elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Parked Pre-departure
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: This is the second occasion I have experienced what appears to be an unsafe loading of a combination of dangerous goods in the same cargo compartment.  Today; compressed oxygen; aircraft alkaline batteries; and flammable aerosol gas were all loaded in the aft cargo compartment. Any malfunction from batteries could ignite the flammable gas which then could lead to explosion of the O2 cylinders. This would cause a pure O2 environment and would certainly overwhelm the fire fighting capabilities of the cargo compartment. We contacted Dispatch and they were able to reach a Dangerous Goods Specialist who stated this was a legal loading. We did not agree and requested the dangerous goods be separated. This was accomplished causing a delay in the departure. We received planned dangerous goods info 18 minutes prior to departure and worked this issue as quickly as possible. On another occasion lithium metal batteries were loaded in the same cargo compartment as oxygen cylinders.  Once again we contacted Dispatch. Nobody answered the Dangerous Goods Hotline and the Dangerous Goods Manager did not answer the phone. In this case the Dispatcher went to his Manager and the decision was made to separate the lithium batteries from the oxygen cylinders. I would like some feedback on the reasoning that it is acceptable to load very volatile materials in the same cargo compartment as oxygen cylinders. There does not seem to be any common sense for doing this.  I understand that it is appropriate to carry such items but to have them in the same compartment as oxygen cylinders creates a potentially dangerous environment when it is not necessary.




Synopsis: B757 Captain questions the wisdom of loading compressed oxygen; aircraft alkaline batteries; and flammable aerosol gas in the aft cargo compartment; even though it is apparently legal to do so.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHF.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ORF
ATC / advisory: TRACON ORF
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During arrival into PHF; we were direct JAWES following a short vector off the DRONE Arrival. About 8 miles from JAWES we were issued a clearance to descend to 4;000 FT. At that moment I saw a target on our TCAS about 4 miles ahead at 4;000 FT. I told ORF Approach about the target and they said they weren't talking to that traffic. The First Officer shallowed the descent rate and we began to look. Then we caught the target visually at 12 o'clock. I first thought it was a hawk circling because it was very small and maneuvering mostly in circles. A few seconds later what we thought looked like a hawk took shape of an aircraft with wings. We were now about 3 miles from the target so we told approach we were going to turn right to avoid hitting the aircraft. As we were turning we got within two and a half miles and same altitude as it went from our 12 o'clock position and for about five seconds it seemed to chase us (by turning into our right turn); before suddenly turning back to our 12 o'clock position. As it passed by our 12 o'clock position again; we observed it flying extremely erratically; in fact so erratically; that we pilots believe it was a drone; due to the excessive g forces required to pull those maneuvers that were almost continuous rolls; loops; etc. It passed by us to the left; and we were then clear of that conflict. We also noticed three Chinook helicopters flying in formation flying below all of us; which were not a factor. I called PHF land-line and they said they could not officially tell us what it was. Due to our airmanship we avoided an RA; however a TCAS TA did occur. Drones are to be flown below 400 FT. This was at 4;000 FT. It demonstrates careless and reckless operation (FAR 91.13) of the drone pilot. If it was a military aircraft and it needs to be maneuvering like that; it needs to be done in a Military Operations Area. MOA's are designed to separate or segregate certain non-hazardous military activities from IFR traffic-not on final approach of a commercial airport.




Synopsis: CRJ200 Captain arriving PHF on the DRONE 1 arrival reports evading a drone maneuvering at 4;000 FT and visible on TCAS.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Number 2 engine failure on climbout. First Officer was pilot flying. Captain became pilot flying and went through QRH procedures for High Engine Vibration followed by Single Engine Landing Procedure with Number 2 engine at idle. Crew coordinated with ATC; Dispatch; flight attendants; and Ops. Landed with flaps 15 uneventfully. Flight crew was removed to deadhead back to their respective crew bases.


Second narrative: Climbing out through 11;000 FT; we encountered an engine failure on the Number 2 engine. We first noticed a high vibration and then a high EGT. We brought the Number 2 engine thrust lever to idle before an EGT exceeding limits; and performed the High Vibration Checklist. With the thrust lever at idle all engine instrument were normal. We returned to the airport with the Number 2 engine at idle with no further problems.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew experiences high engine vibration and high EGT climbing through 11;000 FT. Thrust is brought to idle on the vibrating engine and the flight returns to the departure airport in that condition.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The First Officer was flying the act.  During level off at the cruise altitude FL240 the First Officer said the primary trim was not working.  Then he tried to use the alternate trim switches.  The trim did not move.  I then attempted to trim using the primary trim switches on the Captain yoke.  The trim did not move.  We consulted the QRH for stabilizer Inoperative In Flight.  After checking all referenced circuit breakers and the Stabilizer Trim (Red Guarded) were normal.   Step six requires a check of the primary longitudinal trim.  It operated normally.  The QRH says at this point to continue normal operation.  We were ready for descent to our filed destination at this time.  Although normal operation was restored; I felt it prudent to [advise ATC] and expedite our arrival.  We flew a visual approach and landed uneventfully.


