elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Q400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft was established on the ILS approach. Speed was 190 approximately and autopilot was engaged 3 miles prior to FAF where I commenced final configuration. We were flying in icing conditions with ice detected; so Np was 1020; ref speeds were increased; and solid bug speeds were to be used. I reduced power and commanded flaps 5; gear down; flaps 15 and finally flaps 35.As the speed decayed; the low speed cue did not reduce as rapidly as anticipated during each flap setting and the stick shaker activated. A recovery was initiated which kept us within approach tolerances and the approach was reestablished and continued to a successful landing.As flying pilot; I adopted my usual routine and technique of slowing the aircraft by setting power levers to flight idle prior to the FAF and commanding the flaps and gear through the normal sequence of 5; Gear; 15 and 35; then adding power to stabilize the speed at Vref.However; the conditions of the day (and my expectations established from previous approaches in more favorable conditions) were the perfect storm. Props 1020; increased ref speeds; actual light to moderate ice accumulation; and flight idle; all of which led to a much faster than anticipated speed reduction. This led to a situation where the speed decayed faster than the low speed cue retreated and resulted in a stick shaker. Primary cause would be my faulty expectations; which should have been modified to not reduce power so aggressively due to obviously adverse conditions.




Synopsis: A Q400 First Officer reported receiving a stick shaker on arrival when the aircraft slowed faster than expected while in icing conditions.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B STL
ATC / advisory: Tower STL
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: When cleared for the visual approach for Runway 12L coming in to Saint Louis Lambert airport; I aimed for the numbers starting from the vector I was on. When I got to short final at a slight dog-legged angle I was instructed by Tower to go-around and join a left pattern for Runway 12L. After landing via the left pattern Tower informed me that a new system Saint Louis control was using had flagged my landing and the controller had no choice but to comply and give a go-around instruction. [Caused by] sensitivity of the new system being used by ATC. After the event I was instructed to submit this report in response. The system should be fixed as to not give errant flags. As for what I can do about it; I now recognize that the system is new and is prone to such errors so in the future I will make sure to square off a pseudo base leg in an attempt to avoid being flagged errantly.




Synopsis: Pilot informed to Go-around by Air Traffic Control due to a glitch in a new system.
Date: 201905
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Ramp EWR
Second aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Ramp cleared us to taxi on the ramp's 'Outer' taxi line. Before we left the taxi line for Taxiway RB; another B737 NG was cleared to taxi inbound on the 'inner' taxi line. Both of us had to depart the taxi lines approximately 10 feet to our respective right in order to maintain safe visual wingtip clearance. I believe these lines may not be properly measured for safe wingtip clearance of opposite direction B737 traffic.These 'inner' and 'outer' taxi lines of the ramp only appear in a cutout portion of the 10-9 page with a limitation of wingspan. Visually; there does not appear to be adequate buffer distance between these two lines to safely accommodate opposite direction B737 traffic following the lines.Please analyze and evaluate these lines for an airport information page pictorial and comment to inform pilots of the hazard; if it actually is a hazard; and include proper procedures to safely operate on the ramp at EWR. (Do not accept simultaneous opposite direction taxi clearances on 'inner' and 'outer' taxi lines if opposing traffic is a B737 or larger).




Synopsis: B737 NG Captain reported having deviated 10 feet right off the taxiway centerline to allow for wingtip clearance with opposite direction B737 NG traffic at EWR airport.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SNA
Second aircraft: PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was providing training on Local 1. The Trainee cleared a PA46 for take off of Runway 19L. Air Carrier X had just landed Runway 19R and was exiting at Taxiway Echo as PA46 was upwind. PA46 was issued a MUSEL6 departure from Clearance Delivery prior to takeoff. When the Trainee cleared PA46; he issued 'fly runway heading' which is what the MUSEL 6 departure does until a mile South of the airport anyway. When Air Carrier X exited; he advised Ground Control that the Malibu overflew him and was low. I observed the Malibu overfly Air Carrier X as it happened and I did not feel it was unsafe. PA46 was definitely much lower than I would expect; as Taxiway Echo is 2;500 feet from the departure end of Runway 19L and the standard climb rate of a PA46 is 1;143 feet per minute. The Malibu was maybe 5 plane heights above Air Carrier X. The Malibu; however; did not appear to be in unsafe proximity to Air Carrier X where I thought either plane was in danger. After the training session; I did not consider it a safety event; so we did not discuss it much. SNA airport is extremely compact and it is not uncommon for aircraft to overfly other aircraft; especially the little planes that depart Runway 19L on a 15 degree left turn and aircraft on Taxiway Alpha. Most aircraft have to taxi down Taxiway Alpha and it is our busiest taxiway and it is directly under the 15 degree left turn off Runway 19L. The difference in this scenario with Air Carrier X was the Malibu's climb rate (he appeared heavy). The only way to avoid this situation is pilot education and awareness. The pilot should have advised us that he was too heavy for Runway 19L. When a plane's climb rate is that much different than expected we have no way of knowing.




