elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A310
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff; received a Number 2 Engine Bleed Leak.  Complied with QRH.  On approach approximately 5;000 feet; ECAM notified us of the Lower Access Panels being open.   We both thought that the bleed leak could be related to the panel light.  Perhaps a fire.  We declared an emergency just to be safe.  Completed all checklists and landed uneventfully.  Came to a stop on the runway where the fire trucks were waiting for us.  We shut down the second engine and they inspected us for any fire.  After they confirmed we were not on fire; we taxied to the gate.    After we exited the aircraft; we checked the access panels and found the handle was dislodged and open; where it should have been flat and stowed.I think the bleed leak and the panel were two separate things and don't relate to each other.  No way to really prevent it.


Second narrative: [This report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: An A310 number two engine BLEED LEAK ECAM alerted; so they complied with the checklist; declared an emergency; and returned to landing. During the return; a LOWER ACCESS panel door light ECAM alerted; but the crew determined after landing the two ECAMs were not related.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Parked
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I carefully briefed the 1st flight attendant that passengers were not allowed back on the aircraft once they had gotten off and gone up the jet way. As I completed my post flight duties; I returned to the flight deck to gather my belonging. I glanced up to see a female passenger walk back on the aircraft. The 1st FA let her back on the aircraft without saying anything.I spoke out the door and told the 1st something to the effect to stop the passenger she was not allowed back on the aircraft. The 1st said oh she just left a bag and then it seemed to sink in with her. She said oh yeah you briefed my on that. I forgot.The flight attendants do not want any conflict with passengers. So they are constantly just ignoring numerous company procedures and F.A.R.s. We are still getting a lot of we do not do it that way attitude.There are a lot of ways the company could reinforce some of these procedures. Memos; training; ground school modules. But when the FA group gets away with paying people to do their ground school. A ground school section probably would be useless anyway.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported a flight attendant allowed a passenger who had deplaned back onto the aircraft.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was left seat Captain pilot flying an IOE segment. Right seat was a LCA. Jumpseat was a company FAA rep for my line observation. Auto throttles were deferred INOP for flight. Weather VMC at destination. On downwind/base at approximately 3000 feet began to configure to Flaps 1. Observed no movement of leading edge devices with flap needles split. No associated roll. Asked ATC for vectors to holding pattern. When established; transferred plane to LCA. Ran checklist with FAA jumpseater and configured for flaps up landing. Landed uneventfully and taxied to gate. Made logbook entry; briefed maintenance and outbound crew.


Second narrative: I was Line Check Airman flying as First Officer and Pilot Monitoring (PM). Upgrading Captain was Pilot Flying. Jumpseat was occupied by a company Quality Control Line Check Airman (QCLCA) accomplishing an FAA Captain Observation. Auto-throttles were placarded INOP and was a threat to this flight. Weather was night VMC. On downwind and at 3000 feet PF asked for and I selected Flaps 1. Observed trailing edge flap needles were split and less than Flaps 1 with LE devices remaining up. There was no associated roll with this configuration. Obtained holding clearance from approach control. I became the Pilot Flying while the upgrading Captain and QCLCA accomplished the appropriate checklists. Control of the aircraft was transferred back and the Upgrading Captain accomplished an uneventful flaps up landing. Taxied to the gate.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew experienced a split trailing edge indication and leading edge flaps remaining up when flaps 1 are selected during approach. QRH procedures are complied with resulting in a flaps up landing.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: Tower TEB
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: While on the ILS Runway 19 TEB we were established on the localizer inside of TUGGZ and were cleared for the ILS approach. We were level at 2;000 feet with the autopilot engaged. As the glideslope captured the aircraft made an abrupt climb. A correction was made to prevent continued climb on the glideslope and the aircraft followed a visual path backed up by the localizer. The climbing action was sudden and unexpected. We queried the Controller on the unexpected deviation in the glideslope and explained what had occurred. Further reading on this subject reveals that it is a known problem at Teterboro and is well known by the Teterboro users group. I feel given the severity of glideslope deviation and the high likely hood of occurrence that this needs to be addressed.




