elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202012
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: It was the middle of a very heavy snow [storm] and strong winds. We made it to the de-icing pad and were de-iced and had anti-icing applied (100% Type IV). I noticed on the way to the runway that the side cockpit windows were still snow covered. In fact; they did not do any sort of de/anti-icing of the front of the aircraft. I told the Captain I wanted to call back to the de-icing crew and ask them about it; but the Captain said it didn't matter. So we took off after I did the wing inspection. As we accelerated in the climbout; we hear numerous large chunks of ice fly off the airplane; loud enough that I wrote the airplane up and told maintenance they needed to do an aircraft inspection after landing.  Upon further reflection; I am sure they did not de-ice the fuselage.  With heavy; wet snow falling; they should have.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported noticing their aircraft was not properly de-iced; but the Captain disagreed and decided to take off.  Reporter stated that during climbout possible 'chunks of ice' hit the aircraft resulting in maintenance inspection.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft; MEL
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The NEF 52-40c; requires a Door Verification for the integrity and condition of the metallic speed tape application PRIOR TO EACH DEPARTURE. The grand majority of the AMT are not documenting this verification in logbook; because the (M) procedure instructions in this NEF are very confusing. The AML is classified as the major historical record of the aircraft since it contains records of pilot reported irregularities; 'ACTION TAKEN'. Every Action Taken must be documented in the AML as required per GPM section 05.01. To make this situation more complicated for the MOC-MCTs the MOCPM section 03.06.5 (A) 1. Requires that a Maintenance Hold will be applied to an aircraft when MOC has identified a task that must be accomplished prior to flight departure; The MCT is required to remove Maintenance Hold and release the aircraft when 'POSITIVE' confirmation that the task has been accomplished. the problem with this is that we cannot do a positive confirmation if the verification Action Taken required per the NEF was not documented in the logbook. This MEL verification procedure must be corrected to ensure traceability with the FAA/CASS DEPT; and the safety of our flight crew and passenger. In order to correct this issue a logbook entry signifying verification of the tape; must be required to be in compliances with the GPM section 05.01 and FAR 14 CFR 121.701.




Synopsis: Technician reported that an MEL/NEF item on an aircraft required a reinspection and log book entry before every departure and was not accomplished as required.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I stepped off the aircraft to use the restroom since we had 30 minutes before boarding. Operations was not around. I asked the lady at the desk (customer service) if she could let me back on to plane. She said you need to wait for the operations agent to return. I then texted the C Flight Attendant and asked her to please let me back on aircraft. She did. Five minutes later customer service came down questioning how I got back on aircraft and I told her. She then told me I can not do that and it could be a security breach. I was unaware that what I did was wrong but now I do.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight attendant reported boarding an aircraft without an Operations Agent present; causing an inadvertent violation of company policy.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: We had already been cleared for the ILS Runway 8 Approach and we were following the localizer and glideslope using the autopilot. At approximately 2;400 feet on glideslope; the Tower Controller advised us that we had traffic at our 1 o'clock position at about a mile. Neither the Pilot Flying nor I saw the other aircraft; and as Pilot Monitoring; I advised Tower as such. Within a few seconds; TCAS gave us an RA; stating 'Monitor Vertical Speed' and displayed symbol accordingly on our PFD screens. The Pilot Flying took manual control and leveled our VSI following the RA guidance. As we monitored the TCAS symbol for the traffic we noted that it was showing 600 feet below our altitude and continuing from ahead and right of our path toward our intended course. The Pilot Flying then adjusted course slightly left of the localizer course line. Soon after this adjustment; the TCAS advised that the traffic conflict was resolved. The Pilot Flying then recorrected back to localizer course and glideslope which was easily accomplished being that we were no more than one dot left of localizer and one dot above glideslope. As Pilot Monitoring; I told Tower that the conflict was resolved; but that we had gotten the RA and followed the guidance; and were continuing the approach. The rest of the approach went without further event.




