Date: 201901
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Final Approach
Airspace: Class A ZZZ1; Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [I] started a 4 day trip with a 787 Check Airman. There were several points of contention; I'll address them individually. First; on review of the flight plan; a large; barely broken line of CBs (Cumulonimbus) cut across our route near the equator. I fly this route often; I believe the Check Airman said he'd been there once or twice. I advocated an extra 2000lbs of fuel; this motion also had encouragement from one of the relief pilots. Our other relief pilot hadn't joined us yet. ZZZ has a unique way of dealing with critical fuel situations; they force priority handling; and shut down the entire airport. So whether one's own fuel situation; or perhaps another aircraft; critical fuel can amount to a big problem in ZZZ. The Captain opted not to add any fuel; telling us as a matter of fact there's talk of trying to get all international flights to reduce fuel by 1000lbs so we could earn more money. This flies right in the face of the supposed company priorities. We did end up doing quite a bit of deviation and had considerable over burn.Second; on return flight; my leg we were approaching CBs; I asked him to request 30 miles either side of track for weather avoidance. He told me no; he didn't want to tie up so much airspace. For starters we were pretty much by ourselves over the ocean. And the situation of the weather required a right deviation immediately followed by a left deviation to remain clear. To only ask for one side puts the crew at risk of not being able to get the clearance back to the other side in time to avoid the weather. Timely clearances over the equator aren't the norm. As luck would have it; he couldn't figure out how to request just one side; likely due to fatigue. He was then going to request 30R for weather in a free text. I asked him not to as then instead of up to 30R; we'd be locked into 30R; period. He finally gave in to an either side request; which we definitely needed and used. If ATC can't clear a request; then we can work on a plan B. But safety of aircraft and comfort of passengers rate as 1 and 2 on company priorities. I don't recall seeing ATC sensitivities listed. Finally; and this the most dangerous and troubling. I included in my brief that I'd be disconnecting auto flight during my visual approach to ZZZ1. When I did I announced; 'disconnecting auto pilot and auto throttles'. To which he became very perturbed and told me to reconnect the auto throttles. I know there was a recent redefinition of 'should' in our FOM (Flight Operations Manual). In sum; stating that unless there's overriding factors; should means will. So after landing; I apologized for the misunderstanding about what disconnecting auto flight means to him verse myself. However; I stated the fact that losses of aircraft and lives on [recent incidents] could be squarely blamed on pilot's lack of basic flying skills; I felt that represented as big an overriding factor as we can find. I further pointed out that we owe the profession; airline; stockholders; and above all the passengers; pilots that are adept and able to fly the aircraft without all auto flight working. He stated the check airmen are in the leadership position and soon nobody will fly with auto throttles off. So despite KNOWING it degrades safety; he'll follow along; and insist the same from rank and file. Is the mindset coming out of the 787 fleet and/or general corporate structure. These policies remind me of what has caused many of the [other] carrier accidents. If you're looking for line pilots to blindly follow dangerous policy because; 'well that's just how it's done now'; I think you're mistaken. Should flight with auto throttles off be a simulator or airborne failure event only? I believe there's far too many accident reports and recommendations that prove otherwise.I don't fault the individual Captain; but see a very dangerous trend coming out of the 787 fleet structure. I see this as needing to be addressed quickly for the protection of ourairline; our profession; our stockholders; and above all our passengers.




Synopsis: B787 First Officer reported Crew Resource Management issues with a 787 Line Check Airman.