elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Night conditions. Just after PHILBO Arrival on vectors with NY Approach for ILS 22L. Still south of field at 6;000 feet; we were flying on a 090 heading and told to fly heading 360; and that we will have traffic; a small aircraft; that would stay below us. On 360 heading we received a TCAS TA followed by TCAS RA. Target was 10 o'clock indicating 500 feet below our altitude. I followed RA guidance and First Officer reported TCAS RA to ATC. Traffic was hidden by small cloud; but after passing cloud I visually acquired traffic. Continuing to follow RA guidance climbing; the target passed directly below us; indicating 800 feet below; as I had climbed 300 feet. Approximate location [was] SE of SBJ VOR.


Second narrative: After a few minutes ATC gave us a left turn to heading 360 and advised us of cirrus traffic passing under us at 5;500 feet. 500 feet below our current altitude. After 30 seconds we get a TA; followed by an RA stating 'monitor vertical speed.' The Captain disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the RA guidance. I advised ATC we are responding to a RA. We were just above a scattered cloud layer and unable to visually see the traffic; so we climb up to 6;300 feet. We eventually saw the traffic and cleared over him by 800 feet. After clearing the traffic we descended back down to 6;000 feet. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The Captain and I were both confused why ATC would turn us into VFR traffic only 500 feet below us. I thought IFR separation required 1;000 feet. Captain authority was used to comply with the RA; but no emergency was declared.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported taking evasive maneuvers during arrival to EWR due to receiving a TCAS RA when passing overhead a small aircraft reported to be 500 feet below by the ATC Controller.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On my turnover to the next shift I realized I had not applied an over-burn to the flight plan. I ran the numbers; contacted the crew and sent them the information as they were already airborne. I told my relief what I was doing.Busy shift; during the shift we got the second notification in less than a week we were moving from our primary location to our contingency for COVID cleaning. This caused an interruption in flight planning...as I've got immune compromised relatives that I cannot see again until this is resolved. Plus maintenance over flight restrictions on flights...and late inbound flights that require monitoring as soon as they are airborne to fly fast since they were not planned that way by the day shift.  Also; multiple center closures were being announced during the shift...trying to determine of my flights were going to be affected was a concern. I had the over-burn highlighted with a pink marker on my worksheet...I just got busy and failed to look at it again while trying to determine if we would be landing to the north or south. Sent the crew updated numbers with the burn applied and advised what happened.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported incorrect fuel burn numbers were given to a flight crew and cited workload; COVID related cleaning interruptions and ATC closures as contributing factors.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 1000 (Hawker Horizon)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At L30 there is a configuration with departures off Runway 1. The departure requires the aircraft to depart and reaching an altitude turn right to a heading of 050. The Tower is to ensure the aircraft starts this turn before transferring communications to the TRACON. If everyone does their job; the Tower and TRACON controllers; and the pilots; all goes well; however if one person in the chain makes a mistake; the potential for error or collision is great. A Hawker departed Runway 1 and called the TRACON prior to starting the turn; and continued to climb straight out; directly toward LSV TRACON airspace; located approximately 3 miles away. As the TRACON Controller; I am not allowed to issue a vector below the MVA; therefore if the Tower does not observe the turn; and I am in communication with the aircraft; he may proceed straight; depending on climb rate; and penetrate LSV airspace before he can be turned. If LSV cannot approve the point out; there is a potential for loss of separation or collision. LSV routinely has high speed aircraft in the pattern; and this departure points right at them. LSV had an aircraft maneuvering at 6;000 FT; and had I not been able to vector when I did; would have been in conflict. I was able to complete the point out; but this is an area of concern; as any number of things can go wrong; and there are very limited options to resolve the situation. In addition; the sector gets crowded very quickly as soon as one aircraft deviates from the norm; as all others pile up behind it. Due to the high number of aircraft that have difficulty flying procedures in and around LAS; a more positive controlled situation needs to be developed. L30 controllers are routinely asked to expose themselves to needless risk and lack of proper application of ATC rules; and management continues to ignore the problem; by continuing to allow dangerous operations.