Synopsis: An air carrier First Officer on an ILS final approach reported responding to a RA and taking evasive action to avoid an unidentified converging VFR aircraft.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: General Dynamics or Convair Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During RTB (return to base); flight crew noted higher than anticipated fuel burn. Deviations due to developing weather forced the aircraft to fly well outside its intended flight path in order to remain safely airborne. Coupled with high winds (270/45) en route; the aircraft reached ZZZ at a state approaching minimum fuel. The flight crew realized the criticality of landing promptly and requested a descent en route. Due to operational provisions; the aircraft is required to maintain Class A airspace until entering restricted airspace where it may descend to join up with its chase aircraft and then RTB. The pilot determined that fuel would drop to a dangerous level and elected to descend below Class A; using the lower power setting in the transition to minimize fuel burn. Once in restricted airspace; the pilot delayed long enough to join with the assigned chase aircraft and then proceeded directly to land. The aircraft landed below minimum fuel level. During this rejoin period; a Center supervisor called and treated the pilot with open hostility while discussing the issue. He ignored the pilot's attempted explanation of his fuel constraints.




Synopsis: UAV operator reported having to exit restricted airspace early due to a low fuel state.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Let me start by saying this event could have been prevented simply by me issuing the CRJ-200 an altitude of 90. I was working D-N for the first time since coming off my RDO's. Fusion RADAR was implemented on my RDO's. I was getting familiar with the new RADAR and adjusting the levels earlier in the session. I never got into a groove and felt comfortable how the targets were moving. However traffic was light and I issued the MD-90 a vector off the STAR and anticipated climbing him as soon as he got turned to the northwest. He delayed his turn then took about 5 miles to make a 110 degree turn or so. I subsequently turned the departure behind him which turned in a more normal fashion. This would not normally have been a factor but the MD-90 was then put in a position where I had to wait to climb him due to arrival traffic. This delay; coupled with the Tower advising me via land line of a no-tag; allowed me to get the two aircraft closer than anticipated. I told the MD-90 to tighten his turn when I recognized the length it was taking him to turn. I should have then gone back to the CRJ-200 and issued 9;000 feet; but I didn't. I do believe the unfamiliar feeling of the new RADAR had me distracted enough to miss this simple mistake. I asked the MD-90 to say altitude leaving and he said 10;800 while his Mode C read 10;100. Leaving aircraft on the STAR would have eliminated this issue. However I was trying to save some flying miles. I will be more diligent to issue a paper stop on crossing traffic.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller experienced a loss of separation event claiming that working with the new 'fusion' RADAR display was distracting and contributed to the occurrence.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORF.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flying in the lower Chesapeake Bay at 2;500 feet heading west. Passenger in right seat caught a glimpse of an aircraft to the right about 500 feet away and 50 feet above. Aircraft was a single engine Cessna. I made a quick turn to the left and descended. Other aircraft made a climbing turn.




Synopsis: A VFR pilot reported a near miss at 2;500 feet over the Chesapeake Bay. Both pilots took simultaneous evasive actions.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Yesterday [we] had a pressurization issue on the climb out when we got an OVBD COOL Amber and INBD COOL FAIL Status Message.We finished our climb checklist than proceeded to run the QRH for OVBD COOL; the First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying (PF) so he took the radios too and we also discussed to stay at [10;000 feet]; until we finished QRH procedures.QRH was finished and required us to stay at [10;000 feet]; at this point [I] discussed the plan with the FO and we continued to [destination]. We advised the Flight Attendant and passengers; also communicated with Dispatch via ACARS. We requested a slow descent; [and] landed unpressurized. No other issues. Maintenance was waiting at the gate when we got there.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Captain reported continuing a short flight to destination following the loss of their pressurization system.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Indication
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon applying takeoff power the takeoff warning horn sounded and I rejected the takeoff and taxied clear of the runway. The speed was under 20kts at the time the reject was accomplished and no reverse or braking was required. After starting the engines and selecting flaps to 5 degrees the flap circuit breaker had tripped without us realizing it. After we completed deicing the aircraft craft the First officer requested the information from ops for the fluid used and other required information. They responded saying they would have to get back to us with that information since the radio in the truck was not working and they were relaying the info. While we were running the taxi checklist ops came back with the information and interrupted the checklist while the first officer read Flap -Verify- 5 selected and indicating. Neither the first officer nor myself looked at the actual indication of the flaps after the interruption. This lead to an improper configuration for takeoff which sounded the takeoff warning horn. Takeoff was rejected and we taxied clear of the runway; once clear we looked at all items that would cause the horn to sound and found that the flaps were indicating 0 degrees yet the flap lever was at 5 degrees. I then looked to see if the circuit breaker had tripped and it had. I called dispatch and was transferred to maintenance control and advised them of the events. We decided to return to the gate and deplane until maintenance could look at the aircraft. We should have run the taxi checklist over again from the beginning instead of continuing from the last item when the interruption occurred.


