elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While taking off in ZZZ; shortly after liftoff noticed smoke in the cockpit but could not determine the source. The smoke presented as a thin haze preceded by an odor that resembled burning plastic. The cockpit door was latched open; packs and bleeds were in the normal takeoff configuration; APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) was off. FO (First Officer) was pilot flying. Continued climb straight out; donned oxygen masks and advised ATC. Began running smoke/fire/fumes QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). Leveled at 4;000 ft. and requested to return to ZZZ; vectored onto a downwind for runway. Accomplished QRH through the bottom of page XX. Since the smoke did not continue to accumulate; decided to pause QRH at that point and set up landing data and approach in FMS (Flight Management System). Priority was given to landing as quickly as possible since smoke seemed to be under control. Smoke dissipated slowly during approach and landing. Pulled off runway onto parallel taxiway and instructed FO to open main door to help ventilate while letting fire personnel inspect exterior of aircraft. Met face to face with fire crew and they reported no visible signs of fire or damage on exterior. Smoke continued dissipating and with no obvious signs of fire or damage on flight deck; decided to taxi to a gate. Taxied to gate with escort from fire crew; shut down and opened door. Fire crew came onboard to search aircraft with heat gun; no hotspots were found. Contacted the chief pilot and Maintenance.[There was] visible smoke/haze in flight deck. [Advised ATC]; returned to fieldFull maintenance base rather than a line maintenance base in our hub would prevent these planes from having to be flown to maintenance elsewhere.




Synopsis: Captain reported smoke in the cabin that resulted in a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SJC.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Challenger 300
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: [We were] cleared for the Fairground Visual Runway 30L. We were at 5;000; flying pilot started to descend prior to the 170 [radial from] SJC. At this point I said 'why are you descending?' He said 'We were cleared for the visual.' I then replied; '170 [radial from] SJC at 5;000.' He stopped the descent and climbed back to 5;000. NORCAL then asked if we are familiar with the Fairground Visual approach. I replied affirmative and at this point we were back at 5;000. We did not descend more then 200 FT. Flying pilot then told me that prior to the 170 SJC radial on the chart it says RECOMMENDED 5;000. Then in small print at the 170 SJC radial it says MANDATORY 5;000. The chart is printed with confusion. They need to remove the RECOMMENDED 5;000 and make it say MANDATORY prior to the 170 radial.




Synopsis: A CL300 Captain cleared for the SJC Fairground Visual Runway 30L was confused about the descent clearance because the Chart stated RECOMMENDED 5;000 FT prior to the MANDATORY 5;000 FT SJC 170 constraint and so he began the descent early.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HPN.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; Turbulence; 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D HPN
ATC / advisory: Tower HPN
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was conducting stop-and-go practice at night at White Plains (KHPN) airport for the purpose of gaining night currency. Winds were 290; approximately 10G20. ATIS mentioned landing runways as Runway 34 and Runway 29. I chose runway 29 as it was more aligned with the wind. I took off Runway 29 and flew a left traffic pattern. I was cleared to land on Runway 29. On final; I found myself lower than needed and I clipped the top of a tree. I subsequently conducted an immediate go-around; [advised the] Tower; and landed the airplane normally on Runway 34. I was alone in the airplane. There was no bodily harm of anyone; nor was there property damaged on the ground. The airplane was damaged. The likely cause of the problem in my opinion is that it is extremely difficult to conduct a normal approach to Runway 29 at night; as there is no VASI light; and the threshold is displaced by a very large distance in order to account for tall trees that border the airfield. Before taking off; I looked for an approach to Runway 29 in order to get an approach profile as a backup; but found there was no such approach (very likely due to the nonstandard configuration of obstacles close to the runway end.) In my opinion; Runway 29 should be closed at night for landing.




