elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LIRF.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON LIRF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While level at 6;000 feet on the TAQ 1D arrival into LIRF we received a TCAS TA. We observed on the ND traffic climbing fast towards us. I reduced range on the Nav display. I said to the First Officer if we get an RA it will be autopilot off; flight director off. Before I could even finish the sentence; we immediately got an RA to climb. I shouted autopilot off; flight director off; and immediately climbed the aircraft up into the green and saw a climb of 5;000 feet per minute. The VSI was full red with only a sliver of green at the top. I could barely make out the green. I had never seen this even in training. The TCAS then said increase climb. I instantaneously made the decision to pull the stick all the way back and hold it. I recall saying to the First Officer I was going to just trust the automation to keep us from stalling. I saw the target on TCAS merge with our airplane and by reflex hunched my shoulders expecting an impact. I can not say for sure how close we were. A lot was going on. Perhaps 100 feet or less. We were completely in cloud. The TCAS was alerting; the altitude warning buzzer was sounding; our airspeed was decreasing rapidly thru 190 knots and we were pitched up above 30 degrees. Then the TCAS alerted clear of traffic. We recovered normal flight and automation after the RA; and the First Officer advised the Controller of our actions. The IRO (Relief Pilot) called the cabin to ask if everyone was OK. The Flight Attendant reported everyone was OK. Later they reported two flight attendants who were standing were thrown against their jumpseats but were not hurt. Also they reported the feeling of floating at one point. This is probably when I pushed the nose over to recover as the airspeed had decreased into the orange band on the airspeed indicator. From listening to the Italian Controller and the Air Carrier pilot; the Italian Controller asked if they had climbed above 5;000 feet. They insisted they had received a clearance to climb to 15;000 feet at rate of 2;000 feet per minute or more. The Italian Controller insisted they were only cleared to 5;000 feet.




Synopsis: Widebody Airbus Captain at 6;000 feet during arrival to LIRF; experiences a TCAS RA requiring a maximum performance climb to avoid traffic climbing into them. A misunderstood communication between ATC and the other aircraft were cited as the likely cause of the NMAC.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Second aircraft: P180 Avanti
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Local Control 1. The control of the intersection for the runways belonged to Local Control 2; where training was in progress. We had coordinated for the intersection to return to me after a B737 landing Runway 19L. I was holding a MD83 in position on 25R; waiting for intersection control. The aircraft behind the B737 was a P180; who seemed to be doing a short approach. I told the MD83 that it would be another minute or so in position; and my assist called Local Control 2. Local Control 2 said that the lander was squaring and slowing; and the trainer told the trainee to give up the intersection for my departure. I then cleared the MD83 for take off; and they started rolling. The problem occurred when the lander slowed very little; and did not square the turn; but continued straight for the numbers. The Local Control 2 trainer asked the Supervisor if they should let the P180 land; or send him around. The Controller was told to let him land; and did so. This was safe; as the 25R departure was already airborne when the lander crossed the threshold of 19L; but meant that aircraft were operating on intersecting runways at the same time. We used to have a tool we used that allowed simultaneous operations on the intersecting runways; using parameters that ensured safety. This tool is rumored to be coming back; but has not as of yet. In this situation; the parameters were met; and this would have been a legal operation. I recommend that this tool be returned to use. I should use my experience to decide what will work; rather than counting on an aircraft I am not talking to; to follow an instruction that I did not issue. My initial decision was to wait; but did not. Giving up control of the intersection means that the controller giving it up expects the plan to work; or will fix it if it does not. The lack of experience on the part of the trainee; as well as the years of experience the trainer had; should have clued me in to follow my original plan. The worst thing that would have happened would have been that the departure would have waited a couple of minutes. Next time; I will error on the side of caution.




Synopsis: LAS Controller described a possible intersecting runway separation error noting he should have delayed the departure for the landing aircraft; adding that an automated assistance tool would have been helpful in this scenario.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: GPT.Tower, MS
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON GPT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After turning and descending the CRJ-900 I was dealing with a VFR south east of GPT that had traffic coming at him and didn't realize in time CRJ-900 hadn't turned as quickly as I anticipated and he was descending faster than I anticipated. In all honesty I remember him being higher than he was when I glanced back up at him. CRJ-900 was on the border of our antennas north of GPT 1780 highest obstruction where MVA is 3000 ft. His attitude when I saw was leaving 2900 ft. for 2800 ft. almost out of the MVA circle. No recommendations for the airspace I understand I just miscalculated the situation.




