Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Challenger CL604
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other Flight Inspection
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post flight inspection
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I directed the co-pilot to complete the preflight and all aircraft checklists up to engine start. He was also directed to load the new FMS database into the aircraft. Because the database download requires a significant amount of time; he was sent out early to perform the task. I arrived at aircraft and noticed that only FMS two was being loaded. I told the co-pilot we needed to load FMS one and three as well. During the download process; no function keys on the FMS are operational. This further delayed the mission/upload process. After database download to number two was complete; the copilot initialized the FMS. Approximately 50 minutes later; FMS two and three were initialized after being updated. [Unknown to me at the time] due to system design; the 'downloaded' database is loaded into the secondary database (an inactive position). The expired database remains active until de-selected by aircrew. The aircrew was unaware of this design feature. However; the NAV data (line one) of the status page shows the newly updated database name; even though it is not active.During the flight; current navigational publications were used and the co-pilot's side navigation displayed raw data information to back up the pilot side FMS navigational display. VMC prevailed throughout the flight.Detailed information follows: After the new databases were loaded; the FMS(s) were initialized without confirming that the new data was in ACTIVE DATABASE. The new data (just downloaded) is stored in SEC DATABASE. Having recently loaded a new database; I noticed on the top of the STATUS page; it shows the new database under NAV DATA as the new one even though it's not active. Since FMS one was initialized with the out-of-date data; no warning was displayed on the FMS two and three because they too were initialized with the out-of-date data. On the CL601--which is the aircraft I primarily fly--the installed Universal FMS; once loaded; erases all information and then 'activates' the loaded database without pilot input.After engine shutdown at our destination a Standards Pilot met the aircraft with FAA Avionics Maintenance personnel. The Standards Pilot was sent to check our pubs and FMS. We were told that the FMS database we had loaded had not been selected and remained in sec database position. I am aware the PIC is directly responsible and is the final authority for the operation of the aircraft. The PIC has the authority to delegate flight crew functions and assign qualified crewmembers specific duties; but always remains ultimately responsible for the safe outcome of the flight. I knew the database was expiring; we downloaded the database. We thought we had the new database loaded. We had current flight publications on board.Our organization's Differences Training [for the CL604] did not address FMS database maintenance issues. In addition; my Differences Training failed to meet the required eight hours and my records show a total of only 3.6 hours. Finally; in two years; I have had less than 6 hours in the aircraft. Our organization needs to develop currency requirements for dual rated pilots.




Synopsis: The Captain of a government operated CL604 directed his First Officer to load the new FMS databases but failed to insure they had been activated prior to departure. A ramp inspection by a Standards Pilot upon arrival at their destination discovered the error. A contributing factor was the reporter's meager training and experience on the 604 model aircraft and its FMS; on his primary fleet; the CL601; the FMS automatically activates a new database after it is loaded.