elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Control System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During climbout on the ZZZZZ departure; we received an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Computer) message: F/CTL SLAT SYS 1 FAULT. I was Pilot Flying; so I continued flying the departure and handled the radio while the Captain handled the QRH procedure. The message happened after the gear and flaps were up and the AFTER TAKEOFF checklist was completed; and we were climbing through 6000-8000 ft MSL. All instrument and flight deck indications showed that the flaps and slats were up. After the Captain referenced the QRH checklist; he called Dispatch on the COMM2 radio and patched through with Maintenance. I continued the departure and climb and leveled off at FL250. After discussion with Maintenance; the Captain and I both agreed that the best course of action was to return to ZZZ. We [advised] with ATC; began our descent; and requested an extended final to Runway XXC. During the descent; per the checklist; we slowed down and extended our slats/flaps; since the ECAM message could mean that our flaps/slats were jammed; During extension; the flaps and slats were slow to extend; and we had an ECAM status message that said something like 'SLATS SLOW'; but they still extended to the correct setting. We chose to land with flaps in our normal landing configuration of CONF 3; and didn't attempt to go to Full Flaps. Landing on Runway XXC AT ZZZ was uneventful; and we continued to taxi to parking at Gate XXX. System 1 fault led to slow/degraded flaps and slats.




Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported aircraft encountered Flight Control anomalies inflight.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback from gate and after engine start and released for taxi-out by ground crew I started the taxi-out. As I approached the outer roadway a pickup truck rapidly approaching did not stop for the aircraft or the road STOP SIGN; but rather sped-up trying to outrun the aircraft. I promptly stopped the aircraft. The pick up truck; I guess realizing that a collision was imminent if the driver continued; abruptly stopped and approximately 20 FT from the aircraft. Then backed up on the roadway to the STOP sign area. Not yielding to the aircraft. Driving in an unsafe manner. Promote safe driving techniques. Reinforce the rule that ground vehicles yield to aircraft; that aircraft always have the right of way.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reports a ground conflict with a pickup truck that fails to yield as the aircraft is taxied out for departure.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The flight was a full flight. According to the policy seats XX 2/3 are supposed to be blocked due to the COVID 19 pandemic. I realize that the company has to make a profit but not at the expense and of its passengers and employees. I felt that the aircraft did not conform to social distancing policy and guidelines per the CDC guidelines and company policy.I ask the gate agents to block these seats and they stated the flight was oversold and the aircraft would go out full. At this point I contacted our inflight support group and expressed my concerns. They advise write this safety report.Comply with the CDC guidelines.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported gate agent issued seats that according to company policy were not supposed to be used.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: SVFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Beech 1900
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our local Medevac Helicopter operator called requesting a SVFR inbound. He sounded like it was urgent and we had just had a Medevac return to the field with a cancelled mission; we assumed it might have been associated. Local advised the Medevac that the field was IFR with the ceilings at 800 FT. We had numerous IFR inbounds so we were looking for a hole. I called our TRACON and asked them to slow the inbounds for the SVFR inbound. The reply was; 'I can't; I have a bunch of inbounds'. I restated that it was for a Medevac or I wouldn't be calling; no success. Local and I then observed a possible hole that would be big enough prior to an inbound. The preceding IFR arrival was short final with landing assured and Local cleared the SVFR into our airspace and advised him to maintain max forward airspeed. We had 10 SM below the 800 FT ceiling and knew we would have aircraft in sight very shortly. The Medevac made it to about a 1 mile final when the IFR arrival penetrated our Class D 5 NM northwest of the field. At this point the Medevac was obviously landing assured. We never lost 3 miles and 1;000 FT; but as I understand it we aren't supposed to have them in the airspace at the same time unless we have both in sight. I agreed with and supported Local's decision to expedite the Medevac Helicopter to the airport. As soon as he was down an ambulance sped away from the helicopter. We had a long string of inbounds so the Medevac would have had to wait for at least 20 minutes if we hadn't hit that hole. Medevac's and Lifeguard aircraft are supposed to have priority. I would think that if our TRACON can't slow an aircraft; they should break it off the approach so that we can legally get an SVFR into the field.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described a possible procedural violation when a Medevac Helicopter was cleared to the airport when IFR traffic was on approach.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A passenger entered the cockpit to sit in the copilot seat and turned off all electrical power in the aircraft by hitting the overhead electrical panel with his head. The EFIS for both pilots went off; the autopilot went off; and the engine instruments went off. I then had to wait for everything to go through their startup diagnostics and do the autopilot test. I had to fly raw data NORDO for several minutes with just a battery powered standby 2 in attitude gyro. The Controller apparently never noticed. I don't really know if I had an altitude deviation as too much was happening at once but I don't think I did.#1 They could use a simple guard to recess the switches; a piece of clear plastic with slots cut in it so the tip of the switch is flush with the surface.#2 Garmin radios will delay shutdown a few seconds and ask if you really want to shut down - it would be nice if the electrical system did that.#3 I am a Pilatus instructor [and] we see and hear of this all the time. It's something that is lived with but is a characteristic of what I call high tech 'airbussy' type planes. I am rated in many turbine airplanes and looks can be deceiving; the Pilatus is the most complicated I fly. On the surface it is simple to operate but is [actually] very complex and sometimes has penalties for that. A large portion of owners are lower time owner pilots and don't grasp all the automation issues.




