elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground CLT; Ramp CLT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The following event occurred after we landed in CLT and exited Runway 36R on Romeo Taxiway. We were given taxi via a left turn on Alpha; then right turn on Alpha 4; cross Runway 5; join Bravo and contact Ramp West Control for further taxi instructions. We complied with those instructions and the First Officer contacted Ramp west Control for clearance into the ramp. Ramp Control told us to join the 'inner line' right side and taxi to Spot X and hold for further instruction. What he wanted us to do was turn right into the ramp area and taxi around the east side of the 'west hard stand' near Terminal Bravo and hold at Spot X.What we did was continue straight ahead on the 'inner line' thinking we would taxi around the west side of the 'west hard stand'. Unfortunately; as we soon found out; that put us in direct conflict with aircraft taxiing southbound around the west side of the 'hard stand.' The Ramp Controller; of course; asked us where we were going and we told him; having misunderstood his instructions that we were continuing on the 'inner line' around the 'hard stand' to Spot X. He then told us to turn right and taxi through the 'west hard stand' to join the inner line near Terminal Bravo and hold at Spot X for further clearance to our gate. When the taxiway was clear; Ramp Control then gave us further clearance to Terminal Alpha and our gate. Both the First Officer and I thought we were complying with the Ramp Controller's instructions; but we simply did not understand the airport specific language that was being used.Obviously; if there's ever any doubt about an assigned clearance just ask the Controller. The problem here was more with the language being used or local. The SIP page for CLT doesn't contain much information at all concerning taxi instructions; or what to expect from Ramp Control when taxiing inbound or outbound such as use of the inner ramp lines. It would definitely help with anticipated taxi instructions. Especially after landing; when tasks are high and radio congestion is common.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported misunderstanding taxi instructions leading to a conflict with oncoming traffic at CLT airport.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D10.TRACON, TX
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: TRACON D10
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y; was VFR and sequenced to ADS Runway 15 final and switched to ADS Tower. Aircraft X; was IFR to ADS and was sequenced to follow Aircraft Y. I saw Aircraft Y continuing westbound across the final and issued Aircraft X vectors across final for spacing behind Aircraft Y. I then attempted to coordinate with ADS Tower via the landline but could not get an answer. I informed Aircraft X of the delay due to the aircraft ahead not turning inbound. I again attempted to coordinate with ADS via the landline and finally the Flight Data Controller at ADS answered saying that they were breaking out Aircraft Y as it was a student who was not following instructions. I turned Aircraft X to a heading of 130 who was level at 2;000 FT; towards the airport for the visual approach. At this time I observed Aircraft Y in a northbound turn; into Aircraft X traffic. I issued a traffic alert and an immediate climb to 2;500 FT; and I informed him that the traffic was at 1;800 turning into him. There was a brief transmission that was garbled and could have been a response. Aircraft X executed the climb and reported a TCAS/RA was observed as I was issuing the traffic alert. I then called Addison Tower and demanded that Aircraft Y be returned to my frequency. Aircraft X was then cleared for a visual approach and landed.My recommendation is that prior to any breakout instructions being issued; ADS Tower (via Local position) should coordinate with the Approach Controller in compliance with the LOA. Departure North is required to sequence inbound IFR and VFR traffic to Addison. With the inability to control what the VFR traffic being broken out is doing; the Approach Controller cannot with any certainty define the sequence to the airport or provide safe control of inbound aircraft.




Synopsis: Arrival Controller has problem with inbound arrival and previously sequenced arrival when first aircraft is resequenced by Local Control; into the second arrival aircraft.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Maintenance
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There had been a continuing hydraulic leak in the #2 engine/pylon area that appeared to be coming from the area of the pump. The other Mechanic and I spent several hours cleaning and inspecting the hydraulic system and engine areas. The source seemed to be the pump. We ordered a new pump and installation hardware and went to the hotel. When the pump arrived later I assisted in removal and replacement of #2 hydraulic pump. The pump was removed by another mechanic and I was to change the fittings and replace the o-rings. At this point I must not have installed one of the o-rings. The other Mechanic installed the new pump. We did an engine run for the operations check and the pump functioned properly. The leak check was difficult due to the amount of residual fluid in the engine area. The other Mechanic (engine run qualified) did not believe it was safe to run the engine with the cowls open. We did a couple more leak check runs and then would open the cowls to check for leaks but this was difficult due to the excess fluid in the engine compartment. We did one last engine run for 30 minutes to check for fluid consumption. The fluid level did not decrease. We opened the cowls and checked the area again and once again it was hard to determine leakage. We closed the engine up and cleaned the area and did the documentation on the repair. On a later flight the aircraft lost hydraulic fluid and had to shut the system down.I believe that I had a moment of inattention during the process and missed reinstalling an o-ring. I do not remember not installing the o-ring and believed I had properly installed them all when I gave the pump to the other Mechanic to install on the engine.Increased attentiveness on my part. I should have double checked the installation.




