elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Wheel Assemblies
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: The current AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) tire change removal for an A330 requires AMT access to an A330 SB (Service Bulletin) 32-3238 noted in the AMM 32-41-XX-XXX-XXX-A step 4.A. (10) and visual verification of actual installed brake assy MPN (Manufacturer Part Number) data plate (not just the [system] provided Serialized part info; especially since many affected/unaffected MPNs are under common M&Es). Any A330 tire change is when this has happened to any city/person involved in replacing an A330 MLG (Main Landing Gear) tire. Maybe nothing has been needed due to physical MPN verification revealing only NON-SB effective brake assemblies on our A330s.AMT typically has no access/knowledge (how to) to reference SB (I had to get from Airbus world Airnav Engineering search). Most may be unaware of the flowchart and may assume the 'prime' MPN assigned to 'AN' M&E# noted in the [company systems] info is the actual installed brake assembly MPN. (for example 33-XXXX-X-XXXX is 2.XXXX-X BUT several affected MPNs are in with some acceptable MPNs under the same M&E).Supplement incorporation into manuals is also an issue---example--Also I put in for the often overlooked Supplement mandating Axle inspection on every A330-300 TIRE change that Supplement should have been incorporated over 10 years ago....If we still have any effective MPNs---AMM should include the 3 figures/sheets and brief instructions from the SB; AND possibly separate out from the common M&E (Example--33-XXXX-X-XXXX; I used this one as an example; effected X-XXXX-X; X;X etc. MPNs for serialized 'installed' tracking info). Unsure if any impending ruptures or even if the MPNs on our A330's are the flow chart--effective #s. I can only assume people know what the 1st stage stator rotational dimension is supposed to be and look like (IF THEY HAVE a SB EFFECTIVE brake MPN currently installed) as noted in the SB that someone must accessed somehow. MAYBE nothing has been needed due to physical MPN verification revealing only NON-SB effective brake assemblies on our A330s. Add the info to AMM and identify accuracy of all A330 installed MPN #s (not just M&E) and positions. Insure actual MPNs installed and that all 'old' affected assemblies have been 'purged' and none are currently installed nor going to be installed. Be more diligent when combining MPNs under 2 M&E.




Synopsis: A330 Maintenance Technician reported deficiencies in the Main Landing Gear Tire replacement procedure.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LMO.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While maintaining my aircraft at the Vance Brand Longmont Airport; I observed skydivers descending through the traffic pattern and crossing the runway center line to land in the designated landing area. The same operations were repeated all afternoon. I observed the parachutes opening high above the airport and to the north. The skydivers then descended to the north of the airport; passing through roughly the 1;000 foot AGL traffic pattern then crossing the runway center line to the south to land next to the runway on the south side. Some of the parachutists crossed the runway below 500 feet. The winds at the time favored landing on Runway 29; and a left hand pattern to the north. Multiple aircraft were in the pattern at the time; and all afternoon as well. In the event of a go-around or an aircraft performing a close-in pattern there could certainly have been a collision of an aircraft with a skydiver. My understanding is that the skydivers are required to stay south of the airport and not to cross into the active pattern or directly over the runway.




Synopsis: Observer at LMO airport reported skydivers were crossing the runway in their descent to the ground; posing a safety hazard.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Was brought to my attention that the throttle lockout and stow switches were installed incorrectly on aircraft. The key washers were installed backwards and on the wrong side of the mounting bracket and the switches were incorrectly clocked.Our mechanic was the mechanic on the job had never done the job before; I don't know if any leads were helping him that I saw. I got with him at the start and showed him were to start and to measure the inside stop nut for reference of where to start for rigging the stow switch. I visually checked once installed and checked the measurements and were correct per AMM 78-37-01. I did make him re-safety because it was incorrect. Operations test was good. The throttle lock out switch was removed to get access at the stow switch and not to move the inside stop nut for ease of rigging; measurements good and operations checks good.Need to have a trainer on the floor helping and instructing of jobs. I as an inspector I'm not supposed to train or help do the job.


Second narrative: I remember installing the stow switch following the maintenance manual procedure. The inspector even made me safety the lock nut again. We measured everything to the tolerance specified by maintenance manual. The lock washer should only go in one way I do remember that. It's been awhile so I really don't recall every detail about the event.I think I installed this correctly and I have no explanations for how this happened.


