elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Ramp had us stop on the RA bridge. The ramp controller did not understand the safety hazard of a potential evacuation on the bridge.


Second narrative: We were given clearance to taxi RA spot 1; monitor West Ramp. As we were taxiing across bridge we noticed another aircraft stopped just over the end of the bridge. We did not want to stop on bridge in case we would have to emergency evacuate the aircraft. We told the West Ramp controller; we would like to move as the aircraft in front of us moved and he would not give us clearance. We advised him we were moving just over the bridge and we would then stop. Our aircraft was never in any danger or close proximity of another aircraft while taxiing; but I wanted to write this to see if there is some other procedure we need to be following while in IAH. We were taught to never stop on the bridges in case of evacuation. This does not seem to be the case in IAH; I just want some clarification of this as for our SOP.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew believes that stopping on a taxiway bridge is not safe due to the inability to evacuate should the need arise. The Ramp Controller does not seem to understand this logic.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In terminal area; we experienced a complete loss of hydraulic fluid on left hydraulic system. Ran QRH; consulted Maintenance; alerted ARFF and landed.




Synopsis: MD82 pilot reports loss of left hydraulic system fluid during arrival. Maintenance is consulted and a normal landing ensues.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Lubrication Oil
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X has had two tail pipe fires on March XXth and XYth reported to the pilot by the Flight Attendant; Passengers and another aircraft that was behind them. Both times the engine was ran and signed off as no faults; it would appear that there is an issue if there have been two tailpipe fires in one week.  The Number 2 engine has also used twice the amount of oil as the Number 1 for the month of March. Number 2 engine is leaking a large amount of oil into the tail pipe causing a tail pipe fire two times. Investigate leak and repair.




Synopsis: Technician reported tailpipe fires on two consecutive days and expressed misgivings over maintenance actions on aircraft to correct the issues.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were ready to pushback off of gate X at ZZZ; and told ramp control. They responded; 'hold the push; aircraft pushing off Y [a couple gates down].' About two minutes later; ramp control asked if we had two-way communication with our push crew; which we answered in the affirmative. She responded; 'Reference the push off gate Y; cleared to push.' I asked the tug driver if he could see the aircraft that pushed off Y; and he said he did. I said; 'okay; don't push us into him - park brake released; cleared to push.' About 50% into the pushback; the Captain that had pushed off Y excitedly came on the frequency and said; 'Aircraft pushing off X; hold your push! Stop the push! You are pushing right into us!' FO (First Officer) and I immediately told the tug driver to stop the push; and about the same time ramp control told us to stop the push. After discussion with ramp control and pushback supervision; we decided to disconnect and taxi out from the present position; as the push off gate Y did not have room to taxi with us first clearing the area. Normal operations resumed. The other Captain detected the event.Maybe add a tail-walker if the pushback crew isn't going to pay attention to the rear of the aircraft.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported stopping midway through pushback to avoid colliding with other aircraft in the ramp area.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower BOS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Cleared to taxi K; B; M to cross 4L approach end. At the intersection of Taxiway B and M we made query to Tower as to direction from this point. We were cleared from Taxiway M on to Runway 14/32 and hold short of Runway 4R. As we turned onto Runway 14/32 we missed the visual hold short line and did not penetrate Runway 4R. I was not familiar with the visual hold line. I am used to the standard hold short line and was distracted by trying to determine our transition route from Runway 14/32 on to Runway 4R.