Synopsis: GPT TRACON Controller reported descending aircraft below the MVA.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RJJJ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center RJJJ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight crew on Aircraft X asked of any confirmed reports of a missile attack against Japan. [Later] Aircraft Y sent a message about missile launch. I checked [the internet] and confirmed that a missile had been launched. I contacted section manager; chief dispatcher asking for information. The director came to the pacific quad to advise launch had occurred; already in the sea; no action; no response. I asked if his source could give us the landing location of the rocket. When the director returned about 10 min later; we got info stating the missile landed approximately 1100 miles east of Japan coast; which would have covered all routes from the Alaska area. I set up a plan with the flights that based on a waypoint of a waypoint to decide if we would turn [aircraft] back. During the 10 min; we checked again with [the internet] and saw landing information. If corporate security has information of live fire; the dispatcher should have the information to pass on the flight crews. We had two flights advised by passengers of missile launches that crossed their routes of flight. Dispatch was given no information until passengers said something to the flight attendants onboard.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported two flights reported passengers observed a missile launch that crossed the aircraft's route of flight. Dispatcher reported no information was provided until after the fact.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X checked on at FL390. I issued a descent to FL370 to get the aircraft out of Sector 40 airspace since the aircraft was landing at DSM. The pilot read back descending to FL370. I had traffic at FL360 and FL350 that was diverging. About a minute goes by and I notice my En Route Information Display System (ERIDS) light up with conflictions. I look back to the scope and observe Aircraft X descending below the assigned FL370. It takes about 3 seconds to fully process what I am seeing. Aircraft X is descending head on threw the traffic at FL360 and is busting through my base altitude of FL350. I ask the pilot what altitude I assigned believing I misstated the original altitude of FL370 or missed the read back. While this is happening I forced a data block up on Sector 39 scope. The Sector 39 controller shouted out it was ok; he only had traffic at FL300. The pilot responds that he was assigned FL270. Still not believing what I was seeing I asked if he was at FL370 to which he responded the altitude he was descending out of. I amended Aircraft X altitude to FL330 and hand him off to sector 39.This happened my last stint before I went home. I returned that night for the midnight shift and listened to the tape. I did issue FL370. Aircraft X responded descending to FL370. I question the pilot about the altitude I assigned he responded FL270. It was a pilot deviation on his part which I didn't react to quickly enough and I had an airspace violation with Sector 39. Had Aircraft X not descended as quickly as he did there could have been 3 aircraft with TCAS alerts to respond to. Luckily no separation was lost however I was giving quite a scare.I shouldn't have questioned myself. I should have forced that data block to Sector 39 and stopped the aircraft immediately and asked question later. I've been in the agency almost years and this skill is hard to teach and obviously execute when it matters. Pilot deviations happen. It all goes back to hear back/read back on both sides of the microphone.




Synopsis: ZMP Controller reported of a pilot deviation. Pilot read back correct altitude to descend to but went through the cleared altitude. No Separation was lost due to the descent rate of the deviating aircraft.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DSM.Tower, IA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C DSM
ATC / advisory: Tower DSM
Second aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This was a training flight. We had been instructed to 'make left hand pattern Runway 13'. This was our second pattern and were climbing straight ahead on a southeast; runaway heading. Another Cherokee behind us on Runway 13 changed his plans; aborted his approach; and was instructed to turn direct to IKV; which is a left turn. It appears he turned more to the East rather than northeast.We were told turn crosswind; which we did (to the left); to approximately 050. But; because we had been told to make left hand pattern; we turned downwind (approximately 310) putting us on a collision course with the other Cherokee. I saw the Cherokee just before the traffic collision avoidance system announced 'traffic ahead; less than a mile.' I took over and started sharp climbing turn to the right. At the same time; Tower advised; 'traffic; twelve o'clock; less than a mile.' I then announced I had the traffic in sight. Tower said maintain visual separation. Tower then directed the Cherokee to turn to IKV; now more north; northeast. After a moment; I asked if we could turn downwind and Tower approved. I believe the confusion started because we had been told to 'make left traffic.' Tower did not say they would call when to turn downwind; as the might for a base turn to avoid traffic on final. So; I assumed we could turn at our discretion. In retrospect; I should have inferred that because Tower said to turn crosswind; that we could only turn crosswind. I might have done a better job of envisioning where the other Cherokee; who seemed to be struggling; would be and possibly on a collision course.




