elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201602
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Sovereign (C680)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: This concerns an engine failure (C680) close to or on final approach to landing. The Aircraft Operation Manual (AOM) has actions and call outs for an engine failure during takeoff and for a single-engine go-around. Also; there is a QRC for Inflight Engine Shutdown. However; no guidance is provided in the AOM for an engine failure on final. The assumption is we don't use the Cessna emergency/abnormal checklist for an engine failure (QRC should be utilized). My concern is there is no guidance to follow the manufacturer's direction to set flaps to 15; Vapp for speed or any other directive as stated in the Cessna Engine Failure during Final Approach checklist. Pilots who flew the 680 prior to the AOM implementation know this. New transition pilots might not know the information provided in this checklist. The Engine Inoperative Approach QRC assumes the Inflight Engine Shutdown QRC has been completed. This is inadequate in my opinion if the failure is close to the airport. Add a new QRC for Engine Failure Close-in or During Final Approach.




Synopsis: A C680 Captain recommended that his company add a procedure in the QRC for an engine failure on final approach.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On taxi out the Captain and I were concerned that the nose wheel might be behaving differently than it had been on taxi out from previous departure. During the course of the discussion we determined that the difference in sound was due to the much colder weather in Airport ZZZ. At that time; tower cleared us for takeoff; which we accepted. We accomplished the takeoff check; took the runway for departure; and climbed out uneventfully. After notifying the flight attendants that we were above 10;000 feet; one of them called to inform us that we had neglected to inform them that we were ready for takeoff; and one of them had to rush back to her seat to get seated on time. We apologized to the flight attendants; then the Captain and I reviewed the events leading up to takeoff and determined that we had forgotten to accomplish the Before Takeoff checklist; resulting in the failure to notify the flight attendants.Threats include the potential for missing an item on the checklist; which happened; and could have resulted in injury to the flight attendants. Slow down and verify following any anomaly after pushback; but before takeoff.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no aditional information].


Synopsis: A CRJ-700 flight crew; taxiing for takeoff; were distracted by unusual nose gear sounds they determined to be associated with the cold conditions. When they were then cleared for takeoff in advance of arriving at the departure runway they mentally entered the 'takeoff mental mode' and departed without completing the before takeoff checklist and; thus; had failed to advise the flight attendants of their imminent departure. Upon climbing through 10;000 feet the flight attendants called to notify of their incomplete SOP.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FNL.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF FNL; TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on an IFR flight plan Denver Approach did an excellent job of getting me into FNL with very severe weather. A C210 was ahead of me and vectored for the ILS approach 33. As he reported the airport insight Denver cleared him for the Visual and to switch frequencies. Denver gave me vectors to do a right 360 for spacing. I slowed down did a right 360. While doing the 360 I told Approach that I was familiar with the area; had the airport in sight and VFR conditions. Approach released me; closed the flight plan and told me to squawk VFR. I switched over to 122.7 (Unicom for FNL) I announced on final a few times. A Caravan also going to FNL announced he was holding over Boyd Lake for me to land and he would land. I announced short final. I landed. Midway down the runway when I was slowing I met the C210 on the runway in opposite direction. I moved all the way to the left. And the Centurion took the opposite side and exited the runway. I radioed the pilot with no response; I then tried again and the pilot answered and said he had the wrong frequency; he set 122.8.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reports being vectored behind a C210 for the ILS approach to Runway 33 at FNL; then switched to a visual when the field is reported in sight. After a 360 degree turn the right the SR22 pilot is also cleared for the visual approach. During roll out after landing the SR22 pilot reports coming nose to nose with the C210 which had landed in the opposite direction. The C210 pilot was using the wrong CTAF.
Date: 202001
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Our flight was scheduled for approximately six and a half hours from ZZZZ-ZZZZ1. It's been this way for years in fact. And today was indeed a two man crew.  But this flight was about eight and a half hours. This is in light of the Iranian geopolitical situation involving the large; no fly zone across the Middle East.  Now we have an entirely different routing over a different region which goes over Africa instead of traversing from Asia to Europe. So we were scheduled six and a half hours and showed up for an eight a half hour flight; which we didn't realize or expect. We called to confer with with the chief pilot; and the company directed us to go. The company said we were legal because of flight history and 121.471 allows for airspace closure. This is contrary from what I understood. FAR 121 allows a flight normally and reasonably at eight hours to depart if local; daily circumstances have varied to increase flight time over eight hours. This would allow for things like strong winds; significant convective weather; or a TFR Temporary Flight Restriction. None were the case here.   In this case; historical data also wouldn't be relevant since this new routing is over another region-continent; not just a different airway. Furthermore; this particular flight was also VMC with no delays. In fact we also had three ATC shortcuts. And we had a visual approach. The flight was 8:37. This has been the case precedent in decades past with the FAA when airlines mistakenly substituted different aircraft or utilized non great circle routing for any reason; adversely altering a flight schedule with no relief pilot. The eight hour regulation is the reason and intent for having pilot relief over eight hours scheduled - to mitigate fatigue.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported that a flight scheduled for 6.5 hours was planned for 8.5 hours due to a company routing change that has become standard practice in order to avoid a no-fly zone. The flight was dispatched with 2 pilots; however an additional relief pilot was needed.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The SHEAD 7 Departure requires five altitude restrictions on successive waypoints right after departure. The first is at 7;000 MSL; and the second is at 9;000 MSL. I misread the waypoint name and commenced the climb from the 7;000 FT initial level off to the next altitude (9;000) one waypoint early. The Controller noticed it and asked when I was at about 7;700 FT; before clearing me unrestricted to FL190. My mistake; but a SID design that requires aircraft without VNAV to rapidly scan back and forth from closely spaced waypoints during the busy initial climb; fly the airplane and communicate with two ATC sectors; is flawed. In retrospect; I should have requested the McCarran 3; which has a more conventional pilot workload.




