elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Fighting Falcon F16
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Tactical
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Medium Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working the CIC position in the tower cab with GC (Ground Control) and LC (Local Control) split off. LC cleared Aircraft X for landing or option clearance for Runway 15; as they were coming in for a 4 ship initial. LC departed Aircraft Y runway heading off of Runway 15 that was eventually going to ZZZ. LC told the Aircraft X flight to break approach end when they were about a 2 mile final and issued the traffic of Aircraft Y that was departing. I then reminded LC that with a 4 ship; that the flight will be extended out for Aircraft Y that was departing. I then walked over to the left side of the cab to better see the [flight] in their break. Once I seen the 3rd one break and the position of the 4th aircraft; I told LC that they needed to break now. LC told Aircraft X to break and asked if Aircraft X [number 4 aircraft] had Aircraft Y in site. Aircraft X [number 4 aircraft] replied back negative just as he was breaking over the top of Aircraft Y. One of the pilots then said something like 'that was close' or 'a little close'. It was hard to hear which pilot said that live and on the tape.LC needed to recognize that a flight of 4 [aircraft] are going to be pretty spread out. Even an approach end break was still not going to work. Having Aircraft Y in a turn to the east and not runway heading created more conflict.




Synopsis: Tower Controller In Charge reported that a flight of four aircraft came into the airport and while they were arriving the Local Controller departed an aircraft which resulted in an airborne conflict.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: FMS was programmed on the HYPER 5 arrival landing south due to that being the advertised configuration before departure. Upon descent in IAD; crew did not hear of the landing direction change (landing north) and therefore did not re-program the FMS to reflect such changes. Therefore; after reaching the MULRR fix; aircraft proceeded to the COUVR fix instead of SIGBE. ATC then advised crew of lateral deviation and instructed them to proceed direct to HUSEL to rejoin the arrival for runway 1R. The lateral deviation which could have brought the aircraft in close proximity to others. An error would have been not verifying that the information previously entered in the FMS is still correct for the current conditions at the landing airport. Next time I would verify with ATC (even multiple times; if necessary) the runway assignment especially during an RNAV arrival. Also; I would make sure to verify that it is properly entered into the FMS and cross-check with the other crew member to make sure it is correct.




Synopsis: EMB145 First Officer reported entering the expected arrival and runway into the FMC prior to departure then not changing it when the airport switched from landing south to landing north. This resulted in a track deviation on the HYPER5 into IAD.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BTV.TRACON, VT
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C BTV
ATC / advisory: TRACON BTV
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: While on radar vectors for an ILS for Runway 33; in IMC; ATC issued a vector and a descent to 5;500 ft. in the vicinity of terrain charted at 4;056 feet southwest of the Runway 33 approach course. Simultaneous with leveling off at 5;500 feet; we received a ground proximity warning for terrain. The autopilot was immediately disconnected and a climb was initiated. Almost immediately the ground proximity warning went away and ATC asked us to stop the climb at 6;000 feet for traffic holding overhead. New climb and vector instructions were given and we continued with an uneventful approach and landing. As soon as we received the ground proximity warning was received an immediate climb was initiated and the warning went away immediately. It's hard to say with absolute certainty on a cause. Our descent rate was between 1000 to 1300 FPM; so it wasn't drastic by any means and we were in radar contact with ATC. It seems that we were within seconds of likely never even getting a warning as we were leveling off as it happened. We reacted in accordance with making sure the airplane climbed and the ground proximity warning went away. A vector away from the highest terrain in the area would've almost certainly meant we never would've got the ground proximity warning. Left or right around that particular mountain would be best.


Second narrative: [Narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported that ATC vectored them towards terrain; resulting in a GPWS warning.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap/Slat Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute FL310 Autothrottle rapidly went to idle thrust concurrent with EICAS message FLAP DRIVE. First Officer PFD speed tape displayed red overspeed tape down to amber under speed indicator. Disconnected A/T then followed Flight Manual Flap Drive procedure. Split flap indicators displayed with outboard in amber and left tape showing partial flaps extension. No adverse control wheel or trim indications. First Officer conducted visual inspection of flaps from aft cabin windows and noted no apparent extension. [We] established SATCOM with Dispatch to Maintenance. Data download indicated left outboard flap sensor sending erroneous flap extended signal. [We] discussed potential flap lockout due to erroneous flap position indicator and potential for split flap or no flap landing. [We] asked Dispatch to investigate long runway options enroute in event no flap landing necessary. Subsequent discussion determined our destination was the safest option due to crash/fire/rescue capability. Asked Dispatch to coordinate with ATC for us to remain at clean maneuvering speed or higher until downwind to preserve fuel and runway options should flaps fail to extend. ATC complied. Flaps Drive EICAS intermittent message but was not active on arrival. Flaps extended normally. Briefed Purser of potential for last minute cabin prep but did not advise passengers and declined equipment standing by once we had flap extension. Procedure has guidance for split flap landing but minimal information on no flap landing. The only reference noted was the abnormal landing distance chart. No maneuvers profile was found.




Synopsis: A B747-400 intermittent flap position sensor malfunction at cruise caused a partial flap extended signal which positioned the autothrottles to idle because of an overspeed detection. The warning was false and a normal landing ensued.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was called on reserve to fly a ferry flight. I went into Dispatch to talk about the status of the plane and our flight. The aircraft had speed restrictions for a main landing gear door missing and I wanted that reflected on the flight plan. I also talked to Maintenance about why the airplane was being ferried. They said it had had an oil pressure issue on the previous day's flight. I asked if it had been fixed and they said it had OP checked good. After dealing with other minor maintenance issues we started the engines and I noticed the engine pressure maintained well inside the normal range. We thoroughly briefed our plan as a crew and prepared for takeoff. As the First Officer added power during the takeoff I watched the oil pressure closely. Before the throttles even got to the set position the pressure was indicating in the yellow range and indicated 120 PSI and climbing fast at the rejection. I do not believe we had even reached 40 KTS at that time.The event occurred because the AC was not properly repaired. It seemed that it could not be duplicated by maintenance when they tried the night before.




