elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Fractional
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Control
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: My partner and I had arrived at the FBO in the afternoon. We began pre-flighting our assigned aircraft. My partner had brought to my attention something on the stabilizer which required a close inspection.  As I climbed up the ladder and put my hand on the horizontal stabilizer; I noticed there was significant free play. This is a result of the four horizontal stabilizer attach point bolts; and bushings being worn out. (Information provided by the technician).The Federal Aviation Administration holds aircraft manufacturer to high tolerances. I don't know why this problem has slipped through the cracks. This is a potential threat to the safety of our aircraft; our pilots; and their owners. Immediate action is necessary to have a fleetwide inspection. The current inspection method is inadequate. The bolts; and attach point bushings need immediate attention! I would suggest a fleet wide inspection; and replacement of the horizontal stabilizer attach point bolts; and bushings.


Second narrative: Upon preflight; noticed a possible break in tape on the right side of the leading edge of the boot and the tape. The first officer checked the break on a ladder only to realize there was excessive play in the horizontal stabilizer. We called a mechanic; he verified there was considerable more play in this than three others he or the first officer checked on the ramp. Notified Maintenance and wrote the horizontal stabilizer up for inspection.I suggest physically checking each horizontal stabilizer.


Synopsis: During preflight CE-560XL crew discovered excessive horizontal stabilizer play because of excessive attach bolts and bushings wear.
Date: 201808
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This was day one of a seven day trip and I was preparing to leave my home. One of the last things I regularly do before departing is ensure I have my Pilot certificate; medical; and passport with me. When I did so I saw for the first time that my medical; dated months prior]; showed 'must wear corrective lenses' in the limitations block. I have never been prescribed glasses nor have not yet needed them. Clearly it's a clerical error; but should I be ramped checked; it avails me little credible recourse. After a few minutes to think it over; I called the program director on duty to relay the situation then proceeded to the AME's office that issued my medical. They agreed it was a clerical error. They provided me their application that was sent to the FAA indicating I met the standards not requiring corrective lenses. They also wrote a signed letter saying it was a mistake. The AME's office gave me their FAA contact to ask what's next; but when I called; it went to voice mail.I then called AMAS (Aviation Medicine Advisory Service) to ask if this was sufficient; but since they're on [different] time zone; I didn't speak with an AME [for a few hours]. The AMAS AME agreed with my concern; and indicated I could proceed with the FAA for correction; but that typically takes weeks to months. The AME indicated the inspector's manual has vague guidance as to what their looking for in something like this. That avails an inspector conducting a ramp check a lot of leeway leaving me in a difficult position. He suggested the most expedient route was for me to get a new medical. I called the AME's office and secured an appointment on the same day. I was done by [early] and called in well for the next day's work. Later that evening; I received a call from the FAA's medical department following up from my call earlier in the morning. He indicated he could have reissued my medical via email. Nevertheless; given the information I had at the time; I feel my decision was sound.This was clearly a clerical error; and went unnoticed for months. I apologize and should have caught it when issued the medical. Having noticed it when I did; and having the information I did at the time; I think I took the prudent recourse for the most expedient remediation. I will be more attentive before signing my medical in the future!




