elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At FL340 on our last leg of a three day trip; I noticed the Captain rubbing his jaw and right ear. The Captain then appeared to turn red and started convulsing in his seat. I attempted to talk to the Captain over the flight intercom; but he did not seem to hear me. I was protecting the throttles and flight controls from his spasms. This went on for about 30 seconds; and then the Captain regained his composure. He told me he had just blown out his ear drum. At this time I noticed blood flowing from his right ear. I asked the Captain if he would like to seek immediate medical attention; but he insisted that he was fine. I asked if he wanted to start a slow decent or have EMTs meet us on arrival which the Captain declined. During this episode we developed a 600 pound fuel imbalance; which I brought to the Captain's attention. He said the imbalance was within limits and took no further action. We landed uneventfully on time. 'Don't fly with a cold.'




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reports noticing the Captain rubbing his jaw and right ear then turning red and convulsing in his seat. The Captain regained his composure and stated he had just blown out his ear drum. Flight continues to destination.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank Cap
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This aircraft is missing sealant from the screw heads holding the boost pump access covers within the area of the TDG overwing heating pads. Other screws on these covers had large blobs of sealant extending at least a 1/2 inch into the airflow on the top of the wing and not faired at all. Maintenance Control says this is within limits and called the item 'fixed.' In a prior discussion with Maintenance Control several years ago; I was told that: 1) The sealant is required. 2) The max thickness for the sealant is .015 inches. 3) The sealant must be smooth with the air stream. During this conversation; I was told that the Airworthiness Directive (AD) had been mis-copied in 1999 (10 years prior to my conversation); and the maximum limit was mistakenly not listed on our Company's work orders; so many of our MD-80's were improperly sealed. He said he would look into the situation. Three years later almost all of our MD-80's have excessively thick; un-streamlined blobs of sealant on the boost pump cover screws. Has the maximum thickness requirement been lifted? What is the new limit if it has? I was taught that the upper surface of a wing is sacred when it comes to anything that can separate the airflow; and I think 1/2 inch is rather large. Please have the limits checked; and if it is still .015 inches; then almost every one of our MD-80's are out of compliance and they need to be fixed immediately. Furthermore; planes like this one have obviously ingested the blobs of sealant into their engines; since the pads are immediately forward of the cover screws. This cannot be good for the engines.