Synopsis: L30 Controller voiced concern regarding the Runway 1 departure procedures noting that if the Tower; flight crew or the TRACON makes an error an airspace incursion with LSV is likely to occur.
Date: 201303
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: Other Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other 
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my 48 years of flying; 36 as an airline pilot; I have witnessed major improvements in equipment and technology. Most were fully tested and vetted prior to their introduction onto the flight decks of our passenger aircraft. The latest such technology is the I-pad. My comments need to be prefaced by stating that computers are a revolutionary technology with which I am very comfortable and in the use of which I am extremely well versed. That being said; the rush to put the I-pad into full use aboard our airline's aircraft--WITHOUT BACKUP PAPER MANUALS BEING ON BOARD--is an extremely poor decision and could lead to unintended outcomes. There must be more testing; training and evaluation prior to their full implementation without paper backups being on board. There needs to be several training and checking cycles during which the electronic pad is used as the primary information and reference source. Data from these events should be collected; evaluated and codified to determine the practicality and desirability of full implementation without such redundancy. The collected data needs to be compared against a base line established from training and checking sessions using the existing paper manuals. This is the only means to determine the feasibility and safety of full implementation. The comparative data collected must be the evaluations of line pilots only; and not skewed by the inclusion of data related to line check airmen; pilot instructors or standards Captains. These individuals are highly trained in the use of the I-pad and their jobs require daily usage. This is not the case with the average line airman. I strongly urge our managers to abstain from their 'RUSH TO JUDGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION' of the I-pad without far more training and evaluation. An aircraft accident or incident related to the early implementation without proper training and evaluation would be difficult to justify.




Synopsis: An A320 Captain discussed his concerns with respect to his airline's; in his opinion; rush to implement the availability of aircraft operational content solely by 'pad type' hand held electronic devices. He believes their use as the sole on board procedural resource should be proceeded by extensive testing and evaluation of the average line pilots' facility in its use.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: RADAR Vector Right base to Runway XX; ZZZ at 4;000 FT MSL. No autoland followed by CONFIG warning and siren CA RA amber INOP flag. CA RA input to CONFIG monitoring system lost causing warning. Exact failure not known to crew at the time; obvious corrective action was taken and the landing gear was extended early. The warning ceased. Captain advised Tower of problem and placed a request to keep the approach and landing area sterile. Note the airport is tightly timed for takeoffs and landings on the crossing runways. Captain viewed this as good CRM using all resources: human; information; and hardware to insure a successful completion of the flight with a minimum amount of possible complications. Tower asked us to call via telephone after arrival.




Synopsis: Air Carrier experiencing equipment difficulties requested ATC to keep approach/landing area sterile most likely prompting ATC to initiate emergency handling
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [Received a TCAS RA at 5;000 feet to climb while receiving vectors from ZLA.]




Synopsis: A320 Captain experiences a TCAS RA at 5;000 feet approaching SNA.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 3
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: J3 Cub
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Pilot was holding on the runway waiting for oil temperature to rise for run up. [This airport] has no visibility or ceiling for weather reporting. Pilot could see blue sky and sun and decided to take off. Pilot climbed to 100 feet above ground level and encountered IMC. Pilot decided to turn crosswind and return to the runway.




