elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C OAK
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was on a San Francisco Bay Tour with a student for their first discovery flight.  I departed having arranged for a transponder code and Oakland Class C transition prior to departure.  Having transited through Oakland tower; I was instructed to contact Northern California (Norcal) Approach on 120.90.  Remaining within two-way communication throughout the entire event; we completed our flight over the Bay and asked Norcal for an Oakland transition; landing ZZZ with the current ATIS.  Norcal replied that our transition was approved; altitude at our discretion. Norcal was busy with other aircraft requests on frequency and did not issue our hand-off until we were almost abeam the Oakland Coliseum.  After the hand-off Oakland tower asked when I received my transfer; to which I replied I had just received it and made immediate contact. The controller then told me that I needed to establish two-way communication prior to entry in his area; which I had because I was talking to Norcal. I replied that Norcal was inundated with many pilot requests and I didn't have opportunity to make request for the hand-off earlier.  I feel that my actions were in compliance with the regulations; I was using a discreet transponder code; was in two-way communications at all times with the various controlling agencies. Perhaps if Norcal amended the instructions to include handoff instructions at a certain point; it could minimize workload in the event that the frequency congestion takes place.  Example; 'transition approved as requested; contact Oakland tower upon crossing Lake Merritt.'




Synopsis: An instructor with student completed an introductory SFO Bay tour and when returning to the airport did not receive a NCT to OAK handoff until abeam the Oakland Coliseum. OAK Tower wanted information about the late communications handoff.
Date: 201601
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZOA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Inbound flight was issued potential holding at PIRAT intersection; then pilot's discretion to FL200 by PIRAT. Flight then re-cleared RAINS intersection then PIRAT intersection with possible holding at RAINS. Initially we had a slight problem finding the intersections on the iPad Jeppesen coverage. Found the intersections on both iPad and paper Area charts after a short search. Then we were issued holding instructions at RAINS and to hold at FL200. With the first clearance to FL200 for PIRAT Captain selected FLCH until the data could be entered in the FMC then re-selected VNAV. When the routing changed to RAINS then PIRAT plus a hold clearance at RAINS it was noted that we had 59NM to descend from FL360 to FL200 which should have been within the performance available. At this point we had built holding at PIRAT and then again for RAINS. Captain got distracted with checking weather options and holding time versus fuel available and allowed the aircraft to get behind on the profile.First Officer checked our clearance with ATC and we were advised that we did not have to cross RAINS at the FL200 and that we were cleared to descend in the hold. ATC was advised that we would be above FL200 at RAINS.This was the second leg for the Captain and the First Officer in this version of this aircraft. Slight delay in identifying the charted intersections and building multiple holds. ETOPS flight and considering fuel versus divert scenarios. All added workload that the Captain allowed to get out of priority.




Synopsis: The Captain was late descending for holding at PIRAT intersection because of workload.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After we received takeoff clearance from Tower and completed the before takeoff checklist; the Captain (pilot flying) proceeded to bring the thrust levers to the takeoff detent and begin the takeoff roll. A few seconds after the engines were verified stabilized at takeoff thrust (3-5 seconds approximately) the EICAS displayed a magenta MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN warning and EMERG LT NOT ARMED caution messages along with the associated aural bells. The Captain subsequently called for an aborted takeoff and brought the thrust levers to idle and began braking. I made a PA to the cabin to remain seated; declared the aborted takeoff to the Tower and completed the rejected takeoff checklist once we were clear of the runway and the Captain requested it. Company policies and procedures were executed; as they should have been.




