elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During approach to ATL we were vectored out of the Class B airspace and told we would re-enter in 5 miles. The preceding aircraft was also vectored out of the Class B. The ILS was functional and all aircraft were on IFR  flight plans. I believe this was done by ATC in order to assign visual approaches. Part 121 IFR traffic should never be vectored out of the Class B. This extremely unsafe practice defeats the entire purpose for having Class B airspace. VFR traffic is excluded allowing the traffic to the Class B anchor airport separation from each other. Class B airspace (then TCA) came into being due to the midair collision causing great loss of life in a similar situation. It is apparent ATC believes the requirement for aircraft operating within the Mode C veil and under Class B airspace to have ADS-B Out capability allows them to see all aircraft. This is simply not true. There are many aircraft types which can legally operate in this airspace without ADS-B Out capability. Gliders; ultralights and any Part 91 aircraft never having had an electrical system are some of the types. A midair collision between an airliner on an IFR clearance and one of these VFR types operating legally in the airspace would be catastrophic. The presence of a Part 91 aircraft required to have ADS-B Out capability but with an ADS-B equipment failure unknown to the pilot in command would be another possibility. All of this is easily avoidable. Keep the traffic requiring the Class B confined to that airspace as ATC is supposed to do. Do not have airliners outside of their protected airspace infringing on airspace where other traffic may be. The price of an error on the part of a controller; pilot or equipment is simply too high. We should have been kept in the Class B and given clearance to fly the ILS we were told to expect and for which we were briefed and prepared.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported ATL TRACON vectors commercial aircraft outside of Class B airspace on approach.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were assigned 210 knots on downwind while on the Arrival.... After turning us North on a vector toward final; the Controller switched us to the final Approach Controller. The final Approach Controller cleared us for a Visual Approach.... In my experience; if a Controller wants us at a certain speed to the FAF; he will usually assign it with the approach clearance. We did not get a speed assignment with the visual approach clearance. The Captain asked me if we could now slow down since we were cleared for a Visual Approach; and I said 'I think so.' He began to slow and configure since we were going to join the final approach course right at the FAF. After a minute or so; the Controller asked us to say our speed which I reported as 190 knots. He said that for future reference; we should maintain the speed previously assigned until told otherwise and then told us to maintain 180 knots to the Final Approach Fix and switched us to the Tower.


Second narrative: Approximately nine miles southeast of the airport; we were asked if we had the airfield in sight. Upon answering yes; we were given a vector of 360. Shortly after that vector; we were given a new heading of 330 and we were cleared for a visual approach.... Having been cleared for a visual approach; with no additional airspeed instructions (i.e. maintain 170 to a five-mile final); I began slowing the aircraft. Almost immediately; Approach asked us what airspeed we were flying. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) responded 190 knots. Approach told us; in the future; we were to maintain last assigned airspeed until further instructed. I made the assumption that upon clearance for a visual approach; with no further assigned airspeed restrictions; it was my discretion to maneuver and slow the aircraft as necessary to ensure a stable approach.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew commenced slowing the aircraft for final configuration after being cleared by ATC for a Visual Approach. ATC advised that the previously assigned speed was to have been maintained until the Final Approach Fix.
Date: 201602
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Stall Warning System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute; left flaps transit light; with 3D LED on right wing annunciator. Complied with QRH and contacted Dispatch via ACARS. During coordination with Dispatch the light went out. Approach: All normal (no lights) visual flaps 30. After completely configured for landing flaps 30 and slowing to target airspeed at around 1;500 feet AGL at about 155 knots IAS we received stick shaker; followed by 'Airspeed Low' voice indication. We immediately did a full power go-around. I noted that the HUD; my Primary Flight Display (PFD); FO PFD and standby; all said same airspeed. After clean-up from go-around; the same leading edge extension light came back on as before.Downwind vectors: Repeated QRH steps. As per QRH; set up for a flaps 15 landing. This time I did not communicate with Dispatch due to time constraints with three page QRH procedure and lots of Approach Control issues. While being vectored around; I discussed with FO that if we received stick shaker again that we would both confirm and verify that all airspeed indications are correct and if so that we would continue the approach. My feeling is that going around and doing it all again was not going to fix anything; and a third time vectoring around could make fuel a problem.Final: Flaps 15 fully configured. At same airspeed as first approach 155 knots; again received stick shaker. This time though it was about same as target airspeed (because of QRH flaps 15). I double/triple checked all airspeed indications. Also aircraft attitude and engines were normal. Before I could verify with FO; the stick shaker quit and all seemed normal. We elected to continue to a normal flaps 15 landing.Post Flight: Maintenance met us at gate; first check they did was stick shaker check; and the check failed.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported that after running the QRH for a left flaps transit light they received a stick shaker on approach that was later traced to a malfunctioning stall warning system.
Date: 201603
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: PA-24 Comanche
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Twin Otter DHC-6
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After completing a practice RNAV approach to Runway 5; I landed and was rolling out on Runway 5. During the rollout DHC-6 calls jump plane departing [intersecting runway] and obstructs the runway intersection. I yell 'look out' on radio as max braking was applied to prevent a collision. I was able to get the aircraft stopped in time. Pilot on jump plane said 'sorry thought you were clearing on Delta.'  After which point we exited on Delta; but had planned to roll to end of the runway. All appropriate radio calls had been made.'




