elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Takeoff roll was normal. On initial climb at approximately 400 ft. AGL; the engine lost power and started running roughly. Takeoff rpm was approximately 5;300 rpm and engine dropped to about 4;000 rpm. Told Tower that I was having engine problems and needed to land immediately. A landing was made on the intersecting runway without incident or problem. The taxi back to the hangar was normal. I believe that this had something to do with the fuel system; even though the system was sumped with no visible contaminants immediately prior to the flight. The pre-takeoff run-up was normal. The engine ran normally at low rpm on the return to the hangar. Possibilities in my mind were fuel contaminants or possibly carburetor ice. I plan on removing the cowl and checking the fuel lines and then doing a full power run-up for about 5 minutes to see if the condition can be reproduced on the ground.




Synopsis: Pilot reported the engine lost power and began running roughly during initial climb; resulting in an immediate return to landing.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X called for an IFR clearance. I issued the clearance and Aircraft X read back the clearance correctly; then taxied to the run-up area. After approximately 10 minutes; Aircraft Y called ready for taxi. I issued the taxi instructions and passed a VFR chip to the Local Controller. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff without receiving an IFR release because the Local Controller thought that he was VFR. After Aircraft Y tagged up on the radar; the Local Controller realized that Aircraft Y was on an IFR flight plan. The Local Controller then coordinated with TRACON and provided visual separation with the IFR arrival that was on a 3 mile final. I made a simple mistake that I normally would have caught because I was distracted. I was thinking about what I could cut out of my budget or possibly sell in order to make next month's mortgage payment. If it continues much longer; I might have to get a second job. Normally I am very focused at work; but the shutdown has caused me to be increasingly distracted over the past month.




Synopsis: Tower Ground Controller reported incorrect coordination with Local Control that an aircraft on an IFR flight plan was a VFR flight due to being distracted by the government shutdown.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, CT
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After 2 days of long cross country flying; I was on the last day along the Hudson river through the NY special flight rules with Presidential TFR in progress. There was a higher stress/workload due to airspace and active TFR navigation. After flying north the corridor then up near military academy; turned eastward towards destination. Using map I thought I was going to do a water landing at what appeared to be one lake; but after landing decided our navigation was incorrect. I did an immediate takeoff and left the lake. However the lake; not being published on FAA charts; I later found out seaplane ops were prohibited. There was not any safety issue I could see that would consider this unsafe; and I kept visual with boat traffic and people; but was unaware the lake wasn't seaplane approved. There should be a better database of lakes; rivers; waterways that are legal/safe to land that is inclusive.




Synopsis: Pilot reported that due to a Presidential TFR and fatigue; pilot landed on a lake that was not approved for seaplane operations.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: M98.TRACON, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: During cruise while preparing for the arrival and approach briefing; we noticed the localizer frequency for MSP ILS 35 SA CAT I shows 110.3 in the briefing strip; but has 100.95 in the plan view. We could not find any chart revisions in the on board binder to rectify the discrepancy. We verified the correct frequency of 110.95 through ATC and the FMC. Additionally; it should be noted; the localizer frequency for Runway 30L is 110.3. We were in VMC conditions performing a visual approach with ILS backup so it presented no issues; however; this may cause some confusion if a Crew is flying an ILS in IMC.




Synopsis: The flight crew of a B737NG discovered the commercially provided chart for the ILS Rwy 35 SA CAT I at MSP published an erroneous LOC frequency; 110.3; in the briefing portion of the page. The plan view of the approach; however; displays the correct frequency; 110.95. Worth of note; however; is that the identifier; IBMA; is correct in both locations and; thus; an alert flight crew could be expected to note the incorrect identifier had they tuned 110.3 per the briefing text.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HOU.Tower, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 0.25
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B HOU
ATC / advisory: Tower HOU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After performing a CAT III approach it was discovered that the Center Line (CL) lights were NOTAM'd out of service prior to beginning the approach but turned out to be operational during the landing. While descending the current ATIS showed a 200 foot ceiling with 1/4 mile visibility. It also mentioned that the lead-off lights were extra bright. ATC mentioned that other aircraft were making it in; but were reporting the ceiling to be right at minimums. The RVR received from the Tower was well within limits. With the above information we elected to perform a CAT III approach.The Pilot Flying briefed the approach and all checklists were run. The approach was successful having obtained the required visible items between 100 ft. and 200 ft. After exiting the runway a Company aircraft; who was 50 miles away; queried the Tower about the center lights being NOTAM'd out. Tower did state that the NOTAM for the centerline lights had been removed about one minute prior to this other aircraft's call. It was at that point we realized an error had been made by beginning the approach with the CL being OTS (Out of Service); only to have NOTAM technically be cleared during our final approach.Factors I believe that contributed to our mistake. Failed to notice the NOTAM for 'CL OTS'. Absence of the centerline lights being OTS in the ATIS. The ATIS specifically mentioning the lead off lights being 'Extra Bright' led us to believe the centerline lights were functioning as this is one of the components of CAT III approaches. No mention of required runway lighting under the approach review items.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported after successfully landing a CATIII approach the crew discovered the runway centerline lights were NOTAM'd out of service at the time they began their approach but began working by short final.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Turbulence; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on vectors for an ILS approach. When given turn to intercept LOC; ATC informed us that the GS was now Out of Service (OTS) and we were now cleared for the LOC approach instead. In hind sight; at this point I should have discontinued the approach and gone around. This would have allowed my crew to properly brief the LOC approach. I did not do this. Instead; we continued the approach thinking we would be able to easily identify all the step down altitudes. We crossed the first fix at 2;300 feet and then descended all the way to 1;000 feet MDA. By doing this; we missed the 1;640 feet mandatory level-off at the second fix. We broke out of the clouds at 1;200 feet just as we received a low altitude alert from Tower. We were then able to see that we were too low and climbed back up to 1;500 feet; which was now clear of clouds; until we were back on a more appropriate visual glide path.




