elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Had the planned route in the FMS. When I received the CPDLC I missed the new route. I had reviewed several routes via the weather application. The route looked familiar and I didn't notice the route change.I have not flown in 5 months. Flight Attendants checked in while I was checking the clearance via CPDLC.The ability to print CPDLC on the ACARS would have trapped my error.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported a track heading deviation during climbout.  Pilot cited distraction and lack of flying as a contributing factors.
Date: 201502
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Denver was a wintry mess. It was -11 degrees and fine crystalline snow was both falling and blowing around. Braking action and visibility were both variable and poor. When we pushed back; we were told which departure runway to expect and we briefed the performance and routing for that runway and proceeded to the J Pad deicing area. The deicing area is comprised of two deicing areas sandwiched by three taxiways and bordered by four unimproved areas. The taxiways are defined by painted lines and flush green line centerline lights which were mostly obscured by snow. As our deicing was wrapping up; we were told by Ground that we would depart from a different runway. This is a classic 'out of the Green' scenario requiring new performance calculations and route planning. Because of obscuration; there was no visible way to distinguish the boundaries of the ramp areas versus the designated taxiways other than clear ways between deice trucks and aircraft and tire tracks which were all over the place. Because the Denver Airport is so physically huge and complicated; its taxi chart details are tiny and vast. I had a reasonable idea of where I needed to go; but no way to verify that it was correct. Trying to figure out how to manage risks with resources; I came to the conclusion that I needed to turn on the Own Ship display feature on the EFB. It was a godsend. It allowed me to verify where I needed to go rather than guess and; when we came upon a patch where we could briefly see the green centerline lights; they verified that we were exactly where we were supposed to be. I can't tell you how reassuring and helpful that was.  I know that we are not supposed to use the Own Ship feature; but in this particular situation it would have been a violation of Captain's [SOP; CRM;] and common sense responsibilities not to.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported using his EFB for taxi orientation on a snowy day in DEN; even though it was against company procedure to do so.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: It was brought to my attention today; that; I was involved in an engine change; and there was a question about certain steps that I accomplished. The work card in question was 71-XX-XX and it was step 11b. that stated to put a do-not -operate tag on the alternate flap control switch. On that day; I used a C/B (Circuit Breakers) do not operate tag; and attached it to switch with yellow tape. I also put a large yellow Do Not operate tag on the pedestal. The next item that was brought to my attention; was whether or not I properly filled out the pulled CB tags in the lower E&E. I recall putting the job card number and job description for the reason on the tag. I hope this clarifies all the questions.




Synopsis: Technician reported confusion over the correct completion of Do Not Operate tags installed on the aircraft during an engine change.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Electrical Wiring & Connectors
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was on the second break around 4 hours into the flight when awakened by the Number 1 FA and told that the cockpit had a problem and wanted me up there. I entered the cockpit and smelled a heavy electrical odor but no smoke. We donned our O2 masks; completed the checklists for Smoke; Fire or Fumes and Smoke or Fumes Removal. We were around 320 NM north of a suitable diversion airport; so we declared an emergency with Center and diverted there. Weather was VFR and we landed without further incident.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reports being awakened during his break on a flight to South America and informed of electrical fumes in the cockpit. No source is discovered and the Captain elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: During pre-planning phase of release Dispatch system recommended NO ALTERNATE for flight. This recommendation was in spite of the weather forecast of winds gusting to 33 KTS. The runway configuration Runway XX L/R and YY puts a 29 KT crosswind for Runway XX. [The arrival airport] is in ground delay program for this reason and has a high potential of staying in a ground delay program for a while. Dispatcher caught weather and added destination of ZZZ1. This crosswind configuration also was the limit of the company prescribed operational limitation for this fleet of aircraft (29G35 KTS) A319/320/321 PH 1.3.1 operational limits. Cause; Dispatch system does not factor in considerations for alternate and does not assist in computing fuel as required by FAR 121.647. It does not factor in the operational limits of company fleets and the overall weather picture.  System provides multiple messages in a condensed time period to provide distractions to the Dispatcher's primary duties of operational control and safe monitoring of company flights. System provides false information and has a high potential of causing at minimum departure delays for adding alternates and fuel if caught by flight crew and Dispatcher. System provides high potential of causing illegal flights if not caught and could be a major contributing factor of illegal or delayed flights. This automation is distracting and goes against the Safety Management System (SMS) and Threat Error Management (TEM) models of the SMS and provides additional safety barriers at a time when the company is trying to reduce them. Suggestions; remove this system: This is a hindrance to the professionalism; experience and judgment of the Dispatch group. This system also provides many barriers to safe operation including multiple and conflicting messages over a condensed time period. This system is also activated at a time when the company is closing dispatch desks providing already increased workload. System also provides multiple NOT RECOMMENDED messages AFTER Dispatch release is calculated increasing message traffic and possibility of errors/conflicting information. Dispatch system uses inaccurate and potentially illegal information to base the recommendation.




