elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival at the aircraft we noticed a pallet that had been double stacked and the bottom row had 'Do not double stack' stickers all along the bottom row. RFO noticed Lithium batteries were on the bottom row. I learned from ramp agent the pallet and two others were a trans load. I told them we could not accept the pallet in current form; they decided to bump the pallet and we took a picture of it. We later learned the Lithium batteries were not listed on the original Part A as Miscellaneous Hazmat. I then asked the ramp agent to check the other two pallets for any other undeclared hazmat; the two pallets were OK. The pallet was removed but it weighed 7;000 lbs. Not all of the weight was Lithium batteries but enough to cause a severe fire. I suspect the people who built the pallet. Better supervision.




Synopsis: MD11 Captain is informed by the Relief First Officer that a pallet of Lithium Batteries has been double stacked in violation of labeling and procedures. The pallet was just being loaded on their aircraft but had already flown a great distance. The batteries were not on the hazmat form either and were left behind.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climbout; past 15;000 feet; number 2 engine lost oil quantity rapidly from 21 to 5; then slowly to zero. After complying with the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook); we consulted with Dispatcher and Maintenance Control; electing to continue engine operation; but when engine oil pressure started to fluctuate and then dropped from 60 to 28; the engine was shut down for a return to ZZZ. Fire/Crash/Rescue scanned the aircraft on the taxiway after an uneventful monitored; coupled approach to an auto land.




Synopsis: MD-11 First Officer reported loss of engine oil during climbout.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While doing a 210 KTS; westerly climb off PDX 28R; traffic popped up on the TCAS just off the nose. It appeared within TA range and immediately we heard 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' from the TCAS. ATC advised traffic off our nose at 7;000 FT. We had a high rate of climb already and were climbing through 6;500 FT. We had been given a turn to the right just prior and I increased the turn rate and tried to increase the climb rate to get above the traffic. At or about the same time we got an ATC Traffic Alert and a TCAS reduce vertical speed. It seems that the traffic I was trying to out climb was trying to out climb us. I lowered the nose and further increased the right bank. I'm not sure but the TCAS displayed recommend climb reduction didn't look anywhere near enough to avoid a collision so I lowered the nose even more and reduced the power. I had my flight director and autothrottles off prior to the incident so I was able to quickly react to the rapidly changing situation. My best recollection is that we came within 100 FT below the traffic and extremely close laterally. I never saw the plane other than on the TCAS. I do not believe the passengers noticed the incident as I adjusted flight path smoothly and the combination of a steep bank while lowering the nose canceled out the G force. I believe the maximum speed attained was 260 KTS for few seconds while in a descent. After the incident; ATC informed us he was not talking to the traffic. The First Officer also noted that at some point the TCAS RA seemed to make a dramatic change to more closely reflect what I had already initiated.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier aircraft had a near miss with an unknown aircraft after departing PDX Runway 28R while climbing through 6;500 FT; headed westerly.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Received ACARS message asking us to remain in cockpit until jetway operator leaves jetway. When we got off the airplane met by Chief Pilot and other personnel and we were told that we were exposed to another crew member that tested positive in ZZZ1.  We were released from duty for 14 days and self monitored.


Second narrative: Upon landing in ZZZ from a flight from a layover in ZZZ1; our crew was met by Chief pilot of ZZZ and the local ZZZ CDC in the jetway.  We were informed our crew had been exposed from another ZZZ2 pilot (who was there on another flight) had ate breakfast that morning with Captain; who was on my flight.  He later told me social distancing had been applied; but they ate at the same table about 5-6 feet apart.  I guess my exposure should had been 3rd hand thru Captain.  We were taken off the flying schedule for 14 days to self monitor.  I took it upon myself after 6 days at home isolation to get a COVID-19 test which turned out negative.  I have subsequently returned to work and never had any symptoms whatsoever!  I'm submitting this report on behalf of company pilots to make sure the flight deck is disinfected after an event such as the one we were made aware of for the safety of our down line pilots entering a cockpit.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported being exposed to COVID-19 from another pilot and having to self quarantine after notification.
Date: 201212
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Emergency Exit Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: With the new requirement that MD80 crews check the EMER exit lights during preflight; I have found that the majority of the aisle lights will NOT come on. The overhead lights work; but the aisle lights will not come on using the cockpit switch. They will come on using the Number 1 Flight ATT switch at the forward exit door. Sometimes; after turning them on then off using the FA switch; they will come on with the cockpit switch; but not all the time. I think; due to lack of use; the switch contacts in the cockpit EMER lights switch are oxidized and need to be cleaned or replaced. If I had a fire and needed to get people out of my aircraft at night; in the dark; most of my aircraft aisle lights would NOT come on by turning my EMER lights switch to ON. I suggest a fleet wide look at these switches on overnights.




