elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: RJJJ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center RJJJ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Crew flying at the time encountered severe turbulence at FL310. Aircraft gained 340 feet and had a speed reduction of around 20 knots. I was in the supernumerary compartment at the time. This was all info give to me by the crew who were flying at the time.


Second narrative: Two back to back severe turbulence encounters at FL310. While at cruise just on top of a high cloud layer; we experienced severe turbulence in two back to back encounters. Aircraft felt like it hit a wall of wind shear and was thrown up 340 feet. Very violent. Somehow; autopilot stayed engaged. Airspeed went down just to the foot. Aircraft immediately started to correct back down to altitude regaining airspeed. Shortly thereafter a second encounter almost as severe as the first occurred. Aircraft handled it in the same way. Mach .82 at 685;000 pounds gross weight. Never have I felt anything quite like this. As Pilot Monitoring; I immediately reported this to Tokyo Control knowing [company aircraft] was right behind us. They offset; but unfortunately still encountered the same severe turbulence. Many aircraft on the frequency were concerned about their flight path and Tokyo Control somehow was confused so I began to repeatedly report the LAT/LONG position of outrage encounter so they could avoid. Not impressed with Tokyo Control. Reported [to Operations] also. Both encounters caused a very brief instant stick shaker of only momentary activation. We were ready to take action but aircraft recovered very nicely with autopilot remaining on.There were no warnings. We were clear of any convective activity; well above returns below. I also had the EFVS on in cruise; something I learned going to South America at night over the Amazon during a moonless night as being useful. Severe Turb warnings [Operations] had dutifully provided were no where near this location. We could not avoid this.


Synopsis: B777-200 flight crew reported encountering several and un-forecasted clear air turbulence incidents during cruise.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: Tower ATL
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to Runway 26R we were assigned 170 kts to AJAAY. We were behind a Boeing 767 and were closing on him. We started to get into his wake turbulence. At about two and a half miles behind the Boeing 767 we started to slow. As a result; we began to slow before AJAAY. I should have told Tower we needed to slow due to spacing and wake turbulence.


Second narrative: Assigned 170 knots to AJAAY. Visual 26R. Behind Heavy B767; wind straight off nose; distance decreasing to aircraft ahead.  Configured and slowed prior to AJAAY to maintain spacing and wake turbulence avoidance.


Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported slowing too early on approach to ATL in his efforts to avoid wake turbulence in trail of a B767.
Date: 201207
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon descent into LAX on the SADDE 6 arrival we were assigned speed 250 KTS over SYMON. Shortly after SYMON; we were given the speed 220 KTS. We then began to get light to moderate wake turbulence due to the aircraft ahead of us showing less than 5 miles separation on our TCAS. The Captain began slowing to give us more separation from our traffic. Shortly before SMO VOR we were queried on our speed. We were at 200 KTS and stated so. The Controller told us to speed up to 220 KTS to which we promptly did. The flight continued the arrival and approach with no further incident. The Captain spoke with the supervisor at SoCal Approach over the phone and explained his intentions. The primary cause of this event was our airplane entering an area of wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us. Based on our TCAS; it appeared we were less than 5 miles from them. The Captain began to slow in order to give space and lessen the turbulence. Our failure was to inform ATC of our speed reduction.




Synopsis: B737-400 First Officer reported deviating from ATC assigned speed when they encountered wake turbulence from preceding aircraft on arrival to LAX.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PAO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ; Class D PAO
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Aircraft component: Switch
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While enroute with flight following; I turned on the auxiliary fuel pump. I switched tanks; and turned off what I thought was the fuel pump. I experienced a loss of power to the fuel gauges and made note of the time. I calculated that I had plenty of fuel and continued toward my destination. I assumed that the recent fuel tank repair was the cause of the current problem and checked the fuses; which were okay. At that time; I realized that I was without radios and activated my hand held radio. I contacted approach and told them that I was proceeding to HAF. I requested that approach contact HAF to facilitate visual confirmation of my gear being down. Approach informed me that due to the lack of tower at HAF that SQL would be able to confirm my gear down. I was aware that the master switch could be in the off position but I did not want to add to the already problematic situation by cycling it. I agreed with Approach that proceeding to SQL was appropriate and proceeded there. Approach tried to direct me to another frequency but I was unable to change the frequency and I requested to stay with them. They asked if I was using my PIC final authority for an emergency and I felt that they were requiring me to do so in order to continue helping me. So to fully cooperate I declared one. I then requested a change to PAO for the landing due to my familiarity with its larger open spaces. I landed at PAO and discovered that when I changed tanks I mistakenly turned off the master instead of the fuel pump. I have now practiced with the emergency backup radio and can change frequencies.




Synopsis: PA-28 pilot reported mistakenly turning off the Master Switch while selecting fuel tank.
Date: 201402
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Other Departure / Pushback
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After disconnecting the tow bar; I had the wands crossed waiting for the push tractor and the other Wing Walker to be beyond my position. As I looked to my left; to make sure they were clear; the aircraft applied power and turned despite my still crossed wands.




