elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climbing to 25;000 feet. At 10;000 feet TCAS gave us a TA. Traffic was approaching above us at 10-11 o'clock. ATC gave us instruction 'Expedite climb.' At the same time TCAS RA gave us 'Descend'. We followed TCAS RA and initiated descent. We informed ATC about RA. In VMC we never saw the traffic. After 'Clear of conflict' we continued to climb to 25;000 feet.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported receiving an RA to descend at the same time ATC was telling them to climb.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Fatigue; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Other fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Over a period of time
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Continuously; we [reserve pilots] fly all nighters back from Hawaii to San Francisco. We land at either early in the morning and are then expected to be phone available even during our 'crew rest.' It is impossible to sleep in the morning while being expected to keep the telephone on. We are continuously interrupted by outside contacts but are not allowed to turn off our phone. Almost every time on reserve; the pilots are assigned a very early short call assignment for that same night. It is physically impossible to be interrupted from phone availability requirements; get more than 4 hours of sleep that same night; and be fit to fly when called. We are fatigued every time in these circumstances. We have been advised to 'accept the assignment' but if we are called and unfit then to say we are fatigued. In these circumstances; we are questioned by the Flight Office. This is an egregious safety issue when we are continuously expected to comply with 'as per the contract.' I was so fatigued upon an early call from the crew desk after flying an all-nighter; I did not hear my phone until 1.5 hours and four calls later! Now I am punished with five hours of docked pay and an 'Absence' in my record for what is an unsafe practice; for back to back and multiple swing shifts in just a 72 hour period.




Synopsis: An air carrier First Officer addressed debilitating scheduling demands placed on Reserve Pilots at her airline; in particular the requirement that such pilots must remain phone available for new assignments during their contractually limited breaks between assignments.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After landing; we turned off on SG6 with ATC instructions to taxi via the Green 7. Both of us were surprised by the STR as we had never encountered this at ATL and immediately referred to our EFBs in order to find the appropriate STR.  The way the STRs are indexed; neither one of us could find the procedure.  We knew the previous aircraft was also instructed on the Green 7 so we followed them.  While still searching for the chart; ATL Tower called and told us the other frequency was looking for us.  We taxied without further incident on the new frequency.  I finally found the STR; but it wasn't from the index labelling.  The list does not have all the color codes for the associated runways. The STR we needed was titled: 'STR (from RWY 10 GOLD West; Red 7 and East and RWY 28'.  Trying to access 'Green 7' in a hurry with no knowledge of where to find it creates a very uncomfortable position. The STRs should be listed by runway only; or include all the color routes on the listing.  In addition add a comment on the 10-7 pages to expect STRs after arrival so they can be properly briefed.  The disadvantage to the EFB is only one chart can be displayed at a time; needing extra briefing time to decide which Pilot displays the appropriate chart for taxi in.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported difficulty finding their assigned standard taxi route after landing at ATL; citing unintuitive indexing practices used in their EFB as contributing.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D21.TRACON, MI
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E D21
ATC / advisory: TRACON D21
Aircraft component: Compass (HSI/ETC)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During descent on the SPRTN3 Star via LAN; my Captain and I noticed a discrepancy between the information our FMS/GPS was showing as well as our HSIs. We were given a vector after SPRTN intersection to intercept the 9R localizer into PTK. When we turned to the assigned heading ATC queried us regarding our present heading and location. At this time we realized there was an apparent malfunction with our navigation systems. We were given a descent below the ceiling and became oriented visually using local landmarks and dead reckoning. While we didn't have any system warnings or flagged (failed) avionics; it was apparent that both of our headings were approximately 90 degrees different than our actual orientation.We were subsequently cleared for a visual approach and landed without any issue as ATC helped us gain situational awareness by providing directional cues to the airport once we were in VMC conditions.After discussing the event with Maintenance we are still waiting to hear back on what the issue was. The aircraft is an older model and it is not overly uncommon to have older components fail simply due to their age. Luckily my Captain and I had VMC weather conditions and were able to utilize ATC and good CRM to arrive at PTK safely.




Synopsis: A BAe 125 flight crew experienced a track deviation when their actual heading after receipt of a vector from Approach Control was approximately 90 degrees from the heading assigned.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Just crew onboard B737-800; First Officer closed the boarding door and informed cabin crew we were ready to go. I was in the cabin; went to my Left Forward Entry (L1) Door and made announcement to flight attendants to 'Arm' doors and Cross Check. Immediately after take-off a loud air noise was immediately noticed. First Officer (who was APC riding in passenger cabin) went to cockpit to notify them. We turned around and landed back at the departure airport. First Officer re-opened/closed door; per procedures; door had to be inspected. All checked out OK. We took off for our destination without problem with the door.Defect in Boeing door [design] that cockpit Door Warning Indicator doesn't show if door is not properly closed; if problem is in the aft section of the door; was how it was explained to me.




