elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Relief Pilot; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Dispatch had 1 hour (3439 lbs) of taxi fuel on board the aircraft due to snow and de-ice. When the fuel sheet got to the cockpit we had an extra 500 lbs of fuel over requested. We deiced at the remote parking spot. If we could have taxied straight forward we were less than 500 feet from the departure runway. During deicing it became obvious that we would weight about 514.0 for takeoff; and we had received our final weights showing a takeoff weight of 510.5. We were unable to override this takeoff weight to get V speeds for a 514.0 take-off weight.We had to get Dispatch to give us the numbers for wet runway; anti-ice on; and 514.0 weight. Crews should be able to override the takeoff weight to get correct numbers. Does this mean that any time we have not burned the complete taxi fuel we are not legal for takeoff?


Second narrative: Prior to pushback from a hardstand we received our final weight manifest where the ZFW increased 91 pounds. Our actual pushback weight was 514.3. Our performance figures for RWY 25C limited us to a MTOG of 545.0; ASSUM WT of 510.5; and a MAX EPR TOG of 510.5. We did not need the full compliment of taxi fuel given for the weather conditions (1+00) so we tried to override the TOG in ACARS to 513.5 for an 800 pound taxi burn. The SABRE ACARS data and V-speeds returned on multiple occasions were for 510.5 which was the original TOG and ASSUMED TOG. Since we were heavier than planned; we called Dispatch discussing the problem. After about 5 minutes; Dispatch was able to pull up the weights for our airfield conditions and an actual weight of 513.5 and commensurate V-speeds. Dispatch sent the new ACARS data over the cockpit printer. 9/10 line trips have a drop off of the ZFW which makes the planned V-speeds very conservative. In this case; the ACARS v-speeds generated for a 510.5 aircraft were ILLEGAL and potentially unsafe. Why can a Dispatcher override the TOG but the operating crew not do so for the actual conditions? SABRE has some serious programming errors and the potential for some seriously erroneous data being forwarded to the crew since the ACARS generated V-speeds are procedurally necessary according to SOP.


