elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201811
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In the last several months I have noticed during my flights that the evacuation slides have been improperly armed. In most of these cases when looking at the slide and girt bar area you can see the RED warning which states 'THIS SIDE DOWN'. In these cases not only is the manual inflation handle inaccessible but ultimately the door may be impossible to open completely and/or the slide may not deploy/operate properly during an emergency evacuation. I have firsthand knowledge of this because I learned this during an evacuation training event. Two doors were armed improperly in this manner and it was impossible to open the door because as the door opens it tries to pull the skirt of the slide under the girt bar and the skirt gets pinched between the bar and the floor and prohibits movement of the door outward to full open. I was wondering why [I have seen] so many slides improperly armed this way and recently attended [additional training] and noticed the training devices are not like the actual slide packs we have on the airplane. Also the video for slide arming and disarming we have does not address this common mistake or misunderstanding. The video does allude to the manual inflation handle being accessible but I believe the video should stress the fact that the slide skirt has to be above or outboard of the girt bar and the warning 'THIS SIDE DOWN' not visible. The best way to do this is to roll or rotate the bar under the skirt and then place it in the arming brackets. This is potentially a very dangerous situation as one knows all exits must be available. I'd say about half the times I go back for a physiological break I see the slides improperly armed this way. The slides are easy to arm improperly because over time the improper fold or placement of the skirt material is like a piece of paper that's been already folded a certain way--it naturally is easier to fold in the way it's been already folded/placed (improperly). All of the FAs (Flight Attendants) I've discussed this with are very eager to get this corrected via their training and mentioned the training devices at other locations are also not representative. Some FAs are unaware of the hazard even when I point out the RED 'THIS SIDE DOWN'.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported observing the incorrect arming of evacuation slides and that this common mistake has not been addressed in training.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: PFD
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other After takeoff
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On rotation or maybe a few feet AGL; the Attitude Indicator; Turn Coordinator; and HSI all showed red Xs for a second or two and then all three displays on the G1000 PFD went to black. The Altitude and Airspeed tapes appeared to work. I contacted Tower around 100 FT AGL and requested a return to the runway. No emergency was declared as conditions were VMC and the Standby analog instruments were functioning. At about 400 FT AGL on final or base-to-final; all three displays turned back on. I landed without incident; reported the problem to the flight school that owns the plane; and completed a maintenance form.




Synopsis: A private pilot reports the Attitude Indicator; Turn Coordinator; and HSI all showed red Xs for a second or two and then all three displays on the G1000 PFD went to black just after rotation; on a Cessna C-182T aircraft.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: CRJ-200 departed KBUR on the Tower assigned heading of 210 degrees. On initial contact; I RADAR identified the CRJ-200 and climbed him to 14;000 feet. The CRJ-200 read back the assigned altitude. A Cessna 172 was VFR at 5;500 feet Eastbound landing KSMO; requesting an IFR clearance. The C172 advised he could no longer maintain VFR at 5;500 [feet] and either needed an IFR clearance or a climb to 6;000 feet. Once the C172 entered the lateral confines of my airspace; I issued an IFR clearance to KSMO with a descent to 5;000 feet. After verifying the C172's correct read back; I noticed that the CRJ-200 had turned direct KVNY VOR without a clearance which had placed him on a collision course with the C172. I turned the CRJ-200 to the Southwest; away from the C172. I then issued an immediate left turn to the C172; and went back to the CRJ-200 and issued an immediate left turn. The closest proximity was 1.62 miles and 200 feet or 1.8 miles and 0 feet. Every once in a while an aircraft turns on their own. Apparently there is some confusion on the VNY9 SID or something. Someone needs to investigate why certain pilots believe they can turn off the Tower assigned heading when the SID is a RADAR vector SID. Common ARTS; without fusion; contributed to the time it took to recognize the aircraft had turned without clearance. Had fusion RADAR been in use; I may have recognized it sooner. Fortunately; we had the staffing to have sectors split.




