Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SKEC.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A SKEC
ATC / advisory: Center SKEC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Pre-departure flight planning was completed in [departure airport] operations as is standard. Both the FO and Relief Officer (RO) were present during this flight planning. Two areas of high terrain were noted on the flight plan verbally to the FO and RO along with annotations on the flight plan document. The first area to be transited is a route often flight planned (UL417) with terrain along path up to 15;600 feet. This terrain parallels a published 'no fly zone' and is below our procedural depressurization descent altitude of 17;000 feet.The second area of terrain was positioned along UG444 underlying waypoints MAKBU and UBLAX at an altitude of 18;400 feet which is above our procedural depressurization descent altitude of 17;000 feet. UG444 is not a normal route. I accepted the flight plan knowing that we could transit this route with a decision point like our current practice on UQ108 and UB560 - airways that are located outside of the 'no fly zones'. Alternatively; that area could be circumnavigated with a very small impact on time and fuel burn. Fuel planning on the flight plan included 'dispatch add' of 2;500 LBS (13 minutes) and holding of 4;539 LBS (24 minutes).At approximately XL:00Z a message was sent to dispatch asking if they were aware of terrain on UG444 at waypoints MAKBU and UBLAX. The intent of the message was to make the new dispatcher (shift change) aware of the terrain and request a depressurization decision point. She volunteered to run a 'resident depressurization' program and sent the result. Expecting a single decision point as per current practice like that on UQ108; we were surprised to receive a calculation that had 18 latitude and longitude decision pairs that would suffice for depressurization planning. The format and complexity of the calculation rendered it unusable. Please note that this high terrain is still over 3 hours away.In a series of ACARS communications dispatch was advised that our current route was unacceptable absent a usable decision point. During this back and forth dispatch became increasing defensive eventually to the point of threating to get the Chief Pilot on duty on the line for a conference.Shortly thereafter we received a SATCOM SELCAL. On line was the Dispatcher and the Chief Pilot on duty. The nature of the call can be characterized as confrontational and certainly not in pursuit of resolution. I was questioned by the Chief Pilot specifically about my flight planning procedures and my acceptance of the flight plan. The dispatcher demanded the CVR be pulled at termination of the flight. In short; the situation was escalated with very little focus on solving the problem of high terrain in the event of depressurization. The dispatcher rather than becoming a resource to facilitate safety became a road block to the solution. A re-route had been repeatedly asked for to avoid high terrain in the absence of acceptable depressurization planning. The dispatcher stated that high terrain existed to the west of the airway and thunderstorms to the east. Rather than seeking an acceptable solution; the dispatcher was making excuses that were factually incorrect. Contrary to the dispatchers statement of terrain to the west the grid Minimum Off Route Altitude (MORA) immediately west is 9;100 feet. Also to the west is Barranquilla and then the Caribbean Sea. Near the end of the conversation dispatch was advised that we would choose an acceptable route clear of the terrain in absence of their help. Referencing the South American Low Altitude Enrounte Charts 1 and 2; a new route was selected from ELB (on flight plan) direct to STA (new fix) direct to SELAN (on flight plan). This new route added about 3 minutes flying time; provided terrain clearance and weather avoidance. Dispatch was advised prior to re-route. Barranquilla center re-cleared our flight via the requested route.The flight departed the original flight plan route via fix ELB at XA:09Z. At XO:35Z dispatch sentan ACARS message with enroute diversion information of an acceptable format; a request made over three hours earlier. Receipt of this information occurred well after our departure from the original flight plan route rendering it useless.In summary. Dispatch was confrontational to the point of neglecting safety. Requests for help to calculate a depressurization decision point were ignored until that information was useless. Dispatch was situationally unaware to the point that their statements did not reflective an understanding of terrain location to facilitate a re-route. Dispatch escalated the situation to a point of conflict and completely neglected resolution. The Chief Pilot on call did not facilitate a solution and in fact appeared to question flight planning procedures in an attempt to create impropriety. Given the Chief Pilot's lack of concern for depressurization planning in high terrain; specifically the South American division; I am concerned that this chief lacks knowledge and experience in this area. The potential impact on safety cannot be understated. Crew emotions ran high thereby creating an atmosphere not conducive to a safe operation. This escalation impacted rest breaks and the crew's ability to achieve sleep on their breaks with the ultimate effect of crew fatigue. The process served to distract the crew from its most important duty of flying the airplane.Dispatch should be a resource to the flight crew. Chief Pilots should not be used by dispatch to intimidate flight crews especially in flight. Company procedures for pressurization descent planning should be updated to include a review of all routes in South America with specific training in techniques for terrain analysis and decision making using a precise methodology.




Synopsis: B777 Flight Officer mentions improper flight planning policy with regards to terrain clearance/avoidance for Depressurization scenario due to high terrain along their route in South America. Crew contacts Dispatch while enroute asking for a new route to properly avoid terrain in case of a depressurization issue and is left on their own to file a new route after Dispatcher and on duty Chief Pilot question the flight crew's reasoning. New route is filed by crew and accepted by Colombian ATC some 3 hours later.