Synopsis: Maintenance personnel on a Bombardier CRJ reported that the throttle lockout and stow switches were installed incorrectly.
Date: 201704
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A carry-on suitcase containing two rechargeable drill batteries shorted or arched when it came in contact with a wire bound notebook; catching the notebook on fire and the towels close to the battery caught on fire and were smoldering inside the suitcase while loading the bag for an outbound flight. The alert ramp serviceman smelled and saw smoke coming out of the bag and set it aside. The passenger was confronted; but allowed to separate the one good battery; and take it on the flight in his possession and the bag was then sent on the same flight. The burnt battery was left at the station and taken to lost and found. Fundamentally the ramp deserves credit for their reaction; but the policy regarding batteries might have to be changed to reflect the combustion danger. The battery leads should have been taped off or put in a separate case. The situation could have been disastrous if the battery had been allowed to go on the plane and smolder; possibly catching other items on fire in the pit/bin of the aircraft.




Synopsis: Gate Agent reported a suitcase containing two rechargeable drill batteries caught on fire when it was being loaded on the aircraft.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon selecting flaps 2 for landing received ECAM message - flight/controls - flaps locked/alignment fault. Told ATC we needed to hold. Ran checklists and computed landing distance and approach speed for configuration. [Sent message] to Dispatch and [Maintenance]. No additional items from them. By now had advised passengers and flight attendants of situation. [We] landed longest runway [available]. [We] had fire trucks standing by in case of excessively hot brakes. [We] did not apply brakes until below 90 KTS. Exited runway with 2;000 plus FT remaining; taxied to gate.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported flaps failed on extension for landing. An emergency was declared and safe landing followed.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: On our landing roll I noticed the runway surface looked new. As we slowed I noticed the runway appeared not to be grooved. Once on ground frequency I asked if [the] Runway was grooved. Ground spoke with airport ops and they confirmed that [the] Runway is not grooved but will be in the near future. I indicated that is most likely worth a NOTAM since the chart indicates it is grooved. Hours later there is no NOTAM.




Synopsis: First Officer of a Medium Transport aircraft reported that a runway that had recently been repaved is not grooved; as indicated on the runway information page. A Notam had not been issued.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Second aircraft: Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While climbing through 4;300 FT up to my cruise altitude of 7;000 FT Kansas City Center notified me of VFR traffic at 11 O'clock; less than a mile; at 4;500 FT; unverified. I was hand flying at the time; and looked for the traffic. Only when I leaned forward to look around the aircraft structure between the crew door and the windshield did I see a Bonanza at less than half a mile near my altitude. I was climbing at about 130 KTS; so I increased my rate of climb as I kept a close eye on the Bonanza. I climbed over the Bonanza and passed over him by 100-200 FT as I saw him disappear underneath my left engine. I notified ATC that the Bonanza passed close to me and asked if he was on her frequency. According to ATC they were not talking with him.I could not see the traffic coming from my left because it was blocked by the aircraft structure. The ATC traffic notification; while very helpful; came late. Equipment such as TCAS or TIS-B would have been very helpful to prevent this situation from occurring.




Synopsis: A windshield pillar restricted the ability of a CE-402 pilot to spot threatening traffic during his IFR climb. A timely advisory from ATC provided the impetus to expand his traffic watch and take appropriate evasive action.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC; Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Ground Control and CIC combined during this incident. The only other Controller in the Tower was working Local Control. Aircraft X; a helicopter; was on an RNAV approach and landing. When Aircraft X was 1/2 mile final to the left runway the Local Controller cleared Aircraft Y; a C172 Skyhawk; for takeoff from the right runway. The distance between the center-lines is approximately 320 ft. No traffic was given between the two aircraft. No caution wake turbulence/rotor wash from the landing helicopter.Aircraft X hovered down the right runway and then made a right turnout just past midfield to hover-taxi to land at the helipads. They hovered at about 50 feet. Meanwhile; Aircraft Y had taken the right runway for departure and began his departure roll. Still no traffic calls were exchanged between the aircraft.I asked the Local Controller 'Are you going to say anything?' and pointed at the helicopter. 'Whatever!' the other Controller replied. 'They won't hit.' 'That is [expletive deleted] dangerous!' I said as Aircraft X was halfway across the grass field between the left runway and the helipads. Hovering at about 50 feet AGL when Aircraft Y passed directly over Aircraft X about 200 to 300 feet. The other Controller was not phased in the least about the situation. No altitude restrictions were given; no separation was ensured even when I brought it to the other Controller's attention. It was pure luck that the Aircraft Y's climb rate kept it above Aircraft X. I believe that if there were a member of Management in the Tower; things would have been completely different. The Local Controller would have actually done their job instead of being lazy and not ensuring any kind of separation. This is not the first time situations like this have occurred with this Controller in my presence; but this is definitely the most dangerous one!