Synopsis: A MD-83 pilot noted that the boost pump access covers within the area of the overwing heating pads may have excess sealant on the screw heads which could be ingested in an engine.
Date: 201907
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During boarding I was in my boarding position at the overwing. After assisting with some pre-boarding customers boarding stopped and the D FA (Flight Attendant) informed me that while assisting a passenger in a wheelchair into the seat 2A she was stowing her purse in the overhead bins as it is a bulkhead seat. She asked the customer if she needed a bottle of water or anything from her purse and the customer replied 'no it's just bottle rockets'. The D then informed the Captain who called a Supervisor who took the bottle rockets from the passenger's purse. While we continued to board an employee that had pre-boarded to ride the jumpseat informed us she thought the customer had more in her other carry-on bag. Boarding then stopped again and the Supervisor asked her if she any more fireworks and the customer said no. The Supervisor checked her other carry on and discovered another large; approximately 12-18 inches wide triangular shaped firework as well as other fireworks including sparklers. The Supervisor also removed these from the aircraft; and the customer was upset that she would disappoint her grandchildren. The passenger said TSA let her through with these explosive materials. TSA should be more vigilant in screening all passengers including those in wheelchairs for explosive materials; perhaps using dogs more frequently; especially at times of year like this when fireworks are easier to obtain.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported passenger had fireworks in carry on purse while pre-boarding.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While performing the ETOPS walk-around on aircraft; found evidence of hydraulic fluid under belly of aircraft. Opened panel 198CR; found no leaks. Found the inflation system ramp slide pressure hose Rh side FRAYED braiding; collapse and contaminated. Researched the Maintenance Manual (MM) procedures which states replacement of the damaged hose (FRAYED braiding). Entered in the Log Book; item was signed off by the supervisor with an EA (Engineer Authority); written by an Engineer.We are concerned with the safety and airworthiness of the airplane and the safety of the passengers. The item in question here is the TESTING that has been performed on the hoses and its passing performance.How is the Engineer determining the condition of the FRAYED hose without performing a visual detailed inspection? The engineer was never present at the aircraft to physically look at the damaged HOSE. The sign off was 'Maintenance reported a few damaged threads on the subject Outer Braid'. The EA accepts the noted condition as 'permanent repair'. This contradicts the findings of the write up! The FRAYED [hose] was broken completely. Documentation was sent to the Engineer to look at. The EA was written as a PERMANENT fix?  The maintenance manual states to replace damaged hose. If found FRAYED; bulged crossed threads or security of end fittings; and other signs of deterioration or damage. Are we not following the MM procedures any longer? Are we so desperate to dispatch flights at the cost of people's lives? Are people being bullied into signing discrepancies at what cost? Their jobs? People's lives?We MUST follow the MM procedures and keep in mind that SAFETY of the passengers is at stake when discrepancies are being signed off by supervisors and engineers that are not involved in the physical aspect of the airplane.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported finding a slide pressure hose with frayed braiding; collapsed and contaminated; which was subsequently signed-off by a supervisor and engineer as serviceable; contrary to the maintenance manual.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BGM.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; Rain; 4
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D BGM
ATC / advisory: Tower BGM
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Narrative: While flying an ILS approach to Runway 6; and while inside the final approach fix; our glideslope CDI began showing a series of significant deviations despite that the airplane was maintaining a consistent descent rate. The deviations are consistent with interference or a glideslope antenna issue at the airport. Beginning at approximately 2;600 feet; our glideslope course deviation indicator (CDI) showed a 1/2 scale downward deflection seemingly out of nowhere; followed by a 1/2 scale upward deflection. The Pilot Flying (PF) had configured the airplane to fly the approach by autopilot; and it had been doing a good job tracking the vertical path until that point. At approximately 2;000 MSL; our glideslope CDI showed an almost full deflection downward. The PF disconnected the autopilot; and then we immediately saw the airport and continued our approach in visual conditions. Had we not seen the airport; we would have gone around because the glideslope seemed incapable of properly guiding us to the decision altitude; and the deviation was exceeding our limitations for a stable approach in IMC. The sudden nature of the glideslope swings made us both think that it was not an issue with our airplane's equipment. In talking to other pilots at our company; this seems to be a known issue at this airport; but it also seems as if nobody has bothered to bring it up in a safety report or inquiry with the control tower. The PF and I notified the control tower of possible glideslope problems; and we also spoke with an airport ops tech once parked at the terminal about the issue. A contributing factor may have been low level wind shear; however; we had been dealing with this all day at other airports and not had it impact our autopilot's ability to track the glideslope on an ILS approach.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported the aircraft experienced glideslope signal interference during an instrument approach.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SF 340B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the final stage of the takeoff roll right at V1 was when we noticed a quick jolt of the aircraft. I quickly glanced at the engine indications and master warning panel; all was normal and I decided to rotate to become airborne. After contacting the Departure frequency; they advised us that we had left a tire on the runway. Being that we leveled off at five thousand feet and told to slow for traffic ahead; I decided to lower the landing gear and have the Flight Attendant give me a report of the main tires. At that time Dispatch called us on company radio frequency telling us that the Tower had called them as well. The Flight Attendant called us back advising us that the right main inboard tire had what appears to be a hole in it. I then raised the landing gear and radioed back to Dispatch to confirm we had a tire issue. My Dispatcher asked that we return back to the departure airport. I called the Flight Attendant back on the phone and asked she prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. I gave instructions of what may occur and act to appropriately if evacuation was imminent. The First Officer and I ask discussed possible scenarios. Collectively all three of us worked very well together. Tower asked that we perform a low approach; followed by a landing on Runway X. After making one of my smoothest landings yet; I taxied the plane off the runway and stopped on the high speed taxiway. Emergency crews inspected the tires and determined that the tire tread had separated from the tire and was OK to taxi to the gate. After parking at the gate I immediately inspected the tire and saw what the emergency crews had seen also. There was also damage from the separation of the tire to the most rear bottom aft part of the engine cowling.




