elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Departing ZZZ; the Captain and I heard a loud popping sound on FO (First Officer) side and EICAS showed Pack 2 valve closed. The Captain ran the QRH as specified; recycled the pack and EICAS message went off and a few minutes later it came back with cabin pressure rising rapidly. The Captain ran QRH as specified at the same time we were getting Packs 1-2 valves closed and were alternating on our way down. We [advised ATC] and came back to ZZZ and deplaned normally. A non-rev pilot came to us after deplaning and told us he heard a loud pop in the back and a rush of air in the cabin.Suspected bleed air leak.


Second narrative: On climb out from ZZZ; we had a PACK 2 bleed closed message. We attempted to open the valve using the QRH procedure and it did not work. A few minutes later we saw that the cabin altitude was climbing rapidly and we then saw PACK 1-2 valve closed message. We asked to remain at 10;000 ft. and ran the QRH and were unable to get either valve to open and therefore unable to pressurize the cabin. We [advised ATC] and decided to return to ZZZ. We landed and deplaned without any further issues. Later we were informed by a non-rev pilot that he heard a loud air sound on the climb out and he suspected a bleed air leak.


Synopsis: ERJ-145 First Officer reported bleed air and air conditioning/pressurization issues with aircraft and elected to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I previously submitted a report on this flight/issue; but one of my main concerns was completely ignored; thus this second report. At issue was planning an ETOPS flight over a Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedure (TCDP) area where the ETOPS solution did not comply with the TCDP requirements. Though the previous answer addressed the lack of functionality of the Sabre terrain solver; it completely failed to address the legality of a dispatch where an ETOPS alternate fuel computation does not include that necessary to comply with a TCDP. On our flight the critical point was west of 040W. With the ETOPS alternate being BIKF; east of 040W. While the TCDP requires a flight experiencing a depressurization prior to (west of) 040W to remain west of 040W and to proceed to the west coast of Greenland; in the opposite direction of the ETOPS alternate.  As decompression was the issue that was driving the ETOPS fuel computation; both the ETOPS [and] TCDP address the exact same scenario. I can find nowhere in the FARs; the Operations Specifications nor our FOM where it specifically states that an ETOPS solution can ignore a TCDP. As both the ETOPS procedures and TCDP are in our Flight Operations Manual it seems a reasonable inference that both must be complied with during flight planning. If this is not the case; I would like a specific FAR or Operations Specifications reference so stating and would suggest that the Flight Operations Manual be amended to address this situation and the legality. Though the previous response stated that there was sufficient fuel; how do they know as once a flight in such a condition reaches the coast of Greenland; if no suitable alternate exists to the west; a circumnavigation of Greenland at 10;000 ft could be a significant fuel burn. Please address the legality of this type of dispatch with either an FAR or an Operations Specifications reference if it is legal.




Synopsis: B777 Captain questioned the validity of a trans-Atlantic ETOPS dispatch release that in his opinion did not comply with fuel considerations if a terrain critical depressurization procedure became necessary.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Make this a memory item. Too much going on trying to talk to crew; ATC; run checklists etc.; while dealing with the O2 mask distraction while Flight Attendants and passengers are inhaling toxic fumes. O2 on; PACKS OFF; RAM AIR on.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported a fume event during a busy initial approach phase.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: FAA [was] waiting at the aircraft. During my preflight; found oil under #1 engine to be excessive. Called Maintenance; did a runup; aircraft ok. Called Ramp for push and received clearance and brakes were released; [but the] tug had a malfunction. After [it was] corrected; called for push clearance again. Started #1 engine and disconnected from the tug. Lowered slats and they stuck and we were unable to move the handle. Returned to gate under our own power. Airplane was taken out of service. Captain called Dispatch to tell them what had happened and Dispatcher removed our times from the computer; our record of push and return to gate no longer existed. I had told Maintenance what happened and was told this should be on record as an air interrupt. The flight rescheduled to leave later; I was unable to continue; [so I] called crew tracking to let them know I had to go home. Crew tracking told me I needed to call scheduling; [because] there was no record of our out or in times. I tried to correct her and she said our times no longer existed and information had been removed from the computer. Documentation needs a paper trail. Important information should never be deleted at the click of a button at any-ones discretion. My record of being at the airport is non-existent; times for aircraft are non-existent.




Synopsis: MD83 First Officer describes maintenance actions and delays that occur during preflight and pushback with the FAA observing. After pushback the flap lever becomes jammed and the aircraft returns to the gate and the flight delayed while another is sought. The times for the pushback and return to the gate were removed from the computer by the Dispatcher; much to the dismay of the reporter.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Line; Fittings; & Connectors
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After we closed the door to push in ZZZ the ground personnel told us we needed a 'gas cap.' We asked for clarification and were confused by the communication and terminology the ramper was using. The ramper had us wait as he got clarification on what it was we needed; he later told us that Maintenance had already been out and replaced fuel cap. We asked if the fuel cap had been replaced and he said yes. The entire communication about the issue was confusing. We departed and flew normally to ZZZ1. Once at the gate in ZZZ1 the Captain and I agreed that I would look closely at the fueling port and talk with the new fuelers. Before I got to them; they informed me that they were unable to fuel the plane due to the broken fuel port.Upon the first indication that there was an issue we should have pulled the jet bridge back up and we should have gone out to visually inspect the fueling port.




