elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201301
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Shorts SD-330
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Repairman
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Operations
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Staffing; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Someone needs to look into our Air Carrier deeply before someone gets hurt. This is a serious safety issue.

Callback: Reporter stated nobody puts anything in writing. Many Senior Maintenance Management personnel have left their Part-135 Operations. They operate numerous type aircraft including the Shorts 330. He thought this would be a wake-up call for their oversight Federal Regulators; but so far; an overall element of fear continues and Quality Assurance only exists in name. He and other mechanics are concerned about what may happen if maintenance practices do not change or regulatory improvements don't occur.



Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes a maintenance work environment where overhauls are not accomplished; engine failures not reported; incorrect fuel used; aircraft discrepancies not written-up; all combined with a fear of retribution.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were rerouted; running late; had a Maintenance delay; [and a] weight and balance system delay. We got our CPDLC. Tower was closed. [Procedure] page [said] contact NorCal for clearance. [Jeppesen] 10-9 says nothing. We took off VFR; called NorCal. Norcal said we should've called them for takeoff clearance. It was VFR. [Procedure] was unclear.


Second narrative: The First Officer and I decided that since it was VFR; we could depart with our ATC issued CPDLC clearance and contact Departure in the air based on the back of the [Jeppesen] 10-9 page and the [Procedure] page.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported receiving a PDC clearance on the ground; then taking off without calling the departure facility for their release.
Date: 202103
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The FA called the flight deck and reported an electrical burning smell and I had the check the overhead bins and electrical outlets under the seats.  No obvious reason for smell.  I called Dispatch and Maintenance Control and we continued to destination.  We followed the QRH and FM.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported being advised by a Flight Attendant of an electrical burning smell during cruise.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GRB.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E GRB
ATC / advisory: UNICOM GRB
Second aircraft: SR20
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Sporting event arrival procedures [in effect] (2.5 hours before kickoff; very busy). We had an unusual split of airspace; one Controller working final; and me working satellite airports; feeding the Final Controller; and departures. The C182 was northeast and inbound to GRB at 50. The Cirrus was southeast and heading to SBM (LOA with MKE says we'll give him to them at 50 - which was coincidentally the altitude he came over at from ZMP). I noted a potential conflict when the two aircraft were about 30 miles apart; but wanted to see the situation develop with plenty of time to take steps - unsure if there would be a conflict at that time. Then I went on to other traffic/situations and failed to return to the conflict until it was too late. At that point I put both aircraft on 90 degree headings and descended the Skylane. Too little too late; ZMP - Minneapolis Center; SBM - Sheboygan; WI;= Airport; MKE - Milwaukee Tower/TRACON; GRB Tower/TRACON.I discussed this with my ATM. GRB is unusual in that we are effectively an ATC5 for 350 days of the year; and an ATC10 the other 15. Eight football home games (not counting playoffs) and aviation events are incredibly busy. A three-way split would have alleviated the workload and I believe I would have prevented the incident. We had an agreement (between feeder and final) to set everyone up for a downwind entry for the Back Course 24 approach at 60. But visuals started working and many pilots were requesting the GPS 24 arrival and coordination between the two positions was pretty heavy. I think a stronger controller would have had this ironed out earlier on. I should have descended the Skylane as soon as I could have - rather than putting off the potential situation. I got wrapped up doing other things and didn't get back to it like I should have. The next time I see a potential situation like this; I hope to deal with it at the onset rather than waiting to see if anything comes of it.




Synopsis: GRB TRACON Controller describes a loss of seperation event that occurs during a time of high inbound traffic.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Lead Ramp Guide was marshalling us into the gate.  While I was concentrating on his directions bringing us into the gate I caught; out of my left peripheral vision; what turned out to be a catering truck crossing directly from left to right in front of the aircraft.  I applied hard brake pressure and the aircraft came to a stop.  The truck drove on by.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports a near collision with a catering truck that cuts in front of the aircraft while he is being marshalled into the gate.
Date: 201201
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We both verified the fix in the FMS before executing direct. While talking to Chicago Center around 45 minutes later; they asked what fix we had last been cleared to. I responded with TRAGG. He asked if we were direct to TRAGG; as he was showing us flying north of course. I confirmed we were direct to TRAGG and spelled the fix phonetically. He then replied with a clearance to TRAKK intersection. It seems the easiest way to avoid this situation is absolute diligence when reprogramming the FMC. The flight plan was eight or nine pages long; and it was easy to skip a page when looking for the correct waypoint. We both saw what we thought was the correct waypoint; and the PM verified with the PF before the change was executed. A quick glance at the paper release could have possibly revealed there were two very similar sounding waypoints on the flight plan.


