elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beech 1900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon selecting gear down the Landing Gear Relay CB popped immediately.  I was PF and we went around and were still talking to Approach; so we told them we were going to go to the VOR to hold as published to run our checklists.  I spoke with the passenger and then contacted operations to declare our emergency and get them in touch with Dispatch and Maintenance Control.  We also declared an emergency with Approach.  I gave controls to the First Officer and then performed the Failure of Landing Gear to Extend Normally Checklist.  After running the checklist the gear was determined unsafe.  We then ran the Landing Gear Manual Extension Checklist and the gear was extended.  We got all three green and all tests contained in the checklist passed.  After conferring with dispatch and mx control we deemed the gear safe and were all comfortable with taxiing the plane to the terminal.  After all checklists were completed; I took control of the airplane again and commenced landing.  We landed without incident.  We stopped on the runway and had ARFF take a look to see if anything looked out of the ordinary; they said no so we continued to the terminal.  During the whole process our pax were kept abreast of the status of our flight and were told to expect a normal landing.  This is the third time today that a company aircraft has had gear issues.  This is the second time in less than a month that the landing gear wouldn't extend normally for me personally.  Something is wrong with this picture.  I don't know how to fix this; but someone should probably figure it out.




Synopsis: BE1900 Captain reports the landing gear relay circuit breaker tripping as the landing gear is selected down.  A go-around is initiated and the landing gear is extended manually.  A safe landing ensues; but the reporter states that landing gear malfunctions are a common occurrence at his company.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Pushed back from gate about 2 hours late. Normal taxi out. All checklists completed; cleared for RNAV departure; FO's leg. I transferred controls to him after lined up on runway. He advanced throttles and called for set thrust which I accomplished. At between 40 to 60 knots a master warning of 'rudder configure' appears. I immediately pull throttles to idle and take control of aircraft and abort takeoff; contact tower and tell him that we are aborting takeoff and need to exit without any assistance needed at this time and that we will let him know after we run checklist. He asks nature of abort and I told him that we had a master warning come on right after we started the roll. He asked how fast we were going at time of event and I told him between 40 and 60 knots. He has us pull off first right turn off runway and hold there. I pulled off runway; notified FAs then made announcement to passengers. I then shut down #1 engine and started APU. I then called dispatch and notified them and asked to talk with maintenance. Explained to maintenance the issue and together we resolved the issue and completed a write up and corrective action and advised tower that the problem was fixed and that we were ready to depart. We started engine after running through shutdown checklist and performed all other required checklist and advised FAs and Passengers. Were given clearance for taxi back and takeoff clearance. Takeoff and remainder of ensuing flight were completed without further problems.The plane had an MEL of YD1 inoperative and after reading maintenance action for the MEL 22-22-01 which stated that the rudder limit had to be within .005 limit; which is a maintenance action. After talking with Maintenance Control he believed that the rudder could have been out of the limit required for the MEL. I began to reference the QRH for the master warning after exiting runway and to my surprise there wasn't any guidance in QRH for 'rudder configure'. So I would suggest updating QRH to include guidance for 'rudder configure' and to make sure that the aircraft meets the limits for the specific MEL.




Synopsis: CRJ900 Captain reported rejecting a takeoff at 50 knots when a master warning of 'rudder configure' appears. The aircraft had been dispatched with an MEL for YD1 and the rudder limit may not have been within the MEL tolerance. The next attempt is uneventful.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EUG.TRACON, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON EUG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Being radar vectored for ILS 14 into Medford VMC night. We could see mountain peaks with snow below us. At 11;000 ft. about 15 NE of OED we got a 'Terrain Pull Up'. Conducted CFIT maneuver and climbed to 12000 feet. Notified ATC that we climbed and he was okay. We had no other indications on MFD - no terrain pixels or PFD warnings just an aural warning. The warning only lasted a brief second [and] as soon as I responded the warning went away. Did not see Radio Altimeter. First Officer stated his was at 1;700 ft. Highest MSA around OED in NE quadrant was 10;700 ft. We verified altimeter setting with ATC and we had it set correctly.


