elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp LAS
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After arrival landing Runway 19L we were given instructions to proceed eventually Taxiway C enroute to Gate X. After switching to Ramp Control; we were given instructions to enter Spot X to Gate X. However; there was an aircraft outbound toward Spot Y. Taxi light on; still moving; and uncertain clearance in my opinion between two large transport category aircraft if I continued. Ramp came up again to state go to Spot X and enter and 'You can't stop there.' Before I could speak to ramp on be radio suggestion allowing the outbound aircraft to taxi out our outbound Company aircraft just went for it; scooted over to Spot X and went left on C toward [Runway] 26R and begged forgiveness with Ground Control. This never should have been an issue. In every other city we would have been held short of the alley a minute or two; wait for outbound aircraft to clear the alley; then taxi to the gate. And there is even a parallel Taxiway B available if jamming up C at that point is so critical. We try to embrace Ramp Resource Management (RRM) as Pilots. Maybe LAS Ramp Control needs a tutorial on this. And perhaps include LAS ATC if the Ramp Controller is not authorized to hold an inbound aircraft on Taxiway C to allow an outbound to clear. Looks like barrier to Safety for the back C alley in LAS needs some fixing. LAS Ground and Ramp Control should be advised that holding an inbound aircraft for the back alley to allow for outbound aircraft to clear is by far the safer and most stress-free option and will only delay their taxi plan less than a minute.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict at LAS airport with outbound aircraft while taxiing to the gate. Reporter stated that Ramp Control did not hold them short of the alley to wait for traffic to exit the ramp.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Enroute to ZZZ1 we failed to set altimeters to 29.92 when climbing through 18;000 feet. Due to the very high altimeter setting at our departure field; it lead to us inadvertently leveling off 300 feet below our assigned altitude. ATC queried our altimeter setting and we immediately corrected. Inconsistent scheduling and continued ongoing stress from the organization's uncertain future lead to a flight deck environment prime for small errors such as this one.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported not setting the correct altimeter and leveling off below their assigned altitude.
Date: 201604
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E GSO
ATC / advisory: TRACON GSO
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Two parts to this event - Filed IFR flt plan from ZZZ to CLT via Majic1 arrival. Closest STAR available. A/C is GPS WAAS /G and ADS-B equipped. ZZZ tower insisted on describing MAJIC [Intersection] in radial and bearing instead of using [intersection] name. After looking it up; I made no change in flt plan and after TO was turned over to GSO app. VFR and bumpy with light to occasional moderate. As soon as I checked on GSO had a reroute: Direct GANTS V409 LOCAS. This really spiked the workload as I had to look everything up and load into GPS. Bright sun made it hard to see iPad where charts were displayed and turbulence made it difficult to program. Was heads down for several minutes with occasional glimpses outside and trying to fly; communicate and program. Single pilot ops deserve some consideration. Rest of the arrival was uneventful.Later in the week; I had opportunity to speak with ATL ATC rep who said it was likely due to LOA between GSO and CLT. There are several aspects to this that need systemic change. 1. ATC need to move from VHF descriptors to RNAV descriptors if the aircraft files /G. Don't describe intersections in [terms] of VOR and bearing/radials. Much more complex to translate for GPS units.2. If there's a preferred route then let's publicize them and that's what we'll file. It's easier for both ATC and pilots. I've been after the FAA for years to publicize all the LOAs and secret routes - most of them are NOT shown in the AFD - which very few people have anyway. The EFB flight planners can give you an idea but why not go to the source.3. I understand that there will be changes but there was no runway change or convective weather involved.




Synopsis: BE36 pilot reported increased workload resulted when he was cleared on a different route than filed to CLT perhaps due to an LOA between GSO and CLT TRACONS.
Date: 201501
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Altitude
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared to climb and maintain 8900 meters. Captain set 29;100 feet and; backing him up; I looked up the Tables/Codes/Signals page in the FOM and said it should be 29;200 feet. The flying first officer (F/O) said that number seemed to be more accurate as the meters readout showed 8890 with 29;200 set. I then went on break after we passed 18;000 feet. When I got up from my rest break; the Captain informed me that the Chinese controller got excited and said our altitude was off by 100 feet and issued a directive to turn immediately to avoid traffic. Captain said conversion chart he was using came from the ICAO conversion chart. Several questions come to my mind concerning this incident. First; and foremost; why is there a difference between the ICAO chart and our FOM conversion chart? Second; why did the Chinese controller get excited over a 100 feet altitude difference when we have 1000 feet of separation in RVSM airspace? Again; I was in the bunk room during the actual time in question so I can only reflect on the facts as they were relayed to me by the Captain.




