elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: DC-9 10
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Post flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was pilot flying on the leg when my First Officer accessed ATIS which; according to the chart; is AWOS when the Tower is closed. The weather we got was 230@5; 10 SM; 4;500 BKN; 29/23; 29.96. My approach suggested that the wind was not quite as reported; but the landing was uneventful. After taxiing in and shutting down; I checked the ATIS/AWOS again; and we'd copied down the weather correctly. The problem was that it was not AWOS; but rather; it was ATIS Zulu. Tower evidently forgot to switch it over to AWOS when they closed. The weather was from XA45Z; and we were landing almost 7 hours later. The actual weather (we were able to get it afterwards on my First Officer's phone) was 350@11G18; 10 SM; 3;900 OVC; 20/17; 30.05. We thought we had current weather; but due to what probably was Tower's mistake; we did not.If both pilots independently listened to the weather; one of us might have noticed that it was ATIS and not AWOS; at a time when the Tower normally is closed. It was a short flight; and I was trying to avoid areas of lightning. Also; if the pilot who copies the ATIS/AWOS routinely includes the Zulu Time which is broadcast with it; that might have alerted us that something wasn't quite right. Also; if the Tower personnel do not have a departure checklist that includes switching the ATIS to AWOS; adding such a checklist/procedure might prevent a recurrence.


Second narrative: His approach made the winds seem to be a lot higher than the called for winds and I commented about the possibility of a shear on the approach.  Next time; I will include the time stamp in the ATIS report to the other pilot. I will also review the weather page from the Flight Followers that is given to the Captain before we take off so that I can back up the Captain and have a better idea of the weather we should expect at the arrival airport.


Synopsis: When ATC apparently forgot to make the switch from ATIS to AWOS weather reporting the flight crew of an air carrier flight failed to note the error and landed utilizing a report some seven hours old which differed significantly; especially with respect to wind direction and velocity.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: About 20nm Northeast of DEN on the LAWGR arrival; 12;000 ft. we received a GPS-R fail; then a GPS-L fail. Confirmed failure on FMC NAV-STATUS page. Then we received the 'xnpndr fail' light on transponder. ATC still had us radar contact. Intercepted LOC on [Runway] 35R. Aircraft symbol showed left of course on NAV page; but right on with LOC/GS with Number 1 and 2 VHF as well as Standby. At about 10;000 ft. MSL we got a TERR POS indication momentarily on NAV display. We landed safely on [Runway] 35R; and during rollout and taxi onto P7; GPS and XPNDR came back on with normal ops.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported loss of GPS and transponder on arrival into DEN. Both systems returned to normal after landing.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I turned final and noticed I was losing altitude very quickly and the trees were getting close. I decided to start go-around procedures. During the process I could hear the trees scrape against the plane. Afterwards I flew to [the] VOR and never felt the aircraft act any different than before the incident.




Synopsis: A student pilot in a C152 mismanaged altitude control turning final and brushed tree tops prior to going around.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flying at 40;000 FT passing over an outer band of weather from a tropical storm; the Number One Engine had a rollback to approximately 65% N1. We were IMC at -55 SAT. Turned engine ignition and engine anti-ice on and engine returned to normal operation in about one minute.


Second narrative: At FL400 flying over a tropical storm; we noticed ice was building on the window and windshield wiper. Temperature outside was a minus 55 degrees. The First Officer and I discussed turning the engine anti-ice on even though the temperature was -55. I looked around the HUD to look outside at ice buildup when the First Officer said we just lost the Number One Engine. I then turned the igniters to FLT and turned both engine anti-ice to ON. The Number One Engine reduced to 65% N1 and stabilized. I pushed the throttles up to get additional power and after approximately 30 seconds to one minute the Number One Engine came back up to speed. We left the anti-ice on until in the clear. No further events and we landed in our filed destination. I contacted Dispatch and they contacted Maintenance. I contacted the Chief Pilot. Maintenance said the aircraft was good to go and that when a sensor ices over it defaults to 65% N1.


