elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On go-around Aircraft X had a gradual loss of power which resulted in having to land in a nearby field. The airplane had been sitting (pickled) for three years a week before but had recently been flown from and to maintenance for the annual inspection (at ZZZ) and back to ZZZ1. The same day the off-field landing occurred; I had performed several landings and had no problems at all with the aircraft until this last takeoff/climbout.The RPM seemed to drop and the aircraft was not producing thrust. The engine has a massive carb heat system. Carb heat was used and possibly left on in the climbout however nobody thinks that carb heat would cause enough power loss to cause a catastrophic thrust - lift scenario in low density altitude flight conditions (sea level 65 degrees).Other issues might have been debris in the recently fueled tank; carburetor float issue and then possibly a prop governor issue. We could not reproduce the problem on the ground. So far; the issue is unknown as to the continual loss of power.In looking back at this event; I think that it would have been prudent to take a newly run aircraft that has been sitting for a while and just out of annual to a large airport where there is more room for errors. Only after several hours or days of 'testing' should you exercise an aircraft to other shorter riskier areas. You just never know what can go wrong. They say hindsight is 20/20 but I will need to take a better look at risk management when it comes to flying an aircraft that has an unfamiliar history or has just come out of hibernation and or annual inspection.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported engine failure while climbing out from a go-around.  Reporter successfully landed in a field near the airport.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was asked to inspect the right MLG (Main Landing Gear) assembly per job card XXX. On page 2 of the job card is a note that the 'Aircraft Must Be On Jacks'. The right MLG was supported by an axle jack and both wheel and brake assemblies were removed. I was to accomplish Step 3: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; SLIDING TUBE; BRAKE ATTACHMENT FLANGE; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINKS; UPPER AND LOWER TORQUE LINK PINS AND APEX PIN & NUT - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS AND BUSH FLANGES; and Step 4: DETAILED INSPECTION OF MLG; MAIN FITTING; FWD PINTLE PIN; FWD PINTLE PIN LOCK/ STUB BOLTS; REAR PINTLE PIN & NUT; RETRACTION ACTUATOR ATTACHMENT PINS & UPPER DIAPHRAGM CROSS PIN - EXTERNAL SURFACES; EXCEPT WHERE COVERED BY DRESSINGS & BUSH FLANGES.I read the note on page 2 of the job card; which stated the Aircraft Must Be On Jacks. I began inspecting the MLG but could not access all the points described because the axle jack interfered. I stated in a Work In Progress entry in [software] what items I inspected as well as a Work In Progress that the Aircraft needed to be jacked to complete the job card. The job card was completed without the aircraft being placed on jacks. Steps 5 & 6 of the job card are mechanic steps; however they require measurements to be taken with the weight off the gear. By using an axle jack to support the gear; inaccurate measurements may be obtained; and excessive wear fails to be identified. This job card is normally sequenced in the check to be accomplished after the aircraft is jacked; I noted that it is scheduled on day XX.I would suggest having this job card worked after the aircraft is jacked as the normal workflow shows.




Synopsis: Maintenance Inspector reported an inability to complete a task card because of procedural issues concerning correct jacking of aircraft.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Uneventful preflight; checklists; pushback; taxi and takeoff on first leg of four total on the last day of a three-day trip until receiving an ACARS message from Dispatch at (time) that read 'your Ops agent from ZZZ just called to say they neglected to give you hazmat paperwork to sign. You have oxygen cylinders onboard. 5 pieces totaling 280 lb.' On arrival at the gate in ZZZ1; the faxed hazmat paperwork was signed by the Captain. Out time: XX18Z. Takeoff Time: XX24Z. Notification: XX36Z. The crew were completely unaware of the hazmat onboard until notified by Dispatch. Once the discrepancy was discovered the Ops Agent made a timely call to Dispatch who contacted the Chief Pilot on call and the [Company Communications System]. Attention to detail from the Ops Agent or the agents responsible for supplying the paperwork to the Ops Agent would have mitigated this discrepancy.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported no pre-departure notification or documents of onboard hazmat shipment provided to the flight crew.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: CAVOK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While at cruise altitude; cockpit began filling with smoke. Smoke appeared to come from the ventilation system. Smoke density increased to a point where cockpit visibility was difficult. Both crewmembers immediately donned oxygen masks. Center was contacted and a divert was initiated. Prior to the event; the cockpit temp had been recently adjusted to a warmer setting. When the smoke was noticed; the rheostats were returned to the full cold setting the smoke stopped after 3-5 minutes.The divert; approach; and landing were uneventful. ARFF met the aircraft upon landing. ARFF escorted both flight crew members to the hospital for evaluation. Both crew members were released with no injuries and no signs of smoke inhalation.


