elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Other Law Enforcement
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLA; TFR ZLA
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying approaching the LA Coliseum; East to West. I had a TCAD alert that an aircraft was approaching me from the North and behind my position (from inside the Dodger Stadium TFR). I gave a position report and did not hear a reply on the common LA basin frequency of 123.02. I checked in with LAX Helicopters and asked if the helicopter had checked in with them. I was told no. I was at an altitude of 700 to 800 feet MSL. I continued West bound and observed the other traffic fly directly underneath me; approximately 100 to 200 feet below me; putting the other aircraft; [aircraft Y;] at about 300 to 400 feet AGL.The other aircraft continued to increase speed and went westbound along the 10 FREEWAY. I contacted another helicopter [aircraft Z] to intercept in order to get a tail number. That helicopter followed the aircraft to a nearby Airport where it landed. That Tower provided the aircraft tail number and advised about its origin airport.




Synopsis: A helicopter near the LA Coliseum reported a near miss with another helicopter at 700 feet after that helicopter violated the Dodger TFR then proceeded to land at a nearby airport.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Had a gear up incident. Landing gear would not go down. After manually trying to pump the gear down for over an hour I decided to belly land the plane at ZZZ. All precautions were taken and an emergency landing was made on Runway XXR. No injuries but plane has extensive damage.


Second narrative: My student and I took off in his airplane from ZZZ and flew to ZZZ1 where we added some fuel to the airplane. Then we took off and flew to ZZZ2 where we began an ILS practice approach. On final the gear would not extend. We went missed and flew around for an hour and forty five minutes trying to get the gear and flaps to extend. Only the nose gear came down. We decided to land at ZZZ2 so called approach for landing. They immediately turned us over to the tower where we explained our situation. WE then landed on [Runway] XXR on the nose wheel and the tail tiedown ring. It stayed on the tiedown ring until it was almost stopped then came to rest on the left wing. We departed the airplane with no issues. There was very minimal damage to the plane. Later we discovered the ELT battery was due for replacement 60 days earlier.


Synopsis: C210 flight crew reported an uneventful planned gear up landing due to landing gear malfunction during training flight.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The procedures for crossing the holding position marking at the 4L approach differ depending on runway configuration in use. Note that the designs of the holding position markings for the 4L approach are identical to those for the veritable runway (see satellite view of BOS.) With the new taxi procedures that were instituted in recent years; pilots are trained never to cross a runway without explicit ATC instructions. The presence of an identical marking; one for which a pilot does not need explicit ATC clearance to cross creates a set up for confusion and ultimate incursion. Recently I landed Runway 32 in BOS clearing at J1. Ground cleared me to taxi via Juliet; Bravo; to hold short of Charlie. I know they intended for me to cross the 4L approach; but I don't feel right crossing the double yellow without a clearance; particularly in the vicinity of a charted incursion hot spot. I held and asked ground to confirm I was cleared across the 4L approach. My pause for clarification resulted in a re-sequence. Now I was told to hold short of Kilo in order to give way to jet traffic from right to left. This was no hardship for me; but I am sure it was an annoyance to Ground Control.I believe that if we need explicit clearance to cross a runway marking; then the same markings ought to require the same clearance. Otherwise pilots will become conditioned to disregard the hold markings which will contribute to a runway incursion. I pity the poor pilot who is new to Logan and unfamiliar with these procedures.




