elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Fractional
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Staffing; Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During roll out of [logbook program] with many contradictions confusing processes and inability to accomplish the processes as written between in GMM (General Maintenance Manual)/ SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) and Processes; poor training; and lack of manpower I became distracted. When the Site Manager called and wanted to apply MEL (Minimum Equipment List) to release the aircraft I referenced the MEL book. I was aware there has been an MEL for the toggle switch covers. I looked in the MEL; and found the NEF (Non-Essential Furnishings) 25-20-XX-XXXX. I then confirmed and applied the MEL. After review today I found that I had referenced the incorrect MEL book. I looked in the XL book where this NEF lives and not in the XLS book where it has been removed.[My suggestion is to] mitigate the distractions to maintenance control; add more manpower to accomplish all of the work load being imposed onto 50 controllers covering all shifts and all aircraft 24/7 /365. Weekends; holidays; sick-time and other holes in the manpower planned. Or have the Management of the company/programs be held accountable for the materials they produce and dictate; when it is forced to be used by the end user.There is no say in what we have to sign our names to; as long as someone in management does not have too! Apply the same level of Integrity; accountability; to the work that is produced in the back ground and pushed to the End user. The processes are knee- jerk reactions; critical thinking does not go into any of the junk pushed to maintenance. The task cards; policies; processes; GMM and SOP are hastily put out without thinking thru cause and effect; leaving the continued operation solely upon the [maintenance] controllers to figure out how to work around to get the job done and maintain the flights we are providing to the clients and customers. This is very apparent over the years; but even more so for an example; after a year of [program] work; it gets rolled out and the guidance is what I have come to expect. No one is doing their job but pushed to [maintenance] and have a let the guys figure out how to achieve; then second guess the direction and decisions made by the controllers.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported they inadvertently applied incorrect MEL item to defer an inoperative aircraft component.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: CTAF VKX
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working SFRA-S; security monitoring position. Had 3 aircraft landing VKX. Aircraft X was number 3 for the airport. Made traffic call for aircraft in front of Aircraft X who reported traffic in sight. Also reported VKX in sight. Switched aircraft to advisory frequency. Aircraft Y was in comms with DCA tower southbound; abeam of DCA when I switched Aircraft X to UNICOM. Aircraft X was short final to VKX when CA alert went off. Shortly after; Aircraft X returned to my frequency and reported an NMAC with Aircraft Y who was still in comms with DCA tower. I acknowledged the transmission and returned Aircraft X to advisories. Aircraft Y contacted me about 5 miles later and I asked the pilot if he had received a traffic call from DCA tower for the VKX arrivals. He said he did; and he had the traffic in sight and had been maintaining visual separation.I don't have any recommendations. The aircraft were more than 10 miles apart when I switched Aircraft X to advisories. I wasn't talking to either aircraft at the time of the reported NMAC. Aircraft Y had received traffic advisories and reported that he was maintaining visual separation.