Synopsis: Medium transport Captain reported that during final ILS Runway 19 approach to TEB and established on the localizer with autopilot engaged the aircraft pitched up unexpectedly. Captain stated this is a known problem at this location by the airport community.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Aircraft component: Position Computing System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After engine start and starting to taxi we had a red Flight Director FD box and red MAG on the captain side. We pulled off to the runup area before runway XY. The captain called maintenance and they advised to shut down completely and restart. After doing that all annunciations were clear and we taxied to the runway. No issues during initial takeoff and climb out. During the continued climb the Captain's SDU went black for a few min and then came back on. After that it went out again and my Status Display Unit (SDU)went black and started back up again. The left SDU seemed to stay black and the right side was continuing to go on and off. We decided to return back to ZZZ with the unreliable SDUs and unknown if the issue with the MAG on the left side would return. We asked ATC to return. When sent back to Approach they asked for souls and fuel on board. No issues on the return back; landing was normal.


Second narrative: During taxi we had a red MAG and FD flag on the pilot side PFD and Navigational Display. After contacting maintenance they advised a complete shutdown and reset. After restarting the aircraft no flags were present and everything functioned normally. During climbout; the Pilot side Status Display Unit (SDU) failed. The SDU would function briefly; then fail again. As we were discussing returning to ZZZ; the co-pilot side SDU began to do the same thing. We advised ATC that we had an instrument malfunction and needed to return to PIT and that we did not need further assistance at this time. They asked if we were declaring an emergency and we said no. ATC did provide excellent service from the Center controller all the way to the Tower; asking us occasionally if we needed any additional help. We told them no each time; but did thank them after landing.


Synopsis: BE-400 Flight Crew reported an Status Data Unit error message followed by intermittent PFD and Navigational Display failures on both the Captain and First Officer's displays.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: ZZZ: Departed from runway XXL. On the approach into ZZZ1 RNP X RWY XX; PF (Pilot Flying) called for gear down; flaps 20. Immediately PM (Pilot Monitoring) extended the gear lever there was a warning horn and right body gear disagreed alert followed by an EICAS message 'Equipment Cooling'; the second time message showed up during the flight. At 1;000 feet both pilots called for 'Go Around'. PF requested for vector from ATC for an immediate landing ILS runway XX. PM worked the QRH read the gear disagreed checklist. Equipment Cooling non-normal checklist was completed earlier during cruise. The message went away both times. Please note there are lots of write ups on A/C X. (LE Flaps; Outflow Valve; Thrust Reverser; W&B Indication System; Cockpit Smoke Vision; Equipment Cooling; ATC failure & Landing Gear Config warning.). These were all the numerous write ups on the aircraft from our flight and previous flights. I suggested the Aircraft should be AOG with immediate effect and the above listed malfunctions should be rectified prior to the aircraft being released for operations. This is a classic example of chains of error; that should be broken before leading to an incident or accident. Thank you.




Synopsis: First Officer reported two EICAS messages on final; causing a go around to allow time to run the QRH; landing safely on next approach.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were prepared for a departure from SFO on Runway 28L. As we were holding short of 28L we were given clearance to cross 28L and line up on Runway 28R. The First Officer put in the changes to the box and briefed me on the new V-speeds. They were roughly the same as the numbers for 28L and I specifically remember that V2 was 140 KTS. As we turned onto 28R I looked down at my PFD and saw V-speeds. I also asked him if he was ready and he said yes. When we were cleared for takeoff; I advanced the throttles to the MAN/FLEX detent. As we began rolling; we got a Master Caution with a 'ding.' I assumed that the flex number had dropped out of the FMC so I advanced the throttles to TOGA to continue the takeoff. We were light and there was quite a bit of wind so the airspeed jumped up and we accelerated very quickly. I was waiting for the V1 call when the First Officer announced that we had no V-speeds displayed on the PFD. At that point we were approaching 160 KTS which I knew was well above V2. I felt it was safe to continue the takeoff and that it was a better decision than to abort at a speed well above V1. I believe that the First Officer changed the runway correctly prior to entering 28L but either hit the wrong button or didn't push hard enough for the runway insertion to take. As we started the takeoff I believe he inserted the change and that's when the speeds dropped off the airspeed tape. By that time I was completely outside and the 'ding' distracted me from my FMA check. I just went to TOGA and thought everything was normal except for the lack of a flex temp.




