Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Robinson R22
Operator: Other unknown
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Climb
Second aircraft: Robinson R22
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other CFII
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying with my student in the designated practice area; working on a variety of maneuvers. There were 2 other company traffic in the practice area (both training helicopters); one of which was cleared to operate at 2;000 ft MSL and below. Without this radio-communication approval from the control tower; all helicopters are to remain below 600 ft AGL. I was unaware of this helicopter operating at 2;000 ft and below; as although the Control Tower cleared them into the practice area; I did not hear it; as my student was talking. Most of the time (but not always); the Control Tower will call up all other helicopters in the practice area to inform them of the joining company. This explicit advisory was not issued to my tail number; which in this scenario is why I was not aware of the company traffic. While my student and I were taking off in a normal takeoff configuration; we did not see the other involved aircraft which was entering a practice engine failure directly above us; flying in the same direction as us. It wasn't until about 200 ft AGL on the climb out that I (and not my student) saw the descending aircraft about 100 feet ahead of and above us. I quickly lowered the collective to arrest our rate of climb and decelerated to avoid a collision; and once the company traffic was well clear I proceeded to climb out in a normal profile. When questioning the other pilot and their student after the flight if they saw us; they said that the saw us on the ground; but did not see us take off. They were unaware that the near-miss had occurred. Control Tower not explicit warning us of the company traffic joining us. Not adequately visually clearing the area above me before take off. As per company SOP; this is normally only done when conducting a maximum performance takeoff maneuver. Not adequately listening to the Control Tower frequency. Other pilot not deciding to recover their descent well before 600 ft AGL; knowing that there are two aircraft operating at 600 ft and below. Company policy is recovery by 100 ft. Taking off to the south; despite Runway XX being active. However; it is understood in our standard operating procedures that all takeoffs in the north practice area should be made in the opposite direction when the winds are strong from the west and Runway XX is active; due to obstacle clearance and left crosswind avoidance. As the other pilot corroborated later; he was not able to confidently predict which direction we would be taking off in.




Synopsis: Helicopter instructor pilot reported an airborne conflict with another training helicopter.