elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicat
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we were climbing thru FL250 to cruise altitude FL340 the right engine EGT gauge began to fluctuate. Although never above normal EGT range the fluctuations occasionally ceased with either a normal reading or no reading at all. We then selected the standby engine indicators and the right EGT reading was available and normal. We reviewed all appropriate checklists and other onboard references--MEL; etc.--and advised Dispatch and Maintenance via ACARS. Maintenance responded to 'continue if ALL engine readings were available.' With the standby engine indicator available; they were. Prior to ETOPS airspace; however; the standby right engine EGT indicator also became inoperative. Without EGT available and per ETOPS requirements; we diverted/returned to our departure airport. This aircraft has no fuel dump capability and to burn fuel down to MSLW [Maximum Structural Landing Weight] would have taken 3.5 hours. We contacted the company and; after all checklists were accomplished; decided to land overweight at 320;000 pounds with Flaps 30; ref of 147 and autobrakes set to position three. Landing rate of descent was normal at less than 300 fpm. Due to the overweight landing we declared an emergency with men and equipment standing by.




Synopsis: A B767-300 westbound for Hawaii had to return to its departure airport when both the normal and standby sources of EGT for the right engine failed prior to entering ETOPS airspace.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: S05.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-30 Twin Comanche
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: By NOTAM checked with flight watch the runway at Bandon State was closed at night. This gave me 40 minutes in the morning to leave the airport on a trip to ZZZ. The runway had markers up at the ends and the taxiway was blocked. The engineer walked the runway with me to be sure it was clean; the X markers were removed and I was told by the engineer the runway was open at which point 1 1/2 hours after I arrived I departed for ZZZ. There was later a call that I had departed from a closed runway.




Synopsis: PA30 pilot reported departing an airport after he believed a NOTAM for runway closure was no longer in effect.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Clearance was the GEETK9 RNAV Departure. On takeoff Runway 8R; Tower cleared us for takeoff RNAV HRSHL. After takeoff; while cleaning up the aircraft; we tried to initiate direct HRSHL as directed by Tower in the FMC. We had no flight director showing direct to HRSHL. After several attempts to initiate direct in the FMC; cleaning up the aircraft; IMC; raining; Master Caution for Center Boost Pumps (twice); and Tower querying us; I told Tower we were having navigation issues and ask for a heading to HRSHL. Tower gave us a heading to HRSHL and handed us off to Departure. We found the flight directors switches were off; we contacted Departure and rejoined the departure. I turned the flight directors off during taxi-in to clear the FMA and got distracted. My usual pre-departure 'mental checklist technique'; after the before takeoff checklist is run; includes checking 'flight directors on' among several other items (i.e. minimum takeoff fuel). The one time I did not perform my technique; the flight directors were off.Preventative Measures: Add flight directors to the before takeoff checklist.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight reported taking off unknowingly with flight director switches off.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent; Landing
Airspace: Class A ZID; Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Every evening we have laser events involving [an Air Carrier`s] inbound flights on the RNAV arrival. We must have filed hundreds of these over the past few years. I am not kidding. HUNDREDS! It is extremely unfortunate that nothing seems to be being done about it. It is obvious to us that a local resident does not like the [Air Carrier`s] arrivals flying over their land between [late evening] and midnight local time. They have taken it upon themselves to light up cockpits with a high-powered laser most nights of the week. We get estimates from flight crews on the location of the laser; but understandably; they choose not to look out the window after it happens so we can never actually pin point the location. We do our job by filling out the required time consuming paperwork; calling in the event to the local sheriff department and forward the form to the DEN (Domestic Events Network); but that seems to be the end of it. I believe there must be another government entity that has some advanced capability to pinpoint a laser transmission. It would be awesome if we could get the word out to them that we need them to spend a week in the area between [late evening] and midnight usually on clear weather evenings to help up pinpoint this goofball who is responsible for this unlawful and unsafe act before it actually blinds a flight crew. I also am curious what (if any) resources [the Air carrier] has available to throw at the problem? It involves their flights every night.