Second narrative: After reaching a cruise altitude we asked ATC for a shortcut. ATC issued a clearance to the fix; TRAGG; on the BOJID 1 RNAV Arrival. Pilot Flying scrolled through the FMC pages and found the fix with Pilot Monitoring observing and verifying the fix; TRAGG. Nearly 45 minutes later; ATC queried us on our direct navigation towards TRAGG. We confirm that we are direct TRAGG. Minutes later ATC queries us again about our navigation to TRAGG. We then phonetically spell out the fix TRAGG. ATC informs us that TRAGG was not the fix we were given direct to. The fix ATC intended us to fly direct was TRAKK. During our FMC selection; we do not ever remember seeing the fix TRAKK. After further review; the fix; TRAKK; was discovered to be on our original flight plan. ATC did not seem too concerned about the mix up; but redirected us direct to TRAKK. We complied immediately. Both PF and PM were convinced that ATC issued us a clearance direct TRAGG. Our read back of the original clearance did not alert ATC. With two fixes on the same route with almost identical spelling and pronunciation; it can be extremely easy to overlook the ambiguity. In the future; it may help for both pilots to verify the entire route more thoroughly before selection of fixes.


Synopsis: B737 crew is cleared direct to what they believe is TRAGG. Some time later ATC questions the crew on their navigation and it is discovered that they should be proceeding direct to TRAKK.
Date: 202006
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The company currently requires Flight Attendants to wear masks on the jumpseat for taxi; takeoff; and landing. It is unsafe. I was sitting on the jumpseat doing my 30 sec review on taxi-out. The cabin was hot and I realized that if I had to suddenly start shouting commands that I probably would have hyperventilated and passed out. The passengers are having enough trouble hearing and understanding us during regular conversation. I may not have the opportunity to remove the mask while trying to do my job in an emergency situation. Flight attendants are constantly complaining that their glasses are fogging up or the mask is hindering their vision. Depending on the type of mask being worn and how secure it is to the face it could get pushed up over the eyes; sucked into the mouth; or slip down and tighten around the neck. We are not currently sitting 2 on a jumpseat which means the flight attendant in the front row is already shouting at a wall. We are already physically separated during taxi; takeoff; and landing. We should not be required to wear the mask when we are secured at these times.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported problems associated with wearing the required COVID-19 type mask while performing duties.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Snow; 4
Aircraft: Super King Air 350
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cowling
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Immediately after takeoff I heard a thump and felt yaw. My copilot looked out the window and saw that the right engine cowling had come open. I looked out mine and saw that the left cowling had also come open and departed the aircraft. I maintained configuration with the gear down and made an immediate left pattern to return for landing. We informed tower that we needed to immediately return to the airfield and we were cleared to land on either runway. I was encountering controllability difficulties in the yaw axis so I maintained speed slow enough to control the airplane and to not exacerbate the structural damage.With the accelerated pace of the short pattern coupled with the immediate landing clearance issued by tower and no other traffic in the area; I did not declare an emergency (in retrospect I probably should have).After an uneventful landing I taxied to maintenance and informed tower that they needed to do a FOD check since we had dropped objects on the runway. After shutdown; I discovered that both engine cowlings had departed the aircraft with one lodging itself on the left horizontal stabilizer.


Second narrative: My co-pilot duties prior to flight directly related to the airplane are to prepare the inside with regards to catering; coffee; icing down drinks. On this day; I did not divert from my usual duties requested of me. At some point after the completed exterior walk around which the captain accomplished; captain left both left and right nacelle doors open for line service to fill oil into engine. I was not made privy to the fact that oil was ordered for the plane; nor that the nacelles were even left open.