Synopsis: B747 First Officer reports being assigned 8900 meters by Chinese ATC. The FOM and an ICAO conversion chart show a 100 foot difference in the meters to feet conversion and the crew choses 29;200 feet. The Controller becomes agitated indicating the flight is 100 meters off the assigned altitude and issues a vector.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LCH.Airport, LA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: SVFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LCH
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was assigned to take a mechanic from LCH to ZZZ. Got weather briefing and knew of convective weather in the area. I called LCH Tower and requested VFR flight following to 2L0 and received taxi instructions to Runway 15. As I began to taxi; I noticed the wind sock standing up straight; facing the west; indicating an approximate 20 KTS crosswind to Runway 15. I asked to taxi to Runway 23 due to wind and was told to stand by. The Controller then stated field was about to go IFR. After a couple of minutes; the Controller said disregard and to taxi to Runway 23. I completed my run up and requested takeoff for Runway 23 with an immediate turn to northeast to avoid precipitation west of airport. The Controller stated field was IFR and I requested SVFR to the northeast. The Controller stated stand by. After a minute or two; the Controller came back and gave an SVFR clearance to the northeast with incorrect phraseology and cleared me for takeoff. Upon takeoff; I went IMC with heavy rain and visibility at less than 1/4 mile. I transitioned to instruments and turned the northeast and cleared weather in approximately 5 minutes and entered VMC conditions and safely finished the flight. I would recommend ATC review this event and the Controller's performance.




Synopsis: General Aviation departure from LCH questioned the performance of ATC with regard to runway assignment based upon wind conditions and SVFR procedures/phraseology.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MUHA.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Airline does not have extended over water capable aircraft. Since start of MUHA/HAV operations we would send aircraft via the ENTRY2 arrival passing through MAXIM waypoint. With explicit instructions to not accept CANOA and not to fly west of MAXIM waypoint. (Beyond 50 NM). Recent policy change requires us to file though the CANOA waypoint which is beyond 50 NM thus our aircraft are unable to. Corporate policy changes causing unsafe flight operations.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported that company routes are not in compliance with FAR limitations for no over-water capable aircraft.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Taking the runway; cleared for takeoff; when the FO (First Officer) called out 'FMC' I got to where I normally check 'NAV armed' and I realized I had never selected a runway in the FMS. We had V speeds and everything looked (almost) normal. I told the FO to select the runway; not thinking this would wipe out our V Speeds. We started the roll; I called '80 knots'; made one last check of the engine instruments and looked up. At this point I noticed the display wasn't right. We were already over 100 kts. So I elected to continue. I knew rotate speed was in the low 160 knot range (turned out it was 162) so I waited and called rotate at 170. FO called out he didn't have a Flight Director. He did a nice job of flying the jet. After some confusion we got PROF selected and the Flight Director was once again active. Causal chain started early. Last flight of trip. FO and I get along well; very comfortable with each other. When doing the numbers; I obviously missed that the FMS didn't have a runway in when I called 'runway'. I was just listening for the correct response from the FO.  Then; taking the runway; I should have stopped the airplane and solved the problem. There was no reason to rush. We could have taxied off the runway if necessary to make sure we had it all squared away. It was complacency on my part that missed the lack of a runway in the FMS. I usually stare right at it when I call 'runway' and obviously I wasn't. I've caught this same mistake in the past. Then when I realized the mistake taking the runway I should have stopped everything and solved the problem as a crew. Biggest set of errors in my career and most dangerous.




Synopsis: MD11 Captain reported failure to properly program FMS prior to takeoff.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Many of our employees working inside the pits are exposed to COVID-19 as everywhere else in the airport is being sanitized except for the aircraft pits. Aircraft came in and no one came to sanitize the pits before; during; or after the flight came and left. Handling baggage; freight and other commodities.




