elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ERI.TRACON, PA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: TRACON ERI
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Two events. Both events are a result of the 126.05 line tx/rx being OTS at JHW. This is a ground based transmitter and our only means of communicating with aircraft at lower altitudes (below 5000) 40+ miles (E/SE) of ERI. So this affects our arrivals and departures from JHW since aircraft will call on this frequency arriving and departing JHW. Adding to the frequency loss; this airport and area is strictly non-radar below 4000 msl; therefore not only are we not able to see them; we cannot talk to them and provide any type of good service.Event 1: Aircraft #1 released for departure climbing to 6000 (NE; issued 6000 wrong for direction because of frequency strength on 121.0 at 6000). Aircraft #2 calls up via the land line for clearance to ZZZ; at that point I am unable to issue a clearance because I am not talking to aircraft #1 so the pilot is instructed to call back when they are ready holding short of the runway. Pilot calls back within 3 minutes ready; still no check-in from previous departure; I have to explain to the pilot what is going on and have him hold on the line for 5+ minutes until aircraft 1 calls in. Event 2: Aircraft inbound to JHW from the NE checks in at 5000. Due to the weather they have to fly the ILS 25 approach; however since I have no radios I have to clear the pilot for the approach and tell them when to switch over to UNICOM all prior to the aircraft being established on the approach. This approach requires a hold-in-lieu of procedure to establish on the localizer/glideslope. There is a time of over 15 minutes from when I lose the aircraft on 121.0 frequency and receive the IFR cancellation on the ground via land line. If I were to have had another departure it would have been like the previous scenario with a significant delay on the ground. Frequencies need to be fixed ASAP. Another procedure with adjacent facilities (BUF/BFD) need to be in place in the event of losing the frequencies 126.05.




Synopsis: ERI TRACON Controller reported a bad radio transmitter and receiver which limits the amount of traffic allowed into and out of JHW airport.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Upon descent; I was pilot not flying and was calling Operations on radio 2 while First Officer was pilot flying. Upon returning from calling Operations; I saw that we were below 10;000 MSL and speed was 270. First Officer had autopilot ON and using VS set at about 2;500 down. The First Officer had just started to put in speed brake to help slow down the airplane but was using less than half speed brake input. I finally intervened and reduced the descent rate and used full speed brake to be under 250 KIAS.  The First Officer; first flight off of IOE; was told that he should never use full speed brake. Also; the First Officer coming from a twin Cessna; relied on VS and not FLCH mode; and didn't comprehend the priority of descent vs. speed in the various descent modes.Stop teaching new hires that using the speed brake is bad. Also need to emphasize the descent modes and their priorities. Finally; need to instill in everyone that we must fly the airplane; and when automation is not working; it's time to eliminate the automation.




Synopsis: An ERJ-170 Captain intervened by extending full speed brakes during descent below 10;000 FT at 270 KTS because the First Officer; as the flying pilot just off IOE; was trained not use full speed brakes.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying the IVANE RNAV STAR routing. We had checked to be certain that the arrival was set up and briefed the way it was charted. At some point we were cleared to cross MAYOS at FL220. The fact that it was a hard altitude as opposed to the window of FL260 to FL220 didn't dawn on me until we were too high to make the crossing restriction. We advised ATC we not be able to make the restriction. The First Officer was the Flying Pilot and I was the Monitoring Pilot.I think this was a case of thinking you heard what you expected to hear and not what was really said. We expected to cross MAYOS as per the OPD [Optimized Profile Descent] and the lower; hard altitude was not what was loaded.If we are going to be expected to fly these types of arrivals; then let us fly them as published. If ATC keeps modifying these things mistakes of this kind will probably continue. We've been given a lot of guidance on these arrivals. But what I was not prepared for (but will be in the future) was for a significant modification that involved not being cleared to descend via; but instead simple step down altitudes that completely negate what was set up in the FMS. We don't need these complicated arrivals in 2013 if our clearances only mimic the arrivals of 20 years ago. Clear us and let us do it and get out of our way or give us less complicated arrivals. If ATC can't or won't do it; then I fail to see the value of OPD's.




