elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Bonanza 33
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My Developmental departed an IFR BE33 with an IFR M20P on a 2 mile final. The low ceiling prevented us from visually observing the M20P. The M20P did not have the field in sight and executed a missed approach. The BE33 and M20P ended up two miles apart laterally and 300 FT vertically. I was well aware of the low ceiling and the unusually high altitude of the inbound M20P. I should not of have permitted my Developmental to depart the BE33 in this situation; especially without having the M20P in sight to provide visual separation. Proper application of the visual separation rules would have prevented this situation from happening. Making my Developmental more aware of the situation and likelihood of the succeeding aircraft to execute a missed approach may have prevented him from departing the BE33.




Synopsis: Tower Controller providing OJT described a loss of separation between an IFR arrival and an IFR departure when the final traffic executed a missed approach due to weather.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Inbound flight showing Logbook [item] # 3 on ACARS (Mid lavatory light inoperative for Mid lav).  We were expecting a simple re-lamp job.  What we found was the light lens bonded in place. After removing the lense; we pulled out the light assembly to find no wiring in place.  At this point; we started searching for the wires. We had to disassemble the overhead [ceiling] of the Lavatory module to find the wires hanging between the Galley module and the [inner] fuselage.  When I grabbed the wires to move them; I found them to be 'Hot' (Power on).  We killed [electrical] power to the plane and fished the wires through the conduit and        re-assembled the lights reference Wiring Diagram Manual (WDM) 33-26-21.  After reapplying [electrical] power; we checked lights and found lights to be operationally good.  We then reassembled aircraft and sent  the B757-200 aircraft on it's way. Not ETOPS.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports finding a Mid lavatory (lav) light lens bonded in place and no electrical wiring attached. Further trouble shooting located the 'Hot' (power on); electrical wires hanging between the Galley module and the inner fuselage.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation I/SP (C501)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was not night current. Filed flight plan with arrival [planned] during daylight. Headwinds over 100 kts; multiple approaches delayed landing causing landing at night. [After] arrival [I was] assigned visual approach. On downwind approach flaps at 180 kts then lowered at 150 kts nose landing gear failed to lock; based [on] no nose green light indication. Recycled gear 3-4 times; flew by Tower for a visual. Tower thought the gear was down. Flew the pattern again; performed the emergency gear blow down procedure; and asked Tower for another visual. I then advised passengers to have seats belts fastened and that the nose gear may fail upon landing and once plane stopped exit the plane safely as soon as possible. Followed the POH procedures.




Synopsis: CE501SP pilot reported the nose gear failed to extend on approach.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We were in the middle of a six day ERAM run. The Cirrus was VFR DCT..CGT..ARR at 10;500 FT; slow descent to 3;500 FT. I put the aircraft in hard at VFR/035 so the flight plan would pass to SBN APCH and I could do an automated hand off. I initiated the hand off and called to coordinate the slow descent with approach. By the time I got off the phone the data block disappeared and all that was left was a limited data block with the BLOCK 'I' and a discreet code. I called SBN Approach back and asked if they had removed strips. They said no. I called over the ERAM SME. He investigated the situation and said that someone had removed strips on the Cirrus flight plan. I was still talking to the Cirrus; so I didn't even have a record of his call sign and no indication that he was still on my frequency.  When I typed a request for a full route and got an error message FLID not stored. Luckily he was grayed out in ESDT< SO I quickly selected to keep the line in the ESDT. The old NAS didn't allow FLIGHT PLAN data to get passed back to the Center's computer. Apparently; ERAM does. So controllers need to be taught not to remove strips on aircraft they are not responsible for. If this had been an IFR aircraft the results may have been disastrous.




