elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On rotation; the Takeoff Warning horn sounded and an amber LE Flaps Transit light illuminated. The horn stopped once we got airborne. We left the flaps at 1 and leveled off at 8000' and 210 knots to work the QRH. The Leading Edge Flaps Transit procedure decision tree did not fit our exact situation. The first choice was definitely not correct; but the second and third did not exactly fit out situation which was on takeoff; flaps extended. We chose the third option because it seemed the closest to our problem. It led us to 'roll is encountered'. This aircraft didn't fly straight to begin with. I had made a comment to the Captain two legs prior; that it was hard to trim. I detected no roll so we continued which led us to a speed restriction of 300/.65 and a flaps 15 landing. It turned out we had a Number 4 Slat Hydraulic Control fail and it was hanging out the whole flight. Judging by the damage to the fairings on the slat; I don't think we should have flown greater than 230 knots but the QRH lead us to believe we could. We didn't encounter any roll because all the slats were still out when we reached that point in the checklist. After that point; I used the autopilot; and when we got to Step 3 in the checklist; all slats; but number 4 retracted; unknown to us. I only got roll when I disconnected the autopilot for landing. What I'm trying to express is that the second choice in the decision tree; and if roll is encountered on the third choice both keep the speed below 230 knots; but due to us being unsure which situation fit we ended up on the part that allowed us to increase airspeed. I'm not sure this was correct. The second issue was on landing we were expecting a flaps 15 landing with slats and TE [trailing edge] flaps. The slats didn't extend on approach. We were concerned about not having the right REF Speeds so we went around and consulted the QRH. There is no mention of the slat position for landing in the checklist. A note in the QRH stating the REF Speed is for slats out or in would have eliminated our confusion.




Synopsis: A Boeing 737 pilot reported experiencing a Leading Edge Slat anomaly just as the aircraft was being rotated for takeoff.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Supervisor / CIC
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: At ZZZ [Center] I have experienced multiple issues with equipment failures related to the Level 3 cleaning being performed. Today we had 4 separate data input keyboards which were not functioning properly. On one sector; as we tried to open the sector; the code button on the *DIK was stuck. As a result; we could not see that any handoffs were in progress to the new sector being opened. This caused unsafe delays in opening sectors as we tried to find the root of the problem. I have noticed the multiple equipment issues since we started level 3 cleanings. I reported the issues to the SOC; they said they understood and agreed that it has a negative effect on the equipment; but there is nothing they can do about it. They said that they have also expressed their frustration on the damage it is doing to equipment; but fallen on deaf ears.Stop Level 3 cleanings. The CDC has reported that there is a 1/10;000 chance of COVID transmission through surface contact. One of the latest CDC releases said that these cleanings are 'theater' and not necessary. The FAA should be following CDC guidelines and stop these cleanings.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported that due to COVID-19 cleaning; four separate data input keyboards were not functioning properly.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Operating ZZZ to ZZZ1 ; aircraft came in with multiple MEL. Biggest threat we saw was deferred pack 2; and pack one controller fail on pack 1. Legal time Dispatch; weather was great; filled at 240; had to stay below 250 per MEL. Departed ZZZ; got to cruise; accomplished cruise check. Pack 1 then failed in flight; hit the master caution  to clear; pack still failed. Don 02 masks; requested 10;000 ft.;requested priority handling; I executed a rapid descent; Captain ran the depressurization check list and deployed passenger oxygen masks. By the time we got to 12;000 ft. or so we got the cabin altitude high warning. Got to 10;000 ft. alarm going off still. Descended to 8;000 ft.; did a 180 turn back to ZZZ. Took off O2 mask and landed overweight in ZZZ.I think the training department did a great job in training us for a random event like this; as well as the threat forward thinking; dispatched with one pack; it was in our departure brief etc. Overall it was a nerve racking event; but when that Master Caution showed up on the panel; we went into respective roles and got the aircraft down and gave the passengers oxygen and returned to the field. The passengers were pretty happy with us after going through that; we're clapping as we landed in ZZZ. Overall; training did a great job preparing us for something like this I think.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported the aircraft failed to pressurize after takeoff and flight crew elected to make a rapid descent and air turn back; resulting in a safe precautionary landing.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On the ENDEE Arrival into MDW we were cleared to descend via. There is a crossing restriction to cross NOGEE at or below FL180. On the descent we were on the snowflake and complied and were below FL180 per the profile at NOGEE. However; the altimeter setting was approximately 30.50 so once crossing NOGEE; we set in the altimeter setting and the altimeter spun above 18;000 FT briefly. We continued the arrival as instructed.I do not believe we erred here. The instruction was to cross at or below FL180. Flight levels are predicated on a standard ALT setting of 29.92; so you are expected (based on my view) to cross that fix at or below 18;000 with a 29.92 setting. That is exactly what we did; we crossed [at or] below FL180. In my opinion; however; this is a problematic OPD and I see it creating problems. Having a crossing restriction at the transition altitude is a threat (again; in my opinion) and creates a potential for deviations. If the altimeter is set; for example; too early while conducting the checklist and the local ALT is low (i.e. 29.60 for example) then the crew could potentially cross high when they believe they are on profile. In our case; when you wait to set it until after crossing the fix and going below FL180; if you wait too late; you will set yourself up for failure on the next fix which is to cross KOOKS at or below 16;000 (which must be done with a local setting; so if the ALT is very high and you delay in setting the ALT; you have a lot of ALT to make up in a short period of time). It may be prudent to consider revising the crossing restrictions on this OPD to mitigate issues. Given the above explanation; it is possible this is setting up for problems.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain questions the advisability of using FL180 for crossing restrictions on RNAV STARS due to the impending change to QNH. An early change over may cause the restriction to be missed and a late change over may cause problems with the next restriction.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-500
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback we received a taxi clearance. After we began to move; we noticed a tug heading right for us. It appeared that they did not see us. I had to stop quickly. We contacted the cabin crew to assess the situation; and were informed of a flight attendant injury needing medical assistance. We informed Ramp Tower of the incident; and requested a gate return with medical assistance. We returned to the gate; and were then informed that a second and third Flight Attendant had been injured. The people were given medical attention; and eventually replaced.


