training or FMS automation) correctly or completely; therefore my recommendation would be to stop utilizing this OPD until flight standards can confirm that the necessary training and software adaptation have completed.


Synopsis: ZTL Controller described a failed altitude crossing event resulting in airspace incursions; the report including both the ATC and flight crew perspectives regarding this event.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ASW.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ASW
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After waiting for an arriving aircraft to clear the runway; I was taking off VFR on Runway 36 at ASW. The winds were out of the north at seven knots. Very shortly after I became airborne a helicopter appeared from behind a hangar to the east of the runway near the departure (north) end. The helicopter flew to the centerline of the runway approximately 500 feet from the departure end directly into my flight path at an altitude of less than 200 feet AGL. He then turned slightly right to the runway heading. I made a radio call that the 'helicopter on Runway 36 at Warsaw had just flown in front of a Bonanza taking off.' As soon as I saw the helicopter I could see the potential conflict. Since he was moving from my right to left I started a turn to the right away from his relative movement. I passed about 100 to 200 feet right (east) of the helicopter at the same altitude. The helicopter replied that he had radioed his takeoff on Runway 36 but did not hear any other transmissions. Since I had been receiving transmissions from the aircraft which landed before I took off; I assume the helicopter's transmission was blocked by the hangar mentioned previously. The problem appeared to be that the helicopter did not taxi to the runway before taking off; but took off from a position east of the runway not visible from departing aircraft. The helicopter flew north and west from his liftoff point and did not clear to see if there was traffic departing on Runway 36 before he flew directly to the runway centerline. A contributing factor was that the helicopter's position north of the hangar blocked radio transmissions to/from aircraft on Runway 36.




Synopsis: BE33 pilot taking off to the north reports a NMAC with a helicopter departing from behind hangars on the northeast quadrant of the airport and flying to the runway centerline. The hangar apparently blocked VHF communication between the two aircraft.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Tire
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Brakes parked just after pushback. Before taxi checklist complete except my rudder control check. Prior to receiving ground crew departure salute; I asked the First Officer to call for taxi in an effort to alert Ground Control and another carrier's jet also pushing back (uncontrolled ramp). Upon receiving taxi clearance from Ground Control; I instinctively released the brakes and began the taxi forward. Simultaneously; the First Officer said 'stop'; I realized my error; and I heard an unusual noise below. In quick order; I stopped the aircraft and parked the brakes. The Tug Driver (still connected) informed me that I had 'run over' the tow bar during my short taxi. After confirming no one was hurt in the incident; I called Operations for Maintenance to assess damage; if any. Maintenance determined (through conversations with Maintenance Control) that the aircraft needed a single nose tire change; but that is was safe to taxi to the gate. I believe there was some damage to the tow bar. After tire change; normal flight to filed destination. This incident reinforced to me the importance of exact procedural compliance and how any deviations can impact safety (other's lives) in our operations. In the future; I will be more aggressive in ensuring strict checklist discipline; specifically making no radio calls until receiving a departure salute and satisfactorily clearing the area before beginning taxi. I am extremely fortunate that my error did not result in injury of our push crew.


Second narrative: In hindsight; instead of calling for taxi I could have made a radio call pointing out our position to the other aircraft and Ground. It is my duty to back up the Captain and monitor all ground activities which I failed to do. I am thankful no one was hurt. Our procedures are in place for very good reasons.


Synopsis: A MD-80 Captain began taxiing and ran into the recently disconnected tow bar; damaging a nose tire before the Push Back crew gave a cleared to taxi release.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: S-76/S-76 Mark II
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Furnishing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Inspection Authority
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During aircraft maintenance on the flight line; the installed 'LifePort' cabinet was found improperly installed. The LifePort cabinet is used to support patient litters [stretchers] and infant 'Isolettes' during airborne patient transfer. This system was originally installed by Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) in the Sikorsky S-76B [helicopter] approximately several years ago. There are two additional Patient Air and Suction fittings installed on the aft aircraft cabin wall as back-up systems. These are powered by the LifePort cabinet and connected by color coded hoses. The two control valves on the aft wall had blue masking tape across them with the words 'Inop' [Inoperative] written in black marker. The supply hoses for these valves were found loose and not connected to the supply fittings on the LifePort. The supply ports were open to the atmosphere and not capped off. In operation of the LifePort; these uncapped fittings would have allowed the cabinet 'Air' and 'Suction' to be vented to the atmosphere; thereby disabling the system on the LifePort. The potential for having a patient aboard and these systems not functioning properly could result in a more severe medical emergency. The LifePort cabinet was removed and replaced with a second cabinet and the 'Air' and 'Suction' lines were properly connected. Failure to properly install the [LifePort] cabinet in accordance with the STC instructions; no testing of the systems after installation and a 'Return to Service' of a medical unit not functioning properly was not done to the Repair Station standards and Part 135 [Operations] Manual requirements. This situation was brought to the Director of Operation's (DOP) attention; who also was the pilot on the aircraft. His response was 'those systems were not needed over the week-end'. It was not documented when; or who; installed the LifePort [cabinet]; as there was no Work Order (W/O) or logbook entry generated.




Synopsis: A LifePort medical cabinet was improperly installed and without correct documentation in a Sikorskey S-76B helicopter.