elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201205
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Fatigue
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was relief pilot for this flight and arrived prepared for the first break (nap earlier in the day and no caffeine for 6 hours before estimated break time). This aircraft has the new First Class seat installed in the former bunk area (commonly known as the 'Man Cave'). I usually try to avoid this rest seat due to excessive noise and poor ventilation. Unfortunately there were no empty First Class seats or usable Business Class seats (two outboard seats open) available. I know that I am not allowed to use a non-designated seat for rest. However; I do what I need to do to ensure a safe operation. While use of either First or Business Class seat cannot be considered a quiet location for rest; it is better than the loud noises of the 'Man Cave': You hear every time someone goes in or out of the flight deck; Every time the secondary barrier is used (regardless of how careful the flight attendants are with the unit); General noise from the galley; any use of the phone or any activity in the forward cabin (Duty Free cart). If I am ever able to fall asleep in this facility; I will be awakened shortly by noise. It is difficult that this facility is approved as a rest area. As a result of the above conditions I was unable to get any sleep and little rest during my break. This later resulted in a degradation of safety when I missed timely Class II requirements; and later was missing radio calls and at times confused over ATC instructions. I believe this was a direct result of inadequate rest due to an inadequate rest facility. Fortunately the return leg was in an aircraft which has a First Class seat with a curtain for privacy/noise suppression in a quieter part of the cabin. While the curtains could be designed to fit better; and in general are poorly maintained by my Carrier; they offer a rest facility that probably meets a minimum standard for crew rest. Yes; I was able to sleep/rest on the return leg.




Synopsis: An air carrier Relief Pilot reports that his aircraft had no suitable flight crew rest location and so he was unable to rest; resulting in fatigue and some ensuing communications and procedural errors.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Other maintenance
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Squat Switch
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The aircraft was not on [the FBO] ramp but we saw it on the customs ramp. We got to the aircraft and started a walk around. I plugged in the batteries and pulled the main chock. The other technician hooked up the torque links. I got in the aircraft in the pilot seat and looked over the CB panel and the various switches in the cockpit. I turned the batteries on. I turned the aux hydraulic switch on the buildup press and set the brakes. With brakes set the nose chock was pulled. I started the APU and got the generator on line. I turned on the inverters and turned on the AHRS [attitude and heading reference system] and power supply. With avionics up I started the right hand engine. With the engine running and amps at a good level; I started the left engine. I checked the oil pressures and hydraulic pressures. I called ground [control] for clearance to taxi to [FBO ramp]. With clearance I pushed the brake off and started rolling. I went to turn and had no nose wheel steering. I applied the brakes and had no brakes. I pulled the parking brake handle and had no results. I was closing in on the hangar in front of me and shut down the engines to avoid damage to the engines. I impacted the hangar right after that. I shut down the APU and shut down the power. I then got out of the aircraft and unplugged the batteries. After a bit of time talking to the [airport personnel] I then thought of squat switches as a possible problem and found the squat switches were manually placed in air mode.Suggestions1) Documentation of tooling installed on aircraft2) Flags on all maintenance lockout/pins etc3) Inspection Buy Back of ground lock devices being removed




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported impacting a hangar during taxi when the nosewheel steering system and brake system were disabled by the unreported activation of the landing gear squat switch.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower DCA
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: The Captain was the pilot monitoring and I was the pilot flying. This was leg 3 of a 4 leg sequence. We were on the visual approach to Runway 01 DCA with an aircraft approximately 5 miles ahead on the same approach. We were configured Flaps 3 and stable at about 1800 feet. The aircraft quickly rolled left to about 20-30 degrees uncommanded. There was also a distinct buzz/vibration when this occurred. I immediately grabbed the controls and turned off the autopilot. I elected to leave the auto throttles on at that time. I rolled the aircraft level and continued the descent. The EICAS began flashing messages; the big ones being windshear fail; AOA Limit; Unreliable Airspeed and Stick Shaker Anticipated. There was a verbal transfer of aircraft control; I continued to fly the aircraft and the Captain ran the QRH. We determined that the airspeed was reliable but that the stall protection was an issue. We decided to bump up Vref by around 10kts and both felt it was safer to continue the approach rather than execute a go-around at that point. I continued the approach and we configured with gear and flaps 5; then I elected to turn the auto throttles off and fly the aircraft with no automation. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful. We taxied to the gate and called Maintenance. This event was similar to a previous event I have had in the past from wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft. There was also a tailwind and the winds were about 5 kts. I'm not sure how we could do more to avoid this if it was wake turbulence. The preceding aircraft; an E-175; was about 5 miles ahead.