Second narrative: We were level at 12;000 ft. being vectored to ILS Runway 14 at MFR. Night VMC conditions. We had good situational awareness of our location and could see the tops of the mountains below us. Min Sector Altitude was 11;800 ft. Cascade Approach gave us a descent to 11;000 ft. We descended and leveled off. I expected that we would pass over the peak ahead at about 1;000 ft. AGL so when the radar altimeter went off at 2;500 ft. AGL and started counting down I was not surprised. At about 1;700 ft. +/- we received a 'Pull Up Terrain' command from the GPWS. The Captain turned off the autopilot and began the Terrain Escape Maneuver. Within a second or two; the warning went away and we leveled off at 12;000 ft. We told Cascade Approach what happened and our reaction. Then we confirmed with Cascade that we had only descended to 11;000 ft. We related that we were level at that altitude when the GPWS alert occurred. We then confirmed the altimeter setting. We had the ATIS from MFR which was a setting of 30.26 in. The controller told us his altimeter at that time was 30.25 in so we knew we were at the correct assigned altitude. I believe the mountain we were above was Mt McLoughlin which has a peak of 9;397 ft.


Synopsis: A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on a night visual approach to MFR.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying to MFR. I was initially cleared SAC V23 TALEM MFR. I loaded up the G1000 using the airway feature and inputted V23 TALUM as TALEM was the first exit waypoint to show up on the flight plan screen. I did not verify my way points on the enroute chart unfortunately. As I passed the RBL VOR the Center controller advised me that I was 4 miles east of V23. I went back through the waypoints and then realized I had entered TALUM and not TALEM. Both intersections are waypoints on V23. This is very confusing as only one letter is different and they are on the same airway. Clearly I made a mistake and I should have verified the route I entered into the GPS with the chart itself. That was my mistake and I will do a better job in the future of not making that error again. But without question having two almost identical waypoints on the same airway is a recipe for this type of error.




Synopsis: A pilot discovered after a track deviation that he entered the incorrect waypoint; TALUM instead of TALEM. Both waypoints are located on V23.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eclipse 500
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While flying at flight level 41;000; I was given a frequency change to 135.15 which I acknowledged and attempted to contact the next Controller. I waited and received no response; so I tried again and again to contact the Controller over a ~15 to ~20 minute period. I continued to call numerous times on the previous frequency and the assigned frequency using both transmitters. I then attempted to transmit on frequency 121.5 and still did not receive a reply. I had complete radio failure of the electronic computer controlled radios. I then opened my QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and followed the instructions for the radio failure attempting to reset the radios via the computer displays; however; nothing worked. My flight plan had earlier been amended by ATC which routed me through a Restricted Area. After about 15 to 20 minutes I was able to reset the radio and reestablish communications. I was then given an amended flight plan direct without further incident. Unfortunately; the new radios that I have in my aircraft were approved without any manual backup which is troubling. When a radio failure occurs in the Eclipse Jet the pilot is at the complete mercy of the automation controlled radios and there is no direct manual switch to engage and there is no backup. If Com 1 goes out there is a good possibility that Com 2 will also fail as they both go through the same controller or mixer. In any case; I believe that it would be in everyone's interest to not approve such automation that can fail both radios at the same time.