Synopsis: ZAU Controller described an unsafe situation due to the functionality of ERAM which is unlike prior equipment; the reporter emphasized that controllers must not 'remove strips' for aircraft under their control.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: Tower MCO
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X on final to Runway 18L because Runway 18R was closed. I told him there would be a departure prior to his arrival and to start slowing. Aircraft Y (departure) Line Up And Wait (LUAW) 18L for traffic exiting the runway. I also informed him his company was on final and to be ready for an immediate departure. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff in a timely manner and spacing with the arrival looked adequate. Aircraft X called his own go around prior to the runway threshold. The departure was more than 6;000 feet down the runway and rotating when the aircraft on final called the go around. The departure was airborne prior to the arrival (now a 'Go Around') crossing the threshold.Being that it was a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR); somebody further up looked at it and said the departure was approximately 7;800 feet down the runway and 'not airborne' when the aircraft (that was going around) crossed the runway threshold. I did not send the aircraft on final around because; had he landed; it would be legal (more than 6;000 and airborne). I did not ask the pilot for the reason of the go around; nor did he state why. Things that would have helped; the departure would have been airborne sooner had he rolled quicker. I told him to be ready for an immediate but when I cleared him; he was slow to roll. Not like an aircraft ready for immediate departure. Likewise; I told the arrival to slow. He stated he was already slowed (180kts); but later slowed more (150kts). Neither of these matter in my opinion; because it was a legal operation. I am only filing this because somebody behind a desk; who did not witness the operation; said the departure wasn't airborne.It was a legal operation but; if I had to recommend something it would be; all the arrival aircraft be established on final; be slowed and with appropriate spacing for 'Hitting Gaps' prior to being switched to the tower on a five mile final.




Synopsis: MCO Tower Controller reports of a loss of separation due to a departing aircraft not being airborne when an arrival was over the threshold. Controller thinks the action was legal; but complained that someone who sits behind a desk made the determination that it was not legal.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I sat in the Observers Seat behind the Captain on left side of the aircraft for taxi; T/O; and climb to cruise for this flight. All was normal for these phases. I was assigned to be Relief First Officer on the return flight. I spent most of this flight in rest. Again I occupied the Observers Seat for the descent; approach; and landing. I arrived in the cockpit approximately 15 minutes before the descent. All appeared to normal. During the Approach Briefing there was concern expressed to a couple of facts. One; Runway XX was in use due to the weather had changed and blowing sand was now happening reducing visibility; and Two; concern to stay out of [Foreign] Airspace 15 [nm] to the east. The current visibility was such to where the airport could be and was acquired visually. The blowing dust was not as bad as reported. I saw the airport at 7 DME from the end of the runway. As did the Pilot Monitoring; and the Pilot Observer in the center seat. All appeared to be normal until about a 3 mile final. I ask the Observer in the center seat; does it look like he (The Captain; Pilot Flying) is lined up with the Runway? No. We agreed. I immediately said 'Captain you need to turn right and line up with the runway.' To my dismay he said; 'I can't see the runway.' I immediately told the Pilot Monitoring take the airplane and turn right to the runway and land. 1.5 mile final. Both the other Observer and myself said loudly go-around. The Captain then corrected the airplane saying 'I have it; I have it; I have it' and successfully landed the airplane. Then taxied to the parking stand without further ado.




Synopsis: B767 Relief Pilot reported flying pilot set up for landing to incorrect runway.  The crew corrected the issue and landed uneventfully.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
ATC / advisory: FSS ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Engineer / Second Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After the landing the Captain did a post flight walk around inspection of the aircraft. It was at this time that he found a fuel leak in the #2 engine nacelle. A call was made to company who in turn dispatched mechanics to evaluate the situation. The aircraft was determined [not to be airworthy].


Second narrative: After shutdown the Captain did a post flight walk around and discovered a fuel leak on number two nacelle. We notified Company. They sent mechanics. We flew [back to base] on a passenger aircraft.