Synopsis: A PC12 Captain reported losing all EFIS data for several minutes after a passenger accidentally turned off power to the system.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was with a student providing training. Our flight was planned to complete a VFR cross-country from [the Los Angeles area] to [San Diego area] via the shoreline. Restricted Areas R-2503 A & D were hot so we contacted SoCal Approach for VFR flight following above the restricted area along the shoreline. SoCal gave us a squawk code and cleared us direct to Mission Bay VOR (MZB). We requested to follow the shoreline to remain within gliding distance to shore and our request was approved.Approximately 10 miles south of OCN VOR we were given a traffic alert; 11 to 12 o'clock; above us and heading towards us; both myself and my student had the traffic in sight. As we are looking at the traffic ahead and to the left; directly ahead and slightly below is a high-wing aircraft in a right banking turn. I took over controls and initiated an immediate climb and right turn to avoid the oncoming traffic.I estimate that the aircraft was about 150 feet in front of us (horizontally) and about 50 feet below; but it is very difficult to judge. After regaining straight and level flight I contacted SoCal and advised that there was also an aircraft directly below us to which the controller responded 'roger'.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reported that while transiting over restricted airspace with flight following aircrew experienced a near miss event.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZOB.ARTCC, OH
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Cleveland Center Area 1 had been designated the Lansing Approach airspace due to an ATC Zero event at the Approach Control. We owned all the airspace except the Class D airspace around the VFR tower. Our sector had accepted a Point Out from the JXN Sector on an aircraft landing GRR. Apparently GRR Approach Control has a Letter of Agreement with LAN Approach that they have control for descent on GRR landing aircraft. Because we at Cleveland Center are unaware of those Approach Control to Approach Control agreements we were not expecting the aircraft to start its descent. It caused an unsafe situation because we were releasing aircraft off of LAN airport Westbound underneath the GRR Arrival. A better check list attached to the LOA or contingency plan to cover all phone calls and coordination necessary before accepting the airspace.


Second narrative: Cleveland Center Area 1 was designated the Lansing Approach Control airspace due to an ATC Zero event at the LAN Approach Control. Area 1 has not owned; nor controlled aircraft in that airspace; for more than 15 years. Controllers in Area 1 are not comfortable; nor have they been trained; for approaches to the airports associated with that airspace. More training is necessary to get everyone up to speed. Having a specialist from Lansing Approach give briefings and some training would be optimal.


