Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VIDP.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: TRACON VIDP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a last minute change from the ACARS PDC (an OBDAG RNAV departure from Runway 10); clearance verbally assigned us the UXABA RNAV departure off of Runway 11. This is what the Captain entered in the FMS; what we cross-checked; and what we flew. We were assigned an initial altitude of 2;600 FT; which is an altitude not normally associated with that published RNAV departure; per se. It was after climbout that we realized that we might have made a mistake on our departure. ATIS stated that 'Mixed Mode Operations' were in effect and; as one can see on the Jeppesen 10-3 page; there is a procedure for initial climb during 'mixed mode operations.' For Runway 11; it is to 'climb to 1;500 FT; turn right; 150 heading; climbing to 2;600 FT; further with radar.' The combination of our seemingly non-standard; initial departure altitude of 2;600 FT and the ATIS note 'Mixed Mode Operations' worried us. It is my opinion that we flew the correct departure but I believe it is ambiguous; at best. We were never notified of a route deviation by any controlling agency; nor were we ever giving a radar heading by ATC; which we should have gotten if we were expected to fly the 'Mixed Mode Operation' departure with 'further with radar' as part of the procedure. As well; in none of the many contacts with clearance (after they changed our departure 2 minutes prior to push back) did they make mention of the UXABA RNAV departure being modified by the ATIS note. I believe this event was caused by three things: First; a heavy workload (i.e. the change of our digital PDC 2 minutes prior to push and to something completely unexpected) caused us to drop the ATIS 'Mixed Mode' note out of our scan. Next; we failed to cross-check this ATIS note with departure to see if; in fact; this ATIS note in any way superseded/modified our clearance or if departure wanted/expected us to fly the SID as published. And finally; an ambiguity in the VIDP departure pages; in that it does not explicitly state something to the effect that 'any time Mixed Mode Operations are in effect; the clearance-assigned SID will be modified accordingly.' VIDP clearance certainly did not say anything to this effect.This type of event is; unfortunately; always possible at VIDP. ATC there presents many challenges and I cannot say for certain that even if we HAD cross-checked this ATIS note with clearance; that they would have been able to state their intentions for us clearly. That however is a long-term problem which VIDP ATC can only fix with modernization and a major mindset shift. In the immediate term; we should contact VIDP ATC regarding this issue and send an [operational bulletin] to VIDP operating crews confirming the expectations of VIDP ATC in this exact situation.


Second narrative: ...I did fail to slow the climb rate to 1;500 FPM out of 6;000; I spent a significant amount of time preparing for this flight the day prior to the flight. This included reading through all applicable Delhi charts; India regulations; Air Carrier briefing guide and taking notes for reference. Delhi is one of the most challenging airports we operate through; and I take my time to make sure to prepare. We requested a DCL 20 minutes prior to departure; and about 10 minutes later received the clearance we expected for Runway 10. I took my time briefing the departure and taxi route; noted that the mixed mode operations were in progress; but that for our departure on that runway it was the same initial climb as the SID. When we called for push at or close to scheduled push; we were given a runway and SID change. The new clearance was depart Runway 11 UXABA; manor transition. We delayed the push about 8 minutes while we changed the runway in the FMS and loaded and briefed the new departure. I took care not to rush. Somehow in my mind; perhaps because the previous departure clearance did not require any changes for the initial climb for mixed mode operations; I didn't connect that we needed to look at it again. I just forgot. I also failed to brief the reduced climb rate prior to level-off. No excuse; I just didn't remember; and Departure told us to reduce the climb rate. That was the only unusual communication from Departure Control. As previously stated; Delhi is one of the most challenging airports we go to. The huge amount of information we have to comb through includes: out of control NOTAMs; 21 pages of Jeppesen 10-1 briefing guides; and a separate company briefing guide that has spotty information; some of which is not completely up to date. It's easy to miss something. A well-written and updated company briefing guide would go a long way to reducing the preflight workload in dealing with all the non-standard procedures and potential traps. Things I made sure to brief included: special transponder and TCAS procedures; making the correct pre departure calls as presented in the manuals; FIR comm issues (we were going through Karachi and Teheran FIR's); taxi issues and hot spots; language issues; and finally I briefed that we needed to clear up any ambiguities or questions immediately. What it comes down to is that there is a lot of chaff. Prioritizing information is key to operating in challenging environments like India. Information overload is absolutely a factor here; and managing it better is the answer.


Synopsis: The flight crew of a commercial transport aircraft was given a revised runway and RNAV SID with their taxi clearance at VIDP. During the hurried attempt to reprogram the changes while taxiing for takeoff they failed to re-consult the separate departure chart detailing 'INITIAL CLIMB PROCEDURES DURING MIXED MODE OPERATION' which specifies: a different first turn altitude; a different heading to which to turn; a different altitude to which to climb following the turn; and the directive to expect '...further with radar.' They also advised they failed to comply with a directive to limit rate of climb to 1;500 FPM.