Synopsis: SNA Controller described an air/ground conflict when an IFR PA46 departing Runway 19L overflew an air carrier taxiing to the gate on Taxiway E; the reporter surprised by the very slow climb rate of the departing aircraft.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: An evening call was received for an aircraft from Maintenance Control; Flight crew reported '2-L Arming levers get stuck when arming'. I was assigned to the gate call and I went to the aircraft. When I arrived at the aircraft there was nobody onboard so I referred to the Logbook to see the exact discrepancy reported which was '2-L arming levers get stuck when arming' I approached the L-2 Door and started to inspect the door mechanisms. I opened the door and noticed that the arming levers where indeed getting stuck; both while opening and closing; Arming and Disarming the L-2 Door. I inspected the mechanisms inside the door lining and found no visible indication of what could've been causing the door handles to be getting stuck. I also visibly checked the Girt Bar engagement to the floor and all was operating normally. After closing the door one more time I 'armed' the door; then 'disarmed' the door with the handles being rough to disarm. While lifting the main handle to open the door I saw the Escape slide starting to deploy and I let go of the door and the slide deployed completely. After the slide deployed I verified again; the position of the disarming levers and they were in the 'Disarmed' position.  Door might of been misrigged or worn down; causing handles to be getting stuck and mechanism within the door not disengaging properly. Evening.

Callback: Reporter stated no defects were noted with the Flex Cable that connects the Door Arming handle to the Girt Bar. But; there was a roughness and 'arming' was indeed difficult with the arming handle. The Girt Bar movement however did appear OK. He and another Technician were both surprised when the Door 2-Left slide began to deploy; because the 'Arming' handle was up; in the 'Disarm' position. He had barely opened the door when they heard the hissing sound of the Door Emergency Assist and the slide starting to deploy. After the deployed slide had been removed; he lubed all the door mechanisms and Flex Cable. No roughness in arming movement was noted. A new slide was installed by the oncoming shift. He has nine years experience on Embraer aircraft.



Synopsis: A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports an escape slide at passenger Door 2-Left on an ERJ-170 aircraft had deployed with the door slide lever in the up and 'Disarm' position. Technician had been troubleshooting a flight crew squawk that the 'arming levers get stuck when arming door.'
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approaching the North Atlantic Oceanic Area; Number 3 engine oil quantity was noted at 11 quarts down from 14 quarts at engine start. At our ETP; oil quantity was 8 quarts. Dispatch and Maintenance were advised of our plan to continue to destination with the Number 3 engine at idle or shutdown with sufficient oil quantity to restart for landing. Once clear of the oceanic track system and in radar contact with Center; FL320 and Mach .80 was requested and approved. Number 3 engine was operated at idle once level at FL320. When oil quantity was 4 quarts; Number 3 engine was shutdown IAW Engine Shutdown Inflight checklist. ATC; Dispatch and Maintenance were advised. No emergency was declared and no special handling was requested. Enroute to destination all ATC controllers were advised of our status. On descent FL220 and A/S 300 knots in VMC the Number 3 engine was restated IAW Engine Start Inflight [checklist.] All parameters were normal except Number 3 oil quantity of 3 quarts. ATC was advised of our return to normal operations. Engine was kept at idle until final approach. VOR/DME approach was flown VMC conditions. Landing and rollout were normal. Taxi was conducted with the Number 3 engine at idle and oil quantity remained at 2 quarts to parking. Oil temperature and pressure were normal at all times.




Synopsis: MD-11 Captain reported oil quantity decrease over the North Atlantic. In accordance with procedures; after coordination with Dispatch and Maintenance; the engine was shut down until descent; where it was re-started and operated at idle for arrival and landing.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Thrust Reverser Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing out of 10;000 ft; the left engine thrust reverser UNLOCK light illuminated along with the master warning lights. After confirming the proper engine; the memory items were completed. We locked the thrust reverser with the hydraulic switch. We advised ATC that we needed to level off at a lower altitude and levelled off at 15;000 ft. We complied with the QRC followed by the QRH. After completion of the checklists; we contacted the company and decided to ZZZ which was less than 15 minutes from our current position. We landed at the diversion airport uneventfully.The aircraft was picked up the same morning from [maintenance]; where it was worked on for the same engine thrust reverser UNLOCK light. The previous crew reported that the light flickered as they taxied in after landing. Upon shutdown; the light remained illuminated. After reading the corrective action for this discrepancy; it seems that not much was done to correct the issue other than cleaning and lubing the actuators.




