elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201812
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing; Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I asked the Ops agent in BWI; if she minded if I went downstairs outside on the ramp to smoke; as many ops agents allow pilots and flight attendants to do so; providing they stay hidden. She replied she had never let an attendant down before. I told her I knew some ops agents allowed it; and if it was ok with her; I'd like to do so. She looked at me strangely and said 'whatever' and proceeded up the jetway. She never replied no; so I went outside; but after feeling strange due to her behavior; I returned up the jetway and onto the aircraft. I cleaned the plane and we were waiting to board when 2 supervisors from BWI entered the aircraft and asked to speak to me. They asked if I had gone down the ramp and I replied yes; but after consideration; didn't think it was a good idea and returned. One sup informed me that it was against the law in MD to smoke on the ramp. I apologized and replied I wasn't aware of that; had I been; I never would've gone down in the first place. I explained I had asked the ops agent first and she didn't tell me no; I have never disobeyed a fellow employee. She simply said 'whatever' and walked away. The supervisors recommended I write [a report.] We shook hands and began boarding.I feel there needs to be a complete understanding and consistency with all employees regarding smoking on the ramp. As I mentioned; many ops agents allow it and many employees from [another company] do it. If there is a rule; everyone should be on the same page. I never would've gone down without asking. I did ask. When the ops agent says 'whatever' and walks away; that doesn't convey breaking a law. For myself; I can say smoking in general has become a nuisance and affecting my health and have decided to quit; for many reasons. I've got the tools to quit; now I just need to put them to use. I understand now the severity and the importance of this rule now and have no intention of ever breaking it again.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a communications breakdown with Gate Agent during preflight regarding local ramp access procedural policy.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; MEL; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: [I was Lead Mechanic] called to assist mechanics on ground for [flight] crew report of 0-to-1 [position] right side slat seal damage. Removed damaged slat seal and rub strip. Reinstalled seal adjacent panel. Contacted Maintenance Control; informed them of action taken and was issued Configuration Deviation List (CDL) Chapter 57-9; accomplished required logbook entries. Aircraft departed after delay. Overnight Maintenance replaced seal and rub strip on April 2012 and cleared CDL deferral.During removal of seal found rub strip damaged. Strip was cracked almost half-way through material width and unseated from attach surface. Strip is held on with one rivet at top and one rivet at bottom of strip. Decision was made that condition of strip; as found; could depart aircraft and possibly enter right engine inlet so strip was removed. With slat seal removed per CDL; rub strip has no function. Maintenance call indicated CDL was not accomplished correctly. Suggest either allow rub strip to be removed if damaged; when Metal Slat Segment Seal is removed per CDL; or clarify CDL Chapter 57-9; to not include rub strip removal for compliance. By not allowing rub strip removal when damaged; defeats the purpose of CDL; on account of when seal is damaged; most of the time rub strip has damage.




Synopsis: A Line; Lead Mechanic was informed that his Configuration Deviation List (CDL) deferral of a damaged right wing slat seal was not accomplished correctly. He had also removed a cracked rub strip for the damaged slat seal to prevent the rub strip from departing the aircraft and possibly entering the right engine.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon final approach to XXL on [an] ASR approach into ZZZZ the Pilot Flying elected and performed a go around approximately 2-3 miles from runway. The decision to go around was due to being high on glide path and in bad position to land at the final descent point. After the go around; Approach Control gave vectors to 7-mile final for another approach to XXL. The Pilot Flying was able to acquire a better sight picture and glide path; then landed without further issue. The crew had to do a radar approach as no approaches for ZZZZ are available in the FMC database for the open runway; XXL/XR. The ASR final descent point did not put the aircraft in a position for pilot flying to see PAPIs to refine glide path. In addition; the sloping terrain just off the end of the runway gives illusion of lower position on glide slope that actual position. Runway XXR/XL is closed for an extended duration due to construction. All approaches in FMC database are for the closed runway. Our company version of Flight Deck Pro has approaches available to XXL/XR so consideration should be given to adding these approaches to the FMC database since ZZZZ is [an] airport with regular flights by company aircraft.




Synopsis: Flight Crew flying 747-400 performs go around on approach.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMUN.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower MMUN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Executed a missed approach when we realized the flaps were not set to 30 for landing. Captain mentioned at around 700 ft he was slow and correcting. I focused on airspeed and failed to notice we didn't get the flaps to 30 before the too low terrain warning was heard. At that point we executed a missed approach. We received vectors around for another approach and landed.