Synopsis: ATC Center Supervisor reported arrivals routinely experience laser events but no action has been taken to resolve the problem.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the takeoff roll approximately 100KIAS a windshear warning was received. The takeoff was rejected; reverse thrust was not used and we exited the runway without further incident. We were directed to a hard stand where our local maintenance crew boarded the aircraft and proceeded to complete the required tasks following a high speed abort. After brake cooling;refueling and filing a new flight plan we taxied to runway 29 for takeoff. Winds were reported 240 @ 6K. at approximately 65KIAS another windshear warning was annunciated and the takeoff was discontinued. After consulting with maintenance the decision was made to [defer the windshear warning system]. At the time we were all in agreement the system was unreliable. We returned to runway 29; took off and completed the flight with no further incident. A maintenance supervisor met the flight and I debriefed him in detail. I conveyed to him that the crew had no way of validating the windshear warning system. Since all other airplanes were taking off and landing normally that night; in our best judgement it was safe to takeoff and complete the flight.


Second narrative: Storms enroute caused weather deviations and vectors...for sequencing into destination added time. We ultimately exceeded our flight duty time by 8 minutes.I personally will be more conservative in the future and insert a more substantial personal buffer for both flight time and duty day limitations to alleviate the potential for a future issue. This perspective would adversely effect operations if widely adopted.


Synopsis: A B777 flight crew experienced two sequential incidents of apparently fallacious wind shear alert warnings on takeoff roll for an international flight.  The system was subsequently deferred but the flight; delayed enroute by weather; ultimately exceeded the flight crew's legal duty time.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Aircraft component: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Climbing out of ZZZ through approximately 5;000 ft MSL for 17;000 ft MSL. ATC advised us of traffic at our 12 o'clock; a Cessna at 9;500 MSL; VFR. We responded that we were looking for the traffic. Unable to get the traffic in sight; ATC had us stop the climb at 9;000 ft MSL. We leveled at 9;000 ft MSL with the autopilot on. I told the FO we may get a TCAS RA and to be ready. We kept searching for the traffic but with the haze we did not get the traffic in sight. We then got a TCAS TA; a few seconds later we got a TCAS RA to 'climb; climb'. We disconnected the autopilot and began a climb per the SOP. We advised ATC that we were climbing in response to a RA. She advised the traffic was directly above us. At approx. 9;300 ft MSL the RA switched from climb to 'descend; descend'. We then reduced power and descended to 9;000 ft MSL. As we began the descent; we got visual contact of the traffic that was passing off our right and was no factor. We advised ATC the traffic was in sight. She then climbed us to 17;000 ft MSL. We continued the flight as normal.The restricted visibility due to haze and the inability to get the traffic insight visually. Another factor I believe is the TCAS gave us a RA initially of 'climb; climb' because the other aircraft was not TCAS equipped. When our TCAS saw the other aircraft go from 9;500 to 9;400; it wanted us to climb above him since he was descending into us. With the other traffic only 500 ft above our current altitude of 9;000 ft; we could have asked ATC for a lower altitude or a turn off course. Also; if the other aircraft were TCAS equipped he would have been issued an opposite RA from ours.


Second narrative: Apparently; since the TCAS could not communicate with the GA target; the TCAS initially picked the wrong course of action.


Synopsis: CRJ-200 flight crew reported a traffic conflict that initially resulted in less than optimum guidance from the TCAS system presumably due to the fact the other aircraft was not TCAS equipped.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BTV.Airport, VT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BTV
ATC / advisory: TRACON BTV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was on a base leg to final during a visual approach. As the aircraft was about to capture altitude the GPWS activated calling; 'TOO LOW TERRAIN; PULL UP' I failed to respond. I should have responded by stating 'Pulling Up; Max Power; Spoilers In' and actually doing it. This would have been the safest thing to do and is what is required by our operations manual. My mind set: I was on a visual approach. I had a mountain in sight miles ahead and to the left. My first thought that this is a computer error. I don't know what I was thinking that allowed me to disregard a GPWS warning. I will never make this stupid mistake again!