Synopsis: Air carrier maintenance technician reported a post maintenance loss of hydraulic quantity was likely due to a o-ring installation error.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JYO.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: CTAF JYO
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: There is a new power plant 1.5 miles SSW of JYO. The plant has just opened.  The power plant is 0.25 miles from the centerline extended of RWY 17/35.  The power plant is 1.0 miles from the departure end of RWY 17.Left pattern for RWY 17. Pattern height 1;200 ft MSL (800 ft AGL) Climb out from RWY 17. Standard left turn to crosswind is at 900 ft MSL (300 ft below pattern). This turn is at 500 ft AGL.The turn to left crosswind departing RWY 17 in a C172 takes the plane directly over the power plant (500 ft AGL) and through the thermal plume of the cooling system. It's a very bumpy ride directly through the thermal plume above the power plant.Today had to make left turn to crosswind at 800 ft MSL (400 ft AGL) or wait and turn left crosswind at 1;000 ft MSL (600 ft AGL) thus turning left crosswind either before or after the power plant.




Synopsis: A Student Pilot reported that a new power plant near JYO creates a very bumpy ride in the pattern.
Date: 201810
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft had [an] MEL for left Main Fuel Tank Gauge Inop; which required the fuel tank quantity to be determined via the drip sticks. I went out on the ramp to 'stick' the tanks and the Fueler told me it was all done and I was good to go. I told him that I needed to see the readings. He asked me if I had a chart. I said I did but I wasn't sure how he had fueled the aircraft without knowing the stick readings. When he dropped a few of the sticks he asked me to get Maintenance because the readings must be wrong. I asked him what the readings were and he didn't know how to read it. At this point I got up on the ladder to read the sticks. They read the exact amount of fuel that I had landed with. The wings should have been full; however they only contained approximately 4500 pounds. They had not fueled the wing tank even though they told me they had. I then watched them pump another 4000 pounds into the left main to fill it.I verified the readings on the sticks. I also asked the Ops Agent for the gallons added to make sure the total amount of fuel required added up which it did. I called Dispatch to inform them of the issues we had and was told that the fuelers had been giving them problems. We departed late due to the issue but the flight was uneventful. Had I not followed the procedures in the MEL and trusted the fuelers; we would have taken off with a minimum of a 4000-pound imbalance and obviously not enough fuel to safely conduct the flight. The other issue is that I only get gallons added on the first flight of the day now. This was our third flight of the day. It is a good double check on whether or not the required amount of fuel was loaded onboard. The next time I have this MEL I will get the number of gallons added to back up my stick readings. Something also needs to be done about the fuelers. This situation could have been very ugly.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported that a Fueler made significant errors and demonstrated a lack of fuel system knowledge.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I made a normal approach and landing. During roll out the weld between the nose gear strut and the nose gear fork broke. The nose wheel went forward under the cowl. The aircraft slid to a stop on the nose gear strut. The right wing tip contacted the runway during the deceleration. The NTSB was sent pictures and determined this was an incident.This problem has happened to several other Zenithair CH 801 aircraft. If I had performed more than a visual inspection at the last condition inspection I may have been able to detect the crack prior to failure. Or I could have increased the strength of this connection which would have prevented this incident. In looking at the broken weld some of the weld had failed earlier and was rusty.