Synopsis: CE-560XLS Captain reported a thrust reverser becoming unlocked during the climbout.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I pushed back from the gate and was about to have my aircraft deiced with the engines off and APU running. The APU shut down and the aircraft lost all A/C power. I tried an APU restart and received what looked like a hung start. As I was I stopping the APU start sequence; one of the ramp personnel signaled to me that he saw a momentary plume of fire from the back of the aircraft. Firefighters and policeman arrived promptly thereafter and it was established that there was no further signs of fire. When I examined the APU exhaust area; there were lots of fragments of fan blades on the ramp. I called maintenance control and informed them what had happened. There were already two maintenance personnel in the area from work they had been doing on the aircraft prior to my flight and the maintenance controller told me that he would send them back to the plane. I asked if there was a particular verbiage he would like in the discrepancy section of the Aircraft Maintenance Log and was told that if I liked; the mechanics who were in the area could do the write up. I stayed with the plane and the mechanics arrived quickly; examined the APU; and completed the write up; putting in the discrepancy section; 'APU blew up throwing parts and pieces on ramp (needs a new APU).' Although a mechanical irregularity was what prevented the flight from continuing; the issue is clarity about who should and is able to complete write-ups. I have been told by different sources that it should have been me to complete the write up and that it was correct to have the mechanics complete the Aircraft Maintenance Log. There is not any specific guidance that I am aware of as to who should complete the write-up our pilot manuals outside of pg 5-6 in our MEL that says write-ups are to be completed in accordance with the FARs but gives no indication what FARs it is referring to. Provide clear guidance within our manuals as to whom should complete write-ups in all cases but specifically when the PIC observed the discrepancy but a mechanic is close at hand.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported the APU had an uncommanded shutdown and he didn't know whether he was required to write it up or have Maintenance make the write-up.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About four minutes after takeoff and climbing through 5;000 FT; we received an ECAM Master Warning/Caution from the FWC which read 'Green System Low Pressure.' We verified this failure on the hydraulic panel; which showed zero pressure and zero contents in the Green System. The Captain then notified ARTCC of the problem and requested 7;000 FT. After leveling at 7;000 FT the Captain declared an emergency and notified ATC of our intentions to return to the departure airport. The First Officer remained the pilot flying while the Captain continued with pilot not flying duties and completed the ECAM action steps; performance computations; and all ECAM/AOM checklist items down to the Landing Gear Gravity Extension; (landing gear manual extension). Company Operations was notified of our impending return. At this point; the Captain became the pilot flying while the First Officer; as the pilot not flying; completed the Landing Gear Gravity Extension checklist. With all Emergency/Abnormal Checklists completed the First Officer set-up and briefed the ILS10. The crew discussed performance; missed approach procedures with the landing gear down; manual brake application; and coordinated with ATC our intention to stop on Runway 10. All normal checklists were completed. After coming to an uneventful stop; adjacent to Taxiway Hotel Nine; we communicated with Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) on ATC Ground Control frequency. Brake temperatures were under 100 degrees C and no further concerns were discussed. The Operations towed us to the gate at which time we completed the Shutdown and Secure Checklists. All control surfaces were left in the landing configuration and the CVR Circuit Breakers were pulled.




Synopsis: An A300 ECAM alerted Green System Low Pressure climbing through 5;000 FT after takeoff so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201404
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Other General Ramp
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Vehicle Driver
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other While driving
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This is to report an alarming situation ongoing with the cargo vehicles at EWR. The cargo vehicles that are used to transport the cargo from the cargo and mail facility to rampside are affecting many agents adversely. Fumes are emanating throughout the vehicles. Agents are suffering from nausea headaches dizziness and general confusion. This is symptomatic with what I assume to be carbon monoxide poisoning. These vehicles are equipped with curtains which are essentially our doors. They are all mostly in disrepair and is also a safety issue. We were told by our equipment room that the Supervisor does not see a need to fix this issue. This is a separate entity from the more important issue of the carbon monoxide fumes. This lies solely in the hands off G.S.E. Which is the mechanical end of this problem.




Synopsis: Tug driver reports headaches and dizziness from exhaust fumes emitted by the vehicles due to their poor state of maintenance and lack of an enclosed cab.