Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SBGR.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Second aircraft: B777-300
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Near midair collision/loss of ATC separation. Miami to Sao Paulo; B777. Other aircraft: New York to Sao Paulo; B777. Both aircraft highly accurate GPS navigation capability; flying the same published STAR at the same time. Saved by TCAS RA. Without TCAS or clear weather; the mid-air collision geometry would have been two aircraft on the same course and altitude; colliding in straight and level flight; with approximately 100 KTAS closure; the trailing aircraft closing on the leading aircraft. Both aircraft unsuccessful communicating with Brazilian ATC at time/location of event. Common problem in vicinity of PIR on PIRA5 arrival. Previous experience suggests both aircraft flew beyond VHF range/altitude capability of ATC without a successful handoff. Captain pilot flying. First Officer pilot not flying. First Officer returned from rest break; assumed pilot not flying duties 20 miles prior to TUBE as aircraft descended to FL200. On PIRA5 arrival; leveled at FL200. No TCAS targets in view. Passed over TUBE level at FL200; requested lower altitude from Controller. No response. Repeated request three times; no response. Able to hear foreign language conversation on frequency. Level at FL200; 10 miles south of TUBE; pilot flying and pilot not flying observed new TCAS target precisely at six o'clock position; less than 3 miles. Target observed less than 1;000 FT above; target descended to co-altitude.As target closed to minimum range for RA parameters; TCAS RA directed a climb. Pilot flying executed accurate RA response; climbing slightly above FL220 and then leveling at FL220; with no change in course. Air to air comm on primary VHF established with TCAS target aircraft: Other aircraft stated that he had us in sight; and was at our right 3 o'clock low. (Other aircraft maneuvered off course to the right and did not climb). Pilot not flying gained visual contact with TCAS target as it moved from 6 o'clock to 3 o'clock. Pilot not flying confirmed with other that they also did not have contact with ATC on primary VHF. Pilot not flying switched secondary VHF to 121.5; and immediately heard ATC (unknown ATC callsign/station) directing us to contact Approach on (new frequency). Pilot not flying switched primary VHF to new frequency; announced to approach control TCAS RA climb to FL220; and received instruction to hold present position; left turns; FL220.) directing Air Carrier X to contact approach on (new frequency). Pilot not flying switched primary VHF to new frequency; announced to approach control TCAS RA climb to FL220; and received instruction to hold present position; left turns; FL220. Descended in holding; rejoined STAR; landed Sao Paulo. ICAO is at least TWENTY YEARS LATE in standardizing procedures to get aircraft offset from the magenta line provided by our highly accurate GPS navigation. Mid-air fatal catastrophes such as the collision with Gol airlines in Brazil a few years ago prove the point; to no avail. Our high technology GPS navigation achievements are leading us to fatalities via mid-air collisions. We play a game of chicken every night flying in South America...it is by far the most obviously senseless procedure in commercial aviation -- not offsetting. See my similar near mid-air ASAP over Colombia a couple of years ago.The failure of ATC to affect a handoff in the vicinity of PIR on the PIRA arrival into Sao Paulo is a common problem. Our Flight Department should obtain Commercial Chart FD on our iPads. Among other obvious benefits its display of ATC boundaries and frequencies would enable us to more quickly overcome the common ATC problem of handoffs near VHF coverage limits; while we wait (for how long?) for Brazilian ATC to upgrade its radios into the modern era of commercial aviation. Our pilots should be trained in the simulator to EXPECT danger in foreign countries; and BE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED when flights are uneventful. The 'Domestic mindset and domestic scenarios' in the simulators represent the high quality US ATC system. A better standard training scenario would be foreign locations with their sub-standard equipment; language barriers; and higher degree of difficulty.


Second narrative: [No additional information contained in this report].


Synopsis: Two Boeing 777's; proceeding to the same destination and on the same and routing; were alerted to an impending mid-air collision by their respective TCAS RA's; and both aircraft followed their TCAS avoidance commands. Both aircraft had lost communications with ATC.