Synopsis: ERJ-190 F/O reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to DCA five miles in trail of an E175.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DRO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The Jeppesen 10-7 for DRO shows ACARS available. Late in the loading and W&B computation process; the Ramp Agent alerted us that [our aircraft type] did not have ACARS access and we then verified that to be the case and began an expedited process to complete a manual manifest by dividing the task between the two pilots. In so doing we did not notice the omission of the 25-pound pet enclosure weight and so that weight was not included in the manual manifest. [There was] a small amount of fatigue after a demanding arrival and approach to DRO; followed by a sizable and unexpected add on task at the last minute. If the 10-7 for DRO was to accurately reflect the non-availability of ACARS for [our aircraft type]; then advance preparation for a manual manifest would be provided and crews would prepare for it in a timely manner.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that incorrect 10-7 chart information on ACARS availability led to rushed manual weight and balance computation resulting in a minor error.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During Takeoff a strong odor of chemical/burning plastic filled the cabin and all-call was made to confirm everyone else also smelled the same odor. It lasted for about 15 minutes.  Pilots also confirmed the smell; along with some passengers and non-rev crew members. During descent and approach the same smell came back through to landing; 15 minutes; the chemical burning odor.  The Flight Attendants felt symptoms (coughing; watery eyes; sore throat; lightheaded; headache) from this odor and had Medical meet us at the gate.  The First Officer also had Medical check him as well.  We did not feel well enough to continue on for our next segment of our trip.  Due to the pandemic of COVID-19 and the short time frame of a fume event needed for bloodwork; the risk to go to a hospital is too high for both ourselves and others.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a cabin fumes event during departure and again during descent resulting in health issues. Flight Attendant described the odor as 'chemical/burning plastic.'
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C X
Aircraft component: Interphone System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: The purpose of this report is to identify a possible MEL discrepancy as it pertains to the A300-600F operated at [company]. When we received our flight paperwork; it included MEL 23-XX-XX-X-X-X for an inoperative interphone system. This MEL was used to defer the system (the flight deck to ground function) after another crew wrote up difficulty communicating with the mechanic during their engine starts. We planned to use hand signals for engine starts to comply with the operations procedures of the MEL.During preflight of my oxygen mask; I discovered that I was unable to hear through the flight deck interphone system (overhead speakers) when transmitting. A closer review of the MEL title indicated that the flight deck interphone system was assumed to be inoperative. The full MEL title is: 'CREWMEMBER INTERPHONE SYSTEM - CARGO CONFIGURATION - FLIGHT DECK TO GROUND FUNCTION: (FLIGHT DECK AND SERVICE INTERPHONE SYSTEMS INOPERATIVE).' So; per the MEL; the aircraft appeared to be legal for dispatch. However; I discussed with the Captain my safety concern that we would have no way to communicate while wearing oxygen masks during flight (reasons would include smoke/fire/rapid decompression) if the flight deck interphone system was inoperative or deferred. The Captain put the flight deck interphone system discrepancy in the logbook; assuming the same MEL would be used to defer it. Had that been the case; I would have been forced to refuse to fly the aircraft because of the potential inability to communicate during an emergency requiring oxygen masks. Fortunately; the mechanics were able to replace the radio interphone amplifier and clear the write up and deferral. [Company] A300 procedures require the use of the interphone system and the overhead speakers for crew communications while using the oxygen masks. I am questioning the applicability of any MEL that would defer the flight deck interphone system on the A300.




Synopsis: A300 flight crew reported a MEL discrepancy regarding an inoperative interphone system; resulting in maintenance action.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff at 1;000 feet AGL; called for VNAV flaps 5. The flaps immediately froze at about 13 and 15. We got the trailing edge flap assym message. There was also a flaps elec status message. We engaged the autopilot and continued the departure at 170 kts. We notified ATC we were working a flap problem and ran the checklists. It called for leaving the flaps as set and using flaps 30 ref plus 30. We also looked at the landing charts to verify runway needed with the non standard configuration. We called dispatch and let him know what was going on and asked them where they wanted the airplane to be fixed. Contingency requested us to land at our next destination to make service. The dispatcher asked us if we were comfortable with that and we were. Also; by this time we were closer to that airport than the departure airport. We asked dispatch to verify our landing charts and calculations. He agreed we had the required runway for landing. We landed uneventfully; exited the runway and taxied to the ramp. There were no issues with the brakes. The emergency was cancelled and a fireman came to the aircraft for our information.




