Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The Aircraft's Thrust Management System was placarded inoperative. This meant throttle control would be manual the entire flight. Upon initial level off; the thrust was left at climb power and the aircraft speed exceeded Vmo. I was in the crew rest seat in the cabin on my regularly scheduled break when this occurred. I was not aware it occurred until I returned to the flight deck after my break and was informed by the Captain and FO.When aircraft systems are degraded; all crew members could remain in the flight deck until stable at cruise.


Second narrative: Aircraft refused by Captain because inoperative Auto-Throttle (A/T) caused no Cat III and weather all week was Cat III at dawn (arrival time). Captain went illegal and I made mad dash to cover. On 18 hour (vice 25) layover; I slept but not particularly well; which is usual for Europe trips for me and doable.As we arrived at the airport in the AM; the inbound flight entered holding and eventually diverted. The diverting aircraft was the same one with an inoperative A/T causing no CAT III and the weather went to CAT III minimums. There are no rest or relaxation areas for crews; so we sat in hard chairs for over 4 hours then got the plane ready for a total ground time of 4+50. We were 55 minutes from going illegal.On the crew brief; I emphasized that one pilot would always be flying the Throttles.After 10;000 feet; the [relief pilot] calculated the breaks and started first break; as usual. The FO and I started the track entry duties. As we leveled at FL180; we were both heads down and no one pulled back the power for intermediate level off/cruise. The speed increased to the red line and the horn sounded. FO immediately pulled back the power and I extended the speed brakes. We were a few knots over the red line for less than 5 seconds.I don't remember if it was before or after the overspeed (I think after); but at one point early in the flight; I declared myself to the FO 'in the yellow.' I wrote up the aircraft for an airframe overspeed and debriefed maintenance upon arrival. Of course this is a classic fatigue related human factors incident. My fatigue degraded my control of events and my ability to see problems proactively in the air.I briefed that one pilot will fly the throttles at all times; but then I failed to enforce it when the FO started doing all the pre-track 'paperwork'. I should have done all that. (FO ego and CA fatigue).I let the [relief pilot] leave before getting the track stuff done. When I [first] started international; the [relief pilot] never left before all the track stuff was done; even if leaving from Milan where you have lots of time. (Institutional complacency). It is now 'standard' that the [relief pilot] leave ASAP after 10;000 feet (institutional procedural creep/complacency).All FOs are doing too much in the cockpit; I believe as compensation for not progressing to Captain as fast as they thought they would. It's as if they are proving to themselves/their ego that they really are good enough to be Captains to cope with the lack of progress (compensation/ ego protection).My FO tried to do everything at a time of degraded equipment; as all FOs do now. Even after the incident; I stopped him a few times trying to do too much; even though we agreed that he would just fly the throttles. We laughed each time---The habit is so ingrained; he couldn't stop it easily; even after a major screw-up. (Institutional ego/stagnation/habit patterns)That aircraft should never have been scheduled into marginal weather a second time or even a first. There is no procedural flexibility to evaluate the appropriateness of scheduling an aircraft into certain conditions. By the time the Captain sees it; there are no other aircraft available. I commend the Captain I replaced for refusing the aircraft which cost him his trip. The Captain that brought us the same aircraft; was perhaps not as proactive as he should have been. Company aircraft routing; needs a better way to see limitations on aircraft that are variable; especially when the aircraft might be okay for certain weather/destinations but not others. I tried for years to get the flight department to let me develop this concept (for free) with no response (management careerism vs professionalism).There needs to be crew rest facilities at the airport and local personnel to get us to them or hotel. 4.5 hours in chairs is not acceptable. I should have cancelled the flight for fatigue (Captain ego/mission orientation)


Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reports accepting an aircraft with an inoperative auto thrust system and no CAT III; that had been refused by the first Captain assigned for an international flight. The same aircraft is sent over the next day for the return flight and diverts due to low visibility. Departing five hours late; the lack of auto thrust is forgotten about at the first level off and an over speed occurs.