elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Visual to 22. Backed up by ILS. On the final vector to join the autopilot intercepted a false localizer and glideslope and started following it down. ATC issued low altitude alert and I (PM; Pilot Monitoring) kicked off the autopilot and told the FO (First Officer) to stop the descent. Continued the approach visually to a normal landing.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported false reading from the ILS on final approach to LGA airport.
Date: 201903
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Other Person
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I don't see the attention being paid to the failure of the AOA and the Air Speeds system on both the [MAX 8 accidents]. Clearly MCAS has played a role;  but the trigger was the two input (or adding to the confusion with air speed issues). Why do we have both in both crashes and why is AOA suddenly unreliable when no reports of stick shaker in the 737NG group aircraft?  The systems are not linked in any way other than computer outputs.




Synopsis: Former air carrier pilot reported concern with the lack of attention being paid to Angle of Attack and Airspeed systems issues following the recent B737 Max accidents.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 3TE.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 152
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My student and I decided to fly to a local grass runway (7N4) for soft field takeoff and landing practice. Since the field looked a little wet; I decided to divert to an airport nearby (3TE; Tecumseh; MI; hard surfaced) to do a landing or two before heading back to the home airport. The possibility of a runway closure had not crossed my mind; and so we landed on RWY 18. On final approach for the runway; it was noted that the runway looked to be in rough shape. There were; however; no apparent markings denoting the runway closure; so we proceeded to land. Upon returning to Ann Arbor; I decided to look up the NOTAMS for 3TE (since the airport looked fairly run down); and discovered that RWY 18/36 had been closed as of June 2; 2015 until further notice. In order to avoid this type of situation in the future; it is my intention to more thoroughly acquaint myself with the airports of intended use; and all other airports in the vicinity; and include a NOTAM search for each of them.




Synopsis: C152 Instructor with student reports landing on Runway 18 at 3TE and noting that the runway looked rough. Upon returning to home base the Notams are checked and it is discovered that Runway 18 at 3TE has been closed since early June.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NEW.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D NEW
ATC / advisory: Tower NEW
Second aircraft: T6A Texan II / Harvard II (Raytheon)
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was being vectored to the 36 left visual approach by New Orleans approach at 2;000 feet and was advised of a Texan trainer at 900 feet that was also heading to NEW. I was vectored to the final approach course and when I had the Texan in sight I was cleared for the visual and was told to contact Tower. I was over the top of the Texan and Tower switched me to 36 right and cleared me to land. I was high and would lose sight of the Texan and the wind was 090 at 13; so I went around. Although I was visual with the Texan it would have been a difficult landing with the cross wind on the narrow short runway. I had previously asked for 36 left when offered 9 by the New Orleans controller. I preferred the longer wider runway than 9 despite the crosswind on 36L. I would have refused 36 right if the Approach Controller had offered earlier. I believe a late switch to 36 right and the close proximity of the aircraft made it an unsafe situation. I performed a 360 and was vectored far south almost to the boundary of the delta; to now let another jet (eclipse) in ahead of me. I was low over buildings longer than I would have preferred and out of glide range to the airport if an engine out occurred. The Texan performed a low approach prior to the Eclipse jet and myself and the Texan was forced to do a go around because I was not clear of the runway when he approached again for the landing. I think the tower allowed too close of separation and when I queried him on legal separation he said it was legal because I was VFR. I was VFR but under direction of ATC who vectored me too close to the Texan and required a go around to avoid an unsafe cross wind landing and a go around by the Texan after my landing.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reports going around at NEW when Runway 36R is assigned at the last minute due to conflict with a Texan II on Runway 36L. The 75 foot width of Runway 36R and crosswind were factors in his decision. On the next landing the Texan II is told to go around when the reporter does not clear the runway in timely manner.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Descending on the LTOWN SIX RNAV arrival into MEM we descended below FL240 approximately ten miles prior to AXXEL. I realized this at 23;500 then quickly corrected and climbed back to FL240. Nothing was said by ATC.This could have been prevented by paying closer attention to the notes on the arrival as well as the Commercial Chart enlarging the arrival to a fold out page and having the restrictions labeled next to the fix instead of a note located elsewhere on the page. The fact that the arrival has been split into two sections on the small page indicates that there is not enough room on the standard page for this arrival.