Synopsis: MD80 Captain reports that cabin emergency exit lighting often cannot be activated using the cockpit switch but will test using the Flight Attendant switch.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EUG.Airport, OR
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF EUG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Early morning departure out of EUG; the Tower is closed. It was the first time for both pilots at this airport. We briefed A7 to enter runway per the chart and looking at the JEPPS. As we taxied out we were surprised to see A7 is now A6. Picture shows ownship showing aircraft at A7; while the sign says A6 JEPPS and AIC should be updated to show this change.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported a taxiway is mislabeled on their charts and does not coincide with the airport signage.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Q400
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landing Runways 34L and 34C; departing on Runway 34R. The Final for [Runway] 34C was getting strung out to about a 20 mile final when a B737 checked on frequency on a west downwind; I advise him of the length of the final for [Runway] 34C and ask him if he would prefer a shorter final to [Runway] 34L; they replied affirmative and told him to expect [Runway] 34L. When I turned the B737 base; I instructed him to report sighting a DH8D landing 34C; eventually he did and I instructed the B737 to maintain visual separation from the DH8D landing [Runway] 34C and you're cleared for the visual approach for [Runway] 34L. The B737 accepted visual separation and read back Visual Approach Runway 34L. Another Air Carrier was trailing the B737 and on approach to [Runway] 34C; I issued traffic and when the trailing Air Carrier reported the B737 in sight I instructed him to maintain visual separation; and the B737 was landing [Runway] 34L and you; (trailing Air Carrier); are landing on 34C; all read back correctly; and sent to Tower frequency. The B737 flew threw the final for [Runways] 34L and 34C and then came back to my frequency saying he's deviating for traffic. Both aircraft go around; and I am instructed to issue the TRACON phone number to the B737. When the Captain of the B737 spoke to the Operations Manager; he said he knew he was cleared for [Runway] 34L and read it back; but the Copilot (flying the aircraft) had it in his mind he was landing Runway 34R and crossed over both finals of 34L and 34C; and lined up for 34R. The Captain said he told the Co-pilot he was lined up for the wrong runway and tried to adjust; but by that time trailing Air Carrier had closed the gap and was very close. The B737 didn't tell me; or the Tower about this maneuver; so no one knew what he was doing until he came on my frequency announcing his now deviation to the east. When the Captain of trailing Air Carrier called the TRACON he told the Operations Manager he was going to file a NMAC.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a conflict event when traffic cleared for an approach to Runway 34L but flew through the final for Runway 34L and 34C resulting in a declared NMAC. Pilot error was listed as the causal factor.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the walk around; my First Officer discovered oil leaking from multiple points inside the number one engine exhaust area. I notified maintenance and approximately 30 minutes later it appeared that their corrective action was to add more oil. No attempt was made to investigate where the oil was coming from or to stop the oil from dripping. The line mechanic at this point in time informed me that the number one engine was on a high oil consumption watch. I didn't see anything about the number one engine being on a high oil consumption watch in the maintenance history. The aircraft was refused and I received a new aircraft about 15 minutes later. Lack of investigation into my maintenance concern. Investigate why oil is actively dripping from areas it doesn't normally drip from when an engine is on a high oil consumption watch.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported oil leaking from engine exhaust.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I assumed a radar position under normal operations. Management decided to split the sector without advising me or any of the other controllers on the shift. They made it seem as if the change was only going to be to the ATOP (Advanced Technologies Oceanic Procedures) channel. This resulted in numerous issues in the ATOP sectors. My sector was split out via a high and low sector. The low sector 31;000 feet and below remained my control. The high sector 32;000 feet and above became an ATOP sector. At the time; I had low level aircraft only in the sector so it was unnoticed. After some time I began to see limited data blocks in my sector which I wasn't talking to; had no flight information and had no control over. I called the ATOP sector to see who the aircraft were. The Controller seemed extremely busy so I hung up; walked over and saw the unsafe situation this caused. The way the ATOP was configured and the channel change resulted in numerous Nordo aircraft as well as numerous aircraft actively in the non radar sector without conflict probe analysis. Management had no answers. This wasn't supposed to be done until the next day. They put both the controllers and flying public at risk. Management needs to communicate better and become knowledgeable about the systems that they're supposed to be in charge of.