Synopsis: EMB145 crew rejected their takeoff when EICAS displays MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN warning and EMERG LT NOT ARMED caution messages.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared to land. At approximately 4 miles; saw an A380 cross the hold short line. Approach target speed of 137 kts reached by 1;000 ft and our aircraft was fully configured; on glideslope and on centerline. The A380 was given takeoff clearance. I remarked that it would be close. The A380 did not begin to roll. We noted that it wasn't going to work; that he wasn't rolling. At 500 ft we could see that the A380 had barely begun to roll; and the FO (First Officer) queried tower; asking 'Tower; how's this going to work?' Tower replied; 'It isn't; cancel landing clearance; climb and maintain 3;000 ft; heading 265.'We executed a good go-around; following profile exactly; though we were a bit slow getting gear up (second request from PF). We turned immediately to 265 heading; maintained ref speed and then selected 180 and retracted flaps to 5 as we accelerated through 170. We hit ALT CAP; and selected AP on. Tower requested climb to 3;100 ft (terrain separation or radar minimum; I reckon). We caught sight of a Cessna 172 at our 11; heading North west; and passed about 400 ft under him (TCAS data). ATC called him out several seconds after we caught sight.Vectored back around and landed without event.Two critical points: 1. Insufficient separation on final was caused by a tight interval take off clearance for the A380 and a lengthy delay on the runway from their crew.2. VFR Traffic on the go-around presented a threat had we not precisely executed the clearance.Selection of flaps 5 and an intermediate speed allowed the AP to be engaged sooner while preventing the possibility of flap overspeed. Early AP engagement reduced workload; which allowed traffic acquisition before ATC called it out. I was really pleased with our performance and the excellent PM (Pilot Monitoring) execution of the FO. The whole evolution was executed smoothly and minimized risk.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported that while on final another aircraft was given takeoff clearance on the same runway; causing them to go-around.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Instructor was conducting a check flight; and crew was returning to SFB for closed traffic. Approximately 12 miles ENE of LEE while at 2;500 ft.; Check Instructor contacted Orlando Tracon on 119.4 requesting the Monroe Arrival. Crew navigated the aircraft along the north boundary of Class B towards the north shore of Lake Monroe scanning for traffic visually. Approximately 17 miles east to northeast of LEE; Check Instructor detected an aircraft at 10-11 o'clock at same altitude with little relative movement from left to right. Instructor verified the Traffic Map on the G1000 and received an alert of traffic at 10 o'clock 2 miles. Instructor took immediate evasive action imitating a left climbing turn to deconflict with traffic. Simultaneously; the other aircraft initiated a level climb; coming to within 200-300 ft. of [our] aircraft right under the right wing. Aircraft Y was not identified to [us] by ATC; and no traffic advisories were issued before or after the NMAC. Following the deconfliction; crew proceeded on the Monroe arrival and completed the check without further incident.




Synopsis: Light twin instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft in the vicinity of LEE airport.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Military
Mission: Refueling
Flight phase: Other Analysis
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Design Engineer
Reporter qualification: Other Stress Analyst; Ph.D. Materials Science
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A nonconservative margin of safety calculation has been used on components for the [fleet of aircraft] at the ZZZ location of the [Company]. The calculation of margin of safety; MS; compares ultimate tensile strength Ftu to stress s:MS = Ftu/s - 1A positive MS is wanted to prevent overload failure. The maximum principal stress s1 was sometimes used at [Company] in the MS calculation; i.e.; s = s1. This calculation is non-conservative; specifically when the stress state includes a compressive principal stress; s2. In the two-dimensional case; the Tresca failure criterion stress is:sTresca = s1 - s2Because s2 < 0; i.e.; compressive; sTresca is larger than the maximum principal stress; s1.Using sTresca in the MS formula therefore predicts failure at lower load levels than using s1.For ductile metals such as aerospace aluminum alloys; the Tresca criterion matches observed failure behavior; as described in Dowling's text Mechanical Behavior of Materials. The first principal stress criterion applies only to brittle materials such as gray cast iron.An example calculation shows the possibility of generating a specious positive margin of safety. The MS1 calculated with first principal stress indicates positive margin (predicts no overload failure):s1 = 70 ksis2 = -50 ksiFtu = 100 ksiMS1 = 100/70 - 1 = 0.42but the margin MSTresca calculated with sTresca predicts failure:MSTresca = Ftu/(s1 - s2) - 1 = 100/[70 - (-50)] - 1 = 100/120 - 1 = -0.17      An explanation of the stress tensor and its expression in terms of principal stresses can also be found in Dowling's text.

Callback: Reporter has concerns about calculating structural safety margins. Reporter was involved with calculating structural safety margins for fuel tanks and other components. Reporter insinuated that proper analysis was done in the past. Reporter stated that reporter did not know for sure; but thinks that for these fuel system components; a negative structural margin of safety is possible on overload.



