elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During climb; the cabin altitude warning horn activated passing approximately; 11;000 FT. First Officer (pilot flying) immediately donned O2 mask and leveled aircraft at 11;000 FT (with ATC permission). We quickly recognized that our problem was that both packs were off. 'Cabin Altitude Warning' procedures were stopped and one pack was reinstated. After pressurization stabilized; the second pack was reinstated and normal operations resumed. The remainder of flight was uneventful. The aircraft had overnighted in ORD. I believe the pack switches may have been off when we arrived at the aircraft. A contributing factor to the crew's missing the incorrect position of the pack switches was the mild outside temperature and neither heating nor cooling were required before takeoff.


Second narrative: [No substantive additional information was contained in the Secondary Report narrative.]


Synopsis: When the flight crew of a B737-800 failed to note both pack switches were off prior to takeoff they predictably received a Cabin Altitude Warning during the climb. They leveled off; turned the packs back on one at a time; and continued the flight.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After landing 8L I was expecting the Victor route to Ramp 5; I also was going to quick turn the airplane and needed Maintenance to look at the service door that had an issue enroute. We were given a taxi command to cross active 8R at B10 and contact ground on Echo. I had the First Officer (FO) heads up with me on the crossing then asked for the after landing check on the other side of the active runway. On Echo we contacted Ground and were given taxi to Ramp 5 via Echo Foxtrot. I didn't look at the taxi diagram closely and got busy with my EFB to report the maintenance issue with the door; so I handed my EFB to the FO and him type and submit the discrepancy. As I was talking with the FO I lost track of getting on Foxtrot and continued on Echo to Ramp 5. After satisfied with the reported discrepancy submitted I made the radio call to ramp for entry to Ramp 5; as the FO was finishing up the EFB report. After getting instructions to the gate I turned left into the ramp; as I cleared the left turn I noticed Aircraft Y nearby and a bit close and heading my way; I accelerated to clear the other airplane and enter the ramp. At that point I figured out I was on the wrong taxiway to enter the ramp. All else was normal operations to parking at the gate. I was rushing to report a maintenance issue that distracted me from the primary job of taxiing the airplane. Also; being given an unexpected taxi route to the ramp that I did not brief or really look at the taxi diagram contributed to loss of situational awareness on the ground. I need to focus on the primary job on the ground of taxiing the aircraft correctly and maintain situational awareness using the airport taxi diagram and engage the FO in being heads up with the taxing instructions as well. Also; I need to slow down and realize that maintenance issues occur and will maybe cause a delay or maybe not; and deal with that issue as it comes.




Synopsis: CRJ Captain reported being distracted and using the incorrect taxiway causing an opposite direction conflict.
Date: 202001
Location: LGB.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground LGB
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The LGB 10-9 Page does not depict the Runway 26L Approach hold short line on Taxiway L just south of Taxiway J. The primary runway is 30 and crews taxi via L [on] almost every departure. Runway 26L is frequently used by GA aircraft. The hold short line should be depicted on the 10-9 page so pilots that are not familiar with the airport can brief and be prepared to hold short when taxiing out. To be clear; we did not have any issues on this flight; this is a general safety concern only.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported LGB 10-9 Page does not depict the Runway 26L Approach hold short line.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During my preflight briefing with the captain; we reviewed the use of the seat belt sign while inflight. This was of particular importance since turbulence was also forecasted enroute. I asked the captain about his particular use of the seatbelt sign. He stated that he would probably leave it on for the entire flight. I told him this was certainly his call being the PIC; but suggested leaving the sign on unnecessarily could place FAs in jeopardy. He responded with; '...really?' I reminded him the fasten seatbelt sign is usually our first indication of pending turbulence. If the sign is continuously on; then we are unable to take advantage of the advanced warning. I also reminded him about FAR 121.311; and the implications related to disregard of a lighted passenger sign. His response; 'I really don't like turning it on/off during a long flight; particularly at night.' Again; I totally understood it was his call; but wanted him to be aware of my concerns. The entire conversation was positive and professional; and he appeared genuinely open to hearing my concerns. Please also reference my previous report; there are similar threads related to this topic. No further discussion regarding this topic occurred for the remainder of the flight. Interesting enough; the sign was used (as needed) during our flight. There were several times that it was cycled on/off; particularly due to pending turbulence. In fact; I thanked him after our flight. The purpose of this report is for track/trending; and to be forwarded to appropriate departments.In this particular event; I encountered a little more resistance regarding my concerns. However; it's also important to note the captain seemed very willing to consider my point and changed his initial approach. I genuinely feel my conversation educated him further about the risks related to leaving the sign on. It appears that some captains simply don't understand the full implications of unnecessary use of the FSB sign during flight (particularly flights over six hours and at night).




