Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: N90.TRACON, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 2.5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: ATIS weather reported 2 1/2 SM and OVC 0400 We were on a vector for the ILS to 4R into EWR. At 3;000 feet approach vectored us on a heading of 020 to intercept the localizer. They said maintain 3;000 feet until established and 180 knots till DOOIN. The heading had us intercept the course at 0.8 miles from the final approach fix of DOOIN. DOOIN has a glideslope intercept altitude of 1;700; and is 5.2 miles from the runway. At intercept we were flaps 1 and 180 knots. The First Officer was flying the approach. The First Officer is newer to the line and was trying to fly by the procedures we learn in training which is to arm LNAV before arming the approach and start configuring based on the glideslope indications or the 2 miles prior to the FAF. Due to the poor vectors during instrument conditions and without the normal cues; he was behind the aircraft. The Captain told him to arm the approach and started configuring the airplane with gear and flaps because The Captain realized the poor vector and need to configure. Over DOOIN the First Officer armed the approach. However; we were still above 1;700 feet and fast. The Captain said; 'we will need to go around'; and the First Officer agreed; and then the Captain called ATC to tell them that we were going to need to go around; instead of going around after that initial discussion; the First Officer had the plane on FPA (Flight Path Angle) mode of 1;200 feet per minute to try to intercept the Glide path while the Captain was talking to ATC. By the time the Captain realized what he was trying to do and that we weren't going around; we were descending rapidly inside the Final Approach Fix. At this time; the Captain stated 'go around!! Do not descend any further.' The First Officer called the Go Around and we both pushed up the throttles and the lowest the radio altimeter indicated was 680 feet. During the go-around the auto throttles failed because of the abrupt push and the First Officer elected to disconnect the Autopilot. ATC gave us a heading of 039 to 3;000 [feet]. The First Officer flew the airplane while the Captain cleaned up the flaps and gear and selected the appropriate heading and FLCH 210 buttons on the panel. After leveling at 3;000 [feet]; we re-engage the auto throttle and autopilot and were vectored around for another approach. The second approach we had proper vectors to 3.5 miles outside of the Final Approach Fix of DOOIN. The First Officer flew proper procedures for the ILS and we broke out at 300 feet and safely landed. We debriefed in the jet after we reached the gate and had shutdown. The following is the Captain's self-assessment: After the debrief we realized that the key factors were as follows: ATC vectored us too close to the FAF for the meteorological conditions. The Captain should have been more clear with the communications to the First Officer in telling him that the vector was poor and during the vector the Captain should have been more directive at telling the First Officer that he needed to start configuring and helping him build his situational awareness. The Captain should have also been more directive at having him arm the approach sooner once we were cleared for the ILS. Additionally; the Captain should have asked ATC to vector us through the course and back around once it was recognized that they were vectoring us too close to the FAF. Further; instead of saying 'we have to go around' the Captain should have said 'Go around' and ensured that the First Officer did so immediately. The First Officers lack of situational awareness; the Captains indirect phraseology; and the First Officer's misunderstanding of the phraseology caused us to delay the go around after the call had been made which resulted in an unstable approach. We both learned to be more direct and communicate things early and often if something seems odd. The importance of using proper procedures and recognizing when things are nonstandard was also reinforced. The followingis my own (First Officer) self-assessment: As a fairly new first officer; there was a lot for me to learn from this experience. First of all; I should have been more situationally aware of both our location and our vectors. I should not have relied on ATC to set me up according to my per-conceived structure. Had I realized earlier that there is a high likelihood that we would get vectored so close to the final approach fix and at a high altitude; I would have had more awareness to the potential risks and more time to assess my options and to act accordingly. Beyond my initial situational awareness; and given that situation and how it went; I should have immediately realized that the current parameters were not conducive to a stable approach. My personal minimums for a stabilized approach are to be stabilized by the final approach fix; Especially given the fact that I am fairly new on the line. I disregarded my personal minimums given the high work load and mental saturation of the situation; and that is not acceptable. Moreover; I did not have the glideslope intercepted while passing the final approach fix; and that by itself should have been grounds for going around. If there is a one most important lesson that I learned it would definitely have to be practicing my authority and decision making as the Pilot Flying. I felt uncomfortable in the situation right away when the captain brought to my attention that we are being vectored right on top of the final approach fix; and that we are behind in our configuration. Had I trusted my instincts; and followed my normal thought pattern and decision making skills that I have developed throughout my career; I would have went around right then. But I think part of me was fearful of doing one of my first go around in the actual plane; so I was initially trying to recover and fix the situation to avoid that. And that is unacceptable as a professional pilot and a captain in training. Another point about me not practicing proper authority and decision making; was me not going around immediately once I heard the Captain discuss it. She mentioned a Go Around; so I should have initiated it right then and there; no matter the context or phrasing. Which takes me to my last point; communication. The communication on both our ends should have been better. I should have been more decisive and timely with my go around; and shouldn't have misunderstood the Captain when she said 'we will need to go around'; assuming we will need to in a bit if we don't re-intercept. The Captain calling ATC should have waited and was not essential at that time. In addition to the miscommunication with the phraseology of needing to go around; I was waiting for her to finish her ATC call; because I was unsure of her intention or understanding of whether I am going around right then or not; and did not want to initiate the go around while she was on COMMS and couldn't hear me; creating further confusion. The responsibility falls on me not initiating the go around earlier though; as I was the Pilot Flying; and had no business waiting for her confirmation to call and execute a go around in an unstable approach. I admit to plenty of shortcomings in this situation; and realize the need to practice more often and not grow complacent in my studying and chair flying scenarios. I learned plenty of lessons from this experience; and wish to use the experience to further my skill; proficiency; safety; and professionalism. How to prevent this happening in the future: I think personal minimums should be taken and handled seriously; especially during high stress situations; because this is when they truly matter. I think ATC (while they usually do a great job); should not be a reason for a pilot to grow complacent or reliant on being vectored properly; it is the pilots responsibility to assure a stable approach. I think a pilot (in this case myself) should feel more comfortable executing a go around; and not worry about the consequences of it; or the stresses caused by it. I think any discussion or involvement of the phrase 'Go Around'; should be an almost absolute trigger to perform the Go Around procedure; regardless of the phrasing or skepticism (in this case from me).


