Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Paperwork Audit
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Several Non-Routines I wrote up were signed-off by the Inspection Manager as 'visually re-inspected.' then he decided that the discrepant component was OK. The components were pulley and Slat Track bearings on a B717 aircraft. The Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) has procedures to determine the wear of bearings. The procedures require bearing removal to verify the condition of the bearings. The pulley bearings had fretting residue from the deterioration of the needle bearings. The Slat track bearings had plating worn down to the base metal causing rust. Engineering provided a Repair document which contradicted the written criteria in the Boeing SOPM. In the past the bearings were replaced because of the SOPM criteria. Lack of time is no excuse to overlook safety. Recently a jammed slat caused the aircraft to roll during take-off. The mentioned worn components would cause the same situation when they fail. Our Air Carrier has not had cable pulley failures because we have been replacing the pulleys when they show signs of bearing wear. [Found] during audit of the Check Non-Routines. This type of maintenance is being used in a desperate attempt to make an unrealistic C-Check Estimated Time of Release (ETR.) This type of maintenance will cause future delays when the aircraft leaves the Check. [Recommend that] Inspection Manager realizes his lack of B717 experience along with his lack of B717 knowledge and follows Boeing procedures. Stop blindly signing-off. Maintenance Inspector. Hangar. C-Check.

Callback: Reporter stated their Inspection Manager was also the Chief Inspector for their Air Carrier and did not have any experience on the B717 aircraft. The Manager had been 'Overriding' numerous Inspector write-ups by using the same information in the Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) that the Inspector had referenced in his write-up indicating excessive wear. The Manager would than state on the Inspector's write-ups; that the pulley and Slat Track bearings were serviceable. He believes the Inspection Manager's comments on the write-ups could be considered fraudulent sign-offs. Reporter stated the Inspection Manager had been fired; no reason was given. Their Fleet Engineering however; continues to try and deviate from the Boeing SOPM and allow the excessive wear on the pulley and Slat Track bearings in order to reduce the maintenance time of the aircraft. Engineering still has not shown any information that Boeing has approved changes to the bearing wear criteria.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports their Inspection Manager; who is also their Chief Inspector; had been overriding non-routine write-ups made by inspectors during C-Checks for excessive wear on B717 aircraft pulley and slat track bearings; and then signing them off as serviceable bearings.