Second narrative: During enroute cruise the cockpit filled with smoke from the ventilation duct inside the cockpit. The cockpit filled with smoke requiring the crew to execute the Phase I Oxygen Mask On. Smoke was billowing so much so that it became difficult to see the flight instruments. A temperature adjustment was made prior to the first sign of smoke. The pilot monitoring adjusted the rheostats back to full cold. After approximately 3-5 minutes the smoke dissipated and the visibility increased enough to see the instruments. The landing was uneventful. [Fire rescue] shuttled the crew to a local hospital for observation for potential carbon monoxide poisoning. The crew was released several hours later after tests came back negative.


Synopsis: Flight crew experiences a cockpit full of smoke shortly after the temperature controls have been adjusted to a warmer temperature. Oxygen masks are donned and temperature selected to full cold. As a descent is initiated the smoke begins to dissipate and the crew continues the descent and diverts to a suitable airport.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Captain flying. After an extended taxi; with a pass through the deicing pad; no ice detected; continued towards runway. Approximately 10 minutes before TO started engine 2. After engine 2 start and at power change over received a FLCT SPLR FAULT. Following non normal methodology decided to contact dispatched and advised. Connected with maintenance and a reset of SEC 3 was suggested and instructed by maintenance. This cleared the fault and all flight controls and spoiler movement was checked. After takeoff; FLCT SPLR FAULT returned. No high roll rate experienced or autopilot disconnect with fault. Through 10;000 ft followed non normal methodology; and ECAM exception procedures. First officer is now flying pilot. After discussion with dispatch; selected a diversion airport. Enroute [we advised ATC] and managed fuel to an acceptable landing weight. Uneventful landing and taxied to gate.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported a FLCT SPLR FAULT after takeoff. Crew followed recommended procedures. After discussion with Dispatch; the crew diverted for an uneventful landing.
Date: 201603
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We landed; the seatbelt sign was [turned off]; and the Inflight Service Manager (ISM) made the announcement; 'Flight attendants; please prepare your doors for arrival; crosscheck; standby for all call'. The three of us at door two (2) released our seatbelts and got up. I then proceeded to stop; drop; review; I proceeded to touch the disarming lever; but instead accidentally hardly lifted the door handle; causing the pneumatic assist to kick in; therefore fully opening the 2R door and causing the slide to fully deploy. As soon as the pneumatic assist took over I took a step back. Once the slide was fully deployed; [another] flight attendant placed the barrier strap across the door; while I blocked passengers away from the door. During the all-call; the ISM [was] informed of the mishap.




Synopsis: B767-300 Flight Attendant reported accidentally deploying a slide at destination gate following an international flight.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSY.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C MSY
ATC / advisory: Tower MSY
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on a visual approach into New Orleans Rwy 2 backed up by ILS Rwy 2.  On downwind; Tower gave a left turn to heading 110 and cleared for visual to follow aircraft on final. The clearance heading was well inside the final approach fix with a 90 degrees intercept to final approach.  I needed to start the descent down because we were high to begin with. Tower gave low altitude alert and we made the correction with power adjustment.  I believe we were at 1;100 FT between FAF POVVI and YERUB.  I made correction and we were below GS while correcting and at one point with one white and three red on the PAPI. On short final 3/4 mile we were back on GS.Next time advise ATC for vectors outside FAF and do not accept 90 intercept and try to get a vector to FAF with 30 degrees intercept.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on a visual approach to MSY.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 500
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Heli Pilot was not talking on the radio; but had it on.  I found out later in the day he was unsure where he was.  He heard my radio calls but didn't know how to process them.  Didn't understand N1ame & Name 2 Beach or where they were.  I have T-CAS & ADS-B that are working perfectly; he didn't have transponder turned on & I'm not sure if he had ADS-B.  My system would have warned me he was there.  I was descending through 500 feet on base-leg 1/2 mile off shore to land on the Name 1 Beach to pick up clients.  I checked the 3 planes on the Name 2 beach to my left to make sure they were not departing; then focused on my landing paying close attention to the two Bears sleeping on the beach and folks taking pictures; maneuvering around and beyond them.  Then suddenly there was a Heli at my altitude 100 feet off my right wing. At the end of the day I have discussed this with Company that own the Heli & the Pilot.  I believe it to be resolved.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HNL.Airport, HI
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight; Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Software and Automation; Human Factors
Primary problem: Software and Automation