Synopsis: Flight crew executed a missed approach when they realized aircraft was not configured properly.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SA-227 AC Metro III
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I conducted a preflight in preparation for an OCF (Operational Check Flight) flight. There was a trim issue that was worked on that needed to be validated OK and fixed. Trim controls; position indicators; and elevator position checked off OK and in good condition during trim test on the ground. I was cleared for departure. During take off roll I adjusted the trim up for climb. The trim controls stopped working the moment the wheels lifted off of the runway. It was difficult to maintain altitude assigned since the aircraft kept climbing. I had immediately advised Tower Control and Departure of the situation and requested a higher altitude clearance while I attempted to control the aircraft for a runaway/stuck trim setting via QRH and memory items. I requested a deviation back to the airport. I was also notified by the previous pilot who flew the aircraft that trim worked when the auto pilot was engaged but found another issue with the aircraft when the auto pilot was not engaging. I requested a visual approach and landed with no incident. Proper squawk entries were made in the maintenance log for an unsuccessful OCF. Shortly after takeoff roll when the wheels came off the runway and further noticed other issues after the climb. This was an unusual occurrence and didn't quite add up systematically. I am unsure what caused the event. Memory items needed to take control of the aircraft and QRH. I [notified ATC] and a deviation back to the airport.




Synopsis: A pilot reported trim controls malfunctioned and returned to the airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During troubleshooting of the Left Fuel Quantity System; [the Maintenance Supervisor] said that the Fuel Quantity Left [Circuit Breaker] was pulled and collared. I then started with troubleshooting the system. We reset the breaker; then we opened the fueling door and the breaker did not pop. Then we closed the fueling door and disconnected the densitometer and the breaker popped. Then we removed the fuel quantity processor; and the breaker still popped. We opened the refueling door and the breaker would not reset. So then we replaced the breaker and tried everything over again. We opened the refueling door; and the breaker did not pop. We closed the refueling and disconnected the densitometer; but the breaker still popped. We removed the fuel processor and the breaker still popped. After a few hours of troubleshooting we still had the same problem that the aircraft came in with. [Since it was] the end of my shift; we put the aircraft in the configuration it came in without reading the MEL [Minimum Equipment List]. I briefly looked at the MEL [Minimum Equipment List] and did not recognize that there was an issue with the MEL. After reviewing the MEL; we found out that the fuel quantity breaker should be in and not collared and the densitometer connector should be capped and stowed; but the aircraft did not come in that way. From what I was told this morning; before the aircraft [was released] the connector was capped and stowed. We accomplished troubleshooting and found the faulty circuit that was causing the breaker popping. The circuit was isolated to comply with the MEL procedures. We will review every action of the MEL when work on a system that we come across.




Synopsis: During troubleshooting; the Maintenance technicians isolated the cause of the fuel quantity system fault; however due to time; they reconfigured the aircraft in the manner in which it arrived. Only after a thorough review of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL) did it become evident that the aircraft arrived in a state not in compliance with the MEL. The aircraft was configured per the MEL prior to departure.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Our flight departed late due to the aircraft arriving late from the previous station. During the flight we told the F/A's to remain seated on climb out until they heard from us. Upon reaching cruise altitude FL380; and talking to ATC about the current turbulence; we told the F/A's that they could get up with the smooth/occasional light chop. This flight condition stayed for most of the flight and we sat the Flight Attendants down twice as precaution when we heard reports of greater than occasional light chop; or visually saw what looked like clouds with possible bumps along our route. At the time of the incident we had started our descent out of FL380; and leveled at FL360. The seatbelt sign was on and the F/A's were up with only occasional light chop. After leveling at FL360; the aircraft hit what felt like a light wake turbulence and after a few minutes the F/A's called and said one of the FA's had a broken ankle and was being treated by a Doctor and Vet. At this point I was assigned the First Officer to take the ATC communication and the flight controls. I coordinated with the F/A's; Operations and Dispatch for our arrival for medical staff to meet the aircraft. Upon arrival; we kept the Passengers seated while medical personnel boarded the aircraft and took command of the injured F/A. [Medical assistance on radio] was not contacted because the injured Flight Attendant was stable and secured in a seat and because of reported light to moderate turbulence in the area; I wanted to keep all Crew Members safe.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported a Flight Attendant was injured when they encountered turbulence.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working all the ground and local positions. Weather was MVFR; and I noticed a vehicle entering the movement area. The ASDE-X confirmed it was a Port vehicle. I called the vehicle a few times to ascertain his intentions. After about the 3rd call he answered. All vehicles are required to get ATC approval prior to entering the movement area. This includes taxiways. For all the vehicle operator knows; a helicopter in weather difficulty could be landing on that taxiway; a scenario I have had happen. This situation is part of the system-wide safety problem we have at BOS where Massport vehicles do not have a clear understanding of what ATC clearances on the movement area mean. This operator apparently believes as long as he steers clear of runways; he can enter the movement area without authorization. This is wrong and unsafe; and needs to be addressed by the facility. Recommend training for all vehicle operators done by current controllers.




