elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Get vectors in terminal area for [SFO] ILS 28L; told we are following B747. Captain said to stay a dot high on glideslope (GS) to avoid wake. I; pilot flying; agreed. As we started intermediate descent from about 6;000 FT to 5;000 FT we encountered moderate turbulence with rolling tendencies. Without hesitation I disengaged autopilot (AP); as I correctly interpreted encountering the 747's wake. Told the Captain (pilot not flying) that I was going to hand fly. He said no problem. A final vector/heading we were told to intercept localizer for Runway 28L. I engaged the VOR/LOC to arm and capture localizer. After getting LOC CAP displayed on FMA and following FD commands we were then told cleared for ILS Approach. I then armed APCH to capture GS. Captain said; 'GS alive' followed by GS CAP. I followed FD commands with AP off; continuing to configure with gear and flaps; fully configured in the slot by 1;500 FT AFL. AT approximately 700 FT AFL on GS Captain said LOCS not armed and that I was in HDG SEL with a 3/4 - full scale deflection to the right; meaning I was left of course. I began to maneuver the aircraft back to the right to get back on the LOC immediately and at almost the same time we broke out of the clouds and I maneuvered the aircraft back onto the LOC for a safe and smooth landing. We do not know why the aircraft fell out of LOC CAP mode and defaulted to HDG SEL. We never lost GS CAP mode. I was fully configured and on speed with no excessive maneuvering. We talked about possible go around but broke out of the clouds almost immediately when all this took place. While a go around may have been the better option; I felt due to rising terrain to the left and right of the aircraft may have put us in an unsafe situation since we were off the LOC and we did break out by 500 FT AFL. We advised ATC after landing they said no one reported problems with localizer. We took same aircraft [out] and had no similar problems.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported losing LOC capture on approach to SFO for unknown reasons.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Performed RTO (rejected takeoff) in low speed regime; less than 20kt GS on Runway X due to aircraft controllability issues because of runway conditions. During deice ops I asked the Tower about the condition of the runway and when it was plowed last. ATC responded with a poor braking action report and plowed an hour and a half ago. I requested that the runway be plowed again prior to us taking off as it had been snowing continuously for hours. They agreed and we saw 3 plows start at the Runway X threshold and proceed down the runway. After deice ops we proceeded for departure on Runway X. Double checked APS (aircraft performance) and FOM prior to takeoff. Lined up with RWY X centerline; released brakes and gently advanced power towards 60%. Around 40 to 50% power the aircraft began to slide to the left. Immediately performed RTO procedure. Braking at this point was NIL. Reported RTO to ATC; exited runway and performed necessary checklists. The plows had done a very poor job of plowing the runway leaving portions of it unplowed. Notified ATC of the runway condition and braking action. Requested that the runway be replowed thoroughly before we would attempt a second takeoff. Due to the time involved with this and a couple of other departures ahead of us I elected to deice/anti-ice a second time due to possible holdover time issues. Runway replowed thoroughly and second takeoff uneventful. Cause: Weather conditions and less than adequate plowing of the runway. Suggestions: More diligent work performance of the plowing crew during deteriorating weather conditions. Pilots should not have to ask ATC for the runway to be plowed.




Synopsis: A300 Captain reported executing an RTO after the aircraft began to slide sideways. Captain informed ATC the runway needed re-plowing.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-88
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout passing 15;000 FT MSL; the left engine stalled and was subsequently shutdown in accordance with our procedures. We returned to the departure airport for an uneventful landing. An emergency was declared due to single-engine operations.




