elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working Radar at the HI ROCK sector; having just shortly before this event experienced another reported event. I pointed-out Aircraft X and Aircraft Y to the CLARK HILL sector climbing reference their Aircraft Z (at FL350). Both climbing aircraft were climbing well and requesting FL410 (and on similar routes before splitting into the Q-Route system). I did not notify the 2 aircraft of similar sounding call signs because the numbers were in no way similar; and they had been on the same 3 ZTL frequencies following each other. I applied merging target procedures between Aircraft Y (the trailing aircraft) and Aircraft Z and told the aircraft it would be 2 minutes for higher. Aircraft Y reported Aircraft Z in sight. Moment's later; I climbed Aircraft X to FL410. The read back was indecipherable and it was clear to me that both pilots had read back the clearance. As soon as their transmissions stopped; I keyed the microphone and said quickly '@ aircraft' read back that clearance; it was only for Aircraft X. Aircraft Y; maintain FL340.' Aircraft Y promptly read back 'Maintaining FL340' and I think apologized. 1 minute later; targets of Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z appeared to merge. A minute after that; I climbed Aircraft Y to FL410.It seems clear enough to me; that Aircraft Y heard '[company name]' and a climb to his requested altitude and assumed the clearance was for him.I took action as quickly as I could to prevent an event. Perhaps something Datacom can help fix.




Synopsis: ZTL Controller reported that two of the same company aircraft had similar sounding call signs and both aircraft responded to a climb clearance.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working a VFR Cessna wanting to photo shoot up and down the San Mateo Bridge at 1;000 AGL which would take him around 3-4 miles outside my airspace and across the SFO 5-6 mile final; I completed a point out with both the Foster and Woodside Sectors working the SFO finals and verbally coordinated the Cessna's intentions as well; gave the Cessna a Bravo clearance and approved his request VFR (At Or Below) AOB 1;000 FT. I failed to make a point out to SFO Tower thinking he would stay outside of 5 mile final. I became aware today that 2 heavy's on final to SFO descended below 2;000 FT in proximity to the Cessna. I was not aware of the type aircraft on the very busy SFO final; nor did the Final Controllers there make me aware of their traffic so I didn't issue traffic calls; was very busy with my sector at the time as well. In hindsight I would have handed the Cessna off to the SFO Final Controllers; barring that I would have made SFO Tower aware of the traffic as well. I believe the SFO Final Controllers should have been restricting their traffic above the operating Cessna and made me aware of conflicting traffic so I could have had the time to issue it and obtain visual with the heavy's.




Synopsis: NCT Controller described a heavy separation event involving SFO arrival aircraft and a photo mission aircraft near the SFO 5 mile final point; the reporter acknowledging the SFO Final Controllers should have handled the aircraft.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MGGT.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower MGGT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Braking action reported 'medium 30.' Max landing weight; rain; 5 knot tail wind; Rwy 20; flaps 30. Received braking action report of medium inside of 1000 AFE; selected max brakes and had landing data [for] the reported conditions. On speed landing; touch down early in the touch down zone; braking action poor at best. Went max manual braking; asked FO to assist on braking 3/4 down runway. Stopped with approximately 150 feet remaining. Should have briefed flaps 40. If I would have landed 10 knots fast or long I am certain we would have not stopped. Reported braking action as 'poor' to tower.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported difficulty stopping on the runway after finding braking action 'poor' rather than 'medium' as reported by Tower at MGGT.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I filed and flew two VFR out and back legs. I planned the flight on my iPad using Garmin Pro Pilot; but filed using [a flight planning website]. I had just landed at my home airport and was putting the aircraft in the hangar when a car drove up and the driver asked if I had a VFR flight plan. I replied in the affirmative; and stated that I had just landed and was about to close it. The driver said that the FSS had called the airport and was looking for me. I immediately closed the flight plan; but I was puzzled as to why this had occurred. Upon arrival back home; I looked at the filing. The online software automatically populates the speeds for aircraft type; while the pilot enters the other data. The software [I] had used the correct airspeed for the first leg; but then used an airspeed 25 KTS faster for the second leg. Because I was using the iPad enroute; I didn't catch the discrepancy. I am going to be much more cautious about automatic online filing; and review each item more closely. It is my fault that this occurred. The FSS was right to check on me; and I'm grateful they did.

