elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [We had] planned RNAV30 approach into Oakland because notams said long term outage of ILS30. Upon reaching NORCAL approach control; they told us to expect ILS30 which we accepted and began setting up approach in ILS radio head and FMS according to our iPad jepp data. In our printout of FPR and weather/notams was included an ILS30 approach plate dated 26 September. This was not effective for two more days so we both questioned why it was even included in our paper work; and had no indication that it would be a valid approach so we did not reference it. ILS was identified via morse code. Approach controller tried to clear us direct to MYFUT and intercept the localizer. On our approach plates; this point was not present so we queried approach and he gave us vectors at that time to intercept localizer course. At least two other flights questioned this same clearance from the controller. At this point we were too high to commence the approach so we did a go around to re-enter the pattern. We got vectors to final for ILS30 approach and landed. Because of the confusion of the event; several phone calls transpired between my Captain and the duty officer to get a note placed for future crews traveling to Oakland so they wouldn't be involved in a similar confusing situation. Multiple airlines are having this issue even as I type this the next day. Apparently; the communication on this approach change has not made it down to the end user.




Synopsis: An A300-600 was cleared for an ILS 30L approach at OAK for which their company provided approach plate was not yet valid and for which their nav data base had no data.  Cooperative assistance from ATC ultimately provided the tools to fly the approach.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: 9V9.Airport, SD
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Other unknown
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The airport rotating beacon was lighted up but not rotating; there is no NOTAM for the airport to this effect.  Approximately five days earlier on a flight to 9V9 [Chamberlain Municipal Airport] the airport beacon was not working at all.  I notified ATC Center via comm radio and the Controller explained that their Supervisor would call the airport Manager about issuing a NOTAM.  There is still no NOTAM or operational rotating beacon for the field.




Synopsis: Pilot reported the airport rotating beacon is out of service at 9V9 airport and there is no NOTAM.
Date: 201507
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was very surprised to find that all three flight attendants (FA) assigned to work the Boeing 737-700 from were conducting their first flight. The three new flight attendants were incredibly personable and did their best to operate the trip as they were trained; but as all of us can attest when we are new to a position; there is a big difference between learning something in training and putting it to practice in the real world. I do not know what the training footprint or scheduling rules are for FAs; but I was incredibly surprised to learn this was even legal. Yes; the FAs are trained for safety events; but would three brand new FAs be able to manage the cabin well? I would greatly appreciate more insight into the FA training footprint; what their level of OE is before being signed off; and would love to see a no all-low-time crew restriction. Even having just one experienced flight attendant; even one with just 100 hours or so; would have been extremely helpful for providing much better service and ensuring the highest level of safety. Additionally; I would suggest that if those procedures are not going to be changed; then at a minimum an all-new-FA crew should be assigned to a longer flight; not one with barely a 1hr flying time.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports that all three flight attendants assigned to work his flight were on their first flight out of training. FAR 121.434 (operating experience; operating cycles; and consolidation of knowledge and skills) only lists a 'consolidation of knowledge and skills' requirement; after completion of initial operating experience; for PIC and SIC; none for Flight Attendants.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: SFO ATIS reported cig 1800 BKN; Few 1200. Cleared for the ILS 28L; on 10 mile final with bridge and airport in sight. Given the ATC instruction to maintain 220 or better to the 7 mile final; we were at 240. Pairing traffic to 28R visually acquired by both pilots and communicated this to ATC who then told us to maintain visual separation. Both pilots recognized excessive closure rate to E170 and Pilot Flying started to pair airspeed towards 220 by disengaging Autothrottle and using manual thrust (idle). Around this point (@9miles) ATC instructed 'slow to 180 knots to San Mateo Bridge'. Approaching San Mateo Bridge; we entered IMC (BKN layer) with E175 @ 500 above; offset to 28R FAC (Final Approach Course); and slightly in trail. Pilot Monitoring advised ATC that we were IMC and lost sight of pairing traffic. ATC responded with 'maintain visual separation'; to which Pilot Monitoring advised we were unable due to IMC. ATC instructed 'Go Around; maintain RUNWAY HEADING' (emphasis mine). By this point; we were VMC with field in sight again (@1400ft) but E175 was in the layer above. Pilot Flying disengaged autopilot and began a methodical go-around conscientious of the presence of the E175 above and slightly in trail and that winds at altitude were @220/25kts. With this in mind; Pilot Flying instructed a slight offset upwind of RH to Pilot Monitoring to enter into HDG window and @275 was entered with Pilot Flying executing a reduced rate climb back into the IMC. ATC nearly simultaneously instructed a left turn towards a downwind and remainder of FM GA/MAPP was executed.




Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported entering IMC conditions and losing visual separation with landing aircraft on parallel runway while on an ILS approach. Go-around and missed approach conducted.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On approach to 9R in Atlanta we flew through a large roll change due to wake turbulence from an aircraft ahead; aircraft went into Control Wheel Steering and disengaged LNAV mode. Loss of LNAV mode was not noticed until late turn onto 9R Localizer. Deviation corrected by Crew and ATC gave us a new heading to intercept the 9R Localizer. Remainder of the approach and landing was normal.




Synopsis: B737-700 First Officer reported a track deviation following a wake turbulence encounter on approach to ATL.
Date: 202011
Location: P50.TRACON, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E P50
ATC / advisory: TRACON P50
Reporter function: Captain; Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other ATP
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Staffing; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: Please listen to the Phoenix [P50] TRACON sectors during peak periods. The Controller could not work all of the traffic. The COVID-19 cutback by ATC is dangerous during peak use hours. The controllers are magnificent but need help/more controllers.  One Controller is working an area twice to 3 times the reasonable area. Please let them get back to work like it was before the COVID slowdown.I have been actively flying for XX+ years. Please don't blow this off. The environment is dangerous.




Synopsis: Pilot reported the P50 TRACON controllers appear to be working unreasonably large areas and expressed concern over COVID-19 related cutbacks in ATC staffing.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We had flown to MSY from ZZZ earlier and knew of various unstable build ups earlier and had conducted a quick turn back to ZZZ from MSY. As a crew we were cautious and on guard for possible turbulence. The FA's were aware of the possibility of light turbulence and according to previous aircraft and ATC there had been nothing worse than occasional light chop so the seatbelt sign was turned off and there were no returns in the immediate area on the aircraft radar. Approximately 40 NM from LGC VOR we started to get continuous light chop and the seat belt sign was turned on. When we were approximately 25 to 30 NM from LGC to the South we encountered Moderate turbulence and the PF (Captain/Me) guarded the controls and then Severe turbulence was encountered with the Autopilot becoming disengaged and the aircraft banked hard left and started to descend at approximately 700-800 FPM and speed decreased. I applied Climb thrust and was able to regain control of the aircraft smoothly but the turbulence persisted for 45 seconds to 1 minute at Moderate. After aircraft was under control I directed the FO to check on the FA's and Passengers. The report was that things flew around the cabin and I transferred control of the aircraft; made an announcement to the passengers and received more information from the rear FA that she had hit her head and I checked to make sure she didn't need immediate medical attention or anyone else. The aircraft was handling normally and all systems were checked. It was discussed and as a crew to include dispatch we decided to continue to ZZZ with no severe injuries and no indication of aircraft damage.I did not use AIRINC but utilized ACARS. In hindsight I would have utilized AIRINC to ensure Dispatch; Maintenance and the crew were on the same page. I do not believe without being risk adverse that we as a crew could have done anything different or taken a different route.




Synopsis: Aircraft encountered moderate and severe turbulence at FL370. Pilot regained control and stabilized aircraft. One injury reported by Flight Attendant.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During boarding; I noticed a passenger step on to the plane with a mask around his neck. I said hello and he said hello back. When he turned right to head down the aisle; he stopped almost as soon as he stepped on to the carpet. I stepped forward from the galley to see why he had stopped. I saw him turn his head completely to the left so that his face was now facing mine; with approximately 18' between us. He sneezed directly in my face; making no attempt to cover his mouth; pull up his mask or turn towards the row 1 window. I immediately stepped back; grabbed a C-fold and blotted my face. I politely asked him to cover his mouth and/or wear his mask if he needs to sneeze or cough. He said okay and proceeded to a seat. I don't believe his behavior was intentional; but I was still exposed to any germs he has. I was wearing a mask; but no eye glasses or goggles to cover my eyes. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic; this is an even greater safety concern than it normally would have been.Not sure what else could have been done; as passengers should always cover their mouths when they sneeze. Perhaps Operations could add some basic hygiene tips to their boarding announcements; like washing hands; covering their mouths; etc.




