elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BXK.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Personal
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Narrative: I was approaching (BXK) Buckeye Airport to enter the pattern for Runway 17. I noticed a gyrocopter on downwind and decided to overly the runway to the other side of the airport to avoid him. As a result; I inadvertently over flew a parachute jump zone on the other side of the airport. This decision made at the last second was not a good one because it caused a conflict unnecessary with the parachute operation.What caused the problem was poor situational awareness and understanding that I should have a plan of action ahead of time to avoid conflict with traffic and specific airport operations. Had I pre-planned evasive action; I would know to make a 180 degree turn to the left away from traffic and away from the airport. This includes better pre-planning of the activities and operations at the intended airport of use. I learned it is not possible to make good last second decisions without having in mind a safe course of action to avoid conflict and you need already in mind all airport operations as a part of the plan to be able to take corrective actions that are safe and keep you and others out of harms way.




Synopsis: A pilot reported entering into a parachute jump zone while trying to increase the distance between their aircraft and a gyrocopter at BXK.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: M-20 F Executive 21
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Shortly after takeoff; at] approximately 200 ft. AGL we experienced almost total electrical failure. A few days before; turning on the landing light recycled power to my Garmin GNS530W; all other systems operated normally. My initial thought was that the landing light was on its last legs and drawing higher-than-normal current. Runup was normal and I deactivated the GNS530W for takeoff with the landing light. Gear came up slightly slower than usual and shortly later in the climb the backup radio and transponder died. Immediately we lowered the gear to make sure we had gear down to return to the airport. At that point it became apparent we were at the end of battery power. By midfield downwind we only had the NAV lights and the electro/hydraulic flaps were inop. Following light gun signals we landed uneventfully.Human Factors:- I made one assumption about the landing light and resolved that was the answer. I was wrong and excluded other possibilities.- I worked around the problem with that assumption and it became worse.




Synopsis: Mooney M20 pilot reported returning to departure airport after experiencing 'almost total' electrical failure.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E MMMX
ATC / advisory: TRACON MMMX
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: AVSAR 2A arrival into MMMX (same issue applies to all arrivals from the north). Per ATC 'Cleared to descend via AVSAR 2A.' Looking at chart; STAR clearly ends at SMO; not SLM. Altitude at SMO is 12;000 per chart. Passing SLM we noticed traffic below us at 12;000. We were descending from 13;000 over SLM to 12;000.  ATC told us to level off at 13;000; so we climbed back up from about 12;700 to 13;000.ATC appears to be under the impression that the minimum altitude is 13;000 when cleared to descend via. From everything I read and my interpretation; the minimum altitude on the descend via is 12;000 after passing SLM; to SMO.  Someone should clarify this with Mexican ATC.

Callback: The reporter had been contacted by his company and informed the minimum altitude on the AVSAR DESCEND VIA clearance is 13;000 FT. The 12;000 FT is an MEA. The reporter considers this to be a formatting issue and if he is confused; no doubt other pilots are also.

Second narrative: I rechecked the arrival and it does end at SMO with an 'at or above' altitude of 12;000 FT. I set 12;000 FT in the altitude window and the First Officer acknowledged the 12;000. After passing SLM; the First Officer started a slow descent out of 13;000 FT for 12;000 FT. Approach Control told us to maintain 13;000 FT due to traffic. At 12;800 FT he climbed back to 13;000 FT. After referencing the FOM and Flight Manual we both agreed 13000 FT should have been set in the altitude window.


Synopsis: A crew cleared to DESCEND VIA the MMMX AVSAR TWO ALPHA crossed SLM at 13;000 FT then began a descent to 12;000 FT; which they believed that to be the SMO crossing altitude; but ATC told them to return to 13;000 FT for traffic. The crew was informed 12;000 FT was the MEA; not segment altitude.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Rain; .75
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Low visibility evening in ATL with low ceilings and fog. While in line for takeoff we heard two preceding aircraft request the tower to dim the runway lights while they were waiting for takeoff clearance. Controller responded that [they] couldn't reduce intensity due to FAA rules. We were [cleared] to line up and wait on runway 9L. As we waited for takeoff I; too; found the new LED lights extremely bright. During the takeoff roll as the First Officer made required 80 knot callout I cross checked my airspeed indicator and was surprised that the outside lighting was so bright it was very difficult for me to read my flight instruments. During climbout we heard the following aircraft request the lights be dimmed also. I believe the tower controller needs the authority to dim the runway lights when asked repeatedly by departing flight crews. The new LED lights can be so bright they become a hindrance to safe operations.




Synopsis: An MD80 Captain reported multiple flight crews requested that the ATL Runway 9L runway lights be dimmed for evening takeoffs in low ceilings and fog. The Local Controller advised they were unable to do so per the FAA. On their subsequent takeoff the reporter found the intense reflected light made it difficult to read the flight instruments.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Upon arrival in ZZZ we were given instructions to taxi to our gate by Ground and we proceeded as instructed. After parking at the gate the agent told us that a (other carrier) aircraft came very close to the back of our aircraft and had to brake to avoid us. I had the right side of the aircraft visually cleared all the way from the runway to the gate and can remember keeping a vigilant eye on clearing the right area as we turned right from the taxiway and ramp into the gate. I'm unsure how we could have been more alert and the Captain and I felt we had been alert and diligent in our operation.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A Boeing 737 Flight Crew reported when they turned towards their gate another aircraft nearly collided with them from behind.
Date: 202004
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Other unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A company employee continued to come to work knowing a member of his family had tested positive for the COVID-19 or Coronavirus. By doing so has put the health and safety of employees at risk.  I am also informed upper management had information on this.  This was reckless and far from safe.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported a person came to work after a family member had allegedly tested positive for COVID-19.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: S95.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZSE
ATC / advisory: CTAF S95
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Short Final to S95's Runway (RWY) 23 - a motorhome and trailer crossed the runway.  Executed a Go-around as I was just crossing the threshold. I thought I was making calls on the CTAF of 122.8; but I had failed to select the proper radio; and was actually making calls on the [wrong frequency].




