elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Dispatcher
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approach vectored us for a visual approach to runway XX at ZZZ. When we got the airport in sight; we realized that we were a little high for the approach to land; so we requested a 360 degree turn to lose altitude. During our final turn toward the runway; I requested flaps 25 degrees from the FO (First Officer). When he selected the flaps to 25 degrees from 20 degrees; we received a TE FLAPS DISAGREE caution message. We then performed a go around; coordinated with the tower; and flew vectors while performing the QRH checklist for the TE FLAPS DISAGREE. Once we completed the QRH; we let Dispatch know; and [coordinated] with the tower due to the increased landing distance; landing at flaps 20. We landed on runway XX and cleared the runway and taxied to the gate.


Second narrative: On final descent into ZZZ; the crew received a Trailing Edge Disagree Message. They ran the QRH and completed it. They sent an ACARS: 'TE DISAGREE ON SHORT FINAL. QRH COMPLETED'. I acknowledged the ACARS; so the crew received a 'Dispatch acknowledges'. The crew was below 10;000 feet. I proceeded to call Maintenance Control and asked best course of action. The aircraft was on descent into ZZZ. Maintenance Control recommended landing in ZZZ if able and they would notify maintenance at the ramp. I called recovery and notified them of the situation. The lead dispatcher coming on shift and the dispatcher taking the flight over were both notified of the situation. The crew landed in ZZZ.Maintenance Control explained it was a trailing edge disagree; most likely the flaps.


Synopsis: Flight Crew reported a Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree light on final; causing a go around and precautionary landing.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Ozone odor detected in aft of cabin by flight attendant and on flight deck [on] 4 mile final [to] ZZZ. [Notified ATC]. Landed normally; completed inspection by emergency vehicles. Odor dissipated on landing. Taxied to gate. Maintenance informed. Logbook entry made; smoke form completed.


Second narrative: Flight Attendant reported burning odor in aft of aircraft to Captain on final approach. I maintained control of the aircraft and radios; while Captain coordinated with cabin. We [notified ATC]; landed; taxied clear and let ARFF [Airport Rescue Firefighting] inspect the aircraft. The odor dissipated upon landing and we taxied to gate.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported being notified by a Flight Attendant of burning odor in aft cabin during final approach to landing.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On descent into ZZZ passing FL310 and 20 minutes from landing; the Number 3 FA called me and said the Number 1FA was hurt. At the same time the Number 2 FA picked up the inter-phone and began speaking. The Number 3 FA was a little bit frantic and vague in his communication. I attempted to get more information from him but he had hung up his inter-phone. About 30 seconds later; I called back to the Number 3 FA. He answered and I asked him to calm down and tell me what happened. He said the #1FA had hit his head on a 'tray table.' I asked if he was ok and did he need any medical assistance. He said the Number 1 FA was ok and no medical assistance was required. The remainder of the flight was without further issue. After parking the aircraft at ZZZ; I went back to the forward cabin to ask the Number 1 FA what happened. He had a small ice pack on his head. He removed it and had a light reddish bruise where he had obviously hit his head. I asked him to describe to me what happened. He said he was sitting in the FA jump seat; facing aft. When he stood up; he hit his head on the side of a metal tray which extends from the storage area just aft of the FA jump seat. I then asked him if he felt ok or needed medical assistance. He said he had a little bit of a 'headache' but otherwise felt ok. He said he felt ok to work the return leg to ZZZ1. He did request that when we arrived back to ZZZ1 that a supervisor meet us at the gate. I agreed that I would notify ZZZ1 Operations when we were in range. There was no turbulence or other weather related events. There were no external factors contributing to this injury. All normal procedures were being followed. All cabin crew members continue to be aware of their surrounding work environment and continue to exercise diligence. Flight attendants are trained how to handle medical situations in the cabin area and how to effectively communicate this to the flight deck. The Number 3 FA could have done a better job remaining calm; analyzing the non-life threatening situation and communicating this to the flight deck.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported poor communication with Flight Attendant relating to a Flight Attendant's injury.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were operating ZZZ-ZZZ1. Our APU was INOP. We took off climbing out of around 7;000 ft. we got a Gen 1 Off caution message followed by a IDG Disc status. I was flying so I had the Captain run the QRH for the Gen 1 caution. The QRH called for the APU to be turned on; ours was INOP. We [advised] with ZZZ Center then talked about our next step; we looked at different airports and most airports on the east coast were 300 ft. or less overcast; with thunderstorms to the west.  We messaged Dispatch and Maintenance about what was going on; they told us to air return to ZZZ. The Captain made the announcement with the flight attendants and passengers and kept them informed. We made a normal ILS landing into ZZZ and switched airplanes and made it to ZZZ1 2 hours later.[The cause was] Gen 1 failure; APU INOP; only working off one generator. Communication between pilots; passengers; ATC; dispatch and Maintenance Control was very good; we were all on the same page.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 First Officer reported No. 1 engine generator drive failure during departure climb. Flight crew requested ATC priority handling for air return followed by a safe landing.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZZZ loaded HAZMAT material; an aircraft battery; onto my flight without informing me or Dispatch; and also failed to present me with the Dangerous Goods form before departure. I had no idea it was onboard until I arrived in ZZZ1 and was asked to post sign the Dangerous Goods form after completing the flight. I refused to sign it and notified my Dispatcher and the Chief Pilot.


