elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201307
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Learjet 45
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I gave a position relief briefing and was completing my overlap when the Controller that relieved me cleared a Learjet 45 for a visual approach to Runway 35 without having the proceeding B737 in sight. The B737 slowed to 130 KTS across the ground and the Learjet closed to approximately 3.6 miles behind the B737. Also; the Controller switched the Learjet late to the Tower. The Tower had no real opportunity to send the Lear around before the B737 crossed the landing threshold. I would have had the Lear report the B737 in sight to follow. I asked the Lear to report the B737 in sight when I turned the Lear base leg. This is the point when the relieving Controller assumed responsibility for the position. The Lear said he was looking. The relieving Controller did not ask the Lear a second time to report the B737 in sight. He just asked him to report the airport in sight. When the Lear reported the airport in sight the relieving Controller cleared him for a visual approach. Later the relieving Controller told me that I had a video map and that he was not use to using that 'confused' him as to the end of the runway. We just received a new video map that depicts the final approach courses for the LDA and RNAV approaches to Runway 35. This map is 'backwards' in it's depiction of the distance markings on final than all of the maps that we have. It makes the runway end appear one mile longer/further south than it really is. The Controller thought the B737 was on a mile final when he shipped the Lear; when in fact the B737 was on a two mile final instead. This gave the Lear more time to catch the B737.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event involving two successive arrival aircraft on visual approaches. The reporter listed a new 'video map' that may have been a contributing factor.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were being vectored for an approach to Rwy 35R in DEN descending to 11;000 ft. We were asked if we had the airport in sight and cleared for the visual. The PNF set the MCP altitude to 7;000 ft. (FAF altitude). About 15 miles from the airport we were asked if we would like 35L. Both pilots saw the airport and we agreed to the Runway change. ATC did not give us an altitude restriction. We were then distracted by ATC giving us another vector to intercept to avoid traffic he cleared for the 35R approach. We discussed the terrain and obstructions before descending. Visibility was unrestricted. At about 7;500 ft. we were given a low altitude warning by ATC. We verified our altitude and continued to descend. A moment later we got a GPWS too low terrain warning and climbed to 8;000 ft. The approach and landing continued without further incident.


Second narrative: On approach into Denver; we were given a visual to Runway 17R [35]. I set in the outer marker altitude of 7;000 feet. During the descent; approach asked if we would accept a visual to 17L [35] and of course we accepted. As I was busy entering in the new runway I got distracted and approach called to 'check altitude' as we were below the minimum vectoring altitude. It was then that I realize the first officer had descended to 7;000 feet approximately 10 miles early. Just as the First officer was leveling off we received a blurb of a 'terrain' warning and we climbed back up to 8;000 ft. The rest of approach was normal. Having been flying into Denver for many years I know better. To rub it in and make me feel even worse was; the next morning as I was flight planning and waiting for dispatch to load flight plan I read the weekly bulletin that on the front page addressed descending too early on a visual approach.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported descending early during a visual approach to DEN resulting in a low altitude alert from Approach Control followed quickly by an EGPWS terrain warning. The flying First Officer climbed from 7;000 feet to 8;000 feet.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Approach Coupler
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Fatigue
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were set up for the RNAV 25 approach with V ref (30) +5 speed [and] FAF altitude correctly inserted into the FMC at the FAF. LNAV and VNAV were the active lateral and vertical modes with autopilot and auto throttles engaged. First Officer was the Pilot Flying. We were in VMC conditions at 2500 feet; (estimated cloud bases at 3000 feet during the descent) and had the runway in sight directly ahead. Prior to the FAF; the Pilot Flying dialed the Decision Altitude into the Altitude window and upon reaching the FAF the aircraft pitched down normally to follow the path.During configuration change to flaps 30 and speed reduction to the final approach speed; the aircraft; for some unknown reason; suddenly pitched down reaching approximately 1500 FPM rate of descent. The Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot and took over manually to arrest the descent rate; however the GPWS announced 'Obstacle' during the recovery. The Pilot Flying leveled the aircraft to re-intercept the VNAV path and the remainder of the approach was stable and uneventful.I can't remember making the 1000 feet call; but distinctly recall making the 500 feet call and the aircraft stabilized. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Contributing factors: early report time; extreme cold weather; tail swap in departure airport; pressure to block out on time for the leg; irregular sleep and nutrition during the layover; circadian flip/flops and cumulative fatigue from previous days on the pairing. In addition; the event occurred on my 10th consecutive day of work.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: An Air Carrier flight crew reported that after the glideslope was captured some unknown reason the aircraft suddenly pitched down.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MBS.TRACON, MI
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON MBS
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Approach Control and switched an EA-50 on a visual approach to Tower. Tower had one in the pattern and tried to put a Cessna in front of the EA-50.  It appeared to me the [aircraft] were nose to nose on a base leg to Runway 23. Tower then saw it wasn't going to work; and told the Cessna to go around and side step right. The problem was the Cessna was still on base and caused him to cut right in front of the EA-50 and they looked very close on the D-Brite. I just asked where was the Cessna going because I was very uncomfortable with the whole situation; but I was afraid to really say anything because of the supervisor being there.




