elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Aeroplane Flight Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During Climbout; I felt that the control wheel forces were not normal. I had to trim 'RWD' [Right Wing Down] almost full trim deflection in order to get the aircraft to stay trimmed. I also noticed that there was about 3' of play in the control wheel travel before any aileron movement occurred. Mach Trim/Stab Trim disconnected twice during this flight. I had turned the autopilot on at one point; and after a few seconds; the yoke had slammed rearward towards my seat very abruptly and instantly returned to neutral. At that time I turned the autopilot off and hand flew the aircraft back to our departure airport. I advised ATC of situation; described the aircraft condition to the ATC controller; and informed ATC that I wanted to return to the airport. We sent Dispatcher a text via ACARS as to what was happening and what our intentions were. I called dispatch once we were on the ground. Maintenance was notified next. No QRH procedure was followed because there is no QRH procedure for this incident as I recognized it. There was no 'Runaway' condition..... Just severe play in the control wheel in the roll axis. I would like to know what maintenance found when they inspected the aircraft. The threat was the possibility of an aircraft upset scenario. Threat of a total loss of roll control. I am sure there were some errors performed by myself or the F/O; but I really can't remember them. We worked well as a team to land the aircraft safely.




Synopsis: A CRJ-200 flight crew returned to their departure airport when aileron operation appeared severely compromised and the autopilot exhibited extreme and uncommanded elevator inputs.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEX.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZDV
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on the RNAV Z RWY 9 at TEX; we descended from 13000 ft. and leveled off at 12900 ft. Shortly after this I noticed we began descending again. Confused by this I double checked our position and the approach plate and realized we were descending prior to the final approach fix. I voiced my concerns to the PIC that we should still be at 12900 ft; the PIC immediately agreed and began a climb back to 12900 ft. The correction was made between 12200 ft. and 11900 ft.




Synopsis: Small Transport First Officer reported an altitude deviation occurred on the RNAV Z Approach to Runway 9 at TEX.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Air Carrier Ground Agent 1 in ZZZ called coworker and stated that some MISC HAZMAT (hazardous material) had been placed in position 6R. Apparently this had been loaded into this can 2 days prior; and they didn't realize this until the aircraft had already taken off.   I then talked to Agent 1 about the situation and had him to send me the HAZMAT paperwork. Called the Director of Operations and informed of the situation; and also informed the crew of what had happened. As showing on the paperwork; it was Class 9; MISC; 804KG - position 6R. The cause was with the holiday; it caused the ramp to lose track of the can where this HAZMAT was and the paperwork that needed to be with the HAZMAT material. I suggest when there is a holiday; the ramp needs to make sure that they are extra careful about where the HAZMAT is and the [related] paperwork is.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported Hazmat cargo was inadvertently left on aircraft over the holiday weekend without appropriate Hazmat documentation.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 36
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had mistyped an intersection (WOOLY) into my GPS route of flight cleared by ATC returning to HEF. The intersection I typed in (WOLLY) was northwest of my intended and cleared route of flight after BAL VOR instead of southwest.  I was practicing hand flying this particular leg of my flight that morning and after departing and following runway heading directions while climbing successively to 3;000 and then 6;000 feet; had been cleared to WOOLY. I was queried once by ATC as to whether I was flying direct to WOOLY; which I incorrectly confirmed after viewing the GPS.  Approximately one minute later; I was queried again by ATC and it was at that time that I noticed the discrepancy when comparing the GPS indications to the indications on my iPAD using foreflight and an IFR sectional.  The controller identified the direction I should have been heading which I turned to while entering WOOLY in the GPS and heading directly to WOOLY.  I then complied with additional vectors to facilitate my return to HEF.My mistake began with my landing and requesting an immediate taxi back and my clearance back to HEF where I began my flight that morning.  I was taxiing and reprogramming the GPS after receiving and reading back my IFR clearance from the tower controller. I should have waited until stopping at the hold short line or the run up area to program the next segment of the flight as I was flying single pilot that day.  In that case I could have taken greater care in entering the flight plan in the GPS and checking it as well. Taxiing the airplane and programming the GPS compromises safety and better management of my responsibilities would have kept the navigation error from happening.




