elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AWO.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: sky clear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E AWO
ATC / advisory: CTAF AWO
Second aircraft: PA-31 Navajo/Chieftan/Mojave/T1040
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was with a student pilot providing instruction. We decided to go shoot some stop and go's at Arlington Municipal (AWO). At 3;000 ft and 10 miles south; we tuned the weather on the field and noted the winds were favoring 34. We confirmed this by dialing up the CTAF and listening to other traffic in the pattern. We entered the airport environment at 3;000 and 5 miles and made a radio call stating our intentions to land Rwy 34 while reporting our position in miles from the airport and altitude. Abeam the airport and to the west by about 4 miles we had reached TPA of 1200 feet. Making another radio call and stating our intentions to make a 45 degree entry to the downwind for RWY 34. Not soon after we heard a call from a Piper Chieftan reporting that they were over island crossing (a common reporting point for the airport) and were entering a 45 to the downwind for RWY 34. Then a particularly excited call came from another Cessna in the area saying that he also was over island crossing and did not have the Chieftan in sight. The Chieftan then proceeded to announce that he wasn't actually over island crossing; but was actually over the casino. The problem here is the Chieftan pilot did not once state his position in relation to the airport or altitude and there just so happens to be two large Casinos in the area. I assumed the Chieftan pilot was over the casino located southwest of the field (behind us) when in fact he was North of the field. This is where I should have queried the Chieftan pilot to specify his position in direction and distance from the airport. My student and I reported island crossing and entered the 45 to the downwind for RWY 34 number 2 to land and my student sights the Chieftan to our 9 o'clock and I take the controls and alter course to my right as does the Chieftan driver. Passing to our left and behind us at about 200 feet and same altitude. I learned how important good radio calls are and let it be a lesson for my student. In the future I will be more pro-active and question others to give more precise position reports.




