elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202004
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: At the present time we are faced with COVID-19. Here in the US and other parts of the world people are told to wear mask or PPE to protect themselves.  While our passengers on [airline name] are wearing masks; bandanas and other items to cover their nose and mouths no where in our safety demonstrations or announcements do we tell them how or what to do in a decompression during COVID-19.  Shouldn't we change our announcement to say 'If needed; oxygen masks will drop from an overhead compartment. Remain seated with your seat belt fastened and pull the mask down to start the flow of oxygen. Remove your personal mask or protective equipment from around your nose and mouth and place the yellow mask over your nose and mouth and put the elastic band over your head.'




Synopsis: Flight Attendant suggested changing the safety announcement during the COVID-19 pandemic to include instructions for passengers to remove their personal protective masks before donning drop-down oxygen masks.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: PA-30 Twin Comanche
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Before starting out at ZZZ; an advisory radio call was made at XA41; stating we would be taxing to RWY XX from the terminal. Weather conditions were VMC; winds at 34004; CLR and 10sm visibility. Throughout our taxi from the terminal to the hold short line of RWY XX; no radio calls from any other aircrafts were heard by us. Before entering RWY XX; a second advisory call was made to state our intentions. No replies were heard again. A third advisory call was made at XA50CDT stating we would be taking off from RWY XX. Again; no replies or acknowledgments were heard. Right before we cross the intersection of RWY XX and XY; an airborne aircraft; Aircraft Y; crossed our departure path at 100 ft. above us and departing from RWY XY; simultaneously as we departed RWY XX. No radio monitoring or calls made by Aircraft Y pilot; before entering the airport movement area and departing the RWY XY.




Synopsis: C-402C Captain reported an NMAC event on takeoff caused by a nonreporting aircraft departing cross runway.
Date: 202010
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Flight Attendant (FA) in charge advised that passenger in XX10 would not wear mask and was becoming belligerent changing seats at will while disregarding FA instructions to wear his mask and return to his seat. Dispatch [was] notified. We decided to have personnel meet aircraft in ZZZ and advised that this passenger should be denied boarding on next leg to ZZZ1.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a passenger would not comply with face mask policy and became belligerent with the Flight Attendant in Charge.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [I was] performing Line Check from jumpseat. During initial taxi out from ORD gate; Captain made a left turn out and did not observe an RJ approaching from left on Taxiway A. I observed the aircraft approaching at high speed; and called for Captain to stop. The Captain; now seeing the conflict made an abrupt stop. The crew then reaffirmed their taxi clearance as ATC had not mentioned any traffic to follow on initial clearance. Crew continued taxi out and confirmed that Flight Attendant's and passengers were okay. Later in the flight the Purser claimed that she may have experienced an injury and would be filing a report. The rest of flight was uneventful.


Second narrative: Ground Control was very busy when we got our clearance to taxi. We were not given any traffic to follow on the nearby Taxiway A. I proceeded to add power as I was turning towards our assigned route to Runway 22L. I was making sure we were not going to come too close to an aircraft parked to my right. My LCA in the jumpseat saw a fast moving RJ on the taxiway behind us in my blind spot. He called for me to stop immediately which I did. Our speed was about 2 to 3 KTS; but the sudden stop caused our Lead Flight Attendant to fall against an open galley door. We asked her if she was OK and she said she was fine. She also said there was no problem to continue. The closest we got to the RJ was about 50 to 75 FT. We never crossed the taxiway edge line. The RJ never slowed down or took any action.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew was cleared to taxi from their pushed back position to Runway 22L via Taxiway A. As the aircraft began to move the Check Airman on the jump seat sights a fast moving RJ from the left rear and commands a stop.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was coming to land on Runway XX at ZZZ but was slightly off centerline and the nose was slightly pointed towards the left. When I touched down; the plane started to tip over towards the right and I reacted by quickly turning the plane left and it went off the runway. I was able to taxi off the grass and to Parking upon being instructed by the Tower Controller and without further assistance. No runway lights were damaged; nor the aircraft damaged. Winds were 110 at 03 kt.; visibility 10+; sky clear. I believe the runway excursion was due to not being completely aligned with the runway and causing the plane to side load upon touchdown. My initial reaction to correct towards the left immediately likely led to the aircraft going off the runway. Since this event; I have received flight training emphasizing correct landing and touchdown procedures and I feel more comfortable in my ability to respond should this scenario happen again.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported a runway excursion occurred during touchdown and cited that not being aligned with the runway led to sideloading the aircraft and overcorrecting.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Other Non-Flight
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Inspector
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was performing a Post Dock General Walk around Safety Inspection on an aircraft. In the left wheel well I failed to see the presence of the Standby Leading Edge Shutoff lock out tool still attached to the valve; rendering the leading edge devices inoperative in the standby mode. It was not discovered until the aircraft flew to another station where the crew found it on preflight walk around before the next flight. I believe one of the contributing factors was the color of the lock-out tool. It is a dull red color which I believe blends into the surrounding components. Another contributing factor is the Maintenance Task Card for the Post Dock Intermediate Check- General Walk Around Safety Inspection. There is not a block that specifically states to remove this locking tool. It refers you to three different Maintenance procedures for the activation of the leading edge flaps and slats. Also; if I had paid more attention to the inspection of that component in the left wheel well; I believe this would have been prevented.