Second narrative: [We were] cleared to descend via the LTOWN SIX RNAV ARRIVAL. The altitude window was set at 14;000 for the lower restriction at SPKER. The Captain initiated the descent and I was looking down at my weight and balance sheet; computing landing weight for predicted fuel on arrival (for V speed computation). I felt the aircraft level out; looked up and saw 23;300 FT; I looked at the MFD and saw that we were approximately 5 miles from AXXEL. The Captain initiated a climb back up to 24;000 FT. Looking at the Commercial Chart; I saw that the crossing restriction was at or above FL240 at 290 KT. The LTOWN SIX RNAV ARRIVAL is printed on a standard size Commercial Chart plate. The volume of information requires abbreviated alpha markers for detailed altitude and speed information. This and all of these detailed RNAV arrivals should be printed on the large; folded Commercial Chart plate to allow enough space to clearly note these restrictions and limits. CASOT; AXXEL and KELNE have a definite altitude and speed limit; yet the 'A' is only about 3 mm across and buried on a cluttered and busy page.


Synopsis: An air carrier crew descended below FL240 10 miles prior to AXXEL because the chart note describing the common restriction at CASOT; AXXEL and KELNE is printed some distance from the waypoints and not clearly associated with the them.
Date: 201811
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: When preparing to pressurize hydraulics; I heard the sound of the ground crew frantically calling us on the intercom coming faintly from the headset. I donned the headset and heard ground crew telling 'the plane is moving! Set your parking brake!' I hastily jumped on the brakes and noticed that they were already set. The captain pressurized the hydraulics which allowed the brakes to engage and stopped the aircraft. We asked why the ground crew had removed the chocks without our permission and they said they do it all the time. It is important to note the brake pressure was indicating above the orange band before hydraulics were pressurized. The flight crew also could not tell the aircraft was moving.Do not allow ground crews to pull chocks until hydraulics have been pressurized and it had been confirmed the parking brake has been set. Residual hydraulic pressure leaks and can cause such a situation; especially when done without flight crew's knowledge.




Synopsis: B767-200 Captain reported ground crew pulled chocks before hydraulics were pressurized and parking brakes were set; causing aircraft to roll.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The Captain and I became concerned about the fuel and declared an emergency. We landed safely in Airport ZZZ. During the visual approach the approach control didn't realize we declared an emergency with previous controller. We cleared the confusion and landed with no further incident.The dispatcher made a revision to the release with addition fuel and the crew was not informed. The first controller didn't relay the emergency to the approach controller.On ferry flights; if the dispatcher changes the release [it needs] to inform the crew of changes. Better communication between controllers.




