elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 170
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was enroute at 1800 ft MSL. I experienced sudden moderate engine roughness with about a 100 RPM drop. The issue continued despite applying carburetor heat; setting the mixture to full rich; and reducing throttle. I decided to make a precautionary landing [at a nearby alternate]. Because the airport was beyond gliding distance; I also decided to begin a climb while the engine was still making enough power to do so. During the climb; I climbed into the 1900 ft shelf of the Class B airspace; stopping around 2500 ft MSL. I was already on the CTAF and didn't want to be messing around with the radio; so broadcast on frequency my position; that I had an emergency; and that I was proceeding directly to the airport. I also broadcast that I was climbing into the Class B and requested anybody on frequency who was talking to [ATC] to inform them. Once reaching the airport was assured I descended out of the Class B and landed uneventfully.Because I was in an emergency situation; I had a right to climb into the Class B if necessary for the safety of the flight. I didn't want to add the distraction of getting out a chart and messing with the radios; so I elected to not attempt to contact [ATC] to inform them of my intentions. I also only have one radio; so to do so I would have had to stop monitoring the CTAF at my destination. Only after I had already descended out of the Class B did [I] realize that I should have squawked 7700.




Synopsis: C170 pilot reported entering Class B airspace without clearance after experiencing engine roughness.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At Gate XX in ZZZ; I was notified of a Passenger with a lithium-ion powered heart monitor. She told the Flight Attendant that her spare battery was in her checked luggage. I asked the Gate Agent if this was okay. The Agent was not sure but was going to check. I then called Dispatch to check on the battery. Dispatch connected me with someone else in Operations who said it was okay to continue. After talking it over with Operations and Dispatch and having been given the okay to continue; we were on are way to ZZZ1. After landing; I received an email saying that the battery needed to be in her carry-on bag; not in the checked bag.


Second narrative: The cabin was notified of a Passenger with a lithium-ion battery powered heart monitor; of which she had her spare battery in her checked luggage. After consulting Dispatch and others at Operations; the Captain was told that this was okay with our policies and procedures. Once we landed in ZZZ1; we were told this was against our policies and procedures.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported being notified at their destination that a spare lithium-ion battery in checked baggage should have been stowed with passenger's carry-on bag.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL270...300 KIAS 1. Master Caution - 'Pressurization Flow' with cabin climbing  2. Declared emergency and requested emergency descent to 10;000 feet.  3. ATC acknowledged.  4. Gave a clearance to FL240.  5. Which I replied; 'Negative; we've begun emergency descent; request 10;000.' 6. ATC acknowledged 10;000... Heard a turn given to another aircraft of 40 degrees; TCAS did not show a below conflict. 7.  During descent with QRH procedures we did manually regain cabin controller in standby and prevented cabin from exceeding 10;000 feet. 8. We requested 11;000 MSL for continued cruise on the arrival. And reported regaining normal operations 9. Multiple components of the pressurization system failed to initiate this event. Emergency descent is a trained response procedure and checking below on TCAS we expect turn guidance to clear traffic.  A short descent of 3;000 feet would be an abrupt halt to an increasing speed and descent rate with speedbrakes deployed. W e appreciate all the help received from ATC.




Synopsis: MD-82 Captain experiences a pressurization flow light at FL270 and declares an emergency requesting 10;000 feet as descent is initiated. The initial clearance is to FL240 and ATC is reminded of the emergency status. Manual control of the pressurization system is regained at 15;000 feet and flight continues to destination.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was briefed and took the position. The sequence was set up as the Cessna 172 number one midfield; followed by an experimental sea plane by a mile and a half; all aircraft were sequenced to Runway XX. As the C172 was midfield; I cleared him number one for the option which he then read back. I then told the experimental to follow Skyhawk ahead in the downwind and he replied that he did not have traffic. I then saw that his traffic was in the base turn and told him traffic ahead and to your right a Skyhawk in the right base. He then said he had the traffic in sight and I cleared him number two to land. As the C172 joined the final I noticed the experimental a little tight on the base but he was 40 KTS slower than the preceding traffic and if he flew a normal pattern would fall in place behind the Skyhawk that he had already reported in sight. He then continued in the right turn and cut off the C172. The C172 then made a turn to the south to avoid being hit by the experimental. The pilot reported later on the phone that he thought it may have been less than 50 feet. After the C172 reported southbound and said that the experimental had descended into them; I instructed him to fly eastbound and enter a left base to Runway XX. The experimental and the C172 both landed without incident. There are no recommendations that I can make as this would have been avoided if the pilot of the experimental had been honest and told me that he didn't have the traffic in sight.