Synopsis: A B737-700 Number One Engine rolled back to 65% N1 while flying at FL400 over a tropical storm with ice forming on the windshield at -55C. After the igniters were selected to FLT and the engine anti-ice turned ON; the engine recovered in about 30 seconds.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was maneuvering between 3;500 and 4;500 FT approximately 12 miles east of [a Tower controlled airport that bordered a major metropolitan area] when I experienced a complete electrical failure. I proceeded to [a nearby uncontrolled airport] and made a total of six attempts to land; all of which resulted in go arounds due to the flaps being inoperative. I made the determination that I would be unable to land safely at [the uncontrolled airport]; and I climbed to an altitude of 3;000 FT and while making a box pattern around [the uncontrolled airport] I turned on my cell phone and looked up a phone number for [the original destination] Tower. I called that number and reached a voicemail box. I then called my flight school and asked them for a phone number; and they provided the phone number for [a different local] Tower. I called that number and reached a Controller. I informed him of my situation and my intent to declare an emergency and proceed to [the original destination airport]. He instructed me to proceed to [the original destination airport] at that time and told me he would attempt to coordinate with [that] Tower. I flew south to [the original destination airport]; overflew the airport midfield at 1;800 FT; made a descending left turn; and entered left traffic on a 45 degree angle to the downwind. I flew a normal pattern; observed a green light gun signal while on final; and landed without further incident. Given that cell phones can provide an alternative to radio communications in emergency situations; Air Traffic Control facilities' telephone systems should offer an option to connect to a Controller if an emergency exists.




Synopsis: The pilot of a C172 experienced a total electrical failure while operating near a Tower controlled airport. He elected to divert to a nearby uncontrolled airport; but was unable to conduct a landing without the use of flaps. While circling the area; he was able to contact another local Tower on his cellphone; who facilitated communication on his behalf. He returned to the original Tower controlled airport where he received a light gun signal and landed.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We received a briefing that you can no longer load dry ice in the forward cargo area on Airbuses. When I saw the [load plan] for [flight XXX] I saw that a dry ice quick pack was loaded in the forward cargo pit. It could not be loaded in the rear because this flight also had a live animal in the rear Pit 6. This quick pack should have been left off this flight.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported Dry Ice was erroneously loaded in forward cargo pit.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: A borrowed part from Aircraft X; an A320 aircraft; [with] Part Number (P/N) -E01 for Base Contactor and a Three-Pole Contactor P/N -Y1 was installed on Aircraft Y; also an A320 that had Base Contactor P/N -00 and Three Pole Contactor P/N -Y00 removed. The installed parts have a different aircraft 'Effectivity'. The Base Contactor installed on Aircraft Y; from Aircraft X; did not have an index pin [but was able to be] installed on Aircraft Y with no problem. The [Base Contactor] P/N -Y00 removed from Aircraft Y; has an index pin and is not installable on Aircraft X. The Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 29-24-08 Item # 105; shows that the [Base Contactor] P/N -Y00 may be used as a spare part on Aircraft X; but [Base Contactor] P/N -E01 does not show that the part is a spare on Aircraft Y. Both aircraft have the same [Airbus] Functional Item Number (FIN) number XXX-5GX for the parts. When trying to install P/N -Y00 Base Contactor on Aircraft X; the part was not installable because an index hole is not present in the mounting box 107vu126 [panel] for the Yellow Hydraulic Power Contactor. [Non] ETOPS.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the different aircraft 'Effectivity' of two Base Contactors used for the Yellow Hydraulic System Power contactor on A320 aircraft. The Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) did not identify that one contactor had an index pin and required an index hole in order to be installed.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival outside the aircraft; we noticed the fueling and loading operations were underway. The fueler was up on the basket and connected to the aircraft. Suddenly the LE slats deployed; catching the fueler by surprise. The fueler put his hands up and ducked away from the slats. The FO (First Officer) was doing his walk around and was equally surprised by the movement of the slats. The LE slats did NOT strike the fueler and did not contact any equipment. We got lucky. I questioned the maintenance man performing the slats check; he told me he told the ground staff he was moving the flaps. I don't know who he told but the fueler did not get the word nor were any safety personnel in place outside the aircraft.Safety personnel need to be in place outside the aircraft and able to keep the area around the moving devices clear. Ground communications need to be established with a safety observer. Fueling needs to be suspended during flap operations on the ground.




