elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: Ramp LGA
Aircraft component: Taxiing Light
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airport
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: After landing on Runway 04 in night VFR conditions at LGA with an MEL for Taxi light inop; we were cleared to eventually taxi via Bravo to Lane 9 to enter ramp. As we approached Lane 8; there was an aircraft among a line of aircraft departing on [Runway] 31 with it's tail protruding onto Bravo enough to make us stop on Bravo. After a few minutes wait; the Captain decided he might be able to taxi around the tail of the aircraft by using part of Lima. After attempting to do this; we saw that there was not enough room to get back on to Bravo after the aircraft tail; and we were now forced to turn right at Lima on to the ramp. The Taxi light being inoperative; we could not see that in making this turn not only put us on to the ramp early; but it also forced us to taxi across the painted 'island' that physically exists; but is not depicted on the Jeppesen 10-9B chart. The combination of no Taxi light and an improperly marked reference chart; caused us to taxi over the painted 'island'; which after we had done so; was chastised for by the Ramp Controller as he also 'reminded' us that we had been cleared to enter at Lane 9 vice 8. Fortunately; the scolding was all we received and the rest of the taxiing went uneventfully.




Synopsis: Air carrier Non Flying First Officer reported a near taxiway incursion due to Jeppsen 10-9B chart not depicting the island at spot as is depicted on 10-9.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FWA.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm; Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C FWA
ATC / advisory: Tower FWA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: We performed a normal GPS Approach to Runway 23 into FWA. We continued to the missed approach point and went missed. Tower assigned us runway heading and 3;000 FT. Shortly after arriving at the assigned altitude the turbulence increased from moderate chop to extreme turbulence. I called windshear and quickly declared an emergency to Tower. I informed Tower that we were experiencing extreme turbulence and we are unable to maintain altitude. We then requested 5;000 FT when able and advised that a right turn toward west looked like our best option. Tower agreed that west to southwest would place us in better weather. We were then able to exit IMC and discuss our diversion alternatives.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier executed a missed approach on the FWA Runway 23 GPS approach and entered extreme turbulence so an emergency was declared because altitude could not be maintained as the flight turned to exit the embedded cell.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DWH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Other Demo Flight
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D DWH
ATC / advisory: Tower DWH
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We had just fully configured for landing; crossed the FAF and began our final descent on the RNAV RWY 17R approach into DWH. I was the pilot flying and had a customer pilot in the right seat for a demo flight. Tower called out traffic at our 1 o'clock and 2 miles unknown altitude that was apparently on final then began to turn north 'possibly NORDO'. We called visual and were instructed to continue the approach. Both of us in the cockpit saw Aircraft Y turning what looked to be base to final converging on our path. I broke off the final approach course to the left keeping Aircraft Y in sight and let tower know. Aircraft Y appeared to notice us as it made an abrupt climbing right turn away from us. Once I felt we had enough separation I elected to resume the approach; notified tower; received landing clearance and landed uneventfully. If I had to guess; we came within about 200-300 ft. of Aircraft Y. There is a lot of student traffic and flight schools at DWH. Aircraft Y was most likely a student training flight. Tower was transmitting in the blind to Aircraft Y repeatedly and told them not to circle on final and to look for light gun signals.Exercise heightened awareness when flying to/from airports where there is a lot of student training.




Synopsis: Pilot reported NMAC with another aircraft on approach.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We pushed off the gate the other day and the ATIS was showing 30L for takeoff. Ground gave us a clearance to taxi to Runway 29; since they had closed 30L for maintenance. The First Officer went heads down to get the performance weight and balance for Runway 29 while I taxied following a company plane; and there was also one behind us. We switched to Tower as we approached the runway and told ATC we would need one minute to run a checklist. He then issued us some crazy taxi clearance to basically get out of the way; but the Company behind us keyed in saying they would need a minute for the checklist as well. So Tower said to just hold short and advise ready. We started running the Checklist and Tower started calling us to see if we were ready. I told the First Officer to ignore him and finish reading the checklist. The Tower must have tried to call us four to five times since we were not responding; and it was super distracting. We finally called ready and we felt he was rushing us for no good reason; but I said nothing to him. As we took off; I heard the Company behind us try and explain that there are new procedures that require us to run a checklist stopped when there is a runway change. Tower said the Company plane that took off first didn't have to stop.I see no reason for ATC to have pressured us and rushed us to takeoff; we only needed one minute. But in fact; I ran into the same thing the week before in ZZZ. We taxied to Runway 25 and there was windshear; so we went over to Runway 34 and told the Tower we needed a minute to run the checklist holding short. He did the same thing as [this] Tower did. He kept calling us and making it very difficult to not be distracted.




