elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201702
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Took off out of MCO and climbed to FL280 where there was a bumpy ride. We checked to see if we could climb because of bumpy ride. Our max altitude was FL358. We climbed to FL340. After being at cruise for a while we noticed the airspeed would not go above .76. We looked at the cruise page and noticed our max alt was now FL328. We descended to FL320. After leveling we noticed our max alt was now FL268. We consulted with dispatch and maintenance and our charts. There appeared to be an anomaly. After a period of time the FMC appeared to operate normally. We closely monitored the airspeed the entire time and were never within 20 knots of buffet even though we had a buffet message at one point.




Synopsis: B737NG First Officer reported noticing indications of a malfunctioning FMC; including inconsistent maximum altitude indications.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: DC Rectifier
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After a maintenance delay at the gate due to replacing the battery and battery charger; we had smoke and fumes in the cockpit about three hours into flight at FL370. I was a Check Airman in the jump seat observing the Captain and crew perform the diversion. Crew O2 masks and goggles were put on for divert. First of all the aircraft had no ground cooling air while it sat at the gate prior to departure and was extremely hot when I was first entered the aircraft. The battery and battery charger CB's popped and Maintenance ended up changing both items. Upon arrival at the diversion airport; there were really no ground personnel that could handle a B767. We sat for quite a few minutes after landing waiting for arrangements to be made so we could get a door open. I know there have been cut backs; but this airport is a major safety divert airport for our operations to South America and need to maintain some sort of emergency items. We got a Main Battery Charger EICAS status message right after the smell and smoke started. The managers of the 767 fleet have been putting out that 'status messages' are no big thing and in fact have removed these messages from our operating manual. Let me say; that message does mean something to me; and I would like to know from Boeing; what items make it comes on in flight. There may be some causes that are not important; and there may be some items that are important.




Synopsis: B767 Check Airman reports the battery and battery charger circuit breakers popped during preflight and Maintenance had to change both items. Three hours into the flight we got a Main Battery Charger EICAS status message right after the smell and smoke started and diverted to a suitable airport.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While back taxiing on runway XX at ZZZ Airport; another twin Cessna; Aircraft Y; announced a 1 mile final on runway XX and then stated that 'they had the aircraft lights in sight on the runway.' Before entering the runway; the First Officer had made several radio calls on CTAF announcing our position and intentions. At no point over the course of the time since we turned the avionics on to the back taxi on runway XX did we hear another aircraft make a radio call. When we entered runway XX to back taxi; both the FO (First Officer) and I checked left and right and did not see an aircraft on final for runway XX. As soon as we became aware of the aircraft on final for Runway XX; I quickly turned the airplane around and exited onto runway XY. Had I not had all aircraft lights on while taxiing; I believe there would have been a high likelihood of a runway incursion leading to an accident.Both the First Officer and I followed company SOP and adhered to all applicable regulations to avoid a runway incursion. I believe the cause and fault lies with the pilot of the other aircraft; Aircraft Y; who failed to monitor ZZZ CTAF and make appropriate radio calls. Additionally; he did not have the appropriate lights illuminated on his aircraft that would have alerted us to his position on final before we entered runway XX.




Synopsis: C402 Captain reported hearing an aircraft on final approach during back-taxi at non-towered airport.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On RNAV arrival the crossing restriction was between 12000-11000 feet and we crossed at 13000 feet. Because of a dual MFD failure we became task saturated. Proper descent planning separate from automation.




Synopsis: An air carrier pilot reported non compliance with a published crossing restriction.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMUN.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center MMID
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were cleared for the EDGAR 1B arrival into MMUN; landing on RW30L. We checked the step-down points and found an error at the fix: EDGAR. It's published on the Jepp plate as 280/FL 390BFL340A. However; the arrival loaded into the Pegasus FMC with: 280/FL320BFL340A. Since it is impossible to be 'below FL320' and 'above FL 340'; we changed the fix data in the FMC. I don't know what the plane would have actually flown in this case. The data in the FMC must be reliable.