Synopsis: Flight attendant reported passenger sneezed directly into Flight Attendant's face without attempting to cover the sneeze. Flight Attendant suggested passengers should be given hygiene tips during pre-boarding announcements.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Approx 2 hours into our flight (time and position were not noted); we were advised by ATC that an experimental balloon was in free fall near our position. We were also advised that the vehicle was unlit and had no transponder and no way to fix its position. ATC later reported that they had a primary target at our nine thirty position and eight miles and estimated the altitude at 45;000; but could not confirm that it was the plummeting balloon. Although we were looking for any trace of the balloon; we did not see; nor would we likely see it; due to the fact that it was unlit and it was a dark nightWe continued to our destination without further incident.Why the balloon failed is unknown. However; the fact that it did not have emergency lights and emergency transponder (or other way to absolutely fix it's position) when operating above commercial air routes is inexcusable. It would seem a simple thing to have an emergency aneroid switch that would activate when below a certain altitude; say 80;000 ft; thus giving position/altitude data; as well lighting for visual conformation (see and avoid) during hours of darkness.




Synopsis: ATC notified an air carrier at FL360 about an experimental balloon in a free fall descent through an estimated FL450; unlit and without a transponder during night conditions.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After being cleared for the visual approach; ATC called out traffic and advised leveling at 5;000 FT until traffic passed. I was able to make visual contact with the traffic below. The traffic continued to climb. At that time I turned the aircraft to the left to create more space and began to level the aircraft prior to reaching 5;000 FT. At that time I watched the traffic pass below us and started a shallow descent for the airport. We received the traffic alert followed by a RA that lasted approximately 5 seconds. I complied with the RA. I should have been more aggressive with my spacing for the other traffic.


Second narrative: After we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 30L; we were advised that there was traffic that seemed to be climbing toward us. Norcal suggested that we level off at 5;000 FT which we did. The light single engine plane continued to climb toward us. The non-flying pilot climbed slightly to about 5;100 FT and we got a 'Monitor Vertical Speed' followed shortly thereafter by a very brief 'Climb'. A very slight climb was initiated and then we were 'Clear of conflict'. The approach was continued uneventfully to a normal landing.It would be nice if VFR traffic would not be allowed to climb into busy airspace without having to talk to any Approach Control facility.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reports a TCAS RA arriving SJC from the south at 5;000 FT. Climbing slightly and turning to avoid VFR traffic.
Date: 202004
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was the X Flight Attendant on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. With only 2 passengers the operations Agent came down to ask if we were ready to board. I said no we don't need to board 30 minutes early with only 2 people. Agent was pressured by management to still board at the normal time of 30 minutes prior to departure time. Again I explained that we do not need to board this early. I even told the Agent that I had not confirmed that the safety checks were done yet and started walking to the back of the aircraft. Agent asked 'How long is that going to take?' To which I replied 'I don't know maybe 10 minutes.' Even though I had not indeed confirmed the safety checks had been performed; I honestly was trying to hold Agent up from boarding with this as a stall tactic. As I walked towards the back Agent yelled out 'Are you guys ready?' to the flight attendants in the back to bypass me. I can only assume Agent was actually feeling pressured to board this early when anybody clearly knows that boarding 2 people will take at most 5 minutes. I believe with the current pandemic going on we could better limit ourselves to exposure by relaxing our boarding times. It is in our best interest to board people as late as possible right now. As the X Flight Attendant I am required to stand in the front of the aircraft for boarding and this forces me to be in close proximity to somebody that sits in the front. And upon boarding; the one passenger did take the first available seat to him which was row X. Had this person been disabled and required the first row seats I am required to let that individual sit there and expose me to them as well as expose them to me. Even more so than I was with the gentleman on my flight. The longer people are on these planes the more chance there is for them to contaminate the planes or us and vice versa.There needs to be less on time performance pressure from the company. We should be allowed to choose a boarding position that we feel is safe and appropriate.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns with being pressured to board early with only a few passengers. Flight Attendant stated it would be best to avoid boarding unnecessarily early to minimize the time of possibly being exposed to COVID-19.