elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Staffing
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to ZZZ. Aircraft Y in trail was cleared for a Visual Approach to ZZZ1. I've been told that Aircraft X received an RA from a helicopter on a 3 mile final and they proceeded to go around. I informed Aircraft Y to cancel approach clearance; then began to give them instructions for a re-sequence. I issued 'Cancel approach clearance; fly heading 360; climb and maintain 4;000 ft.'. Aircraft Y was currently in a 3;000 ft. Minimum Vectoring Altitude descending out of 3;000 ft. They began their turn and climb shortly after leaving 2;700 ft. On Aircraft Y's base turn; Aircraft Z was climbed northbound towards Aircraft Y's final leaving 3;000 ft. Aircraft Y descended to 3;500 ft. and received a TCAS RA. They were still able to make a visual approach. The correct way that I should have handled Aircraft Y's re-sequence is I should have first issued a climb and waited for them to begin their climb; before issuing a turn. It is unfortunate; because if; for example; I had a ZZZ departure climbing on a 360 heading leaving 2;100 ft.; I would have been in compliance.ZZZ should have better handled the helicopter traffic and Aircraft X. We were short staffed in the area. It may have been helpful to have another Controller available to help assist; but all of us were doing 1.5 hour rotations on position. Satellite airport VFR departures are a poor operation. I'm not sure when it began; but why are we working and identifying aircraft that are not in our airspace? Even more so satellite airport Towers depart aircraft and assign them frequency changes to this sector without a hand off. Most of the time it is not an issue; but the sector can get saturated and adding more aircraft is not ideal. The Supervisor was helpful in the recovery process.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller reported that VFR traffic from a satellite airport created a conflict and resulted in a go-around.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: I recently completed the B737 Max training. I found the training to be good but do have concern for the Airspeed unreliable when the stick shaker is going continually. The loudness contributes to a continued distraction and ability to clearly communicate. This all for an erroneous warning. The ability is there to disable the erroneous stick shaker via pulling the offending circuit breaker. This is somewhat analogous to not silencing the fire bell until the fire is out and you're on the ground. Additionally; with the distraction; auto throttles off while running the QRH; the opportunity presents itself for masking a real stick shaker if in low speed event. Would you recognize the other stick shaker going off if the pilot monitoring was not on the controls? One additional step in the QRH after identifying the erroneous side would take a significant distraction out of the equation. Other than the initial stick shaker and identifying the erroneous airspeed indication; I feel the continuous stick shaker is the greatest threat in this situation. By taking away the erroneous stick shaker distraction you can eliminate one of the 'holes in the cheese'.

Callback: Reporter clarified that the report describes his experience in the B737 MAX simulator; not an actual aircraft.



Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported while in a 737 MAX Simulator; with an airspeed unreliable situation; the unreliable airspeed indicator with associated stick shaker warning is too loud and makes communication difficult.
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While waiting to exit the ramp; I pulled up a Takeoff Performance System (TPS) for [Runway] XXL and XYR EE as it appeared both were in use. We were told to follow company to XXL; but the company aircraft we pulled behind was going to XYR EE. We resolved the discrepancy and taxied down [Taxiway] XX toward [Runway] XXL. Being in a MAX; I paid close attention to the engine selection as I entered the TPS data. As a result; I missed the obvious first step of changing the runway on the route page. We completed the before takeoff checklist as we were entering the runway and discovered that XYR was selected for takeoff. I changed the runway to XXL and we initiated the roll. As a result of the runway change the aircraft reverted to TO and we didn't have V speeds displayed. The takeoff was uneventful otherwise.Serious congestion on the ZZZ ground frequency. They are still using the same frequency for both outbound and inbound aircraft. First time flying the MAX since it's return. Late in the evening after a long duty period. Confidence in being able to fix the issues on the fly.Slow down and be willing to stop when task saturated.