Synopsis: After landing on BOS Runway 32; a pilot questioned whether he could cross the Juliet hold line after exiting Runway 32 at J1 and while transitioning to Taxiway B.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E P80
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: During descent into PDX; PM (Pilot Monitoring) discovered PDX VOR inoperative. He then queried Portland Approach about the inoperative VOR. Approach stated the PDX VOR has been decommissioned. The descent and approach briefing included the briefing page referencing 'Engine Failure Procedures; Missed Approach.' However; all of the single engine missed procedures for the commonly used runways in Portland; OR; (28L/10R and 28R/10L) are predicated on the use of the PDX VOR. The briefing page procedure needs to be updated; amended; or discontinued. Also; the aircraft release paperwork as well as the PDX arriving aircraft ATIS (503)493-7557 received through ACARS contained no information regarding the PDX VOR deactivation.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer is informed during descent that the PDX VOR has been decommissioned although no mention is made on the ATIS and no specific NOTAM has been issued. It is also noted that company engine out procedures use the PDX VOR.
Date: 201904
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Tonight I had an issue with a Supervisor of mine. Aircraft X had a Number 2 brake that was worn past limits and when he caught wind of it he came out to the plane and proceeded to yell at me for changing the brake and told me what I should have done was don't believe what the pilot had written up in the log book and just signed it off. And I had told him several times that the brake had to be changed and his reply was 'I'm gonna look at it when the brake gets back to the shop and you better hope that the measuring rod is flush; or I was going to be in a world of 'sh**' and I had responded with 'For what doing my job?'. At this point he had gotten back in the supervisor truck and drove off. I believe that he was out of line going against the Aircraft Maintenance Manual and trying to bully me in to doing things illegally. Not to mention; the way he handled the situation was completely unprofessional. I also had another mechanic that was working with me; that had witnessed all of this.




Synopsis: Technician reported Maintenance Supervisor tried to 'bully' and intimidate Technician to sign-off a damaged part as airworthy.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pushed back from gate and ramp asked us to push deep in alley for an inbound flight. We started up normally; waited for the inbound; which was a tow-in and now had vehicles blocking parking. The bottom line is we sat for a good 10 minutes with engines running before we were cleared for taxi. Finally we moved forward toward the top of the alley; about that time we asked Ground for taxi when we were told our left engine was on fire. We made a couple of calls to confirm it was us; the Captain stopped the aircraft and he moved the left start lever to cutoff. At the time we had no internal indications of fire or abnormal indications. The Captain then pulled the left fire handle. At the same time a ground Marshaller was pointing and signaling a fire by wanding the horizontal infinity symbol. While this was going on I pulled out the QRH and started reviewing the Evacuation Checklist in case the problem escalated. After shutting down the engine down; ramp told us the fire was out. The Captain talked to the cabin crew and made a PA to notify about the malfunction and to remain seated while situation was under control. The FIRE trucks arrived and confirmed the fire was out. Since the situation was resolved; we coordinated for tow back to gate.Overall I thought the situation was handled well. Since our ground crew was gone and we had been engines running for a good while; a fire indication from ramp/ground could mean a lot of things. It was dark outside so I am sure it got quicker attention than it might have during daylight. We were not given any specifics so we reacted to mitigate the situation and eliminate the threats. After reviewing the QRH later we realized that the only checklist that might have applied was Tailpipe fire. I always assumed that might happen during an engine start; not 10 minutes after so it didn't cross my mind as a possible scenario at the time. By the time we got someone on intercom the fire was out. Kudos to the Captain for staying calm and preventing an escalation of the situation.