Callback: The reporter stated that he flies at about 95 KTS to conserve fuel but the standard PA28 Garmin default speed is over 110 KTS. He has used this iPad APP many times previously and his preprogrammed 95 KTS has been retained. He does not know of a reset function which would permit the APP to transition from his manually entered speed to the default speed.



Synopsis: A VFR PA-28 pilot was advised after a cross country that Flight Service was looking for him because he was overdue. Upon investigating; the pilot determined that the return leg speed the iPad software calculated; and he then filed for; was higher than normal speed for his aircraft type.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MEM.Tower, TN
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: Tower MEM
Second aircraft: RV-8
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working LC1 position in the Tower. The event took place at LC2 position. The surface wind displayed on the CTRD [Certified Tower Radar Display] was showing out of tolerance for CRDA [Converging Runway Display Aid] operations to Runways 18L and [Runway] 27 according to MEM Order 7110.68 'use of CRDA during VFR conditions.' The supervisor; decided to advertise CRDA on the ATIS anyway. Aircraft X was now inbound to RWY 27 with V traffic inbound to RWY 18L. The LC2 Controller told the Supervisor [LC2] was going to break out the arrival to RWY 27 on initial contact; planning to turn Aircraft X south heading 180. The wind was 110 at 11 kts. The Supervisor told [LC2] directly to clear the aircraft to land anyway and said he would take all responsibility for the situation. The LC2 controller complied with the Supervisor's directions and cleared the aircraft to land. In addition; the Supervisor was instructing LC2 to adjust the speeds of aircraft on final to RWY 18L and RWY 27 within the final approach fix - which is not allowed according to the 7110.65w section 5-7-1. Wind of 110 at 11 kts gives the aircraft to RWY 27 a tailwind and then the aircraft to RWY 18L a headwind. These conditions make it unsafe for CRDA operations. After this instance; another arrival was allowed to land RWY 27 in CRDA operations with RWY 18L when the wind was 130 at 10 kts. This aircrafts call sign was Aircraft Y. Again; speeds were adjusted within the final approach fix and the CRDA operation occurred when wind was out of tolerance. MEM Tower should not allow CRDA operations; as per the MEM Order 7110.68; to occur when wind is out of tolerance. RWY 27 should be released to ground control during times when the wind is out of tolerance for CRDA operations.




Synopsis: Memphis Tower Controller reported the incorrect usage of Converging Runway Display Aid procedures.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had Flight Service call for a clearance request off of Sun River (S21); a non-towered field. Due to IFR traffic departing in the area; I issued a hold for release clearance. The FSS employee replied that she did not give hold for release clearances because she was uncomfortable with them. This is not the first time I've had Flight Service balk at issuing one of these. While in this specific instance it did not add an undue burden to my workload; I can easy picture situations where it would. Hold for release clearances are given because of anticipated conflict and because the Controller assumes that they don't have time to issue the clearance later. If workload is high enough for those considerations to come into play and a decision was made to issue a hold for release; Flight Service forcing the Controller to issue it later; and the plane to wait; is unsafe and poor practice. Moreover; it's ridiculous for an employee to pick and choose which clearances they'll accept from ATC. Flight Service's job is not to interpret the validity of what is issued to them. It's just plain lazy. This isn't the only Flight Service employee to refuse a hold for release clearance; it appears that this is a systemic problem. Training on how hold for releases work and how they are issued should be improved for Flight Service.




Synopsis: ZSE Controller voiced concern regarding Flight Service refusal to issue a 'Hold for Release' clearance to an aircraft departing a non-towered airport.
Date: 201512
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: FDC NOTAM for SFO amends an altitude on an RNAV STAR:FDC 5/0051 SFO STAR SAN FRANCISCO INTL; SAN FRANCISCO; CA. DYAMDTWO ARRIVAL (RNAV) CHANGE ALTITUDE RESTRICTION AT ARCHI TO READ:8000. ALL OTHER DATA REMAINS AS PUBLISHED.Having a critical crossing altitude on a heavily used arrival procedure amended via NOTAM with no other ATC notification; while legal; is inadvisable. This is evidenced by reported violations of the NOTAMed altitude in a recently released [aviation organization] Safety Briefing.Until proper charts can be published with the correct altitude; it would be advisable to either rescind the NOTAM or include information about the amended altitude restriction on the ATIS of airports affected by this change.