Synopsis: Glideslope failed during ILS approach. Flight crew converted to LOC only approach procedures; but missed a crossing altitude restriction. Tower received a low altitude alert.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
ATC / advisory: Tower FLL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After verifying fuel and sending the close out; I unlinked the performance data for Runway 10L flex 47 degrees; called for a push clearance performed the engine start and after takeoff checklist. I called ramp and we were cleared to spot 4 and advised to contact Ground; we were then cleared to the departure end of the runway. We then received the close out and performed the taxi checklist; switched over to Tower and were cleared for immediate takeoff referencing landing traffic on a 5 mile final. The Captain (flying pilot) initiated the takeoff from a roll and called flex and after verifying flex had been set I called 'flex set;' prior to eighty knots we got an aural caution and I read the memo takeoff 'thrust not set'; the Captain elected to reject.




Synopsis: A321 First Officer reported the Captain rejected the takeoff when they received a memo 'thrust not set' prior to 80 KTS.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The flight blocked out one minute early and immediately after; the ramp closed for thunderstorms in the area. I personally saw the one minute early on the post flight page while we were sitting; as I used it to base [the] tarmac delay off of. We sat for quite a while before we eventually were able to taxi to the runway. Upon landing; we noticed our 'Out' time had been changed in the company scheduling system to about an hour later; I suspect to keep us legal per 117; as we were literally right down to the minute taking off legally. The Captain called and told Scheduling our proper 'Out' time; and he was contacted at least twice more before the end of the trip by Scheduling to clarify it. Today; I received a phone message (on my day off) from (Name); Manager Flights Operations Crew Scheduling; wanting to discuss this. I do not have anything more to add that I haven't written here or what the Captain discussed with Scheduling. My concerns are that we may have violated CFR 117 due to times in ACARS not being accurate as the original 'Out' time was changed to a later time.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported the aircraft out time in ACARS changed resulting in a possible FAR 117 violation.
Date: 202202
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The difference between this flight and a LOFT is that in a LOFT; we know when it is going to end because there's an end to the SIM availability. In retrospect; this was a case study in additive conditions. Planned at [Allowable Takeoff Gross] minus 100# with a short flight and an alternate. Attempting to accommodate a Jumpseater; HAZMAT; multiple releases; I traded into the leg to help a fellow Pilot. Unusual day; because of incoming weather. The last two days of my trip were pulled; due to cancellations. Requirement to burn fuel; prior to push; ZFW issues; OTP pressures; I was notified; in passing; that there was HAZMAT on the flight; during a conversation with the Operations Agent and Dispatcher about [Allowable Takeoff Gross] and ZFW issues. The amendment to add the HAZMAT was sent via ACARS. After departure; I realized that I had not received a [Dangerous Goods Form]. I seem to remember that the HAZMAT was pulled; but cannot say for certain. If that was the case; then I should have amended the Release to remove the note for HAZMAT. If the HAZMAT was still on; I failed to ensure the [Dangerous Goods Form] was delivered to the cockpit and in the logbook.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported gate departure without the required [dangerous goods form] due to a communication breakdown between flight crew and Dispatcher. The high workload of multiple issues and time pressure at departure time caused the communication issue.
Date: 201410
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Took static discharge while flying through a moderate non-CB rain shower (tops 10;000 ft) on the departure from ZZZZ. Discharge knocked out both Captain forward displays and First Officer outboard display. Captain's forward window heat went inop. Flight deck door power went inop. Status message also showed 'ELEC P300 DISTR CHANNEL'. Autopilot continued to work. Initially monitored autopilot using ISFD with existing map displayed on inboard First Officer Display unit. Reconfigured displays to put reduced PFD and EICAS on First Officer's inboard display and alternated lower display unit halves between CDU / Checklists / Synoptics / Map. Ran all appropriate checklists; unable to restore displays. Pinned cockpit door. Fully engaged both IROs in VVM; communications; and problem solving. [Briefed the] flight attendants; made customer announcements; requested fuel dump area and were provided vector racetrack pattern for fuel dump. Requested vectors to final; uneventful normal ILS and landing. HUDS were operative. Aircraft status can best be summarized by saying that it was a completely normal airplane (except window heat and flight deck door power) behind three dead displays. All other systems functions normal. Multiple logbook discrepancies entered. No overweight landing. No altitude deviations; no deviations from clearance. Fuel dump info transmitted to [ATC] via SATCOM.  [The Check Airman] (Captain) was flying from right seat with IOE Captain in left seat on a pilot monitoring leg. Fuel dump specifics: Dumped approx 50;000 lbs at 9000 feet.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: An airliner suffered the loss of three of four forward displays following a static discharge as it climbed through 10;000 feet after takeoff.  Crew dumped fuel to max landing weight; and returned to their departure airport.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Falcon 10/100
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A Falcon 10 was ready to turn base for ILS. Instead of issuing a right turn I mistakenly said left to 030 heading. The Falcon turned left as instructed an entered a 3;000 FT MVA. I noticed the turn and realized the problem and issued a climb to 4;000 and a right turn to 030 and pointed the Falcon out to adjacent sector. The pilot did a great job of complying with instructions. I need to relearn the difference between my right and left. Or just say fly heading.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a below MVA event when traffic was issued a wrong direction turn to the ILS; the reporter noting a 'fly heading' clearance may have been more applicable in this instance.