Synopsis: BE36 pilot reports incorrectly programming his GPS after receiving a clearance while taxiing single pilot. Waypoint WOOLY is incorrectly entered as WOLLY; resulting in a track deviation. ATC detects and corrects the error.
Date: 201907
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Vehicle Driver; Ramp
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: It has been a concern of mine that we may not be towing aircraft in the safest possible way in ZZZ. Having a tow team background; I understand the importance of safety being the top priority during aircraft repositioning. It is my understanding that every regional carrier has developed a towing checklist for each aircraft type in their fleet; and has certain rules for towing their aircraft (towing dead or powered). In ZZZ; it seems that our only procedure is to tow all regional aircraft without power; which is fine as long as the brake pressure is checked correctly and it is not going against the regional companies regulations. A couple examples that I am concerned about are the CRJ200/700 aircraft does not store brake pressure; so the only pressure you have is what is in the brake lines. On a normal tow; you may have one or two stops before the pressure is depleted. If the aircraft has been sitting for a while; you may not have any pressure at all to stop the aircraft in case of emergency. I did manage to find an E170/175 checklist; and it is very useful for checking brake pressure; however; for towing aircraft without power; the very first line (in bright red letters) states aircraft to be moved 300 yards; or less. My concern with this is that many of our tows are well over 300 yards; and we are the only airline in ZZZ towing any aircraft without power. On the tow team; we did not enter any flight deck without a proper checklist; for our safety and the safety of the aircraft. My main objective is to get every employee that tows aircraft a copy of each checklist; along with each regional carriers' regulations for towing that aircraft.




Synopsis: Air carrier ground employee reported concern that the team is towing aircraft using incorrect procedures.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZSE; Special Use RAINIER MOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was going to OLM VFR when my GPS froze and I had to grab my paper charts. I was under the Class B airspace south east of SEA-TAC (SEA) and east of McChord (TCM) and decided to go south and skirt around the MOAs where I may have inadvertently entered one.  Not sure.




Synopsis: C182 pilot experiences loss of GPS NAV capability while flying south bound beneath the SEA Class B airspace and believes he may have entered a MOA while attempting to navigate using paper charts.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Transponder
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were preparing to fly and the display on the transponder was inoperative. A typical digital display for a single number is made up of seven dashes in the form of a boxy figure eight. The middle dash was not working and one could not read the number that would be put into the first digit of a four digit transponder code. So a number 3 would look like a backwards C.We contacted dispatch who contacted Maintenance and a mechanic came to the airplane. He applied MEL 34-XX-XXX. The MEL says that zero transponders are required as long as certain conditions are met: May be inoperative provided: a) Operations do not require its use; b) Prior to flight; approval is obtained from ATC facilities having jurisdiction over planned route of flight; and c) Apply MEL 02-XX-XXX.We avoided operations requiring its use in A. We met the standards of section B by having dispatch contact the appropriate ATC's. And C applies to avoiding RVSM airspace so we filed and flew at FL280.  At the bottom of the procedure was the following NOTE: 14 CFR 91.215(b) requires [the company] to have one serviceable ATC Transponder operative for dispatch at all times; unless otherwise specified per 14 CFR 91.215(d) or other appropriated regulations for authorized deviationsI am not sure we were in compliance with the note as we did not have a serviceable transponder due to the MEL. And we had no way to read the language of 14 CFR 91.215(d) as that is not referenced in any of our guidance. Further; we had no guidance as to what we were supposed to do with the transponder during flight. Keep it in Standby; TA; or TA/RA. There is also the question about what we would do if we had to squawk an emergency code such as 7500; 7600; or 7700.Pilots need to have a copy of the CFR's in our compliance reference materials. The [company] safety team should discuss whether or not it is safe to fly without an operable transponder on a transport category aircraft in revenue service and disseminate those findings to the pilot group. We should have written guidance on what mode to operate the transponder in that has been MEL'd and what to do in case of needing to squawk an emergency type code.




