elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Circuit Breaker / Fuse / Thermocouple
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my interior inspection I noticed several irregularities with Circuit Breaker Panel #2. There were circuit breakers that were not labeled and there were labels where there were no circuit breakers. More specifically; CBP-XX XY and XZ had circuit breakers but were missing labels; and CBP-XX XA was labeled 'FMS 2' but did not have a circuit breaker present. Maintenance was already at the aircraft dealing with another issue and I asked them to look into it. The Mechanic shrugged it off stating that he 'Didn't know' and 'That's just how some airplanes are'.  I informed the Mechanic that we would not be departing until the labeling discrepancy was remedied.  After an extensive back and forth with the Mechanic he produced new CBP (Circuit Breaker Panel) labeling strips that appeared to match the circuit breaker configuration for the associated rows.  The Mechanic installed the new labels without any real confirmation that the circuit breakers were properly labeled.  Unable to positively verify that the circuit breakers matched their new labels ourselves; we had to take the Mechanic's word for it.Our Line Maintenance in ZZZ seem blissfully unaware that not all of our aircraft have the same circuit breaker configuration. Our Maintenance Department needs to pay more attention to detail; specifically when on-boarding an aircraft from another operator.  There needs to be an audit done on our entire fleet to make sure that circuit breakers are properly labeled and that the location correctly corresponds to the procedures within our QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and MEL (Minimum Equipment List).  There needs to be swift action taken to correct this attitude as unfortunately it is coming at the price of safety.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew flying reported circuit breaker panel not labeled properly.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center MMEX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Originally filed via the AVSAR3B arrival; we were given direct SLM; comply with DME restrictions. The direct SLM removed the fixes and they had to be rebuilt. Prior to this clearance; I had drawn the 10 NM and 30 NM rings around the airport to help comply with the speed restrictions in Mexico. After the clearance; I simply added a 60 NM ring to this fix info. SLM is about 18 NM prior to the airport; so my rings were about 18 NM beyond where they should have been. About 2 minutes from Top of Descent; ATC asked when we were going to start down. This made me recheck things and my First Officer (FO) pointed out that the rings built from the airport and not the VOR. I immediately switched to VS and deployed the speed brakes; but we still crossed 60 NM from SLM at about 33000 feet (3000 feet high). I redrew the fix info page to reflect distance from SLM and the 30 NM restriction was drawn correctly and met.I should have used a different technique to redraw the DME restrictions. Had I used 'SLM//60' instead of the fix info page; it would have been clear that it was built from the correct point. Also; I should have asked him to double check my FMS work after I finished building it. We may have caught my error if we looked it over again from the beginning.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported they were high on the arrival into MMMX.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SKBO.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Normally for departure we use the GEPKI 2B departure.We selected the runway and the departure as usual however the initial left turn off of BOTH 31L/R was not in the database. There was a discontinuity on the flight plan however when trying to delete the discontinuity the FMGC scratch pad display NOT ALLOWED message.THIS NEEDS TO BE CHECKED before a crew misses this and ends up flying into the mountains.Review ALL Airbus databases to see if this a specific aircraft problem or a fleet wide database issue.

Callback: The Captain reported that inconsistencies exists between the charted departure; the FMS database and the controllers. The full departure procedure could not be loaded or followed in the FMS; and there is a serious terrain issue if the correct procedure is not followed. The controllers did not seem to understand the problem nor with communication difficulties could they be relied on to provide terrain clearance guidance.The pilot reported that the FMS database problem has been fixed.



Synopsis: The Captain reported that inconsistencies exist between the charted GEPKI 2B departure and the FMS database. The full departure procedure could not be loaded or followed in the FMS and there is a serious terrain issue if the correct procedure is not followed. The problem was corrected with the next FMS revision.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: OAK.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared direct MITOE intersection getting ready for a visual approach to runway 30. About 15 miles out we reported the field in sight and were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 30.  The captain began a descent from 4000 feet to 2000 feet MSL as that is the altitude for crossing MITOE and during the descent through approx 3000 MSL we received the '2500' auto callout. A few seconds later the controller issued a terrain warning and the GPWS gave a 'TERRAIN-TERRAIN PULL UP' warning. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched up. As soon as he pitched up the aural warning went away and I acknowledged ATC. We climbed a few hundred feet and then continued the descent for MITOE. We never lost sight of the field during the event and I believe it was due to the ridge east of the field which we were too close to during the descent.It occurred due to our lack of awareness of the actual height of the terrain in that particular area. We could have been lulled into a sense of complacency due to flying into OAK for many years and being in clear weather with exceptional visibility. The only hindrance to us was the fact that it was dark and that particular area of terrain is relatively unlit.Better situational awareness and use of the terrain feature on our ND's.




