elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202104
Location: TRK.Airport, CA
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: There are two waypoints near Truckee; CA; with identical identifiers: VERDI.  One is a useful visual reporting point for aircraft approaching Reno.  It is shown on the San Francisco Sectional over the town of Verdi on Interstate 80.  The other is an airway intersection on V200 and V392; 12 miles out on the 241 radial of the Mustang (FMG) VOR.  This location is about four miles southeast of the town of Verdi.  It is in the northern portion of the Mount Rose Wilderness Area; on a ridge at a much higher elevation than the town.  This is very mountainous territory.  The aforementioned ridge rises to the south of I-80; reaching 10;785 feet due east of Donner Pass and Truckee.  Minimum IFR enroute altitude is 11;500 feet on V200 and V392; and 13;000 feet on nearby V6.  Even in VFR conditions; the mountain tops are frequently obscured by clouds.  Many pilots plan their route over Interstate 80 and utilize the VERDI reporting point as part of that route.  The town is strategically located at a 90 degree bend in the Truckee River canyon and I-80. VERDI the airway waypoint appears on IFR enroute chart L09; but it does not appear on the sectional chart. A pilot relying upon the sectional chart when programming a route into his or her GPS navigator will reasonably enter VERDI as a waypoint.  It will be happily accepted by the instrument; since there is such a waypoint in its database.  The problem of course is that the location is not over the intended route; but instead is over a mountain ridge in a designated wilderness area almost four miles to the southeast. This is an unnecessary hazard to navigation.  One solution would be for FAA to rename the VERDI visual reporting point as part of its series of five-character VPxxx waypoints which are in the navigation databases.




Synopsis: Pilot reported two waypoints near Truckee; CA; with identical identifiers: VERDI. One is a visual reporting point while the other is an Intersection.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Rated Helicopter Pilot was conducting solo; DAY; VFR cross-country flight in pursuit of Single Engine Land Airplane add on rating. Pilot was using iPad2; with iOS7; and ForeFlight for cross country navigation assistance. After 1.5 hours of in-flight usage; the iPad shutdown with an 'over heat' caution. Pilot continued with the standard VFR paper sectional chart. iPad was being 'charged' in flight with a cigarette lighter USB panel conversion. Limited research in the INTERNET suggested the iPad might have been charging at 5 amps verse the recommended 2.1 amps. This was probably OK for a short while; but not recommended for more than an hour or so. In the future; the pilot plans to use a portable Smartphone/iPad battery recharger instead of the panel mounted USB device.




Synopsis: A PA-32 pilot reported his iPad overheated and shutdown while being charged on a USB cigarette light adapter 5 AMPS verse 2.1.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Climbing through I think about 11;000 or 12;000 feet we were alerted to an 'AFT CARGO OVERHEAT'. I took the controls and radios and instructed FO to reference the QRH. After searching the QRH index section under the Alphabetical A's he could find nothing that referenced the Aft Cargo Overheat. I then transferred the controls and searched the index myself [and] I found nothing under the As. I regained the controls and radios. FO continued his search of the QRH.About this time I alerted ATC of our situation and requested a return to the field. FO searched the fire tab and found items that referenced cargo squibs. This section advised us to arm the fire bottle which we did. Without further information I assumed that an overheat situation was occurring and that the situation had the potential to quickly worsen. I felt that time was of the essence and did not want to fly further from the airport. FO continued his search of the QRH page by page and found the item under the air tab. He ran through the items and the 'AFT CARGO OVERHEAT' light was extinguished. We landed and taxied to the gate without further event.I feel as though the index section of the QRH should reflect what is actually indicated on the EICAS verbatim. That alone would have eliminated my confusion. After being alerted to 'AFT CARGO OVERHEAT' the last thing that I was thinking was to check the 'AIR' tab in the QRH. Also I was made aware that others in maintenance and other departments have seen this situation arise in the past. This is the type of information that ought to be disseminated to the pilot group as a whole in order to avoid a reoccurrence.


Second narrative: It took us 4 minutes to find the item in QRH because EICAS displayed caution 'AFT CARGO OVERHEAT' and when going through Index we went through all A index items and never found it as it was in C index section with name 'CARGO OVERHEAT OR AFT CARGO OVERHEAT'. That was a little confusing but we did run the QRH and did the right procedures with Captain making a call to land.


Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving an 'AFT CARGO OVERHEAT' caution message and had difficulty finding the procedure in the QRH.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger CL600
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Arriving at aircraft for preflight I observed the AC external power door was closed and partially latched. Because our procedure is to leave the door open it was apparent a lineman must have closed the panel without our permission after we left the aircraft two days prior. Closing the door moves an internal switch to the 'close' position so that when hydraulic pressure is reapplied nose doors close.This situation is potentially dangerous as our practice is to leave nose doors and the nose door panel open when the aircraft is powered down for the night. Had I not noticed the closed door; hydraulics could have been re-activated during normal power-up procedures thereby unexpected closing the nose doors.Ironically; the PIC had received a call from an FBO agent during our first overnight (we stayed there for 3 nights) advising him that the panel had been observed opened. The PIC told him this was normal and panel should not be touched.




Synopsis: Challenger 600 crew arriving at aircraft found the AC external power door closed and partially latched. Closing the door moves an internal switch to the 'close' position so when hydraulic pressure is reapplied the nose doors close. A dangerous situation if any ground personnel are nearby. The external power door should be left open.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp LAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: At the gate in LAX just prior to departure I noticed there was the Gate Agent and two Customer Service Managers at forward entry door.  I went out to see how the boarding process was going and the CSMs were in the process of shutting the aircraft entry door.  I stopped them and told them that there numerous overhead bins open; passengers were up with their bags in hand.  I told them that the aircraft was not ready for the door to be closed.  The female CSM got in my face and told me 'Have you read management's letter regarding on time departures?' I told her that I did not care about the letter if it meant that we are going to compromise safety and FAR's.  She threatened to call Operations and get me in trouble.  The threatening nature of the two CSMs was appalling especially when they were willing to sacrifice safety for an on-time departure. She was in violation of 14CFR121.589 as well as 14CFR121.533; 14CFR121.535; and Flight Manual Part 1.  I asked my #1 Flight Attendant if she had been pressured by the CSMs and she said that she was being unduly pressured by them to shut the aircraft entry door before all the overheads were closed and bags were stowed.  Do not pressure the flight attendants and to abide the CFRs.  Also to check with the Captain before shutting the door.




Synopsis: A Captain refused to allow Customer Service Agents to close the main cabin door because passengers were not seated nor baggage stowed in the open overheads; but insistent agents cited a Company memo directing their behavior.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VRB.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: To depart the US; the pilot submitted the required international flight plan and eApis form in a timely manner prior to flight. The pilot believed the submission of those documents properly identified the pilot and aircraft to authorities for the intended flight. Because VFR international flight plans are acceptable; the pilot assumed that because it was VFR conditions at the time of flight; the flight could take place under VFR rules and that there was no requirement to talk to ATC and obtain a unique squawk code. Therefore the flight took place and crossed the international ADIZ without two way communication with ATC and without obtaining a unique squawk code.




Synopsis: PA32 pilot reports pilot submitting the required international flight plan and eApis form in a timely manner prior to flight. The pilot believed that because it was VFR conditions at the time of flight; the flight could take place under VFR rules and that there was no requirement to talk to ATC and obtain a unique squawk code.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cargo smoke detector found bad; parts not in stock. [I] robbed smoke detector from Aircraft Y; an A320 aircraft. Installed smoke detector in Aircraft X; an A321; and Operational Checks were good. While doing paperwork discovered part installed was 'Not-Effective' for Aircraft Y. [I] did not consult Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) for Aircraft X until after the part was installed. [I] contacted Supervisor; Manager and Technical Support. After further input from Engineering; the part was determined to be 'Not- Effective'. Check with IPC before installation.




Synopsis: A Lead Mechanic reports he robbed a cargo smoke detector from an A320 aircraft and installed it in an A321 without checking the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). Although the Operational Checks passed; the smoke detector was later determined to be 'Not-Effective' for the A321 aircraft.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Second aircraft: B777-200
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A B777 departed full length Runway 28 right; rotating well before Runway 01L/R. The Local Controller and I discussed whether or not to depart the B777; as we could not allow them to rotate before Runway 28R. There was a tail wind component (120 at 5-7 KTS); so we agreed they would not be expected to rotate until passing Runway 28R. A B757 rotated around Runway 28L. I believe that pilots operate on the premise of what they are accustomed to (SID's; STAR's; next frequency; preferred runway; etc.) and seldom are given other than what they expect. This is how I work traffic. Whereas; we are seldom given the performance expected and now operate more on the 'work around whatever we might get' premise. This is dangerous. I am fearful that one day; unexpectedly; an aircraft will get rolled just after takeoff in the wake of the crossing departure and that person will never be able to live with what occurred. When an airplane crashes unexpectedly; there is some questioning about what could have been done to have kept it from occurring. In this scenario; we are desensitized by the frequent success of departing through the wake. I believe this would cause a career ending blow that the person might not ever be able to live with; and it would not be their fault entirely. Given that we have more knowledge today; I would like to see a video presentation developed that highlights some modern wake turbulence information for a scenario like this that provides memorable input as to what might occur.