Synopsis: Dispatcher voiced concern regarding the functionalities of the current decision making tool providing a number of examples of the limits encountered.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Overdue aircraft that did not receive timely attention; a BE55/A flight plan showed up as overdue in CCLD (Core Capability Limited Deployment); and was highlighted in SAA as it should be. ZME checked back to ZTL to find out the status; ZTL MGM-L seemed unconcerned because it was 'not showing overdue in' their 'system'; the aircraft's flight plan was already estimated to have progressed through ZTL airspace and entered ZME. That's why it no longer showed overdue on their CCLD; they missed their opportunity to take action when it was overdue in their airspace. ZME reiterated the need to find the aircraft. Almost two hours later; we finally received word that the aircraft was on the ground. Evidently the flight plan had slowly progressed Puerto Rico; the Gulf; Florida and the Mid South states before anyone took action. During this time there was much severe weather along the aircraft's projected route of flight; it seems he could have easily crashed without anyone looking for him. A critical first step to caring for someone under your responsibility is to recognize when they are not there. Although CCLD has exhibited shortcomings; it does a rather good job of highlighting overdue aircraft; competent controllers must take effective measures when that notification is made. Once the situation is known; the flight plan must be amended or removed to reflect the situation appropriately. There is no room for apathy in our Agency.




Synopsis: ZME Controller voiced concern regarding a possible missing aircraft and the lack of efforts made to locate the aircraft.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: R46 called me for a point out; I didn't catch the call sign or even where the point out was located.  I asked 'Point out on who?' and then he gave his initials and hung up.  I then called D46 and asked them who was it that their R-Side was pointing out.  The Controller then gave me the point out; I said 'no display'.  The Controller then proceeded to PVD the aircraft on our scope.  In the background; I hear the Controller's R-Side state that I said point out approve already.  When the aircraft was finally on my scope; he was already out of 17;500 FT and still within our airspace.  I then approved the point out.  When making phone calls; listen to what the controller is saying; not what you think they're saying.  It also seemed that the aircraft was climbing prior to the initial point out.  So not to do reverse coordination.


Second narrative: Aircraft X was climbing out of MIA approach airspace.  The aircraft was being work by Sector 46.  Evidently the aircraft was issued a climb prior to the point out being made.  At the time the point out was made; the aircraft was already in Sector 21 airspace climbing out of 17;500 FT without a PVD or a point out made.  The point out was made when Aircraft X was at the FLL255005 but not in a timely manner.  Recommendation; review the point out procedures.


Synopsis: ZMA Controller described an airspace incursion event listing human factor failures as the reason for the occurrence.
Date: 202005
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I understand trying to keep people safe though COVID-19. Has the company looked into the health effects of having employees and customers wear masks for long periods of times including long hours on aircrafts and working in public? Someone would be breathing in their own CO2 for extended periods of time that the body isn't really able to handle. This could drop O2 levels along with other side effects. If someone is practicing social distancing why would they need a mask too. We could be doing harm with this policy even though the company takes advice from CDC and WHO.