Synopsis: A reserve Captain; asked to ferry a CRJ-200 that had been written up with an oil pressure issue the night before but which could not be duplicated by maintenance; monitored oil pressure closely as the First Officer began the takeoff roll. When the oil pressure fell into the yellow range early in the roll the takeoff was rejected and the aircraft returned to the gate.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GCY.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: CTAF GCY
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While I was taking off from GCY on Runway 23 someone else was doing a GPS approach using 05 runway. As I was climbing out the other aircraft did a missed approach and they turned East and I turned Northwest to miss each other. I had announced my takeoff on the radio. I did not hear the other aircraft position. No accident occurred. I am not sure if the other aircraft ever saw me.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported an NMAC during climb out.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Returning to home field after training flight. It was my seventh landing that day. Pilot induced oscillations [caused] nose wheel collapse and prop strike. Probably landed too fast. Remedy; more training.




Synopsis: Cirrus SR22 pilot reported pilot induced oscillation while landing resulted in a nose gear collapse and prop strike.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Gulfstream V / G500 / G550
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Gulfstream was being worked by me as a departure climbing to 23000 feet. The Regional Jet was a departure; which was pointed out to the sector. When I noticed that the Regional Jet was climbing slowly; I stopped the Gulfstream at 21000 feet; but didn't change the data block. The sector called to determine if the Gulfstream was stopped below the point out. The other controller felt that separation was lost. I felt that at least 3 miles was maintained at all times and lateral separation was maintained until vertical separation was established. I should have taken the handoff back and amended the altitude in the data block to show the aircraft was stopped at 21000 feet.




Synopsis: ZNY ARTCC Controller reported allowing less than required separation between successive departures and failing to enter the correct altitude in the data tag.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Aircraft Y as he was flying about .5 to 1 mile south of the airport at 1;000 feet making East and West passes. He was pointed out to the tower as we usually do because the tower controllers say they dont want to talk to the Aircraft Y company aircraft. Tower called me for a release on Aircraft X to depart to the South and I said released. As Aircraft Y said he was turning back westbound he said I have the traffic in sight on departure roll and maintaining visual so I immediately called tower and said Aircraft X has him in sight maintaining visual. Tower then called me back and said that was close because the Collision Alert (CA) alarm went off. I don't know when the tower will launch the aircraft that I give releases on as sometimes its 1 minute and sometimes its as long as 7 to 10 minutes. Tower knew Aircraft Y was making East and West passes and launched the Ifr departure directly at the VFR traffic South of the airport.We need to point out the Aircraft Y's working in towers airspace. If they will be flying in their airspace we need to always switch them to the tower. We don't know when an aircraft will be departing this airspace so it is much easier for the tower to be talking to both aircraft in their airspace.




Synopsis: ATC Controller reports of issuing a release to a tower for a departure and issues traffic they are working in close proximity. Tower departs the aircraft and gets visual on the pointed out aircraft. Tower then calls TRACON Controller and says that was close. TRACON Controller does not like that the Tower departed the aircraft so close to the point out.
Date: 201701
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPWS
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight; the NO GPWS INOP light illuminated. The Captain read the QRH; we sent in the Fault Reporting Manual code; and did not receive the normal and automated response from maintenance (the ACARS system went down). During final approach to ZZZ and after being fully configured for runway XYR; the airspeed maximum and minimum maneuver speed amber and red and black were all visible on the PFD. As I understand; the amber maximum maneuver speed bar should not be visible after being fully configured for landing. Our indications seemed very abnormal. The safe speed window was very narrow and fluctuating because of the turbulence.As we descended on final; the ride was moderate turbulence. The aircraft in front of us performed a go around then reported plus and minus 30 knots wind shear. We were also experiencing airspeed fluctuations and made the decision to go around (GPWS INOP). During the go around maneuver; the flaps would not retract and the safe speed margin was extraordinarily narrow. The moderate turbulence continued. It was difficult to maintain a safe airspeed and climb rate. I focused on flying the airplane.During the event; the Captain [advised ATC] and we continued our climb eastbound; meanwhile requesting higher altitudes with ATC. After knowing we were at a safe altitude with the aircraft in positive control IMC; the Captain returned the flap selector to flaps 30 and then we were finally successful with flap retraction. The gear warning horn sounded almost the entire time.Wind shear conditions continued at ZZZ with more aircraft going around. We proceeded to our alternate and landed there without further incident.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported ambiguous airspeed indications on approach in windshear and rainy conditions.
Date: 201901
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: As you know; [Company] now wants pilots to conduct Autoland approaches for aircraft currency vs the previous protocol where maintenance could restore the currency. My safety concern is that most approaches we fly are in weather above 800/2. Of course; there is an FOM paragraph that address this. The paragraph notes that we must notify tower so they may protect the critical area. As [we] know; at busy airports; the critical area cannot and will not be protected. As required; ATC will notify us of the unprotected area. The FOM goes on to say that while an autoland is authorized with an unprotected area; that LOC/GS beam bending may result in the possibility of a runway excursion. So [company] recognizes the possibility of a runway excursion with an unprotected critical area autoland; yet tell us to go ahead and chance it anyway. That's just plain old crazy. [Instances of this procedure causing this type of problem have already occurred.] If the logic break noted in the previous paragraph does not change [Company's] mind on this procedure; I'd hope the [aforementioned incident] causes an immediate change in [Company] procedures.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer reported that a policy change was made encouraging the pilots to complete dangerous autoland operations.