elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was made aware of aluminum speed tape that was applied to the First Officer side ADC ports that I flew 4 legs in. As to where or when the tape was applied I am unable to answer. The First Officer taking the plane from us on a crew change found the speed tape covering both First Officer's ADC ports in a vertically applied position. The plane flew just fine for us with no EICAS messages or irregularities in altitude; airspeed or vertical speed control on either side. I am unsure if my First Officer missed the tape on his walk around or if someone with foul intent applied this tape. A good quality preflight would have caught this; if it was in fact applied before we took the plane.


Second narrative: I was made aware of the circumstance at the end of my trip. From the Chief Pilot's office and Captain I flew the trip who contacted the chief pilot. I am unaware of when or how or who attached the tape to the side of the airplane. No inflight abnormalities or cues where given that it affected our flight in any way. I am unsure if it was maliciously placed there or due to a maintenance person.


Synopsis: An EMB-145 crew was notified that tape was discovered over the First Officer side ADC port by the receiving crew during a crew change they had flown numerous legs that morning.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower FLL
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Aircraft X touched down; Aircraft Y was instructed to Line Up and Wait. Aircraft X instructions were to turn right at the end of the runway; join the taxiway and contact Ramp Control '. I observed Aircraft X making the right hand turn to exit the runway; to which the whole aircraft appeared cleared of the runway. At that time I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. A few seconds later Aircraft X came back to me and asked if he could get his company aircraft in front of him to move forward more so they could clear the runway. I very quickly asked Aircraft X if he was not clear of the runway; and he replied with a no. I then immediately went to Aircraft Y to cancel take off clearance. Aircraft Y was able to turn off the runway in a timely manner that did not put him anywhere close to Aircraft X.The Runway has recently been re-constructed and is still currently under construction. We do not have a lot of exit taxiways to work with as they are still closed due to construction. This runway should have remained closed until it was completed 100%. This issue would have not happened if all the taxiways were open and available.




Synopsis: FLL Tower Controller reported they cleared an aircraft for takeoff before a previous arrival had completely cleared the runway.
Date: 201912
Location: KZAK.ARTCC, HI
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A KZAK
ATC / advisory: Center KZAK
Aircraft component: HF SSB
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This [report] is being filed to document the ongoing challenges that using [HF Radio] presents on [certain] routes. If the Aircraft X had to use an HF phone patch for all their critical communications; the [report] committee used it for weekly meetings; or the [Company Communications System] relied on HF phone patch for daily conference calls; it would certainly demonstrate the need for SATCOM on [certain] flights. Safety is suppose to be our number one concern and caring is number two. On Aircraft X; a 12 year old was experiencing pain and nausea and his mother needed medical guidance on proper dosage of medication being provided. It took over 47 minutes via several dropped calls and poor connections with Dispatch and Medlink to get this information. Fortunately this was not a life or death situation; but certainly highlighted the major weakness the [HF Radio] system presents. A [Satillite] Phone call could have achieved this quickly and clearly. There is nothing safe or caring about [HF Radio] as a primary communication system vs. SATCOM; yet this [report] will likely be brushed away as it is a money issue which Aircraft X seems to be focused on. None of us would want our family members in need of critical medical care or pilots in need of critical information to depend on [HF Radio].




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported the difficulty using HF communication and the need for SATCOM during an ill passenger event.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: A11.TRACON, AK
Aircraft: Military Transport
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E A11
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11
Second aircraft: Military
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working North Radar and was vectoring Aircraft Y for a practice ILS RWY6 into EDF. I made ANC red which shut off automatic releases. ANC asked for 2 releases and I approved them. I turned around and looked at the ASDE display and thought I saw the 2nd release rolling down the runway so I turned Aircraft Y in for the approach. When I realized it was going to be tight I called traffic on the departing Aircraft X to Aircraft Y who did not call him in sight. I called ANC to turn Aircraft X but as I was calling Aircraft X checked in on my frequency. I then instructed Aircraft Y to turn right to a heading of 360. I then went back to Aircraft X and told him to descend to 1000'. The MVA in that area is 1600' but it's over water and knew there were no obstructions in front of him that posed an immediate threat. I then instructed Aircraft Y to climb to 3000. I felt climbing Aircraft Y would create separation faster because he was indicating 230 knots and the climb would both slow him and create more vertical and lateral separation. After I observed that Aircraft X had passed Aircraft Y I immediately climbed him to 2000 to be compliant with the MVA's. My phraseology was lacking because the situation rattled me and I was just trying to get out the control instruction to separate the aircraft. As soon as I recognized the situation I should have broken out Aircraft Y instead of trying to salvage the situation.