Second narrative: Flaps failed to travel to the position they were set to. Mismatch indication between the flap setting and indicator. Electrical problem; the breaker popped. Rejected takeoff; maintenance was called and the breaker was reset. Ops checked good. We were redispatched.


Synopsis: Dash-8 flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff due to the takeoff warning horn sounding. Once clear of the runway; the crew recognized that the flaps were not in the selected position. A circuit breaker was found popped which prevented the flap movement.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X; and Aircraft Y; departed MEM simultaneously. Aircraft X departed Runway 36L. Aircraft Y departed Runway 36C. I noticed Aircraft Y commencing a left turn into Aircraft X at roughly the same altitude. I immediately turned Aircraft X left heading 230 and amended his altitude to maintain 3;000 FT. Once standard IFR separation was established; I sent Aircraft X on his way and climbed him. There are two north SIDs that are closely named (CRSON and CASLN). One of the two needs to be renamed. Aircraft Y was supposed to have been on the CRSON1 departure as cleared. In fact; the aircraft was navigating via the CASLN1 departure. That was the root cause of the issue; I believe. This is not the first occurrence that I know of. The last time; there was not an aircraft on departure from another runway.




Synopsis: M03 Controller described a developing conflict when traffic issued the CRSON SID was navigating via the CASLN SID; the reporter noting that this was not the first instance of pilots confusing these similar SID names.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X; was filed ...A590.HAMND...AMOTT…  I gave a restriction to cross AMOTT at 12;000 feet.  Aircraft X reached HAMND; and immediately made a sharp right turn off course; presumably toward the fix NONDA.  I had lower; slower moving traffic ahead and to the east of Aircraft X's route; and had I not caught the mistake; or had the other traffic been higher; there easily could have been a loss of separation.  I asked Aircraft X what routing they were showing.  They responded: 'AMOTT 8 arrival'; which is not what my strip said.  This was the second instance in 2 days of an aircraft not flying the routing we were showing in the NAS.  I spoke with the controller who worked the aircraft in the previous sector; and he said that he had not given any route change.  All other indications were that no route change had been issued by any previous ZAN controller; leading me to believe that the problem originated prior to Aircraft X entering ZAN airspace.  My guess is that either an incorrect flight plan from the previous Center was activated; the flight plan received from the other Center was incorrect; or the original clearance off of the departure airport differed from what the pilots were showing and it wasn't caught.As far as I understand; aircraft are usually cleared 'as filed' on long routes like this; and small errors in the routing thousands of miles from origin might go unnoticed.  More verification needs to be done between what the pilot's routing shows; and what is on the controller's strips.




Synopsis: ZAN Controller reports of an aircraft entering his airspace that takes a wrong turn. CPC queries pilot and determines route is different than what the controller had.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Dangerous Goods in checked baggage. Passenger had two containers of Coconut Oil Spray; items were discovered and removed from baggage by TSA.




Synopsis: Air carrier Cargo Safety Analyst reported passenger baggage contained prohibited Hazmat items.