Synopsis: MBS Controller witnessed a traffic pattern conflict when the Local Controller issued a questionable clearance resulting in traffic on opposite base legs nose to nose.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LBE.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D LBE
ATC / advisory: Tower LBE
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We came into close contact with terrain during a visual approach to runway 23 in LBE. At night approximately 8 nm southeast of LBE we were cleared for the visual into runway 23 at 4;500 ft. MSL. I was the pilot flying and began a descent to 2;700 ft. (the pattern altitude) and turned right to enter the downwind. As we approached 3;000 ft.; the first officer noticed terrain started to obscure the city lights on the horizon. I leveled off and began a turn for the base leg. On the base leg we passed the terrain and continued the descent to the pattern altitude and then to intercept the glideslope on a 4 nm final. There was no EGPWS warning and now low altitude warning from the tower.During the taxi to the FBO; the tower asked us for our N-number. I thought that was strange request and thought that we might have triggered a low altitude warning even though they didn't say anything to us.While the approach plate does not indicate high terrain along our approach (only the antennas at 2;953 ft. and 8 nm final); the sectional chart does show a ridgeline over our base leg. Based on our flight path over the sectional chart; I believe we were within 200 feet of the terrain.While we did review and brief the ILS approach plate; we did not review the sectional chart which would have shown the ridgeline not depicted on the approach plate.




Synopsis: CE-560XL Captain reported coming within 200 feet of terrain on a night visual approach to LBE without receiving a warning from the EGPWS.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: UGN.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I filed an IFR flight plan from UGN; over Lake Michigan. I only do this in late summer and in daytime as the Cessna T210N is a single engine light aircraft. I filed for 11;000 FT and way points that would keep me clear of the Class B outer ring centered on ORD. My goal is to climb as fast as possible to have glide range in the event of an issue. If I file a lakefront route; Chicago Approach vectors me far to the west adding 40 minutes or more to my flight time; as compared with a Victor airway lakefront routing (I've tried and they won't grant). On this flight they restricted me to 4;000 FT. I asked Chicago Approach I was told I could not climb due to O'hare traffic. I have TIS and saw no traffic at all the entire episode within 12 NM and +/- 3;000 FT. When I was switched to Chicago Center I asked again and got the climb but a vector which extended my time over water significantly. There should be a reasonable method to allow small aircraft to cross the minimum distance and climb quickly over the water so as to minimize the risks. I think this is a policy issue more than any ATC conflict rules. Whether a lake crossing; or a trip on the Victor airways across the lakefront or a trip around the west of Chicago; under IFR the controllers vector me way out of the way; increasing risk. If I were to cancel; or fly VFR (outside of the Class B or under); I could fly any route I choose; not participate in the flow; and fly the safest route. It makes no sense that by filing IFR I am put at much higher risk; whereas if I fly VFR I reduce my risk but put other aircraft at risk; and push the controllers to keep IFR aircraft clear of me. Chicago TRACON should adopt a lakefront IFR corridor for small aircraft; a West IFR corridor; and a lakefront overflight corridor that allow safe flight.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot expressed concern regarding the ATC procedures used to handle IFR aircraft flying in the vicinity of ORD; indicating IFR handling results in high risk over water flights compared to VFR operations.
Date: 201902
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp; Vehicle Driver
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I hooked up the tow bar and pushback tractor and continued helping my crew load the flight. Last minute freight arrived at the gate and I jumped in the back pit to load the 5 or 6 boxes that came late. Got out; went to the front of the plane to get on the headset. Once I started pushing out; about 5 seconds into the push I noticed the plane become disconnected from the tug. At this point I didn't know what to tell the pilot because in training I wasn't presented with this type situation or informed the proper verbiage to relay to pilot. I continued to drive with the plane so I wouldn't disconnect the headset from the plane and lose all communication with pilot. Once I [saw] the plane coming to a stop I slowed and came to a stop as well. The plane rolled back onto the push tractor.