Synopsis: J-3 pilot reported returning to departure airport after taking off in what appeared to be VFR conditions but encountering clouds at 100 feet AGL.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While on the Expressway visual to Runway 31 at LGA we received what we believed to be an erroneous 'Obstacle' GPWS warning. We received this warning when on short final at approximately 200-300 FT above the water to the southeast of Runway 31. We were on the extended centerline and  approximately a 1/2 dot low on the electronic glideslope from the FMS as well as we momentarily had 3 red lights and one white light on the VASI. The First Officer (pilot flying) started to fly up and we got the GPWS warning. At that point the First Officer initiated the go-around. We complied with ATC's instructions and returned and shot the same approach without incident as well as without any GPWS warnings. It is worthy of noting that we were stabilized out of 1;000 FT. The biggest threat I see here from a flight crew and operational perspective is that there should be a charted RNAV visual approach in the FMS and on paper to fly for Runway 31 using the autopilot and constant angle (CANPA) procedures. While in our case; we were stabilized and on the glideslope; I have no doubt that if we had a charted and FMS based procedure that the margin of safety could be increased ten fold. Having to hand fly a dynamic charted visual approach procedure at night to an airport such as LGA is very workload intensive and requires expert airmanship. I believe that we could level the playing field by having an established and charted procedure.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 crew executed a go-around from about 300 FT on final to LGA Runway 31 after the GPWS alerted an OBSTACLE warning.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were approaching the airport and we were given clearance for a Visual Approach. We were at about 5000 feet roughly 7 miles from the airport. We started a descent to the runway and got a 'terrain' warning on the GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System). Immediately after that we got a 'pull up' alert. It was at night in VFR conditions. We had the runway as well as all surrounding terrain in sight and were well clear of the terrain. We complied with the 'pull up' warning just in case we missed something. I believe our rate of descent may have caused this alarm to go off. At no point were we close enough to any terrain for this to have gone off and at no time was the aircraft in any unsafe situation. After the warning stopped we completed the landing as normal without further issue.




Synopsis: Cessna Citation pilot reported receiving a Ground Proximity Warning while conducting a Visual Approach.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TPA.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B TPA
ATC / advisory: TRACON TPA
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was on a vector to SPG and issued 3;000 to get below traffic at 4;000. Aircraft X descended to 2;000 into an MVA of 2;700. When I noticed the aircraft's altitude I issued a safety alert and instructed them to climb to 3;000. When I asked the Pilot why they descended to 2;000 they responded that's what they thought they were issued.I should have been scanning quicker and noticed the descent through 2;700. At the time of the occurrence I was trying to figure out a few reroutes for overflight traffic. Since Metroplex was implemented ZMA issues over flights VARSE direct destination. This does not comply most of the time with our LOA's with JAX or F11. They should be getting VARSE direct NITTS or VARSE direct OCF. Not having this distraction could have helped me see the issue sooner.




Synopsis: Controller reported descending an aircraft below the MVA; by mistake. Reporter also shared issues relative to the Metroplex changes.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ORD
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the final portion of taxi to the gate; just as the Captain was setting the brakes; I noticed the FWD cargo door light come on. Both engines were running and; in fact; may not have been all the way to full idle as we had used power to move the last couple of feet to the stop position. I immediately called out the light and shut down the right engine. Following complete shutdown I went down to the ramp to check if anyone appeared hurt and; luckily; no one was.




Synopsis: A B737-800 First Officer immediately shut down the right engine when he noted the forward cargo door was being opened by ground crew prior to setting the parking brake and shutting down the engines.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GAF.Airport, ND
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G GAF
ATC / advisory: CTAF GAF
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Winds were 360 at 16 kts. While turning from base to short final to runway 35 during a power-off 180 accuracy approach; I noticed a yellow crop-duster more than halfway down the runway in a takeoff roll coming right at us using runway 17. I instructed the student to perform a go-around and then kindly urged the crop-duster to use the active runway on the radio. In addition to taking off with a 16 knot tailwind he also took off on the opposite runway while two [other aircraft] were in the pattern for runway 35; and did not make any traffic calls.




Synopsis: An instructor pilot saw a crop duster taking of opposite direction on CTAF GAF Runway 17 and so had his student execute a go-around to avoid the aircraft. The winds were 360°/17 kts and three aircraft in the Runway 36 pattern communicating on CTAF frequency. The crop dusting pilot was not communicating.