Second narrative: [Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: An aircraft taxied beyond the BOS Runway 4R visual hold short line on Runway 14/32 because the crew did not recognized it as the runway hold short line.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cargo Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Currently [Maintenance] is working a skin change on a 737 forward cargo door. While drilling up a pre-shaped skin it was realized that this skin was not fabricated for use on this MPN or model door. During discussions about the discrepancy with the crew; it came up that one of these pre-formed skins had been used in the past for a same model; MPN door.A review of the records shows that earlier this year; [Maintenance] produced a 737-800 cargo door by installing a skin fabricated by Engineering Order and drawing 52-XXXX-XXX.The skins fabricated per the Engineering Order and drawing are for a different model aircraft. This alone does not make these skins unusable but the fact that engineering based their approvals on a different aircraft model type; when approving the material substitution; does.The original substitution approvals were for an original skin bonded from two layers of 036 2024-T3; substituted for one single thickness skin of .071 2024-T42; for the aft cargo door of a 737-200/300.We installed this .071 2024-T42 on a forward cargo door where the original skin was .071 2024-T3. The Engineering Order; as stated; does not cover forward cargo doors or 737-800s. To use the Structural Repair Manual material substitution chart in an effort to allow for the substitution of a -T42 skin vs a -T3 skin requires additional thickness due to the different heat treat properties.Therefore the skin installed is an out of compliance situation.




Synopsis: Technician reported that material substitutions during a skin replacement were found to be out of compliance.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: STL.Airport, MO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground STL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: For many years STL has held on to Ground Metering frequency even though their traffic level is negligible.  We are required to contact Metering when we are ready for initial taxi.  Very often Ground Metering will issue taxi instructions as they are also manning Ground Control; i.e. combined up.  This means you have aircraft taxiing in the same space on different frequencies.  This leads to confusion and potentially dangerous situations as one aircraft does not know what another aircraft said they are doing.  For example on our taxi out yesterday we were cleared first and a Company aircraft on Ground Control frequency was then cleared to taxi.  They did not hear our clearance first; so they were surprised to see us taxiing in front of them. Of course Ground also failed to tell Company to follow us; but the point is when aircraft on the same pavement taxi around on different frequencies it creates an unnecessary rise in the level of risk.Close Metering frequency; it isn't necessary.  It is almost always manned by the same person manning Ground Control. If they won't do that; then stop allowing aircraft to taxi on multiple frequencies.  It is lazy controlling.  Taxi is done on Ground Control; not Metering.




Synopsis: B737 Captain stated that the Metering frequency at STL has out lived is usefulness and caused confusion when used to issue taxi instructions; with a ground control frequency also in use.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Piper Single Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Aircraft component: Emergency Equipment
Component problem: Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a routine training mission to familiarize a student pilot with the safety features of their high performance turbo prop aircraft; the aircraft automatically activated and notified various ATC facilities and the emergency guard freq of a aircraft presumed emergency. The aircraft broadcast a mayday distress call and changed our VFW squawk code from 1200 to 7700 without our input or knowledge. This aircraft has a new 'home safe' feature that is designed to be a one push button a pilot or more importantly a incapacitated pilots passenger can activate designed to bring the airplane back to earth safely without any additional human input. In a particular emergency training profile; the system activated before we had time to cancel its engagement. ATC and other surrounding aircraft became aware of the broadcast and were coordinating action plans until we had the ability to broadcast on 121.5 and eventually with ZZZ Center that the aircraft generated emergency broadcast was a false alarm and we were initiating a reset of all systems including cancelling the emergency squawk of 7700 and returning to 1200. We were in a class E airspace in a training zone and at no time were other aircraft in the vicinity of our location which could have caused a hazard. Only by monitoring the 'Guard' frequency did we know that the aircraft had initiated its own emergency distress call. Once we realized that the aircraft had broadcast a distress call; we initiated corrective action of cancelling all automation which stopped the aircraft from operating in its 'home safe' process and returned control to the pilot.




Synopsis: Flight instructor reported that on-board 'Homesafe' system automatically activated the emergency radio and transponder broadcasts.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ERI.Tower, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D ERI
ATC / advisory: Tower ERI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Go around below 1000' for unstable approach. Flew below glide slope. Pilot Monitoring (PM) called out the deviation. Corrected but not enough. Went further below glide slope and receive the 'glide slope low' warning. We were at 800' and executed the go a round.We were unstable at 800' at night. The approach didn't meet the definition of a stable approach so the go around was executed. Perhaps multiple late nights was making me more tired than I realized. Fatigue could have been an issue. I felt OK but my performance was sub-par.