Synopsis: MD80 Captain experiences a compressor stall on the left engine during climb. The engine is shutdown and the flight returns to the departure airport.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared to intercept the localizer for 8R. The first officer said he was going to go to heading mode and then switch over to green needles for the intercept (but we were still many miles out) I stayed in white needles and intended on going green as soon as we were inbound as we were 20 mi out for the localizer intercept. When the first officer began to intercept; the autopilot took an excessively sharp turn; I realized something was not right. I had the first officer go back into heading mode; as I tried to figure out the sharp turn that the autopilot took. As I was trying to figure out why the autopilot was acting abnormal; the FO mentioned that maybe his inbound course was not correct. I quickly realized what the problem was (he must have flipped to green needles outside of the 30 mi 'blue needle' point) at that point; I helped him with the heading; and set his inbound course for him to get us back on course. As I was trying to help him with this; we ended up slightly off course from the localizer; ATC questioned us as I was trying my best to correct it. We said correcting for the localizer. I asked ATC if we caused a problem; and the response was; no you're fine. The first officer must have selected green needles prior to the '30 mi' or blue needle point. As a result; his inbound course was not correct; and when trying to intercept the localizer this caused the autopilot to take a sharp turn. Make a quick look at first officer's screen before intercepting the localizer. If something like this were to happen again; it will be my first instinct to look at the first officer's screen and double check our screens are in agreement. Also; probably should have just taken the controls at that point and got the first officer lined up and given the controls back. This would have avoided us being off course.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported a track deviation on approach when the flying pilot First Officer selected green needles too soon.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other parked
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We blocked in on the ramp in ZZZ at (time). We shut down according to our AOM procedure. I kept the parking brake set; knowing we were not chocked. After seeing the passenger off and cleaning and postflighting the plane; we still [were] not chocked. I asked the FBO agent if she could get us some chocks since none were available on the new ramp they were using. The sedan that was to drive us to ZZZ1 showed up at the plane. We loaded our bags into the sedan. Still waiting for chocks and not wanting to leave the plane unchocked; I asked the sedan driver if he could drive us to the FBO about 200 yards away so I could get the chocks myself. When we got to the FBO; the FBO agent was leaving the FBO with chocks in hand. I spoke to the crew that was taking our plane to brief them of its status and fuel load. I happened to look out at the plane only to see it slowly rolling across the ramp. Two pilots from [FBO] were attempting to stop it. The sedan driver quickly drove us back to the plane. By this time the chocks were placed on the nose wheel. One of the [FBO] crew members said he had injured his right calf in attempting to physically stop the plane. I contacted the Company and spoke to the [Chief Pilot]. When back on the plane; [name] and I both noticed that the parking brake was still set. While chocked; we started the plane; checked the brakes and taxied to another part of the ramp. I set the parking brake again and brought the left engine up to about 60%. The brakes held. We shut down the plane. By this time the crew from [FBO] had departed the airport in their plane. I briefed the crew who were taking 583 of the situation; and they assumed control of the airplane for their trip to ZZZ2. I understand the ramp we parked on was recently opened but yet there were no chocks immediately available. Chocks should be located anywhere planes are expected to park. Also; would it be possible to have airplanes carrier their own set of chocks for instances like this?




Synopsis: Small Transport Jet Captain reported aircraft began to roll from parking position even though parking brake was set. Captain reported FBO had not yet inserted wheel chocks.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 2
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was Pilot In Command (PIC) on a CE550 and weather was 2;500 overcast 2 miles with light snow. After about 3 minutes into the flight the left engine oil light illuminated with the oil pressure showing 40 psi. We returned to the airport by being vectored for the ILS; landing uneventfully 8 minutes after the light illuminated. I didn't shut down the engine feeling that it was safer to land with it operating at reduced power. Opening the oil access door; I noticed the loss of oil was from the dipstick not being fully locked in place. I had preflighted the aircraft a few days before the scheduled flight; and recall the oil level in both engines was in the normal range. I can't believe that I would not have secured the dipstick into its proper place. It is so routine. My inactions of not checking the oil dipsticks to make sure they were secure was the reason for this incident.My judgment was further clouded because after new oil was put into the engine I completed the two day trip. I wrongly perceived that having some oil pressure after landing I could still go on the trip. I regret not having a discussion with my supervisor and the other pilot about doing so. While taking full responsibility for my actions; the 'get the job done' attitude may have overshadowed my judgment. If any of us had raised some doubt; I don't believe we would have departed. I have implemented a new procedure that after the oil is checked by one pilot; the other pilot will check to make sure everything is secure.




Synopsis: A CE550 Captain reported a low oil pressure indication on the left engine shortly after takeoff and returned to the departure airport. Post flight revealed that the dipstick was not locked in place; causing the oil loss and the reporter was likely the last person to touch it. The oil is then replaced and the flight departs on a two day trip without any additional maintenance.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU Electrical
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: An electrical anomaly occurred upon taxi in to the gate. After deplaning the passengers all electrical power was removed from the aircraft. Under direction from maintenance control ground power was introduced to the aircraft to try and diagnose the problem. At that point the 'Check Fire Detect' warning light illuminated with no other indications. I smelled what I believed to be smoke. I exited the aircraft to perform a visual inspection from the exterior and saw smoke pouring from a vent in the tail section of the aircraft. The automatic thermal fire suppression system had not discharged. I got back on the aircraft and ordered the remaining crew members to evacuate. I manually discharged the APU fire bottle and called ground control to send the fire trucks then removed all electrical power from the aircraft again. Some sort of electrical malfunction caused a fire to start in the tail section of the aircraft.All appropriate check lists and immediate action items were performed. Nothing really could have been done to prevent this other than being extremely cautious when diagnosing an electrical problem. In my opinion it would have happened regardless.