Synopsis: A pilot who departed on the LAS SHEAD 7 RNAV without an FMS became very busy so that he transposed waypoints and began a climb to 9;000 FT before passing POPPR.
Date: 201709
Aircraft: B787-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During my outbound trip; noted captain's announcement to cabin regarding his intent to leave the FSB (Fasten Seat Belt) sign on for the entire 9 hours of flight. I mentioned to Purser; 'is this routine for this captain?' Her response; 'yes'. I asked if she's discussed the risks with the captain regarding this practice. She stated; 'no' but was open to me bringing it up with him. I told her that I would consider if the opportunity presented itself. Indeed; the FSB signed remained on for the entire duration of the flight. On the return trip (prior to the captain's rest break); I had a productive conversation regarding this action (with the Purser in attendance). I asked 'why'...; he explained his reasoning was that it created a more 'quiet environment' and made the flight attendant's job easier by not having to perform compliance checks during the flight. I responded that may be true; but what about the safety implications and possible FAR violations? He responded with; 'how so..?' I reviewed the details of FAR 121.311 and stressed that by keeping the sign on for the entire flight he was inadvertently encouraging passengers to disregard and violate a FAR. Additionally; his actions decreased the flight attendant's ability to recognize pending turbulence because the sign being switched on is one of the first signs of pending trouble. In the captain's defense; he was appreciative of my concerns and stated he would consider reevaluating his approach about the use of the FSB sign during flight.




Synopsis: B787 Flight Attendant reported an issue with fasten seat belt sign usage with a particular crew.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I have been informed by a line cargo safety rep; that they have been told (and he has furnished me with an alert bulletin); that if the cargo compartment doors on the airbus fleet are inoperative (Hyd system on MEL; and or unable to open); that they are to open the door manually. This being said; I believe this puts them at danger; and anyone unloading and loading the aircraft in danger; because they do not have access to our AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) and are not qualified on the aircraft. The AMM is clear on what needs to be done (safety measures; such as writing down the time of opening; and also installing hold open locks.) I would request that the company would cease (reconsider) this process; in the best (championing) interest of safety for all employees involved; and also to prevent possible aircraft damage. I have supplied the alert bulletin; as well as the AMM references. Have AMT's open the cargo doors; in case of them not being operative!

Callback: The reporter stated that this is a SAFETY ISSUE. The reporter stated that when the hydraulic system for the cargo doors is inoperative it requires personnel to follow the procedure in the AMM by a qualified mechanic. The reporter also stated that contract Maintenance is called on when the Aircraft is at an off line station to perform this task. When the aircraft is at a maintenance facility and mechanics are available the cargo crew open the cargo door themselves and they are not qualified to do so. The reporter stated that if the Maintenance Manual is not followed precisely the cargo door can fall and cause injury.