Synopsis: B747-400 Captain reported a fueler at his aircraft was almost hit by the extension of the leading edge slats during maintenance action.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff I attempted to select PITCH mode from the FGC controller. I noticed that my selections were not being displayed on the 802 panel; and that the modes on the FGC became 'locked.' I was also not able to clear the flight director; and the flight director was giving inaccurate directions. I tried several times to select different modes as well as tried to disengage the flight director without success. Once we discovered the issue; we looked into the non-normal checklist to determine what/if any actions could be taken. We discovered there was no checklist available and decided to contact company as we were approaching IMC and very low ceilings at our destination. After speaking with Maintenance Control; it was determined that there was no way to clear the flight director in the air. After speaking with dispatch and my first officer; we determined the best course of action was to return to [departure airport] because the weather at our alternate would require us to enter IMC conditions which we did not feel comfortable doing.




Synopsis: Dash-8 Captain reported returning to the departure airport after losing autoflight capability.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B SFO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Airport closed for VIP movement. Aircraft X holding at BOLDR sector. Decision made to allow Aircraft X to land 20 MIT to the VIP aircraft. Told by FLM I was to vector 20 MIT and expect a visual approach. Same time BOLDR sector yelling across room that Aircraft X was on vector for ILS28L. I asked FLM which approach was I to issue. Was told either visual or ILS. Aircraft X checked on and I vectored for ILS28L and told pilot to expect that.  FLM then told me to disregard the 20MIT and turn him in. Turn Aircraft X to join final and maintain 3;000 feet until established on the localizer; cleared ILS 28L. As Aircraft X approached the localizer; Aircraft X advised he was not getting a signal or identifier from the localizer and inquired if it was operational. I had no information that indicated it was OTS; so I vectored heading 290 and maintain 2;000 feet. About 7 miles from airport Aircraft X reported the localizer was now working. I issued the ILS 28L approach clearance but was not 2 miles outside the approach gate. Aircraft X; landed without event. I questioned FLM if they had turned the localizer off for the VIP movement and FLM did not know. FLM went to ask TMC if it was off and I heard TMC say; 'It was back on now.'  FLM returned and said he did not know if it was on or off. During special operations controllers need to be kept in the loop. There were at least 10 management officials standing in the center of the room watching the VIP movement and none of them could coordinated important information that included the fact that the localizer was turned off.




Synopsis: NCT Controller reports of a session where he is vectoring in an aircraft to an airport that just had a VIP land. The vectored aircraft was not receiving the localizer signal and questions the Controller. The Controller wonders if the localizer had been turned off after the VIP landed and no one knew the answer.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class C OAK
ATC / advisory: Tower OAK
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Flight Data / Clearance Delivery
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We are seeing a number of flights where FRC (Full Route Clearance) is added in completely inappropriate and unsafe parts of the flight plan remarks. The FRC remark was all the way at the end and did not appear on the proposed departure strip. The only reason I noticed the FRC in this case was because I requested a Full Route Strip to see the aircraft destination. I would have never known to issue this aircraft an FRC had I not requested an FR strip. Clearances eligible to be sent via PDC would not be blocked in this instance since TDLS (Tower Data Link System) only looks at about the first 5-10 remarks characters for the FRC indication. So this aircraft could have easily been sent a PDC and no FRC. In the case of CPDLC; again TDLS would not uplink and FRC to the flight deck since it did not see an FRC indication in the correct part of the flight plan remarks. I submitted another AIMS ticket today in the hopes that this issue gets timely and decisive corrective action; and in checking AIMS I found other tickets opened by other terminals who have seen this or a similar problem. See 7110.65 paragraph 4-3-3b: If it is necessary to modify a filed route of flight in order to achieve computer acceptance...the contraction 'FRC'...or 'FRC/(fix)' will be added to the remarks. 'FRC' or 'FRC/(fix)' must always be the first item of intra-center remarks. We first need to find out how users are able to even put FRC in the remarks of their own flight plans; and then work with them to comply with the FAAH 7110.65 requirements. Ideally they should be filing clearances that don't necessitate FRC in the remarks; or only place FRC in the remarks when truly necessary. I have had instances where I issued the FRC and then the pilots says; 'that was exactly what we filed; why was that an FRC?'




Synopsis: Tower Controller reported the Full Route Clearance (FRC) indicator printed in the remarks section was located where it may not be visible to the Controller resulting in an aircraft not receiving the correct departure clearance.