Synopsis: An EA50 Pilot reported his computer controlled communications system malfunctioned while flying at FL410. He overcame the malfunction and was issued a new clearance around a restricted area.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Entering the terminal area after an overnight oceanic flight from the United States. The flight planned route terminated with a STAR. Based upon our experience from previous trips; we were expecting the RNAV Transition following the STAR to end up with an ILS to runway 26R. During the STAR; Approach cleared us to ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1. We were NOT cleared for the RNAV Transition. We entered the waypoints and continued.  We were then handed over to the Final Controller. Passing ZZZZZ1 we were told to expect the ILS Runway 26L approach (we previously were expecting the ILS 26R). At that point the PIC (Pilot Not Flying) was focused on changing the approach in the FMS. As the aircraft passed ZZZZZ1; the aircraft began a right turn based on the ILS being loaded into the FMS. We immediately asked the Controller for a heading and were given a turn back to 070. We then took vectors for an ILS 26L and completed an uneventful landing. At no time did we come near any other aircraft (noted both visually and on TCAS).The RNAV Transition notes that at ZZZZZ1 the aircraft should maintain track and expect radar vectors to the final approach.In our minds; this event developed due to a combination of a bad clearance from Approach and our failure to confirm what actions would be required following ZZZZZ1. If Approach had cleared us for the entire RNAV Transition; the procedure loaded in the FMS would have prevented us from turning towards the runway at ZZZZZ1. Further complicating the issue; upon initial contact with the Final Controller; aircraft are expected to state only their call sign; again; a full check in might have increased situational awareness for both our crew and ATC. Given the long oceanic flight and our operations within a circadian low; we believe that fatigue was a factor in this event. We intend to share our experience with our entire pilot group to ensure that as a team we learn from this situation.




Synopsis: A corporate flight crew on an international arrival started a turn to the initial approach fix before asking for further clearance.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Super King Air 200
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: SR22
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on about a 7-mile final for runway XY and called my position on the CTAF frequency. At that time there was an aircraft on a left downwind for runway ZA that informed me that he would be extending his downwind to ensure spacing for his aircraft. At about 1 1/2 mile final; another aircraft called and asked us how far out were as he wanted to back taxi on runway 09. The PIC informed the pilot we were less than 60 seconds from the runway and we were short final. By what he said; (...wanting to back-taxi on runway 09); we expected that he was at the taxiway on the ramp and wanted to back taxi on the active. As we were crossing the threshold; we could see the Cirrus on the West end of the runway parked on the unusable (yellow painted) part waiting for us to land. Knowing that there was another aircraft in the pattern and seeing clearly that we were about 200 feet above the cirrus and safely clear; the PIC chose to go ahead and land. We touched down about 30% down the runway and there was no incident or issue.We both felt that landing well clear of the aircraft was the safer option than making a go-around on runway XY as we did not ever have a visual on the opposite direction down-wind aircraft. The PIC attempted to speak with the other pilot regarding her incorrectly reported position on the field; but he was no longer in the area.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The flight crew of a King Air reported a ground conflict with a Cirrus while landing at a non-towered airport. The Cirrus pilot was holding in an area very close to the runway; making it an unsafe condition.
Date: 202004
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X from ZZZZ to ZZZ my crew and I locked off a lavatory to store bio hazardous waste along with trash we were unable to stow in carts due to a lack of space. This report is simply to explain the reason such action was taken. Upon leaving ZZZZ we had 212 passengers; consisting of adults; infants and children. The flight was originally blocked for 10 hours and 45 minutes; however; about 3 and a half hours into the flight there was a medical emergency that resulted in the contacting of Med-link; the utilization of medics on board the aircraft; and essentially the use of said medics finger prick stick to check the affected passengers oxygen levels. Upon completion of this check; the finger prick stick was placed in the red sharps container retrieved from our EEMK (emergency medical kit) for disposal. This container was then wrapped in a red hazardous bag and placed in the aft lavatory to be locked off. The medical emergency resulted in our diversion into ZZZZ1. While on the ground; several beverage services were provided based on the time experienced on the ground. Prior to departing; it was asked if trash could be removed from the aircraft to free up space for the continuation of the flight; unfortunately the ground representative was unable to assist and implied the trash must remain on board. Once back in the air to continue on to ZZZ another passenger appeared to us ill. They filled several air sickness bags of vomit which were also collected; wrapped in a red hazardous bag and also placed in the aft lavatory that had been locked off on the previous portion of the flight. After providing the final service and setting up for final trash pick up; we were unable to create any further space to dispose of trash so that too was stowed in the aft lavatory that had already been closed off for the remnants of our medical emergencies.I am aware stowing trash and locking off the lavatory is against regulation; but being that the lavatory was already being used for bio hazardous waste we did it. Any suggestions for future experiences of this or was this an acceptable action?




Synopsis: B-767 Flight Attendant reported no specific FOM storage procedure for storage and disposal of Biohazardous waste during flight.