Second narrative: After landing; started APU taxiing in to the gate. APU starter light did not extinguish. Cycled APU off; then on; but it did not restart. Noticed APU AUX breaker (N8) was popped. GPU voltage was low; so we requested a different one. Began getting erroneous lights; such as 'touched runway' along with others. After hooking up different GPU; the 'check fire detect' light illuminated; but we had no other signals from the control panel. We went outside to check; and saw smoke coming from the APU. The Captain went back onboard; discharged an extinguisher bottle; and advised ATC to roll Crash Fire Rescue to our location.


Synopsis: DHC8 flight crew reported attempting to start the APU during taxi in to the gate but the APU starter light did not go out and the APU did not start. A second attempt is also unsuccessful. After deplaning at the gate; smoke was detected coming from the APU compartment; the APU fire handle was pulled and Crash Fire Rescue was called.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: All checklists/procedures were properly done prior to takeoff. We then aborted the takeoff due to the Takeoff Warning Horn sounding. Horn did not sound until approximately three to five seconds after takeoff power was set (88.4% N1). The Captain aborted takeoff at approximately 75 KIAS and cleared the runway. We ran the rejected takeoff and Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn Checklists and calculated brake cooling. Horn sounded again when Captain did a throttleburst.We discussed possible problems/solutions. He ran the stab trim forward 'about a dot' and redid the throttleburst with no horn. I mentioned that it was still in the green band on my side before he ran it forward; but apparently 'my side' indicated a higher setting (i.e. 5.2 vs. 4.9). The Captain then notified Dispatch and we told ATC we could take off again after the cooling period. We ensured the aircraft was properly reconfigured for takeoff (i.e. rejected takeoff re-selected) and the Captain made several more throttlebursts. The second takeoff was uneventful.


Second narrative: Brake cooling was 16 minutes. A subsequent throttleburst check gave an immediate Takeoff Warning Horn. Flaps were checked at 1; speedbrake handle down detent; and the trim checked in the green at 4.9 units. However; I noticed the First Officer's trim pointer indicated closer to 5.1 units; so I trimmed the First officer's side to 4.9 (Captain's side now 4.8); and moving the thrust lever forward now produced no horn. Had I checked across the center console to view the First Officer's trim pointer I would have set the trim conservatively with the disparate pointer closest to the edge of the green band further towards the center of the green. If the pointers aren't matching; I'd notify Maintenance to recalibrate.


Synopsis: A B737-300 rejected their takeoff upon receipt of a takeoff warning horn determined to be the result of the Captain's trim indication being in the green band; but not the First Officer's. By electing the most conservative of the two displays a subsequent takeoff was uneventful.
Date: 202108
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On [date] technicians painted Aircraft X right and left elevator top surface with a spray paint gun in an improperly ventilated area. The fumes were very strong and concentrated causing me to experience a headache and throat irritation.  Aircraft paints can be cancer causing when inhaled; according to OSHA and the company's respirator training exposure and inhaling some of these toxic fumes may compromise our health. I approached the techs and told them to stop spraying and to open the hangar doors; they informed me that they had been authorized by Management. They also said that they were told to paint it during lunch. Nonetheless; management authorization or painting during lunch; does not reduce exposure to cancer causing fumes; specially in a non ventilated area. I spoke to the supervisor of line 3; and he said they had been authorized to do so by our local 'safety manager'. I then went to the shift manager and he said he would 'look into it'; in the meantime the fumes continued to accumulate in the hangar so that there was a mist in the bay where they were painting and beyond. After about an hour; they stopped spraying and opened the hangar doors. Incidents like this are not isolated. I've brought up to Management the dangers of buffing on fiberglass panels; cutting honeycomb; grinding on aluminum on the open hangar floor. It seems to me that our local Safety Manager does not care to emphasize the importance of following proper safety and health procedures.




Synopsis: Air Carrier maintenance technician reported a fume event in an improperly ventilated maintenance hanger during aircraft spray painting. Hanger doors were opened and painting ceased after notifying supervisor.