Second narrative: Atis weather reported 2 1/2 SM and OVC 0400 We were on a vector for the ILS to 4R into EWR. At 3;000 feet approach vectored us on a heading of 020 to intercept the localizer. They said maintain 3;000 feet until established and 180 knots till DOOIN. The heading had us intercept the course at 0.8 miles from the final approach fix of DOOIN. DOOIN is 5.2 miles from the runway. At intercept we were flaps 1 and 180 knots. The First Officer was flying the approach. The First Officer is newer to the line and was trying to fly by the procedures we learn in training which is to arm LNAV before arming the approach and start configuring based on the glideslope indications or the 2 miles prior to the FAF. Due to the poor vectors during instrument conditions and without the normal cues; he was behind the aircraft. The Captain told him to arm the approach and started configuring the airplane with gear and flaps because The Captain realized the poor vector and need to configure. Over DOOIN the First Officer armed the approach. However; we were still at 3;000 feet and fast. The Captain said; 'we have to go around' and as the Captain was telling ATC that we were going around; instead of going around; the First Officer selected FPA with a 1;200 feet per minute descent to try to intercept the Glide path. By the time the Captain realized what the First Officer was trying to do and that we weren't going around; we were descending rapidly inside the Final Approach Fix. At this time; the Captain stated 'go around!! Do not descend any further.' We both pushed up the throttles and the lowest the radio altimeter indicated was 680 feet. During the go-around the auto throttles failed because of the abrupt push and the First Officer elected to disconnect the Autopilot. ATC gave us a heading of 039 to 3;000. The First Officer flew the airplane while the Captain cleaned up the flaps and gear and selected the appropriate heading and FLCH 210 buttons on the panel. After leveling at 3;000; we re-engage the auto throttle and autopilot and were vectored around for another approach. The second approach we had proper vectors to 3.5 miles outside of the Final Approach Fix of DOOIN. The First Officer flew proper procedures for the ILS and we broke out at 300 feet and safely landed. We debriefed in the jet after we reached the gate and had shutdown. After the debrief we realized that the key factors were as follows: ATC vectored us too close to the FAF for the meteorological conditions. The Captain should have been more clear with the communications to the First Officer in telling him that the vector was poor and during the vector the Captain should have been more directive at telling the First Officer that he needed to start configuring and helping him build his situational awareness. The Captain should have also been more directive at having him arm the approach sooner once we were cleared for the ILS. Additionally; the Captain should have asked ATC to vector us through the course and back around once it was recognized that they were vectoring us too close to the FAF. Further; instead of saying 'we have to go around' the Captain should have said 'Go around' and ensured that the First Officer did so immediately. The First Officers lack of situational awareness; the Captains indirect phraseology; and the First Officer's misunderstanding of the phraseology caused us to delay the go around after the call had been made which resulted in an unstable approach. Also; the First Officer is from [foreign country] so there was also a cultural barrier. The First Officer admitted that in his culture he needs to be told multiple times before he thinks of it as a command. We both learned to be more direct and communicate things early and often if something seems odd. The importance of using proper procedures and recognizing when things are nonstandard was also reinforced. ATC following proper protocol for vectoring to an ILS final approach fix in IMC. Also in training;it must be communicated to new hire First Officers that we can't always follow the normal cues for an approach and when to configure. Sometimes we get back vectors and you have to realize the distance from the airport and configure accordingly. Also; cultural differences need to be taught.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported being vectored with a turn less than 1 mile from the final approach fix; in IMC conditions; led to an unstable approach and a go around.