Synopsis: Local Controller described pattern conflict when one aircraft was instructed to follow traffic that was reported insight by the pilot; but turned base inside of the preceding traffic requiring evasive actions.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: En route at FL300; a white status message illuminated 'L FADEC FAULT 2'. We performed the QRH for the status message and advised the company via ACARS of the message to pass along to Maintenance Control. The message became intermittent; and finally went off; then a caution message displayed indicated L FADEC. We performed the QRH; which stated to bring the left engine to idle. Captain (CA) instructed First Officer (FO) Pilot Monitoring (PM) to request a descent. ATC had a delay in giving us a descent so CA instructed FO to advise we were beginning a descent due to engine trouble. We determined that from our position; the nearest suitable airport was our destination airport because it had the longest runway at 12;000 feet. ATC cleared us direct; which gave us just enough time to get set up well for a planned emergency landing. We continued with the left engine at IDLE and executed the ILS to the longest runway. After landing we stopped on the runway and had the safety equipment inspect the brakes before we then taxied clear of the runway. We did not brace the cabin and the landing was very smooth and uneventful. The entire crew had excellent communication and the flight attendants did a nice job of preparing the cabin for a planned emergency landing.One point I would like to add is that although the checklist directed us to leave the engine running and at idle; it does not clarify how to run the before landing checklist with the Flaps only set at Flaps 20 rather than 45.The aircraft was previously written up and signed off for the same maintenance issues.




Synopsis: Flight crew Captain reported receiving L FADEC caution message in cruise flight; engine was reduced to idle thrust per procedure. Nearest suitable airport was destination; where a safe landing was made.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower LGA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During landing rollout on runway 31 at LGA we were given a full litany of taxi instructions by the Tower Controller. These instructions were being given while were slowing through 135 knots. The First Officer was the flying pilot and did a superb job of landing at night on a 7000 foot runway. During landing rollout I did not clearly hear the taxi instructions as my attention was completely focused on the runway and stopping. I will not acknowledge or accept taxi instructions during landing rollout since it is paramount we concentrate on safe guidance down the runway centerline and the stopping of the aircraft. At a safe taxi speed I exited the runway at intersection 'Tango' following the green high speed taxi lights that directed me to turn right upon exit. After I turned right we switched the radio frequency to the Ground Controller who then told us we turned the wrong direction on taxiway 'Bravo'. We were told to hold our position until passing traffic on the adjacent taxiway was clear and then continue to our gate. No ground safety issues were encountered and no admonishment was given by the Ground Controller. The potential for problems exist when the Tower Controller is issuing taxi instruction at such a critical phase of flight. At other airports taxi instructions are given by Ground Controllers after exiting the runway. Perhaps this is a normal 'business as usual' at LGA; however in my opinion this is a very 'unsafe' practice.Tell the tower controller at LGA not to give a taxi clearance during a critical phase of flight that requires total concentration on aircraft stopping.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a taxiway incursion occurred when he missed a taxi clearance issued during the landing roll out.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We had extensive ground delay in ZZZ for our flight to LGA. As time went on; I called Scheduling to let them know that our FDP was going to have to be watched and confirmed our limits with them. I also called the Union and talked to our FAR 117 expert to confirm limits. When we were eventually ready to push back; I got the FDP worksheet from the Agent. It showed our LUW time had already passed. I didn't think that was right and called Scheduling. The first Scheduler said that we weren't legal and that they would call me back. I still thought this was wrong and called Scheduling back. The next Scheduler said I was good to go and that LUW time on sheet did not include extension. After all the mixed answers; I had Scheduling get the Chief Pilot on Call on the line. When all was said and done; we were still legal to takeoff. While enroute to LGA; we had numerous delays for flow; and when we got on the ground in LGA we had numerous delays getting to gate; too many aircraft; not enough room to move them around. Bottom line; this whole FAR 117 change that was supposed to make things easier is a chocolate mess. Constantly causes confusion to Aircrew and Scheduling. When you go to something with this many charts and tables and 'What ifs' and rolling look-backs that take a computer to keep track of; how can anyone say this is simpler? It only creates more confusion at a time when Aircrew is already tired and their performance is on the downward slide. Numerous NASA and Military studies have shown a steep drop off in performance after a 10 hour duty day; but we can still go 15 hours and the FAA expects us to be perfect; and now we get threats of FAA violations for FAR 117 limits that we have no say in writing. The weather/winds/turbulence was terrible going into LGA that night. I wonder how this easier/safer FAR 117 limits would have looked if something happened; as a former Safety Officer in the Air Force and a trained Accident Investigator; I can tell you we are setting ourselves up for a fall. Our FDP sheet that we get in the cockpit before push needs to have any extensions included in the LUW time; having to do math when tired and distracted in the cockpit before push only leads to more confusion/errors; at least put that new time in 'Extension Reason' box. Exceeded FAR 117 FDP by seven minutes.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported exceeding his maximum FAR 117 duty time due to weather; enroute delays; and ground delays at LGA.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While descending via the Eagul5 Arrival into PHX; I noted a discrepancy in comparing the chart with the aircraft Navigation Display. Specifically; the chart directs crossing EAGUL intersection at or above FL180 (based on QNE; that is; aircraft altimeters set to standard 29.92 in Hg.) The aircraft navigation database; in contrast; directs crossing EAGUL intersection at or above 18;000 FT (based on QNH; that is; aircraft altimeters set to a local altimeter setting.) Please note that the upper clearance limit of FL230 at EAGUL intersection is not at issue here. I queried the Air Traffic Controller as to which lower limit was correct at EAGUL intersection: FL180 or 18;000 FT. He replied that the lowest clearance limit to cross EAGUL intersection is FL180; not 18;000 FT (that is; the chart is correct and the aircraft navigation database is incorrect.) I asked him if he was certain of this and he replied that the lowest clearance limit to cross EAGUL intersection is FL180 and has always been so. I believe; but I am not certain; that this aircraft navigation database discrepancy is present in all A320 series aircraft. It is important that this discrepancy is promptly corrected because a sufficiently low local altimeter setting could result in a clearance deviation/violation/aircraft accident. For example; a local altimeter setting of 29.62 in Hg could cause an A320 series aircraft to cross EAGUL intersection at FL177 - which is 300 FT below the clearance limit altitude of FL180. The performance standards for Airline Transport Pilots delineate a maximum tolerance of 100 FT.