Narrative: During preflight; the crew noticed the Hazmat paperwork showed 15300 pounds of Lithium in position 15L.  This Lithium was in an AAD can.  This can only weighted 2800 pounds.  As the Captain; I asked for the Dangerous Goods [DG] specialist to explain what we were seeing.  I asked the ramp agent what the weight of the can was and that is when I found out it was around 2800 pound.  Clearly there was a problem.  First problem is that the two systems do not talk and crosscheck the weights.  Secondly; the DG system does not know the max weight of a can and therefore can't check to see that the maximum can weight is not violated. Third; did I have a CG issue? Fourth; how does the system generate paperwork that has such gross errors?I believe the cause is the systems for DG and W&B do not talk and the DG system Allows Lithium to be declared way above the maximum AAD can weight.  Also; the W&B system does not catch such gross errors.My suggestion is to ensure the DG paperwork system and Weight and Balance system learn how to crosstalk.  There should be no way for the system to produce paperwork that has gross errors.  The DG paperwork system must know and be able to verify the max can weight is not violated.  Further; the actual can weight must be known by the DG paperwork system as another crosscheck.  It should never be able to have more Lithium declared in the can than the can weights.




Synopsis: B777-200 Captain reported Hazmat documents contained Hazmat cargo weight errors caused by Weight & Balance software/automation  issues.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CAK.Airport, OH
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower CAK
Second aircraft: Medium Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Aircraft X was cleared to land on Runway 23. Aircraft Y was holding short of Runway 23 at Taxiway E; and Aircraft Z was continuing inbound for Runway 23; having been advised that traffic would be holding in position. Once Aircraft X had passed Taxiway E; Aircraft Y was instructed to line up and wait was as issued traffic for Aircraft Z inbound. Aircraft X was rolling out on Runway 23; and as instructed to turn left onto Taxiway K; Cross Runway 19 on K and contact Ground Control. Aircraft X slowed to taxi speed and was informed no delay off the runway; traffic holding in position; which the pilot acknowledged. Once I visually assured that the tail for the Aircraft X was clear of the runway; I issued a takeoff clearance to Aircraft Y; with a wind check and an instruction to turn left to heading 190. I observed Aircraft Y beginning a departure roll; and then issued a landing clearance to Aircraft Z. The Ground Controller/ICT then informed me that Aircraft X had not completed crossing Runway 19. Aircraft X was informed to continue to pull forward as he was still in the runway environment.  The pilot of Aircraft X then asked if he was cleared to cross Runway 23. Then; I informed the pilot to cross Runway 19 straight ahead and then contact Ground Control. The Ground Controller then taxied the aircraft to parking. [My recommendations are to] improve the airport markings at the Taxiway K; Runway 23 and Runway 19 intersection to make it more clear to pilots which runway they are currently on; or change Taxiway K to parallel Runway 19 south of Runway 23 to join Taxiway F.




Synopsis: CAK Tower Controller reported a runway incursion of a pilot that hadn't fully cleared the runway.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSN.TRACON, WI
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E MSN
ATC / advisory: TRACON MSN
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working combined Radar Approach Control from the east side R3 position.  Aircraft X was descending west to east on an IFR flight plan to UES.  I received Aircraft X from ZAU descending to 110 and continued his decent to 050 to comply with MKE LOA.  I received Aircraft Y from MKE Approach Ripon sector north east of UNU airport level at 060 enroute to SUS.  Somewhere between UNU and RYV I inadvertently terminated control on Aircraft Y resulting in a dropped data block.  The target still showed a splat with altitude.  As I was scanning Aircraft X's descent to see if he was going to make his descent per our LOA to 050 before entering MKE airspace.  I saw the 060 altitude splat over RYV without a data tag and assumed it was a VFR aircraft.  I issued traffic to Aircraft X told him to stop descent.  Aircraft X leveled at 063.  I then realized that this was not a VFR aircraft but Aircraft Y enroute to SUS.  Before I issued traffic to Aircraft Y he reported aircraft in sight as the CA alert chimed.  Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at an estimated 2 miles and 300 feet vertical.  The event happened due to my inadvertent dropping of the IFR tag enroute to SUS; and failing to realize that the tag was an aircraft I had on frequency and was IFR.  My scan missed the dropped data block.To prevent this from happening I need to pay particular attention to tags I drop.  I also need to slow my scan to ensure I am aware of all targets on my scope.




Synopsis: MSN Controller drops IFR tag not realizing it and later has conflict with other IFR aircraft causing a loss of separation.