Synopsis: PA-28 instructor pilot reported confusion with the tower controllers instructions resulting in an airborne conflict.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: B747-800 Advanced
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: We were on vectors for Runway 28 at ORD. Our heading was 360 on the left base leg. We were descending from 5;000 to 4;000 FT; and were informed that we were following a 'Heavy' aircraft. It was a B747-800; and was reported to be approximately 6 miles ahead of us. We encountered what we believe to be wake turbulence; which resulted in a roll to the left of approximately 40 degrees. The autopilot disconnected; but it is unclear if it was a result of the roll itself; or if we may have accidentally done so; as the First Officer and I both grabbed the control wheel when the roll commenced. It only lasted a few seconds; and the aircraft came back under our complete control. Immediately after the event; we notified the Controller; who reiterated the distances between our two aircraft; and the fact that we were above the Heavy's flight path. We continued on the vectors; choosing to fly slightly above the glideslope until just prior to landing. We landed without incident. After landing we were given a contact phone number; and I spoke with [an ATC representative]. She said a quick review of the two flight paths showed that we should have been free of any encounter with wake turbulence.




Synopsis: MD-82 Captain reported wake vortex encounter six miles in trail of a B747-800 on arrival to ORD that resulted in a 40 degree roll. ATC stated there should not have been an encounter based on the flight paths.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C AUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON AUS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Vectored south of KALLA descending to 8;000 FT. Entered CB clouds at 11;000 FT. Slowing for 10;000 FT in IMC. Was advised by ATC of 'pop up' VFR traffic at our 10 o'clock. We got a TA followed by an RA immediately climbing into our position. PF started climb as directed by TCAS and slight right turn to avoid traffic. ATC gave us a 080 heading to turn in front of traffic; which we rejected as it would turn us more into RA. RA passed very close off our five o'clock and last seen 400 FT and climbing into us. Clear of conflict at 8;500 FT.


Second narrative: In the descent just east of KALLA going direct to HOMAL going past about 9;000 FT the TCAS started saying monitor Vertical Speed at the same time AUS Approach issued traffic; then the TCAS said climb. All this was in IMC and happened very fast. The quickest thing I could do was run the radar scale in to the five-mile scale. I started a climbing right turn because the last time I saw the echo; it was on the left side climbing. He passed just to the left on me. ATC gave me a left turn but we were already in the right turn. After the 'clear of conflict;' I looked to the left and couldn't see anything. There were broken clouds at that point. I quizzed AUS Approach and they were not talking to the aircraft. He was climbing at a high rate of climb they said.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew descending into AUS in IMC experiences a TCAS RA with VFR traffic not talking to Approach Control. A climb and a turn are initiated to avoid the intruder.
Date: 201910
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Many of the NG (Next Generation) aircraft I fly have wiper blades (the rubber part that touches the wind screen) shorter that the metal frame/bracket holding it. I have seen the wiper blade as much as an inch short of the frame on each end. I have also seen wiper blades that are exactly the same length of the frame so I know the correct length is available. I believe it is a safety hazard not to have a wiper blade that spans the length of the metal bracket/frame that holds it in place. In a heavy rain; the more wind screen I can clean with the wiper blades; the safer my approach and landing will be. (Older model) aircraft wiper blades were shorter than NG blades. I think a left over supply of (older model) aircraft wiper blades might be in use on many NG aircraft causing this issue. Wiper Blades on many NG aircraft are shorter than the metal frame. Company and Maintenance Technicians need to ensure all our aircraft have proper wiper blades in place on our NGs.




Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported aircraft wiper blades on many next generation aircraft are shorter than the metal frame.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TPA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B TPA
ATC / advisory: Tower TPA
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were several hours delayed departing. As we taxied; we had a maintenance issue and had to work the problem. We were under the pressure of an EDCT time. After working the problem through Maintenance Control; we rushed through a before takeoff checklist and were cleared for takeoff. As we passed through 400 FT; the Captain called for heading select; I selected heading and saw that the heading was set at 021 which is way off of the RNAV SID heading. We then received an ECAM (master caution) that distracted me from the turn that seemed wrong. I fixed the problem quickly and then asked him why we were turning. Before we could ask for clarification; ATC began vectoring us back on course. It is unknown why that particular heading was set in the window. I had been so busy that I assumed that we had received the heading and I missed and the Captain indicated that he thought I had set it and that he had missed it. The flight continued without incident.




Synopsis: An A320 departed TPA with an incorrect initial heading selected; but neither pilot remembered setting it. ATC and crew both quickly identified the track deviation.