Synopsis: ZOB Controller described a confused situation when required to take over Lansing TRACON airspace due to an ATC Zero event; the reporter claiming additional training is needed for these types of occurrences.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PIT.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground PIT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Deice in PIT is unsafeDeice in PIT done by [the FBO] on the general aviation deice pad near taxiways N and N5. Deice for other[s]; that I could see; was done by another vendor on either deice pad E or C.The short story is that the deice pad we are expected to use is just big enough to park [our aircraft] only if the pad was clear and unobstructed. When we arrived; the pad was unplowed; with no markings available. Lighting is poor. There were two deice trucks; one facing east and one west; with what appeared to be perhaps 125% of our wingspan between them. It's difficult to judge distance at night in the snow on a poorly lit ramp with lights facing us - but it was WAY too close. There is no specified aircraft operation zone. Were the vehicles in that zone? Who knows? Add that braking values on the ATIS were 3/3/3; and the ramp appears to slope slightly downward to the north.We did get the east-facing truck to back up so we could get parked; to do this I had to make a 120 degree turn (roughly from N5 into the ramp; I was able to widen out a bit) on this snow-covered; unplowed (and therefore unmarked) ramp. There are NO WINGWALKERS provided here - it's all on your own with only the driver and sprayer in the truck on duty as far as we could see. With a corporate jet; the building; and then a fence all within less than a wingspan this is simply unacceptable.To leave this deice pad; I had to add power to get through the unplowed snow. Notice that there was a building less than 150 feet behind me; and possibly the corporate jet there too although I think we got turned enough to not endanger them.While the folks in the deice truck were very professional; we did have to prompt them for the fluid type; etc. On the initial call to let us know they were done they only told us that the deice and anti-ice steps started 'x' minutes ago.We got it done. I'm only moderately sure in hindsight that it was safe enough. I can't be sure that when we got deiced we were completely off the taxiways. I am certain that if this setup continues someone will hit something. Why we don't use the vendor that *others* use is beyond me.




Synopsis: Captain reported that the deicing location had several safety hazards; including no wing-walkers; poor lighting and unplowed snow on the surface.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Landing roll out phase; aircraft nose gear was not extended. The main gear are fixed (not retractable). Subject aircraft is a canard with engine in rear. Aircraft skidded to a stop with wear to skid plate only (aircraft designed to resist damage from these types of landings). No other damage to aircraft/engine/prop and no injury to sole occupant (pilot). The skid to a stop was controlled; and once stopped; gear was extended electrically; and aircraft was taxied to hangar without further delay.Pilot unsure as to why nose gear was not extended; but the switch was found in the retracted position upon inspection after stopping on the runway. Pilot believes high workload may be a contributing factor to the incident. Prior aircraft departure was a 737; and tower reported possible wake turbulence. Parallel runway was closed due to an unrelated accident (runway overrun); and this caused a full pattern that disrupted checklist flow as subject aircraft was maneuvering during the straight in approach to accommodate request from tower for slower traffic turning base and #1 to land ahead of subject aircraft.Subject aircraft does not have a warning horn for gear if misconfigured; although a gear position light is located at the switch (out of peripheral view area).




Synopsis: Experimental aircraft pilot reported landing with the nose gear retracted.
Date: 201405
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During replacement the rod ends are removed from the [Elevator] Servo-control and sent to Inspection for a [special] procedure; via our Remove and Replace (R/R) Parts Tag. The rod ends are returned with the 'Inspection Only' block stamped. The Job Instruction Card (JIC) has provision for re-installation of the rod end if passed inspection; or installation of Serviceable rod end if failed [inspection]. The installation procedure has you ensure all parts removed and retained are in Serviceable condition. There is no information available to Maintenance staff that can ensure Serviceability is met. This would be the job of a Home Shop [where Component Maintenance Manuals (CMM) are available]. The [JIC] Card cautions that no deviations are allowed due to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-19-04 requirements. We are being pressured to ignore the cautions and instructions [of the Job Cards] by the supervisors; as they feel they are clear and concise. Engineering was contacted months ago and we still have concerns with this maintenance procedure. [Recommend] eliminate all Serviceability instructions for the Mechanic's determinations. Create a Home Shop for the rod ends. Have the Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) Inspector stamp the R/R Tag in the made 'Serviceable' block rather than the 'Specified Repairs' completed block.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports Technicians are being pressured by their Maintenance supervisors to ignore the 'Cautions and 'Instruction' requirements in their Job Cards for Serviceability of all parts removed and retained during Elevator Servo-control Unit replacements on A320 aircraft. Lack of adequate information to ensure Serviceability and strict requirements of Airworthiness Directive AD 2011-19-04 for Elevator Servo-control rod ends were also raised.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: STP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Learjet 60
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While being vectored for a visual approach to the airport; ATC vectored us into a position where a single engine Cessna was 500 ft. above us as well as another unidentified aircraft 300 ft. below us. I did receive an RA and complied with it.




Synopsis: A LR-60 Captain reported ATC vectored them to the final approach course and within 300 ft. of an unidentified aircraft.