elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Cockpit Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: MEL; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: MEL 52-XX was in effect. After reviewing the MEL my First Officer and I noted that due to the cockpit door electronic lock being deferred that we had to use the deadbolt in the key inoperable position. The problem with this MEL is that the flight deck door cannot in an emergency be opened from the cabin. This left me with concerns that though are remote; the possibility exists that in an accident if both pilots are incapacitated they could be trapped for a period of time in the flightdeck. FAs would not be able to access the flightdeck in any way to help incapacitated pilots; nor would fire rescue with the deadbolt engaged. The only way would be through the flightdeck windows by fire rescue. The flightdeck door is a good design; however; with the electronic keypad being INOP; and with the flightdeck keyhole being purposely blocked by a metal plate on all B737 aircraft; the deadbolt in the key operable position is no longer a possibility. If the deadbolt in the key operable position were possible then FAs would be able to use a flightdeck key to override the deadbolt and open the flightdeck door in the event of pilot incapacitation. This MEL 52-XX with the deadbolt engaged does not allow for a timely response from FAs nor fire rescue to the flightdeck in an emergency.MEL 52-XX should be a non-deferrable MEL with the deadbolt in the key inoperable position. Or the key operable solution must be restored.




Synopsis: Captain reported disagreement with MEL52-XX being accurate.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Post Departure
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After release and delivery to the gate of a B737-800 aircraft from a C-Check; discussions took place as to whether the drain holes were installed in the Repair Doubler on the Right-Hand (R/H) Horizontal Stabilizer.  It was determined that the holes needed to be there and the aircraft be routed back to the Maintenance Base and inspected for drain holes.  Upon arrival at the gate; the inspection of the doubler revealed that the drain holes were not there.  The drain holes were located; drilled and treated at the gate.  The paperwork was signed-off (deferred item) and the aircraft was returned to service. There was an Engineering Authorization (EA) issued that provided deviations from the Structural Repair Manual (SRM) with the Aircraft Manufacturer's approval.  However; the EA did not address the drain holes; creating some confusion among those performing the task.  Once Engineering was asked about the holes; clarification was made.  Recommend following the paperwork more closely.


Second narrative: It was brought to my attention that information was submitted for a Right-Hand (R/H) Horizontal bottom repair doubler on a B737-800 aircraft that I was a part of.  Approximately four days earlier. I arrived at work and went to check on how the repair was doing.  I saw that everything was complete except for the two drain holes that where removed because of the doubler.  I did mention that the Structural Repair manual (SRM) reference 55-10-01 Repair XX did indicate to replace any drain holes that might be affected by the doubler.  I also mentioned that I thought after the doubler was shot on [riveted in place]; a center line from the existing drain holes on each side of the repair would be drawn across the doubler and equal measurements placed to mark the holes like the others.  That didn't happen.  I was asked by Maintenance Supervisor if I could do that now and I said 'Yes'.  I was getting what tooling I thought would be needed to accomplish the task when I was informed not to; being that the Engineering Authorization (E/A) didn't exactly mention the holes; I guess the thought was they may not be needed; as the E/A was deviating from the SRM repair cutout.


Synopsis: A Maintenance Inspector; Maintenance Supervisor; company Engineer and a Mechanic report drain holes were not drilled at a repair doubler on the lower surface of the Right-Hand Horizontal Stabilizer of a B737-800 aircraft prior to departure.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Contacted by Supervisor
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was accomplishing a # 3 Maintenance Visit Check on a B737-700 aircraft [on Graveyard shift] that needed the #1; #2; #4 Main Landing Gear (MLG) tires changed. I finished up the exterior parts of the aircraft. I did not check the tire pressures at that time knowing that I had three tires to be changed; I would check them after the new ones were installed and to let the other tires cool off [Nose tires and # 3 Main]. A co-worker and I changed the tires and went on to work other things on the aircraft that took us some time to get thru; then we went in and finished up the paperwork. I had to come back to the aircraft a few times to complete [items] that the Maintenance Visit Check said to do. Then went on to help other Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) get finished on their aircraft. I missed checking the tire pressures and I don't know if my co-worker checked them after we changed them. Six legs after tire change; tire or tires came apart. I think that my coworker and I being new hires and trying our best to get the Check done and the other maintenance task in a timely manner and help other people that needed help was a factor; and I did not stress to my co-worker that they [tires] need to be checked first! Or at least remind each other to check them - was a factor. [Suggest] that when I sign for something on the paperwork that I make sure it is completed and that I communicate better with the people I am working with.