Synopsis: PCT TRACON Controller reported a NMAC from an aircraft they were no longer talking to.
Date: 202201
Location: EMV.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G EMV
ATC / advisory: UNICOM EMV
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After completing a practice RNAV34 approach into EMV; my student and I started our departure on Runway 34 and shortly after takeoff; what looked like a helicopter passed over us flying across the runway no more than 300 ft AGL on an opposite heading. My student and I had reported on final and never heard anyone else in the area of EMV and was surprised by this occurrence. The runway lights did not come on after trying to turn them on which no NOTAMS were issued for this to be inoperative. We flew level until the aircraft passed and waited for the wake turbulence before continuing the climb.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported an NMAC at EMV non-towered airport during takeoff requiring evasive action.
Date: 201705
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Immediately after landing a customer from the back of the aircraft stood up with his bag and started to walk up the aisle. I made an announcement and advised customers we were on an active taxiway and to please return to your seat with your seat belts securely fastened until we arrive at the gate and seat belt sign is turned off. The customer continued up the aisle and I made the announcement again. The customer continued up the aisle and stopped at the bulkhead of coach and I once again made the announcement. He then continued up to the 1L door and said he had a tight connection and would not go back to his seat. I then called the Captain to advise and the Captain said; 'That's Weird'. No other comment from the Captain as he continued to taxi the aircraft without making an announcement or stopping the aircraft.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported a passenger would not remain seated during taxi to the gate. The Captain was advised; but continued to taxi.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MKE.TRACON, WI
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E MKE
ATC / advisory: TRACON MKE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We departed MKE and were assigned the UECKR 1 departure. The first fix is PRFEC and is an 'Expect to cross at 8;000 feet.'  We were already assigned 8;000 feet when we were cleared direct to PRFEC but were not told to cross PRFEC at 8;000. A few moments later ATC assigned us to; 'Climb via the SID except maintain 13;000.' The rest of the fixes on the SID were; 'At or above'.  When we were given this clearance we had not reached PRFEC yet and I started a climb to 13;000. The Captain and pilot observing; asked me a few minutes later if I thought we should have crossed PRFEC at 8000; as we were assigned to climb via SID. I thought that when a fix says; 'Expect' it's not mandatory even in a climb via or descend via unless ATC specifically states that is what they want. I am not sure if this is correct and cannot find any information specifically addressing this question. It is usually not an issue but in this situation we were unsure as a flight crew on what the correct thing to do was. ATC never queried us; however we thought it would be good to file a report just in case.Query ATC if unsure on the instructions.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 crew depart MKE on the UECKR 1 departure. Initial altitude was to climb to 8;000. Controller told pilots to 'Climb via the SID except maintain 13;000.' Pilots questioned each other if they were to cross PRFEC at 8;000 and continue via the SID. Aircraft was not at PRFEC yet.
Date: 201511
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ferry flight [trans-Pacific international]. Inbound flight delayed; so our outbound was also delayed; we ended up departing at xa:54 and airborne at XB:10; putting us directly into our Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). Captain was PF and I was PM; because of recent FAR 117 interpretations that required him to have a 2 hour break in the last half of the flight he was required to fly the first leg (when he would normally be asleep) and sleep the second leg (when he would normally be awake). I had planned to be PF for the leg and took a 2 hour nap from XR:00-XT:00; and felt well rested when I showed for the trip; but still found myself fighting fatigue during the leg; including micronaps; etc as did the Captain. We then took our break during the second leg; but due to a malfunctioning crew bunk rest thermostat the bunk area was far too warm for effective rest; and after 3 hours of sleep I moved to an empty cabin seat; where I was able to get only another hour of sleep; since my body/mind was following its normal sleep/wake cycle and was awake. Captain also reported sleep issues after the rest period ended due to the warm bunk area; and amount of caffeine taken in to (try to) stay awake and alert during the first leg.During the descent/approach to landing numerous errors were made; with the Captain declaring fatigue issues due to the revered sleep schedule. Landing was safely accomplished with the assistance of the two International Relief Officers (IROs); who had been allowed to stay on their normal sleep schedule.




Synopsis: B787 FO reported fatigue on a trans-Pacific international route when FAR 117 dictated a rest schedule that was less than optimum for the flight crew's physiological needs.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SAV.TRACON, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZJX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SAV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I noticed that Center was trying to handoff Aircraft X to me from the southeast. The radar track was flashing with an AMBQ. As the track approached our common boundary; I took the handoff. I know that we should not take an AMBQ handoff; but I thought Center was probably busy and did not have time to verbally handoff the aircraft; so I took the handoff prior to the track entering SAV airspace. Aircraft X called me level at 9000 feet; with the ATIS and was told which runway to expect. Several minutes later; the track dropped and I called Aircraft X to make certain he was still with me and all was okay. At about this time; I noticed another target at 9000 feet about NINETY miles northwest of Aircraft X squawking the same code. To shorten the story; the target to the northwest was the REAL Aircraft X. The target that I took the handoff on was a false target...not real. We have lots of duplicate beacon codes and false targets at SAV [TRACON]; we have simply learned to live with them. This one is much different and more dangerous. Unlike most other duplicate beacons; this one actually had a tag on it with a real call sign; aircraft type; altitude; and speed. And it actually flashed at me. I hate to think what would have happened if I descended him; thinking he was in my airspace; when he really 15 miles northwest of my boundary with Center. And maybe even still in the previous Centers' airspace when I took the handoff. The obvious answer is to verbally coordinate all AMBQ tags. We would not have to verbally coordinate these handoffs if we could get the radar fixed. The duplicate beacons and false targets are getting worse and our tech ops admit that they cannot fix the problem. We have a tremendous amount of flights going up and down the coast every day. We stay pretty busy calling traffic on VFR codes and primary targets. What we don't need is our radar creating false targets that appear very real. Sooner or later this is going to lead to a bad situation where someone gets hurt.