Synopsis: A11 Controller reported descending an aircraft below the MVA to resolve an airborne conflict.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SYR.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C SYR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on descent to land into SYR. We were cleared for the visual approach into runway 28. I selected the altitude of 1600 feet in the altitude selector for the altitude at ZIMBI on the approach. Not being familiar with the terrain around the SYR area; and failing to notice on the approach plate the MSA for that area is at 2800 feet to 3700 feet. Descending at a normal rate and not knowing about the rise in terrain located to the southeast of the airport. The landing gear warning went off. At that point; I stopped the descent; and asked for the landing gear to be lowered to silence the warning. Noticing that we were moving away from the area of rising terrain; that we were alright and continued on with the approach and landing.I suggest reviewing the glide slope intercept altitude and the MSA for the area.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot cleared for a night visual to SYR Runway 28 descended to 1;600 feet on approach from the south. The EPWS alerted LANDING GEAR as the aircraft approached the high terrain so the landing gear was lowered and the descent stopped. The pilot failed to check the charted MSA for that area.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 55/Cochise
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach to landing the right main gear indicator failed to illuminate. I advised the Tower and started climb to a safe altitude. Tower advised that it appeared that the right main gear was not fully extended. I advised Tower that I intended to climb to a safe altitude and perform an emergency gear extension. Tower advised me to fly a heading of 140 then sent me back over to Approach Control. After establishing radio contact with Approach; I attempted a manual gear extension. Emergency procedures where followed from the POH. After the procedure the right main gear light was still out. I advised ATC that I wanted to return to my base airport. A new code was issued and I remained on VFR flight following. I made contact with Approach and advised them of my situation. I advised that I wanted to attempt a second gear extension before switching over to Approach; this channel is extremely busy. Controller asked if I want to declare an emergency; I declined at that time. The second attempt yielded the same results; no right main gear light. At that time I felt the gear was unsafe and might collapse on landing; I elected to declare an emergency. While in route; the Controller asked if I wanted to land at an airport with emergency equipment and suggested a nearby major airport. I agreed and asked for a vector and loaded the ID in my GPS. I made a successful landing. The landing gear was found to be down and locked into place. There was no damage to the aircraft or any ground equipment. I reported to the emergency crew and asked permission to restart my aircraft and taxi to the ramp. I spoke with the Airport Administrator and provided my person information to the Tower for reporting. I then called the phone number given me by the Controller as requested by ATC.