Synopsis: A pilot reported he was concerned with an SFO arrival crossing restriction appearing in NOTAM form but not yet charted.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were handed a cargo load report that listed 50 standard and 7 heavy bags; all in the forward cargo compartment. As the ramp agent handed me the cargo load report; I asked him if all bags were below the fire suppression line. He replied; 'yes.' When we arrived; the First Officer noted during his post flight inspection that the bags were well above the fire suppression line.




Synopsis: Captain reported ramp loaders placing cargo and bags above the height for proper fire suppression in the cargo hold.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Interphone System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Evacuated; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Staffing; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Our jet was parked in remote parking. APU air was working for approximately five minutes but then quit. We requested the air start cart for a #1 engine start. During the #1 engine start ground personnel started yelling through the interphone that we were moving. With no lights in the area; we could not detect any aircraft movement; but we shut down the #1 engine when we saw smoke coming from in front of the right wing and #2 engine. CFR was notified and we shut down and left the aircraft through the air stairs.During the event; the ground person was very difficult to hear. Later; in Operations; one of the ramp personnel commented that the headset had been giving them trouble in the past.




Synopsis: A ground crew headset; previously noted as 'giving them trouble' may have contributed to a breakdown in communication between the flight and ground crews when an engine start at a remote location at night ran amok due to uncommanded movement of the aircraft.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff roll the left main tire failed; resulting in the airplane partially departing the left side of the runway and coming to a stop with the left main wheel and the nose wheel off the runway. There was no structural damage to the airplane and no propeller strike. Therefore this was not an accident or even an incident by FAA requirements and therefore does not require communications to the NTSB. A temporary wheel was put on the airplane and the airplane was towed off the runway. After replacement of the wheel; tire and inner-tube the aircraft was returned to service.I had noticed that the taxi was a little 'bumpy' the last 200-300 FT approaching the runway. I thought that this was just a rough surface; but in hindsight it was probably an indication of the problem. I was in a hurry to get to my destination to meet family; the weather was excellent and I had never [has] a mechanical problem; all of which led to a belief that nothing could be wrong.What I might do to prevent this in the future:1. Enhance the preflight inspection. I checked the wheels; like I always do; but maybe it was not sufficient.2. Listen to my feelings better; the last 200-300 FT felt bumpy; but I thought it was a rough surface; I should have stopped and checked.3. Constantly consider potential issues and ask questions of myself - 'does this seem right?'4. Work with my mechanic to understand 'normal' replacement cycles for tires and be more consistent in doing so - even if the tire doesn't show excessive wear from the outside. Apply this procedure to other systems and mechanical parts on the airplane.




Synopsis: A BE36 exited the runway when the left main tire failed during the takeoff roll.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The concrete in BWI Gate #XX safety zone in the vicinity of the #2 engine 'Stay Clear' zone is still breaking up badly. There is loose gravel and chunks of concrete in and around the #2 engine 'Stay Clear' zone. This situation was reported in a company report several weeks ago; but the situation is just as bad; or worse; than it was when the situation was first reported. The area that is breaking up appears to be long rectangular area that runs from the front of the safety zone to the rear of the safety zone. This rectangular area appears to be an area which was cut out and then patched with concrete. The concrete in this rectangular area continues to break up allowing Foreign Object Debris (FOD) to accumulate in the safety zone. Also; other FOD is accumulating in the holes left in the concrete. If a proper FOD walkdown was being done before each aircraft arrival; how could this situation go unnoticed?Our Station Manager needs to have situational awareness of the material condition of the flight line; specifically the aircraft safety zones. If concrete is breaking up leaving gravel FOD and concrete FOD in the safety zone; it is something that should not go unnoticed for hours; days; weeks; and months.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Captain expressed his dismay that his initial report; several weeks previously; of broken ramp concrete FOD in the stay clear zone of the right engine at a company gate at BWI failed to elicit a satisfactory response and repair.