Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Pre Taxi
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After pushback; we started the engines and I called for flaps 5 and the After Start Checklist. While observing the flight control synoptic screen; I performed the required flight control check per the FM. I observed that the #11 spoiler indication on the synoptic screen was not going fully up as per the FM; therefore failing the flight control check. Before moving the aircraft; we contacted Maintenance concerning the issue. Maintenance was unsure how to handle the issue and requested that we contact [Maintenance Control]. We were asked to taxi the aircraft to another location to allow for other aircraft to taxi. Once relocated to another allocation with the parking brake set; we once again performed another flight control check resulting in a failure. As allowed per the FM; I referenced the maintenance information page (Flight Controls) to gather further information to relay to [Maintenance Control] for a more detailed explanation of the issue. We were then directed to return to the gate.Once at the gate; Maintenance boarded the aircraft and performed approximately seven flight control checks. One out of the seven checks passed. Maintenance had another mechanic positioned on the ground visually observing the flight control check. With only his eyes; he said over the radio that the spoilers were going fully up. I mentioned that there is no possible way he would know if they were going fully up and that the cockpit indications; both the pilot flight control synoptic display and the maintenance information (Flight Controls) display page both indicated a failure. The Maintenance Supervisor indicated to me that he was going to make a logbook entry showing that the spoilers were operating properly.I made it very clear to the Maintenance Supervisor that that is fine with me; but when I pushback and do the flight control check and the #11 spoiler does not fully deploy; I will return to the gate. He said that was not going to happen and keep telling me that as the outside temperature increased; the spoiler will operate within tolerance.From my past experience with this type of issue; the outside temperature was not going to correct the issue. The #4 and #11 spoilers are the roll control spoilers and are the only spoilers that cannot be deferred. If I was going to rely on the outside temperature to correct the issue; what was I going to do inflight where the outside temperature will be 50 degrees colder? The Company asked if I would be willing to load the passengers; start the engine and perform a flight control check at the gate. I refused because we cannot pushback with both engines running. They then offered the same; but I can shut down one engine for the pushback. That was fine; but I informed them that I would have to do another flight control check after restarting the engine. Then Flight Operations came back with another offer to load up the aircraft; pushback; start the engines and then perform the after start checklist; including the flight control check with a mechanic in the cockpit. Their stated intention was that if the flight control synoptic screen still indicated a flight control failure; the mechanic would then view the maintenance information page (Flight Controls) to observe the #11 spoiler value. If it was within the allowable limits; he would sign off the logbook as such and we would be able to continue. He would then exit the aircraft via the maintenance hatch (with reluctance from the entire flight crew) which later was determined to be a security violation. I then asked if we were to [do] that; would Maintenance then make a logbook entry that the flight control synoptic indications were not correct; therefore requiring a deferral. The Company refused to allow such a logbook entry as that would not allow the aircraft to be flown.I [decided] that the best course of action as the Captain was to go to the Flight Office and have a discussion with the appropriate Flight Management to properly rectify this issue in the interest of the passengers; but more so; in the interest of safety.  I was numerous times asked to do things that were not allowed either per the FOM; FM or FAA regulations. Another example was that when it was determined that the mechanic could not exit via the maintenance hatch; it was suggested that they use portable stairs while still running both engines. I said that was not allowed; nor was it safe to allow someone to do so with the engine running. I also insisted in that if the flight control synoptic page indicated a flight control failure; but the maintenance information page indicated proper movement; that there must be a logbook write-up showing the failure. The Company would not allow the write-up because that would not be deferrable.[Flight Operation Management] then informed me that I was not cooperative and that all available options have been exhausted and informed me that I will be removed from the flight without pay and they would assign another Captain to fly the flight. Furthermore; I would be allowed to pick up an open trip to make up for the flight pay loss and that I would be contacted should Flight Management pursue disciplinary action against me.I then returned to the aircraft to retrieve my person belongings. There in the cockpit I meet the replacement Captain who was originally scheduled to DH [elsewhere]. Once he was informed that I was being replaced because I refused to operate an unairworthy aircraft; he contact the Company and refused the aircraft.I was also informed by the crew that while I was in the flight office for the meeting discussed above; Maintenance came back onboard the aircraft and performed five more flight control checks. Every flight control check failed! Even knowing that the aircraft was not airworthy; Maintenance signed off the aircraft as airworthy.I gathered my personal belongings and then exited the aircraft. I later discovered that after [the replacement] Captain refused the aircraft; Maintenance then decided to bring the aircraft to the hangar to fix the issue. Then; a new departure time was quoted. Soon later; it was discovered that there was a real issue and that the resolution was going to take much longer than originally thought. A replacement aircraft was ferried to operate the flight.In my thirty years at Company; I have never been treated in such a terrible manner as the way the Assistant Chief Pilot treated me; and worse; trying to get me to violate Company and FAA regulations/policies. I asked for assistance in the matter by contacting my representative. After a couple of hours; I received a telephone call from the Assistant Chief Pilot to inform me that they had regrouped and decided that they would restore my lost flight pay and to file a pay claim.


