elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Altitude Excursion. I was operating with a company instructor pilot.  We were on an IFR flight plan operating in the vicinity of ZZZ.  We had requested a practice RNAV XX instrument approach into ZZZ and were cleared direct to ZZZZZ; maintain 2;000 feet until ZZZZZ; cleared for the RNAV XX into ZZZ.  We were descending out of altitude (above 2;000 feet) and I was wanting to practice cockpit automation.  The minimums for the approach were already programmed in the FMS; so I requested we set the minimums in the altitude selector and got approval from the IP.  I selected LPV minimums with the altitude selector and continued the descent.  At 1;700 feet MSL; I realized that we did not capture 2;000 feet MSL and took appropriate action to return to 2;000 feet.  I'm not absolutely sure; but I believe we may have descended to 1;600 feet before arresting the descent and climbed back to the assigned 2;000 feet.  The approach was then completed normally.  Analysis and debrief revealed that an inadequate brief of the approach with the intended use of automation and a confirmation of correct programming of the automation had not taken place.  The vertical descent mode of the AFCS had been left in VS as opposed to the required selection of the VNV function.  The VNV function would have held us to 2;000 feet while VS only looks at the altitude selector for level off.  Supplemental factors:Do to COVID-19; our flight schedule had been greatly reduced and this was my first day of flying in [X] weeks.   At the time of the altitude excursion; I had been on duty for [X] hours and had flown close to five of those hours.




Synopsis: Pilot reported experiencing an altitude deviation and cited lack of flying due to the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Final landing of the flight was to be made with [pilot receiving instruction] flying the aircraft; previous approach to same runway resulted in a go-around due to low airspeed; and high flare. During approach to the incident landing pilot was at a better altitude however slow on airspeed. Pilot touched down at the stall horn; and immediately pulled the control back over rotating; resulting in an audible scrapping sound with aircraft on the runway center line in a nose up attitude. During the entire approach my hands were in a defensive position; right hand open in my lap ready to catch the yoke coming back; left hand resting on my knee to catch the yoke going forward. Pilot's rotation was quicker than expected; resulting in the tail striking the ground before I was able to catch the yoke.I believe there is little I could have done to prevent this incident from occurring. A stabilized approach to landing should have been required; or go-around executed. At no time did I believe that the landing was unsafe; and being a training flight (last lesson before stage 1 check) I felt it necessary for the student to see how the resultant landing would be or make the decision on their own to execute a go-around.




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported a ground strike due to an unstabilized approach by the pilot flying.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: None
Mission: Traffic Watch
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While flying traffic watch; we were sent to report on [an event] occurring [near Anaheim]. Before entering Fullerton's (FUL) airspace from the east over the 91 freeway; I called FUL and requested a 91 west transition and informed the controller I would be headed into the Disney TFR. At that time I got cleared for the transition; but no squawk code. Noting that; I requested a squawk code and again informed the controller that I would need to be working inside the Disney TFR.I was told to standby and I continued west along the 91 freeway. A moment later I received my code from the controller and was asked if I was turning south towards Disney. I replied that I was and was then given a frequency change to SoCal (TRACON). SoCal was extremely busy so by the time they replied to my initial calls; I was already beginning to circle the [event] inside the TFR. Shortly after I was asked to ident. SoCal saw my ident and stated that I was inside the TFR; asked me how I felt about that; and stated that I had not received clearance into the TFR. I was then asked to leave the area. No statement of violation was made at that time.I was given a discretionary code and had informed TRACON of my intentions. In the past I have worked inside of the Disney TFR by using the same method. I have always asked TRACON to enter; but to my recall have never heard the phrase 'cleared into the TFR'.Another consideration was that I was rushing a bit to get to the scene of the [event]. Also; FUL's airspace abuts the northern edge of the TFR with its southern border where I entered. Time was short.Going forward I will be sure to not only get a discretionary code; but I will be sure to receive an actual clearance to enter the TFR.