Synopsis: An air carrier crew was clear off their arrival direct to the OAK ILS 30 MITOE waypoint for a night visual and while descending to 2;000 feet received nearly simultaneous EGPWS and ATC Terrain warning at about 2;500 feet. Evasive action was taken.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Clear; no wind; 50
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Champion Citabria Undifferentiated
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other landing roll
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Landed on main gear; plane veered to the right; tried to maintain directional control down runway but was not possible; ground looped off runway on grass.




Synopsis: Citabria pilot reported the aircraft departed the runway after he experienced directional control difficulties on landing roll.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LOT.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E LOT
ATC / advisory: CTAF LOT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After touchdown; aircraft veered to the right and struck airport sign.




Synopsis: After landing at LOT; a single engine aircraft veered right and struck an airport sign.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR20
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Accomplished pre-flight walk around inspection in hangar. Then pulled aircraft out onto ramp with a tow bar. I did not remove the towbar; as my intention was to do it after going to restroom. Upon returning to aircraft; I did not remember to remove [it]; nor did I see the towbar; as I got in the aircraft from the aft. Engine start; taxi; and takeoff appeared normal. About 20 feet AGL; I heard a loud metallic sound from under the aircraft (the towbar separating from the nose wheel). About the same time; a pilot in the FBO called on CTAF; and stated that I had taken off with the towbar attached. I entered the traffic pattern; and coordinated with the FBO to visually look at my nose gear as I did a low approach. They stated that it appeared normal. I then accomplished a full stop; taxied clear of the runway and shutdown. The only apparent damage was some cosmetic damage to the nose wheel pant. I then started again; and taxied to hangar. Upon further investigation; the tips of the propeller had struck the tow bar; and were ground down a bit. I retrieved the towbar from the FBO that had picked it up. What caused this was inattention to detail. I do thorough pre-flights; however; I should have never made the [conscious] decision to leave the towbar attached; with the idea that I would get it when I got back to the aircraft. That is just setting yourself up to forget. I should have done another walk around the entire aircraft after returning.




Synopsis: SR-20 pilot reported some minor damage resulted when he took off with the tow bar still attached.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other LUAW
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We taxied out for takeoff on Runway 15L as usual. While completing the 'Before Takeoff Checklist' the First Officer answered a call to line up and wait Runway 15L. I did not hear the call since I was speaking as part of a checklist response. I waited to see if his readback would be questioned and it was not; so we taxied into position. [Runway] 15L was a departure only runway and therefore no chance of an incursion; however 40 seconds later; another aircraft questioned the Tower if they should position and hold; or not. Tower instructed them to do so and told us to taxi down and exit the runway. I must assume that we answered someone else's call and that we entered the runway in error. Nothing more was said and we took off shortly thereafter.I don't think our error caused any distress to anyone; however; it could have in a different situation. The First Officer was fairly new to the airline and somewhat nervous. He was also very task saturated due to the highly complex IAH ground procedures and short taxi. The ground procedures at IAH seem unnecessarily complicated. Ramp to push and turn around; Metering to get to Ground Control; every taxiway in Houston has a 4 syllable name; and then Tower; all within 300 yards. LGA handles twice as much traffic with 2 frequencies. I will be more leery of accepting clearances I did not hear personally in the future; however; I really think IAH should examine their procedures.