Synopsis: B767 Flight Attendant reported having a conversation with the Captain regarding the use of the fasten seatbelt sign throughout the entire flight.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Learjet 60
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Miami center cleared our aircraft from 10;000 to 17;000. At approximately 11;000 we received a warning to monitor vertical speed and traffic showed on TCAS display. Traffic was then spotted visually off the left side. We then climbed through his altitude. We did receive a 'descend now' aural warning but continued the climb because we had visual contact and could 'see and avoid' the traffic. ATC did not call traffic so we elected to advise ATC of conflict at later time for their review. Several minutes later we were cleared from FL320 to FL360 by ATC. After initiating the climb we were asked for our rate of climb. We responded with 4;000 FPM. ATC then asked if we could maintain that VSI to FL380. We responded that we could hold 3;500 FPM to FL380. ATC then cleared us to FL380 while maintaining 3;500 FPM in the climb which we complied with. A short while later we heard ATC asking another aircraft (with a similar number) for his rate of climb. He replied with 1;500 FPM. Then ATC asked for clarification as to whom was maintaining 3;500 FPM and FL380 to which we replied.In reviewing the facts; I believe that there were two potential issues here. The first was ATC not advising of traffic as we were cleared from 10;000 to 17;000 causing a RA. The second was ATC calling the incorrect N-number or us responding to a call for the wrong N-number. This could have been avoided by a statement of 'like' N-numbers on the same frequency.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Learjet 60 flight crew experienced an RA and later some confusion on assigned altitudes with ATC. There was another aircraft with a very similar number on frequency.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D LGB
ATC / advisory: Tower LGB
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was working a Radar Departure sector and acknowledged Aircraft X in the departure rundown list. At the time; there wasn't a VFR conflict in the departure corridor. A little bit of time passed; and there were 2 VFR aircraft in the corridor so I called Tower to tell them not to launch Aircraft X. As I was calling; I saw the splat (Aircraft X's target) and knew it was too late. One target was at 1;900 feet; the other was at 2;800 feet. I could not stop Aircraft X at any safe altitude. I asked Tower if they see the traffic and they said something to the effect of they had it or that they would take care of it. As I watched the situation I called Tower again to tell them to keep Aircraft X climbing. They said they were not talking to him. Aircraft X and one of the targets were almost right on top of each other at the same altitude. Aircraft X was checking in as I was on the line with Tower telling them to keep him climbing. Aircraft X checked in out of 3;300 feet responding to an RA.[Suggest] make LGB airspace a Class C before there is a fatality.




Synopsis: SCT Departure Controller reported a departing aircraft was in immediate conflict and received a TCAS RA with VFR aircraft transitioning the airspace not in communication with ATC.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the DRLLR5 Arrival into IAH the aircraft went into a roll mode configuration at DOMNO; displaced the NAV mode and maintained its course on the RNAV arrival without turning to the next fix (SKLER). I immediately went on heading mode; turned the aircraft towards SKLER the next fix on the RNAV and my First Officer updated the aircraft simultaneously towards the next fix (SKLER). A few seconds later; the controller asked us if were making a turn towards the next fix. We replied yes and continued the flight on the arrival. The event took less than 10 seconds. Once heading in the right direction we then re-engaged NAV mode and continued on the arrival with no further incidents. This incident has been very frequent on our airplanes on the same Arrival on the final turn on the arrival; we followed every single procedure on our SOPs and training bulletin by double checking our fixes to make sure we had no duplicates and by waiting till we get a runway assignment before we load any runway on the FMS; still we still had the same issue.On landing at IAH the tower control advised us of a possible pilot deviation and issued us a phone number; after the flight on our debrief we then concluded it will be wise to submit an incident report. Since we followed every single procedure and training bulletin and still ran into the same issue; my suggestion is for the company to find out why the FMS and autopilot keep getting confused at this fixes; for the mean time I will always be ready and alert on this said arrivals and fixes to reduce or completely eliminate any deviation.