Synopsis: Crew is unable to modify and correct outdated takeoff data supplied by Dispatch.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This report is to document a low speed rejected takeoff. We taxied out from the gate and started both engines. During start we had an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) that said AUTO FLT YAW DAMPER 1 FAULT. We referenced checklist and contacted [Maintenance]. We shut down both engines; reset two circuit breakers and then restarted both engines to clear the fault. [Maintenance] sent us a new [Maintenance Release] and we continued taxi. The weather was VMC with light winds. Tower then cleared us for takeoff. I was the pilot flying. I taxied onto the runway and lined up for takeoff. I pushed the power up to about 1.05 EPR on both engines checked the indications and pushed the power up to flex thrust. I called out 'check thrust'. About that time the aircraft yawed to the right and the First Officer called out 'engine failure'. I rejected the takeoff. We were at about 30 to 40 knots for a low speed reject (auto brakes did not engage). I went to idle and reverse for the reject. I straightened out the aircraft with rudder to bring it back to centerline and returned the thrust levers to idle. The First Officer called the Tower about the reject and told the passengers to 'remain seated'. I slowly taxied the aircraft down the runway to analyze the malfunction. The First Officer stated he saw an ENG 2 STALL ECAM. We also saw an ENG 2 OVRSPD PROT FAULT ECAM. I decided have the First Officer run the REJECTED TAKEOFF QRC. We cleared the runway; stopped; and set the parking brake. The First Officer referenced the checklist and we shut down the number 2 engine. Tower asked if we required assistance. I said that as a precaution that I would like the fire department to look over the aircraft for any possible damage or turbine/compressor blades that may have created a FOD (Foreign Object Debris) issue. The fire department said that there was no damage to the aircraft. The brake temperatures maxed out at about 150C (normal) and there were no passenger issues in the back. I decided that we did not need to declare an emergency in this case. I contacted Dispatch and [Maintenance] to discuss our situation. We decided to return to the gate normally. The gate return was uneventful.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff when the #2 engine failed early in the roll.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: When we arrived at the gate; maintenance had to reapply an MEL that was just cleared. The MEL was being re-issued; it was 27-XX (ELAC) [Elevator Aileron Computer]. The FO (First Officer) and I reviewed the MEL and decided on doing the action items because it dealt with checking the flight controls which meant the hydraulics were pressurized. I realized my error when I was unable to turn on the blue hydraulic pump; on the maintenance panel; to ON after engines start after pushback. The switch would not lock into the ON position. I contacted Maintenance Control via Dispatch and Maintenance Control said to go back to the gate. Maintenance came to the airplane and I explained what happen. The Technician mentioned why the blue hydraulic pump would not turn on; because the system was energized. After he said that; I said you were right and remembered you cannot turn on the switch with engines running. Then we discussed the action items on the MEL. We both; along with FO; were in agreement about how the MEL was written; not in a clear manner. No where does it say to perform the action items with the engines off. The way the action items are written; such as C then D; it only adds to confusion. When you complete action item C; you have completed the task. When you go to D; nowhere does it mention to perform the rest of the action items at the gate or remote area with the engines not running. We performed the action items at the gate and proceeded on our flight.Clarity of the MEL needs to be improved. This MEL is extremely rarely issued; ELACs are extremely reliable. Make mention this must be done at the gate due to the blue hydraulic system must be turned on via the maintenance overhead panel; engines running locks the switch from turning on.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported confusion on the wording of an MEL action items list after pushback resulting in a return to gate.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: At 11;000 feet approximately 30-40 miles from ZZZ; we experienced and complied with TCAS RA. We noticed traffic about 20 miles away climbing toward us and could see traffic both on TCAS and visually. When traffic got inside of 10 miles it was climbing rapidly right toward our flight path. At approximately 5 miles I asked Center if [they] were talking to [the] aircraft. No response; then simultaneously our TCAS gave us an RA advisory to climb [at] greater than 1;000 FPM. I disconnected autopilot and put the aircraft into a steep climb to avoid a collision and simultaneously advised [ATC] of climb. During the RA maneuver we observed traffic come within 500 feet of aircraft. After clear of traffic I advised ATC that [we] were descending back down to 11;000. I spoke with Center after I landed on phone and was advised they were reviewing the incident. Spoke with Center again [the next day]. They called me and said the two aircraft closest points were 1.74 miles and 500 feet. I'm glad I was very alert and my training took over or a lot of lives could have been lost.The cause of this event was ATC controller not recognizing the aircraft was climbing into our flight path and did not advise us of oncoming aircraft.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Captain reported an airborne conflict while on approach.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departed and nose gear would not retract; shown down and locked. [We] executed checklist EMERGENCY GEAR DISAGREE; and contacted Maintenance; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; ATC. [We] were instructed to proceed to a nearby international airport. [We] asked for trucks to standby [and] landed with no further issues. Nose gear had been replaced within days of the flight.




Synopsis: A CRJ200 nose gear would not retract so the crew completed the GEAR DISAGREE emergency checklist; then declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby international airport.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Go-around for wind shear with possible severe turbulence. We briefed up the possible wind shear and gusty winds and I elected to use flaps 15 for the approach and landing. Final configuration was selected prior to the FAF at 2;400 feet. We were getting about plus and minus 10 kts on the ILS GP. At this time I was hand flying the aircraft to keep up with the speed changes and get a feel for the aircraft on final. As we passed 2;000 feet the airspeed was getting closer to +- 15 kts and the turbulence increased significantly followed by an uncommanded roll to the right to about 25 degrees of bank and an increase in aircraft pitch. I also saw the airspeed increase about 20 kts. I recovered the aircraft to wings level and was correcting to the Glidepath when we got the wind shear warning. We executed the wind shear recovery procedure then cleaned up the aircraft and followed the missed approach procedure. I reported to ATC the moderate to severe wind shear/turbulence. After contacting Dispatch we diverted to ZZZ1. I reported moderate to severe turbulence to ATC after completing the go around. After contacting Dispatch I elected to divert to ZZZ1. Upon arrival at ZZZ1 I discussed the event with Maintenance and based on the lack of buffeting; heavy G loading and rough movement of the jet I elected to not make an entry in the log book for severe turbulence.


Second narrative: Approaching ZZZ; aircraft rolled substantially and smoothly to about 30 degrees of bank. Nearly full deflection applied before aircraft stopped rolling. Aircraft pitched up and gave a windy shear warning. Captain went around and we advised FSS and company of moderate to borderline severe turbulence. Based on discussions with maintenance; write up was not entered.