Synopsis: A general aviation pilot reported clipping a tree on final approach to HPN Runway 29. Darkness and the lack of a VASI were reported as contributing factors.
Date: 201810
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was always under the impression that the PRM (Precision Radar Monitor) Monitor is there to manage any converging traffic issues and issue break out instructions as described in the ALL USERS page. That is all I ever expected to hear on the PRM frequency. In ZZZ; though; they seem to do way more than that. I've had PRM Monitors ask me for a radio check before; as if checking just to see if we're complying with the procedures. Today I had one really mess me up because inbound to the runway; and already on Tower Frequency (female voice); I heard another person tell us to slow to 170 knots. (Male voice) I answered on Tower and there was no other comment. Then the male voice said 'Slow to 160 knots.' The First Officer then said he thought that was on the PRM Monitor Frequency. I then replied on the PRM Frequency and got no response. A little bit later the male voice; which was the PRM Monitor because I could tell by raising the volume; told us to slow to approach speed. Never once did that voice identify itself as the PRM Monitor. At the least this caused confusion. Usually if there are separation issues on final; the Tower will tell us to slow. Having the PRM Monitor doing that just doesn't seem correct.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported confusion due to being assigned speeds from the Precision Radar Monitor Controller while also on Tower frequency.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 7/8
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I took the runway to return to [base]. The winds were 270/280 at 7-9 knots. The runway was icy with poor to fair braking action. It was after sunset; there were low light conditions. As I was rolling down the runway; I tried to apply crosswind correction and rotate for takeoff. I could not get the yoke to move aft. I immediately tried looking for the problem. As I was looking for the problem; I gained enough airspeed to start skipping across the runway. Since I was not able to control the airplane at that point and on the side of the runway; I reduced power and hit a runway light. I came to a stop after my nose gear collapsed. I shut down and exited the airplane.Although I checked the flight controls on the first leg; I did not check for flight controls to be free and correct [for the return flight] and I should have immediately aborted the takeoff when the problem arose.




Synopsis: Cessna 207 pilot reported his nose gear collapsed after losing directional control while attempting to takeoff with the controls locked.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Crew
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Found crew O2 bottle safetied in closed position.




Synopsis: Crew oxygen bottle was found to be safetied closed.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Data Processing
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While enroute a 'Display Source' flag appeared on both outboard PFD's. Additionally; the First Officer's PFD had 'SPD LIM' flag and the low speed indicator was missing. We referred to the QRH and notified Maintenance Control and Dispatch via ACARS. After approximately 30 minutes we started losing additional equipment. We lost the First Officer's weather radar; both ECC's went into ALT mode; Captain's low speed limit; and the First Officer's pitch F/D. Based on what information we had lost I surmised we had lost the #2 Display Electronic Unit (DEU) and possibly some information from #1 DEU. I was monitoring the weather in our filed destination and at that time it was [900 FT] BKN; RA and 10 miles visibility. I referred to the Approach/Landing data for non-ILS approaches and noted we are required to have the Source in AUTO. I interpreted this to mean we need both DEU's. Also; in my judgment it would not be prudent to make an instrument approach with only one DEU operating. If we were to lose the second DEU we lose all 6 displays and would only have the standby for flight instruments and no engine or hydraulic indications. I then made the decision to declare an emergency and divert. We were about 100NM from our divert airport and it was VFR. We landed uneventfully and once on the ground maintenance ran a bite test and it indicated the #2 DEU had failed. Additionally; something did not test properly with the DEU interface. The mechanic pulled both DEU's out and swapped them and reinstalled and tested again. This time both DEU's passed. Maintenance released the aircraft with the remark of no previous history. I flew this aircraft 2 more legs and everything worked normally.




Synopsis: A B737-800 First Officer's Display Electronic Unit (DEU) failed in flight so the crew diverted to a VMC airport where Maintenance determined that both DEU's had faults.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft's left engine stalled on short final to landing; approximately 200 FT above the ground. Since the power was below idle and I was in a position to land and keep control of the aircraft; I made a landing on [the runway]. On the landing roll-out I confirmed that the left engine had stalled and taxied off the runway onto taxiway. The Tower Controller asked me if I had lost an engine once I had taxied off the runway; and I replied yes. I attempted to re-start the left engine on Taxiway C; but could not so airport operations towed the aircraft to the GA Ramp. I immediately contacted Operations and Maintenance to notify them of the problem. After conferring with Maintenance; I noticed that the left fuel selector valve had inadvertently moved to an intermediate position cutting off fuel to the left engine. This was confirmed when I slightly moved the selector back to the ON detent and successfully restarted the left engine. A Contract Mechanic was notified to observe the engine during a run-up; which he did; then signed off the discrepancy on the maintenance log.




