elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Local West when the City vehicle called and asked for a runway inspection of Runway 15L; I gave the City vehicle permission to proceed onto Runway 15L. I had an arrival to Runway 15R and verified with the pilot that he was indeed lining up for Runway 15R. The pilot verified that he would be landing Runway 15R. I also had tagged the City vehicle on the ASDE-X. I picked up the visual aid to place on the strip podium but the visual aid fell out of its protective sleeve. I started to try to fix the visual aid while someone tried engaging me in a conversation that I tried to stay out of but did answer specific questions. I dropped the visual aid again while trying to fix it. It fell on the table below and then my attention was directed elsewhere at taxing traffic. Looking ahead to the taxing traffic the visual aid that I was trying to repair was now in the wrong position; as I was also looking for tape that might be lying around to fix it. I then again felt just fine scanned the runway and did not notice anything as an aircraft was ready for take off. I think the City vehicle tag had dropped off of the primary target; something that I have heard of it doing before. I then cleared the aircraft for take off. Shortly after the aircraft began take off role the City vehicle called clear of Runway 15L at [Taxiway] WL. After the aircraft had gotten airborne he reported that the vehicle might not have been clear of the runway when he was rolling but didn't sound sure. I verified the City vehicle was clear and proceeded with the operation until I was relived shortly after. I am beside myself and have a hard time believing I allowed myself to get distracted with the visual aid repair and then forget to get a report from the City vehicle that he was off the runway. I should not have tried to fix the visual aid on my own and should have used a different reminder in its place. I am not sure how relevant the brief period of nausea was but it may have caused loss of focus. I wanted all circumstances to be known as to why this mistake happened.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described a ground conflict event when clearing an aircraft for departure without making sure that an airport vehicle on the runway had cleared.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Upon arrival into ZZZ; the lead ramp agent advised me a bag was unloaded that had a lithium ion battery powered motor with the battery still attached from the main cargo bay. Neither myself; or my crew were notified in ZZZ1. From what I understand; these powered luggage cases are only allowed on board if the battery is removed and brought into the cabin. Crews shouldn't be notified of this after the fact. Proper procedures must be in upheld to ensure all passengers with lithium ion battery powered devices remove the batteries and bring them into the cabin. This is a fire hazard; my crew never saw the battery or the bag but were notified after the fact. If in fact it was an illegal battery; the agents in ZZZ1 must be held accountable for not allowing these devices to be gate checked to an un-reachable part of the aircraft during flight.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported being notified on arrival of a HAZMAT violation.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B NYC
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Enroute we saw that Kennedy was running VOR visual to 13L. I was flying pilot. I have limited experience with this procedure and the First Officer (FO) was not New York based so we took our time briefing and we discussed how I was going to fly the approach down to every detail---where I would be configured; when we would lose VNAV guidance; use of vertical guidance on the flight director for additional situational awareness; appropriate descent rate for the runway; attention all users page; effect of the wind on my intercept to final and more. The approach was stable throughout. The aircraft was configured well before 1;000 ft AGL. I was hand flying and as I began the turn to final and the VASI started becoming visible I realized I was slightly low. I made the necessary changes to my descent rate while maintaining a stable approach. Just as I completed my corrections ATC informed us that he had a low altitude alert on us. We acknowledged the transmission and I determined that at this point we were corrected; still stable; and in a position for a normal landing. I continued and landed without incident. In retrospect I am dismayed that we just didn't request the RNAV RNP 13L and I would have had vertical and lateral guidance through the turn to final and lower in the descent. With all our briefing and discussing and fixating on the visual approach I didn't investigate other options. I will not make that mistake again. I also believe that we become so dependent on instrument approach guidance to the detriment of visual flight skills making an approach like this one even more challenging.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight crew of large turbojet reported ATC issued a low altitude alert during a visual approach to 13L at JFK.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were vectored onto final approach for a visual approach to 9R at ATL. We joined the localizer at a lower altitude than the aircraft ahead of us. Well outside the marker; we encountered two noticeable wake turbulence events. The aircraft remained on autopilot for the duration of the sequence of the wake turbulence encounters. After the second wake encounter; the autopilot was disconnected and the aircraft was hand flown for the remainder of the approach. The maximum bank angle was approximately 25 degrees during the sequence of events. We were stabilized and configured well prior to the final approach fix. Cause: ATC vectored us onto the approach below the aircraft that was preceding us. This caused us to encounter wake turbulence that could have led to an aircraft upset and potentially loss of control.