Second narrative: The Captain [advised ATC] and First Officer landed aircraft uneventfully at the filed destination.


Synopsis: A MD-80 First Officer discovered both the Main and Alternate trim inoperative upon leveling at cruise. The QRH was completed but all systems appeared normal; then prior to descent both trim systems became operational. An uneventful landing ensued.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tires
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: My passenger and I departed ZZZ1 on for a day VFR sightseeing trip up and down the lakefront. It was a cold morning. The air was very stable and the winds were calm and the flight was pleasant. On the return trip southbound; we decided to do a touch and go at ZZZ. This is something I have done in Aircraft X many times. ATIS indicated winds were 230 at 4 and we were instructed to enter a right base for Runway XX. The approach was stable and we flew over the threshold at 65 knots with 2 white and 2 red lights on the PAPI. The roundout and flare was normal and smooth. Seemingly immediately after touchdown the plane began to spin to the left; similar to a car on black ice. I tried to correct but the spin continued and we ultimately left the runway and ended up completing a 180 turn in the grass.Because the spinning happened immediately on touchdown; I had not completed any steps of the landing or touch and go process; e.g. I had not closed the carb heat; opened the throttle; or raised the flaps. Neither my passenger nor I had made any significant control movements during touchdown or touched the brakes. Tower asked if we needed assistance. I said we could use some help. Neither my passenger or I had any injuries of any sort and we declined attention from the fire department. The plane was towed to FBO after about 20 minutes. Damage to the plane was minimal and it is expected to be flown out 1 day after the incident after an A&P inspection. I suspect the worn tire treads on the main tires on the plane slid on the substantial rubber deposits of the runway at ZZZ causing it to spin out of control. Because I had flown this plane before with the worn tire treads and had no issue; there was a 'normalization of deviance'.




Synopsis: A pilot conducting a touch and go reported a loss of control during landing resulting in a runway excursion.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On the LOC approach to ZZZ we were on a 190 degree heading at 4000' in ALT Hold on an intercept the localizer clearance. Approach cleared us to turn right 240 cleared for the approach. The PF (Pilot Flying) selected LNAV once the turn was complete; set the MCP (Mode Control Panel) to field elevation; and selected VNAV; and pointed at the 000 MCP altitude. As PNF (Pilot Not Flying) confirmed LNAV and VNAV PATH and verbally confirmed 'the dirt' in the MCP. To our surprise; the aircraft; on autopilot and autothrottles; immediately started to descend. We were outside ZZZZZ with a crossing altitude of 3600'; and it appeared we would cross below it. Both pilot's VDI's (Vertical Deviation Indicator) showed the aircrafts projected flight path to be parallel to and well below the magenta correct glide path. The VSD (Vertical Situation Display) also showed us to be 800-1000' below the path. PF (Pilot Flying) disconnected AP (Auto Pilot) and AT's (Auto Throttle) and began to manually fly the aircraft up to the magenta correct glide path line on the VSD. With the field in sight we were comfortable doing this. Once established on the correct path the PF hand flew the aircraft to landing. As far as we could tell in the absence of intervention the automation would have flown the entire approach 800-1000' low.Investigate why the aircraft attempted; while in LNAV and VNAV path; to fly the ZZZ LOC approach well below the correct flight path.We have racked our brains and have been unable to figure out a mistake we made or why the aircraft did what it did.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported observing the autopilot system directing the aircraft to fly well below proper glide path on approach.
Date: 201401
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Wheels/Tires/Brakes
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing Rollout
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Normal landing; when autobrakes engaged at wheel spinup; I felt stronger than normal braking. When disengaged and subsequent manual braking; brakes seemed to stick then release. Kept both engines running to gate. After inspection; found Brake Assembly at right Outboard [Main Landing Gear] truck disintegrated.

