elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The flight plan would not load through ACARS into the FMS so I manually entered the flight plan.  I entered the waypoint KD45O as KD54O; I  was distracted by the O (oscar) at the end; being certain to enter an O (Oscar) instead of a 0 (zero).  When the Captain read the waypoint  back during the legs check; I again missed the transposition of the 45.  As we turned over DBL to KD54O Denver Center said ' I show you off course; verify KD45O';  we immediately saw the mistake and  proceeded on course.  Their we're no other aircraft in our vicinity.


Second narrative: The First Officer was unable to upload flight plan via ACARS.  He then loaded the plan manually and incorrectly entered waypoint KD45O as KD54O.  During preflight Checks I read waypoints from FMC and and the  First Officer verified from printed plan.  When PDC came via ACARS only the first few fixes were listed; followed by 'as filed'.  After passing DBL; Denver Center asked if we were proceeding to KD45O and we immediately realized our mistake and promptly reentered the correct waypoint.  TCAS showed no aircraft in our area.  The course correction was less than 10 degrees.  These created waypoints require special attention as opposed to VOR's and named fixes.  The last safety net would have been a full PDC.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew describes a track error caused by a NRS waypoint FMS entry error.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Other Part 141
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Trainee; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Normal training environment; student [in] left seat with instructor [in] right seat. Simulated Engine out (right) on takeoff; student only retarded left throttle. Due to asymmetrical thrust from right engine; plane diverted from runway to the left. Student called out 'your controls' and instructor took controls using full ruder both sides to keep from missing equipment that seemed only inches away. Taxied back onto taxiway; shut down and accessed plane for damage. Decided it was good enough to be towed; Maintenance came with a tug to take it back to school. To prevent re-occurrence; empathize importance of reducing both throttles during the takeoff briefing during engine out and to maintain directional control with light rudder pressure initially to not over control the airplane.




Synopsis: PA44 student reported experiencing a runway excursion during a simulated engine out on takeoff.  Student only retarded left throttle causing asymmetrical thrust and the aircraft to veer left before the instructor took over to avoid a collision with airport equipment.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LSE.Airport, WI
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E LSE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landing in LSE at night the Captain; and I; experienced a GPWS warning going into the airport. We were on our initial descent going down to pattern altitude. During our approach briefing we noted that there were bluffs and towers in the area. During our approach down to pattern altitude we saw the towers and were concentrating on avoiding those. We were about to execute our base turn and were configuring the aircraft when we got a GPWS warning; 'Terrain; whoop; whoop; pull up.' I was flying and began adding power and initiating a climb. I turned the aircraft towards the airport because I knew the terrain in the river valley was lower than the area we were in. We climbed up and then restabilized and began our turn toward the runway and landed safely without any further incident. I feel this occurred because we were focused on avoiding the towers. They have added the note on the Briefing Page. I would go further and add that each time an approach is conducted to 36 that it de done with the GPS approach instead of just loading a visual approach when landing at night. There is no populace on the bluffs and so there is little or no light. Landing on the GPS profile into the runway would ensure terrain clearance. I have personally added a note on my Briefing Page indicating this.




Synopsis: Regional jet First Officer experiences a GPWS terrain warning during a night visual approach to LSE and takes evasive action.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Outbound crew noticed during their preflight duties an extremely potent smell near the aft section of aircraft. Flight Attendant (FA) 1 was notified of the smell immediately. FA1 notified the Captain who then notified Maintenance. An inflight manager was also notified. Air circulation on the aircraft caused the entire flight crew to become overwhelmed with the fumes resulting in headaches; reddened eyes; coughing and breathing difficulties. The Captain and the inflight manager ask the crew to leave the aircraft and return to the boarding area. FA1 had extremely bloodshot eyes and requested medical attention. The Captain filed a fume event report. The flight was eventually canceled.