Synopsis: King Air 350 flight crew reported they took off without fastening both engine cowlings; which; shortly after takeoff; separated from the aircraft.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While taxiing out a fuel truck was attempting to cross over to the fuel truck staging area. The fuel truck was driven directly at the radome of my aircraft. When the [truck] came within roughly 100 feet of my aircraft I turned on all additional lighting and stopped the aircraft. The fuel truck still continued on a collision course with my aircraft until it came within 25-50 FT; at which time it swerved to avoid hitting my aircraft. Due to the last minute and erratic maneuver taken by the driver of the fuel truck it was apparent that they had not seen my aircraft due to some type of distraction.




Synopsis: Dash 8-300 Captain reported a fuel truck nearly hit his aircraft on the ramp at CLT.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Fuel Booster Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; MEL; Aircraft
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Enroute to ZZZ; the Right Center Fuel Boost Pump 'Low Pressure' light illuminated. I notified both Dispatch and Maintenance; via ACARS; of the failure. Luckily; the other boost pump operated normally and we were able to burn the center tank fuel to empty the tank and continue normally to ZZZ. Upon landing; ZZZ Maintenance consulted Maintenance Control and elected to defer the pump under MEL 28-X-XX; rather than MEL 28-X-YY. The primary difference between the two MELs as I read them; relates to the fuel status of the center tank. 28-X-XX; in my opinion; should be applied when the center tank is empty; as it was in our particular situation. 28-X-YY should have be used when fuel remains in the center tank (as it states in the title of the MEL). I envision this MEL was designed to give relief to an aircraft that has fuel in its center tank; to depart; as long as the fuel; should it become trapped and therefore unusable; does not adversely affect the weight and balance of the aircraft.The other center tank pump is operational in this case and should be able to burn that fuel out of the tank. I do not think that this MEL s intended to give relief to continually fill the center tank; as needed; on subsequent flights; as the failure of the remaining center tank pump would likely cause you to immediately violate the structural limitation in the AFM regarding the burning of center tank fuel in excess of 1;000 lbs; prior to using wing tank fuel. If my interpretation of the application of the MEL is incorrect; however; I cannot imagine why MEL 28-X-XX would need to exist. Deferring the item under 28-X-YY would always be operationally preferable. The mere existence of 28-X-XX implies that the goal is to empty the tank if possible and once empty; it should remain so until a repair can be accomplished. I queried Maintenance Control and was told that they wanted to keep the aircraft able to carry center tank fuel.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported a lack of consensus in applying an MEL to an inoperative boost pump.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CZQX.ARTCC, NF
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center CZQX
Aircraft component: Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Relief Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately three hours into the flight off the coast of Canada we received a Main Deck Fire warning. While the flying crew began the checklist I left the cockpit to go investigate. While opening the door I informed the other crewmembers [aboard] that we had a possible fire on the main deck. After assessing the door for signs of smoke I went down to the main deck and grabbed the PBE box and a fire extinguisher. I walked down the main deck looking for signs of fire. After walking the freight I found no indications of fire or smoke. About this time I was joined by three other crewmembers so I elected to go back up to the cockpit to inform the pilots that no fire or smoke was seen. I then retrieved the ice spotlight from the upper deck and went back down to the main deck to continue looking for signs of smoke or fire. After a thorough search none were found. The Check Airman contacted [Operations] by SAT phone and the decision was made to continue on to destination. We checked the main deck every 30 minutes for the rest of the flight. I believe that we handled the situation well. The only possible problem is the wording of the checklist. According to it we should have started an immediate diversion. If it had been a cargo compartment fire or only two pilots on board the decision to follow the checklist and divert immediately would have been taken with alacrity. However; with a large group of supernumeraries on board we were able to ascertain that the fire indication was an anomaly. I believe that the checklist should perhaps be rewritten to allow for the possibility that there are additional crewmembers on board to assess the veracity of intermittent warnings.




Synopsis: B747-400 Relief Pilot experiences a Main Deck Fire warning and goes to investigate; informing other personnel aboard of the issue. No smoke or fire is found and the reporter takes exception to the checklist requirement to begin an immediate diversion.