elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed ZZZ Runway X on runway heading the Tower switched the aircraft to me on departure I believed this small faster climbing aircraft with the winds the way they were could turn and climb before getting into the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I told the aircraft to climb to 060 and turn to a 290 heading as to turn tighter than the MVA. They climbed slower than I have seen [aircraft type] climb and took a much wider turn than anticipated. They just clipped the very edge of the ring for the MVA and allowed to Low Altitude alert to go off. I made them do a tighter turn to a 280 to get them facing away from the obstruction.This is a Controller mistake thinking an aircraft could do something in which it is capable of but a pilot may not.




Synopsis: Controller reported turning an aircraft in an attempt to clear an obstacle; but according to the reporter the aircraft turned slower than expected and crossed into a lower Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Aircraft: Falcon 2000
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: Beechjet 400
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working the Foul Line FLM/CIC position. I noted; when I sat down; that the ORD arrivals were continuously exiting their pre-assigned descent airspace; used for arrival into ORD. This was placing the aircraft into Sector 3's airspace. It is important to note; that Rockford Approach feeds Sector 3; at 5;000 [feet] directly towards the ORD finals; and Sector 3 only has roughly 10 miles to descend out of the way. I asked Sector 3 if anyone on arrival had pointed out these aircraft. They said no. Later; when arrival had too many aircraft; they did point out 3 aircraft from the SW descending below the south final; into Sector 3 airspace; but besides these three cases; roughly 20 or more aircraft entered Sector 3 airspace without coordination. On multiple occasions; I addressed the situation with the 20 (Front line FLM/CIC) and the [Manager] was standing there during the conversation. Not only did the 1W1 position continue to violate the airspace; the 1F1; started to as well at 4;000 [feet]; taking two of the three available altitudes from Sector 3. This occurred for well over an hour. When I asked [Front Line Manager; FLM] about it; [the FLM] insisted the fixes were already slowed. I suggested they hold; as they were not staying in their airspace. As predicted; the 1W1 left the airspace again; while we awaited RFD to ship Aircraft Y; so we could descend. We didn't lose separation; however; it was imminent. The aircraft were head on at 5;000 [feet] with 10 miles or less between them; on two separate frequencies.We have procedures and airspace to accommodate for this. The 1W1 has the ability to turn on the final at 6;000 [feet]; and they own 6;000 [feet] to the boundary but chose never to use it. The FLM never assisted in reducing the traffic allowing the vector positions to stay at their turn on points. This isn't the first time I have witnessed and reported arrival spending more than an hour out of their airspace; without coordination; and without management doing anything about it. I have filed reports about this before. Time to correct this problem. Please share with whomever you wish.




Synopsis: C90 TRACON Controller In Charge reported numerous airspace violations due to others not pointing out aircraft correctly.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Transponder
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were level at FL300 ATC mentioned traffic 1 o'clock at FL310 opposite direction. We looked for and spotted the traffic which I thought was closer. About the same time; I heard the other aircraft; say that he had a Resolution Advisory to 'descend.' He said he was committed to follow the Resolution Advisory and descend. My Aircraft is not equipped with TCAS. ATC asked us to recycle our Transponder as they were not receiving our Mode 'C.' ATC also asked if we were level at FL300 as assigned. All 3 Altimeters were indicating 30;000 FT. On descent; we were asked to call out every 1;000 FT. After landing I talked to our Maintenance Supervisor who said that the system was recently checked out; tested and certified for RVSM.




Synopsis: CE550 Captain at FL300 is informed of opposite direction traffic at FL310. At about the same time the other aircraft states that they are descending for a TCAS RA. The CE550 was not TCAS equipped and remained level and is informed by ATC that Mode C has failed.
Date: 202112
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S43.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G S43
ATC / advisory: CTAF S43
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a busy time at the airfield (S43); I entered downwind on a 45 for [Runway] 33R after having to do a 360 to make room for an airplane that had done a go-around and remained in the pattern. I made a call on frequency when I first entered downwind; and then again when I was midfield; calling out that I was #2 to land behind Aircraft Y (The plane that had done the go-around). Behind me Aircraft Z joined the pattern on downwind from a 45. I believe I heard him say he was #3. It was very congested on frequency; with several airplanes in the pattern; and others trying to get weather info; and other airports sharing frequency. I waited until Aircraft Y was abeam my position before beginning my landing sequence; and then waited until Aircraft Y was over the numbers of [Runway] 33R before turning base. I announced base; and then announced final when I began the final turn. The Aircraft Z pilot began his base turn before he had a visual on me; his call on the radio said 'looking for the Aircraft X' (I was announcing as Aircraft X). He completes his base turn ahead of mine and if he had continued onto final we would have been extremely close to each other. He must have seen me finally; because he took evasive action before turning final; and executed a 360 on the base leg; about 300 ft. vertically from my aircraft. I landed without further incident; and so did Aircraft Z. According to the ADSB data in my airplane Aircraft Z was about 300 ft. from me; but it looked a lot closer; and this could have been a mid-air collision. Pilots should confirm aircraft in the pattern ahead of them visually before making pattern turns.