Synopsis: Tractor driver reported failing to communicate with the pilot due to lack of training when the aircraft disconnected from the tractor during pushback.
Date: 201512
Location: IAD.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 2.5
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: TAF visibility was 3 SM between an hour before and hour after arrival. Forecast to drop to 1 SM roughly six hours after our arrival. We picked up the ATIS on arrival (1/4 mile; ceilings indefinite 002). Promptly contacted dispatch to work out a viable alternate. Discussed alternatives (ZZZ would have resulted in Min Fuel with ~2.3 fuel remaining); ZZZ1 is not in our Ops Specs; ultimately decided on ZZZ2 as our alternate. The RVR was fluctuating between 1600 and 2000. RVR dropped to 1600 (needed RVR 1800 for 19C) just prior to reaching FAF; we went missed. Dispatch wanted us to try again; which was not going to happen with ZZZ2 deteriorating as well. Proceeded direct to ZZZ2 (ATIS: vis 2 1/2; 003 overcast) and landed. Though not required; I should have requested an alternate with TAF reading 3 SM; light winds; and a tight spread. [Suggest] Dispatch Provide an alternate whenever borderline necessary. [And] Training for dispatchers on how to look out for 'unexpected' deteriorating weather; classic case-in-point above. [Lastly] Monitor destination weather and communicate deteriorating weather with pilot's enroute to help the crew start planning prior to arrival when workload increases. [Suggest] Company Stress/communicate conservative fuel planning to dispatchers when conditions anything less than ideal. [and] CAT II capability would have given us extra margin for safety; and it would have allowed us avoid the diversion.


Second narrative: While no alternate was required; pilots and dispatchers need to consider local weather patterns; (i.e. springtime; airports near rivers or in a valley; dawn or dusk; tight temperature and dew point spreads; could be favorable to fog formation). Take this into consideration for fuel loads; and when planning for or requesting an alternate airport. Dispatch watching for deteriorating conditions and notifying the flight crew enroute with updated conditions could be helpful; and reduce workload in the descent and approach segments of flight; and having the ACARS capability to receive ATIS enroute would allow the flight crew to monitor marginal weather conditions and alert dispatch so planning could be accomplished in a timely manner.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported they were legally dispatched to IAD with no alternate; but were forced to divert to an alternate when weather deteriorated enroute.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C OAK
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On arrival to KOAK. Radios were probably 3 by 5 at best speaking to NorCal. They had been working 5 by 5 until this time across the entire country. Suspect it was NorCal radio. Nevertheless; cleared direct to MYFUT to intercept the Localizer to Rwy30 at KOAK. Misunderstood Controller and selected direct MITOE instead. MYFUT is further out on the approach to ILS30 at KOAK. After approximately 30 seconds; the Controller asked if we were proceeding direct MYFUT? We realized our mistake and asked for a heading. He provided it and we turned about 10 degrees left. The remainder of the approach was uneventful. All we both understood was the 'my' portion of the word. Unfortunately; there are 2 points on the same approach to KOAK that are separated by only one other point that starts with the same sound. One is spelled with 'My' & the other is spelled with 'Mi'; but they both sound the same.We should have asked for clarification from the Controller. But I also think; for safety sake; the name of one of the two points should be changed to something that doesn't start with the same sound as the other.




Synopsis: A Medium Transport flight crew misunderstood the clearance; 'Direct to MYFUT' on the ILS30 to KOAK and selected the similar sounding fix; MITOE by mistake.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Data Computer
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through approximate FL250 in IMC and icing conditions; we got an IAS Disagree alert on the PFDs.  We noticed a difference between the Captain's and First Officer's airspeed indicators.  Shortly after; we got an ALT Disagree alert as well.  We realized the Captain's instruments and the STBY information were correct.  While we ran the Airspeed Unreliable checklist we coordinated with ATC for a block altitude of FL320-340 and a vector to the west to avoid the weather in the northeast.  At FL320 the Captain's and the STBY airspeed indicators were about 290 knots and the First Officer's was 150 knots; and the altimeters differed by about 800 feet.  We also had an ENG annunciation for the EECs in ALTN mode and completed that checklist as well.  We informed Dispatch and coordinated a divert to ZZZ1.  We [spoke] with ATC but required no further assistance.  We completed the Overweight Landing checklist--we would be landing just under 160;000 lbs.  Descending through about 16;000 feet on arrival the First Officer's instruments returned to normal.  We completed an uneventful approach and landing and taxied to the gate.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported during climb to FL250 aircraft began to experience multiple Air Data Systems failures; compelling Flight Crew to divert to make a precautionary landing.