Synopsis: Ground employee raised concerns with the health effects of people wearing a COVID-19 type mask for long durations of time.
Date: 201309
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our pre-flight the Captain advised us that it may be bumpy going in to our destination and that he may have us sit down and then just ding us at 10;000. I explained that although the company and its pilots have been using this as standard practice to give customers more time to use the onboard WiFi that it was in violation of both company (manual) policy as well as a violation of two FARs. I thought that we had the situation under control until we hit the bumps and the Captain told us that he was sitting us down but the customers could continue to use all electronic devices. We only have a secure cabin or an unsecure cabin. Our flight landed unsecure. The customers had tray tables back down and all electronics on. Had an evacuation happened; customers would have wasted great amounts of time trying to get around all the laptops and other electronic devices.




Synopsis: A flight attendant reported that the company and its pilots are colluding to seat flight attendants early when turbulence is expected on landing but allow passengers to continue using onboard WiFi until descending through 10;000 MSL. Flight attendants thus are precluded from making their pre-landing checks of passenger compliance with safety regulations. The reporter believes the result is aircraft landing unsecured as passengers continue to utilize electronic devices and leave tray tables down; contrary to regulations.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Air Carrier X was handed off to me southbound at 310; I had control to climb via LOA reference Sector 68 traffic shown to me. I observed pertinent crossing overflight traffic; Air Carrier Y; westbound at 340; and climbed Air Carrier X to 330. Subsequently; Sector 68 descended Air Carrier Y to 320. Conflict Alert went off too late for any vector/altitude resolution. The closest point was 800 FT and 3.8 miles. It would be good practice for Sector 68 to hold onto ocean departures when we are on the PSX playbook until they are clear of the overflight traffic. There is a lot of Data Block overlap.


Second narrative: Air Carrier X south eastbound was cleared to climb and maintain FL310 and Air Carrier Y was westbound level at FL340 converging. Air Carrier X was handed off to Sector 79 and given the appropriate frequency. The Controller on 79 was aware of another aircraft in the area level at FL340 and cleared Air Carrier X to climb and maintain FL330. Air Carrier Y was getting a rough ride and requested a lower altitude. Air Carrier Y was then cleared to descend and maintain FL320. Shortly after; Conflict Alert went off. Air Carrier Y was instructed to turn thirty degrees left immediately and expedite descent to FL320 and report reaching. Separation was lost before Air Carrier Y was level at FL320. Complexity might have played an issue because weather in the area was forcing reroutes to nearly every aircraft.


Synopsis: Enroute Controller experienced a loss of separation during multiple play book re-route procedures; the reports listing weather; non-familiar routing's; Data Block overlap; traffic complexity/volume as causal factors.
Date: 201408
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: In both cases the Tower Controller issued a 'Windshear Alert; loss of 20 knots at departure end' type alert. One happened when we were in position on the runway awaiting takeoff clearance; the other while taxiing out nearing the approach end of the runway. Both Captains were very senior (20 years or more with the Company).  One suggested we would be OK as long as we did a precautionary windshear takeoff profile. The other Captain appeared to not be worried about the windshear alert. Both Captains agreed to delay the departure once I stated that I was not comfortable with the conditions. For the record; on both occasions we had pushed early and on-time pressures were not a factor; any more than they are for every flight. I think Flight Operations needs to re-emphasize that the key to handling windshear situations is AVOIDANCE. The Precautionary Takeoff Profile is not intended to be used to allow you to take off during an active windshear alert; but rather should be used when conditions MAY produce windshear. I think some of our senior Pilots are so comfortable with the B737 that they think they can handle anything thrown their way. When you combine that with our famous attitude; rush-rush default mode that many senior pilots learned at the Company; you set yourself up for trouble. At an old airline I used to work for; the FOM prohibited takeoffs and landings when thunderstorms were within five miles of the airport boundary. That's probably a bit excessive; but so is taking off during an active windshear alert.




Synopsis: First Officer voices objection to the intent of two senior Captains to takeoff with a reported windshear alert. The takeoff is delayed.