elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201511
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approximately 2 hours after departure; we received a ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) correction over ACARS. Our ZFW was actually 1000 pounds higher than reported prior to departure. Apparently; cargo was added just prior to pushback but did not get reported to LP. Our take-off data and performance calculations were based on the wrong ZFW.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported receiving a second set of 'final' weights enroute.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon preflight of FMC loaded JFK 1 to RBV as anticipated route. Subsequently [we] received ATC clearance JFK 1; including Breezy Point climb transition then RBV. After referring to chart; was loading revised clearance into FMC and became distracted by discussion with First Officer regarding staying within 039 degree radial on initial turn and failed to manually load Breezy Point transition. On departure after CRI; proceeded direct RBV at about a 300 heading rather than make left turn to 223 per SID. ATC immediately noticed and issued proper turn on course. The JFK 1 departure has no canned transitions; they must all be manually loaded and sometimes change at the last moment. It would enhance safety to have these transitions in the database to load.


Second narrative: We departed Runway 31L at JFK. We were filed on the Kennedy 1 departure with the Breezy Point climb. I conferred with the Captain about the necessity of remaining east of the CRI 039 radial. We discussed whether I should remained configured and at a slower than normal climb speed to facilitate this constraint. We elected to make a normal takeoff and use normal climb procedures. We departed and the takeoff and climb were normal. We remained east of the CRI 039 radial and crossed CRI and proceeded to RBV. This is when ATC called us and gave us a heading to 210 degrees. We were switched to a new controller and given direct RBV. So the mistake that we made was that we neglected to manually enter RNGRR intersection after the CRI VOR. When the Kennedy 1 is selected with the Breezy Point climb; RNGRR does NOT appear in the FMS and MUST be entered manually. We failed to do this and thus the call from ATC. In my opinion; since RNGRR must be entered manually; it might be less easy to miss on the SID if it was highlighted.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reports forgetting to enter RNGRR in the FMC after CRI to fly the Breezy Point transition of the Kennedy 1 Departure; proceeding direct to RBN after CRI. ATC issues a heading to correct; then direct RBN.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: ZDC was in ERAM and ZNY is not in ERAM. Aircraft X flight plan came from ZNY and was flashing at Pinion with no fourth line data. The route was bombed out and showed; MOL.(XXX)..DIRTY2.KATL. The STAR was correctly numbered; we took out the extra pads; we tried a 6/7/10 [flight plan revision]; we tried different fixes on the arrival nothing worked. I asked the pilot if he was RNAV equipped and he said yes. Then a few minutes later he requested the WHINZ3 after MOL; he said he was unable the DIRTY2. Coordination was done. This problem happened during a busy push with over 40 aircraft in the [airspace]; and I had a D-side. There was lots of coordination that needed to be done with aircraft; plus another aircraft that had bad preferential (pref) routing I had to fix. After talking with one of the ERAM leads here at ZDC; it was determined that the pilot had filed his equipment appropriately; which was not PBN approved; however he filed for the DIRTY2 (or at least that's what we showed-not sure). The system (ZNY HOST and ZDC ERAM) had allowed the route to be entered even though it was wrong. There was no pref route that kicked out. This created a lot of extra work and coordination during a busy push that should not be necessary just to try to get a proper flight plan.1) The system (HOST or ERAM) should not allow a route to be accepted that does not match the equipment. Whatever system the pilot originally filed his route through should have told him he could not fly the DIRTY2.2) It would be helpful to have pref routes for ATL show up for ZNY and ZDC so that these problems can be addressed sooner and alleviate any discrepancies. 3) ZDC had a briefing over the last year about equipment codes and such; however; it was a short useless briefing that did not teach us anything; and it was not cohesive. Request more briefings at ZDC on how equipment is handled in ERAM.




Synopsis: ZDC Controller reports of an aircraft route issue and possible problem related to ERAM vs Host.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCF.Tower, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D MCF
ATC / advisory: UNICOM TPF
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I may have broke MCF air space flying in the pattern at TPF to avoid other aircraft in the same pattern.