Synopsis: A CRJ200 First Officer reports encountering wake vortices on final approach into ATL.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MDPP.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Encountered a nuisance EPGWS Terrain warning just prior to the FAF on RNAV approach runway 08 while IMC in heavy rain showers at MDPP. Captain Pilot Flying (PF) executed an escape maneuver to MSA and then turned away from the island to get over the water. Re-sequenced another approach and this time fully configured and slowed to final approach speed prior the IAF. Terrain exists inside [and outside] of the FAF that makes this approach susceptible to nuisance warnings. Company note mentions this risk for 767/757 fleet. We learned that the A320 equipment is also susceptible to this. Suggest amending company pages. The approach plate could use the depiction of the terrain in brown that shows the arrival corridor between two small mountains.




Synopsis: Captain experienced an EGPWS terrain warning at 3;000 feet outside KESLO on the RNAV Runway 08 at MDPP and goes around. On the next approach the aircraft is fully configured and slowed by KESLO and no warning is experienced.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON SKBO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Bogota approach cleared us for the VOR-C approach; to land on Runway 31R; due to northerly winds at SKBO. All FMC approaches are for landing Runway 13. The iPad has a VOR-C Jeppesen chart but would have required QRH raw data approach procedures.ATC refused my requests to land south with a tailwind.I made the decision that to fly the VOR-C procedure in IMC was unsafe for the following reasons:-I have never practiced nor flown a raw data approach in almost 5;000hrs of 737 time.-SKBO is a mountainous terrain airport designated as special per 14 CFR 121.445. Flying approach procedures IMC into this airport; that I have never used; is unsafe.-The engine out missed approach for Runway 31L requires the existence of a 'route 2' in the FMC; per jeppesen page 10-7e-2; that cannot be flown legally on non-route 2 equipped aircraft. I am quite sure we have not even taken delivery on any route 2 equipped 737's...........this issue needs to be addressed on our fleet since; apart from this event; the missed app procedure for ALL runways requires a route 2; installed in the FMC; to perform the Single Engine missed approach correctly.-The VOR missed approach to the northeast via ZIP VOR; although at first glance might be ok for Single Engine missed approach; I was not comfortable not having specific 10-7 page guidance indicating a Single Engine missed was safe in that direction from the missed app point that was located a couple of miles east of the airport.I informed ATC that I would only accept the VOR-C procedure if we could maintain VMC from the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) on the approach to landing.We were able to maintain VMC and fly the VOR-C as published to a circle and land on Runway 31L.ATC informed the Aeronautical Civil authorities of our difficulties accepting the approach. We were met and debriefed by 3 representatives of the Aeronautical Civil agency. I explained to them our procedures; my concerns and the FMC database issue.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The crew expressed concerns about the BOG VOR-C 31R/31L approach at SKBO; as it is not in the FMS database and is used infrequently. There were also questions about missed approach performance.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: KZAK.ARTCC, HI
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A KZAK
ATC / advisory: Center KZAK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cruising at 39;000 feet over the ocean at when we got ACARS reports of severe turbulence ahead. We had been airborne six or seven hours at this point. WSI (Weather Services International) and the weather charts we looked at before we flew had a patch of severe turbulence depicted north of our route. The pilot monitoring used all available resources to analyze the situation and decided on a course of action. He called Dispatch via SATCOM; San Francisco Radio via HF; referenced paper weather charts printed before we left; and conferred with me. He plotted text reports onto oceanic chart; and told Flight Attendants to use 'Severe Turbulence procedures'. We got clearance and descended to 28;000 feet; went through a short period of moderate turbulence and then climbed up gradually to 39;000 feet.  No ill effects from turbulence were noted other than increased fuel burn. The timely ACARS messages were crucial in helping us avoid the severe turbulence.  For some reason; the B787 does not have Wi-Fi nor can the Ipad receive a location signal in the B787.  These work fine in the A320 fleet. Having Wi-Fi and thus WSI would have helped tremendously with prior anticipation and situational awareness especially on these long haul flights. Furthermore; it is very difficult and cumbersome to read and interpret textual coordinate messages in all caps while flying; with hands on the controls anticipating severe turbulence. I recommend flight deck Wi-Fi for all fleets.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported the lack of wifi capability on the B787 greatly hinders the crews' access to important information while flying over the ocean.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: ATC cleared us to cross ZIZZI at 16;000 FT. We acknowledged altitude descending through 17;000 FT with altitude alerter aural indication and flashing yellow indication in altitude select box on PFD. I resumed briefing the river visual approach. The aircraft descended through 16;000 FT in VNAV with autopilot engaged. The flying pilot disengaged the autopilot and corrected altitude to 16;000 FT immediately. I notified ATC that we had an autopilot malfunction and that we were correcting altitude.To 'prevent' this type of event; I feel that VNAV operations could be suspended until the software load is updated to prevent the unanticipated occurrence of ALT Select malfunctions as a function of VNAV operations.


