Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The crew was scheduled for a late night reposition flight that departed well after midnight. We'd just landed and dropped off our passenger. Later we refuel for the reposition to LAS and began to preflight for the next leg. On the previous leg I was the PF; approximately 4:54 flight time. I did not feel sleepy or fatigued and shared my status with my crewmember. Overall we both cross checked with one another for fatigue issues and stressed 'safety first' prior to departing for LAS. With the reposition to LAS forecasted VFR weather we both agreed fatigue was a non-issue. While enroute to LAS I was the PM. We were flying the GRNPA 1 RNAV arrival via MLF during the descent. Later while on the arrival ATC assigned us a heading towards LAS in prep for ILS-1L. I asked the PF 'you want me to extend the centerline?' He replied 'yeah go ahead and extend it.' I proceeded to extend the centerline from NODIY (FAF) since we'd already programed and briefed the approach. We continued on the assigned heading below 10;000 soon to be within close proximity of LAS. ATC-Approach then advised us of the location of the airport (2 o'clock & 6 miles) and queried if we had a visual on the field. The PF gave the thumbs up & acknowledged the location of the field. I then transmitted 'field in sight' & we were 'cleared for the visual approach to runway 1L.' Next the PF made a left turn towards the south paralleling the inbound LOC course for runway 1L. But as we continued to extend southbound we began to descend I felt our situational awareness was in jeopardy. As I stated 'Man we are getting too low!' ATC queried our intentions / altitude and advised us of the MSA and location of LAS (McCarran). The PF corrected the flight path with pitch and power and maneuvered the aircraft in the direction to intercept the localizer towards the runway. ATC then mentioned there must have been some confusion between Henderson Executive and McCarran Intl. Airport. Flights departing after midnight should be micro-monitored. I feel that this reposition flight could have been scheduled for the next day. In the future I will have to be much more diligent assessing in-flight crew fatigue issues. Also VFR night approach policies should include the use of instrument approach procedures.


Second narrative: Approaching LAS; ATC gave us direction and range information and requested we report the field in sight. I spotted a beacon approximately 11 to 12 o'clock and spotted what I thought was the destination airport and instructed the first officer to report the field in sight. We were then 'cleared for the visual for runway 1L base turn at your discretion'. I immediately turned left and started a descent out of 5000 ft because in my judgment we were high and needed a little more distance for a turn to final. As we got closer to the airport I began to realize that the airport I was setting up to land at may not be the intended destination which I should have recognized much sooner but could not due to my degraded attention and lack of reaction time caused by being awake approximately 20 hours at the time. Upon finally realizing that my situational awareness had been compromised I asked the first officer to confirm that the airport I was setting up for was the intended destination. ATC then advised that the MSA for the area we were in was 6000 ft and suggested a right turn and reissued direction and range info for LAS. I executed an immediate climbing right turn to more of an intercept for the final approach course for runway 1L at LAS which we had fortunately programed in the FMS for backup. We were then able to acquire a visual on the intended destination and continued the approach without further incident. ATC then commented that it appeared we mistook HND for LAS which was fact.I was concerned about the reposition leg to LAS in the afternoon and called flight tracking to see if the schedule could be adjusted to mitigate the potential fatigue factor. The flight tracker I spoke to said he would take a look at the schedule to see if it could be adjusted and call me back. He never did. I notified him at the time that I was likely going to be awake for more than 20 hours when reaching the destination. In the future when flight crews make tracking aware of extreme situations such as this it needs to be taken more seriously and more effort needs to be made to insure that back side of the clock flying is limited as much as possible. Also in the future I will be more responsible in my risk assessment and will call in fatigued if I have been awake more than 18 hours at the termination of the flight.


Synopsis: A fatigued air taxi crew transitioning from the LAS GRNPA 1 RNAV Arrival to a night visual mistook HND for LAS and descended below the MSA before ATC alerted.