Synopsis: DC-6 flight crew reports discovering a fuel leak on the number 2 nacelle after landing at a remote airport. The aircraft is grounded until Maintenance can be summoned for repairs.
Date: 201709
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When taxiing to the gate; right as we were making the turn toward the gate it looked as if a fire truck was waiting for the aircraft inbound to the gate next to us. We thought the fire truck looked too close so proceeded with caution. As we started to angle to the gate the guideman gave us a stop signal. I thought great they are going to move the truck. But no; a wing walker ran over by the truck and gave the OK and it did appear that the truck and all its wheels were outside the red line; but it looked very close. I asked my first officer to please keep a close look at it out the right side as we approached. The guideman directed me to proceed and shortly after that; my first officer said 'Stop; the wing walker is signaling to stop.' I applied the brakes and came to a stop even though I was still being given directions to proceed. Then the guideman did give the stop signal once he noticed we had stopped and the wing walker was asking for a stop. FO said; 'wow did that come close.' The truck backed up then drove off and we proceeded to the gate. We ran the after landing checklist; said good bye to passengers and then went to ops. We had a 2.5 hour sit so the FO said he was going to take a quick nap in the break room. I was in ops and heard someone looking for the crew. I asked if they were looking for the inbound or outbound. It was us they were looking for because there had been contact with the scimitar. This was the first we had heard of it.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported making contact with a fire truck while being guided into the gate. Damage was not immediately evident; however the wingtip scimitar was found to be damaged.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower BWI
Aircraft component: Nosewheel Steering
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: After pushback from gate in BWI; the ground crew removed the steering bypass pin.  They did not verify the bypass handle had returned to the normal steering position.  Pushback was stopped early because tug began to slide on the ramp.  We disconnected within 10 feet of the normal engine start position.  After engine start as I attempted to taxi due to a very slippery ramp condition we immediately began to slide without nose wheel steering.  I stopped the aircraft and reported poor to nil braking on the ramp thinking the slide was caused by outside conditions.  We advised ATC we were holding our position.  Maintenance came out to the aircraft and after plugging in reported that the bypass lever had inadvertently been stuck in the bypass position after the pin was removed.  The aircraft had been on the ground for four to five hours in freezing precipitation.  We had deiced at the gate but I am unsure if remaining frozen contamination caused the lever to not spring back to the normal position.  We advised ATC that we had found a stuck bypass lever and were now ready to taxi.  Ramps and taxiways were poor as [Air Carrier] had an Aircraft X slide off Taxiway F across from the Midfield Freight area.




Synopsis: After pushback ground crew failed to complete proper steps to reengage nose wheel steering. Air carrier flight crew noticed immediately upon taxi out they had no control over aircraft steering.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Selector
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was operating a Cessna 172 at 2000 ft. AGL when the engine failed without warning. It was determined that a return to the airport could not be attempted; and spring time meant soft fields; so an approach to a near-by blacktop roadway was conducted. The road was surveyed for power lines and traffic on the down-wind and a turn was made into the wind to finish the approach. Upon completion of the landing roll it was noticed that the fuel selector valve was positioned to the OFF position. When positioned to BOTH the aircraft was able to be re-started and returned to the airport without further issues.I used Foreflight checklist for preflight inspection; which was conducted step by step. On Foreflight the 'Before Starting Engine' checklist and the 'Before Takeoff' checklist contain the step that instructs the PIC to check the position of the fuel selector valve; but not the 'Pre-flight' checklist. Since I had flown 300 plus hours in the area; I decided to put my Ipad in my flight bag after the pre-flight inspection and use the Cessna checklists for the remainder of the startup. The Cessna 'Before Start' checklist and 'Before Takeoff' checklist do not have steps that include the fuel selector valve.  Due to not flying for two months I decided that I should stay local and therefore; decided I didn't need my Ipad strapped to my knee. Had I done that; as I usually would have; the emergency checklist would have been readily available and the fuel selector valve would have been caught on the descent and the engine may have been able to be re-started.




Synopsis: A pilot reported their engine quit so they landed safely on a road where they discovered the fuel selector valve was in the off position. They departed the road and returned to their airport.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ASE.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ASE
ATC / advisory: Tower ASE
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to ASE; the LOC/DME-E was briefed with the Roaring Fork Visual Approach as well for a final approach into ASE. The approach was 12;300 feet at FIMSO inbound and transitioned in visual conditions to clear all terrain with the visual procedure. A terrain and pull up warning occurred with full view and adequate terrain clearance. Appropriate and immediate corrections to flight path were made in VFR conditions with a continued approach to satisfactory landing.




Synopsis: Light Transport aircraft Captain reported a CFIT event during visual approach to ASE requiring evasive action.