Synopsis: SCT Controller described a conflict event involving a BUR IFR departure and a VFR aircraft given an IFR clearance to SMO; noting the BUR departure failed to comply with the Tower issued departure heading.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ELP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON ELP
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Dispatched without HUD and bootstrapped #2 CDU to #1. GPS jamming near Cannon AFB enroute. Elected to fly ILS to RWY 22 with 6 knots tailwind rather than non-ILS with limited options due to CDU inoperative to RWY 04. Computed 5300 ft with max tailwind of 10 knots on 12000 ft runway. Vectors to late descent put us steep and requested left 360 turn at approximately 6500 ft. ATC approved the turn and advised us that the winds were getting squirrelly and gusting 070 up to 14 knots. We elected to continue the turn and transition to a visual to RWY 08R. We maneuvered for the left downwind and continued to configure. Passing 1000 AGL we were fully configured; approximately 5 fast and VVI 1200-1300 and correcting. Fully stable by 700 AGL; we landed uneventfully. The unique circumstances in combination with MEL and wind changes contributed to decisions made.




Synopsis: B-737 pilot reported experiencing GPS jamming near Cannon AFB while enroute.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LHW.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LHW
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Cleared to taxi to RWY 33R on B cross 33L. I never saw 33L due to faded/nonexistent hold short painting. Runway was covered in grass; looked like an old abandoned taxi way; faded or nonexistent numbers and was unusable for wheeled aircraft. With the lack of signage; paint; and condition I passed it up without ever realizing I passed a runway. When I came up to 33R; I crossed the hold short line thinking it was 33L. I saw the R and made an immediate turn to clear runway. Called up tower and seemed like it was a non-event to them. However; with lack of paint and signage it is a matter of time until someone pulls out in front of landing traffic.

Callback: The reporter stated he did not see any Runway 33L hold short or other taxiway marking identifying Runway 33L. In addition; he does not remember upright signage alongside the taxiway identifying Runway 33L.



Synopsis: A pilot reported a runway incursion at LHW airport. Signage and marking issues were cited as contributing factors.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Is there any way to know what de-icing fluids are contaminating the APU during a pre-flight walk-around? Are there any obvious signs that we should look for? During boarding; after ground air removal; I started the APU and selected the APU bleed on. The First Officer and myself noticed a strange odor coming from the vents. It smelled like dirty socks/musty dry at some points and alcohol/cleaning solution at other points. Maintenance was notified and a logbook entry was made. The cabin odor sheet was also filled out. The APU bleed was selected off to not expose the passengers and ground air was reconnected. After consulting with Maintenance; we decided to deplane the passengers and crew for the Maintenance troubleshooting. It was discovered that the plane was flown from ZZZ2 and could have possibly de-iced. The de-icing fluid could have entered the APU inlet and cause the event. After deplaning; I checked with the First Officer and cabin crew to see if they were experiencing any symptoms. They said they didn't have any symptoms. I felt lightheaded; dizzy and had a slight burning sensation in my lungs/chest. I called the Chief Pilot on duty and let him know of my symptoms. I called medic and was removed from the rest of my pairing and seen at an urgent care.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a fume event during boarding resulting in passengers deplaning and aircraft being turned over to Maintenance.
Date: 201306
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We flew a round trip out and back with what I believe was a non-synchronous vibration. At 36;000 and M .76 it was occurring at approximately 2 minute intervals for 15-20 seconds. We tried different airspeeds unsuccessfully and ultimately found relief at a lower flight level. The First Officer suggested engine anti-ice from another experience; which worked; especially on the return flight when ATC couldn't give us a new flight level fast enough.I believe the [continued operation with this] vibration is degrading our company's perceived commitment to safety and is creating a culture that encourages in-flight troubleshooting and flying with known discrepancies. I am embarrassed to fly this airplane. We received a comment from a non-revving pilot in the cabin after landing. I saw this airplane has some previous write-ups for vibration; but that we are creating a situation where individuals are discouraged from stepping forward.