Second narrative: I elected to use 'Terrain Mode' on my MFD. During our descent we called the airport in sight while being vectored. At this time; in my opinion; we were a little behind the speed and energy management curve for a known terrain airport. As best as I can recall; we were around 3;800 FT MSL; 250 KTS and on a 90 degree 10 mile base leg when we were cleared for the approach. During this descent; as best I remember; we encountered descent rates around 1;500-1;800 FPM.The pilot flying and I both visually verified the terrain ahead of us and concluded that the proper course of action was reducing the vertical speed of the aircraft as [we believed] it was a 'predictive' warning. We elected not to comply with the 'Emergency EGPWS response' due to being able to visually verify the terrain clearance. Upon increasing the power setting and reducing the vertical speed the alert ceased and we continued the approach to a normal stabilized approach and landing. After reviewing the EGPWS procedures outlined in the AOM; I have concluded that we made a mistake in electing to simply reduce the vertical speed and continue with the approach while maintaining visual separation with the terrain.


Synopsis: A CRJ-200 flight crew on visual approach to BTV at dusk received an EGPWS 'TOO LOW TERRAIN; PULL UP' warning but elected; based on visual reference; to merely level out rather than execute the prescribed terrain avoidance maneuver. Both pilots questioned that decision after the fact.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CMH.Airport, OH
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C CMH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I released a flight with 1CH ANTI SKID inoperative. In an apparent lapse of concentration I missed the NOTAM shortening the runways at CMH. The remaining distance made the runway too short to meet regulatory requirements. Neither I nor the Captain caught this error; the crew did contact me in range to CMH and said they were having trouble getting landing numbers. I thought they were having a communication problem and gave them the numbers off the copy stored with the flight paperwork that showed 5;344 FT for the landing distance required. Runway 10R-28L had been reduced to 7;000 FT and 28R to 8;000 FT. It was not until a co-worker pointed out the runway NOTAM to me that I became aware of the error; by that time the aircraft was airborne on the way back. There is no excuse for missing a critical NOTAM like this. I will need to redouble my effort to spend a little more time to make sure that I am truly reading and comprehending the materials I look at not only NOTAMs; but also weather and MELs. I do not believe anything will be gained by additional training as I fully understand the limitations. I do think something would be gained if; when runways are NOTAMed out for long periods of time while under construction; the full length option was removed from the available selections. By doing this we would be adding additional level of redundancy. I also believe that crews should be running a landing prediction before departing so that when they sign a release they have looked at the whole flight and not just the departure. I do not know if the crews' procedures require this but it could also help stop events at a much earlier stage in the chain of failures that make up these events.




Synopsis: CRJ200 Dispatcher learns after the fact that he has dispatched an aircraft with an anti skid MEL to an airport with a shortened runway due to construction. The NOTAM was somehow missed or not correlated with the MEL. The aircraft was able to land and takeoff without issue; even though the runway length did not meet requirements for this MEL.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on a visual approach to Runway 16L. I was the pilot not flying and the Captain was flying. We had been cleared for a visual approach and the Captain set 7;000 FT in the preselect. We were about 10 miles away from the airport. I could see the PAPI indications and knew that we were low. I also saw that he had set 7;000 FT and knew that he would level off at that altitude. Then when the glideslope came in we would configure and continue the descent. We never briefed it; but it's a relatively common way to fly the visual approach. At this point I looked out of my window to scan for traffic on Runway 16R. The aircraft banked to the left as we intercepted the localizer and still looking out the window I noticed that we were getting pretty low to the ground. When I looked back ahead I noticed we were way too low on the PAPI's and a glance at the RA showed about 1;000 FT above the ground. We both caught it simultaneously and the Captain added power and returned to the glideslope.  It turns out; when the aircraft intercepted the localizer the Captain mistook the 'captured' indication on the FCP to mean that it had captured 7;000 FT. He then rolled the altitude preselect to 10;000 FT so he could begin the descent when ready. As a result the aircraft continued the descent. I never caught it either because I was looking out the side window. Root cause was a misinterpretation of the automation that went unnoticed by both the Captain and I until the aircraft reached about 1;000 FT AGL. Contributing to the event was distraction with me looking out the window for traffic. In the future; we both agreed to verify every time the FCP captures something. I also plan on being more focused on the flight profile. Scanning for traffic is fine; but not if it results in a loss of situational awareness.




Synopsis: CRJ200 reports getting very low during a visual approach with the Captain flying due to lack of attention by both pilots.