Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SMF.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were cleared to descend via an arrival for a visual approach at the airport. We had decided to use the RNP approach as a way to get to a final approach fix and failed to realize it created an inverse video on our approach which caused us to be high. We were extended farther downwind the arrival to get down to altitude and then turned in and cleared for the visual. Approaching the final approach fix we switched to Tower and got a low altitude alert from them and a correct altimeter setting. Approaching and crossing the final approach fix gear down was called and then flaps 5 but the gear wasn't put down. We got the audio cue for landing gear and then the gear was then set. At the same time we had an FMS speed change that bugged our speed at 200 kts. I overrode the thrust levers to keep them from advancing and changed to manual speeds to bug a lower speed. With the low altitude; the late gear; and the unknown reason for the speed change we were not in an appropriate stabilized approach at 1;000 ft. and decided to go missed. As we called the missed approach they were issuing a landing clearance and got stepped on during their response to us. We went to the appropriate heading but before we could call back and verify the new altitude we had gone above it by approximately 800 ft. Also during the go around insufficient pitch was used and during the transition of the flaps from 5 to 2 the flaps were over sped. We coordinated with Tower to get on a heading and altitude and were vectored back onto the visual approach and landed without further incident. Failing to identify the inverse video of the arrival led to us becoming more distracted and more task saturated in a crucial phase of flight. An incorrect ATIS combined with being higher than planned on the descent caused us to be low on our final and to receive a low altitude alert from Tower. While being distracted with our altitude my scan was insufficient and communication inadequate to commutate what I saw going on with our FMS speeds and to get appropriate gear down and flap settings. While on the missed approach poor communication with ATC didn't allow us to hear an assigned altitude causing us to blow past the altitude given. My inexperience with go a rounds caused me to focus more on a heading and altitude and my scan was insufficient to notice the over speeding of the flaps.Better understanding and planning of an arrival that connects to an approach will the inverse video functions in the MCDU will allow us to be at appropriate altitudes on an arrival. Better communication with the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring during unplanned incidences will allow for smoother and more accurate corrections. Better pilot knowledge with allow me to recognize unstable approaches or the beginning of such in a way that I can correct them before having to properly execute a go around. There were many little things that led up to a big decision to have to go around. Having the correct ATIS printed and reviewed and the arrival and approach appropriately briefed are little things that could have helped us be better focused on the approach. While on the missed approach my scan of the instruments needs to be better to make sure my speed does not increase as to over speed the flaps.


Second narrative: We had been cleared to descend via the SLMMR arrival and we set 4;000 ft. for the lowest altitude on the arrival. We didn't notice that there was an inverse video altitude in the FMS because of a higher altitude of 6;000 ft. on the approach; so the aircraft descent rate was insufficient to cross BANZA at 4;000 ft. and we ended up high. Approach cleared us to descend and maintain 4;000 ft. and our downwind leg extended out to 15 miles past the airport. We were cleared for the visual approach and the First Officer set 1;100 ft. for the crossing altitude at JUNBO. At approximately ten miles from the airport we received a low altitude alert from ATC with an altimeter setting approximately .50 in. Hg different from what we had set; and I realized that we had mistakenly set the altimeter from the [departure] ATIS. Approximately 3 miles prior to the final approach fix the First Officer called for gear down. I chimed the flight attendants; but I was distracted because I noticed that we were in manual speeds with 131 kts. selected. In later discussion the First Officer indicated that the speed setting had gone up to 200 kts. for an undetermined reason; so he had gone to manual speed and just spun the speed knob down. I also noticed that we were in speed on elevator and I was trying to select an appropriate mode. At the final approach fix the First Officer called for flaps 5 and when I selected them we received the gear warning. I initially selected the gear down; but recognizing that we were 1;000 ft. AGL and both task saturated I called for a go around.During the go around the initial pitch was insufficient and we received a flap over speed aural warning while the flaps were in transition from 5 to 2. There was also a miscommunication with ATC during the go around. They gave us a right turn of 140; but we didn't hear an altitude assignment (possibly because of frequency congestion). We queried them regarding the altitude; but didn't receive a response until 2;800 ft. when they indicated that we were supposed to have leveled at 2;000 ft. After returning to the assigned altitude we received vectors around for another approach and landed without further incident.There were several contributing causes to this event. First was the improper altimeter setting resulting in the low altitude alert. Second was our failure to recognize and resolve the inverse video on the arrival the resulted in us being high and extending our downwind excessively. Automation confusion and distraction at a critical juncture ultimately put us in an undesirable aircraft state. I'm glad that we chose to go around when we did; but I think that the fact that we were already task saturated resulted in poor execution of the maneuver and an airspeed exceedance. This may also have contributed to the altitude deviation (we hadn't set a go around altitude during the approach); but frequency congestion also contributed to miscommunication with ATC.With regard to the altimeter setting; I think that this could be mitigated by discarding the old ATIS and making sure that the appropriate ATIS is printed (it hadn't been). When we briefed the arrival the First Officer had been reading the altitude restrictions off the chart and I had been verifying them in the box. He might have caught the inverse video if the roles were reversed; but ultimately the best mitigation strategy for this is for me to recognize the threat associated with the inverse video and resolve it when we're initially briefing the arrival. As for the mode confusion as we approached the final approach fix; I think that the best mitigation strategy is to have the sequence of events be as routine as possible and recognize deviations from that routine early. I think that the best way to properly execute the go around is to regularly brief the maneuver since we rarely execute it.


Synopsis: E175 flight crew reported several errors that resulted in an unstabilized approach followed by a go around and an altitude deviation.