Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OFP.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G OFP
ATC / advisory: UNICOM OFP
Aircraft component: Fuel Distribution System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Having very recently completed my CFI renewal; BFR and Light-Sport Aircraft checkout at an FBO; this was to be my first solo PIC flight in about a decade. Because of the all these circumstances; not to mention a 35-year career related to aviation accidents; I was being very deliberate and careful in everything I did. The aircraft was the same Tecnam P92 I had flown for my BFR the week before (and much enjoyed). I had noted that the aircraft had a slightly complex fuel system for a simple high-wing aircraft; featuring both engine-driven and electric fuel boost pumps and an independent fuel shutoff valve for each wing tank located on its respective windshield pillar. The valves; small 'batwing' types under an inch in length; are by the checklist OFF at engine stop and (obviously) ON for flight ops. Additionally; the engine back-feeds its surplus fuel to the right tank only; which obviously introduces fuel management issues when both tanks are full; and when they aren't. I had noted to friends that this seemed a bit complex for an LSA-class pilot and aircraft; but obviously (I thought to myself); not for ME. On preflight I noted by visual check that the left tank was full and the right; brim-full. While I knew that any excess returned to the right tank when full would simply spill out the overflow tube; I started to think about 'managing' that environmental issue. So after startup; I positioned the valves to draw off the right tank only during taxi and run-up. Because I had noted that there were no fuel-tank items on the checklist once BOTH ON was selected pre-start; I would have to remember to recheck/reconfigure the fuel before takeoff. After 52 years in aviation; I thought I could remember to do this -- and I did; just before taking the runway. And with that mentally checked off; I rechecked the other 'killers' (flaps and trim; engine gauges) as I lined up. It was a gorgeous day; and I unleashed the eager Rotax; with just me aboard and a ten-knot headwind; the Eaglet leapt off the ground in a few hundred feet. At somewhere between 100 and 200 FT; the engine stuttered and quit cold. After a fraction of a second of disbelief; having never had a complete power failure before; let alone on takeoff; I dumped the nose and landed uneventfully well before the first turnoff. As I rolled out I wondered; 'Why??' There was no mixture control or carb heat on this engine and the aux fuel pump was on; and I knew I had checked and reset the fuel selectors. I looked at each windshield pillar and noted with satisfaction they were both similarly positioned. Then to my astonishment I processed what I was seeing; they were both OFF! I turned them back on; turned the key and the Rotax was running again before I even cleared the runway. No one on the airport seemed to have noticed. The airplane was fine and I needed some positive reinforcement so I spent 45 minutes in the pattern. It was obvious WHAT had happened; but it took about two hours after the flight for me to suddenly realize HOW. As I ran back through my thought processes at run-up; I realized that because all my thinking about the fuel situation was focused on the right tank; when the time came to reconfigure; I moved the RIGHT (wrong!) fuel selector; which of course had been ON to burn some excess fuel while the left was OFF. I turned the right tank OFF because my brain had become fixated on changing the right tank; rather than on 'both tanks ON.' While I'm hardly surprised that I could make a mistake; I was -- and am -- astonished that I could make THIS one. I fully understood the P92 fuel system and its selectors. While it IS a bit complex for a simple aircraft; and in some respects the system designed helped me make this mistake; I've logged substantial flight time in Barons; Cessna 421's; and many others with more complex fuel systems than this one; and never had a single self-induced fuel-system surprise; ever. Nor was I rushed or over-confident on this occasion. I wish I could remember whether I physically LOOKED at the fuel valves as I took the runway; or whether I just mentally checked off 'good to go' for that system. I hope and believe it was the latter; I can not imagine actually 'seeing' both valves horizontal wouldn't have rung my bells. My take-away from the affair is not a new one for me or for any airman; but it is look AND think; or think AND look; about each checklist item; especially the potential killers. Never assume that what you already did was the correct thing. This was a memorable way to reinforce THAT lesson.




Synopsis: An experienced pilot; operating a light-sport aircraft; experienced fuel exhaustion on takeoff after miss-positioning the fuel tank feed/shutoff valves.