Synopsis: A B58 pilot reported losing the left engine on short final. Following a safe landing; the fuel selector was found slightly out of the 'on' detent; and when properly positioned the engine ran normally.
Date: 201511
Location: JVW.Airport, MS
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 2
Aircraft: Golden Eagle 421
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E JAN
ATC / advisory: TRACON JAN
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Airport is surrounded by towers and has a very specific departure procedure. When departing Runway 12; it requires the pilot to fly heading 124 degrees until leaving 2;600 feet before turning on course. In the event of a Runway 12 missed approach; the pilot is required to climb to 800 feet and then turn left to a heading of 316 degrees and climb to 2;900.This morning; ATC gave as departure instructions; 'entering controlled airspace; turn left heading 010 for obstructions'. I was not comfortable with this as there are antennas due east of the field that are 670 to 1;560 feet high that I had to fly by while in this turn. The outbound 124 heading provides guaranteed clearance with all obstacles without guessing if your turn is tight enough to miss the various antennas. If traffic was an issue and made the controller issue this departure clearance; I'd have been happy to wait for traffic to clear if he'd advised this was the situation. I feel after making this departure and coming out of the cloud tops and seeing how close I was to some of the antennas; that I should maybe have specifically requested the published departure procedure. I have found FAA published procedures are far more trustworthy and safer than the typical air traffic controller being certified now. However; I would also guess that this particular controller is not even aware of the published departure procedures for the local airports.




Synopsis: C421 Captain questions an ATC clearance departing Runway 12 at JVW to 'turn left heading 010 for obstructions upon entering controlled airspace'; but accepts the clearance. He believes that the published obstacle departure procedure would be far safer for avoiding the 1;560 foot tower to the southeast of the field.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During the takeoff roll prior to the 100 knots call; I heard an unusual noise and observed that the first officer's window had opened. Although I knew that we could handle the window problem airborne; I felt compelled to abort because I believed that we were still in the low speed regime. Since we were over 85 knots; RTO began to kick in. I quickly and momentarily applied manual braking to avoid full RTO at such a low speed. We decelerated normally and taxied off the runway to a holding area. We notified company and ATC of the brief RTO and asked for the equipment to check brake temperatures. ARFF notified us that there was some smoke emitting from the main trucks and that the brake temperatures were high. They used water to keep them in check. We were surprised to learn that all four fuse plugs blew out on the right truck although none blew out on the left truck. We deplaned the passengers and crew via busses without incident. After a five hour delay; we operated the trip with a replacement aircraft.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767 crew reported a rejected takeoff below 100 knots and due to the auto braking system four fuse plugs blew out on the right truck.
Date: 202007
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The crew was onboard the aircraft while the cleaners were cleaning; we were asked to deplane so 1 cleaner could spray the aircraft; 3 of us were in the first class cabin; not deplaned yet  when we noticed the cleaner that was supposed to be spraying was using a misting gun that wasn't misting and he was simply walking down the aisle doing nothing with the sprayer but spraying something from a spray bottle. When I approached the cleaners asking why the sprayer wasn't working; he attempted to show me that it was; the machine spewed everywhere and didn't mist. I didn't want to get him in trouble I just wanted to insure the equipment was working. After talking with the cleaner I informed company of the issues; company immediately was talking with; I am guessing; a cleaning supervisor at the same time. Cleaning supervisor was being told by the cleaners that the spraying is complete. Basically the cleaner went through the aisle with a mister not misting and reported it done; NOT OK!!!! When a new crew arrived with misting equipment that did work; it took them 2 minutes to mist a whole aircraft. They walked down the aisle only spraying the aisle; they didn't touch the overhead bins; seats or any other crucial areas. What happened to wiping down every tray table and every overhead bin after every flight? Are the cleaners not trained properly or are they just lazy. We also witnessed; not 1 tray table was lowered or wiped down. If we are telling our passengers of our safety procedures; we need to perform our safety procedures.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns with aircraft cleaning and sanitizing procedures.