Synopsis: A B757 flight crew reported EICAS TRAILING EDGE FLAP ASSYM message and the FLAPS ELEC status alert. With flaps between 13-15 the flight continued to a nearby airport for maintenance.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Second aircraft: Medium Transport
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X lost pressurization and diverted to ZZZ while the aircraft was NW of the OOM VOR. Approach contacted me and coordinated on a couple of occasions to arrange the aircrafts decent to ZZZ. Aircraft Y was pointed out to me by Approach descending to 080 SW bound and deviating around weather. The aircraft were on course to merge but were separated by 1000 feet. I called traffic to Aircraft X for Aircraft Y 1000 feet above. As I watched Aircraft Y deviate further into my airspace I contacted Approach and asked if they wanted to put the aircraft on my frequency; so I could descend and turn the aircraft for [their destination]. They told me the aircraft was already talking to [another] Approach. After their courses were diverging Aircraft Y began to deviate farther south. Then the aircraft began a descent. Shortly after this the controller at [the next Approach facility] called and apologized saying he didn't realize the aircraft was going to deviate so far and told me Aircraft Y was on a 220 heading. I then called the traffic again to Aircraft X; however I failed to announce Traffic Alert. The aircraft came to within 4.45 mi of each other.I should have made my traffic call a Traffic Alert.




Synopsis: ZID Center Controller reported they approved a point out for an aircraft deviating for weather then allowed another aircraft they were working to fly into confliction with the pointed out aircraft.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were doing touch and goes at ZZZ; the landings and the approach of the student were very good and stable. On the last landing the student landed the airplane slightly to the right of centerline and; being longitudinally aligned; I proceeded to put the flaps 0 so the student could apply full thrust and start another takeoff which is part of a normal touch and go. After applying full thrust the student wanted to catch centerline by applying left rudder; but the student overcorrected by applying too much left rudder and the airplane started to skid to the left side. Noticing the abnormality and now being on the left side of centerline facing about 20 degrees to the left; attempting a takeoff at an airspeed lower than rotation speed with flaps up would not be a good idea. I decided to announce 'my controls.' When I put the power to idle; applying brakes and aborting the takeoff; I started to use right rudder in order to catch centerline or at least being parallel the runway to avoid going outside the runway. Because of the speed and simple physics; the left main gear strut started to lower while the right strut started to rise almost putting the airplane in a side load situation when I decided to straight the nose wheel and keep applying the brakes plus aerodynamic braking. By that time I talked to ATC saying we are aborting takeoff. There was nowhere else to go but the grass. The airplane came to a complete stop on the grass with the engine still running when I used my checklist to shut down and secure the airplane. The student and I did a walk around the airplane to see if the airplane sustained any damage but there was no damage at all. No runway lights were damaged either.




Synopsis: PA28 flight instructor reported his student overcorrected towards centerline after landing resulting in the aircraft departing the runway.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Heavy Transport
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach into JFK VOR Rwy 13L we crossed ASALT at 3000 feet. I began the descent to cross CRI at 1500 feet; but got distracted looking for the lead in lights. This was my first time on this approach and I was worried about missing the lights. The captain noticed that we would be high crossing CRI; I used the TCS (Touch Control Steering) function to take control of the aircraft and increase descent rate. We may have been about 100 feet high over CRI; but at no time was the approach unstable. Earlier in the approach we experienced moderate wake turbulence from a heavy aircraft ahead of us and the Captain said that at the time we were approaching CRI; he was attempting to regain visual contact with that aircraft so we could avoid their wake throughout the rest of the approach. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful. Maintain hyper vigilance on complex approaches such as this one. Using FLCH to get down to 1500 feet instead of a FPA (Flight Path Angle) would also have avoided this occurrence.  Also; being able to use VNAV would greatly help on this approach.


Second narrative: We should have been more clear with each other who was looking outside and who was inside. Approval to use the RNP approach could help as well with a lightened workload.


Synopsis: ERJ-175 flight crew reported deviating from charted altitude on VOR Approach to JFK RWY 13L; citing wake turbulence and possible FMC mode selection errors as contributing factors.