Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Checklists
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Changes for good reasons make sense when needed. For example; who would have thought that two crews at one airline could depart without fuel on their airplane; thus 'verify fuel' was added to the before start; taxi; and below the line items. Another example of a good reason change was what resulted from the crew that departed without takeoff data programmed in the MCDU. That incident happened in [airport] and procedures and training were implemented to prevent that issue from occurring again. Changes to prevent something bad from reoccurring are different from this issue; where according to the company; the changes were made to streamline training among fleet types. The [Airbus] Normal Procedures Checklist changes are being made to an airplane designed and certified under an entirely different crew management philosophy. Trying to be more like [a different airplane manufacture] is fraught with problems. For the Captain; the checklist is much more heads down and does not recognize that there are fleet differences that prevent the checklist from being accomplished as designed. The change also negates the previous checklist protections that verified runway data and route changes in the event of a runway or departure change. Though the operations manual says to discuss such a change; there is no checklist item to serve as a stopgap to trap potential errors. Checking the Status page for messages; which can contain items critical to know before takeoff or before landing; is no longer on the checklist. In fact; the recently released training video depicting the proper method for running the Before Takeoff checklist has STS displayed on the upper ECAM indicating that a status message needs to be reviewed. After the crew runs the checklist below the line; the Status Page is never checked. They miss this potentially critical item because checking the status page is no longer an item on the checklist. A runway change that occurs after start used to have the crew run the 'Taxi' checklist from the top again. It covered flap settings; takeoff data; weight limits; and stab trim settings in conjunction with the TPS data among other critical items. There is no such checklist stopgap in the new procedures. After both engines are started; there is zero reference in the Before Takeoff checklist to any takeoff data or to validate that data with the TPS. The response now from the Captain is simply; 'Checked.' The assumption being that someone checked it to some reference document. We all know this needs to be done; but the checklist items insured it was done. The process rerunning a critical checklist from the top is gone now on the Airbus. The rerunning of the checklist slowed things down during a critical change. This was a good thing and the Distance Learning modules did not emphasize the potential for errors that this change could cause. Another example is something as simple as the Stab Trim settings and TCAS mode verification. The company even made a video to demonstrate this. The Stab Trim settings are supposed to be read by the Captain; while taxing; from the smallest font on the MCDU's Fuel Predict page and compared to the smallest numbers on the trim wheel. This setting is best confirmed by someone who is not taxing the jet. Watch the video; that careful look does not actually happen. The numbers are simply parroted back. The previous procedure to compare the larger UP/DOWN number on the trim wheel to the large font on the PERF Page was much more intuitive and required less heads down time. Further; the TA/RA call is flawed. A blank ECAM display only means the TCAS is not in standby. It can be in TA only and I believe it can be off on some aircraft and not display on the ECAM. Some aircraft have the old style TCAS where even the knob position cannot be determined by the Captain. Some will display TA ONLY as a large font; white boxed item on the PFD; while older aircraft will note that condition; unboxed; in small font to the left of the CDI on the bottom of the PFD. I believe some of the oldest aircraft will display nothing at all but will chime with an ECAM after climbing above 1500 feet. Equipment differences were not accounted for in the new procedures. Also note that the special emphasis training to prevent runway incursions and taxi errors warned that even momentarily diverting attention could cause an error. Having the Captain heads down for more checklist items while taxiing does just that. Some items are best left to be confirmed by the pilot who is not taxing the jet on a busy and sometimes complicated airport. If you wanted to design a system that will contribute to the potential of runway incursions and taxi clearance deviations; the new procedures do just that. Not to keep beating this dead horse; but the removal of the checklist item that requires checking the Status Page for messages before takeoff and before landing is not well thought out. Imagine missing an ETOPS critical item that was on the Status page and discovering it only after departing at over 200;000+ lbs gross weight. It will be some time before getting down to landing weight if it was an ETOPS critical item. Again; in the company two engine before takeoff video this potentially critical status message item is not discussed. A checklist line item would have prevented that. Checking the ECAM Status Page can also serve as a reminder of inoperative equipment that could be critical before landing the jet hours later and long after that item was briefed prior to departure. We know it needs to be done; but the checklist ensures it was done and places the issue back on top of the crew's memory stack. Fleet transitions from Boeing; to Douglas; to Airbus or any other jet are a way of life for airline pilots. We know that. There are costs and challenges associated with that reality. While a few general procedures can be matched; trying to meld technology and procedures identically among jets designed in the 1950's; 1980's; 2000's; and beyond cannot. I hope that you read this [report] constructively and correct the deficiencies in the new Airbus procedures.




Synopsis: Airbus pilot reported on challenges regarding the company's new checklists.