Synopsis: Boeing 737-800 Captain reported that ATC attempted to rush the takeoff; not giving them enough time to complete their checklist.
Date: 201407
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: With the arrival of the new 900s; fuel has been calculated wrong. When I thought numbers were off at first I was brushed aside and was told because the engines are more efficient the numbers would be different. Then another Dispatcher thought the numbers were way off; so he and I started discussing a different release; he involved the 900 Coordinator. Eventually the conclusion was that reserve was incorrect; as it was only calculating one engine versus two. I have dispatched a couple different flights with; at least incorrect reserve numbers and burn numbers for the last week. The 900 Coordinator concluded that it was 'fine' because there has been extra fuel and the engines performance is better than what is planned and the fuel is ok. I feel this was a safety issue as the required takeoff fuel has been wrong this whole time. Basically I thought I was planning for 45 minutes in reserve; but really was off. Due to another Dispatcher's persistence; the 900 Coordinator looked more closely at planning numbers. Calculation errors on IT and or management. Also; a way to manually check computer information is not available. Better training on the 900s might have helped this situation.




Synopsis: CRJ-900 Dispatcher believes that he has been dispatching aircraft with inaccurate FAR fuel loads due to inaccurate burn numbers provided by the company.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: A90.TRACON, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Had an RA and turned and descended 400 ft. to avoided traffic. Controller sent us on a heading and altitude to fly close to a light twin. [We] banked hard to the left and lost 400 ft.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a NMAC with a light twin during climb.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PVR.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was dispatched to PVR with an inoperative APU. I was assured the PVR station would have electric and air available. Dispatch had ZZZ alternate and specifically states do NOT send aircraft to ZZZ without APU so I had amended release for ZZZ1 alternate. The ground power in PVR failed multiple times and ground air was marginally warm. The last time the electric failed was during the boarding process. The ground crew decided to get another power cart. This left us with a dark cabin and running on battery power for several minutes. Do we need to relearn our mistakes from the past? This aircraft NEVER should have been sent to a hot climate with an inoperative APU! I'm very disappointed in Flight Operations for allowing this to happen! DO NOT DISPATCH AIRCRAFT WITH INOPERATIVE APU to HOT AND HUMID climate service!




Synopsis: 737 Captain reported aircraft with an inoperative APU was dispatched to a destination that was hot and humid and did not have auxiliary air or electric available.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Test Flight / Demonstration
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Indications
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Both engines were removed and re-installed during this visit. L ENG had some extra work done on it after discovering leaking fuel pump. On test flight profile at FL300 we got ENG OVHT L EICAS and light. Also L STRUT OH DET 1 and 2 maintenance messages were active.Following [QRH] after EICAS remained active with thrust lever at idle; secured engine; declared emergency; and performed single engine approach and landing. Cleared runway and taxied unassisted back to the ramp. Post flight inspection did not show any signs of external damage.




Synopsis: During test flight left engine EICAS indicated overheats. Engine secured and flight landed single engine.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Distribution System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our aircraft was fueled prior to the aircraft being powered by Battery or GPU. After powering up the aircraft and when verifying the fuel load it was noted that all the outer tank fuel had transferred to the inner wing tanks and the wing tank transfer valves had closed properly. This is the incorrect sequence for fueling and due to all the fuel in the inner wing tank; Load Plan (LP) was notified. Load plan issued new CG setting based on the valves being open which we corrected to show valves closed but outer tanks empty and a second LP calculation was sent. The third LP calculation sent had an incorrect passenger count; so a 4th correction was sent and confirmed to be correct. We departed with a delay.