Synopsis: Controller in Charge observed a Local Controller depart a Cessna over the top of a hover taxiing helicopter; resulting in an NMAC.
Date: 201808
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was recently made aware of a few possible errors I have made with shipping documentation. It is very possible that I was part of the errors that I was made aware of. Some of these items I absolutely shipped and if I made mistakes I will own up to it. I have had a rough last few months with 3 deaths in my family and 2 break-ins at my house. I know these are not excuses; but I certainly have had other things on my mind. I can see where I may have been distracted and missed some of these items. I have listed below what I was made aware of: Entered incorrect Airway Bill so Shipper Declaration didn't match. Found in ZZZ - Shipper did not put any HAZ Class Labels or LTD QTY Label on the box in question. ZZZ1 Questioned weights- Weights were more than 10% difference; ZZZ could not accept. Shipper did not weigh boxes of fire extinguishers; took weight from previous shipments. Company talked with all crew about weighing boxes every time. ZZZ2 Cargo notified Company Ops that a truck shipment that was set for a flight had 4 pieces on Shippers Declaration; but Dangerous Goods Form said 2 pieces. Station redid shipper Declaration send to Cargo to move shipment. Found Shipper left off 2.2 HAZ Label; covered DOT-SP Label with the 5.1 HAZ Label; all labels poor condition. I would like to add that if the [Company safety rep] rep would not have talked to me; I would not have known that I was allowed to file this report.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported several HAZMAT shipping errors.
Date: 202012
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Departure / Pushback
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Ramp
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Push Back
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I notified my lead before departure that there was low visibility due to the jet bridge placement. He asked me if he wanted me to push or if he wanted me to push it. I told him I would wing walk. Once he gave us the clear to push signal; he almost immediately began to push the plane before the wing walker opposite to me could make sure traffic was stopped. A pick up truck with a plow was going; probably too fast; down the vehicle service road. The opposite wing walker was waving his hands and wands to get the trucks attention. The plow got stopped finally nearly once he got to the line of the envelope. The back of the truck went up in the air as he stopped due to how fast he was going and how fast he stopped. By the time the truck stopped the entire tail of the aircraft was in the vehicle service road.




Synopsis: A Ramp Service worker reported an aircraft was pushed back too far extending over a vehicle service road and into conflict with a snowplow.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center SKED; Tower SKBO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft level at 12;000 feet cleared for ILS 13L at SKBO close proximity to BOG VOR. Weather was clear with 30 miles plus visibility with visual contact with terrain at all times. We were configured flaps 15. Pilot Flying (PF) armed approach to follow Glideslope (GS) down. Autopilot was on. Next altitude on approach allows you to descend to 10;000 feet. Wind was very gusty at this phase of flight with light turbulence. Speed brake deployed to control airspeed for flap configuration. Aircraft pitched down after flight director bars. PF arrested pitch down but heard one short caution terrain audible warning. My head was down trying to tune left VHF radio to tower frequency. Looked up and out to see aircraft well clear of any terrain. Retracted speed brake after confirming airspeed under control. The glide path was now above us and reintercepted at approx. 11;300 feet lowest altitude noted was around 10;700 feet within approach criteria. Normal landing without any over speeds. No comments from Bogota approach control or tower. I would never rely on this NAVAID to bring me down in the weather. Actual glideslope should be close to the 12;000-foot crossing at BOG VOR. The feather starts at 10;000 further in the approach. Could have been interference on the ground.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported they received a GPWS terrain alert on approach into SKBO when the aircraft nosed over in thermals.