Synopsis: Not withstanding the Marshaller's still crossed wands directing no movement the flight crew of an E-135 initiated taxi away from the ramp.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: 9
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was departing on an instrument flight plan. I received my clearance from Approach while parked at the FBO; and was told to hold short of Runway 9. During taxi to Runway 9; I was monitoring Approach and CTAF simultaneously on separate radios. After stopping before the hold short markings for Runway 9; I advised Approach that I was number one for departure Runway 9. Approach advised me that there was a King Air on an instrument approach to Runway 9; and cleared me for departure; 'void if not off in five minutes'. Although monitoring both frequencies; I overheard the King Air calling final on the approach; but did not hear the distance. Because of the short void time; I incorrectly assumed that the King Air was farther out and that I had a short time to depart. I switched frequencies and called a departure on Runway 9 over the CTAF; and rolled past the hold short markings to begin takeoff. This transmission was quickly met with the King Air pilot calling his position over the runway; and announcing his intention to go-around. I aborted takeoff and announced my intent to abort on CTAF; then contacted Approach to relay this information.As PIC; I should have more closely monitored the position announcements of the King Air. With this information; I would have waited for the King Air to land; and still have been within my five minute void. In the future; I will request guidance from the controlling authority to clarify any vague information; and monitor CTAF frequencies at uncontrolled airports more closely.




Synopsis: A C210 pilot reported a 5 minute clearance void time led to announcing takeoff intentions on the CTAF and hearing a King Air pilot announce a go around on short final.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon walking into aircraft in ZZZ and during the preflight phase; we smelled dirty socks fumes. We immediately called maintenance to the aircraft. 3 technicians confirmed the fumes and had us make a logbook entry. We were instructed to turn off the APU bleed and a few minutes later; Operations has us deplane the passengers. Our entire crew subsequently deplaned.




Synopsis: Air carrier pilot reported the aircraft smelled of dirty socks. Maintenance asked that all passengers leave the aircraft and then the crew deplaned.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: OAKX.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B747-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center OAKX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just before entering Afghanistan Airspace the pilot not flying contacted Kabul ATC on VHF 2. I was monitoring VHF 1 (Karachi ATC) and also listening in on VHF 2. When I heard the pilot not flying telling Kabul that our destination was Kabul (OAKB) I corrected him and told him that our destination was Bagram (OAIX) and he relayed that to Kabul ATC. Abeam Kandahar (OAKN) I did my approach briefing and we continued our flight. At SIBLO we got radar vectors by Kabul ATC. After extensive vectoring for Approach we realized that something was not right since our position did not match up with our Bagram Approach in the FMS. When we told the ATC Controller that our destination was Bagram he advised that was news to him. He was vectoring us for an approach to Kabul. We then got vectors for Bagram and landed there. I've learned to make sure that ATC controller knows your landing airport and pay close attention to where he is vectoring you for an approach.


Second narrative: I personally entered the flight information into the FMS. I mistakenly entered the Kabul identifier into the destination box of the FMS. This error was caught by myself; in flight; just south of the Kandahar Airport enroute to BAGRAM. I definitely had KABUL on my mind as the destination that morning. Poor sleep and a 19 hour duty day the previous day contributed mightily to this incident; in my opinion. ...Crews were a scarce commodity before we arrived here in Dubai and when we arrived; we were quickly assigned another trip that did not coincide at all with our sleeping schedule.


Synopsis: A B747-200 First Officer; fatigued by duty cycles out of sync with his diurnal cycle; entered OAKB vice OAIX as their destination. Two failed vectors for landing occurred before the flight crew became aware of the anomaly and subsequent vectors to the correct airport were successful.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On selection of flaps 5; [we] got TE Disagree EICAS. We checked flaps in detent; it was. Captain assigned me to fly while he went to checklist. We agreed on the proper checklist; and he did TE Flaps disagree checklist. That led to TE Flap Asymmetry checklist. We contacted Maintenance Control; spoke with Dispatch and Maintenance. We decided on an airport; landing speeds and distance required. We shot a visual approach backed by ILS after declaring an emergency. Landing by Captain was uneventful with much room remaining using auto brakes. Crash trucks followed us to ramp. No hot brakes reported. We discussed issue with Maintenance and recorded it in logbook.




Synopsis: B757-200 flight crew declared an emergency during approach because of an abnormal flap configuration and landed uneventfully.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: About 15 minutes into the flight I received an ACARS from dispatch saying that the ramp crew added an extra 10 bags into our aft cargo bin; but did not write it on the cargo load report. The flight was supposed to be full with a jumpseater and prior to the final passenger count we ran the numbers for a full boat with jump with the bags noted at the time. We were going to be close to out Maximum Landing Weight (MLW); but were still within limits. As it turns out we only had 74 people on board 2 of which were children. In flight we changed our Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) to show the new bag count. Again we were close to MLW but due to extended vectors due to weather we landed well below our MLW. I know we didn't exceed any limits because of the message from dispatch; but we easily could have and not have known. Not sure that there was anything we could have done to ensure the bag count was correct without physically counting the bags ours selves.


Second narrative: While enroute we received an ACARS message from our dispatcher who informed us that ops had called and said that the ramp added 10 extra bags to the aft cargo that apparently were not documented on our cargo load report. He said he could run the numbers and be sure that we were within CG limits. The captain added the weight to our zero fuel weight in the FMS and we continued the flight. I discussed the issue of our landing weight with the captain which was near max landing weight. Our dispatcher was communicating well with us and we decided that no further action was necessary/possible at that time. We continued to monitor our landing weight and landed without any issues.In the future this can be prevented by better communication between the ramp crew and flight crew. Fortunately; operations called our dispatcher and relayed the message. We were within a few hundred pounds of max landing weight and without that knowledge we had the potential to unknowingly land over max landing weight.


Synopsis: EMB175 flight crew is informed airborne that the ground crew loaded 10 bags in aft cargo hold without accounting for them on the weight and balance.