Synopsis: Air carrier crew on final approach to a non-towered airport reported severe turbulence and wind shear. The crew executed a go-around and diverted to another airport.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series 700
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Selector
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While en route at FL360; I noticed that we had a slight fuel imbalance between the right and left main fuel tanks. I told the First Officer that I was going to transfer fuel from the right tank to the left tank. About ten seconds after I had started the fuel transfer we lost power on the right engine. The First Officer agreed and confirmed the right engine had lost power. We both agreed that we should attempt a relight of the engine. The First Officer went through the relight checklist and attempted a relight with no success. We then asked for a lower altitude and a turn back to our departure airport. At that point we had discussed that we should go ahead and perform the engine shut down checklist and secure the right engine until we can get to a lower altitude and attempt a starter assisted relight. When the First Officer was performing the engine shut down checklist; he noticed that the 'Low Pressure Fuel Cock' was in the shut off position. He mentioned it to me and I told him that I was pretty sure that I had not shut that valve off during the fuel transfer; but I wasn't ruling out that possibility yet. When we passed through 27;000 FT the First Officer performed a 'starter assisted relight' checklist and right engine came back online and was producing normal power. We decided to continue to land anyway and have maintenance look at it. We wanted to verify that the Low Pressure Fuel Cock detents were working properly; and they were. We found; in conclusion; the reason for the loss of power was because the Low Pressure Fuel Cock valve was put into the shut off position. We have since incorporated into our SOPs a change on how we as a crew will transfer fuel; effective immediately. From now on both pilots will be involved in the transferring of fuel. The pilot performing the task of transferring of fuel will first identify the transfer valve and the other pilot will verify and acknowledge the transfer valve so as to not accidentally move the Low Pressure Fuel Cock into the shut off position.




Synopsis: A HS125 700 Captain accidentally closed the Low Pressure Fuel Cock valve while crossfeeding fuel which shut the engine down. It was restarted during descent as the aircraft returned to the departure airport.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAT.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E SAT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were cleared to cross BENEY at 10;000' on the CSI [CENTERPOINT] Arrival. On check-in with Approach; I requested the RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 22. We were told to expect that. A few miles later; Approach cleared us to cross JUMDI at or above 6000' and cleared RNAV (RNP) RWY 22 approach. The pilot flying wanted clarification if we had been cleared direct to JUMDI to begin the approach. I asked Approach and got cleared direct to JUMDI; cross at or above 6000'; and cleared RNAV (RNP) RWY 22. My question is: did Approach's original clearance allow us to close the route discontinuity after MEDIN on the CENTERPOINT1 Arrival; fly the RNAV (RNP) RWY 22 from MEDIN; and descend out of 10;000' complying with the altitudes on the approach prior to reaching MEDIN? In other words; were we cleared originally to cross MEDIN at or below 9000' or at 10;000'; that being my last altitude clearance until established on the RNAV at MEDIN?Standard terminology is used to prevent confusion. All the wrinkles are not clear in my mind about the transition from arrivals to approaches with different altitudes depicted for the same points.




Synopsis: When cleared; first; to descend on the CENTERPOINT STAR and subsequently to fly the RNAV (RNP) Z Rwy 22 at SAT the flight crew of a B737NG was uncertain as to compliance with altitude restrictions at waypoint MEDIN which is a fix on the STAR and an IAF for the RNAV approach.
Date: 202001
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Again during preflight; I do my preflight duties per the AOM; which states that I (as Captain) am required to test the Master light test. As it says; 'some lights will not test but will be checked during systems test'. Problem is that the lights that do not test are illuminating from a electrical short or burned out mechanical issue inside the fire panel. Knowing my system knowledge; I know per FRM systems that all fire lights and associated fire master warning lights do not illuminate and the fire 'T' handles do not illuminate. Using our RRM (Ramp Resource Management) model for Safety building block known as 'knowledge and skills'; I know that this is wrong and that a faulty electrical short has occurred.After all flows and checks are done then I am required to call the Before Start Originating Checklist. Per your own procedures the checklist asked lights test; my response is 'checked'. If I am calling 'checked'; what does it mean if I ignore what I know is wrong; (electrical short). Lies. I will continue to ground aircraft and refuse to fly an aircraft that has or the potential to create an electrical fire issue. I find it an issue that I have brought this problem up before and MTC along with other personnel seem to not take notice of this problem. People seem to think that I am creating this issue and should just ignore it. I in my own consensus cannot accept this.I find it an issue that Pilots do not know. Should be added into manual so Pilots have it black and white. Pilots say it's not in manual so it's good to go. (Sad statement). I find most Pilots have no idea what is right or wrong on the light test.




Synopsis: Captain reported a lack of consensus with maintenance regrading a failure of the Master Warning and Caution Lights test during preflight checks.