Second narrative: I noticed a baggage cart coming straight towards us. I informed the Captain; pointed out the possible incursion; and noticed the driver was not stopping. At that time; to avoid a collision; the Captain stopped the airplane. We noticed that the driver still had not seen us and; only at the last moment; he swerved out of the way.


Synopsis: While taxiing for takeoff the flight crew of a B737 had to stop abruptly to avoid tug pulling baggage carts; the driver of which was apparently distracted and failed to take evasive action only at the last moment. Three flight attendants were injured in the stop and had to be replaced to seek medical attention.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout; both the FO and I noticed a strong rotten egg/sulphur smell permeating the cockpit. I called back to the FAs and they concurred that the smell was in the cabin as well. FO complained of a headache and I noticed that my head was starting to ache as well. Both of us donned our oxygen masks and wore them pretty much for the duration of the flight. I called the flight attendants and explained that I suspected we were having a fume event. I asked if they were dizzy; or if they had headaches and they said no. I told them to watch the passengers closely and call me if any started to experience discomfort as a result of the fumes. During this entire time; we were circumnavigating a line of intense weather. Also during this time; the smell would disappear and then return minutes later.My symptoms increased from headache; adding light-headedness and mild nausea as we proceeded. I used ACARS to alert Dispatch and crew scheduling of the situation. We landed and parked without incident. I called the Flight Ops phone and spoke with [a representative]. We decided to have EMTs come down to the aircraft after the passengers deplaned. An EMT came down and checked our vitals; with two crewmembers having abnormally high blood pressure. All other vitals were in the normal range; however three of us were still feeling 'not right' (Myself; FO and FA). FO and I declined to continue and went home. I called the on the job nurse hotline on the way home and filed a report.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported several crew memebers experienced headaches and nausea from a rotten egg/sulphurous smell on the aircraft.
Date: 202001
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While conducting the CAT II SA XXL into ZZZ we experienced momentary Flight Path symbol and Flight Guidance Cue (AIII mode) movement due to an aircraft departing on our runway as we were inside a five-mile final. This was obviously distracting while conducting an approach to a runway with a reported RVR of 1; 600 feet (I believe). My question is; why was the ILS Critical area not protected? It is my understanding that if the weather is less than 800 and/or two miles visibility; this area should be protected while aircraft are inside the OM or the fix used in lieu of. We have another question regarding protection of the ILS Critical area in ZZZ1. We were operating Flight XXXX; ZZZ1-ZZZ2. ZZZ1 weather was reported as 200 broken 1/4 mile visibility. We called Ground Control for taxi. 'Taxi Runway XX via U and W; report turning on to W.' There was no mention of 'hold short of the ILS Critical area.' Again; why not? If ATC does not specifically state a 'hold short' clearance then we are cleared to the runway hold short markings. My reason for submitting this [report] is to help me and possibly others understand the purpose of the ILS Critical Area. In advance; thank you for providing more clarity on this issue.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported a momentary lost of flight path guidance while conducting an ILS approach at the same time a flight was departing from the approach runway.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; MEL; Weather; Manuals
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: This was a round trip event. 1) Ice detect 2 was deferred. 2) All company policies and MEL requirements were complied with at all times to the best of our abilities. During descent; we encountered icing conditions with an accompanying 'ICE' caution message. I turned on the Wing and Cowl Anti-ice switches. After approximately five minutes in icing conditions; we received wing overheat aural and visual warning messages. We complied with the QRH; landed; made a logbook write up and contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch.Together we determined that the Right Inboard Temperature sensor had failed and that it was deferrable and followed the required MEL procedures under the direction of the Maintenance Supervisor. On climbout on the return flight we used the wing anti-ice again and it worked fine. However; after we turned it off and then on again 15 minutes later in the descent; we again received the wing overheat warning message. We complied with the QRH again. In light of all of the above; I am not convinced that the MEL that we deferred this under is actually a legal deferral. I don't think that enough troubleshooting was done in order to insure that the issue was as we thought. This is a concern as we accreted 'trace levels' of icing for a short time before we exited the clouds in the descent. (I expedited the descent to get out of the conditions).