Synopsis: The pilot of a PA24 reported a critical ground conflict during landing rollout when a Twin Otter began a takeoff roll on a crossing runway at a non-towered airport.
Date: 202112
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushing back; all was normal until the push was completed. At that time the Tug Driver said; 'pushback complete' but did not say 'set brakes'. I asked him; 'do you want the brakes set?' and there was no reply. I asked again; 'do you want the brakes set?' There was an unintelligible response and I said; 'I did not get that do you want me to set the brakes?' There was another unintelligible response and the aircraft was lowered to the ground from the tug. I was very alert at this point and immediately noticed the aircraft moving. I set the brakes as the Tug Operator said; 'set the brakes!'I responded that I had asked him several times if he wanted me to set the brakes.He then apologized and told me that the aircraft was disconnected and the by- pass pin removed. There was no one hurt the flight proceeded normally.


Second narrative: On pushback the Tug Driver reported the push complete; but we did not hear him say set the brakes. The Captain asked if he wanted the brakes set at least twice with no response. We could feel the nose being lowered and were on alert. The Captain felt the aircraft move and immediately set the brake and the Tug Driver stated 'set the brakes' at the same time. No injuries and flight proceeded normally.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported ground crew's failure to properly communicate; resulted in the aircraft moving after tug disconnect.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The headset volume on the MAX RAAS alerts and all automated call outs is entirely too high and cannot be adjusted by the crew. This interfered with ATC communication during the flight. We had to clarify landing clearance with ATC and had to reiterate required crew callouts because of the loud interruptions from the automated alerting system.Very distracting!




Synopsis: B737 MAX Captain reported RAAS (Runway Awareness & Advisory System) alerts and callouts interfered with ATC communication during the flight. Reporter stated the volume of the alerts is 'entirely too high.'
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ELP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ELP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the Pilot in Command/ Pilot Monitoring to ELP; the flight went just fine up until the last 10 minutes or so; almost 10 minutes; 20 miles from the ELP we were given the choice between Runway 4 and Runway 8R; we chose Runway 8R for landing because it favored the winds; also the weather was Sky Clear with 10 SM of visibility. We were instructed to descend down to 6000 ft. and given a heading that placed us on a right downwind for Runway 8R; at the 5 mile downwind mark the First Officer initiated a right base turn (which I found to be normal procedure for a visual) as we both noticed the airplane coming into close proximity to the mountain; the First Officer made a swift decision to sharpen his base turn; we knew for certain we were clear of the mountain because it was visual and we can see; however we triggered a 'TOO LOW TERAIN; PULL UP' aural message which the First Officer responded to immediately and pulled up with my assistance. By the time we leveled off and started down again for the runway we hit a thousand feet and weren't stable; we were very close to stabilization and I didn't see a compromise to safety so we continued on and the First Officer made a good safe landing. Upon reaching the gate I realized it was probably a better idea if had instructed the first officer to go around and attempt another approach.  It would help if the runway had an approach given the close proximity to the mountains; also it would have helped if ATC said something along the lines of 'maintain 6000 ft. until a 5 mile final'. Would not recommend this approach at night.