Second narrative: When we arrived at the gate in ZZZ1; an Agent boarded the aircraft and asked the Captain to sign a NOTAC.  The Captain explained that we were never made aware of any HAZMAT prior to or during the flight.  Evidently; we transported HAZMAT without being notified of it being onboard. The Captain was not able to sign and we didn't carry the required documentation. We were also unable to notify Dispatch and have the HAZMAT remark listed on the Dispatch Release per Company policy.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported the transport of undeclared Hazmat. Dispatch failed to provide flight crew the required Dangerous Goods Form prior to gate departure. Captain informed Chief Pilot and Operations upon arrival.
Date: 201307
Location: ZBAA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZBAA
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Pushback from Beijing became very confusing due to lack of communication with the station; and to some extent phraseology issues with the Chinese ATC Controller. It began with an inoperative PA system that no one knew about prior to doors being closed. Unable to contact Operations due inadequate ramp radio. Attempted to contact Dispatch/Maintenance on SATCOM; but had to hang up due to lousy connection and unable to understand Maintenance due to connection. We (pilots) were able to fix the problem through acceptable troubleshooting of the system. Some weather moved into the area; and this is when the confusion really occurred. The Chinese Controller's phraseology of 'long delay pushback'; to the tug operator telling us that Operations stated; 'We were cleared to push;' at which point we are unable to contact Operations due to their radio. We were unable to verify our wheels up time; if it had been updated; what was the status of our pushback clearance; or any other information that Operations might have for us. We did have the tug operator make several calls to Operations for us and relay information; but things get lost/missed in translation; especially when different language accents are involve. While this is going on there is a CSR in first class from Beijing; texting with operations; and stating we were released and cleared to push. Something is [rotten] in Denmark when the passenger knows more about the operational end than the pilots do sitting at the gate with doors closed and armed.




Synopsis: A B777 Captain parked on the ZBAA ramp described a communication's situation in which the crew was unable to contact the Company; Operations; or ATC but a passenger was texting Operations and determined they were released to taxi.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Engine Starting System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were pushing back from the gate in a MAX 8 and were starting the number 2 engine. The FO (First Officer) configured the air conditioning panel before the tick on the EGT was gone; causing the EEC (Electronic Engine Controller) to abort the engine start. Once we saw the white box flashing; we aborted the engine start; reviewed the QRC; and followed the QRH guidance. After confirming with Maintenance (and a review of the [operation manual]) a second successful start was made.We conducted a briefing about the MAX engine start and the items that we were going to see; and time limits associated during our normal preflight briefings. I was very surprised when the aborted start happened due to the fact that we had reviewed the start process. I will continue to brief the engine start procedures with a bigger emphasis on the EGT roll back.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 MAX-8 crew reported failing to follow the engine start procedure resulting in an aborted engine start.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Canopy Window
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: While doing the first officers preflight inspection; I discovered the wrong part installed on the Emergency Enter and Exit window. The window has a retainer clip that allows the first officer to lock his window; effectively locking the emergency entry modification on the first officer's window. Thus locking out first responders in case off an accident or even incident. This is the second aircraft I discovered with the incorrect locking mechanism. It is my belief that we have a problem with installing the correct part; on a safety sensitive system on the aircraft or perhaps on the fleet of 767 freighter conversions. Our fleet as well as other 767 freighter operators should have this checked.




Synopsis: B767 Check Airman reported an incorrect part installed on an emergency enter/exit window.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Safety Zone lines are not extended far enough at MDW (and other airports). Ground Ops regularly parks equipment near the vehicle traffic lanes at MDW. The Safety Zone lines do not extend far enough to verify the equipment is outside of the lines. At nighttime it is frequently IMPOSSIBLE (yes; a valid absolute) to verify the equipment is clear. This is especially relevant with the scimitar winglets.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported concern that safety zone lines at a number of airports are not properly marked.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: Globemaster (C-17)
Operator: Military
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Heavy C17s should not have the call sign DKINE; pronounced 'DaKine.' We already have helicopters at Maui Approach with the call sign DK; pronounced 'DaKine.' This is day number four that I have encountered this problem. I brought up this problem at previous team briefings and I was assured that yesterday would be the last day that we had this problem. But; once again; I had a H/C17 with the call sign DaKine this morning.




Synopsis: HCF Controller expressed concern regarding similar call signs used by the military and a local helicopter operation.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was descending via the STOCR arrival; south transition; near POORE intersection when I noticed him leave 9000 feet. I immediately took action as he went through 8800 feet; issuing a climb back to 9000. The pilot seemed surprised and said something to the effect of 'Yes; we will have to climb back up to 9000'. At which point I issued an immediate westbound turn to avoid a CLT departure climbing to the southeast. Once I was west of the CLT departure; which I believe was an [airliner]; I cannot recall; I put Aircraft X back on course to the downwind leg. This was a close call; had I not noticed this pilot deviation as it was happening; it could have been a far worse outcome. The pilot stated on the phone he accidentally deleted the 9000 box from the FMS.I will also add that on initial check-on; Aircraft X stated they were on the STOCR1 descending to 7000. This is not an uncommon check on. The STAR's bottom altitude is 7000 and that is; in fact; where they are descending to. I should have pried the whole and correct phraseology from him; but at the time I was busy. The fact that the bottom altitude on these arrivals is below the altitude at which CLT departures are climbing is wildly dangerous. This isn't the first instance this has happened. After the first one it should have been changed but it wasn't; so here we go again. Long side arrivals bottom altitude should be 9000. This way; if the FMS drops an altitude; or fix; the clearance limit is at least 9000; not 7000; which is 1000 feet below the altitude of CLT departures!




Synopsis: Charlotte Approach Controller reported stopping an aircraft's descent to prevent a loss of separation with another aircraft. Controller stated pilot accidentally deleted altitude from the FMS.