Callback: Reporter stated the B737 Next Gen aircraft was on a quick turn when they picked-up the aircraft in ZZZ. Maintenance had just signed-off a problem involving the brakes that had been noted by the inbound flight crew. On his arrival in ZZZ1; during the landing rollout the braking action was not smooth during auto braking or manual braking. He decided to taxi to the gate rather than sit on the ramp until Maintenance arrived due to possibility of the brakes locking up if they had overtemped. Their B737 Next Gen aircraft do not have Brake Temperature indicators.Reporter stated he looked at the right Main Landing Gear (MLG) with one of their Mechanic's who said the outboard carbon fiber brake had disintegrated. The Main tire was not flat; but was canted outboard at the top with the Wheel Spin Canon plug hanging out from the axle; the brake was really chewed-up. An outboard bearing for the Main wheel/tire assembly was believed to have failed. The tire sidewall was worn. The aircraft was taken out of service and sent to the hangar.



Synopsis: Captain reports that during landing rollout when the autobrakes engaged; the braking was stronger than normal on their B737 Nex Gen aircraft. Brakes seemed to stick then release; when in Manual braking. Right Main Landing Gear (MLG) outboard main tire was found canted outboard with Wheel Spin Canon plug hanging out and brake disintegrated.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were configuring the aircraft to final flaps and doing the checklist when we were given the instructions to switch to the Tower; by Miami Approach. We acknowledged the transmission. After completing the checklist I then resumed my pilot not flying duties; but forgot to switch over to the Tower and we landed on Runway 8R without landing clearance. We had not even realized we had done so until we stated that we were clear of the runway; and that's when Miami Approach stated that we were still on their frequency. We then immediately switched over to the Tower and told them that we were clear of the runway and what had happened and they said no problem and to taxi to our parking spot on the ramp. The Captain and I were very exhausted and we both were positive we were given landing clearance; but that was obviously not the case.


Second narrative: The incident occurred at the end of a three leg 11 hour night turn. Arriving in Miami we were given vectors to follow traffic to [Runway] 8R. Once calling traffic in sight we were cleared for visual behind traffic. We landed safely; exited runway and [called] for taxi clearance. We were advised we were back on Approach. We then realized we had not been handed off to Tower and cleared to land. We called Ground/Tower and were cleared to ramp as normal. Fatigue was a major contributor to the incident.


Synopsis: After landing in MIA; a fatigued flight crew realized that they were on Approach Control frequency and had not received landing clearance.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A B747-400 was flying IMB; BONVL7; PDX at FL380. In the vicinity of IMB; I issued the clearance 'B747 descend and maintain FL240.' I gave this clearance because I had crossing traffic at FL380 as well as addition arrivals ahead of the 747. The B747 asked me; 'Say again; Center?' I told him to descend and maintain FL240. He read back; 'Descend via the BONVL7 Arrival.' I corrected him saying; 'No; descend and maintain FL240.' He mumbled something about; 'Present Heading descending to FL240.' At IMB the BONVL7 makes a slight turn to the right. The B747 did not make that turn but he did start his descent. I called my Supervisor over and discussed what happened and we talked about what whether we should vector him; or give him a fix to fly direct to. The B747 was off course by about 5 miles; diverging by about 15 degrees for approximately 4 minutes when the pilot called up and asked; 'B747; verify direct PDX.' I tried to explain; 'No; you are supposed to fly the profile of the BONVL7 but descend and maintain FL240.' Then the B747 pilot read back; 'Roger; BONVL7'; I then cleared 'B747 direct DUFUR; descend and maintain FL240.' He read that back correctly and I gave him a frequency change to the next Controller. I'm at a loss for words on how to fix this situation. When clearances can be difficult to understand we are suppose to resort to using plain language; but I think plain language only drives the communication gap further apart. How can I possibly simplify my clearance any more than a simple control instruction as 'Descend and Maintain' an altitude? How can the pilot of a B747 mistake that for anything other than what it was? If he had continued descending direct PDX instead of flying the arrival; he would have descended into Mt. Hood.




Synopsis: ZSE Controller described a confused descent clearance interpretation by an air carrier arrival; noting the apparent confusion between 'descend via' vs. a conventional 'descend' instruction.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I'm attending recurrent [on date] with a huge group of people; I know it's too late for me; however why do they think it's appropriate to gather a mass of highly susceptible people into the same tiny room for several hours; against government advisement; during a worldwide pandemic? My family is terrified I'm going to give them COVID-19 and I think its highly irresponsible and dangerous to continue operations as normal as if nothing is going on. The last thing I wanted to do is be in a room surrounded with other flight attendants that are exposed to the same thing I am on a daily basis. It's completely irresponsible and does nothing; but help spread the virus. I know we are considered 'essential' but with everything going on things like this need to be adapted to provide social distancing and help prevent spreading the virus to other crew members and our passengers.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant expressed concern that attending a scheduled recurrent training class with a group of flight attendants could increase the risk of spreading the COVID-19 virus to other crew members and passengers.