Synopsis: Single Engine low wing pilot reported a NMAC while in the traffic pattern at a non-tower airport.
Date: 201411
Location: ZBAA.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: ZBAA Jeppesen (JEPP) STAR names have no relation to STAR names in FMC. Last minute [crews are scrambling] trying to select proper star in FMC especially when approach control changes assigned star at last minute. JEPP binder does not have STAR key page to match FMC stars with JEPP STARS.

Callback: His First Officer briefed him enroute as to the problem and they searched in advance for the two STARs most likely to be assigned. They determined that if any other were to be assigned they would respond 'unable' and request vectors. He advised his company has provided 'cheat sheets' pairing the disparate identifiers for other airports but had not done so for ZBAA. He responded with a profane guffaw to the analyst's question as to whether the 'new' company flight operations department had been proactive in resolving an issue like this; he submits reports and then abandons hope. The reporter was unable at this time to provide specific examples of the disparities because he had neither his flight bag nor access to an FMS at home but would call back after his next flight during which he would take note of a representative sample and call back.The reporter did; in fact; call back and provided the following examples. The first list is the STAR identifiers that appear in the FMC database and the second will be the presumably corresponding identifiers on the Jeppesen arrival pages. Note that all of these identifiers are proceeded by the letters 'KM' followed by a sequence of two to four letters and/or numbers. There are four additional identifiers--GITUM; DOCAR; VYK and BOBAK--each with multiple numbered arrivals similar to the KM series. The FMC database from which the flight crew must select a STAR by which the FMC will navigate the arrival identifies the 'KM' series as: B01; B36B; 001; 01; 018B; 019; 036B; 18B; 19; 36B; 701; 718b; 719; 736B. The Jeppesen approach plates for the same 'KM' series are identified as (again preceded by 'KM': 7A; 7B; 7C & 7F; 01A & 03A & 05A; 02A (STARS joined by '&' represent multiple 'named' arrivals on a single chart; a common practice in some international arenas).Note further that all of the 'KM' STARs are on pages that only include 'KM' procedures. The other series--GITUM; etc--may include arrivals of multiple series identifiers on a single page.



Synopsis: A B747-400 Captain advised the Jeppesen STAR identifiers for arrivals into ZBAA are not the same as the line selectable STARs in their FMS database.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After I told the Pushback Driver our nose number; their reply was: 'Hi; XXX; towbar connected; were ready for the push.' With all our rollback events at the gate; wingtip clippings and other ground damage of our aircraft in and around the gate area; I try to be as standard and by the book as I can be with my communication with the Pushback Crew. The exact verbiage is pretty much spelled out in AOM table 7.1. So I asked if there was anything else he wanted to tell me; like pin inserted or doors closed and such. Only then did the Pushback Driver; reluctantly; use the correct verbiage. He even added the word '(other carrier)' at the end. Why and how he knew that I was former (other carrier) I do not know; but I took it as a compliment to mean former (other carrier) guys are very by the book and follow the right procedure. During pushback he also told me that 'you can start 'em'.' I then inquired which engine or engines to start. Only then did he tell me to start engine two and one. He gave me a very friendly look after the wave-off.A reminder to use proper procedure and verbiage goes a long way in avoiding misunderstandings between the Pushback Crew and the flight deck and will therefore help avoid future possible damages to aircraft; equipment and personnel. As to calling me an '(other carrier)' in an attempt to ridicule one group over another only leads us to tribalism between groups and does absolutely nothing in keeping it a positive work environment for all of us here.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that the pushback driver did not use standard verbiage during pushback.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEV.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Lockheed Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF MEV
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: A P2V-7 was taking off after making appropriate radio calls on CTAF and making clearing turns in the run-up area of Runway 16 at MEV. At approximately V1 the pilot observed a glider rolling onto the runway from closed runway at the intersection of Runway 16/34 and 30/15. The glider had momentum to cross the runway and cleared the runway ahead of us. The P2 had achieved flying airspeed the plane was rotated to avoid the glider. A collision was narrowly avoided. Subsequently it was determined the glider was using the closed runway due to wind conditions and its radio had failed.