Synopsis: A BE55 landing gear did not indicate down and locked so the pilot declared an emergency and landed safely at an airport with emergency equipment as suggested by ATC.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Night; VMC arrival; all ATC requests were normal; except for a request to maintain high speed until late on base leg. By request; we were still at 250 on base; turning final. That said the spacing was good; with approximately five miles behind and in front of our two closest targets. Due to Continuous Descent Approach (CDA); we never leveled off; maintaining a nearly constant descent from FL340; all the way to the runway. The approach checklist was complete and holding on the local altimeter setting; but we failed to set the local altimeter as we started the turn from base to final. Consequently; we acquired the glideslope at approximately 6;000 FT and maintained the glide for the descent. Unfortunately; due to the incorrect altimeter; the aircraft THOUGHT that we were 450 FT lower than we actually were. While we were visually proceeding to the runway (which was in sight); using the glideslope for guidance; and we actually had correct terrain clearance; we received an EGPWS alert that we were too low; due to the incorrect altimeter input. Although we had an excellent visual picture of terrain and the runway; we complied with company policy with a CFIT recovery. During the resulting Go-Around; we were instructed to contact Departure Control; and were given an altitude of FL070. Since the transition on climb-out is 6;000; we both attempted to set our altimeters to standard; and that was when we realized that they were still in the standard setting. The correct local altimeter setting was 1031; and we had performed the approach with 1013.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reports forgetting set QNH during a night visual approach to an international airport. This results in a EGPWS alert and go around where the crew discovers their error passing through Transition Level.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Captain was Pilot Monitoring (PM). First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF). We were flying at our assigned altitude of 10;000 feet and assigned airspeed of 250 knots. Callsign Aircraft X on NY Approach Control frequency 127.3; we were assigned heading of 060 degrees by NY Approach Control. I replied with our new heading assignment; clearly and concisely; back to Approach Control without any question or objection from the Controller. Flying along at our new heading of 060 for a good minute maybe two minutes Approach Controller came on and questioned our heading and assigned us a new heading of 180. I replied that we were on our assigned heading of 060 but turning to our new assigned heading to now 180 degrees. NY Approach controllers reply; 'who assigned you that heading; no [one] gave you that heading;' asking why we were flying a heading of 060. I told him we were turning to 180. He came back on again to tell us one more time that no one had assigned us our heading of 060. Both myself and the First Officer heard the Approach Controller quite clearly; Aircraft fly heading of 060 vectors to final.It was late at night; after lengthy weather delays into LGA; however; my First Officer and myself are very sure we heard our callsign followed by a directive to fly a heading of 060. Again; we read it back with no objections from Approach Control. It is always very important to speak clearly and concisely when communicating with air traffic control. I believe simply responding with our new assigned heading was the right call. These things can always be figured out on the ground.


Second narrative: First Officer was Pilot Flying; Captain was Pilot Monitoring. We checked in with NY Approach on 127.3 We had just leveled at 10;000 at 250 knots on the MILTON FOUR Arrival. NY Approach gave us heading 060 for vectors; Pilot Monitoring read it back and Pilot Flying confirmed and turned to heading. Approximately two minutes later; NY Approach asks what heading we are on; we respond 060 as assigned. NY Approach tells us he never gave us that heading. He tells us to turn to 180. We turn to heading 180.The Controller did indeed give us the 060 heading despite believing/saying he did not.


Synopsis: EMB-175 flight crew reported being questioned by ATC regarding assigned heading while on the MIILTON FOUR arrival to LGA.
Date: 202009
Location: RKSI.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center RKRR
Reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While descending to start our approach into Incheon; we were given vectors off the approach and told there was unknown drone activity near the airport. We heard other aircraft get holding instructions. We were told we were number 8 for [the] approach. We all started doing our own analysis of how much time we had before we needed to divert due to fuel. Captain made the decision to declare minimum fuel. Approach told us we were number 7 now so the Captain requested to go to the alternate. We were vectored to our alternate; ZZZZ. The approach to ZZZZ was uneventful. We refueled and proceeded to our destination ICN also uneventful. There were no other factors besides the unknown drone not allowing us to land in ICN. No suggestions here. Drones are an unforeseen event.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported diverting to the alternate airport due to low fuel caused by landing clearance delay resulting from UAV activity in the vicinity of the airport.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cabin Window
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pilot possibly improperly secured side window latch. During climb out the front latch on the right window unlatched and bowed out into the slipstream. The pilot attempted to re-secure the latch but was unable to match the detent before the window caught again and broke away from the latch. The window plexiglass departed the airframe at the hinge point over what appeared to be a sparsely populated area. The immediately lost sight of the debris upon departure of the aircraft and am unsure of its final location from altitude. Upon landing a post flight inspection revealed damage to the underside of the wing; fuselage and horizontal stabilizer.The Carbon Cub clearly has placarded limits on window position for takeoff and landing as well as airspeed limitations while one window may be operated while in flight. It is believed that the front latch was not properly seated or reversed in its track but cannot be confirmed. Low experience in this aircraft and door procedures likely lead to this result. The high power setting; cruise climb airspeed (above the window operating range) and aggressive slipstream in effect lead to a very quick sequence of events and powerful forces on the partially latched window.




Synopsis: Carbon Cub pilot reported the right cockpit window came loose after takeoff and eventually separated from the aircraft.