Synopsis: An ERJ Captain expressed concern that repeated dispatch of an aircraft with obvious periodic inflight vibrations; despite previous logbook writeups; presented a poor perception of his company's commitment to safety and encouraged flight crews to become complacent about deferred maintenance.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Air Carrier X (A320) was level at 350 going into one airport; Air Carrier Y; also an A320; was at 360; landing at another. My trainee issued traffic to the Air Carrier Y; '11 o'clock one zero miles southbound Airbus 320 one thousand feet below you; expect lower passing traffic.' Air Carrier Y read back; 'roger; maintaining FL360.' Traffic was issued to Air Carrier X. About 20 seconds later; Air Carrier Y said 'traffic in sight; going direct to the fix descending to 120.' My trainee said; negative maintain FL360; issued traffic again; and told the pilot to report level at 360. But Air Carrier Y had already descended to FL357 before going back up. It's hard to say what to recommend in this situation. I believe my trainee used the right traffic call using 'one thousand feet below you' instead of 'traffic at FL350.' I was told that the charts show the STAR arrival as a profile descent; but I personally haven't seen the charts. Maybe the charts need to be updated if that is the case.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event that may have involved the issuance of altitude phraseology and misunderstanding of same.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Preflight planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Arrived in operations and all paperwork was laid out very professionally. Problem was trying to get a decent satellite photo to verify status of volcanic ash cloud approaching [the departure airport]. No wifi; and our new iPads would not provide access to necessary information. Hence we elected to take off; status unknown; southbound towards ash plume and hope to be able to see and avoid AT NIGHT. We avoided the plume we were told by a very few miles. Unsatisfactory!  We should have cancelled and not taken off with the information we had.


Second narrative: I inadvertently planned the flight through an active Flow Constrained Area (FCA)....fcastv:stave2....I had a heavier than normal workload due to volcanic ash near Buenos Aires...the other issue was that normally a route is provided...this FCA said avoid the area....had ATC put routes out for avoidance I would have been more likely to notice my error before departure.


Synopsis: Dispatcher inadvertently dispatched a B-767 air crew through a volcanic ash area. Air crew was unable to receive any information about an approaching volcanic plume. No satellite photo was available and Wi-Fi and their new IPads would not provide necessary information. They elected to depart and missed the plume by a very few miles.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were given a descent to FL200. After the clearance was given; I commented about there must be traffic because they didn't give us HAYED at 19;000 which is what we had just briefed; planned; and built into the FMS.Passing FL230 ATC called traffic off to our right at FL220 (they did not state it was converging). We responded that we were looking I zoomed the TCAS scale to 12. Passing approximately 22;700 ATC ask us to verify descent clearance; but was stepped on. I was unable to respond due to radio congestion; but seeing traffic off of our right on TCAS that was now -600 and seemed to be closing; but passing off our right I took the controls and used Touch Control Steering (TCS) [to set] the vertical speed to zero (Leveled at 22;400) and answered the controllers second call telling him we were given FL200. The controller issued us a climb to FL230 and before we got there he issued a descent to cross HAYED at FL190. No RAs were issued.The threats were traffic in our vicinity; the heavy radio congestion; and possibly either a misunderstood clearance or a misgiven clearance. In the future I will be more proactive when it comes to ATC clearances that seem to be different than the normal flow or different to what we are expecting.




Synopsis: EMB145 Captain reported being cleared to descend to FL200; but a conflict developed with traffic at FL220 and the reporter took evasive action.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Handoff / Assist; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was D-side at 16. The front has been pushing through northern and central Florida for the past two days.Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were on the TYNEE arrival to RSW with no in-trail spacing. I called R08 for a handoff about a minute north of OGGER. They told me they were unable [to] handoff and to spin him. I said ok. I told my R-side. I then called them back and asked about Aircraft Y. They said to spin him too. My R-side turned out both aircraft. Then he told me to call R14 and tell them no more handoffs because ZMA had closed the door. The R-side told me to call R78 and tell them we couldn't take the FMY lander they were handing off to us.I don't know. This happens fairly regularly so it shouldn't surprise me.




Synopsis: ZJX D-side reports of being shut off from the next Controller; having to hold aircraft; and having to close the door on other sectors.