Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Nigh Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) were present: Unrestricted visibilities; scattered clouds 6;000; winds of less than 3 knots. Air Traffic control was handed off to approach at about 50 miles from the airport. The plane was assigned an altitude of 27;000 ft. The controller asked what type of approach was being requested. A radio reply was made to the approach controller; requesting radar vectors for the ILS XY approach. Then the controller cleared the plane to descend to altitudes of 13;500; then to 8;600 ;and then cleared for the ILS runway XY approach. 'Are you able to get down?' asked ATCAn affirmative reply was made by the First Officer and implied agreement with the captain. The captain began a descent but soon realized how high the plane was for the segment. The Captain asked for the gear extension speed and noted that the speed placard was difficult to read due to low lighting. The first officer affirmed a gear extension speed of 270 knots. Airplane speed was set to 270 knots and the captain commanded 'Gear Down'; followed by flaps 01. The plane was slowed and commanded to flaps 05. Flight course intercepted the runway final at about 12 miles. The APP mode was armed and the localizer course captured. The G/S glideslope was armed and descent continued. ATC handed the flight to tower who cleared the plane to land. But the flight was about 5 miles out and at 7;500 feet and descending. At about 3 miles the decision was made to abandon the approach; request a visual and make a 360 left turn to lose altitude. The controller approved the maneuver. The plane's altitude was about 6;500.The plane was about 3 miles from the airport when the circle was started. The turn radius would end between 3-5 miles from the runway. A quick calculation was made and selected by the Pilot monitoring (PM) for a safe 7;500 foot altitude on the Mode Control Panel (MCP). This decision was shared with the captain and a climb was started.Automated Flight was used since leaving; and continued during the approach. But starting the turn; the captain disconnected the autopilot and hand-flew the plane. The Captain established the turn and called to re-engage the automation; commanding 'Autopilot Left Command'. The PM followed the commend and engaged the left autopilot.A left turn was made of 360 degrees; the airport was in sight; and the plane was established on the runway course. But the altitude was still about 7;000 feet at about 3 to 4 miles from the runway while turning to final course. The first officer set the MCP altitude to 5;100 feet. Auto flight modes were Heading Select (HDG SEL); the pitch mode was VNAV.Continuing the approach found the altitude still high at 3 to 4 miles from the runway XY ILS. The captain disconnected the autopilot and hand-flew the approach. The captain again called for the approach mode to be engaged; but it was already engaged. The approach continued with a descent rate of 2;700 foot per minute.The relief pilot spoke up and said; 'We're high'. This was followed quickly by PM saying; 'consider going around'. The captain replied; 'I've got it.' At about 2 miles the IRO and PM repeated their concerns. and the captain again stated; 'I've got it'.Four white Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights were observed by PM from 3 miles out and continuing during the approach. This indicates a high descent profile. The target PAPI profile is 2 red and 2 white; or 3 white and 1 red. The target descent rate is 1;000 feet per minute (fpm) below 1;000 above the ground (AGL) The Warning System activated with SINK RATE; SINK RATE. PM responded with 'Visual'. The captain continued the approach. The Warning System again activated with SINK RATE; SINK RATE. PM responded with 'Visual'. The captain again continued the approach.  PM called-out SINK 2;700. The captain continued the approach. Again PM called-out SINK 2;700. The captain continued the approach. The plane was a estimated about a mile from the runway threshold. Airplane Warning Systems activated with PULL UP; PULL UP; and both Navigational Displays (ND) became red in color. Crossing the threshold and continuing the descent; the automated altitude call-out engaged all-outs were heard quickly with heights of 100; 50; 40; 30; 20; 10. Then the plane continued to about 2;000 - 3;000 feet past the runway threshold and touched down firmly. Speed brakes deployed automatically and autobrakes engaged at the set level of AUTOBRAKES 3. The captain engaged full thrust reverse and stopping began.PM called-out 'Consider (auto) brakes 4'. No change to braking was made by the captain. Stopping appeared to be effective for the remaining runway and the plane did stop and made the turnoff at Alpha intersection. Alpha taxiway is the normal exit point. Taxing continued to the ramp uneventfully. PM selected the brakes synoptic during taxi. Temperatures of Level-2 were noted. The captain called for 'Flaps Up; After Landing checklist'. These commands were followed. And the checklist accomplished. Arriving at the parking area and shutting down completed the flight.A post-flight inspection was made by the two mechanics.This approach and landing experience left the crew shaken. The three non-pilots expressed fear. The airplane's Warning alarms of SINK RATE and PULL UP were heard by the nonpilotcrews. Another non-pilot talking with PM confided their stopping concern; prayerfully uttering; 'Please stop; please stop' in reference to the plane's braking capacity.PM completed shutdown tasks with the captain and then left for a cabin seat. IRO joined PM in the cabin area but no conversation was held at that time. PM had concerns about the approach and lack of following the company required stabilized approach criteria or then making a go-around/missed approach. Captain joined PM and sat next to each other in the cabin. This was within fifteen minutes of parking. Captain asked PM; 'Did you make a report?'; implying a company notification. PM replied 'No; but we need to tell the company'. This was detailed; stating that the plane's Warning systems had activated and the flight data records would show a high approach descent rate. The captain seemed to accept this need for a report to company.At this time the two mechanics returned to the plane cabin from an exterior inspection. They reported that the plane had damage on the left wing flap canoe area and the canoe was partially detached from the wing assembly. Mechanic stated the airplane mechanical condition was now Airplane on the Ground (AOG). The mechanic stated that this was a hard landing.The Flight Crew were suspicious that the landing was considered as Hard-landing. PM and IRO believed that there was a firm touchdown; but not sure it would qualify as a Hard landing. A Hard landing condition is measured by airplane monitoring quality control systems. A Hard landing condition requires specific maintenance inspections prior to returning to flight.Captain noted the mechanic's verbal report. He seemed to agree with PM comment about needing to notify the company. Captain left the cabin seat; went to theflighdeck to get the plane cell phone; and proceeded to talk with the company and then with the chief pilot.The mechanics contacted their maintenance control staff and were directed to transmit the automated quality control data. This required a complete electrical shutdown of the airplane for ten minutes. The task was accomplished by the mechanics.First Officers elected to leave the plane and get 'a cup of coffee' at the foodservice area. Captain elected to rest during the mechanical inspection. About 4 hours later the plane was determined to be available to fly; with additional Deferred Maintenance Items (DMI).Company procedures for an approach are stated in the General Operating Manual under Arrivals and Approaches.A stabilized approach is one of the key features of a safe approach and landing. A stabilized approach is characterized by a constant-angle; constant-rate of descent approach profile ending near the touch down point; where the landing maneuver begins. All appropriate briefings and checklists are accomplished before 1;000' height above touchdown (HAT).  The aircraft is stabilized by 1;000' HATAn approach is stabilized when all of the following criteria are maintained from 1;000 feet HAT to landing in the touchdown zone:If at anytime the aircraft is not stabilized per the above criteria; the Pilot Flying executes a missed approach or go-around.It is the opinion of PM that the second approach that followed the circle from 3 miles was not stabilized; per company procedure. Call-outs and suggestions expressing this concern were made to the captain during the second approach. The concerns were also expressed by the International Relief Officer (IRO). A go around/missed approach would have been a safer outcome; in PM's opinion.




Synopsis: B747 First Officer described a descent for approach that culminates in a missed approach due to the aircraft being too high and fast to continue; from about 1;600 feet AGL. The decision is made to circle to land visually and again the aircraft is high and fast; but the unstabilized approach is continued to landing with both First Officers suggesting another go-around.