Synopsis: The Captain of a CRJ-700 suspects the deferral of an ice detection system agreed upon between himself and Maintenance Control may not have been appropriate.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: Aerofoil Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On initial climb we received a triple chime; L WING OVHT warning message on EICAS and an aural Left Wing Overheat passing through 2;000 FT MSL. We were still VMC below the clouds but within icing conditions. We leveled at 3;000 FT MSL; declared an emergency; advised ATC of our situation and that we needed an immediate return. We had the airport and runway in sight and requested a descent to 2;500 FT MSL to ensure that we could maintain a visual. We continued visually; performed [the] Before Landing Checklist and a normal landing. The landing was overweight and an entry was made in the AML. After clearing the runway; we contacted the flight attendants and made a PA to the passengers advising them of the situation. We then returned to the gate; deplaned the passengers and met with Maintenance.




Synopsis: CRJ700 First Officer experiences a L WING OVHT warning EICAS message and an aural Left Wing Overheat passing through 2;000 feet MSL. An emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport for an overweight landing.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at FL260 we noticed a strong odor; [a] burning [smell]. We were unable to identify the source. Called the FA (Flight Attendant) to confirm [the] smell in the cabin; and after a few seconds [later] she called back to confirm that it started smelling as well. At this point; we donned masks and [requested priority handling with ATC]; requesting [a] diversion to ZZZ roughly 80 NM away. Ran the QRH; TEST with FA; and notified Dispatch. PA to passengers. Part of the checklist isolates the electrical system which loses the FO (First Officer) NAV (Navigation). So at this point we transfer controls and proceed to land. Taxied to the gate. ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) gave the clear and we deplaned the aircraft. We felt a strong odor in the cockpit [but was] unable to identify the cause. [We responded by] donning masks; checking with FA; [requesting priority handling with ATC] and running [the] QRH. My suggestion is that there should be an automatic email sent to our [Company] email to confirm receipt from safety department.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported experiencing unusual fumes of an unknown source throughout the aircraft; resulting in a diversion to a suitable airport.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During descent the #2 engine EGT began to fluctuate and peaked at 1007 degrees. An 'X' would also intermittently display on the #2 EGT indicator. Performed a precautionary engine shutdown and received vectors for the ILS. Captain flew the approach and executed an auto land.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported that high EGT indications resulted in an engine shutdown.