Synopsis: SAV TRACON Controller reported accepting an automated handoff of an aircraft with 'AMBQ' in the data tag. The actual position of the aircraft was ninety miles northwest of the position of the data tag the controller accepted for handoff.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While landing a Starduster II the aircraft swerved and the right main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slid to a stop on the runway. The passenger in the front seat has a bruise on right leg. I have no injuries. Weather was clear and 10 plus with winds light and variable. In retrospect when the aircraft started to swerve I should have gone around; but thought that I could straighten it out.




Synopsis: Starduster II pilot reported his right main landing gear collapsed when the aircraft swerved after landing.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Passenger
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was a passenger on a commercial flight. The flight was delayed about 3 hours from its original departure time. While at cruising altitude deep into the flight; I was looking out the window and saw another jet; maybe smaller; pass by on the starboard side. I estimate that the other plane was at almost exactly the same altitude. My gut feeling is that it was about 200 yards away; though it's possible is was more. I also noted that our aircraft made no evident course adjustment before or after what I witnessed.I have no professional or private aviation experience. It's my understanding that a 'near miss' must be generally within 1000 feet. But I don't know if that's a real guideline. It is my belief that this encounter at cruising altitude was at virtually the same vertical distance and under 1000 feet horizontally. I was going to ask the pilot when deplaning if possible; but the exit was mid-ship; so I didn't get the opportunity. Heck; maybe this happens all the time. It just seemed really close. I've seen other aircraft pass at cruising altitude before; but never this close.




Synopsis: A B757 passenger reported seeing another aircraft while at cruise. The aircraft appeared close; but neither aircraft crew took no evasive action. The passenger sensed the aircraft was about 200 yards away.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-34-200 Seneca I
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon landing on the main wheels I applied brakes and the brakes did not work. The other pilot in the right seat said to me 'brakes; brakes;' which I then said to him that I am stepping on them. The other pilot in the right seat then stepped on his brakes and it did not stop or slow down the airplane. When he saw that the plane was not stopping; he reached for the parking brake and applied it in a pumping manner to slow the aircraft down. The airplane came to a stop; but both mains were blown. We did test the brakes on both sides before departing our origin airport. I do not know what might have because the brakes to fail and I do not know if proper maintenance was [performed] on the brake system.


Second narrative: [Narrative 2 had no additional information]


Synopsis: A PA-34 pilot and flight instructor reported finding the main wheel brakes were not working during landing roll. The Instructor pilot used the parking brake to bring the aircraft to a stop; during which both main gear tires were blown.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On a flight to ZZZ everything [was] normal until shortly before we descended on the arrival. We received an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) caution indicating a fuel imbalance which required us to run the fuel leak checklist. After running the checklist we could not verify that we did indeed have a fuel leak. We enlisted the help of a company Airbus Check Airman who was riding as a passenger to do a visual inspection of the wings and engine. He reported back to us that there were no visible signs of a fuel leak. We decided to [advise] ATC in the event we had a fuel leak and continue on to ZZZ as it was the nearest suitable airport. Flight attendants; passengers and Dispatch were notified of our situation. We then requested ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) assistance upon landing on Runway XX; as it is the longest runway. Upon routine landing we stopped on the runway where ARFF did a visual inspection and reported no visible signs of a fuel leak. We then taxied to the gate and contacted Maintenance.




Synopsis: A321 First Officer reported a fuel imbalance alert occurred in flight.