Second narrative: The Flight Operations memo regarding VNAV early descents cautions against subsequent altitude restrictions causing such behavior; but no such restriction was in the flight plan. The approach altitude restrictions in place were all 'at or above'.For a few moments as the flight continued; we thought that we might have been affected by the circumstances mentioned in the VNAV memo; but on subsequent review that seems not to apply. The plane simply failed to level off on autopilot as it almost always does successfully; and I happened to be verifying chart information at just the wrong time.


Synopsis: While descending in VNAV to cross ZIZZI at 16;000 FT; the flight crew of an E-145 had to manually return the aircraft to its programmed crossing restriction when the autopilot failed to capture the altitude. A known FMS software flaw; currently under review; may have been a contributing factor.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SAT.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While entering the runway; I confused the TO-1 setting with the flaps 1 setting. I placed the flaps in the 1 position without verify with the Takeoff data; after the before takeoff check list was completed. Once the auto throttles engaged; a master caution sounded 'no takeoff flaps'. The takeoff was rejected. I did not verify a flap change with the takeoff data. Always; Always verify any changes with the takeoff data.




Synopsis: EMB-175 First Officer reports confusing the TO-1 setting [a thrust setting] with the flaps 1 setting. This results in a takeoff warning when autothrust is engaged and the takeoff is rejected.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FRG.Airport, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB-505 / Phenom 300
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground FRG
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At FRG; we were given clearance to taxi to Runway 19 via Bravo. Upon reaching the north end of Bravo were cleared for takeoff on 19 but we made no attempt to turn right towards the runway and continued north on Bravo. ATC noticed we were not beginning a turn and cleared us to continue on Bravo to Mike and back around to Golf Seven and hold short. We were then cleared for takeoff on Runway 19. No traffic was impacted as we did not cross into any uncleared areas or runways thanks to ground controls vigilance. Jepp diagram 10-9 depicts a separation between the end of Runway 19 and taxiway Mike. At the field itself; pavement (unusable) extends from the end of Runway 19 all the way to taxiway Mike giving the illusion of a longer runway when taxing out. It is easy to follow taxiway Bravo onto Mike without realizing the transition of the two; and the taxiway that does connect to the end of Runway 19 isn't clearly labeled. This is a common occurrence at this intersection and is not labeled as a hotspot; although the risk is missing the runway rather than an incursion onto it.




Synopsis: EMB-505 First Officer reported confusion after being cleared to taxi to Runway 19 via B Taxiway at FRG. The crew missed the 90 degree turn at the approach end of 19 and continued onto taxiway M. The displaced threshold is not depicted on the Airport Diagram and caused confusion.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: TBM 700/TBM 850
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On climb out departing ZZZ encountered 2 paragliders.  We did not see them until we were upon them and passed between them; same altitude.Flight was filed IFR but we were climbing out under VFR because conditions were VMC and we cannot communicate directly with ATC below 6000 ft in this area.  Encountered the paragliders just before contacting ATC.  Initially thought they were parachuting; but investigation with ATC showed no other aircraft (jump plane) in the vicinity on radar tapes.  Further investigation revealed a launch area for paragliding south of the encounter.  I have been in communication with the paragliding club and they inform me because they may hold events spanning multiple days they had been advised not to post NOTAMS.




Synopsis: The aircraft passed between two paragliders during climb out. There were no reports and no NOTAMs about their activity nearby spanning multiple days.