Synopsis: An SF-340 crew was notified by ATC that a tire tread separated during the takeoff roll confirming the vibration felt at V1; so an emergency was declared and the flight return to land.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After an uneventful departure from ZZZ runway XX we followed the departure instructions and were told to contact approach. Once in contact with approach for approximately 1 minute we received an audio and visual message indicating 'trim in motion'. FO (First Officer) in the right seat was flying; and I reached down to engage the trim interrupt button. The audio and visual messages went away as I was hovering over the button; so FO attempted to manually re-trim. The trim motor didn't seem to move on his command; and about 5 seconds later it continued to trim nose up. After initial indications that it was trimming up again I engaged the trim interrupt; and ran the QRH as FO kept positive control of the aircraft. The trim was about halfway up on the indicator; and FO indicated  he was not having issue in controlling the aircraft. The QRH led us to disable the main trim motor; and we were able to use the alternate stab trim. After completion of the QRH vectors back to landing was uneventful. We advised ATC of the issue about 1 minute after it occurred; and there was no delay in them vectoring us back to ZZZ.




Synopsis: Captain reported a stabilizer main trim runaway on take off and were able to disconnect and use alternate trim to control the aircraft. Captain elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Approximately 600 NM from PDX ATC cleared us direct to DUFUR Intersection. This intersection was on our flight plan and a fix associated with the HHOOD RNAV Arrival to PDX. As we approached DUFUR ATC told us to expect the HHOOD Arrival and then cleared us from FL380 to descend at pilots discretion to a lower altitude (I believe it was FL240 or 250). There is a speed restriction note on the arrival that states that '...aircraft descend via Mach number until intercepting 280 KT. Maintain 280 KT until slowed by the STAR.' The FMS was in PROF and FMS Speed and we had programmed in 280 knots into the FMS. Our descent started well before DUFUR (probably in excess of 30 miles). Since DUFUR was the first fix we would cross that was associated with the arrival we had planned to comply with the speed restrictions at and after DUFUR. At this point in time were not yet on any segment of the STAR. Passing about FL320 or so we were still 20 to 30 miles from DUFUR and ATC asked us our speed (it was mach .82 and just coming up to about 295 KIAS) and then advised us that we were not complying with the speed restriction printed on the STAR. We immediately slowed to 280 KTS. After we slowed ATC mentioned that nearly every aircraft he had seen in the previous two weeks on that arrival had missed this speed restriction. I believe ATC caused this confusion. When we started our descent we were not yet on the arrival and in fact would not be on the arrival for several more miles. It would have been much better if ATC had stated the need for us to be on a Mach/280KIAS profile at the top of our descent. Also; the fixes prior to DUFUR have these restriction stated on the chart but we were not cleared over any of those fixes and started the arrival at DUFUR. Had we joined the arrival at JOTBA or JERDT it would have been clear that the speed restriction applied from that point on.




Synopsis: When cleared 'direct to DUFUR (on the HHOOD RNAV STAR to PDX); descend pilot's discretion to FL250' the flight crew of an MD11 was later reprimanded by Center for not complying with the STAR speed restriction to not exceed Mach number/280K. The flight crew was not aware the restriction applied as they had never been cleared to 'descend via' the STAR.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-88
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A MD88 was 4 miles in trail of a B737 on the downwind to ZZZ. Traffic to follow was issued as 'just left of 12 o'clock 4 miles about to turn base.' The MD88 responded 'traffic in sight; runway in sight.' The MD88 was instructed to follow the B737 and cleared for the visual approach. I then instructed the B737 to start his base and switched him to the Tower. Moments later; after other traffic checked on frequency; I noticed the MD88 cutting off the traffic he was instructed to follow and turning in on the B737's traffic to follow. I instructed the MD88 to stop his descent and asked if he still had his traffic at 9 o'clock in sight; he told me he had 2 o'clock traffic in sight and then that he had the 9 o'clock traffic now as well. I turned the MD88 back to the southwest for re-sequence; coordinated with the Tower regarding what was happening and re sequenced the MD88 to follow his original traffic again; and switched him to the Tower. Don't clear aircraft on the downwind to follow traffic on the downwind if there is traffic in the base turn. Also; don't include terms like 'about to turn base' when describing traffic to follow when additional traffic is in the base turn already.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a developing conflict event when clearing an aircraft for a visual approach only to discover the aircraft was following the wrong aircraft.