Synopsis: C152 instructor pilot entering the traffic pattern experiences a NMAC with a PA31 also entering the traffic pattern after having made an inaccurate position report.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was flying VFR in VMC conditions with a safety pilot in the right seat. I was flying at 3;000ft under an overlying Class Bravo airspace shelf at 5;000ft. In my mind I had intended to stay at 3;000ft for the relatively short flight but had never verbalized it to the safety pilot. The safety pilot prompted me to start a climb to a higher altitude. I went ahead and initiated the unplanned climb in a now overlying 6;000ft Class Bravo shelf and started a turn to the South/Southwest at the safety pilot's suggestion as well. Shortly thereafter; I identified a lower Class Bravo shelf of 3;600 ft between us and our direction of flight. I initiated an immediate descent and began a 180 degree turn to remain within the overlying 6;000ft Class Bravo shelf. As soon as I initiated the descent I heard a very loud bang come from the engine. I had never heard anything like the loud bang before. I identified an uncontrolled airport to the west of my position and what I thought was within potential gliding distance. I stopped my initial turn and continued my descent heading towards the uncontrolled airport. As I descended; the engine made continuous banging noises; but the noises were quieter than the initial loud bang. I was concerned the engine was going to quit functioning and continued my descent to the uncontrolled airport where I made a precautionary landing. The uncontrolled airport was underneath the 3;600ft Class Bravo shelf. In the future it will be important to assure I discuss plans; routes; altitudes; etc. with the safety pilot before the flight as well as requesting VFR flight following near Bravo airspace.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: C172 pilot and safety pilot reported diverting to a nearby alternate airport when the engine began to backfire.
Date: 201910
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The flight had diverted to ZZZZ due to weather in ZZZZ1. After aircraft arrived in ZZZZ; Dispatcher planned and released aircraft for return flight to ZZZZ1 with a gate release fuel of 13;800 pounds. The Captain sent an ACARS message to Dispatch requesting a flight plan for the return leg to ZZZZ1. Dispatcher responded to the message and advised the Captain the flight plan and release were completed with a planned fuel load of 13.8. Dispatch was informed by ZZZZZ Operations that the fuel load on board the aircraft was 16;000 pounds. Additionally; the Captain reported 16.0 as the fuel load via ACARS to Dispatch. ZZZZ Operations informed dispatch that the Captain requested a fuel load of 16.0. This fuel load placed the aircraft approximately 2;000 pounds over takeoff weight based on landing. Dispatch informed ZZZZ Operations the aircraft was overweight and that it could not be released with that fuel load. Dispatch finally spoke with the Captain and verified the fuel on board requested by the Captain was 16;000 lbs. Dispatch informed the Captain of the overweight condition. The Captain told dispatch he planned to burn additional fuel enroute to ZZZZ to be below MAX Landing Weight. Dispatch informed Captain he needed to notify Dispatch before adding fuel placing the aircraft out of weight limits. Dispatch adjusted planned altitude; route; and fuel burn to place the aircraft within limits.Captain did not inform/consult with Dispatcher regarding the amount of fuel he requested be loaded onto aircraft. Additionally; fuel was loaded onto aircraft without operations personnel verifying the increased fuel load with Dispatch.Captain must contact Dispatcher to prevent an unknown overweight or out of CG aircraft from departing. Additionally; station personnel must verify any change in fuel with Dispatch prior to fuel being loaded onto the aircraft.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported the Captain failed to notify Dispatch of extra fuel requested and caused the aircraft to depart overweight.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZID.ARTCC, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Mentor/Turbo Mentor (T-34)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: Center ZID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working two sectors combined with a lot of popcorn style weather popping up all over. There was a very high volume of IFR traffic with many VFR aircraft both talking to Center and not. Many aircraft were deviating and asking for deviations and I had many traffic calls to make. Multiple times before the incident took place; I had to use merging target procedures to make sure that VFR targets did not merge with each other at the same altitude. At the time the incident took place; I was specifically focused on 2 VFR aircraft merging at the same altitude. While this was going on; Aircraft X flew into an area where the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) was 6;400 feet at 6;000 feet. When I noticed this; I issued a low altitude alert and climbed it to 7;000 feet. To prevent this event from happening again; I have to be much more aware of aircraft flying southbound in hazard below 7;000 feet. Be more aware of my limitations as a controller and request a tracker when the traffic is very high and complex. Dwell lock all southbound aircraft below 7;000 feet traveling southbound in hazard.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported during a high workload period they failed to notice an aircraft fly into an area below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot/Static Ice System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute ZZZ-ZZZ1 on the red-eye at FL 33;000 ft. into the flight we had an ANTI ICE STBY PITOT ECAM. QRH was used. later we were at FL 35;000 ft. and Autopilot 1 disconnected; I attempted to reengage #1 or #2 autopilots and neither would engage. The FMAs went blank on both the F/O and my PFDs. Autothrust disengaged and went into Thrust LK. Thrust levers were matched with power setting and IDP switches used. We had our route displayed in the ND on both sides and MCDUs were operating normally. ECAM displayed:AUTO FLT AP OFF (RED)AUTO FLT A/THR OFF (AMBER)L/G SHOCK ABSORBER FAULT (AMBER)Indications looked similar to an FMGC Dual Failure except we had both NDs displaying our route; our MCDUs did not go into a subsystem page and no FMGC (Timeout) was observed. The Shock Absorber Fault ECAM had me thinking this may be a different malfunction that I have never witnessed or a coincidence. We contacted Dispatch/Maintenance via phone patch using the 'CALL ME' function on ACARS. Maintenance was perplexed of what was causing our malfunction. They had us reset the Auto Flight C/B's B1 (MCDU 1) B2 (FMG 1) and hold. C/B's were reset with no change. We attempted the Long Reset in the QRH Dual FMGC Failure with no success. Mintenance had no other options available.ATC was advised of our equipment malfunction and our inability to remain in ZZZ airspace. We were cleared down to FL 27;000 ft.. Review of our fuel; weather and capabilities with my F/O. Dispatcher we agreed to continue to ZZZ1 with the caution that if we had additional malfunctions; we would consider ZZZ2 as a divert airport. ATC was given our new suffix with the inability to operate in RVSM airspace.Purser was informed of our status.Prior to touchdown at FL 27;000 ft. both FMAs began to populate. Autopilots and Autothrust became available. All malfunctions except for the STBY Pitot cleared. We reengaged the Auto flight functions and remained at FL 27;000 ft. We landed on Runway XX at ZZZ1. Malfunctions were recorded on in the ELB; including a information writeup of what happened. Technician met the plane and we explained what happened.