Callback: Reporter stated that all three Main Landing Gear (MLG) tires they had replaced the previous night; had blown after landing; while taxiing from the Ramp into the alleyway. The Manufacturer said the tires were structurally OK; that most likely they were under-inflated and ran hot. But since all three tires were recaps; some believe low tire inflation might not be the only issue involved; especially since the B737-700 made six legs before the incident. No aircraft damage occurred. He has worked aircraft maintenance for twenty years.



Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports a B737-700 aircraft blew three Main Landing Gear (MLG) recapped tires after landing; while taxiing into the gate area from the Ramp. The aircraft had flown six legs after Mechanic installed the recapped tires.
Date: 201810
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After I completed the walk around during the offload process I noticed the front strut rose dramatically. As a precautionary measure I had to stop deplaning process.




Synopsis: Air carrier ramp employee reported an aircraft tipping risk led to a delayed passenger deplaning.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RNT.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D RNT
ATC / advisory: Tower RNT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was distracted in hazy conditions; having been instructed to follow the aircraft in front of me on downwind.  There had been multiple aircraft in the pattern; so I intended to keep a tight approach; but then I extended my pattern to follow the airplane in front of me. I began my descent into the airport on downwind.  As I turned base; I looked out the side window and I realized that I had descended too much and was passing over dense housing below at around 200 feet AGL (could have even been less).  It was very close to the ground and I was just turning base.  I was not aware that I was so close to the ground. I should have been about 700 feet AGL at that point. I added power and climbed back onto the appropriate altitude for the base leg; and completed the landing normally.The primary cause of this incident was my fixation on contradictory plans: to follow the airplane in front of me; but also to fly a tight pattern.  This fixation led to a loss of total situational awareness; including altitude above ground and terrain obstructions. Contributing factor was the haze; which made it more difficult to track the airplane to follow and my relation to the runway; as well as my perception of the airport being busy; which made me want to 'get down and out of the way' for other airplanes.Corrective actions are to maintain an appropriate scan during all phases of flight; and in high workload visual landings; or when following other traffic; not to begin a descent from traffic pattern altitude until the runway is in sight (turning base) rather than descending on downwind.




Synopsis: A pilot in the busy; hazy RNT VFR traffic pattern became distracted while concentrating on following traffic and descended to about 200 feet AGL turning base.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DEN
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Aircraft encountered severe turbulence.  Pitch; altitude; and airspeed variations exceeded controllable limits for a short duration of time.  Conditions abated within 2 miles of flight distance.  Approach and landing at APA were uneventful.




Synopsis: King Air 90 pilot reported encountering severe turbulence and controllability problems associated with the turbulence.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OPF.Tower, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approximately XA:11;  Pilot Flying and I were on the ILS 27R  to OPF. Weather was good; we could see the runway from 10+ miles. I was Pilot Monitoring. About 3-4 miles from the runway; on course and glide path with autopilot engaged; I saw a bright reflection to our left; about 10 o'clock low.  It was obviously not air traffic; nothing on the TCAS. It quickly moved left to right across our flight path. Passed under the right wing. Appeared to be climbing.  It looked no larger than a lunchbox; but was certainly flying; not just blowing in the wind.  It was a shiny metallic color; not a bird.Aggressive enforcement of laws concerning drone flights in vicinity of airports.


