Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZSE.ARTCC, WA
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZSE
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute; Handoff / Assist
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Distraction; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I arrived in the area at the beginning of my shift and was asked to perform OJTI on Sector 13 for a D-side developmental I had not previously trained. I have however worked with this developmental before and he is already certified on 1 low and 2 other high sectors. OJTI was simultaneously being performed on the R-side. The sector had hot SUAs (Juniper/Hart complex) in the sector with multiple aircraft from PDX already operating within its confines. We normally staff a D-side during this scenario since the SUAs proximity (20-40 miles) to Sector 46 and 16 requires rapid coordination during recoveries. It is my understanding that the aircraft entered Juniper/Hart as maybe only 2-3 total separate flights. However; during recovery they returned as 2-pair flights in rapid succession which meant we had 5-7 separate flights to contend with. Communication between the R-side and D-Side developmental was poor and we quickly got behind on our coordinations (point outs to 46 and 16) and computer entries for flight plan data (assigned altitudes; routes; number in formation).During this busy period; multiple keyboard entries were being made by both developmentals. One common entry in this case is the drop track (QX command); used on the data block of the second aircraft when the flight lead reports 'standard formation'. At some point; a computer entry was made to drop track (QX command) on CID 387. This was the CID for Aircraft X. He was in the southern part of the sector; approaching ZOA Sector 45 airspace. In the northern part of the sector; the CID for another aircraft was 384. Looking at the replay; the drop track message for Aircraft X was entered at. A few minutes later; the ZOA-45 controller called us on the shout line asking; 'what is Aircraft X doing?' We looked and saw a limited data block (uncorrelated beacon target) on the boundary with ZOA-45 at FL250. The ZOA-45 controller stated 'radar contact' and gave his initials.As an OJTI; do not let the poor communication between D-side/R-side become a detriment to the operation of the sector so much so that it creates an unsafe workload situation. Even with 4 of us working the sector; not one noticed that we had a limited beacon target tracking south towards ZOA-45. We all got tunnel vision trying to work on the recovery and missed this anomaly for over five minutes. It is a good reminder as an OJTI to stay extra vigilant. Automation-wise; it would be helpful if an extra step or confirmation was required in order to 'drop track' on an aircraft in ERAM just as there is with the RS (remove strip) message. That could have saved us in the beginning.




Synopsis: ZSE Center Controller reports of a CID (Computer Identification) being dropped; causing an airspace violation and confusion from the next controller. Workload was high due to recovery from SUA.