Synopsis: SFO Controller described a intersecting runway operation involving a heavy jet; questioning the legitimacy of required and operationally applied separation.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger preboarded; came down on a 'Segway'. To me it appeared to be a hover board. I did question the Ops Agent; asked him if he looked it up; he said yes. He also told me TSA let them come through with it. I then asked him if he could show me. He then took the device and sent it down for cargo. I went to the Captain to bring it to her attention. I then started to look it up in my manual. I could not find verbiage regarding this particular device. Understanding it was a mobility device. Where it concerns me is Ops was not able to verify the type of battery in the device.


Second narrative: Female passenger preboarded the aircraft using an assistive device that appeared to be a hoverboard with a handle. The A Flight Attendant (FA) inquired about the type of battery powering the device and the passenger didn't give a conclusive answer. She responded that in ZZZ; the ground staff consistently checked the device as checked baggage and in ZZZ1; they allowed her to stow the device in the wheelchair compartment; which was what I desired to do for her. The A FA and I communicated this to the Operations Agent; who curtly replied that TSA allowed it through and that he had tagged it to be checked. He never communicated with us that he had confirmed the type of battery inside the device and he verified that it was safe for travel in the cargo hold of the aircraft. If he had indeed safely verified he had checked the device thoroughly; he should have been able to answer the question about the type of battery powering the device and communicated that information with both the flight deck crew and the Flight Attendants. It is my belief that a potential safety violation occurred here; and if not; then the Operations Agent needed to communicate the information to the crew in a manner that allowed us to be sure that the device in question was carried safely. We departed ZZZ with that device in the cargo hold; unsure what type of battery was down there.


Synopsis: Two air carrier Flight Attendants reported communication breakdown with Operations Agent regarding transport of battery powered 'Segway'.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-12
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Arriving back to ZZZ I was given clearance to land on XXR as number 2 visually following an Archer. Aircraft Y was given the instruction 'Cessna follow RV on mile and a half; base-to-final; Runway XXR clear to land.' Aircraft Y responds 'XXR cleared to land; traffic in sight.'  Just before the numbers on my final I saw a dark shadow appear on the ground; looked up out of my canopy and saw the Cessna flying directly over me (100 feet or less).Cessna was a student with an instructor. They didn't acknowledge any of the Tower instructions and proceeded to land causing me to have to take evasive action and fly away from the XXR Runway.




Synopsis: RV12 pilot reported an NMAC on short final.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CNO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E SCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On taxing in I was contacted by Chino Ground to contact LA TRACON which I did after securing the aircraft. On the day I was requested to contact TRACON; I was East of KCNO over Riverside airport (KRAL) and later south of there over a lake. I was asked if I was in 30 miles of LAX 30 mile veil of Class B airspace. On occasion I do fly West of KCNO Chino Airport to conduct pleasure flights. This area in question was flown over prior to the request for a phone call. The aircraft in question has no engine-driven electrical system and has never been certified with one. Under FAR 91.215 Part 3 I may conduct flight under the shelf of Class B airspace; and within the 30 mile vail of Class B airspace. In contacting the TRACON representative; I was informed I needed a transponder to be inside this airspace. I was about to explain that I did not; but he was not in a mood to listen so I did not want to seem argumentative. He also informed me that I needed a waiver to enter the airspace in question; which I do not according to FAR 91.215 Part 3. I would estimate I was 11 NM west of KCNO at 2100 MSL and more than 1000 ft. or greater AGL. I feel the controller was not versed with the FARs and not familiar with antique aircraft.




Synopsis: An antique aircraft with no electrical system was reported by SCT TRACON to CNO Tower as having no transponder within the 30 mile Class B airspace veil. However; no transponder is required per FAR 91.215 (3).