elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While taking off; rudder pedal movement was very loose for the first 3-4 inches of travel in each direction; then become very stiff/hard. Not a normal feel. Control check on taxi out felt normal. I decided to reject instead of takeoff with possible flight control problems. Light weight; long runway. Reject was begun at approximately 110 KTS without event. Taxied clear; accomplished QRH checklists; and returned to the gate. I felt this was the safest course of action. FO was outstanding in supporting the reject and checklists and radio calls to the Tower during the event.


Second narrative: I believe maintenance found lack of lubrication on pulley and/or cable.


Synopsis: MD-11 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff and returning to the gate for maintenance when the flying pilot noted abnormal rudder control feel.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While level at 7;000 FT; we encountered wake turbulence. We were level at 7;000 FT at a speed of 250 KIAS; approximately 8 miles behind a B757 also level at 7;000 FT. The autopilot was engaged as we encountered the wake turbulence. The aircraft began to roll right reaching a maximum estimated  bank angle of approximately 15 degrees. At some point in the right bank; the stickshaker activated momentarily (less than a second). I disengaged the autopilot and rolled the wings level using ailerons alone; the aircraft responded immediately to aileron input. The entire event lasted about 3 seconds. No parameters or limits were exceeded and no altitude was lost.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 contained no additional information]


Synopsis: A B767-300 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence from a preceding B757 that was eight miles ahead.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MCI.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MCI
ATC / advisory: TRACON MCI
Aircraft component: Flight Director
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Approximately 50 miles from MCI; Center cleared us direct to MAZOU FAF 19L and a descend 8;000 feet. After being handed off to Approach we were cleared to 4;000 feet and shortly after that cleared for the Visual Approach. Auto tune was performed successfully. Approximately 15 nautical miles north east of the airport descending from 4;000 to 2;600 feet and we were cleared for the Visual Approach. We were LNAV with 2;600 feet in altitude select. The First Officer then armed approach and shortly after that the flight guidance captured a false localizer and made an immediate left turn to a southerly heading. The First Officer disengaged the auto pilot and began hand flying the aircraft back on course towards the outer marker. After the autopilot was disconnected I noticed the flight director had dropped off. I was unable to bring the flight director back online until we intercepted the localizer over the outer marker. We discussed that if a normal stable approach was not possible; we would execute a go-around. A normal approach and landing was made. There were no NOTAMs for the ILS approach. Disconnecting automation and hand flying was essential for maintaining safe aircraft operation. In the future I will make a habit of more hand flying and encourage my First Officers to do the same.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported they lost the localizer signal while conducting a Visual Approach to MCI airport.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Reposition flight. Climbing through 15;000 FT MSL in VMC; received Master Warning Light/Chimes and 'L BLEED DUCT' Warning message on ED2. Pilot not flying (First Officer) complied with QRH Procedure which includes descent to 10;000 FT and closure of both engine bleeds. Pilot flying (Captain) contacted Approach and declared emergency; requested 10;000 FT and vectors to handle situation. Upon completion of first QRH procedure; Captain transferred aircraft controls to the First Officer and reviewed QRH procedure; and decided to return to the departure airport. Captain resumed aircraft control and First Officer continued as directed to QRH procedure 'Unpressurized Flight procedure - Packs Off'. ACARS message sent to Dispatcher to alert of diversion. Flight returned to the departure airport; visual approach; normal landing. Parked at gate and called Dispatch and Maintenance Control.


Second narrative: [Report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A CRJ-700 EICAS alerted L BLEED DUCT; an emergency was declared; the QRH procedure accomplished; and the flight returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B BOS
ATC / advisory: TRACON A90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captains leg; ATC cleared us to 2;500 for visual approach to runway 17.  ATC asked if we had field in site; Captain said yes and I agreed.  Told to switch to tower.  FAF altitude was placed in the window.  While tuning tower freq we got a 'terrain; terrain pull up'.  Captain disengaged the autopilot; raised the nose and advanced power.  The warning ceased immediately and the radio altimeter indicated clear of terrain.  Normal landing followed.


Second narrative: While on downwind approach to MHT on descent EGPWS gave Terrain Pull Up command. Pilot flying disconnected the autopilot at which time the EGPWS warning ceased. Normal approach was continued into MHT.


Synopsis: A B757 Flight crew experiences an EGPWS terrain warning at 2;300 feet during a night visual approach to Runway 17 at MHT. The crew was NNW of the field at the time and took evasive action.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About halfway into the flight; the CA (Captain) pulled up the engine page on the EICAS and we both noticed the Number 4 engine was down to 10 quarts of oil. This is odd since we took off with over 15 quarts on all engines. We decided to keep an eye on it. It got down to 8 quarts to where the EICAS turns magenta for quantity. There is no QRH reference for this. We informed Dispatch/[Maintenance Control] and advised if it gets too low we will do a precautionary shutdown. We pulled the power back to idle around that time at 8 quarts. We shut the engine down when it got to 5 quarts and about 3 hours left in the flight.Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] told us to continue to ZZZ and gave us a reanalysis for 1 engine inoperative. We could maintain our speed and altitude without a problem. It cost us about 2 kilograms of fuel with the engine shut down. During the descent we still had about 3 quarts of oil in Number 4 engine so we elected to do a restart via the QRH. We landed in ZZZ on all 4 engines without any problems and no other engine indications. We informed ATC initially after we shut the engine down and never declared an emergency.We need more guidance on engine oil quantity while airborne. How low is too low. When is it safe to do an engine restart. We have zero guidance on this stuff.