Synopsis: When cleared to cross MAYOS at FL220 (vice the charted 'between FL260 & FL220') on the IVANE RNAV STAR to CLT; the Pilot Not Flying of an A321 failed to program the change in the FMS and; as a result; was unable to comply with the more restrictive clearance.  The reporter took umbrage with the frequency with which ATC modifies OPD (Optimized Profile Descent) STARs rather than clearing flights to descend 'via' them.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll; as [the pilot monitoring] announced 80 Kts; I felt and heard that we were losing power on one engine. I called for an abort; retarded the throttles to idle and assumed control of the aircraft. I suspect that it was the right engine; however I initiated the abort and power reduction before being able to positively ID the engine with reduced power. I notified the tower we would be returning to the north ramp. There were no defects noted on the taxi in; I entered a discrepancy in the [logbook] and contacted maintenance.




Synopsis: The pilot of a C402 reported a rejected takeoff when a loss of engine power was observed.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: AVQ.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G AVQ
ATC / advisory: CTAF AVQ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon takeoff from Runway 12 at AVQ; I called a north departure from the downwind. After completing the upwind and crosswind legs of the pattern; I turned onto the downwind and continued to climb. At 2900 feet MSL and while still flying parallel to the runway on the downwind; I saw motion on my right. Another aircraft was approaching perpendicular to the runway (approximate course 210) at pattern altitude on a collision course. The approaching aircraft pulled up and turned south. Seeing his turn; I pushed forward to reduce altitude. Upon completing the maneuver; I continued to my destination without incident.




Synopsis: A light sport pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at AVQ airport.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked; Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On return to base after successful completion of mission; was advised of a possible overflight of a required maintenance inspection.  Due to operations tempo (COVID-19) and a last minute change of aircraft request by the crew; there was an inadvertent oversight of the available flight time on this aircraft. Aircraft was approaching a 150 hour inspection on a progressive maintenance plan.  High utilization (due to COVID-19 transports; among other factors) ran successive inspections very close together.  I was acutely aware of a 50 hour inspection completed 48 hrs before completion of this flight.  I was under the impression that the subsequent inspection was several hours away; but I neglected to check the time remaining in the maintenance logbook simply because I got in a hurry.  Compounding the confusion was a lack of timely updates which provide a second check on maintenance due actions.  On arrival back at the base and calculation of flight times accumulated on my night shift; I determined that it is probable that I overflew this required inspection.  In summary; I got rushed by a last minute change of aircraft and the press of mission accomplishment and neglected to calculate the time remaining on the aircraft.




Synopsis: Pilot reported  being advised of a possible overflight of a required maintenance inspection.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our aircraft had an open MEL item rendering the auto spoilers inoperative. The Captain called Maintenance Control to ensure that the item was correctly deferred and that all required maintenance items were performed. Maintenance personnel came to the aircraft; evaluated the MEL item; and indicated that the deferral was properly completed. A normal flight was made to destination. Upon [the aircraft's] return flight the flight crew discovered that the flight spoilers did not work as air-brakes. After the flight landed my Captain discussed the situation with a Flight Manager and they determined that the MEL maintenance item was not properly performed. The Captain called me and made me aware of the situation the next morning.


Second narrative: Our aircraft was released per an MEL advising auto spoilers were inoperative. On descent we were unable to deploy flight spoilers. We readioed Maintenance to meet the flight to discuss the issue.  On landing we were unable to deploy any spoilers. No Maintenance personal arrived. I briefed the outbound Captain over my concern that the aircraft had not been properly set up to comply with the MEL item. As a crew member this is difficult to recognize until you need spoilers. Since spoilers are not to be armed for takeoff you wouldn't know that the handle was locked out for all operations.