Synopsis: Light Transport flight crew reported un-stabilized approach due to mountainous terrain resulting in go around.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I arrived at aircraft at XA55 sharp. It was a through flight and passengers were lined up for aft restrooms. Also; catering was in galley. By the time I could even get to an aft overhead bin to stow my bags and get back up the aisle; overwing exit rows were full! I have no idea when boarding commenced; but I had no time to do any type of security check and was definitely not in my boarding position. I assisted passengers during boarding process and completed other duties (closing bins; getting passenger count). It wasn't until takeoff that I realized I hadn't briefed my exit row. I mentioned it to the 'A'. The Captain had instructed us to remain seated for quite a while; but as soon as we had permission to get up; I briefed the passengers. I think what happened is that I got thrown off because I never even really did my other normal 'C' activities; and in just trying to pick up and do the other duties; I totally forgot the briefing. I've never done that in all the years I've been flying. This is not; however; the first time that all of the flight attendants on my crew have not been able to do our required responsibilities prior to boarding. Many times; we board the aircraft only to have passengers on our heels...literally before we have had a chance to even put our bags up. I have been told by several Operations agents that they are being terrorized into boarding AS SOON AS THE flight attendants get on the aircraft; and that if they don't they are in trouble. Even though company policy says; in theory; that they are to allow us time to do our duties; IN PRACTICE; their supervisors are making them board before we've had a chance to. In some cases; it's the supervisors who are there doing the boarding. I should have written those occurrences up before; but I will from now on (I don't know if it will do any good) because it really is unnerving to be rushed to the point where we are unable to do the jobs we have been trained to do. We used to not board until all flight attendants were ready; AND we were notified when boarding would begin...what happened to those procedures? Also; crew briefings have gone by the wayside.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant reports being so rushed during preflight that she forgets to brief the overwing exit row passengers prior to takeoff.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was issued descend via ZZZZZ1 arrival except maintain 8;000 ft. I was at 14;000 ft near ZZZZZ2 when given the clearance by approach. I experienced moderate turbulence at the time; which I then maintained altitude and got control of the aircraft; and then started my descent once safe of the turbulence. I reached ZZZ3 waypoint at 13;300 ft. and I was supposed to be 13;000 ft. or below at that time. I went to contact Approach to advise them; and they came on the radio and told me to descend to 8;000 ft at ZZZZZ4. I complied and had no other issues with the remainder of the flight.


Second narrative: Aircraft X was given a 'decent via the ZZZZZ 1' arrival from ATC. We got to 14;000 ft as per the STAR; but right before we were going to descend to below 13;000 ft for our next fix at ZZZ2; we experienced a pocket of moderate turbulence. Pilot flying decided to arrest descent and hold altitude a bit longer which put us at 13;300 ft by the time we hit the ZZZ2 fix; as opposed to being below 13;000 ft. Just as we were about to call ATC to notify; we were switched from ZZZ Approach to ZZZ1 Approach; who instructed us to cross ZZZZZ3 at 8;000 ft. That altitude was not going to be an issue for us to comply with.What could have been done differently was stay with ZZZ Approach a little longer to inform them of the incident and advise that we might be a little high at ZZZ2. We decided to change frequency instead because we were looking to set up an arrival for runway at ZZZ1. We would have let ZZZ1 Approach know about it; but due to heavy communication between multiple aircrafts; we had to keep our communication brief.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported arrival crossing restriction not met due to pocket of moderate turbulence encountered during descent.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Military Bomber
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While enroute; we were using XM (satellite radio) radar and ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) radar data to deviate around weather. Due to the limitations of these delayed data systems; we were also attempting to remain in VMC conditions to allow for real time deviations. During this time we were changing altitude to aid in this (successful) effort. At one point; we allowed the aircraft to deviate slightly more than 300 feet. We eventually obtained a block altitude to provide us with the required flexibility. We should have obtained the block altitude earlier or have stayed on our assigned altitude until we obtained an amended clearance.




Synopsis: Pilot reports an altitude deviation while attempting to avoid weather using XM (satellite radio) and ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast) radar data.