Synopsis: ZNY Center Controller reported they were not advised their sector was decombined and the ATOP Sector was being worked by a different Controller.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was relieved from Local Controller 1; traffic was building on west flow (Runway 27R/L; an uncommon flow for pilots and controllers) and during my 2 minute post brief I continued to assist the relieving Controller. Approach called with an emergency with rough running engine. Due to traffic complexity and saturation on all 3 Local Control positions and the very cramped Tower Cab it was extremely difficult to coordinate with the CIC and other local controllers. I was still plugged in the same ETVS position as the relieving Controller (and had no other position to plug into) which made coordination over ETVS impossible without significantly impacting the operation. FLM made the suggestion to land the aircraft on Runway 17R (South flow runway) and Local Controller 1 coordinated with the emergency aircraft and they agreed to Runway 17R. I attempted to coordinate with Local Controller 3 several times; but between traffic and congestion in the Tower Cab I was not able to coordinate in a timely manner. Coordination was accomplished before the emergency aircraft was cleared on Runway 17R; but if the situation had been more time critical I'm not sure if coordination could be accomplished safely. Change the position of Local Controller 1 for west flow in the Tower Cab (work group already working on it). Add ETVS positions so more positions can be opened without interfering with aircraft operations (space in Tower Cab limits installation and number of people on position). Larger Tower Cab; so direct coordination can be accomplished; less distraction during times of high complexity and workloads; more flexibility in positioning operational positions; and allow more positions to be opened.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described the handling of an emergency aircraft and the current equipment and Tower space restrictions that hampered the operation.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was flight following with NorCal at 2;500 FT. I was advised by NorCal to immediately climb to 3;000 FT to avoid a collision with a fixed wing aircraft at my same altitude approaching from my 10:30 direction. I immediately complied and leveled off at 3;000 FT and the fixed wing flew below me. I feel if it hadn't been for NorCal's services; this could have been catastrophic. The fixed wing blended into the background of the mountains and given the time of day; it was impossible to detect that fixed wing. Although my helicopter is equipped with TIS; it doesn't operate in the majority of areas we service. TIS works off of the Mode S traffic system; the Central Valley doesn't have that system in place except in the San Francisco/Bay Area. Located near my home base there is a flight school with quite a few foreign student pilots; their English is basic and hard to understand. With the Tower closings and the amount of traffic that flies in the Valley; it's just a matter of time before we do have a major mishap. My solution to this increasing problem of traffic avoidance is to replace our existing TIS with a TCAS III (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) and second; require every our pilots operating in these high dense traffic areas to flight follow with NorCal.

Callback: The reporter stated that in his twenty-three years as a helicopter pilot he has seen too many events such as this which do not get reported. He believes that the near miss situation is becoming more likely with the San Joaquin Valley traffic volume increase; not just student pilots but others not utilizing flight following or talking with Towered airports. Making TIS available in the Valley would help.



Synopsis: A helicopter pilot flying south of San Joaquin; CA reported that a NCT traffic alert prevented a near miss; but increased Valley traffic volume has created the near miss potential for aircraft equipped with only TIS.