Callback: MCF airspace is a few miles from TPF airport. TPF is a non towered airport so reporter was unable to make contact with MCF while flying in the traffic pattern and communicating on UNICOM.



Synopsis: Pilot reported flying into airspace of a nearby airport while in the traffic pattern of another airport.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MHTG.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center MHTG
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The paper Jeppesen Chart Latin American HI/LOW 2 differs from the electronic Jeppesen FD-Pro charts; aircraft (FMS database) and release [document]. On L208 into MID the FD-Pro and the aircraft have RUDMI which is missing from the paper charts. On UB573 into BZE the paper chart shows point PENZO. The FD-Pro and the aircraft have TUGET instead. The Lat/Long coordinates are the same.Additionally; the PARZA 3 restrictions loaded into the aircraft differ from those in FD-Pro. FD-Pro shows PARZA 9000 ft while the aircraft loaded 200B/10;000 ft. The ILS 07 note says 200B for the procedure and has 10;000 ft depicted for the holding pattern at PARZA. However; when I loaded the RNAV 07 which doesn't have those restrictions or even use PARZA; the box held onto 200B/10;000 ft at PARZA. As this was most restrictive we complied with it.I would not have noticed the enroute error as I use the FD-Pro application; but I find many other pilots focus on the paper charts. They need to be updated or removed.




Synopsis: B737-NG Captain reported different navigational data on the Jeppesen paper charts when compared to electronic charts and the aircraft FMS database.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While climbing on departure leg; my student noted traffic on the ADS-B screen; so he was already looking when I lifted the wing preceding a turn to left cross wind for runway XX at ZZZ. We saw the 182 at our 10 o'clock position; with nearly no lateral movement against the horizon; about 800 feet away. The student saw it first at about 800 feet distance; and yelled. I saw the aircraft at about 600 feet away; and pushed the yoke hard. I estimate the other aircraft passed nearly overhead and about 200 feet above us; slightly behind us; owing to the hard push we made on the yoke. The other aircraft (whose number we got from ads-b) was not talking on frequency. Nobody else in the pattern heard him either. The other aircraft cruised through our pattern south bound; two to three hundred feet below pattern altitude. He was about 200 or so yards inside -- that is; closer to the ZZZ runway -- than ZZZ traffic usually turns crosswind. Had we not seen him; I believe he would have hit us.




Synopsis: C172 instructor reported NMAC with transitioning aircraft while in the pattern at a non-towered field.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BJC.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D BJC
ATC / advisory: Tower BJC
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A C182; departed Boulder airport and called BJC tower; with the current ATIS; to request a transition through the airspace from NW to SE at 6;500 MSL. This request was approved as requested. Shortly after; a C172; was inbound from the north with a left base entry instruction for runway 11L at 7;400 MSL; descending. I exchanged traffic between the two aircraft. The C182 pilot reported that he had the C172 in sight; and that it would be 'no problem.' I informed the C172 pilot that the C182 pilot had him in sight. The C182 pilot told me two or three more times in the span of a few minutes that he still had the C172 in sight. After the two aircraft passed; the C172 reported only 200 feet separation. The two aircraft pilots began arguing on frequency about who should have given way; or gone behind. The C172  landed and the C182 continued SE bound. These were two VFR aircraft in VMC conditions. If one aircraft had given the other one a wider berth; it may have prevented the C172 pilot from getting surprised.




Synopsis: BJC Tower Controller describes an NMAC between a C182 transitioning through the Class D at pattern elevation and a C172 on left downwind for Runway 11L. The C182 pilot had reported the C172 in sight several times; but apparently chose to pass with minimal separation; resulting in a verbal exchange on the Tower frequency.
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B PHX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X file a flight plan via the FTHLS1 DP.  The FTHLS1 DP was off due to weather.  Therefore; Aircraft X was rerouted on the LALUZ1 DP.  However; upon departure Aircraft X flew the FTHLS1 DP.  Fortunately he was the last of all the departures and there was no problem.  I got control for Aircraft X from PHXT and pointed him out to Santan. Apparently this is still a problem for decades.  I remember the same thing happening when I worked at PHXT in the late 90s; early 00s.  When pilots get a different routing via PDC other than what they filed; sometimes they don't catch it and still fly the filed flight plan instead.  I believe a good check and balance is for Ground Control to verify the DP when an aircraft calls for taxi and has a reroute (other than what they filed).