Second narrative: I was on an ILS approach to Runway 27R to OPF.  The weather was VFR and we could see the runway from 10+ SM out.  I was the Pilot in Command - flying pilot.  About 3-4 miles from the runway Pilot Monitoring and I saw a bright reflection to our left; about 10 o'clock low.  It was obviously not air traffic; nothing on the TCAS.  It quickly moved left to right across our flight path.  It passed under the right wing.  It appeared to be climbing.    It did not look very large but was certainly flying and not just blowing in the wind.  It was a shiny metallic color and not a bird.  No evasive action was needed on our  part and none was taken.  Pilot Monitoring reported this object to the OPF tower as we continued on the approach.  We landed safely without incident and cleared the runway and taxied to the ramp.  Possibly this was a drone.If this was a drone being flown around and just to the east of the OPF airport; try and find out who was doing this.


Synopsis: GA pilot reported observing a UAS passing near their aircraft as they approached an airport.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Dash 8-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute suffered an oil pressure loss on the Number 1 Engine requiring it to be shut down. Prior to flight the Number 1 Engine was written up due to oil leaking out of Number 1 Engine nacelle. Contract Maintenance found the leak but was unable to determine the source. Company Maintenance was contacted and they came to the outstation and repaired and replaced the flexible drain line to the inboard nacelle. Operations check good and the Mechanic signed off. The aircraft was put back into service.The takeoff and climb portion of the flight were normal; however during the cruise portion of flight approaching the oil press indicator began to fluctuate. The indication was showing approximately 58 PSI and the Captain contacted Dispatch. The oil pressure continued to decrease and the Abnormal Oil Pressure Checklist was utilized. Reaching 55 PSI we brought the power to flight idle and to reduce drag brought the condition lever to start/feather. The Oil Pressure Warning light came on and stayed on and we shut the engine down using all appropriate steps and checklists. We declared an emergency and determined that a nearby airport would be the best suitable airport to divert to in a coordinated effort with Dispatch. The Flight Attendant was notified of the situation. [We] landed with no further incidents. In order for this to not happen again there needs to be a better way of determining why an engine has lost oil. The mechanical procedure used to identify the source of the oil leak; and as a result engine failure in flight; by the maintenance personnel was not sufficient. Clearly the methods used did not fix the problem and as a result placed the crew and aircraft in an unsafe situation.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A DHC-8-100 Number 1 Engine oil pressure dropped at cruise so the engine was shutdown; the QRH completed; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport. Prior to flight maintenance was performed for an oil leak.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: WHP.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was flying a Cessna C-182/G equipped with a Garmin panel-mounted GTN650 GPS Navigator on an IFR flight plan from ZZZ to WHP in perfectly clear sky weather. Before departing; I checked NOTAMS that stated the VNY VOR DME would be OTS (Out of Service); noting that this would not impact the use of the VOR-A approach at WHP.After departing ZZZ; the SoCal ATC Controller told me to expect the VOR-A approach into WHP; with circle to landing Runway 12. He cleared me direct GINNA; to intercept the published inbound approach course; which is the 255 radial from the VNY VOR. I was proceeding inbound to the VNY VOR on the published approach using GPS navigation. Approaching the VNY VOR; I was cleared for the approach and told to contact WHP Tower. I switched to VLOC navigation; but could not acquire a signal from the VOR. I quickly cross checked VOR1 and VOR2 for the VNY VOR signal; and I could not acquire it on either VOR. By this time I was past the VNY VOR and inbound to WHP on the very short final leg of the approach and was cleared to land by WHP Tower Controller. I continued the approach using GPS navigation on my panel mounted avionics; but the reality was that the weather was clear and +20 SM visibility; the airport was clearly in sight and I was talking to the Tower...so I continued inbound to land without conflicts or problems. I landed at XA:47 PDT. After this landing; I checked NOTAMS again and the NOTAM for the VNY VOR had been updated; and was now indicating that the VNY VOR would be OTS [until] XB:26 [that day].Although I landed 39 minutes before the VOR OTS was to be effective; I believe the VOR was in fact OTS for my approach into WHP. On this occasion there were fortunately not any problems or issues; and none of the Controllers had identified that the VOR-A approach was unavailable because of non-operating VOR. Corrective actions perhaps might be to make sure the NOTAM system is efficient and accurate as to when critical navigation equipment activates are to commence. And maintenance ground crews should absolutely conform to the details published in the NOTAMs.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported VOR was out of service before the applicable NOTAM time.