Synopsis: Embraer Captain reported a malfunction indicated by the aircraft auto flight system switching from the NAV mode to the ROLL mode causing a track deviation on the DRLLR FIVE STAR into IAH.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I have been observing this becoming a dangerous growing trend amongst our ramp/pushback crews. After pushback the brakes are set and I have verbally cleared the headset operator to disconnect headset the marshaller gave me hand signals indicating that I was clear to taxi. This occurred well before the pushback vehicle and personel had cleared the area. In this case the pushback vehicle and personel were not visible to me as they were still positioned under the nose of the aircraft. If I had relied solely on the marshallers hand signals indicating that I was clear to taxi and gone ahead and moved the aircraft I would have impacted the pushback vehicle and possibly the headset operator. The reason that I rely on the marshallers hand signals is for the very reason that I may not have visual contact with the pusback equipment and/or personnel. The marshallers are my eyes until the area has in fact been cleared. I have been observing this becoming a dangerous growing trend amongst our ramp and pushback crews. After pushback the brakes are set and I have verbally cleared the headset operator to disconnect headset the marshaller gave me hand signals indicating that I was clear to taxi. This occurred well before the pushback vehicle and personnel had cleared the area. In this case the pushback vehicle and personnel were not visible to me as they were still positioned under the nose of the aircraft. If I had relied solely on the marshallers hand signals indicating that I was clear to taxi and gone ahead and moved the aircraft; I would have impacted the pushback vehicle and possibly the headset operator. The reason that I rely on the marshallers hand signals is for the very reason that I may not have visual contact with the pushback equipment and/or personnel. The marshallers are my eyes until the area has in fact been cleared.




Synopsis: B737 Captain believes that pushback crews are becoming complacent and giving hand signals for 'all clear' before the ground crew and tug have cleared the nose wheel area.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Trainee; Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was the trainer at sector 38.  TMU restriction of 15 MIT to DEN.  Departure push out of DSM and we were handed maybe 5 aircraft needing to be spaced.  Aircraft X checked on and was given climb and maintain I believe FL280. Just behind Aircraft X was Aircraft Y who was initially given a altitude below Aircraft X.  My Trainee was starting spacing and assigning speeds as well as altitudes and requested Aircraft Y to expedite his climb through FL240 for traffic inbound (a air carrier who was turned out).  When my trainee observed Aircraft X out of FL260; he assigned Aircraft Y FL260 and gave him normal rate of climb.  I told my developmental I did not like that plan and to change it so he revised the clearance to FL250 again but the pilot read back;  'Ok; we will maintain 2-5-0 on the speed.'  Neither of us heard the speed part because of the activity and trainer/trainee communication going on.  As I observed the Aircraft X go through the altitude I attempted to correct the mistake but was too late.  Not sure if separation was lost but the plan did not work either way. I don't use it and neither should anyone.  Just because a similar aircraft is out of an altitude; does not mean or should it mean that you can assign that altitude to another aircraft.  There are just too many factors that can make an aircraft climb at different rates.


Second narrative: I climbed Aircraft X to FL320 and told to maintain mach .77 or greater for spacing to Denver.  I climbed Aircraft Y to FL260 and expedited the aircraft up to miss another air carrier jet.  Both me and my trainer tried to stop the aircraft at FL250; and the pilot read back speed 250.  Aircraft X was originally out of FL260 when the Aircraft Y was assigned FL260.None-trainee involved.


Synopsis: ZMP instructor and Developmental describe a situation where the Developmental used vacated altitude rule and the second aircraft climbed faster than the first aircraft leading to a loss of separation.