Synopsis: The Flight Attendant in charge reports their B737-800 aircraft required an air turn-back due to a loud air noise coming from Forward Entry Door 1-Left immediately after takeoff. A First Officer had closed the door prior to departure. Flight Attendant noted the cockpit Door Warning Indicator did not show door was not properly closed.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAKX.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: This incident that occurred on our ZZZ-ZZZ1. As we approached Kabul airspace; our filed routing was from PINAX waypoint V848 to SURVI M881 to DI. Upon checking in with Kabul Control; we were rerouted PINAX P764 LAJAK then flight plan route. This routing was not in the our database and we informed ATC. They asked if we had NOTAM G2465/20. We asked them to standby while we checked. ATC then cleared us to waypoint GULNI then LAJAK. We informed ATC that GULNI was also not in our database. ATC then informed us that V848 airway was discontinued as of 03 Dec 20 per the Notam and replaced with airway P764 and read the NOTAM to us over the frequency. We were then cleared direct to LAJAK and requested to report abeam SURVI intersection. This new routing (and the new airway as well) takes us off of the preferred routing prescribed in the manual. A new route will need to be developed to comply with the new airway - P764. Additionally; this is certainly not an area where we need to be getting vectored off of an established airway because it is not in our database. We were caught completely off guard by this and in reporting it to our dispatcher; she was unaware of it as well. Along with the new airway; the new waypoint GULNI needs to be added as well.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported that the route database for the flight was out of date.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EYE.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: CTAF EYE
Second aircraft: Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was with my student in initial climb out for Runway 21. We were roughly 1200 feet MSL. We made all the proper calls. Winds were favoring Runway 21. When we were 1200 feet MSL; a Piper made a short final call for Runway 3. The Piper did not make any calls before that. We had to turn to avoid them. It was a really really close encounter.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at EYE airport.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After being rerouted into an extremely late night and long duty day we were on descent into LAS. After preparing for and briefing for a visual approach backed up by the ILS for [Runway] 25L Approach; Control offered us a right base to [Runway] 19L. We accepted this change leaving little time for a briefing and no good approaches to choose from. Our instructions were to join final at 3;500 FT. To accommodate this altitude request; I turned further away from the airport to join final at about six miles. We flew over the buildings of the strip (the Stratosphere) and left the perch. Tower issued us a low altitude alert. We were high on the PAPI so I'm not sure if the call was legit; but figured a report would be helpful. My suggestion is to not accept last minute changes unless extremely familiar with new procedure.




Synopsis: A B737 Crew on approach to Runway 25L accepted a last minute change for a Runway 19L night visual. When starting a descent after the Stratosphere; ATC called a low altitude alert although they were high on the PAPI.
Date: 201204
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Aircraft component: Company Operations Manual
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The changeover from a paper copy of the FOM and AOM to a digital format was done without any information given to the line pilots. With the daily revisions and continuous changing of information; I understand the cost of paper updates. However; this leaves line pilots unable to review; study; and learn the completely new manuals. This will create a growing gap of understanding and coordination between crew members that will weaken standardization because of the varying levels of recalling the updates and inability to find items in the new books. It is my desire to study the manuals and keep informed of the continuous changes; but I am unable to do so with the now digital format. I am willing to learn to use a digital format; but no information has been given on how to track changes; or when it is updated; how to download it; and if Company IT will assist if we have complications. The issue is not passing or failing a PC; but my liability to the FAA for the documents I am governed by. I am not to use electronic devices on the flight deck; nor am I to read documentation not pertinent to the flight. I am liable for a document that I cannot touch and don't have the hardware/instructions to digitally use. Problems will arise if there is an accident or incident where the FAA finds non-compliance with our FOM or AOM. I am unable to determine if my actions are appropriate or not.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot noted that Flight Operating Manuals (FOM) and Aircraft Operating Manuals (AOM) are now in digital formats and pilot may not know what changes have been made to them. Also; since pilots cannot use the electronic devices on the flight deck they may not know what to study in order to remain current.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: SFO was using only 28L/R this day due to runway construction on 1L/R. Taxied out to 28L. Holding short of 28L; Tower asked us if we had the numbers for 28R. We said we did. 777 was cleared for takeoff 28L. We were instructed to 'Cross 28L; caution jet blast; line up and wait 28R' The captain taxied across 28L as the 777 was departing and we felt our airplane dip to the right from the jet blast. He immediately put full left aileron to counteract the jet blast. We felt nothing other than the airplane tip to the side. We departed. Upon arrival at our destination; I performed the walk around and found a scrape under the right wing. We contact maintenance and the captain wrote up the issue.ATC cleared us to cross 28L immediately after clearing the 777 to depart. There was another aircraft on short final for 28L so it was very clear that we had to get across quickly. ATC should have waited for a larger gap to clear us to cross; rather than forcing us to cross so soon behind a heavy jet.I should have spoken up and told the captain to wait a few more moments before crossing; explaining that the jet blast was dangerous. ATC should have given us more time to cross the runway rather than squeezing us in between a heavy jet departing and another jet landing.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported they were told to cross SFO Runway 28L as a B777 was taking off. The jet blast caused the CRJ to dip and scrape the right wing.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon checking in with Approach Control; we were told to descend to 7;000 FT; approaching FL100 and slowing to 250 KTS. We were then instructed to slow to 220 KTS; descend to 3;000 FT and altimeter 1032HP. Focusing on the Continuous Descent Approach (CDA); and making sure we complied with noise abatement arrival procedures; we had the opportunity to reset altimeter to 1032HP; but missed the opportunity. Passing FL080; we were told 21 track miles to touch down and asked if that would be sufficient. We were satisfied with that profile and continued the descent. Approximately 3 heading changes were given to prior to intercepting the localizer. At this point; we missed setting QNH to 1032HP as we passed transition. While on the CDA profile going through about 5;000 FT; we were cleared to intercept the localizer and cleared the approach. We were about a dot high glide slope deflection; reducing airspeed; and configuring on schedule for stable approach criteria. All three crewmembers became fixated on the glide slope indicator appearing to be showing on glide slope; but FMAs did not show captured which further hampered us from catching the QNH discrepancy. The glide slope was captured at approximately 6 miles where we subsequently transitioned to VMC conditions and was maintained until a 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN; PULL UP' warning at 3 miles and immediate go around was initiated. On go around; after switching to Approach Control; they confirmed our altimeter of 1032HP at which time we recognized our error. Vector back to [runway] and landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 had no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B767-300 crew on an ILS at a foreign airport failed to set QNH and; following an EGPWS TERRAIN warning; executed a go around at which time ATC's altimeter question lead them to discover the error.