Second narrative: We arrived at the jet in the morning to find no power on the aircraft but fueling had already taken place. All fuel was in the inner tanks (12000 lbs/side); no fuel in the outer tanks; the transfer valves were closed. The Flight Manual (FM) indicates that fueling on battery power only may result in fueling with transfer valves in the open position; however they close when normal power is established. At this point we were debating if we could depart with no fuel in the outer wing tanks. The FM only addresses an imbalance in the outer wing tanks not both empty. However; a section indicates if the fuel transfer valves are open then Load Planning needs to know. We determined that there were no restrictions advised dispatch and load planning. Load planning first sent weight for operating with transfer valves open; then resent weights with transfer valves closed. Each had a different CG. It seems to me that it is not the position of the valve but the quantity of fuel in the outer wing tank that should be the determining factor. Also; after engine start the outer wing tanks began filling and they were both full within approximately 1 hour after takeoff.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported a fuel distribution irregularity due to improper fueling procedures. After determining that center of gravity limits were satisfied; the aircraft was dispatched.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a successful CAT III landing; we had crossed the two inboard runways and were taxiing north on taxiway towards gate. The FO; who was on the first trip back after one month off; did the after landing flow and confirmed our gate with operations. I thought we were cleared into the gate via spot; but this was not the case.As we were rounding the corner for spot and passing Aircraft Y that was on the line just south of spot; I confirmed with the FO that we were indeed cleared in as I had been distracted switching from low vis taxi diagrams to normal taxi diagrams as the vis was very good; shutting down the Number 2 engine; in addition to the fact that the FO was a soft spoken person. I only mention this as I wasn't surprised I hadn't heard them confirm our clearance to taxi into the gate as I was busy concentrating on the other threats just discussed.As rampers were visible from spot and were marshaling us into the gate; we pulled into the gate normally. Approximately 20 feet short of our final parking spot ground reminded us to contact ramp. We immediately contacted ramp; who was understandably very unhappy with us and we apologized for our error.Needless to say; I take complete responsibility for this incident and am embarrassed I allowed it to happen. I have learned a couple of things from this incident- first; that I need to be extra vigilant when some crew members don't have a lot of recent experience; secondly; when we had discussed that the ground ops were our biggest threat for this CAT III approach; I need to truly take it to heart and be extra cautious to help mitigate the threats present during this segment of our flight.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being distracted and not contacting the ramp before taxiing to the gate.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were set up for 8L; visual conditions. Just before turning base leg we were told to expect 8R. We set up the radios and FMS; ATC vectored us to about 2 miles outside MATON (FAF) we descended to 2;000 feet; which is the crossing altitude at MATON. We were cleared for the visual approach to 8R; it was in sight. Everything was normal; the approach mode was armed. Because we were intercepting both the LOC and GS at the same time very close to MATON; we didn't expect to see the GS signal immediately. At MATON the airplane pitched up rather dramatically to around 15 degrees and the autothrottles pushed up the power and pulled it back; it was very confused. I clicked off the autopilot immediately and pushed the nose over; and then remembered hearing ATC tell someone else much earlier; when we were still planning for 8L; that the GS was out of service on 8R. We recovered the situation but in the process gained almost 500 feet at MATON. Whether it was the right thing to do or not we recovered it and landed. We were certainly configured per the stabilized approach criteria; but our speed was a bit fast; maybe 15 kts fast most of the way down. The landing was in the touchdown zone. So we may not have met stabilized approach criteria; and we definitely gained close to 500 feet coming over the FAF. It is; of course; my job to know that the GS was Out of Service (OTS); but the runway change happened fast. Either way; I've never seen an autopilot behave that way to a lack of GS signal. I did not write it up as I really wasn't sure WHAT to write up; it was just responding to erroneous signals. I rather felt this was my fault as I never should have engaged the GS; but this is our standard procedure for any approach with an ILS; visual or not. It isn't necessarily the responsibility of ATC to remind every single pilot that the GS is OTS either.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a late runway change resulted in an unstabilized approach to a landing.