Synopsis: Air Taxi Captain reported noticing the medical certificate issued four months prior included a typographical error that made the certificate invalid.
Date: 202105
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Syst Reservoir Tank
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The hydraulic reservoirs have a big red caution label. It reads; 'CAUTION DO NOT OVERFILL HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR. FILL TO APPROX. 2/3 BETWEEN REFILL(RFL) AND FULL (COCKPIT PANEL SHOULD READ 92% FULL) REFER AMM 12-12-00.'Below the caution label there is an ATTENTION label. It reads; 'ATTENTION Do Not Overfill the RESERVOIR. Overfill can Cause Hydraulic Fumes To Enter the Flight Deck and Passenger Cabin'Some years ago I had an air return when the cabin filled with acrid mist causing eyes to sting and some to choke. The flight attendants thought we were on fire! The Captain and I used goggles and oxygen to safely return. This event was caused by both hydraulic reservoirs being filled to capacity. I believe the cockpit panel read 107%. If I'm recall correctly this is the most that will register.Although I have not since had visible or detectable odor; I believe crew and passengers are breathing atomized hydraulic fluid whenever the reservoirs are over serviced. The leg noted in this report from ZZZ-ZZZ1; started with both reservoirs reading 100%. At shutdown they were at 92%. Where did the difference go in a three hour operation? The day before; my aircraft had 107% in system A and 92% in system B. I alerted Maintenance of the over service. The Technician proceeded to move System A to B. The result was both reservoirs at 100%.I have dealt with this issue individually before. I find a small portion of our technicians understand the significance. Sometimes I meet with great resistance.[Recommend] a notice for Aircrew to remind them of the placards and similar or more specific training for all our Maintenance Technicians and Maintenance Control.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported loss of Hydraulic Reservoir quantity when reservoir is overfilled. Reporter theorized that hydraulic fluid is being atomized resulting in harmful cabin fumes and physiological symptoms.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: A80.TRACON, GA
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E A80
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: A319
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Working North Departure and aircraft called off the south side that appeared to be on a 250 track but had SUMMT in the Data Block. There was a wall of aircraft off the north side of west and north gates. I could not figure out what the Tower was doing because the aircraft on the 250 track had to go out the north gates. I called Tower Control. I am advised that the 250 track does not have his SUMMT clearance. Had an aircraft say he may have to return to ATL because of equipment issues. I turn the 250 track north and top other departures. An E1 DAWGS checks in with no heads up from the Tower. He is approximately 2 miles behind the B757 but separated by altitude. I think I can climb the DAWGS aircraft because he is at the pivot point where he turns east. I notice he is not turning east. I ask if he is on the DAWGS. He says no he is on the SUMMT. The aircraft with the equipment issue says he's OK and is ready to continue on the SUMMT departure. I stop departures at some point. I believe one of the aircraft that I stopped below the 250 track may have entered satellite airspace. Tower rolled another aircraft even though I have stopped departures. South departure is trying to help and coordinate. The supervisor is trying to help and coordinate. I call ZTL and coordinate the end result of speed restrictions to the 4 or 5 SUMMT. It was a cluster; I CIC the departure wall on a regular basis. It is quite common for the Tower to send 1 aircraft off the north and 1 off the south heading for the same gates that are a tie. But what happened last night was inexcusable in my opinion. It put the aircraft and me; in a bad position and caused numerous delays. I was told later that the tower screwed up the 250 track aircraft but the aircraft on the DAWGS (SUMMT) was an automation issue. The Tower needs a better way of coordinating aircraft that are departing the wrong runway.




Synopsis: A80 Controller described a confused and uncoordinated departure operation possibly resulting in an airspace infraction; the reporter suggesting improved coordination procedures by the Tower regarding non standard departures.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An MD11 was on the FNCHR1 arrival level at 10;000 and slowed to 230 KTS as published about 10 northwest of the GQE VOR. Close in trail was a B777 descending out of 13;000 and showing a 60-70 KT overtake. When I first measured the lateral separation between the two aircraft; I showed less than 5.5 miles and quickly decreasing. I did not take the hand-off on the B777 which forced the ZME Controller to call to try and coordinate. The ZME Controller said that he issued a 250 KT speed restriction to the B777; but the pilot was slow in complying.  Considering the STAR has a 230 KT restriction; this didn't help. When I took RADAR on the B777 after telling the ZME Controller to turn the aircraft to a 070 heading; the two aircraft were less than 4 miles apart; but I still had vertical separation. I am aware that this is part of the learning process for ZME regarding the Optimum Descent Path (ODP) STARs and that it may take a while before all of the ZME Controllers are on board; but the FAA (in this instance M03 management and ZME management) have got to hold ZME to the operating procedures of the new Letter of Agreement between our facilities which include the ODP procedures. In retrospect; I should have told the ZME Controller to spin the B777; but I do not feel confident that my facility management would support that decision.




Synopsis: M03 Controller described a near loss of separation event between two successive FNCHR1 arrivals.  The reporter listed the OPD procedures and the unfamiliarity with same by the ZME controllers as likely causal factors.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Crew Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Off Duty
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was a non-revenue on this flight. I was assigned the a cabin jumpseat which is located; Aft Entry Door jumpseat-right hand side. I was the last passenger to board. I notified the #1 and #4 Flight Attendants that I would be occupying the aft door jumpseat with the #2 Flight Attendant. The Agent closed the aircraft door and the #1 announced; 'Flight attendants prepare for departure.' I proceeded to the back of the aircraft. I notified the #2 Flight Attendant I would be sharing the aft jumpseat with her. The flight attendants began the manual safety demo. When I pulled down the aft jumpseat; I could not locate any of the seatbelts. I looked under the jumpseat. All four seatbelts in their plastic casings were bolted to the door and laying on the aircraft floor. I had never experienced this before. I was able to perch all four seatbelts on the back of the jumpseat. The male end of the seatbelt on my side of the jump seat (right-hand side) would not extend from the plastic casing. The #2's seatbelt worked well. Unfortunately; because my male end seatbelt would not extend; I strapped in using the shoulder harnesses' only for both take-off and landing. I notified the #2 about the lack of the seatbelt functioning properly.




