elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LFFF.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center LFFF
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Between Flap Retract and Slat retract; above 3;500 feet MSL we experienced dual FMC failure. Lost all Nav information; Autothrottles; and FMS derived speed information. We informed ATC and requested vectors to OPALE. I think we were still prior to PG092 on the OPALE 2G departure; but not sure since it was not present on the standby flight plan. Asked departure for radar vectors to run checklist. As we were leveling at FL100; we were given a climb to FL140; started the climb then were told to remain at FL 100. I think we climbed to about 10;400 feet before descending back to FL100. Ran QRH checklist and talked to dispatch. Dispatch preferred us to land at EGSS. We advised [center] we could continue to EGSS. Continued uneventfully to EGSS. We informed each controlling agency of our limitations and landed uneventfully. The First Officer (FO) remained pilot flying while the Reserve FO and I ran checklists. Reserve FO did an outstanding job running the checklist and backing us up on everything. FO did a great job also; flying the airplane while we had our heads buried trying to figure out if we could get an FMC back.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a dual FMC failure shortly after flap retraction on departure. Flight diverted to an enroute field.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SMF.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SMF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: As we were taxing out in SMF to RWY 35L; the taxiway narrows and becomes a GA taxiway with a weight limitation. I was the First Officer and I was running the Before Take Off checklist when the Captain stopped the aircraft and informed me that he had missed the turn to the runway. He said that he had been distracted by his PFD that had gone blank for a moment. We informed ATC and they said that they were going to send out a tug. The aircraft didn't go past the intersection more than 5 feet; but it was to tight to make the turn; so we waited for the tug and were pushed back a few feet. After completing the push back we continued with the normal operation of the flight.


Second narrative: As we were taxing out in SMF to RWY 35L; the taxiway narrows and becomes a GA taxiway (250;000 lbs limit). As the First Officer was running the before take off checklist; my PFD went blank and distracted me enough to miss the taxiway. I quickly reacted and applied the brakes. Once the aircraft stopped I reassessed the situation. the aircraft nose wheel was still on the taxiway but the nose was just far enough as to not be able to make the turn. I informed ground of the situation and they sent out a tug. We were then pushed back approximately 5 feet. Once the tug and bypass pin were removed my First Officer re-ran the before taxi and before takeoff checklist. There is little to no indication that the taxiway narrows and become a weight restricted taxiway. Had there been visual cues of this; the incident more than likely would not have happened.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Pilot Crew reported inadequate warnings available for weight limitation change for a taxiway at SMF Airport.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: MD-88
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A B717 was flying the ZZZ1 transition on the STAR arrival. A MD88 was flying the ZZZ2 transition on the STAR arrival. Both transitions converge at the same intersection. The MD88 was slowed to 280 KTS on initial check-in and then told to cross STAR at 14;000. The B717 was told to cross STAR at 14;000 and given a speed of 310 KTS to stay in front of the MD88. As the two were converging on intersection; the MD88 was turned 10 left for in trail. As they got closer the speed and heading didn't give me enough room; so I amended the MD88 to FL200 and expedited the B717 through FL190. Nothing worked and separation was lost. After being off the sector for a while; I was trying to figure out how I could let this happen. After many years of in trail separation to aircraft; this shouldn't have happened. All my turns and speeds are usually right on. My supervisor asked me to do some training and it was the one on fatigue management. After finishing; I believe fatigue had a lot to do with this. It explains about the amount of sleep you should be getting each night. If you don't; you may not realize you are tired. I have been on Alternate Work Schedule (AWS) for a couple of years now and this year management changed all the shifts to later by about an hour. This hour doesn't seem like much; but I drive a long distance each way to work. I have tried to reason with management in order to move my shift by one hour so I can get home and get a good night sleep. They say they can't do it. The training said it is my responsibility to ensure I get enough sleep or rest. I do believe that this is a contributing factor. I think management should stop looking at controllers as a number and start seeing them as people. Realize these people need time off and time between shifts.