Synopsis: Design Engineer reported that nonconservative structural margin analysis/calculations were used on aircraft fuel tanks and fuel system components.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We departed HOU at XA15Z and the flight continued uneventfully for the first hour and ten minutes. At that time we noticed the radio traffic was quiet and queried ATC (FTW CTN) and received no response. We then attempted to return to the previous assigned frequency; still with no results. We then attempted contact on 121.5 (Guard) which we were monitoring and was able to obtain a frequency for Albuquerque Center; which we contacted and reported our altitude of FL430. Shortly thereafter ABQ passed a message to us from FTW CTN with a request to call them upon landing; rather than wait; we immediately called from the aircraft using our SAT Phone. I spoke with the sector chief and responded to his question of why we did not check in with FTW once we were passed off (presumably sometime shortly prior to XB10Z). The controller seemed upset that we had not checked in and asked for my pilot's license number and phone number; which I gave without hesitation.There were no distractions in the cockpit during the time we lost communications. The FTW sector chief indicated that we were given a frequency to check in on and we did not do that. I disagree. Both crew members recollect that we did check in and were acknowledged. What we did was to follow appropriate procedures. There was no altitude deviation; there was no course deviation; there was simply a loss of communications with a busy center while we were at cruising altitude of FL430.Lesson Learned: Do not let too much time pass when the radio is quiet. Observe better diligence. Question ATC sooner.




Synopsis: GLF5 Captain experienced a loss of communication with ATC while in cruise at FL430. ZAB is eventually contacted and the crew is instructed to call ZFW upon landing. The Sector Chief believes the crew did not comply with a clearance to contact the next sector on a new frequency and the crew believes they did.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 3
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Premier 1
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were getting vectors from Approach for the ILS. We were given a final intercept heading of 230 degrees and to intercept the ILS. When we neared the final approach fix on the intercept heading the CDI/LOC needle went from full left to full right. We started corrective action back to the right to try and stay away from the parallel runway; then ATC gave instructions to turn to a heading of 330 degrees and climb to 4;000 feet to get us away from other traffic. We were vectored back around for another ILS to a landing.


Second narrative: Diverting from intended destination; due to a FLAP FAIL indication. Flaps at zero requiring longer runway. Asked for vectors for an approach. Emergency checklist completed. Setup FMS for ILS. As we were being vectored between aircraft; the LOC did not capture and allowed the aircraft to the fly through the LOC. As it took the autopilot some time to initiate a turn back to the right; autopilot was changed to Heading mode with a 30 turn to the right when the controller came requesting an immediate right turn.


Synopsis: Premier 1 flight crew reports diverting for a longer runway after a FLAPS FAIL indication. A flaps up landing with the First Officer flying is planned but the vector is close to the FAF and the autopilot overshoots causing ATC to issue a go around. The second approach is successful.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cabin Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was in command of flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The flight started out as a textbook originator flight; with all checklist; system tests; and security inspections being completed prior to departure. We left the gate and reached our cruise altitude of 12;000 feet approximately [25 minutes later]. I began to take our engine trend information when we received a call from the flight attendant. I answered; as I was the pilot not flying; and she informed me that there was [smoke] smelled and seen in the cabin. I inquired as to the severity of the smoke; and if she could tell the location of where it was being generated. She informed me that it is was 'not that bad' and it appeared to be coming from the overhead light at seats 3A/C. I informed her that I would get right back to her and advised my First Officer (FO) of the situation. We performed the immediate action items for 'Smoke Known Source'. At this time we agreed to return to ZZZ; as it was the closest airport to safely land. I advised ATC that we needed to return to ZZZ and [advised Center of our emergency situation]. I gave my FO control of the radios along with the Pilot Flying duties; and I executed the 'Smoke Known Source' non-normal checklist. I informed the flight attendant that we would be returning to ZZZ; and that I would make a PA to the passengers to advise them of our intentions; as there was one passenger who became a bit nervous as to the smoke in the cabin. I called dispatch on SATCOM to advise them of the situation and our intentions; to which they acknowledged. Descent/Approach Checklist and Landing checklists were performed; and the aircraft was safely landed at ZZZ with no incident. At this point the suspect lighting fixture stopped releasing smoke; so I advised the tower that we would be taxiing to the gate to let the passengers off; and not require a remote evacuation. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting equipment did follow us to the ramp however. A maintenance write up was performed.LED lighting fixtures would solve this problem.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Dash 8 flight crew reported smoke from a passenger overhead light and returned to departure airport.