Synopsis: A jumpseating Flight Attendant reported that only one aft cabin door jumpseat lap belt was operable on an MD-80 so she used the shoulder harness alone for takeoff and landing.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: JAX.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower JAX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: We were cleared to taxi to Runway 14 via Romeo and November. As we approached Romeo; we noticed there were NO taxiway markings of Romeo except almost down to the runway. The next missing sign was for November at its intersection with Taxiway Romeo; which [makes it possible that] someone in low visibility or not familiar might actually taxi [across November and] onto Runway 14/32. As we neared the end of the Runway 14 on November the taxiways we went by were not marked either.We mentioned it to Ground Control and they asked us to report it to have it fixed.




Synopsis: A B737-700 Captain; cleared to taxi to Runway 14 at JAX via Romeo and November; reported the lack of taxiway identification of Romeo exiting the ramp and at several subsequent intersections enroute to the departure end of Runway 14.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: MCP
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon arrival at the aircraft found the Mode Control Panel (MCP) backlighting inoperative. Review of the logbook showed that it had been previously deferred and recently cleared. Contacted Maintenance and the item was again deferred. While sitting on the ramp; I discussed with the First Officer and he agreed that it seemed that we would not have too much difficulty setting the items (airspeed; altitude; heading and vertical speed) contained on the panel. However; we later found this not to be the case. Without the lights from the ramp it was impossible to see the controls without the use of a flashlight or turning on the overhead reading light. We ultimately found the best way was to turn the on the overhead reading light and use a checklist to redirect the light to the MCP. Operation of the MCP became a 2 person operation with one person operating the light while the other selected the required mode. I found the workload far higher than I expected. Fortunately this was a clear night with no weather to deal with. Having never had this type of deferral previously I was not expecting the amount of difficulty we had with routine operations; especially during departure and arrival. I feel that had any type of aircraft malfunction or emergency occurred this deferral would have significantly impacted the safety of the flight and introduces undue risk. I feel that any smoke (even a minimal amount) in the cockpit would have made it impossible to see the items contained on the panel. I feel at best this deferral is very difficult to operate under and could easily become a safety of flight issue. I recommend that Mel 33-12-XX-X-X with regards to deferral of the A300 Mode Control Panel (MCP) backlighting be reviewed and restricted to 'Day Operations Only'.




Synopsis: A-300 Captain experienced a failure of the MCP backlighting and recommended that the MEL be modified to allow for day-time flight only when this malfunction is deferred.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large UAS; Fixed Wing
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Visual Observer (UAS)
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Visual Observer (UAS)
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Visual Observer (UAS)
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On Date at XA15 local Aircraft X had a near miss incident. The other Aircraft Y looked to be a Helicopter. Aircraft X was conducting flight tests in the local area and training in the traffic pattern. They were using Runway XX and using a right traffic pattern. While Aircraft X was descending into the airport the [Visual Observer] noticed the helicopter was headed to ZZZ airport on a NE heading about 200-300 feet AGL. We notified Aircraft X that there was traffic converging in their flight path. At this point Aircraft X completed their landing and was on the upwind Runway XX. At this point Aircraft Y was at the departure end of the runway at 200 feet AGL. We told Aircraft X urgently to turn left and they were about cross paths with Aircraft Y. This wasn't possible because they were too low to the ground. They ended up leveling to pass under the helicopter. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y came within about 20-50 feet of each other. Talking to my other pilot we believe Aircraft Y failed to read the NOTAMS around the local area saying there is UAV activity in the area. Aircraft Y should have never been that low to the ground near the departure end of the runway. Aircraft Y clearly did not see Aircraft X as he did nothing to attempt to climb; descend; or turn.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Visual Observer witnessed a near miss between a UAS and a helicopter.