Synopsis: A maintenance technician reported that non maintenance personnel are hand pumping open Airbus cargo doors when the hydraulic system for the cargo doors is deferred per the MEL.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On second landing of a landing practice session. No clouds; wind variable (weather station reported wind missing last time I checked on approach); visibility >10 miles.  Normal approach speed (around 65 knots); full flaps; throttle idle.Aircraft floated on flare; held while airspeed was reduced; long float but touchdown before midfield. Landed slightly right of centerline. After the plane set for a moment; I began to apply the brakes to stop in time for taxiway Bravo. When I applied the brakes; the plane shuddered and then yawed to the right suddenly. Attempted to steer the plane back to straight; felt the plane wanting to tip to the left. Arrested the tip to the left; but plane started to enter a ground loop and tip to the right. While attempting to stop the ground loop and continuing to slow the plane with the brakes the aircraft continued to proceed to the right and left the runway. Plane came to a stop when it struck a taxiway light.I believe when I started braking that the plane had not fully settled on to the runway and that I induced a loss of control. I think if I had shut down the engine sooner I may have been able to stop the plane before it impacted the taxiway light. Letting the plane slow more on its own before I applied the brakes likely would have avoided the situation. A contributing factor was the light weight of the plane (I am used to flying with an instructor) and the very calm winds which lead to a high ground speed on landing.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported a long landing and runway excursion due to loss of control under heavy braking.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While departing ZZZ we were cleared up to 7;000 feet and receiving vectors. The First Officer was hand flying and we received a TA alerting us to a crossing aircraft on the arrival that was leveling at 8;000 feet. I told the First Officer I had the traffic in sight; it was no factor and he had already begun leveling off. Due to our light aircraft and high rate of climb an RA was triggered. Since the First Officer was already hand flying and in the process of leveling off we complied with the RA and continued the flight uneventfully.Due to a light aircraft and dense air there was a high rate of climb. The First Officer was hand-flying and slowly leveling off while not busting altitude and triggered an RA.


Second narrative: While departing ZZZ for ZZZ1 we received a TCAS RA.  I; the First Officer; was hand-flying and cleared to 7;000 feet MSL. The Captain called traffic in sight as the system said 'traffic;' so I began to level off; while doing so we received 'monitor vertical speed' which I was already doing. This RA was likely triggered due to our light GTOW and high rate of climb. We continued the flight uneventfully.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported receiving a TCAS RA during departure.  The TCAS RA was reportedly due to the aircraft's high rate of climb as a result of having a light gross takeoff weight.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Second aircraft: B747-400
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working South Local (land 28C depart 22L) west flow (new runway and configuration since Oct 2013); I had numerous Heavy cargo jets landing 28C. A B747 had just passed over Runway 22L; I cleared an EMB135 for takeoff. We have been told that departing 22L we do not need to worry about the wake turbulence from heavy arrivals to 28C; because aircraft will just not rotate prior to or at the point of wake turbulence. I gave clearance to the Citation Excel (ORD departure arriving MDW) to line up and wait. I asked the Citation what was his planned rotation point due to the fact that a Heavy Jet had just landed Runway 28C; his response was 5;000 foot mark; I cleared the Citation for takeoff; and the Citation delayed his departure roll; my best guess is 30 to 45 seconds. I observed the Citation airborne maybe 15-25 FT at Y4 (Y4 is just past the intersection of Runway 28C center line and Runway 22L). I reported a possible wake turbulence error immediately. The amount of time to the wake turbulence may have been 2 minutes. The problem that I see is we have been told that 'Wake turbulence at this intersection is not an issue'; aircraft will rotate past the point of this intersection. And I have no guarantees that any aircraft will not rotate prior to this intersection. My thought was to ask the pilot where his planned rotation point would be and if that gave me a reasonable assurance that wake turbulence was no factor then I would proceed as instructed by the designers of this operation. I was aware of the fact that it is approximately 2;900 FT to this intersection; and have seen many aircraft rotate in less distance; commercial and private Aircraft. I once worked a B747 that rotated in less than 2;500 FT and was at 5;000 FT 2 miles west of the field. I have seen B757s on test flights do the same. Recommendation; I am not sure with all the planning that has gone into this new runway configuration there is not a good remedy for this; other than waiting the required 2 minutes for 22L departures that may rotate prior to this intersection.




Synopsis: ORD Controller voiced concern regarding a facility policy that indicates 'Wake Turbulence' is not a factor during the west flow operation because of expected rotation locations.