Synopsis: B747-400 First Officer reported an engine oil quantity anomaly resulting in a precautionary flight engine shutdown.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We taxied into the ZZZ ramp via [specified taxi entrance]. Taxi speed was slow due to tight turns on the ramp and equipment in the area. We lined up on our spot and were being marshaled in from there. Approximately the last 20 ft. of the taxi into the blocks was relatively slow trying to keep our momentum going while not letting the grabby brakes of the 767-200 bring us to a stop. The Marshaller began to raise wands from his waist as a signal to us that we were approaching our stopping point. The aircraft came up about 5' short because the brakes grabbed. The Captain added some power to get the airplane rolling again for the last few feet until the Marshaller crossed wands for us to stop. I saw the Captain bring the power back; felt the Captain push in the brake pedals and saw him set the parking brake. From there my attention was on watching the shutdown sequence. The Captain noticed we were creeping forward about 2 seconds later; applied manual braking and reset the parking brake which was now in the off position. With the parking brake set and verified; the shutdown sequence was completed along with the final checklists. I watched the parking brake being set; but could have missed that the action 'didn't take'. I will be more aware of the possibility of this while training Captains. I do not feel we coasted ahead more than a foot or so after initially setting the parking brake. There may have been some confusion with the Rampers on the ground if they saw the airplane initially stop and started moving in to chock the airplane while we were adding power to taxi in the last 5 ft.




Synopsis: Check Airman reported that the Captain set the parking brake at the gate; but the aircraft continued to move forward.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: T85.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: IFR flight plan to T85 to conduct an instrument proficiency check for a pilot who owns his own aircraft.The plan was to use the NDB at T85 (Yaokum; TX - radio aid identifier OKT). Houston ARTCC cleared us for the NDB Runway 31 approach.During initiation of approach in VMC I noted the NDB was not transmitting a Morse Code identifier nor were we receiving any course guidance. Houston ARTCC was advised that we suspected that NDB OKT at T85 was out of operation and that we were continuing a simulated NDB approach using GPS under VMC conditions. If this had been in IMC conditions we would have declared a missed and requested radar vectors.After landing I contacted Ft. Worth FSS to see if they had any outage of NDB OKT as we were told it was in operation when we filed our IFR flight plan.FSS said that because it is in an unmonitored status we should only be able to use that NDB if we have radar coverage from Houston ARTCC. This is in conflict with what the Airport Facility Directory says about a radio aid that is unmonitored. Also; if this were true then I believe the approach plate would require radar. It doesn't.I was left with the impression that the Ft. Worth FSS didn't want to take the trouble to report this outage and was blowing smoke up my tail pipe. I am also concerned that Houston ARTCC has taken no action to report the T85 NDB out of service.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported finding the NDB at T85 out of service and advised ATC who still showed it in service.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During my preflight I noticed that the longitudinal trim pointer tip was missing.The longitudinal and aileron trim pointer tips on the MD-80 are tritium-gas filled capsules. Tritium is a radioactive gas that emits electrons while it decays. Those electrons then excite the gas-filled capsule so that it glows as a self-powered gas even in the absence of any direct light source. It is designed that way so that the pilots would be able to trim the airplane in the event of a complete power failure in darkness.Well;the longitudinal trim pointer was missing and maintenance signed off the logbook saying that according to McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin the pointer tip was not required anymore. I accepted the airplane; however; having gotten bogus sign-off's before I promised myself to obtain that bulletin and see for myself. I did and unfortunately; that service bulletin deals with modifications to the internal jack-screw mechanism. There is not one word in the whole bulletin that would give anyone rise to believe that the pointer tips can be missing.I checked the maintenance manual. It actually says that if the pointers are damaged or broken than everybody would have to leave the cockpit as tritium gas is radioactive/toxic and hazmat procedures have to be followed. How do I know that the missing tip is not somewhere lying broken inside the center pedestal? The bulletin gives no relief to fly with missing pointer tips. Why did maintenance sign off the logbook with a reference that does not address the discrepancy? How are pilots supposed to safeguard against bogus sign-off's if we do not have access to the documentation that is being referenced? The pointer tips are not mentioned in our MEL book? Can I now assume that either they are installed or if missing the airplane is not airworthy?




Synopsis: The pilot of a MD-80 questioned the practice of signing off missing trim pointers that appear to contain toxic material.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aligning for the runway I; Captain/PF (Pilot Flying); thought l armed the Auto Throttle. Just as I started to push to power up the PNF/FO (Pilot Not Flying/ First Officer) noted it was not armed. I 'again' armed it at that point. Just after gear retraction we received a rear warning and noted the flight director called for a descent which l ignored as inappropriate. The A/T started to retard the throttles. I overrode and disconnected the A/T. The FO then selected FLCH the FD returned to normal and the A/T was reengaged. It took us a while to determine that l had made the error of pushing the ALT button when intending to push the close by and very similar A/T button. A closer check of the FMA by both crewmembers would have at least caught the A/T mistake.




Synopsis: EMB-175 Captain reported that due to unfamiliarity with aircraft; Captain did not select correct setting for Auto Throttles; causing unanticipated warnings and confusion.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Pilot flying] reduced power to start descent for base leg and full stop landing. He had already made a touch and go landing a few minutes earlier. At about 700 FT prior to base leg he announced he had lost power. CFI told him to turn toward end of runway at once and keep 60 MPH airspeed. CFI advised airport of our loss of power. Touched down short of airport property. Neither pilot had any injuries.




Synopsis: A Taylor Craft BC-12 engine failed at 700 FT turning final so the aircraft was turned directly to the airport; but landed short with no injuries to the pilot or instructor.