Synopsis: Captain states that while the EDGAR1B arrival to MMUN shows crossing EDGAR between FL390 and FL340 at 280 knots; the FMC showed the crossing as 280/FL320BFL340A which is not possible.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B BOS
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During approach to runway 4R behind a 737; ATC advised to 'descend and maintain 2;500 feet' upon reaching 2;500 feet we encountered buffet and then a strong roll to the left. I applied opposite aileron and the plane recovered after exiting the wake turbulence. I believe ATC instructions placed the aircraft in the direct path with the previous arrival's wake turbulence. Other company aircraft were allowed to 'descend at pilot's discretion' and I believe that should have been our instructions.




Synopsis: A pilot reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to BOS in trail of a B737. Reporter stated he would have been happier with 'descend at pilot's discretion' clearance.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Aircraft component: Rudder Pedal
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After taxiing into position on Runway 18L; I set the parking brake and transferred control to the First Officer who was going to be the Pilot Flying. When cleared for takeoff; the First Officer released the parking brake and spooled the engines to 50% and rolled forward to the takeoff power point. The First Officer then verbally turned control back to me and said there is a problem with the rudder pedals. I continued at 50% long enough to understand what was the problem; then went to idle and advised the Tower we were discontinuing the takeoff and our intention was to taxi clear [of the runway] and evaluate. After evaluation we requested a gate and advised Maintenance and Dispatch.When the First Officer began to make minor steering inputs at the beginning of the takeoff roll; his rudder pedals were locked together (not able to move interdependently left and right) and; instead; they moved freely forward and aft instead of staying fixed at the selected position. A First Officer never utilizes his rudder pedals until actually using them during the takeoff roll. Today; a less experienced First Officer may have continued the takeoff rather than verbalizing a problem. I suggest we include a check of the rudders by the First Officer to the flight control check.




Synopsis: After taxiing the A321 into position and setting the brakes the Captain transferred Pilot Flying duties to the First Officer.  Upon brake release and power up for takeoff the First Officer discovered he was unable to apply independent left or right rudder inputs.  They rejected the takeoff at low airspeed and returned for maintenance.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp has loaded Hazmat without the 15 bags in PIT XX. PIT weight limit can only take a max of 14 bags; so Ramp moved the Hazmat in PIT XY. Aircraft never showed returned to the block; unless the Ramp went out on taxi way to move the Hazmat which is unsafe. Was the Hazmat really moved?




Synopsis: Airline ground personnel reported incorrect Hazmat cargo configuration was reported corrected in computer load program without aircraft cargo being corrected.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sundowner 23
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I neglected to write down the traffic pattern altitude (TPA) of the airport; ZZZ; prior to take off. I used my EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) to look up the information during the descent but I misread and wrote down the airport elevation instead of the TPA. Starting at 10 nm. out; I called out my intention to overfly the field at; what I now realize; TPA. I don't recall any aircraft announcing positions at that time. When overflew the field; at between 2;500 to 2;300 ft.; I announced my position; altitude; and the intention to join the downwind. An aircraft had just taken the active runway but had not yet started the takeoff roll. I don't recall any other aircraft in the pattern. I was actually at or slightly below TPA but I believed myself to be at approximately 1;000 ft. above TPA so I continued to descend. By the time I turned base; I realized I was too close to the ground. I added power and climbed until I felt comfortable. I continued to fly the plane using visual references and landed. On the ground; I reviewed the airport information and realized my mistake. While I am glad that I decided to fly instead of continuing down a faulty process; I should have prepared better; double checked my information; knowing that I am more prone to error when multitasking; and I should have realized; by sight; that I was at TPA when I crossed the field. From now on; I will make a double check of the airport elevation and TPA a prelanding checklist item.