Synopsis: Traffic watch pilot reported entering a TFR on correct code and was later questioned by ATC as to not having a clearance into the TFR.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Travelair 95
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We filed an IFR flight plan from APC to O88. The clearance that we received was as follows; we were cleared to O88 airport. After departure direct SGD direct; maintain 5;000; Departure frequency 127.8; Squawk XXXX. After taking off from Napa Airport; we contacted departure. Upon arrival of Scaggs Island VOR; I was not exactly sure where to proceed direct from that point so I made this call 'Oakland Center; verify clear direct to Sacramento VOR which begins the instrument approach to O88 Airport.' Oakland responded with 'Just follow the clearance. What was the clearance that you received?' I told him the clearance. He interpreted the clearance as 'direct Scaggs direct O88. Which part do you not understand!' Now what does 'direct' mean in this case? Where do they expect me to go? Here is the part that is not clear for me. Does the word 'Direct' at the end of a route assignment mean to go direct to the destination airport or to go to the fix or navigational aids? Part 91.181 (b) I asked the question because I was not sure about the clearance. Earlier that day we took off from OAK to SNS. The clearance was 'Cleared to Salinas Airport via Nuevo Five Departure Shoey transition SNS (VOR) direct. Climb and maintain 7;000.' So after we arrive over SNS VOR are we expected to go direct to the airport? We are already over the airport because the VOR is located at the airport. Now what does 'direct' mean in this case? Where do they expect me to go?




Synopsis: IFR pilot questioned the routing issued by ATC with regard to the last word 'direct'; i.e. is the direct instruction to the airport; the IAP or some other point.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I had on-call Maintenance in ZZZ1 deactivate the [Overboard] OB Shut-off Valves (SOVs) and (Inboard) INBD SOVs to comply with an [MEL] 'M' action [procedure] for MEL 21-24-05 and MEL 21-24-06-XX. I printed off the AMM references and faxed these to the on-call Maintenance [Provider]. Later my Trainer asked me if I had sent the [our] Air Carrier's Supplemental to the on-call Maintenance? I told him I had not and I assumed the on-call Maintenance provider had all the documentation he needed. On-call Maintenance performed the 'M' action and incorrectly deactivated the SOVs. With the [Overboard] OB SOV open the CRJ-200 aircraft was not able to pressurize and had to divert. [Recommend to] always reference the internal documents. Documentation missing.

Callback: Reporter stated he was a Maintenance Controller in training; working on an MEL for an Avionics cooling EICAS message. He was referencing a Company Supplemental Manual in his report when he mentioned Supplement (Supp). The Supplemental has enhanced information; diagrams and pictures to help Maintenance perform certain procedures. That Manual was sent to the On-call Contract Maintenance. Without the Air Carrier's Maintenance Supplement; the on-call Contract Maintenance provider had misunderstood the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedure and deactivated the Inboard (I/B) Avionics' cooling valve in the 'Closed' position and locked 'Open' the Overboard Shut-off Valve (SOV); when actually just the reverse procedure should have been accomplished. With the 4' inch wide Overboard Avionics cooling exhaust SOV locked in the 'Open' position; the CRJ-200 could not pressurize.



Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller in training reports that a company CRJ-200 aircraft was not able to pressurize after a Contract Maintenance provider had de-activated the Avionics cooling Inboard Shut-Off Valve to the 'Closed' position and the Overboard Exhaust SOV to the 'Open' position. Procedure was opposite from what the MEL required. Aircraft diverted.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon rotation and Captain call for gear up the trim runaway CAS (Crew Alerting System) message and aural warning came on. The captain interrupted the trim and we immediately let UNICOM know we were [in an emergency situation] and coming back to land. When we tried to trim back nose down it stopped the trim from going up but as soon as the trim switch on the yoke was released it continued to trim up. I as the First Officer had to help the Captain land the aircraft due to strong control forces. Landing was uneventful and taxied into the ramp.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: PC12 flight crew reported they received a 'Trim Runaway' on the Crew Alerting System during rotation. The trim system continued to trim up.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHX.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At cruise FL340 on EAGUL6 arrival into PHX between Zuni and SLIDR when First Officer (F/O) and myself began to feel the aircraft vibrate and shudder. [We] then went into a roll to the left. Not sure if our bank exceeded 30 degrees or not but the F/O who was flying pilot turned off autopilot and rolled plane back level with little if any loss of altitude. I then asked ATC if they had a heavy in our area and they told us they had a B747 that they descended from FL380 in front of us but they were 10 miles ahead. [A B737] behind us reported the same wake turbulence at FL340. We then rearmed the autopilot and requested an offset to the right of course to avoid any further occurrences. I did speak with our flight attendants to let them know what had happened; and as we then started to descend into PHX while briefing the passengers on the current weather in PHX I mentioned that what they felt was the wake turbulence from another aircraft. We landed Runway 26 behind the 747 but slowed for more spacing and remained slightly above the glide path to avoid any further wake encounter. Failure of ATC to provide proper separation from heavy while descending him in front of us. Vector heavy to avoid same course as us or provide more separation.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into PHX 10 miles in trail of a B747 that descended through his altitude.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Seated in 4L outboard jumpseat during ascent to level flight at cruise altitude. Dry ice packet placed on top of meal cart; directly across from jumpseat and at eye level; exploded sending fragments of dry ice into my right eye.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant at jump seat position was struck with shards of dry ice from bag exploding.
Date: 201402
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was told that the outbound flight attendants on this aircraft had called in that they couldn't read the door slide bottle pressures. A Mechanic went up to look and said that the red flag was blocking the inflation cylinder pressure gage and that the slide bottle safety pin was installed. Upon further investigation it was discovered that all of the cabin door slides were pinned. I was told about this and I went and looked and all of the door slides were in fact pinned. From what I was able to find out; it looks as if this aircraft ferried in from ZZZ1 after having work done in the ZZZ1 Maintenance Center. Any time a pin is installed; it should have a write-up and an Inspection item write-up to document its removal.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports their outbound flight attendants noticed the cabin door slide bottle pressures could not be read on a company B757 aircraft. Maintenance then discovered that all of the cabin door slide inflation bottle safety pins were still installed. The aircraft had been ferried in from a Maintenance Center Check.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 180 Skywagon
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Propeller
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was leaving ZZZ where I am based to do practice landings [another airport]. Taxing out of the [parking area] I stopped and requested XX because the sock suggested it was slightly favored; although most the wind was across the runway. The controller indicated that it was unavailable due to pattern work on 28R and I believe offered me 33R or XY before issuing a clearance. I began taxiing to 33R via X-Y. As I approached the XY threshold; I was unclear in my head whether I had been cleared to cross XY and initiated braking. Due to a significant tailwind; the braking was less effective than anticipated and I pushed harder on the brakes; which caused the tail to leave the ground and the prop to strike the taxiway. This initial strike occurred before the hold short line.After the initial strike I believe I let my feet off the brakes briefly before pushing them even harder; which caused a second prop strike and the aircraft to roll up on its nose. The aircraft came to a stop roughly 10-15 feet past the hold short line. In conversation with the ATC supervisor; who had reviewed the tapes; I was told later that in fact I had been cleared to XY via X-Y. This came as a surprise to me; as the question in my mind was whether or not I had been cleared to cross or asked to hold short; which was my expectation of what the controller would have said explicitly relative to the past when a clearance to 33R would have implied a clearance to cross XY. This confusion leads me to believe that the sequence of runways discussed; plus the aircraft that was already in the pattern on 33R caused me to 'hear' something different that was actually said. I'm not sure what would have been better from a clarification perspective other than if I had heard 'hold short' 33R but that would have been non-standard for a clearance to 33R. I believe that my familiarity with the airport was actually a hindrance in this case as it may have led to my being less vigilant than would be typical if I were unfamiliar.




Synopsis: c180 pilot reported braking suddenly due to a confused taxi clearance; resulting in a prop-strike.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: The STARS RADAR used while working local displays a green hue over the maps. Level six weather; which is solid brown; appears as solid green. Solid green is light precipitation; solid brown is extreme precipitation. The IFR departure was given a left turn heading 350. Upon reaching the eastern boundary of the airspace; the pilot informed me he needed to fly heading 075 because of weather and could not complete the turn to a heading of 350. The aircraft was leveling at 050 while breaking airspace boundaries. Coordination was completed with the appropriate sectors and the pilot was able to continue a northbound turn well outside my control jurisdiction. Correct the issue with the STARS RADAR used by Local. The color differences used to depict weather needs to be clearly and correctly depicted in order for correct control instructions and actions to be taken.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an airspace incursion event; the reporter listed the STAR RADAR weather display colors as less than desired for control purposes.