Synopsis: P50 Departure Controller reports of a PHX departing aircraft on the incorrect SID which was sent via the PDC.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The First Officer was flying the approach following a lengthy ground delay for weather earlier in the day and 45 minutes of holding during the flight. A B777 was ahead of us on the approach and apparently had slowed to final approach speed 8 miles out on final after the Controller had directed them to maintain 170 Kts. until the Final Approach Fix. We complied with the Controller's directions and slowed to final approach speed when directed. Due to insufficient separation with the B777; ATC directed us to go around. The First Officer complied and the subsequent approach and landing were uneventful. The B777 did not comply with ATC instructions on airspeed. All aircraft should comply promptly to ATC instructions and advise if unable.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that Tower issued them go around instructions due to insufficient wake turbulence spacing on the final approach course.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Do 328 TJ (Turbojet)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: What does 'opposite direction' really mean in a TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT? I was informed that a recent incident was non-separated. I am requesting clarity on this procedure for this facility; and nationwide; for the purpose of consistency; and non-punitive treatment of controllers running safe operations with aircraft on intersecting runways. A Dornier was switched to my (Tower) frequency on a visual approach to Runway 28 about 15 miles southeast of the airport. When the Dornier was 12 miles southeast; I cleared a CRJ7 for takeoff on Runway 6; on a SID; which is essentially runway heading and exchanged traffic to each. When the CRJ7 was through the Runway 28/6 intersection; I stated 'Dornier; traffic through the intersection; no factor.' At that point; the Dornier was 8 miles southeast; about two miles south of the Runway 28 extended centerline. The CRJ7 was switched to departure RADAR; seated next to me; while the Dornier remained on my frequency. I maintained Tower applied visual separation between the two aircraft. I was told this was possibly an Operational Error and was shown the FALCON playback. I was told our local order was not complied with and considering that Runway 28 'final' and Runway 6 centerline reciprocal headings are only 39 degrees divergent; and that the Dornier was within a 10-mile radius of the airport before the CRJ7 commenced a left turn; our order repeatedly states 'turned to avert all conflicts' to state when separation is achieved. There was no need to turn the CRJ7; because once it passed the runway intersection; the conflict ended. The order refers to opposite direction. The Dornier was never aligned to Runway 28 until 2 mile final or less. The national order defines 'FINAL APPROACH' only in terms of instrument approaches. When using the term 'opposite direction' an aircraft 'passed the intersection' is separated from an arrival to a crossing runway.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an alledged loss of separation reference the 'opposite direction' rules; the reporter claiming the governing procedures were mis-interpreted given the location of the event.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I used the flight planned estimated TOW to print up a preliminary runway data sheet. Then; when the real numbers were uploaded from load planning I mistakenly typed in the zero fuel weight where I should have typed TOW and requested numbers for a departure. We set the bad numbers in our speed bugs and took off with the wrong speed and weight. TOW was around 252k; zero fuel weight was around 177k. The captain realized the speeds were wrong after I called out '100 kts' and accelerated down the runway a bit until the airplane climbed out. We were beyond V1 as bugged; but probably below the real V1 (but we didn't know what that number was).




Synopsis: A B-757 First Officer mistakenly typed in the zero fuel weight where he should have typed takeoff weight and requested takeoff numbers for that lower weight. On takeoff; when the First Officer called 100 knots; the Captain realized the numbers were wrong and delayed rotation until further down the runway.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Floor Lighting
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: All required procedures for charging the lights were; and are; followed. I have previously submitted a safety management system report on this issue; and the procedures were changed to the current procedures. The procedures in place; however; are not effective and did not affect the light strips on the floor of the aisle at all.Replace all photo strips or find new technology to replace them.




Synopsis: B737 Flight Attendant reported procedures for charging the lights are not adequate.