Second narrative: While departing the ramp; notified by ramp control of left engine fire. Shut down left engine and accomplished QRH items. After inspection by ARFF towed back into gate.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew is informed of an engine fire during taxi out of the alley. With no indications inside the aircraft; the Captain moves the start lever to cutoff and pulls the fire handle eliminating the visible fire. The aircraft is towed back to the gate.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On a visual to 22L; into JFK; we were on a left base about 2;000 AGL; when on the left side of the aircraft we noticed an aircraft that subsequently turned out to be a good sized model airplane or helicopter about 100 FT below the airplane and about 500 FT or less laterally. It moved from front to aft and was headed west. We informed Tower and lost sight of it when we turned final.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported sighting a large model airplane or helicopter about 100 FT below and 500 FT laterally away from them as they were on base leg for Runway 22L at JFK.
Date: 202109
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I filed due to almost aborting takeoff on an ORD departure because we thought there was a barricade up partway down the runway. In reality; it was the LAHSO (Land and Hold Short Lights) for Runway 9C. Company contacted the Tower and talked about the dangers of having these lights on when the runway is being used for takeoff. They can be easily confused for a barrier on the runway if you are not expecting them. This can cause an early rotation or a rejected takeoff. In our case we did and aggressive rotation. It a perfect set up for an accident.My last flight I again took off from Runway 9C and as I was partway down the runway; I noticed the LAHSO lights were if fact on again during takeoff. Knowing that this was the LAHSO lights; I knew this was not a problem but my First Officers were a bit concerned as they had not seen these lights before. We don't need someone making an unnecessary high-speed abort. This is going to cause an accident and maybe get someone killed. These lights should never be on when we are taking off. It is very disconcerting to say the least. We notified tower that they had the lights on when they told us to go to departure frequency.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the Land and Hold Short lights at ORD for Runway 9C are distracting and can be mistaken for a barricade while taking off.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CGF.Airport, OH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ground CGF
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We arrived at CGF via the 'KEATN SIX' arrival (keatn.keatn6). The following day our departure clearance included: direct FAILS direct KEATING (ETG) J146 ... etc. The clearance; when spoken; included 'KEATING'; however; we had arrived the previous day via the 'KEATN 6' arrival. The similarity in the spoken pronunciation of 'KEATING / KEATN' potentially could have been the source of incorrect navigation. The situation was clarified with Ground Control after several transmissions back and forth as we could not pick up J146 at 'KEATN' Intersection. Then the Ground Controller finally gave us the VOR identifier 'ETG' and the correct fixes were entered into our FMS. The flight was flown without any problems. Recommend changing the name of one of the intersection 'KEATN' to avoid confusion with the VOR (ETG) KEATING.




Synopsis: A pilot departing a CLE area airport eastbound received a verbal route clearance which included KEATING (ETG) along J146 and confused it with the similar sounding; nearby KEATN Intersection.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence; Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During turn to final approach we flew through an area of heavy rain. First Officer was flying pilot. I noticed a decrease in airspeed trend indication and told the First Officer to watch the airspeed. I then told the First Officer to increase power and had to repeat the command another time. We were in a turn and airspeed was around 170 to 180 KTS. As we continued; the airspeed dropped around 30 KTS; the autopilot disengaged and the stick shaker activated momentarily. The First Officer added full power momentarily and hand flew to intercept the inbound course. Airspeed returned to normal and we continued to landing. The turn; coupled with the down draft from the cell of heavy rain; increased the stall speed and at the same time the airspeed loss caused the stick shaker to activate momentarily which turned off the autopilot. I noticed this as it was occurring but I don't think the First Officer's situational awareness was where it should have been and he was slow to react. I had to prompt him several times to increase power. During the next flight sequence the First Officer stated he was going to call in fatigued. I received a call from the Chief Pilot after the return from the round trip that seemed to indicate that this incident may have been discussed in reference to the First Officer's decision to call in fatigued. As I was not involved with that discussion I do not know whether it was discussed or not. When I returned to the aircraft a new First Officer was present and the gate was asking us to board the aircraft. I had received the dispatch release on arrival from the inbound and it included the old First Officer's name on it. While we were boarding and setting up for the flight I actually noted to call Dispatch and change First Officer name on release but was in a high workload situation and answering loading questions and entering data into FMS; doing checklists etc. I did not contact Dispatch. During climb out I thought about the release and checked it; it was not changed with new First Officer name and number. I called Dispatch to do the change and continued the flight.




Synopsis: CRJ200 Captain describes an approach by his First Officer through heavy rain that gets down to stick shaker speed before sufficient thrust is added.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [I received] a pilot call for relamping First Officer's FMC annunciator. Relamping was no help so I conducted a flight control system fault check. I noticed that the left FCC had a fault. After I reset the circuit breaker; the FMC annunciator started to work. [In order] to explain this to the Captain and First Officer I had to [position] the test switch (autopilot disengage) in disengage position and FMC switch on overhead on both on left and do the test again because they were not sure that they wanted to fly this airplane. I left assuming that the pilot saw the switches in test position and would restore them back to normal. All the correct positions of all switches on the overhead and on the center pedestal should be covered by the checklist. Otherwise if any switches are in the wrong position [this will] cause a problem.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician repositioned switches in the flight deck to conduct a test procedure; and assumed that the pilots would recognize it and change them back to the normal position.