Second narrative: I was assigned to an aircraft for cabin visit. After all maintenance was completed; I did post dock inspection. I looked over the plane to make sure (all) panels were installed and no tools were left behind. I looked in wheel wells and everything looked normal. The leading edge lock out pin was removed and safety wired. I didn't notice any flags hanging down. After all paperwork was done; I bought off post dock. The following day I heard that a standby hydraulic valve lock was found installed after plane landed from flight. I don't know how I could have missed (seeing the) lock installed. It was pretty windy that night; the streamer must have blown up in wheel well to a spot where the mechanic and I didn't see it on post dock walk around.


Synopsis: After maintenance was performed on a B737-700; both an Inspector and a Maintenance Technician missed seeing that a standby leading edge shutoff lock tool was still installed while performing a final walk around.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I initiated an engine failure on my student at 4500 feet and had him steep spiral down. Upon reaching 1500 feet AGL he recovered from four rotations and began to configure the aircraft for the simulated engine failure power off landing. Upon reaching 550 feet AGL he initiated a go around adding full power immediately. On climb out a very strong engine vibration began and we lost much of our available power. I turned carb heat back on in the event it was icing but it didn't correct the engine vibration. I then adjusted mixture leaning it out and pulled power to idle then firewalled it at which point power slowly came back. I then diverted to the nearest airport with services and informed operations and had maintenance inspect the aircraft. It was determined that a fouled plug was most likely the cause and after a run up the aircraft was flown back to [home airport]. No further incident occurred.




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported a loss of engine power during a go-around from a simulated engine failure maneuver. After diverting; Maintenance concluded that a fouled spark plug was the likely cause.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BCT.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Embraer Phenom 300
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were scheduled to fly a Phenom 300; on an empty leg.  After starting both engines the VENTRAL RUD FAIL - CAS message illuminated and we shut the aircraft down and notified Maintenance Control.  They immediately directed us to a procedure found in section 5 of the POH that is intended to reset the malfunctioning ventral rudder system by tripping and resetting a circuit breaker. Since the POH does not contain FAA-approved procedures I did not comply with his recommendation.  I indicated that I would be amenable to working with Maintenance Control for troubleshooting purposes only and to provide information for maintenance personnel to use in diagnosing the problem.  He argued that I am authorized to reset circuit breakers when directed to do so by Maintenance Control.  Again; I reiterated that I would assist in troubleshooting only; and that I would not attempt to reset the malfunctioning system for the purposes of flying the aircraft without properly documenting the discrepancy.This is the second time I have been directed to complete one of the non-approved POH procedures by Maintenance Control in the last 3 weeks.  There is absolutely no reason the Maintenance Controllers should be recommending we attempt to reset a malfunctioning system without first properly documenting the discrepancy.  Properly training the Maintenance Controllers that pilots may ONLY complete approved AFM and AOM procedures and that the Pilot in Command (PIC) has the ultimate authority for determining the airworthiness of the aircraft and will not participate in performing undocumented or unapproved maintenance procedures under any circumstances.




Synopsis: Phenom 300 Captain reports receiving a VENTRAL RUD FAIL - CAS message after engine start and shuts down to contact Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control wants to do a circuit breaker reset which the Captain refuses to accomplish; believing it should be written up in the Logbook and corrected by a licensed Maintenance Technician.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We had an] acrid smell from APU after landing [during] taxi. APU bleed open caution message. Crew followed QRH. At gate; momentary APU fire warning followed by APU self shut down. Crew followed QRH. APU fire indication ceased with no APU fire present. CFR called. CFR could find no evidence of a fire. Passengers were already deplaning when incident took place. Dispatch and Maintenance Control were notified.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 Captain reported acrid smell from APU after landing. At gate a momentary APU fire warning resulted in APU shutdown; but no fire found by CFR.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MRN.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: During the terminal phase of a single pilot IMC maintenance ferry flight to MRN (Foothills Regional) I requested the RNAV (GPS) Runway 21 Approach into MRN. ATC approved the request and cleared me to the CIKIS IAF. Scanning the preloaded route of flight in my G1000 PFD; I inadvertently selected the CICAC FAF as the desired steer point and turned in that direction. ATC observed the aircraft tracking to the wrong fix and directed a heading change in the direction of the IAF. At that instant; I detected the switch error and made the appropriate correct selection. The approach continued and the flight terminated without further incident. There can be no excuse for my having failed to confirm the exact GPS steer point selected; but in the interest of preventing a future incident such as this; I might question why two of the fixes on this approach would be labeled with identifiers so similar in spelling and pronunciation that this error could almost have been predicted; especially in the high workload environment of single pilot IMC during the terminal phase of the flight. I suspect that I'm not the first pilot to bite on this one; and the controller was probably spring-loaded to detect and correct my error. Can't TERPS label these fixes with less ambiguous identifiers?




Synopsis: A pilot flying an RNAV Approach into a non towered airport flew direct to the Final Approach Fix instead of the Initial Approach Fix as cleared. The fixes have similar sounding names which contributed to the navigation error.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were to depart 22R at EWR on the NEWARK 1 Departure which we loaded into the FMC. LNAV was appropriately armed before takeoff. The departure calls for basically runway heading to 420 FT; then left turn to 190; then right turn to 220 degrees. Right after reaching 420 FT; LNAV disengaged and a route discontinuity appeared. Because of this distraction; I was late in my turn to 190 and subsequent turn-back to the right to 220. I have never seen this happen before. I should have just ignored the discontinuity immediately and hand flown the departure from memory sooner. I will be on the lookout for this in the future with LNAV engaged for takeoff.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported an FMC discontinuity shortly after takeoff from EWR that led to a track deviation on the NEWARK1 SID.