elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Approach; it was south flow. I cleared Aircraft X; a heavy B7XX RNAV approach then switched him to tower. Then; tower called me said that Aircraft X was going around and they issued him 185 heading climbing to 5000 ft. Then; Aircraft X came on my frequency; I radar identified him; told him to climb to 7000 ft.; because there was a 6300 ft. MIA block to the east. Once he was level at 7000 ft.; he was about 14 miles southwest; I issued him a 030 heading; then a 350 heading vector for RNAV approach. There was a 11000 ft. MIA block east of the 6300 ft. MIA block; but the distance from Aircraft X's position when he made the turn to the boundary of the 11000 ft. MIA block was about 5.6 miles. I thought that was enough space for him to make the turn. However; Aircraft X took an unexpected very wide U turn and clipped the corner of the 11000 ft. MIA block; he clipped the corner of 11000 ft. MIA for about 3 seconds while turning to the north; the MSAW alert was triggered; I issued him a low altitude alert. The aircraft then exited the 11000 ft. MIA back into the 6300 ft. MIA safely.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported issuing a late vector resulting in air carrier entering higher MIA.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on final approach to land there was a van traveling west on the north perimeter of the airport.I developed a higher than normal sink rate while landing. The van slowed as if to watch but then continued and traveled under the airplane.I added throttle to arrest the sink rate.The left landing main wheel touched the top of the van leaving a skid mark on the top of the van. The right main gear wheel touched the top of the windshield cracking the windshield.I continued my landing without further incident.  I parked the airplane on the hangar ramp just west of the runway; and after shutting down went back to the road to check on the people in the van.  All the people in the van were fine; no injuries incurred.




Synopsis: Light aircraft pilot reported contact with a vehicle on an airport perimeter access road.
Date: 202109
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When airborne; we were notified by our Dispatcher that one of our positions had dry ice that was not accounted for in the DG [Dangerous Goods] paperwork.Uncertain as to the cause given the event occurred at some point during the loading or ULD [Unit Load Devise] build process.Uncertain; as the process breakdown occurred external to the flight crew.


Second narrative: At XA:31 [name 1] informed me that Aircraft X; position Y; had 6kgs of dry ice that was not accounted for in the DG [Dangerous Goods] manifest.  The flight was on the active runway ready for take off. At XA:31 I informed Duty Officer [name 2]; of the event. I also told him I would inform the crew via ACARS.  We agreed the flight is still legal; it is safe and within limits. Aircraft X may proceed to ZZZ1.  At XA:32 I informed [name 1] of my discussion with the Duty Officer. I requested from [name 1] the Ramp Agent's employee number #X; [name 3].  At XA:44 I sent an ACARS message:  'Hello Aircraft X. At XA:31 I was made aware that position Y has 6 kg of dry ice that was not accounted for in Dangerous Goods [manifest]. Duty Officer has been notified. Please file a report; I will be doing the same.We have determined that the flight is safe; legal; and within limits. I called [name 3];to inquire about the event. [Name 3]; said it was a can from ZZZ2 that came in from another area; when the Hazmat agent updated the DG summary the aircraft had already blocked. [Name 3]; received an alert and called [name 1]. [Name 3] the can was originally assigned to a can aircraft cargo container type that is not in this aircraft's configuration for this flight. It took the Hazmat agent time to correct it; he entered the information after the aircraft blocked.I suggested Hazmat agent make a phone call to Operations or ramp agent as soon as he encountered the error rather than trying to figure out how to correct the error and entering the information in the DG Summary after the aircraft blocked.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported Dispatch notification of Hazmat documents violation while airborne.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On ILS PRM (Precision Runway Monitor) approach ORD 10C (autopilot and autothrust required); assigned 170 KIAS to FAF (Final Approach Fix). I called 'Flaps 3' below 175 KIAS to maintain 170. Just prior to the FAF; the aircraft encountered either wake turbulence from the proceeding aircraft or some other form of unstable air. The airspeed quickly rose above the Flaps 3 limit of the aircraft. During our debrief; the Captain and I thought it was about 10 knots above the limit for 2 to 3 seconds. I called for the landing gear to help manage the speed. Airspeed returned to normal; we continued to configure for landing; and landed uneventfully. The Captain contacted Maintenance to write up the overspeed. Maintenance did the inspection and reported to us the overspeed was within limits.




Synopsis: A319 First Officer reported a flap overspeed occurred on approach into ORD when they encountered either wake turbulence or unstable air.
Date: 202103
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground HOU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The HOU ATIS states Runway 17/35 is closed; along with Taxiway G2 and G3.  The Jepp 10-9 Page does not identify any of these surfaces. Ground Control gave us a clearance to taxi on H and hold short of Runway 35.  So; does the runway exist or not?  The Jepp 10-9 should reflect the proper surfaces that ATC is using in their communications. I think this can create confusion.  Fix the Jepp or have ATC stop issuing instructions including surfaces that no longer exist.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported confusion regarding information on the Jeppesen 10-9 vs. instructions given by ATIS and Ground Control.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We were] climbing/accelerating out of 10;000 feet when I saw a flickering red light out of the corner of my eye. The source of the intermittent flickering was the Number 2 fuel lever which coincidentally had one loop of the fire detection system already deferred due to a long history of problems. There were no other fire detection alerts or any engine instruments to indicate a problem. Touching the fuel lever caused the rest of the fire detection system to go off. Shortly after silencing the bell all of the alerts went away. I tested the fire detection system successfully and rechecked all of the engine instruments which were normal. We had initiated the engine fire checklist by placing the Number 2 throttle in idle but decided to declare an emergency and return to [departure airport] with the engine running in idle. Also; decided not to touch the Number 2 fuel lever any more. We had no further abnormal indications of any sort. First Officer continued as PF for an uneventful ILS. With fire/rescue equipment standing by we stopped on the runway; shutdown Number 2 and had the fire/rescue personnel inspect our airplane. Given an all OK by them we taxied clear and continued to the ramp without incident.