Synopsis: The flight crew of an A320 mistakenly responded to a line up and wait clearance intended for another aircraft and was asked to vacate the runway for the intended recipient. The Captain reporter cited excessively complicated ground movement procedures at IAH; a short taxi to Runway 15L and an inexperienced and overtaxed First Officer as contributing factors.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight was given a weight and balance at XA:58z. The load sheet was incomplete as the loading agent signed the appropriate signature block; but in the verification block was not signed and in its place the letters BS. I asked the loading agent to have the document signed by the person who verified the load as it is a requirement per our procedures. The agent refused to have it signed and proceeded to berate my request by stating that we don't do that and have not for 15 years. This statement is troubling and was odds as the verification is a safety cross check and the [company] operation has not existed anywhere near that long. Cross referencing our procedures again in our guide and the weight and balance manuals volume II (2) along with a posted description within the ZZZ crew room highlighting the procedures that a signature is required. [name removed] came out to the aircraft at some point after XB:10z to try to assist and relayed that there was a policy conflict and that he thought there was a pending remedy and that [name removed] was working the conflict of the verification policy. I called the Dispatcher and explained to him; the Operations Manager; and the 'Duty Pilot' that I needed relief from our procedures to legally proceed with the flight. All appeared to agree. He knew of the discrepancy and that the pending procedures changes that were being worked on and he gave me his initials and time utilizing his FAA authority to override so that we could legally proceed. This exercise exposed a pending fault in a safety system. The verification of the load is an important critical step and that it should have accountability via someone's signature on the line. I'm hopeful that the actual language change will take into account this important critical function. Circumnavigating the weight and balance verification system would be a safety concern. If there is a process being developed that addresses the verification concern please present it to the pilot group and to the relevant ground personnel post haste. The future delays through this particular station can potentially be avoided as this appears to be a station outside the system verification norms.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported the company's weight and balance verification procedures are being followed at this particular station.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About 2 hours after departure; en route; we received an EICAS message: C HYD LO QTY. Pulling up the Status page showed the quantity at .49 and decreasing. We performed the proper QRH checklist and then Maintenance and Dispatch were advised. We planned on a flap 20 landing at our filed destination with Alt flap extension using a long final and continued. When we checked in with Center nearest our destination an emergency was declared. During the Alt flap extension we got a LE Disagree EICAS and ran that checklist. When attempting to extend beyond flap 5 we also got a TE Disagree EICAS and ran that checklist as well as calling Maintenance to see if they could help in case we overlooked anything and to get more flaps out. All efforts to get more flaps out were unsuccessful. After recalculating a new landing weight and landing distance for a flap 5 landing we decided a safe landing could be accomplished. With the Captain flying; the approach; landing and rollout were uneventful. Using Alt nose wheel steering we were able to proceed to the gate unassisted.




Synopsis: A B767 EICAS alerted C HYD QTY in cruise so on approach to the filed destination the crew declared an emergency and while extending the flaps received EICAS TE DISAGREE and LE DISAGREE alerts which required additional QRH checklists before landing.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: BAe 125 Series 800
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cruising in occasional light chop at FL400 at Mach .74 = 220 KIAS. The airframe started to vibrate at a rate similar to moderate to severe chop. We thought we had an airframe flutter or automated flight control system malfunction. We requested a lower altitude and were cleared to FL350. In the descent we declared an emergency. The Captain used the autopilot to descend and level off at FL350 where he turned off the autopilot. The aircraft stopped vibrating. The Captain flew the rest of the flight by hand. We asked Center for a clearance to a nearby airport. They cleared us to the airport. In the descent we experienced some turbulence; but no more airframe vibration. We told Center fuel and souls on board; and that the aircraft was under control and we no longer considered it to be an emergency. We landed uneventfully. The passengers said the wing tips fluctuated up and down about 3 FT at a rate of about 3 oscillations per second. This lasted for about 3 to 4 minutes.

Callback: During a callback conversation the reporter stated Maintenance had determined there was a service bulletin regarding reported vibrations due to deteriorated aileron bearings and/or the manner in which sealant to spanwise wing skin seams associated with wing anti-ice is applied. The aircraft had been recently repainted and the sealant reapplied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of that service bulletin. The sealant was removed and re-applied and one or more aileron mildly suspicious bearings replaced. Subsequent test flights were unable to reproduce the events which precipitated the report.



Synopsis: An HS-125 flight crew encountered moderate to severe airframe vibration while in cruise at FL400. The vibration ceased following a descent and disconnecting the autopilot; subsequently diverting to a nearby airport.