Synopsis: BOS Tower Controller described an unauthorized airport movement area entry event by an airport vehicle. The reporter noted airport vehicles do not have a clear understanding of the ATC clearances required.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Giving line check to crew; we were cleared for the LOC 31 into LGA. Captain was flying. At the FAF; he initiated a descent using VS mode at 800fpm down. Due to the strong headwind and resulting lower than normal ground speed; the aircraft descended well below the visual glide path as indicated by four red lights on the PAPI. I called to 'check the PAPI; we're too low' and 'you have four reds over there'; however; no adjustment was made. The autopilot captured our DDA (Derived Decision Altitude) rounded to the nearest 100 feet at 700 feet MSL. The Captain seemed surprised that the aircraft was leveling off and disconnected the autopilot to continue the descent. The First Officer advised 'we need to stay at 700 [feet]' [but] the Captain continued to descend. At 650 feet; the GPWS alerted 'OBSTACLE; OBSTACLE; PULL UP'. The crew hesitated as if they were unsure of what the warning was; I called 'GO-AROUND; GO-AROUND; GO-AROUND' from the jump seat. The crew executed a go-around maneuver. We discussed the lower ground speed and decided 500-600 fpm was more appropriate for given conditions while setting up for the subsequent approach. The second approach was completed without further event. Loss of situational awareness on final. Lack of familiarity with procedures for a LOC approach. Failure to use available PAPI. Expectation bias allowing dismissal of conflicting information from First Officer and Line Check Pilot.More thorough briefing in gusty conditions and familiarity with procedures not frequently used. Better CRM and communication from all pilot on the flight deck. Faster reaction to GPWS alerts; especially at low altitudes.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Check Pilot reported the Flying Pilot descended below the glide path on approach and executed a go-around after receiving a GPWS obstacle warning.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Descending on LINKK 1 arrival ATC cleared us at some point (think above 10.000 feet) for the ILS 27 approach. Pilot Monitoring re-selected the ILS 27 connecting the transition from RDFSH (which was not done on initial FMC setup). Our altitude was set at 6000 passed RDFSH. We never set FAF altitude to keep the descent.Houston approach checked if we were cleared for the approach. After that; I realized we were supposed to descend via the transition. No further ATC communication was received however after the crew debrief and looking at the approach plate again; the altitudes were mandatory altitude restrictions and we don't think we made GEYGR and/ or SYYKO.


Second narrative: I was the First Officer and pilot monitoring on this flight IAH. We were cleared to descend via the LINKK1 arrival except maintain 300 knots. Then; 320 knots. Then; as fast as practical until LINKK. Then we were cleared for the approach from RDFSH and maintain 210 knots until FESTA. We had 6000 feet in the MCP window as this was the bottom altitude for the STAR. After being cleared the approach; I failed to set a lower altitude. Shortly after RDFSH (and level at 6000') ATC asked if we were descending on the approach. We were immediately aware of our mistake and the captain began descending. GEYGR and SYYKO (the next two fixes on the approach after RDFSH) had mandatory altitudes of 4000' and 3000'; respectively. Because of our delayed descent after RDFSH; we were high at both of those fixes. The multiple airspeed changes on the arrival caused a distraction and I failed to notice that I hadn't set a lower altitude to continue the approach after RDFSH. That being the case; it was still my job as pilot monitoring to set the lower altitude and I failed to do it.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported that following multiple speed adjustments per ATC's request; they misprogrammed the aircraft; which resulted in not satisfying the mandatory crossing altitudes.