Synopsis: MD10 Captain experienced engine fire warning so he declared an emergency and returned to departure airport.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: STC.Airport, MN
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I gave aircraft X an approach clearance to maintain at or above 3;500 feet until established at (SANLY) on the localizer ILS 31 Approach into STC. The pilot read it back; however descended to 3;000 feet which is 500 feet below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). I climbed the plane back up to 3;500 feet.Do pilots know the MIAs? Do their flight management systems know?




Synopsis: ZMP Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and went below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA).
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Door
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received a phone call from the Chief Pilot regarding the discovery of worn gear door skid plates during preflight by a crewmember. Apparently; Maintenance had not done a thorough check of the aircraft after we had turned over the aircraft at the gate following the emergency landing. During the downwind leg following the low approach and go around after initial discovery of right main gear down indication light; I specifically requested from Tower that Maintenance be advised of our emergency status and requested Maintenance be standing by with gear pins for pinning the gear and a tug and tow bar in the event we would have to be towed from the runway. After turning final and no positive indication of right main gear down; the decision was made to use the emergency extension gear lever. We now were low on fuel and on short final for landing. We left the emergency gear handle in the extended position which meant the main gear doors would be open for landing and would drag the ground. Landing proved to be uneventful. ARFF took control of the situation after we came to a full stop and checked out the aircraft. I called Maintenance after not seeing or hearing any input from them. We then held our position on the runway for 20 minutes awaiting maintenance arrival. We left both engines running and the emergency extension gear handle in the up position (extended). After Maintenance arrival; cockpit to maintenance personnel communication was done via the Captain's window. The landing gear safety pins were passed from the cockpit to the ground via Captain's window. After all gear was pinned; Maintenance told the Captain to stow the emergency extension gear handle to retract the landing gear doors. I stowed the emergency extension gear handle upon the Captain's command. The aircraft was then taxied to the gate without incident. Maintenance specialist informed us the aircraft was out of service and they were taking possession as is. We were told the spare aircraft was awaiting us and I packed my bags for the gate change and was not involved with any further maintenance discussions or logbook entries.




Synopsis: MD83 First Officer describes his role in a landing with the gear doors open resulting in gear door skid plate abrasion that is not addressed by Maintenance prior to the next preflight.
Date: 201409
Location: YSSY.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While taking off in Sydney at 648;000 [pounds] I had briefed and loaded max thrust with NADP 1 for a thrust reduction at 1500 feet vs. 800 feet.Upon loading the take off data from the new ACARS 2 version I knew to check the NADP 1 as it defaults to NADP 2. I also changed the numbers to max weight as briefed. What I didn't realize is it defaults to a reduced take off by putting in a reduced thrust temperature.I realize I am to check this but all of our attention was diverted to burning fuel as we left the gate at 649.5. We were watching closely to make sure we could burn down to take off weight prior to reaching the runway.Upon applying take off thrust the Captain noticed it was reduced thrust and manually set thrust to our max take off N1 setting.This needs to be brought to the attention of the 777 crews; as none of us were aware that the new ACARS 2 version did this. I would venture the majority of the pilots are the same; as we received no training on this as is usual now at [our airline]. This lack of training on new systems and procedures is dangerous. There is always ambiguity in the cockpit on what system we have and how to use it.It's also bad business; as one accident/incident will negate any cost saved by not paying for proper training.No SOPs or FARs were intentionally violated.




Synopsis: A B777 First Officer addressed unanticipated and untrained for interaction between programming of NADP (Noise Abatement Departure Procedure) thrust settings and modifications to the ACARS software that caused a default to a reduced thrust takeoff setting when the intent was to utilize max thrust for a MTOGW takeoff.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff on climb out aircraft seemed to be in a slight slip/ out of trim not too unusual for this fleet; I was hand flying with use of Flight Director in:  EPR LIM; HDG SEL; ALT set for 15000; and IAS 250 knots. As we passed through 10;000 feet I inputted rudder trim [and] we heard/felt a pop as if something broke. The aircraft then began rolling left and right due to rudder yaw - it was as if we were in a Dutch roll scenario. I immediately slowed the ascent rate. We then requested a return to [departure airport]. Notified ATC of our predicament; started a slow descent toward [departure airport]. All control inputs after this point were small; smooth and measured in an attempt to gather information as to what we may anticipate the aircraft state may be in the future as we prepared for approach and landing. When aircraft was slowed and configured for approach and landing the aircraft flight controls seemed to become more effective. A visual approach and landing was completed in normal fashion. Weather was VFR; winds at 210/13kts.


Second narrative: At approximately 10;000 feet and 250kts; the Captain began trimming the rudder while hand flying. It immediately felt like something broke in the flight controls and the aircraft began to shake; roll and yaw fairly violently. We then got a Yaw Damper and Mach Trim caution light. We landed without incident with Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) on standby. ARFF checked the exterior of the aircraft and cleared us to taxi to the gate. Upon reaching the gate; we found Circuit breaker C18; DFGC (Digital Flight Guidance Computer) System popped.


Synopsis: MD-80 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing a rudder flight control anomaly.