Synopsis: A long time Enroute Controller experience a loss of separation event; the reporter noted that fatigue was indeed a factor in the event.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMZT.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were enroute to MMGL airport from the north and were given a descent from FL340 to 11;000 feet by ATC enroute controller (Mexico Center). As we approached 11;000 feet we were switched to MMGL approach control which gave us a further descent to 6;500 feet and vectors for the ILS approach to runway 10. The weather was VFR except for a thin layer of clouds above the terrain. As we descended below the clouds on an ATC vector we noticed that the altitude of 6;500 feet given by ATC was too low in order to maintain a safe margin from the terrain. We then leveled off at a safe altitude above the terrain; informed ATC of our level off; and also that the airport runway was in sight. ATC cleared us then for a visual approach to runway 10. We then maintained our altitude till intercepting the glide slope for runway 10 and made a normal landing. The ATC approach controller may have been new and did not consider the terrain or minimun vectoring altitude for the terrain area we were flying in.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported the MMGL Approach Controller issued an inappropriate and unsafe altitude on approach to Runway 10. Flight crew stayed at a safe altitude and flew a visual approach.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: DC-10 30
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Took over this flight from Mid shift; turn over was flight may be returning to blocks; reason not known. Sent ACARS to crew 'looks like you are back to the gate. What is the issue?' Captain called informed [Operations Control] 2 rejected takeoff speed about 65kts for both [rejected takeoffs]. Number 3 engine; Captain said per Maintenance blew tire. Asked Captain for his phone number. Informed Recovery; called LAX Ramp Agent. Advised new release when [aircraft] is up and fueled. Spoke to Captain regarding new release will be sent when Maintenance clears aircraft currently down.As I was speaking to Captain MEL added 73-XX-XX added.


Second narrative: Start; pushback and taxi-out all normal. Powered up for takeoff and commenced takeoff roll. Got Engine 3 Fuel Filter alert and aborted takeoff at approximately 65 kts. Alert cleared itself. Consulted with Maintenance and reached the decision to attempt another takeoff. Got the same alert after commencing the takeoff roll. Aborted takeoff a second time (again at about 65 kts.) and returned to ramp. On exiting the runway; heard a loud bang and felt an airframe shudder. On taxi in; Maintenance advised that the number 4 tire was blown.


Synopsis: Dispatcher and Captain reported two rejected takeoffs due to a fuel filter bypass alert; the Number 4 tire blew.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NYL.Airport, AZ
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Operator: Other Aerial Mapping
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Other Aerial Mapping
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class E NYL
ATC / advisory: CTAF NYL
Second aircraft: AV-8B Harrier II / AV-8A/C
Reporter organization: Other Aerial Mapping
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During a holiday weekend; the Tower at Yuma (NYL) was closed.  We were conducting aerial mapping operations around Yuma on that weekend; and during this time observed how chaotic this airport can be when the Tower is not operational. With many different types of flight ops being conducted to Yuma's 8 different runways; all attempting to coordinate over CTAF.  The problem was compounded by the lack of wind; which caused pilots to plan landings on the runway that was simply the most convenient for them.  There was one 10 minute period; as we were taxiing to Runway 8 to conduct our runup; when 4 AV-8B Harriers conducted an overhead break to landing on Runway 21L; followed by 2 C130s landing in the opposite direction on Runway 3R; an unknown GA aircraft departing 'Runway 17/35' (whether it was 17 or 35 is unknown); a CRJ approaching for a landing on Runway 8; and a foreign student pilot with a thick accent and a very fragile grasp of the whole situation announcing intentions to land on Runway 26 (as the CRJ was on approach from the opposite direction).  The military aircrafts' overhead pattern is unfamiliar to most GA pilots; and cuts across the standard GA/non-military traffic patterns.  Additionally; several of the military aircraft never announced clear of the runway; heightening the confusion of who was where.  I suggested over the radio to the foreign student that he enter downwind for Runway 8; and to watch out for the CRJ on a left base for the same runway.  After observing similar chaos over the weekend; it's my strong suggestion that the Tower at Yuma not be closed during normal daytime hours; as it is simply too large and busy of an airport with a very diverse array of flight ops being conducted to it.




Synopsis: C206 pilot describes a holiday weekend at NYL when the Tower is closed and a diverse mix of aircraft are using all eight runways for takeoffs and landings; in calm winds; using The CTAF to coordinate.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We started the engines and taxied to Runway 33L and completed all taxi checks including the rudder bias with no abnormalities noticed. During takeoff roll extra right rudder pressure was required. At the time I thought the winds may have shifted a little and the plane was trying to weathervane. During the initial climb I continued to apply more right rudder and dialed in all the right rudder trim available. The aircraft still did not maintain coordinated flight. The decision was made at that time to return to the departure airport. We asked ATC for vectors to a visual on 33L and landed without incident. The plane landed; taxied and turned on the ground with normal rudder pressures.