Synopsis: Ground employee expressed concern that the aircraft pits are not being sanitized; potentially exposing workers to COVID-19.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Last month I had [multiple] aircraft that had Nav databases that would expire that evening which were not overnighting at a maintenance station. I called maintenance on both aircraft to inform them. Their reply was 'we'll just placard it.' I had Aircraft X that did not have the upcoming Nav database installed. I checked the routing on the aircraft and it was not going to overnight at a maintenance station prior to expiration of the current database. I called maintenance and pointed this out (2 days notice). I checked and of course the Nav Database is now placarded on Aircraft X. Apparently there is no effort by maintenance to track aircraft that have not had the update and are using the MEL as a tool to defer their workload. I don't think that's the intent of the MEL. This puts additional workload on our flight crews and dispatchers to comply with the MEL along with the possible delay when the issue is initially discovered. There is also lower efficiency of not being able to fly RNAV SIDS and STARS per the MEL as well as engine out procedures and driftdown points that may not be able to be verified. Just what you want to have to deal with on a departure.... get the item placarded; get a new flight plan/re-file from dispatch since you probably have been filed on a RNAV departure and arrival and check that each point on the route has the proper coordinates to match the flight plan or charts.There is also the additional risk of crews not catching the Database is out of date. This is where a message of an upcoming data base change may come in handy.I have to show up for work with my publications current and up to date and I don't think that it's too much to ask of having an aircraft that's up to date as well.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported the company lacked a proactive maintenance procedure to update the aircraft NAV database and relied upon the MEL to operate in a restricted condition.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Booster Pump
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were dispatched with an MEL on the right center fuel pump [inoperative]. Enroute; during weather avoidance we noticed that the left center fuel pump had failed as well. We had about 5;000 LBS in the center tank that we were not going to be able to use. This would have us landing at our destination very low on fuel. We diverted into a nearby regular airport and landed with about 4;000 LBS of usable fuel. Maintenance reset the center pump and we continued to our destination.




Synopsis: Dispatched with the right center tank fuel pump inoperative the flight crew of a B737 opted to divert for maintenance when the left pump failed enroute leaving them with inadequate reserves to continue to destination.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VHHK.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center VHHK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During departure; both I and the pilot flying heard ATC clear us to FL140 and I read back FL140 to ATC. FL140 was set and confirmed in the FMS. Leveling at FL140; ATC stated our clearance was to FL120. They then cleared us to maintain FL140. Either both myself and the Pilot Flying heard FL140 instead of FL120 or ATC cleared us to FL140 when meaning to clear us to FL120. Whether actually cleared to FL140 or FL120 had ATC recognized our read back of a clearance to FL140 when they intended FL120 the situation could have been corrected.




Synopsis: MD11 Captain departing VHHH reports being cleared to FL140 by ATC. Upon leveling  at FL140; he is advised that the clearance was to FL120. Both pilots believe they heard and read back FL140.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Caravan Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: De-Icing Fluid
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: TKS Caravan. TKS system had been run prior during the morning. Aircraft continued to drip all day while parked. While closing up aircraft for departure pilot compressed tail stand and removed it. Upon removing tail stand; it rapidly expanded as normal; however it was full of TKS fluid (Hazmat); from dripping all day; and sprayed substantial amount of TKS fluid in pilot's face. Aircraft drips hazmat constantly on people; from above after being operated.




Synopsis: The latest of a number of similar reports declaring the inability to utilize TKS de-icing systems without flight crew exposure to the hazards of the fluid. In this case the amount of material dripping after use collected in the tail stand which; upon compression to remove it; then decompressed spraying the face of the pilot conducting his preflight.
Date: 201602
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As I was bringing my cart back to the galley; I smelled something burning around row 3. I stowed my cart and called the Captain (CA) immediately to notify him. While on the interphone with him I switched off the coffee jugs because I thought the burning smell was coming from the galley. I also started checking the overhead bin over row 3 but didn't see any smoke. I hung up with the CA; and was getting ready to move the passengers in row 3 further back; that's when I saw a little smoke coming from the seat back pocket of seat 3A. At the same time the man in seat 3B across the aisle could see that the sunlight coming the window was being magnified through a water bottle in the seat 3A seat back pocket burning the seat back pocket. The man in seat 3A closed the window shade and the burning went away. I called the CA back and told him of the outcome.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Flight Attendant reported noticing a burning smell in the cabin that was later traced to a seat back that was ignited by sunlight through a water bottle.