Synopsis: Captain reported failure of aircraft display systems; causing aircraft to descend out of RVSM airspace.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Recently Denver has added a series of RNAV STARs that seem to be taxing the FMC's capability on 737NG aircraft. What is new to these approaches is that they have numerous step-down and speed restrictions. These I assume are [intended] to improve aircraft flow by better coordinating aircraft separation and reducing separation distance by eliminating some of the variables in altitude and speed that were possible in the less restrictive RNAV approaches previously used. My experience on three separate recent occasions is that 737NG aircraft are too often unable to meet the restrictions by relying on the FMC. On one approach VNAV PATH dropped into PITCH/CWS three times; on another the aircraft leveled at an arbitrary altitude that was neither on the MCP or CDU and; most recently; VNAV PATH failed to make most altitudes and made none of the speed restriction. The CDU didn't display Drag Required; nor did the FMC drop into CWS; or display any [directed] control of the aircraft['s vertical path] although I should note that ATC started us down late on that last arrival. My First Officer and I had a long conversation over these and other arrivals we have had into Denver and agree that; on these approaches; crews will need to inform ATC that we [are able to] meet altitude restrictions or speed restrictions; but not both. [Flight crews can utilize the 'classic'] three miles per thousand feet crutch to monitor autoflight performance; of course; but isn't that meant to be a backup to automation? With these new Denver approaches three per thousand is going to have to be the primary descent path methodology and; with many more step-downs and speed restrictions; won't this further task the flight crews instead of easing their workload? Do we really want pilots in level change spinning down the altitude window five or six times and reloading speeds on the descent page every few minutes on an approach that should be flown in VNAV PATH?




Synopsis: A B737NG Captain advised of several recent failures of the aircraft's autoflight system to comply with altitude and airspeed restrictions on the newly implemented Optimized Profile Descent RNAV STARs at DEN.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival of [the flight]; inside an AKE was found [with] unsecured dangerous goods and human remain barrel that was on an angle when found.




Synopsis: Airline Safety Officer reported Hazmat loading errors at destination during unloading of cargo.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: After landing in ZZZZ airport personnel took our temperatures with an ear thermometer.  He did not replace the tip with a new one nor did he clean it after each person.  This is unhealthy and unsanitary.  Use only a forehead thermometer.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that a person checked their temperature after landing with an ear thermometer and did not replace the tip between checks.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Manuals; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On [one] evening; TRACON had to exit the control room to take shelter due to an [emergency situation]. Nobody seemed to know exactly how to handle the situation. TRACON departure called me to give me their airspace. Other departures called other sectors airspace. Then management said nobody really had the airspace and that the TRACON was ATC Zero. So we weren't allowed to provide IFR services in the TRACON's airspace. I have yet to receive contingency training for such situations as required in the 3120.4. My understanding is that [ARTCC Sector] should have taken the entire TRACON's airspace but nobody on either side really seemed to know what to do. Just seems like something we should train for and be prepared for annually.I would recommend that management actually put effort in areas that matter such as emergency training rather than worrying about water bottles in the area. We have annual mandatory meetings on ski country; weather and things like that but it would be nice to have annual contingency training as well.




Synopsis: D01 TRACON had to evacuate their facility and declared 'ATC Zero' due to an emergency situation. There are procedures in place in which the ARTCC takes over the airspace of the TRACON. The ARTCC personnel did not know how to implement the procedure for this situation.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a 7 hour delay before a scheduled 7.5 hour flying and planned 14 to 16 hour duty day (14.51 actual); I called Crew Scheduling because I was fatigued and did not feel safe to fly. Crew Scheduling said flight attendants can not call in 'fatigued' and it was a Flight Service matter. When I called Flight Service to request a no pay/no credit removal because I was fatigued and unsafe to fly; Flight Service informed me I had to fly or face disciplinary action and be given a missed assignment. I suffer from periodic insomnia and knew very well what my mental state was and management did not care.  Instead I was forced to fly under threat of harassment from the company. This action put the safety of my fellow crew and the passengers at risk. I was up at XA:00 to report to work at XD:55. Due to two mechanicals; three aircraft substitutions and subsequent cockpit crew illegality; we were on duty 7 hours before the duty day even started. Allow flight attendants to call out fatigued as the cockpit is allowed to without penalty. The safety of all was put at risk.




Synopsis: A Flight Attendant laments not being able to get off a delayed trip due to fatigue without penalty as the pilots can.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft came to a stop; the chime went off. I disarmed 1L then I made the PA. [I] disarmed 1R; agent knocked. I armed 1L; I called FA number 2 and FA number 3 to verify their door status. I proceeded to open the 1L door. Agent was opening the 1L at the same time. The door proceeded to full swing when the slide dropped out of the door. The slide did not deploy but it was on the floor in between the aircraft entry and jetbridge. Only I and the agent were involved.I was tired from my 10.5 hour layover. My 3 day trip had 3 different aircraft throughout the sequences. I opened the 1L door under the impression that it was my responsibility to open the door.I would suggest that the aircraft doors be opened by the agents. I would suggest that we re-implement the First Officer make the PA upon arrival 'flight attendants prepare for arrival and cross check.'




Synopsis: B757-200 Flight Attendant reported deviating from SOP door procedures at gate arrival due to fatigue.