Synopsis: B737 MAX First Officer reports missing an entry in the Takeoff Performance System.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL410; the number 2 engine spooled back and the ENG FAIL alert was displayed. The Captain was flying and I was ready with the QRH. We started the drift down procedure. We were light that morning and the Engine Out Max Altitude was FL310. I requested a descent clearance to FL310; it was a slow descent. We started running the Engine Failure or Shutdown QRH. The engine indications we such that we attempted an engine restart. Following the QRH we accomplished the engine in flight start checklist. In order to do a crossbleed or windmill start we had to descend to FL240.We tried the windmill start first. No success. The second attempt was the crossbleed start; no success on that start either. While we were attempting the starts the Captain had already sent a message to Dispatch to see where they wanted us to divert to. The answer was [a nearby airport]. At that point we [advised ATC of the situation] and started our divert. I started setting up the approach; got the weather and NOTAMs; and ran the landing performance [calculations] for the first time in non-normal landing conditions flaps 15. We ran the one engine inoperative landing checklist. We landed without any further issues.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported diverting to a nearby alternate after the #2 engine failed in cruise flight at FL410.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Flight was to depart at XA:00z at XA:02Z I received alert message that a MEL was added; I immediately messaged ramp agent on teams to ensure they voided the positions.  I did not send the MEL to the crew as I thought I had. The crew did not [ask for it] either.  Later at approximately XA:45Z I recalled that I had not sent and uplinked to the crew.I was so concentrated on ensuring the ramp new asap as the flight was past departure time; I forgot to send the crew the MEL. I was also busy updating crews in flight with new weather.  My process is usually not to acknowledge a message until I have handled it.  I did not follow that in this case.  I acknowledge the message; sent the info to ZZZ ramp and forgot to send the MEL to crew as I was working other things. I will not be straying from this process again.


Second narrative: After the load was complete and the door was closed the ramp agent got our attention from the ground and said Maintenance was fixing the paperwork. We told them that they had already updated the release documentation previously. We reopened the main door to get a new release documentation. We understood that Maintenance had repaired a broken cargo floor lock. It turns out that there was a broken cargo lock that required an MEL. We were never told by the load crew that there was a problem; they probably avoided the cockpit due to the COVID virus. The new release documentation had an MEL added that we should have relayed to operations before takeoff. We realized we had missed the addition of the MEL when operations sent us an ACARS message at approximately 18;000 feet.  The confusion could have been cleared up with a brief conversation with either Maintenance or the ramp to be informed of the failed lock.Confusion due to not being informed by the load crew or Maintenance of a cargo lock failure. We were initially delayed for the release documentation being rewritten and thought that was the new delay. Clear; concise communication with load crew and Maintenance on aircraft status. Also carefully reading the new release documentation for additional MEL items.


Synopsis: Air carrier Captain and Dispatcher reported missing a document that was needed before departure.  Dispatch sent the document when aircraft was airborne.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLA.ARTCC, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Utility / Infrastructure
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was informed by Quality Control that an aircraft; Aircraft X had filed a NMAC. The other aircraft in question was Aircraft Y; a parachute jumping aircraft that operates at ZZZ airport regularly. I did not remember the aircraft in question due to the event happening [12 days earlier]. I reviewed the Falcon and tapes to see what had happened. I was providing flight following to Aircraft X transitioning near ZZZ. When Aircraft Y aircraft checks on frequency; we radar identify them and issue traffic advisories. They give us a 5 minute warning before jumpers away. At this point Aircraft X was still about 40-50 miles away from ZZZ. The issue with Aircraft Y is that they sometimes do not tell you when they are leaving frequency and they switch over to ZZZ tower. Aircraft Y descended and then went into Coast Track. Since I was not aware of any radar outages in that area; I assumed Aircraft Y was lower than Aircraft X or even on deck. Aircraft X was at 9500; and I did not remind them of parachute operations. Aircraft X transitioned near ZZZ and then I eventually handed the aircraft off to Center. Aircraft X never told me that he/she came within close proximity to Aircraft Y.In the future I would recommend that no aircraft be allowed to transition within 5 miles of the jump zone until ZZZ tower calls with all jumpers on the ground. Especially if our radar does not allow us to see what altitude the parachute jumping aircraft is at.




Synopsis: ZLA Center Controller reported that a pilot reported a NMAC between them and a skydiving aircraft.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HTS.Airport, WV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Jet/Long Ranger/206
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Tower HTS
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flying mostly south; with a little west. Sun glared in my eyes. Tilted head down to shade my eyes. Additionally; head was down adjusting radio to monitor HTS TRSA. Looked up and realized a small; single engine plane had crossed from west to east; barely in front and above the helicopter. (Recall seeing a low wing; modern composite airplane.)The airplane continued straight and level; with no flight deviations that would indicate awareness or concern about the proximity. Expect the other pilot's vision obscured by their airframe. My vision was obscured by the sun; the protective tilt of my head; and the airframe post on the pilot's right (right hand flight controls).