Synopsis: Two back to back flight crews reported a spoiler deferral on their common MD-82 had been managed incorrectly and all spoiler functions were inoperative as opposed to only auto-spoilers as advised in the AML.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C SNA
ATC / advisory: Tower SNA
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While on approach to 20R inside the outer marker at LEMON; the tower cleared a 737 to cross 20L and into position on 20R. The aircraft was then cleared to takeoff as we were now on short final. As the aircraft left the runway; we were finally cleared to land and landed on 20R as the preceding aircraft was leaving the runway. After arriving at the gate I called the tower and spoke with the supervisor. I asked him: 1) What is the minimum separation between an aircraft taking off and an aircraft landing on the same runway? 2) Why would you clear an aircraft; not only not holding short of the intended runway for takeoff; but clear him to cross another runway before taxiing into position on the intended runway; with a jet inside the outer marker? This is not the first time. The supervisor stated that 6000 ft was the minimum separation between aircraft taking off and landing. Notice SNA runway 20R is only 5700 ft in length. I informed him that I felt the separation was just too close. My wheels should not be touching down just as the preceding aircraft is leaving the runway; 6000 ft ahead. We also experienced the jet's wake while in the flare.This is not unusual. Tower controllers always seem in a rush to 'get 'em out' and as I have written in previous reports; by constantly clearing aircraft for takeoff before the preceding aircraft has even left the same runway. Watch what kind of attitude you get when you state that you want to delay take-off until the preceding aircraft at least leaves the runway before you begin your takeoff roll. I've yet to receive an answer as how to 'avoid wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft' while either taking off or landing after receiving clearance to do so.Increase the separation between aircraft for either takeoff or landing?




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported concern with the tight spacing in use between departures and arrivals at SNA.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TMB.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Parked
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was fueling my aircraft at the General Aviation self-serve fuel. A helicopter had been fueling ahead of me. They started up at the pump and began a taxi/hover from there to Spot 2 (next to AIR SAL). They made their taxi between the buildings and the airplanes. I watched as they hovered past each airplane (approximately 5-7 aircraft). They taxied by a 172 and 182 first; each tail nearly striking the ground. Each subsequent airplane on the way was aggressively shaken around and also nearly struck the ground. The helicopter should have gone to the main taxiway and asked for a taxi from Spot 2 to Spot 1 via Taxiway Alpha. I don't believe it is a safe nor respectful practice to taxi in the manner they did.




Synopsis: An Instructor pilot noted a helicopter air taxied from the TMB fuel pit Spot 2 to Spot 1 and its down wash caused havoc with a line of parked aircraft as it flew over them.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SDL.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was on a PART 135 flight to SDL. I filed ...... DRK.JCOBS2. I was given a clearance by clearance delivery. On departure fly heading direct IGM direct DRK and then As Filed. I departed and when I was handed over to ABQ Center I was given direct DRK as I approached DRK I asked for Direct SWIRL which is a published fix on the JCOBS2 arrival. The Controller at ABQ informed me that JCOBS2 is not authorized and I should be on the DSERT1 Arrival and asked me who gave me JCOBS2. I read back my clearance and informed him I filed JCOBS2 and had not seen the FDC NOTAM when I did my preflight prep. He indicated I was not the first to have this problem and I heard several others after my check in with the same problem. The Controller informed me the procedure was deleted however it is still published and in the nav databases. After verifying my clearance with ABQ I edited my loaded flight plan reviewed the DSERT1 arrival and completed the flight uneventfully to SDL.




Synopsis: A pilot filed and was issued the SDL JCOBS2 arrival but was notified by ABQ that the arrival was NOTAMed canceled but still available in databases. Many other SDL and PHX SIDs and STARs have been NOTAMed unavailable.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After deplaning the aircraft in ZZZ the Captain was informed by the Captain of the next crew that the Number 2 engine had been left running. Maintenance and weather delays caused our last leg of a 4 leg day to arrive in ZZZ two hours late and within 30 minutes of timing out. In a rush to hand the aircraft over to the waiting crew we ran the parking checklist and we did not verify that the engine was shut down on the EICAS during the parking checklist. The Captain only visually confirmed that the start/stop selector was in the off position and due to the thrust lever being positioned slightly advanced the engine never shut down.The Captain receiving the aircraft notified the previous Captain that the engine had been left running and shut it down. I was informed of the event the next morning upon arriving at ironically the same aircraft.Lack of confirming what is said during a checklist is correct and time constraints to hand the plane off to the next crew. Confirm what the captain says during the checklist is correct instead of just accepting it.




Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported leaving one aircraft engine running at the gate when deplaning.