Synopsis: A student pilot on short final to a non towered airport reported they were transmitting their position on the wrong frequency and executed a go around on short final due to a vehicle on the runway.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The First Officer (FO) had informed me he was fresh off IOE and hadn't flown in 3 weeks. I am used to inexperienced FO's and am pretty vigilant at watching over them; especially during critical phases of flight. For this reason; I normally ask them to fly the first leg so that I can devote my attention to both monitoring duties and keep an eye on them flying the plane. Our normal checks and preflight duties were all completed properly and in accordance with company policy and procedures. We took [the] runway and were cleared for takeoff. [The FO] set the thrust levers for takeoff; however we both missed that the power setting was only in the climb detent; not TOGA. We didn't notice any type of change in the acceleration or runway usage prior to the 80 knot callout; V1 or VR. In fact; It wasn't till the after takeoff checklist that I had put my hand on the thrust levers to bring them to the climb detent that I noticed that they were already there. At that point I queried [the FO] if he had brought them back. He responded no; and I thought about it as to whether or not I had without thinking about it. I came to the conclusion that we had in fact taken off in the climb detent and not the TOGA. We came to the determination that the difference in TOGA and Climb must have been so little that it didn't make a difference in this instance; however both learned a valuable lesson on diligence and even went as far as to both verbally state that we were in the TOGA detent on every takeoff from there on out.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-700 flight crew reported taking off with the thrust levers in the climb detent instead of TOGA.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Software and Automation; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I have a trip to ZZZZ scheduled in two weeks. I see the escape procedures for [this very high terrain area] require an initial escape altitude of 29;000 feet. Over XX years ago during my first Captain upgrade training it was strongly emphasized and imperative to descend to at least 25;000 feet as human lungs can't exchange oxygen unless there is a minimum amount of differential pressure. Based on that; if it is still accurate; there will be passengers and crew members actively dying or at least losing consciousness during the time at 29;000 feet. Has there been a change in physiology since the late 80's? How is this justified?I am pursuing a reasonable justification for this procedure.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain is questioning the logic behind the decision to descend to FL290 during the emergency decompression or emergency drift-down maneuver. The Captain believes the correct altitude should be FL250.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CMH.Airport, OH
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Aircraft X was told by Ground Control 'Runway 28L; taxi via [Taxiway] D3; C.' I was working Local Control. Both Ground Control and I observed Aircraft X taxi onto [Taxiway] D3; then turn left onto Taxiway D. Ground Control corrected Aircraft X and amended the taxi instructions. This is a routine event on Taxiway D3. I've seen this happen on numerous occasions. I don't know if the signage is confusing; but this seems to be a systemic problem. This needs to be investigated to see if maybe better signage would correct the problem; or if there is another way to correct the problem.




Synopsis: Tower Controller reported aircraft having confusion with CMH taxiways; resulting in frequent deviation from taxi instructions.
Date: 201705
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: We were cleared to cross LUNDY at FL290. The Controller gave us a clearance 'After BUBBI descend via the ANTHM 3 Arrival; cross BUBBI at 300 knots.' We both looked at each other and interpreted the clearance as to maintain 290 until BUBBI. My First Officer asked if he wanted us to maintain FL290 and the Controller said No and got frustrated with us. He repeated the same clearance which still was interpreted as maintain FL290 until BUBBI. My First Officer asked the Controller again; and this time the Controller started to argue with us. I interrupted and said that we would start down and comply with the altitudes on the arrival and maintain 300 knots until BUBBI. I felt that the Controller was very frustrated with us and I wanted to de-escalate the situation. We got a different Controller on frequency for the frequency change. When my First Officer answered the call I asked [him] to get a phone number to call. The confusing part to all of this was that we got a descend via clearance after a point; and not a descend via where we were at. The clearance should have been 'Descend via the ANTHM 3; maintain 300 knots until BUBBI.' I contacted our ATC Company Representative and he agreed with us and how the clearance should have been given. He also contacted Washington Center and talked to a Supervisor. The Supervisor apologized for the mishandling and confusion of the clearance and said that we interpreted it correctly and it was the Controller's fault for the confusion.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported ATC issued a 'descend via' clearance incorrectly.
Date: 202107
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While conducting the cockpit setup; we received an ACARS message stating; 'No Dangerous Goods Planned.' On taxi out; we sent Load Planning a Late Weights message. The response from company was; 'Hazmat Needs To Be Secured. Ramp Does Not Have Enough Bags.' We were both confused by this message as we were not aware that any Hazmat was loaded. After about 20 minutes; Ops instructed us to return to the gate to have the Hazmat secured. I asked if Ops had been advised what the Hazmat was. They could not provide that information. I told Ops that I was refusing the Hazmat and upon gate return; I wanted it removed. I contacted the Asst. Manager of Ramp Operations; [name]; by phone and advised of the safety implications of what had happened and of my refusal of the Hazmat shipment. Two large red bags and two large boxes were removed from the forward pit and we departed.My main safety concerns are that we were out of the blocks for almost an hour with no idea that we had Hazmat aboard; Ops couldn't tell us what the Hazmat was and Hazmat was not properly secured by the ramp crew. If we had had a cargo fire or smoke or fumes; I had no information to provide to the [ARFF] crews.I refused the Hazmat for two reasons. 1) I had no information about the shipment and 2) I didn't want to subject the passengers to any additional delays for this issue.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a ground gate return to unload Hazmat cargo due to no Hazmat documentation provided to flight crew.