Synopsis: Upon landing structural failure of nose gear resulted in a ground strike.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: VFR glider traffic squawking VFR [was] not in communication with ATC circling 10 miles south of TOMSN at 17;500 FT. ZDV called to APREQ an APA landing aircraft at 19;000 FT and DEN arrival at 17;000 FT; I approved. Long before these aircraft were on my scope; I noticed the VFR traffic so I called ZDV to give them a friendly 'heads-up'. They said they saw the VFR traffic. A few minutes later Air Carrier X appears on my scope and the VFR traffic has moved closer to where Air Carrier X was also heading. Again; I called ZDV to help resolve the situation. I ask for Air Carrier X at 16;000 FT. They advise that their lowest MVA was 16;400 FT and that they would watch the VFR traffic. Air Carrier X was still 10 miles from the VFR and I would have had time to help prevent and accident. ZDV did not ship the aircraft until they were 2 miles apart. I told the aircraft to descend and maneuver at their discretion to avoid a collision. Air Carrier X responded to a TCAS RA. The aircraft passed within 0 miles and 200 feet. ZDV did nothing to prevent this near-midair even though I tried several times to prevent the problem. Also; gliders should be asked (on charts) to avoid this area. They are often observed at FL180 but action is not taken because 'their transponders may be off by up to 300 feet.'




Synopsis: D01 Controller described a conflict event when arrival traffic was not transferred from ZDV in a timely manner resulting in a conflict with VFR glider traffic.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The CHSLY arrival into CLT has had issues in the past with aircraft descending below required window altitudes. This has started to become a problem once again. With that in mind the area Ops Manager requested 30 days of PDAR's [Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System] data. We parsed out the data that we felt relevant to the problem and then used FALCON with voice to confirm or deny suspected deviations. During the course of this time we found 15 suspected deviations and others that may have been deviations but was too time consuming and would have just been redundant. This issue is unlike previous issues associated with the Airbus as we have had numerous aircraft above FL300 descend through the altitude window. When we looked at the data we only looked at the Airbus believing that was the only problem we removed the other aircraft that fly the arrival. Right now I don't know what to think to do. I do not want to suspend the procedure as that causes more work than actually running the [deviation]. I would like to know if this is somehow related to the logic in the Airbus FMS and if so would like to see someone push Airbus to correct the problem sooner rather than later. The FMS and the issue of dropping windows is a dangerous game that the airlines continue to play while waiting on a fix. We use the dependent windows and crossing restrictions for separation and if reliable and predicable path cannot be guaranteed then we need to make a decision on what procedure to remove; the CHSLY or the LWOOD departures from RDU.




Synopsis: Washington Center Controller reported problems with aircraft on the CHLSY arrival again descending below a required window.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98; Tower MSP
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During climbout we received handoff from Tower to Departure later than normal. We were climbing through 3;500 MSL when instructed to turn and contact Departure Control. I acknowledged the instruction from Tower as the pilot flying called for the climb check to the box. I began the flow associated with the climb check while checking in with Departure Control; and clearing the airspace to the left of the aircraft for the turn. I reached up intending to turn off the landing lights. I missed the landing light switches and turned off the generator switches. As I was selecting the 3rd switch (Gen 2) off; several warnings/cautions illuminated. I realized that I was moving the wrong switches and immediately selected the generator switches back on. The momentary power interruption was enough to cause an inadvertent ADG deployment. I consulted the QRH; and ran the appropriate checklist. We had normal AC power. Both Gen 1 and Gen 2 were online. Since the ADG was deployed we knew we would have to return. I notified ATC; the Flight Attendant; the passengers; Dispatch and Operations. We made a normal landing; and taxied to the gate.I need to take the time to ensure that I have the correct switch before moving it. I shouldn't attempt to accomplish so many tasks at once. I should have waited until I had finished checking in with Departure before beginning the checklist; so that I could give full attention to the task.


Second narrative: No emergency was declared; a normal approach was used. Once asking for the climb check maybe watch or observe the non pilot flying run the checklist.


Synopsis: A CRJ-100/200 Captain; distracted by a late clearance to contact Departure Control; inadvertently turned off the generator switches instead of the landing lights while performing the After Takeoff Checklist.  Although the generators returned to operation their momentary loss triggered the deployment of the Air Driven Generator and the flight returned to their departure airport to have it restored.