Callback: The reporter states that his company reported to him that this is just the way the A320 is and that keeping QNE until past the fix will prevent an altitude deviation.



Synopsis: A320 Captain reports his FMGC database depicts crossing EAGUL between FL230 and 18;000 FT; on the EAGUL 5 arrival to PHX. The chart; which is correct; indicates the lower limit should be FL180.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAV.TRACON, GA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class C SAV
ATC / advisory: TRACON SAV
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: About 20 DME southwest of SAV ATC told us to descend to 2000. About the same time we received an ATC caution terrain warning ATC told us to climb to 2500.


Second narrative: We were giving direct to the Outer Marker (OM) for a visual. At 5000 feet we received a TCAS warning from a [aircraft] doing aerobatics. ATC advised of traffic to our right and climbing fast. I saw him climb and do a snap roll then a couple of knife edges which is when I believe he saw us. After that we were given a descent to 2000 feet. PIC started a descent to 2000 feet from 5000 feet. Although it was haze we began to see two antennas in front of us which seemed very high. At the same time we both saw them appear on the terrain avoidance map on the MFD. In the next couple of seconds we received a caution terrain message. A few second after that we got an ATC climb to 2500 feet. We climbed to 2500 feet to avoid the antennas. From this point we had the airport in sight and were cleared for a visual approach to 10. No other mention of this was made from ATC.


Synopsis: Flight crew reported receiving a low altitude warning while approaching the SAV area.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: GSO.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower GSO
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Aircraft component: Nose Gear Tire
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The first two touch and goes were uneventful.  On the third landing; which was to be a full stop; the nose tire deflated and the prop tip struck the runway.  Landing was behind a [commercial] jet. Wind was calm. I was informed by the Tower that I was following [the commercial jet] 'caution wake turbulence.' Then; I was told to turn base because he was fitting me in front of a King Air.  I planned my approach to touchdown past where I thought [the commercial jet] had touched down and slightly above what I perceived as his descent path. On touchdown; the nose seemed to come down harder than normal. I was on center line but the aircraft would not taxi. On inspection; it was noticed that the nose tire was deflated and the prop tip was slightly bent. I plan on getting additional training on wake turbulence avoidance; practice 'spot' landings; and will never let myself get rushed into landing behind a jet like this again! It is very helpful that wake turbulence is a topic for discussion and it should continue to be emphasized.




Synopsis: PA32 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence from a commercial jet that resulted a harder than normal landing and a flat nose gear tire.