Synopsis: A330 Flight Attendant reported a potent smell in the aft section of the aircraft while performing pre-flight duties. Eventually the entire crew was negatively affected by this odor.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: R-Side [was] working in trail sequencing into Atlanta; with approximately 10 to 13 aircraft; 4 overflights. Had the restricted area depicted; took a hand off and turned aircraft on course; thinking that a Restricted Area was active 14;000 and below as it had been in some of the previous days of operation. An adjacent sector called and asked me if the restricted area was still hot; at which time I realized what I had done and turned the aircraft away from the MOA. The MOA had been drawn on the display using the draw feature; the aircraft clipped inside the MOA corner approximately .75 of a mile. At that time I also noticed that the MOA altitudes had been placed inside the drawn airspace using font 1. Recommendation; other than being more vigilant; increasing the font size on the altitudes placed inside the MOA boundaries to stand out more since the altitudes used are not always the same.




Synopsis: ZTL Controller described a possible Restricted Area incursion suggesting the depictions of the subject areas be modified to increase awareness.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working coordinator position. ARTCC called to handoff aircraft X. The data tag was in handoff status; but to the wrong sector. We took a point out on aircraft X instead; since the aircraft only transitions a small portion of our airspace. There is an automation problem with aircraft on this route. Aircraft X departs an airport inside of PCT airspace. The aircraft then exits TRACON airspace and enters ARTCC airspace. Then the aircraft re-enters TRACON airspace for 5 miles before entering ARTCC airspace. Another issue with this route is that some ARTCC controllers assume that aircraft on this route are already being watched/pointed out to the TRACON sector. They think this because the aircraft is handed off to ARTCC from TRACON. The handoff to ARTCC comes from a different area in the TRACON.We need to fix automation so aircraft will handoff correctly. Also need to brief ARTCC that just because the aircraft originates in TRACON airspace that not all TRACON sectors are aware of that aircraft.




Synopsis: An aircraft departs TRACON Airspace; enters ARTCC Airspace; departs ARTCC Airspace back into TRACON Airspace. Automation software does not process the flight data properly; handing off the data tag to the wrong sector. This also causes confusion for controllers as to what if any verbal coordination is required for aircraft on these type of routes. This is a common problem in ATC facilities everywhere. As of this report software developers have not been able to or have not been tasked with figuring out a remedy to processing these type of flight plans.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We pushed back from the gate with Ramp and we were given a taxi of 'outer lane hold short of RB and contact Ground.' We knew the airport information pages and the Jepps 10-9 were inaccurate and we stopped momentarily to take a look at the cover page of the weather packet once to make sure we knew where we were going. As we were still stopped just past the gate I also showed the Captain the EWR Bulletin via My Mobile. We had a shared mental model we thought and enough time had passed that I asked Ramp again to ensure we were still ok to taxi via our previous clearance. The ramp lighting is minimal at best; and it was difficult to determine inner; outer; and middle lanes. The middle lane we came upon first and recognized the hash marks so we stepped outside to the outer and followed that line. I contacted Ground and stated we were 'on the outer to hold short RB.' Ground instructed us to 'taxi 4L via RB and PA.' The Captain was about to make the right turn to RB when we saw blue taxi markers sticking up. The Captain quickly got back on the outer line to ensure our placement and brought the aircraft to a stop. We were getting our bearings straight as Ground announced it looks like we 'missed RB and proceed RA; N; and D to 4L.' We proceeded forward and completed the remainder of the taxi without issue. That whole area is confusing with the lack of proper charting even knowing we have a textual description and the reminder of an inaccurate airport information pages and 10-9. The diagram located in the company documents is a very poor depiction and extremely hard to decipher with the shaded areas and inability to zoom with any clarity. Coupled with the night conditions and poor lighting on the ramp we just missed our taxiway. In time I am sure the Jepps and airport information pages will be updated. It would be nice to have additional lighting in that area but maybe unlikely. Until the Jepps and airport information pages are in agreement with the actual conditions a better diagram would be helpful.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a taxiway incursion at EWR due to inappropriate lighting and airport chart inaccuracy.
Date: 201910
Location: MSO.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D MSO
ATC / advisory: TRACON GEG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: On approach we requested ILS Runway 12 per SOP. Runway was not available due to traffic. We started our approach briefing approximately 1 hour prior to arrival due to the terrain at MSO; so we were not rushed and were fully prepared. When MSO is running visuals for Runway 30; approach gives you direct to the airport which sets up a square turn for the visual approach; pointing directly at rising terrain. We asked for and received direct to a fix on the VOR approach to aid in getting us towards the visual procedure. The first fix on the [company] visual 30 procedure is too close to high rising terrain; and caused approach to ask us if we were aware of the rising terrain. We could see it and at no point was the EGPWS activated. However I believe this procedure must be stopped and corrected towards the middle of the valley; as it is simply too close to terrain. My Captain has an excellent breakdown of the approach that I have nothing to add to.




