Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Uneventful flight to ZZZ. On final ILS XXR at ZZZ; below 2;500 feet; inside ZZZZZ but prior to ZZZZZ1; LOC and GS Captainured; flaps 20 set; Captain called for leg gear down and disconnected AP and A/T. At this moment; the L HYD SYS PRESS Master Caution Lt illuminated. At first I thought the light was associated with the AP and A/T being disconnected. It took a couple seconds to recognize that it was the HYD pressure light. At this time also we were checking in with  XX_1 r outside ZZZZZ1 and were cleared to land. Very shortly after I accepted the leg clearance; the Captain alerted to Go Around and made the Go Around call to Tower. We accomplished the normal go around procedure and shortly received a LDG GEAR DISAGREE caution as the gear did not retract due to the initial emergency. We repositioned the gear handle to the down position and that caution extinguished. After reaching 3;000 feet and completing the GA procedures; the Captain continued to fly the AC and I accessed the Non Normal procedure through the FM on my EFB. The HYD section has a large index and initially I inadvertently selected the HYD SYS PRESS L and C non-normal and after the first two steps realized we were in the wrong checklist and switched to the HYD SYS PRESS L (only) Checklist. I ran the checklist aloud as the Captain continued to fly. Step 7 instructed not to use auto brakes. When completing the deferred items; the flaps and gear were already in the proper configuration and due to the post Go Around altitude and box pattern vectors; though not unduly rushed; I inadvertently failed to re-run the descent checklist as part of the deferred items; missing the last reminder to not use autobrakes. We did run the deferred landing checklist; and the Captain flew the approach to landing. After touchdown the auto brakes engaged firmly and the Captain immediately moved the speed brake lever slightly fwd to disengage the autobrakes and proceeded to manually brake the AC along with use of the RT engine reverser. We slowed to a gentle stop with approximately 1;500 feet remaining on Runway XXR. Due to the lack of runway steering we remained on the runway; coordinating with ground personnel; and monitored brake temps. After an initial external check by ground personnel; we secured the engines; remaining on APU power for the remainder of the ground ops evolution and tug to our gate.


Second narrative: Communicating with ZZZ approach on the ILS XXR to ZZZ between ZZZZZ and ZZZZ1; with the flaps at 20 and after lowering the landing gear; we received an EICAS message L HYD SYS PRESS. I was Pilot Flying; hand flying with the A/P and A/T off. The First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. At ZZZZZ1 we switched to ZZZ Tower and informed them we would abandon the approach. We were given a northerly heading and a climb to 3;000 [feet]. I decided to abandon the approach using V/S mode as we were at approximately 1;600 feet; and to reduce my workload; engaged the right autopilot. I inadvertently called for 'Gear Up' which did not occur due to the loss of the left system. We realized this error when a 'GEAR DISAGREE' EICAS message appeared and returned the gear handle to the down position. The gear remained down from the prior approach through the eventual landing.I stated the I had the airplane and the radios and directed the First Officer to run the L HYD SYS PRESS non-normal checklist.We also pulled up the status page and noted the loss of quantity from the left system; less than .2 with RF showing.We initially started the L and C HYD SYS PRESS checklist but caught the error when the checklist called for an action regarding the center system.We then proceeded to run the L HYD SYS PRESS checklist; but made an error; missing the 'do not use autobrakes' step. I would eventually select Autobrakes 4 for landing.ATC asked me at this point if I needed the equipment standing by and I declined.Upon completion of the checklist up to deferred items; I [advised] with ATC.ATC asked us which runway we would like; and I inquired about [Runway] XYL. ATC said it would be available as a visual approach. I decided to re-use the ILS to XXR as we were set up for it already; would benefit from the precision guidance at night; and it had an approach light system that [Runway] XYL did not. The length of [Runway] XXR provided our required landing distance; with margin; plus around another 4;000 feet.I sent a brief ACARS message to Dispatch stating I had [advised with ATC] and would be landing in ZZZ. I should have included the nature of the [event] and our need of a tow in the body of the message. Despite being somewhat concerned about the time available as I was stuck in a high drag configuration; I still had enough time to send a more complete message and should have done so- it would have been a few more keystrokes. I also had enough time to re-run the non-normal checklist. Doing so would have caught the autobrake restriction. The First Officer and I discussed this in our debrief.I then briefed the purser using the TEST acronym; advising that we would NOT need to prep the cabin for evac.I do not recall asking for the equipment to be standing by; other than stating we would need to be towed off the runway. The equipment was in fact standing by for us at landing and detected hydraulic fluid that contaminated the runway.ATC had provided a modified box vector for us; and as we were approaching base I exchanged roles with the First Officer and assumed aircraft control as Pilot Flying. I called for the deferred items. Another opportunity exists in the deferred items with a descent checklist step stating the autobrakes should be off. In our debrief; we discussed that the were a number of items in the deferred items checklist that were not applicable to our situation such as alternate gear and flap extension. This may have led to the error and missing the descent checklist step. We committed to running future checklists step-by-step.The flaps 20 approach was uneventful; and I used the autopilot and autothrottle until short final. Approach had given us a discrete frequency for ZZZ Tower and the rescue equipment. At landing; I felt a sensation similar to anti-skid activation and immediately disengaged the autobrakes by slightly advancing the speed brake lever; and came to a stop using the operable reverser and manual braking.ZZZ Fire and Rescue assessed our aircraft and we set up for a tow-in. ZZZ Fire and Rescue noted hydraulic fluid contaminated the runway.We proceeded under tow to gate. At the gate; I discussed the event with Dispatch and the [Chief Pilot].In my debrief with the First Officer; we went through the debrief card. The items that seemed to go well included workload management; automation management; and our planning and decision making. The humbling items that could have gone better would include my monitoring and cross check of the items on the non-normal checklist. In a future event; with time available; one of us will independently re-run the non-normal checklist before committing to the approach. Calling for the gear up as we abandoned the approach was a rote response. With a hydraulic issue on arrival in the terminal area; next time we will maintain the existing configuration unless performance reasons dictate otherwise.Communication with Dispatch should have been more thorough; next time I will spend an extra two minutes to send a more informative message to Dispatch.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reported loss of B hydraulic system caused a go around and a precautionary landing.