Synopsis: A CE560 Captain added right rudder during takeoff thinking a crosswind was the cause but discovered after takeoff that rudder was needed continuously and so returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent; SADDE 6 arrival; just prior to SYMON. Prior to descent; we had briefed the ILS 24R approach; with a possibility 25L; and completed the Approach/Descent checklist. Just before SYMON; the relief officer mentions that the 24R LOC is out of service and the approach is actually the RNV-Y 24R into LAX. It was printed out on the ATIS; but we all missed that one. The Captain states that he will reprogram the FMC; so I continue to fly the aircraft while he and the relief officer get the correct approach in the box. At one point I hear the relief officer say 'Don't reselect the arrival' which I took to mean not to reselect the STAR. I'm not sure if he did or didn't; but something was executed without my confirmation. The autopilot was in LNAV/VNAV and the flight path was on the magenta line. Between monitoring the aircraft and keeping an eye on what was happening to the FMC I noticed that the plane was not actually on the magenta line but headed straight for SYMON. I selected HDG and attempted to regain the course to BAYST. It was evident to us and to SoCal Approach that we were going to bypass BAYST instead of going over it; and SOCAL cleared us direct SMO; clearly not impressed with our navigation skills. I'm not sure what was programmed into the FMC; or why the plane didn't stay on the magenta line when LNAV was on the FMA. I was not asked 'Does this look good to you?' before anything was executed; probably because there was a time constraint to get the reprogramming done. As pilot flying; I felt my duty was to fly the aircraft while the Captain and relief officer attended to other duties. There was clearly a break down in communications within the crew. There were no personal conflicts between us on the flight deck; and I felt we all got along. Fatigue was definitely a factor. Also; we have all been into LAX a bunch of times and it's always the same arrivals and approaches. Except for this one. Attention to detail is difficult when fatigued; but not impossible. But recovery from an error while fatigued can be confusing and over wrought. So; get it right the first time; define roles; correct errors using well established SOP; and don't get wrapped around the axle if something goes wrong.




Synopsis: Widebody international flight crew reported a track deviation when they got an unexpected clearance on arrival into LAX and had some difficulty programming the FMC correctly. Reporter cited fatigue as a factor.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on approach we received an Anti-Skid Outboard caution message. We ran the appropriate checklists; and then made a normal approach and landing. As we were taxiing to the ramp we both noticed that the aircraft started to taxi as if it had a flat tire. The Captain immediately brought the aircraft to a stop on the taxiway and set the parking brake. While I asked ATC to send CFR over to inspect the aircraft the Captain contacted Company Maintenance and Airport Operations. Operations brought over buses and we deplaned the passengers who were then shuttled to the terminal while Maintenance took control of the aircraft. The aircraft had two flat tires on the right main landing gear.


Second narrative: Due to the fact that I was very busy performing other tasks and talking to multiple people I forgot to write up the anti-skid outboard caution message before I left the airplane. Once I realized I called Maintenance Control and advised the Supervisor on duty. He said they would take care of it and pass it on to Local Maintenance at the airport.


Synopsis: Distracted after two tires blew out during taxi in after the subsequent landing; the flight crew of a CRJ-200 failed to write up an EICAS ANTI-SKID OUTBOARD message received and addressed on approach. A phone call to Maintenance Control resolved the error.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Right after takeoff; cabin smelled like mold. Continued for about 10 minutes. Very strong odor. Lead Flight Attendant did an all call and every Flight Attendant agreed the odor was very strong and all flight attendants smelled it. Although some thought it smelled like vomit; others thought it smelled like dirty socks; mold; or just an awful smell with no better description than that. It continued even after we left 10;000 feet at which point the Second Officer walked through the cabin to smell it. The cockpit crew smelled it in the cockpit also. However; the Captain attributed it to the fact that this particular aircraft had just had a new engine put on it the day before. Upon descent into ZZZZ we all smelled it again for at least 10 minutes. I sat with a Kleenex over my nose and mouth for the entire time. Again...a very strong odor that smelled like mold to me. The inside of my nose felt raw and dry and when I blew my nose for 3 days after; there was blood in the mucus. Also; had a headache for about 12 hours after the fume event. How is it that I have a hang tag on my company ID that tells me what to do when this happens; but they supposedly have no idea how to fix what causes it?




Synopsis: A330 cabin crew reported a strong foul fume during climb which diminished slight and reoccurred on initial descent. Health issues were experienced which lasted after the flight.