Synopsis: A321 pilot reported that the transponder was deferred due to a missing digit.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Two Accessible Dangerous Goods HAZMAT cans were rejected and removed from aircraft by Captain's direction in concurrence with First Officer and DG Specialists assessment of DG emitting very strong odor. No spills were observed in either can. The DG can at position 1R contained only Class 3 flammable liquid; UN 1263; paint; [and] paint related material all from one shipper. The DG can at position 2L contained Class 3 flammable Liquid; and class 8 corrosive. This DG can also emitted the same odor as the DG can in position 1R; and also contained Class 3 flammable liquids; UN1263; paint; [and] paint related material from the same shipper. In consideration of safety of flight; and per FOM; DG was deemed unacceptable for transportation due to strong odor. Should have stated above that DG was emitting very strong odor/fumes. Possible combustion of fumes over time if transported was a safety concern. Not sure of cause. Improper packaging possibly?




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the removal of two dangerous goods containers from aircraft due to strong fumes.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was assigned to taxi an ERJ-170 aircraft from the gate to the hangar for maintenance.  Number 2 engine had a Boroscope scheduled and I elected to perform a single engine taxi to allow the #2 engine to cool down for Inspection. I dry-motored the #2 engine once after pushback to cool the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) closer to Boroscope allowable temperatures. [Performed] normal start on the opposite engine; and received taxi clearance. I began to dry-motor the #2 engine once again during taxi; at which point we received an amended taxi clearance. As my right seater read back the clearance; he was 'stepped-on' by another radio transmission and the Controller didn't hear him read back the hold short portion of the clearance. The Controller then asked 'Air Carrier X read back hold short'; and my right seater wasn't aware that his transmission was 'stepped on'; so I stepped in and read back the hold short portion of our amended clearance. At that time I looked back down at my chronograph (watch); which I had started to monitor my starter duty limits; and had exceeded the 30-second limit by 5-seconds. I quickly reached down to stop motoring the #2 engine; and accidentally turned the #1 Engine Start/Stop switch 'off' instead of #2. I brought the aircraft to a stop at the instructed hold short position; allowed the engine to spool down; and then restarted the #1 engine. A few minutes later; we received additional taxi clearance to the hangar; and proceeded with no problems.  I felt pressure from lack of time to accomplish maintenance. This was the last plane in; and the first plane out; and I foolishly decided to multi-task the dry-motor operation while the aircraft was under movement; to save time later.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic describes his efforts to multi-task a #2 engine dry-motor operation while taxiing their ERJ-170 aircraft and communicating with Ground Control. He felt pressure from lack of time to accomplish all the scheduled maintenance work.
Date: 202107
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We started our taxi out from gate. As we turned away from the gate a water(?) /service truck passed in front of us close enough for us to apply brakes. The driver was looking at his phone and never saw us.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with a service truck during taxi out from gate.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Portable
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: During preflight checks; discovered at least four out of five O2 Walk-Around bottles of incorrect type provisioned on this aircraft. Aircraft was mistakenly fitted with four 66N O2 4.25cu ft bottles instead of the required 4.2 cu ft bottles which supply either only 4L (Hi flow) of O2 per minute; or 4.2 cu ft bottles which supply both 4L (Hi flow) and 2L (Lo Flow). The 66N bottles found onboard only supply 2L (Lo Flow); insufficient to appropriately mitigate a medical or decompression emergency. Aircraft operated unknown multiple cycles with incorrect type of required FAR emergency equipment while not under MEL. Advised Captain; technicians refitted aircraft with correct types of bottles. Aircraft departed without further incident.This identical issue has been previously documented in prior reports. However; never have I discovered such a large error of provisioning of cabin emergency equipment. How could such an egregious breach of basic provisioning of cabin safety equipment occur? Further; this event exposes FAs lack of knowledge and understanding of specifications and correct operation of the various types of O2 equipment found onboard Company's aircraft. Astonished to find such egregious insufficient attention to detail on key pieces of onboard cabin safety equipment. Honestly; have no suggestions to mitigate this risk except a complete audit of provisioning of aircraft cabin emergency equipment. Where is the necessary oversight to prevent such a significant error?




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported incorrect O2 bottles installed on aircraft and also reported that it is a continuing problem.