Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I believe the two main causes of this gear up incident were channelization on the student (pilot flying) and channelization and complacency on the instructor (pilot not flying). The sortie was a local training flight getting ready for an ATP practical exam. Both pilots were high time with plenty of recency. We were on pattern two of a two pattern delay before departing under VFR flight following to an area 20 miles southeast of the airport. The student was executing a simulated single engine landing. At 1;000 feet AGL; the instructor pulled back mixture slightly to simulate a failed number 2 engine. The student executed the boldface and secured the simulated dead engine. He then obtained his flight following clearance while on downwind. (It seems this distraction was the first link in chain because the normal checklist was put off to coordinate with tower; despite the fact that coordination was done prior to being beam the touchdown zone) When on base; the student noticed he was slightly fast and elected to use 10 followed by 25 degrees of flaps. Based off his previous performance the CFI's attention was channelized in making sure his airspeed was within Practical Test Standards (PTS). (The CFI could not and did not tell that the throttle was at an unusually low setting for a heavyweight single engine approach that required additional drag to maintain approach speed.) As the student rolled out on final he noticed some birds and began to add power and maneuver from them. In the end he called them out; the CFI also saw them and no evasive action was necessary and the student reset his power and continued on a normal glide slope. To the best of the CFI's recollection there was no gear warning horn malfunction; because the CFI heard it on the previous pattern as that was his initial demo. The aircraft was on short final; on speed and on glide path. The aircraft touched down approximately 1;400 feet from the end of the runway and came to a stop approximately 3;000 feet from the approach end of the runway. For an unknown reason; this is the first time I recall forgetting to mentally and verbally go through a safety check prior to landing as either the pilot flying or pilot not flying. It's also important to note that the student called gear down on his base leg to tower and due to the CFI's and student's complacency and possible distraction of birds and airspeed; another missed gear check occurred at that time. There was no mention from the tower about the gear being viewed up. Other than accomplishing a before landing check in a timely manner on downwind and throwing in a safety check on base and final; the only other recommendations I would have to help prevent this incident are the following: if tower is going to respond to a gear down call over the radio; then they actually put eyes on the aircraft's gear. Also; there is a lot of single engine work during the ATP practical preparation; if one throttle in the Seminole is back below 15 inches Manifold Pressure (MP) then the gear warning horn goes off. This horn seems to have different volume settings sometimes even though it has no volume control. 15 inches MP is an approximate value for the horn and during simulated single engine work; the throttle is often back around 12 inches MP. The gear horn is going off so often in training it breeds complacency as the pilots get used to hearing it. If the horn had a separate power source so the volume was standard; and if it went off when both engines were less than 15 inches MP then I believe that would offer a good warning to the pilots that something was missing prior to landing. In the end; it was the failed recognition of multiple very small in flight distractions that tore both pilots attention away from normal checklist procedures.


Second narrative: After initial takeoff the instructor demonstrated an engine failure followed by an emergency return to a landing. That was the first time I had seen this maneuver. I then took off to do the same thing. After securing the engine I forgot to lower the landing gear. I was fixated on maintaining flight parameters for the emergency return. Also; with only 2 hours in type I didn't have a very good GUMPS (Gas; Undercarriage; Mixture; Propeller; Seat belts) habit pattern. Out of habit I called to tower 'left base gear down' without checking the gear (I was focused on directional control and airspeed for the single engine maneuver). On final; we focused on some large birds near the approach end and again failed to check the gear. I set flaps to 25 because I realized I couldn't maintain airspeed without reducing throttle to idle. That should have been a huge clue to recheck the gear; but focus on the birds by both of us precluded that decision. During flare to touchdown I noticed the airplane was very squirrelly to control so I focused very intently on making a good soft landing. Right about then; as we descended past where the gear should have landed; I realized what happened (we had no gear down). I landed on the props and flaps very softly on top of the captains bars and skidded to a halt about 1;500 feet later on centerline.The instructor and I knew each other very well and I believe we trusted each other very much. That probably created some complacency between us. Also; calling out the birds and focusing on them right when we should have been checking configuration (fixation) was a large factor.


Synopsis: An experience pilot and his flight instructor experienced a gear-up landing in a twin engine Piper during practice engine failure and return to the field.