Synopsis: Large Transport aircraft First Officer reported that a visual approach took the aircraft too close to rising terrain and resulted in a GPWS warning.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken

Narrative: Was working these two sectors combined. It needed a D side or to be split. Sector volume was high and complex. Two CPC's [Certified Professional Controller] had been held over on OT to supplement our 5 CPC count for the night shift. They were relieved to go home as they hit their limits. That left 5 CPC's working 5 sectors. No sector could be combined up to free up a controller to help on a D side. There was extensive military training aircraft working sector X at ZZZ1; ZZZ2; ZZZ3. I told the supervisor they needed to tell those aircraft to return to base so X and Y sectors could be recombined to free up a CPC. He got that process started and eventually sectors Z and A were able to combine as well. We have been working short staffed on our 5 day rotations for too long. I am beyond frustrated working combined R/D positions with busy traffic. I have lost my patience and work angry. These sessions are unsafe and on the cusp of causing a safety incident to occur (loss of separation; etc). Our traffic levels are; in my opinion; back to pre-COVID levels. We need to transition back to normal schedules. If not; management needs to place traffic restrictions on the military training flights that routinely come out of ZZZ4; ZZZ5; ZZZ6; ZZZ7; ZZZ8;and etc. I'd say no more than 3 total aircraft allowed to work practice approaches at the ZZZ1 area and no more than 1 at a time at the ZZZ9 area until we can get back to normal schedules and staffing levels.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported an understaffed shift with high traffic volume and offered recommendations to remedy the situation.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During our flight; we noticed a strong odor in the courier area first and then the cockpit about an hour into our flight. Upon noticing the odor was intensifying in smell; we diverted into ZZZ. Landing uneventful.The event was brought on entirely due to an odor from the airplane's cargo compartment.


Second narrative: During cruise flight about 1.5 after takeoff; I left cockpit for lavatory. After closing the cockpit door I detected strong fumes which reminded me of rust remover type fluids. I immediately felt a little sick and returned to the cockpit. We [advised ATC and diverted to the nearest suitable alternate]. We performed the Cockpit Fumes checklist and wore our oxygen masks the rest of the flight. I was not sure how reliable I felt so I instructed the First Officer to fly the airplane. He did a perfect divert profile. Emergency vehicles were waiting and reported no external abnormalities.Once the aircraft was depressurized the fumes came into the cockpit much stronger. We opened both cockpit windows and taxied in. I elected to taxi to our ramp and have the stairs ready rather than egress via the slides. I considered this to be quicker and safer. Upon exiting the aircraft we were met by the crash crew and EMTs. After consultation we were taken to an ER by ambulance. We were both diagnosed as normal and released. The ground personnel could smell the fumes from outside the aircraft and remained clear until a suited DG agent entered and began looking for the source. He found a leaking metal container; about 5 gallons in size. The substance was identified as 1H; 1H; 2H; 2H - perfluorodecyltriethoxysilane.It appears that the shipper did not declare his shipment as DG. The substance was in a dented tin 5 gallon can; placed inside a handmade plywood box. For unknown reason the container began leaking inflight. Do not service this shipper anymore. Customers must declare all hazardous material.


Synopsis: Flight crew detects solvent fumes and elect to divert to the nearest suitable airport. Once on the ground; a search of the main cargo deck reveals a leaking five gallon can of perfluorodecyltriethoxysilane that had been enclosed in a plywood box without a hazmat label of any sort.