Synopsis: Pilot declares fuel emergency with ATC. ATC does not inform next controller of emergency status; pilot advises ATC again.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Station operations delayed Aircraft X without advising dispatch prior to the delay. The flight was given a wheels up time of XX:31z for a XA:17z scheduled time of departure. Station then delayed the flight out until XX:10z in violation of 14 CFR 121.533. The only way I believe this can be fixed is if there was something built into the [operation monitor] or any other of [company's] applications that requires stations to request the delay; prior to posting the delay. Obviously; telling stations to call prior to posting is not working.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported procedural issues that do not keep dispatch informed of changes.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: Tower IAD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Final Controller cleared us for Visual Approach to 19R with a speed restriction of 180 KIAS until 5 DME. We complied and when we checked in on Tower frequency; we were told that we were 50 knots faster than preceding traffic. We acknowledged and slowed appropriately. Tower offered shallow S-Turns for spacing but they would not work. We executed a Missed Approach procedure and were given 2000 feet. Approaching 2000 feet we were given a turn south. As I began the turn; I crossed checked our altitude and I was leveling at 2;220 to 2;240 feet. I announced and corrected. As I leveled back off at 2;000 feet we were given 3;000 feet. We continued vectors for; and subsequently successfully completed another visual approach to Runway 19R.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported overshooting the assigned altitude on a missed visual approach to IAD.
Date: 201412
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I used ZZZ as an alternate for KPDX the alternate routing in the company data base is KPDX...BTG V448 ZZZ VOR... ZZZ. The system filed the ALT altitude at 13;000 FT [although] the MEA is 14;500 FT. This is apparently an issue when using ZZZ as an alternate for KPDX as other occurrences were found when looked into. In some cases the ALT altitude was filed as low as 9;000 FT. [I found several flights in the past with similar errors; one filed as low as 9;000 FT.] Our flight planning software [had] filed an altitude to alternate airport below MEA and neither I nor the flight crew noticed. The error was found by another dispatcher doing some research for another unrelated safety report.[We must have] a floor altitude for alternate route from KPDX to ZZZ set to 14;500 FT (MEA). I will watch more closely what altitude the system is filing for alternate airports.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier Dispatcher discovered that their flight planning dispatch database included a planned enroute altitude for a diversion from PDX to ZZZ of only 13;000 FT when the highest MEA on the route was 14;500 FT.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ1
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departing Runway XX at ZZZ.  Had approaching Aircraft Y on ADS-B while they were executing a practice approach to Runway XY.  Pattern traffic was using Runway YY.  After rotation; I had a visual on the other aircraft and started an early turn to pass behind.  At that point; my glare shield mount for my GPS moving map came loose and dropped into the control stick arc dangling by the data/power cord.  I grabbed it with my right (stick) hand and began controlling the aircraft with my left hand.  I was holding the stick below the grip and unable to reach the push-to-talk trigger.  If I had turned left to runway heading; I would have gone wing up to the other aircraft and lost sight. I focused on flying the airplane first and after passing the aircraft was able to move my left hand into position on the grip to reach the push to talk trigger.  By this time the pilot in Aircraft Y was calling me and expressed; understandably; his alarm. The early turn was an effort to clear the pattern quickly for the training aircraft that use this field.  However; I believe continuing the upwind further would have minimized the conflict that is a part of practice approaches opposite to the traffic patterns in use. Opposite direction approaches are common at this airport and other uncontrolled fields in the area. Secondly; I am re-engineering the bracket for my GPS moving map to preclude a recurrence.  I will also add a 'bracket secure' check to my pre-takeoff flow.




Synopsis: Single Pilot reported after takeoff the mounting bracket for the GPS device broke. The GPS device fell onto the control stick and was dangling by its cord. During this time the pilot reported deviating off course and creating a NMAC with an arriving aircraft.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 310/T310C
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Local; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Speed All Types
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This was a frightening misjudgment by controller.[I] arrived at ZZZ [in a] C310. My recollection of communications with Tower may be incorrect.[Runway] XX was the active. One (or maybe two) aircraft were ahead of me and requested [Runway] XY. As I am based at [an FBO]; I too requested [Runway] XY. I entered downwind and was cleared to land. On final; I observed an airliner taking off from [Runway] XX. Initially [I] thought to go around; but [I] was well above the jet as it took off. It was evident I could safely land on [Runway] XY. Then; Tower ordered me to go around; which I did.I was cleared to land and did so without any problem. I asked Tower why the conflict and was told I was too fast. In any case; regardless of airspeed; the controller must have been fully informed. [The controller] told me I was doing 150 [knots]. I doubt that as I do short final at 100 [knots]. While I name [the controller]; I mean no criticism. She was very professional and helpful.Bottom line; fast or not; I find it incomprehensible the controller could clear me to land [Runway] XY and the airliner to takeoff [Runway] XX. As the airliner was on the ground; there could not have been urgency. Takeoff clearance could have been delayed 3 minutes with no significant effect.My suspicion is that the Tower Controller was new and inexperienced.

Callback: Reporter was unable to obtain any further information from the Tower personnel.



Synopsis: Cessna 310 pilot reported a NMAC after ATC cleared the pilot to land and then directed a missed approach after clearing another aircraft for takeoff.