Second narrative: After pushback and engine start; the captain performed the flight control check. The #11 spoiler was observed not showing full deflection on the flight control schematic. The opposite (#4) spoiler did show full deflection as is historically normal. [Maintenance Control] was contacted and they advised a return to the gate for further troubleshooting. We returned to our departure gate.A handful of mechanics were in and out of the cockpit. A handful of customer service personnel were in and out of the cockpit. A handful of flight attendants were also in and out of the cockpit - all over the course of a couple of hours while the mechanics were working the problem. I was not in the cockpit for at least 30% of the time to make room for the mechanics. So admittedly; I did not witness every event that took place.Relatively early in the troubleshooting phase; I observed our Captain and two or three mechanics discussing a maintenance manual which apparently provided specific guidance on the minimum performance of the spoiler in question; #11. The discussion focused on whether or not the spoiler was achieving the minimum deflection according to the maintenance manual during repeated tests. The minimum deflection we were told was 1.36 (units unknown) on a flight control maintenance page that they displayed on the ACARS panel. Of the repeated tests that I saw; at no time did the spoiler reach 1.36. 1.35 was the closest I ever witnessed. For additional context; the opposite spoiler; #4; achieved a level of 1.58 +/- .02 (estimation) each time I saw it deflected fully. Also; each time the flight control check was performed; at no time did the flight control schematic; that we pilots view when performing the check; ever show full deflection. Remember; the failure to show full deflection is what [Maintenance Control] used as justification for having us return to the gate. Then; at some point in the process; Maintenance took the position that the airplane 'was serviceable' which we took to mean airworthy; but we witnessed no change or meaningful improvement in the flight control conditions that necessitated our return to the gate per [Maintenance Control]. (For the record; the #11 spoiler indication on the flight control schematic did show a marginal amount of increased deflection above what we witnessed when we did the original flight control check - but not full deflection.) When we asked the mechanics what new information they were basing their new assessment on; we got no useful answers; only that it was now a serviceable aircraft. About the same time; the Captain who had been visiting the Chief Pilots' office for guidance; apparently was told he was being unreasonable (Captain's words) and was being removed from the trip without pay - this because he was refusing an aircraft that Maintenance declared no longer had any issues; when in reality; nothing had changed physically with the aircraft. At this point; I was rapidly losing confidence in the mechanics and the flight office and the airplane itself. It seemed that Maintenance was signing off an unfixed aircraft without suitable explanation to the flight crew and the flight office was buying into it with its treatment of the Captain. A new Captain was assigned to fly the flight with; as far as I could tell; very little advance notice of anything that had transpired with respect to the mechanical status of the aircraft or the removal of the previous Captain. Upon arriving in the cockpit; he was briefed by the mechanics; the First Officers (including me) and a few flight office representatives of what he was about to take on. He assessed the information and also refused the aircraft. He advised Dispatch of the same. After a short period of time; we were advised that a Maintenance Supervisor was going to come to the cockpit to talk to us. We asked the two flight office representatives to remain in the cockpit so they could hear the conversation. When the Supervisor arrived;he said again that as far as Maintenance was concerned; the aircraft was 'serviceable'. We again explained that the schematic that we pilots look at during the flight control check had not changed (i.e improved) nor had the maintenance page that the mechanics access improved - 1.36 never achieved. At that point; the mechanics powered the hydraulic system and began a series of repeated flight control checks of the spoilers. Everyone in the cockpit observed both indications (flight control schematic and maintenance flight control page) repeatedly failing to achieve full deflection of #11 spoiler or 1.36. We again confirmed that 1.36 was the correct number that needed to be reached and were told yes. At that point; the new Captain advised Maintenance that based on what everybody in the cockpit was witnessing; repeated attempts were unnecessary and that the aircraft was refused due to it being not airworthy. Maintenance left the cockpit with no further discussion.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported pre-taxi flight control check failure. Flight canceled.