Synopsis: BE23 Private Pilot reported overflying the field at pattern altitude and descended too low on the approach to land.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BOI.Airport, ID
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The flight was BOI and crossed a strong cold front that included moderate turbulence and a strong tailwind. The autopilot disconnected around 18000 ft. due to turbulence and I elected to fly the rest of the STAR by hand. ATIS was reporting visual approaches and we requested the Visual via an RNAV Approach ground track. We broke out and had the field in sight.  My First Officer commented 'isn't this where everyone gets a GPWS warning?'  I replied; 'yes; we're supposed to turn inside the base ground track.' Then I didn't. I started the turn as if I were flying the RNAV approach and combined with a strong tailwind; received a solid yellow terrain caution and the aural 'Pull Up' warning. I had the field and terrain in sight and increased my bank angle to the 'inside of the base ground track' and rejoined the approach guidance on final.We talked about the night visual guidance for this airport on the ground. It says to follow the approach guidance to the runways L/R. Fat; dumb; and happy; I did not catch that the RNAV Approach for the rightis still NOTAM'd out of service by Company until reviewing the data for this ASAP. I feel like an idiot. I humbly submit the following recommendation expecting that 99% of Company pilots won't need it. Change the Night Visual Approach Guidance for this airport in the Aeronautical Information Circular to read 'Authorized with the following additional restrictions. Follow instrument approach procedure or radar vectors to VGSI. RNAV Approach IS out of service due to terrain cautions.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier Captain conducting a night time visual approach reported receiving a Terrain Warning due to not following Company guidelines but continued the approach.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After pushback from gate X and start and the after start checklist was complete we received a salute and cleared to taxi from the ground crew.  The FO called and received a taxi clearance for [spot]; after we received our taxi clearance I heard ramp control clear '[other company flight]  cleared to push when able'.  The Captain began taxing and we all noticed a bump like we ran over a chock. At that time we stopped and received notification from ramp control to hold position which at that time we made the realization that we had made contact with another aircraft.   Followed by a ramp agent coming out to tell us hold position.


Second narrative: After push back and cleared by ramp crew; check list complete we were cleared to taxi;  FO said clear right and I said clear left.  We started to taxi and with in 10 feet felt the airplane shake as if we run over a chock; we stopped not knowing what happened and soon found out our wing right wing tip had hit the left tip of the aircraft that pushed next to us.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported a critical ground conflict during the start of taxi with an aircraft that had partially pushed back from nearby gate.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft Y departed ANC Runway 25R assigned heading 210 climbing to 040. Aircraft X IFR departed ANC Runway 15 assigned heading of 200. The initial lateral separation was 4 miles; however Aircraft X was showing an increasing ground speed compressing with Aircraft Y. The North Radar Controller restricted Aircraft X to 020 and turned the aircraft westbound on course. The North Radar Controller expressed concern over the operation; specifically believing the Local Controller did not understand divergence and that the operation had the potential to result in a loss of separation. I called the Tower to ask what type of separation was being applied between the two departing aircraft; and was informed that the Tower had been using lateral separation. The aircraft had never been closer than 4 miles apart in their opinion. I stated that I wanted to make sure that the Controller understood that 10 degrees was not sufficient for divergence. The Local Controller came down to the TRACON on his break asking about the incident. I reiterated that there was no loss of separation; just a concern about the procedure and that it had caused several questions.Question: Does lateral separation exist if the aircraft before the aircraft is established in radar contact? The radar identified aircraft were not provided radar service until the North Radar Controller identified the aircraft and issued radar contact.Question: Aircraft X heading 200 needed to turn to the right for route of flight; Aircraft Y heading 210 needed to turn left for route of flight; the faster aircraft was behind. What is the expectation for ensuring constant and increasing separation for the Tower and Radar Controller?There is a lot of confusion between the Tower and Approach concerning fan headings and DVA due to a recent change in the DVA. The application of fan headings is not consistent between crews and expectations are not being met on both sides of the issue.




Synopsis: A11 Controller questions the procedure of ANC departing a slower aircraft before a faster aircraft and what type of separation they were using.