Synopsis: B206L4 helicopter pilot reported an NMAC with a small single engine aircraft in the vicinity of HTS.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Reverser Lockout
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other On  Landing
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: One night; February 2012; I; Mechanic X; and Mechanic Y continued to remove the Bleed Valve off of an A320 aircraft for an engine boroscope from where swing shift had left off.  After the Engine Shop had finished with the boroscope; we both proceeded to reinstall the bleed valve per the Maintenance Manual Supplement 72-037.  After installation; I ran the engine for a leak check.  Then we towed the plane down to the gate. Apparently when the plane was approaching the runway in ZZZ1; the reverser would not deploy upon landing.  The mechanics in ZZZ1 had found that the reverser was still locked-out.  That's when I got a call from Supervisor X on my Days-off and he had told me what they had found in ZZZ1.  I told Supervisor X that there was no write-up that the reverser had been locked-out per the General Maintenance Manual (GMM).  So then I called up my partner; Mechanic Y; and he told me that Swing Shift [Maintenance] had left a note up in the cockpit taped to FADEC; saying the reverser had been locked-out; but [he] did not bring it to my attention at the time.  He had told me this three days later; also on his Days-off.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports an engine Reverser on an A320 aircraft failed to deploy upon landing after he had completed a bleed valve installation.  Mechanic also noted that a lack of adequate shift turnover information and failure by the previous shift to make a write-up for the Locked-out reverser; contributed to the event.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X delayed over an hour due to a Dangerous Goods (DG) issue in cargo position XX.  While flight was delayed; both ZZZ ramp agent and service recovery asked if I had heard from the crew.  I had not; yet crew was telling ZZZ ramp agents they were on phone with Dispatch.  ACARS message sent for clarification; where they again stated they were on phone with Dispatch.  Crew then said they called the number on the DG manifest which went to the Dispatch manager's desk in Domestic and no one there notified anyone in International; either myself or service recovery.  I was never directly involved in the issue at all; other than to receive an ACARS from the crew later saying everything had been taken care of.There are three issues which lead to this.  First; the crew; rather than contact their Dispatcher directly or send an ACARS; they instead chose to use a number that shows up randomly on the DG manifest.  Second; the phone number on the DG manifest needs to be tailored to go to the most appropriate person if there's a question; not just default to Domestic Dispatcher.  Finally; if Domestic Dispatcher is getting calls from International flights; then they need to be told to make sure to pass those to the appropriate person in International Dispatch; whether that may be the dispatcher or service recovery specialist.Fix the automatic number on the DG manifest to go to some number other than Domestic Dispatch.  D.G. issues are usually more of service recovery issue than flight dispatch; so I would recommend having it default to whoever the box person is for the given flight.  Continue pounding it into the crewmembers' heads that Dispatchers share joint Operational Control with the Captain and need to be involved when there are issues with a flight.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown between Dispatch Operations and flight crew regarding a Hazmat issue during pre-flight. Hazmat issue was resolved but highlighted discrepancies with Dispatch communications procedures.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLE.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: SA-227 AC Metro III
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLE
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: I was parked at the FBO; off Taxiway L2. I was given taxi instructions 'Taxi to 24L via L2; L; W; hold short of 24L.'  I looked at my NACO airport diagram and misread it. On the bottom of the chart; there is a longitude marking of 81.52W. The 'W' made it appear that Taxiway 'T' was Taxiway 'W'.Instead of making a right turn on Taxiway L; I made a left turn on Taxiway L and was proceeding to what I thought was Taxiway W. Ground asked me if I was heading southwest; and I confirmed that I was. I was then told to turn around on Pad 5 and taxi as previously instructed. There was no threat of an aircraft collision.I believe that having this longitude marking makes it easy to mistake Taxiway 'T' for Taxiway 'W' and should be relocated to another point on the chart. It is the same size and font as the rest of the taxiway labels.




Synopsis: An SA-227 pilot mistook the 'W' in a NACO airport chart longitude marking (81.52W) as a taxiway designator at CLE and taxied southwest bound toward 6R after being cleared to runway 24L via Lima 2; Lima and Whiskey. The actual W taxiway is at the departure end of 24L.