Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Local Control-3 (LC-3) when the first CRJ departed on the assigned SID way point of FUTBL. I was scanning the runway for successive departures when I observed the first CRJ turning northbound on the RACD. I immediately gave them a turn to the south to avoid traffic from Runway 26L. Due to the RNAV courses; I had to pull the next departure; a second CRJ off of their course as I was issuing traffic. The third departure; which had already commenced departure roll; was supposed to go on the same track as the first two was going to be a factor if I put the second CRJ back on the correct course so I chose to leave them on a 270 heading instead. As I called Departure to advise him of what was going on and what had happened; he asked me if I had a helicopter in sight. At first I didn't know what he was talking about; since they weren't displayed on my RACD; and then I looked at the 30 NM scope that is in front of Local Control-4 and saw the traffic colored in yellow. I told him I saw him now; but that the traffic I had just switched to him; the first CRJ; didn't have that traffic issued. Once everyone was established on headings that ensured separation; I switched the third Air Carrier to Departure. I then coordinated with the FLM to ensure when my next departure was released since they were a cross-complex departure that required a release with traffic from Runway 26L. In the middle of all of this; I inadvertently forgot to switch the second CRJ; who called me to question a frequency change approximately 10 miles off of the departure end. The event was caused by the pilot of the first CRJ flying the incorrect RNAV departure. When I advised them that they were going the wrong way; they told me they had the MUNSN departure; Collier transition. This was the correct departure; but apparently they had the wrong runway programmed in; as it appeared they were going to MPASS rather than FUTBL. I would recommend that the RACD displays not be shared by multiple positions. By having to watch 10 miles or more east of the airport for arrivals; the departure end is usually only displayed 5 miles. The location of the 30 mile displays is between positions; which are not easy to scan when an emergency develops. If I had my own scope; I could have set it up to see what is pertinent for me; rather than watching the arrivals. This would have made it much more likely that I would have seen the helicopter initially when DR-S called to tell me about him in the middle of the situation. We should not be coordinating through the CIC/FLM for cross-complex departures. If I was able to coordinate with my fellow controllers; I would have been able to take care of it on the line as it was pertinent rather than having to turn around; get the CIC's attention; then wait for a response. I wouldn't have had to clarify with them what they wanted if I was the one doing the coordinating. We need to stress to the airlines the importance of verifying the RNAV way points when they are issued. Rather than just repeating back what we read them; they need to verify that the FMS reads the same fix name; since each departure is runway dependent.




Synopsis: ATL Controller described an even where a departure aircraft strayed from the assigned RNAV route toward other departures. Equipment limitations and local procedures were listed as contributing to this incident.