Synopsis: Captain reported executing a go-around after going below the glide slope during the approach. Fatigue was cited as a factor.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I took radar on Aircraft X at FL330 northbound requesting FL350.  Had Aircraft Y at FL350 south-eastbound. I thought I climbed Aircraft X to FL340.  Later on the two aircraft said they were getting an RA (resolution advisory) and one climbed and the other descended.  No loss of separation. I was thinking of FL350.  The Aircraft X wanted FL350 for a final; and I had Aircraft Y at FL350. I must have said FL350 even though my entry was FL340 for Aircraft X.


Second narrative: We received a climb from FL350 to FL360. While processing the climb; and after initial rotation up; we got a TCAS RA to climb. We climbed to FL360 as instructed by ATC. We then notified ATC of maneuver.


Synopsis: Pilots and Controller report of two aircraft getting a RA and responding to the RA with no loss of separation. Controller possibly climbed one aircraft to the other's altitude.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After landing (passed taxiway D); given clearance to exit on D after a 180 turn and back taxi. While in the 180 turn; the right brake failed/faded. Left main gear exited paved surface of the runway while other main gear and nose gear remained on pavement.




Synopsis: The pilot of a C402 experienced a brake problem during a 180 degree turn on the runway. This caused a directional control issue that resulted in a runway excursion.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SEA
Aircraft component: Pitot/Static Ice System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Conducted low speed rejected takeoff due to Master Caution Light.  Discovered the Pitot Probe Heat switches were off.  Redid the After Start; Taxi; and Takeoff checklists.  Notified Dispatch and departed. After push back; I elected to do the Delayed Engine [Start] Checklist and taxi out single engine.  The First Officer started the #2 engine and I called for the After Start checklist; while the push crew was still connected. Activity outside the aircraft by the push crew redirected my attention away from the checklist and I missed getting the Pitot Probe switches on.  My decision to call for the After-Start Checklist while I was monitoring the push back was a contributing factor; as well as workload distribution and cross verification.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reports forgetting to turn on the pitot heat switches after engine start and responding without checking at the checklist prompt. As takeoff thrust is set a Master Caution Light illuminates due to the omission; and the takeoff is rejected.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: IAD.Airport, DC
Weather elements / visibility: 7
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B IAD
ATC / advisory: Tower IAD
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A B737 on a visual approach to Runway 1R; after a go-around due to traffic on Runway; came less than 1;000 FT 3 miles from E145; on a visual approach to Runway 1C. At the time this loss occurred; IAD had been IMC for 10 minutes with the prevailing visibility of 1 SM. RMKS showed Tower visibility to be 7 miles. The Tower advertised ILS and visual approaches being conducted simultaneously to [Runway] 1R/C/L; departing Runway 30. Controllers could see the runway and aircrews could see the lights; however; there was a shallow fog layer that was thickening. Controllers were issuing RVR and briefing the low visibility during position relief briefings. After landing; one crew advised of a fog layer at about 30 FT and said that the runway won't be in sight much longer. Local briefed his relief that the field was IFR. Local 1 briefed his relief that RVR was being issued and visual approaches were being conducted. It is Potomac TRACON's (PCT) responsibility to call the approach in use yet PCT did not tell Tower which approaches to advertise nor did Tower advise PCT to stop issuing visual approaches. In fact; a PCT Supervisor called the Tower to talk about the visibility. Incredulously; they seemed to talk each other into NOT believing that the official weather sequence showed the prevailing visibility; whereupon visual approaches were continued. Scratchpad on about 7 arrivals showed they were on visual approaches when they should have been on ILS approaches. This situation occurred because of the breakdown in communications among the Tower and TRACON teams and a lack of leadership by the respective FLMs.




Synopsis: IAD Controller described a separation loss during an attempt to conduct visual approaches when reported weather indicated that conditions were such that no visual approaches should be attempted.