Synopsis: When an A320's throttles were set to MAN/FLEX; a Master Caution and 'DING' alerted but the Captain continued the takeoff after the FMC dropped the V speeds because the First Officer did not fully finish the runway change input from SFO 28L to 28R.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: There seems to be confusion and/or a grey area on when an Out of Service (OTS) Work-package is expected to be generated. A B767-300 aircraft arrived at ZZZ on Day X; November 2014 and assigned overnight Periodic Service (PS). PS released the following day (Day Y). On Day Z (one day later) aircraft item generated with Hydraulic leak.  Aircraft [again] was OTS early evening and Returned to Service (RTS) early the following morning. There was no OTS Work Package generated; it appears it might have been necessary.Reference in Procedures Manual (PM): PM XX-1.B: that all aircraft that cannot be assigned a trip must be 'OTS' until corrected. PM YY-K.2.c; seems to imply all OTS events require a Bill of Work (BOW) Work package.PM YY-1.G.1 indicates only one BOW; either OTS or Scheduled Check. PM ZZ-1.G.7. states all OTS Work Packages need Release (Can't find where all OTS do not require BOW OTS Work Package)Spoke with Quality Assurance (Q/A) Manager; who provided several instances when the BOW/Work Package is definitely required (as this one per PM BB-3.A.4; I believe; indicates was required to have an OTS package; which it did not have). He also stated that every OTS event does not require an OTS Work Package.I believe having multiple sets of expectations; based upon unknown variables at that time; sets up Maintenance to fail; and will produce predictable non-compliances; like in this instance. I asked five Lead Mechanics and not one could definitely say whether and when a BOW/OTS Work Package is required; even after reviewing the Procedures Manual (PM).  Set a simple; clear AND consistent procedure for when the OTS Work-Package will be issued. [Recommend] in the absence of a scheduled check that ALL 'aircraft that are disabled which cannot be assigned a trip' (verbiage excerpted from PM XX-1.B.) require an OTS BOW and Work Package regardless of expected OTS duration. Dayshift. Gate location.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports there seems to be confusion about when a Bill of Work (BOW) and an Out of Service (OTS) Work-package should be generated for aircraft that are disabled; cannot be assigned a trip and do not have a scheduled Check. AMT references several of their Air Carrier Procedural Manual (PM) Chapters that support the BOW/ OTS Work-package requirement and the Non-compliance that resulted from not being issued.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Left traffic for Runway XX at ZZZ; I was cleared to land #2 behind a Cherokee who was in right traffic and who I had in sight. I heard another aircaft get cleared to land; same runway; #3 behind me. I continued my pattern and observed the Cherokee land ahead of me. Just before my touchdown on Runway XX (15-20 feet over the numbers) another Cessna came into view and overtook me from above as if to land on the same runway at the same time. I landed the airplane and applied the brakes. The other airplane was instructed by Tower to go-around and did so prior to its touchdown.  I think the Cessna; #3 behind me; may have also followed the Cherokee but thought it was me. I had to extend my downwind leg to give sufficient spacing for the Cherokee because its downwind leg was longer than expected. If TCAS had been installed in either aircraft; this problem may have been avoided.




Synopsis: Cessna 172 pilot reported a critical ground conflict during landing with an overflying aircraft attempting to land on same runway.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZOB
ATC / advisory: Center ZOB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I had Air Carrier X climbing to FL270 due to traffic. He was requesting FL290 and I had interim FL270 in the data block. I had some other traffic situations such as other DTW climbers and a BUF inbound along with a DTW inbound that was head on with the DTW climber and the BUF inbound. The DTW inbound had to get down through the DTW departure and the BUF inbound had to get down through the DTW departure also. The BUF inbound had to be stepped down on top of the DTW inbound and I had more than one aircraft on vectors in order to make all of these things happen to get the aircraft climbing and descending and on there way where they needed to go. During all of this; Air Carrier X was approaching the boundary of the DKK sector and I still had the aircraft with an interim altitude of FL270 in the data block requesting FL290. I then noticed that the handoff on Air Carrier X had already been accepted by the next sector. I presumed that the handoff was taken by the DKK Sector. I later found out that the aircraft had auto-handed off to the wrong sector; but I did not see this. The WRN Sector who owns FL280 and above had the handoff. I went to switch Air Carrier X to DKK and right then I noticed that someone had taken the interim altitude out of the data block. I did not climb the aircraft; I just switched him to the sector that I thought had the handoff. I switched him to the DKK Sector. I later found out that they did not have the handoff and of course they did not get a point out. The fact is that the aircraft auto-handed off to the wrong sector and I didn't catch it. This is not the first time I have seen this; the other times I noticed it and made the appropriate calls to coordinate. I believe; if the auto-handoff feature was able to recognize if there is an interim altitude in the data block and hand the aircraft off to the correct sector; this problem would be avoided.




Synopsis: ZOB Controller experienced an airspace incursion when failing to recognize that the automated handoff was initiated to the wrong sector; the reporter recommending auto handoff modifications.