Synopsis: A P2V taking off on MEV Runway 16 nearly collided with a glider which crossed the Runway 16/34 and 15/30 intersection after the glider landed on the closed runway using the favorable winds.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Takeoff clearance was received for Runway 33. Upon reaching approximately 40 feet AGL after takeoff the aircraft experienced a partial loss of power. I began a return to Runway 15; however as power began to return I performed a teardrop; short approach; to Runway 33 to achieve a better runway landing position.Time did not permit [to advise ATC] while airborne. However; I did report that I had a partial power loss; and that I was returning to the field. Some transmissions may have been partially blocked. The Tower recognized that I had a time critical situation and assisted by clearing the runway. I performed a landing on Runway 33 without further incident. I contacted the Tower to [talk about the situation] post facto.




Synopsis: SeaRey LSX Experimental Pilot reported a partial loss of power on takeoff and returned for landing.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: An Atlanta Center sector coordinated a jet direct SUDSY Intersection. I approved the request expecting the aircraft to be on the RNAV STAR. When the pilot checked in I verified his speed and he reported 250 KTS. I later asked the pilot whether or not he was descending via our OPD and he responded no. I expected him to make the downwind turn at AMOBE; when he didn't I issued the aircraft a correcting vector then noticed that he had slowed to 200 KTS without advising me. I advised him to increase speed. I tried to turn and slow the OPD arrival behind the Business Jet; but the reaction was not only too late but incorrect. Many factors went into my confusion in this scenario. The Center Controller never specified the arrival routing for the Business Jet; and I should have made him. The aircraft never reported slowing from his assigned speed. Had the pilot been at his assigned speed this event could have been prevented. Pilots reducing speed without notification is an all too common occurrence at CLT. I should have made further inquiries to the pilot about his assigned arrival.


Second narrative: 10;000 FT; 10 DME Fix on MAJIC1 Arrival. NO speed requirements beyond 250 KTS at MAJIC fix. Slowed aircraft to 210 KTS to prepare for descent. No previous speed had been assigned. Increased to 230 KTS and shortly thereafter given vectors to 180 heading and descent to 6;000 FT. I asked if they needed a speed and was given 170 KTS with a right turn to 270; and then given a right turn for visual 36R at CLT.


Synopsis: Controller assumes aircraft is on RNAV approach; doesn't verify arrival assignment with pilot and has an operational error due to lack of speed control.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: E63.Airport, AZ
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 33
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my cross-country solo; I approached Gila Bend and asked for weather advisories. Since wind was 270/4 and there was no one in the pattern (according to no response on traffic advisories and no radio calls on the frequency); I decided to enter left downwind for runway 22. After landing on the runway; I heard a [foreign accent] making announcements that he was maneuvering for the 45-entry to left downwind runway 22 (did not ask for traffic advisories). I taxied back to the holding point for closed traffic runway 22 and at the moment I was ready; [foreign accent] announced entering left downwind runway 22. Since I did not see him on base or final (and also not on downwind; but that should be no factor); I decided to line-up and take-off of runway 22. During my lining-up; I heard him say 'left base runway 22'. After rotation; my TCAD-warning made the announcement 'Traffic; 12 o'clock; same altitude'. At that moment I saw; what appeared to be a Cessna; head on with me (with the sun behind him; so he was first hard to see) on final for runway 4. On that warning; I decided to pitch as much as I could to clear him and I just passed over him. Therafter; I told via the frequency that he was using runway 4 and not 22; on which he only responded with 'sorry'. The vertical difference between both aircraft was not more than 150 ft at the moment of passing (for me at about 400 ft AGL).I really have no idea what to do against these [foreign accent] pilots that do not master the English language and apparantly also do not know how to fly. Best thing is to avoid them as much as possible; therefore I left the traffic pattern as soon as possible and will probably not plan to go to Gila Bend very soon again. I have heard and seen from the backseat multiple times that [foreign accent]-sounding pilots made very strange decisions on that airport; like lining up when someone is turning final or entering the traffic pattern via direct downwind; when someone is turning crosswind.




Synopsis: F-33A pilot reported an NMAC departing E63; he also stated the language and piloting skills of foreign national pilots at E63 could be a factor.