Synopsis: Pilot reported damage to aircraft at the pressure fueling connection that was not reported to the flight crew.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 100
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Sail Plane
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The glider is a two seater. The two primary cables from the rudder go straight to the front seat pedals; and the rear seat pedals connect by a short cable to each right and left primary cable. I was in the rear seat when the left rudder pedal connection to the rudder cable lost tension while applying corrective pressure in a right turn. The cables from the rudder to the front seat were unaffected; and the glider was fully controllable. Only the rear seat connection to the left cable was lost. A bit startling. The rear seat connector cable goes through an 'S' shaped metal tube with a plastic sleeve to improve movement. The tube part closest to the pedal had worn through. Corrective action included immediate slowing and rolling to level flight. The front seat pilot took over rudder control and normal flight was maintained to landing. Stabilizing the flight was priority #1 then descending to landing was next once control was confirmed. We were airborne less than 1.5 hours for the entire flight.

Callback: The reporter stated that front and aft cockpit rudder cables are mechanically attached; with the front cockpit cable being primary and directly connected to the rudder with a solid cable. The aft cables are sistered to the front cables. There was no loss of control during this event. The reporter stated that newer glider models from this manufacturer have been redesigned to prevent this type of failure; which has occurred before and is known to be a potential issue.



Synopsis: An ASH-25 Glider's aft cockpit left rudder cable became disconnected during flight; but the aircraft was fully controllable from the front cockpit.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Instructor
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: After cleared for the touch and go for Runway XX; I continued the approach. I requested a wind check and had a stabilized; normal landing. After touchdown; I had right rudder input to maintain directional control; however; the aircraft veered to the left; instructor also acted with right rudder input to confirm the input but the aircraft did not react and continued to veer off to the left. It resulted in us running over runway hold short sign for the intersecting runway. The aircraft came to a stop in the grass. As per procedure; we shutdown the aircraft and waited for fire and rescue.


Second narrative: We were coming in to do pattern work. When we were on final I contacted tower to confirm we were clear for the touch and go on runway XX. The student had the plane under control the whole way down then once we touched down the aircraft was going to the left. To correct the student was doing the right thing by putting in right rudder to bring it back to the right and center it up. Unfortunately the rudder inputs were not responding; so the aircraft keep going to the left and we went heading into the grass on the left side of runway. We ended up hitting the intersecting runway hold short sign and stopping a little after that. We shut down the aircraft and waited for fire and rescue to come over to us.


Synopsis: PA28 pilot under training experiences a normal landing with the aircraft drifting towards the left despite right rudder input by both the reporter and the instructor. A runway excursion occurs with the aircraft contacting an airport sign.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZNY; Special Use W-107B
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While cruising at 17;000 feet in IMC along V139 over Warning Area W-107B near MANTA intersection; the FMS message indicator came on and the FMS reported 'position uncertain' and 'dead reckoning mode'. A check of the navigation sensors showed no GNSS (GPS) position. The FMS then requested that certain VORs be manually tuned on NAV1. The crew reported the loss of RNAV capability to New York ARTCC. The crew switched to conventional (VOR) navigation and continued the flight to the destination.

Callback: The reporter believed the loss of GPS was jamming of some sort and the aircraft was over W-107B where Naval operations may have been in progress. ATC was not aware of a planned GPS outage; nor was a NOTAM issued. Their aircraft's GPS displayed no satellites available but returned to normal functioning on its own a short time later.



Synopsis: A Cessna Citation Captain reported a loss of GPS signal and satellite coverage along V139 over W-107B at 17;000 feet. GPS function returned a short time later.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MMMX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to descent; the arrival; approach and taxi plan for 5R was briefed and discussed. No digital ATIS is available at MMMX and we were too far out to adequately hear the ATIS verbally. METAR winds and dispatch planning favored 5R. NOTAMs were reviewed and although taxiway B6 was NOTAMed as closed; it was not considered as it did not pertain to our landing runway. Approximately 10 miles before TOD we were issued an arrival and runway change. We worked together to load and brief the new procedure. ATC issued multiple instructions to us including large speed reductions and it became a very high workload environment. On the landing roll out I had briefed and planned to turn off on B7. The approach had a 7 knot quartering tailwind and I landed towards the far end of the touch down zone. After slowing the aircraft it became apparent that I would not be able to make the turn off at B7 so I turned off at B6. After turning on to B6 ATC told us to taxi down the runway to a further intersection for turnoff. We were already on B6 and advised ATC that we could not execute a 180 turn as the taxiway was too narrow. ATC told us that if we did not turn we would 'close the airport.' We again told ATC that we were unable to execute a 180 turn. We were later able to taxi forward a bit to completely clear the runway. ATC advised that we could shut down engines as we would have to wait for Runway 23R to open so that we could taxi across. This delayed our gate arrival by about 30 minutes. Contributing was that I had not flown in to MMMX for over 5 years and the FO had not flown in for over 10 years.




Synopsis: B737 Captain arriving MMMX notes that taxiway B6 is NOTAMed closed; but does not expect it to be a factor. After arrival and runway changes; and numerous speed adjustment by ATC; the NOTAM is forgotten about until it does become a factor.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Advised to contact Tower for visual landing clearance at the FAF.  Perfect flying conditions and all radios were tuned accordingly.  It was a textbook stabilized approach with zero distractions.  I as the Pilot Monitoring simply failed to obtain a landing clearance for no reason at all.  We were both completely baffled at the oversight.  I have zero excuses to why this happened.


Second narrative: ZZZ Approach Control had cleared us for the visual to XXL.  We had the field in sight; and the frequency was not busy.  A normal approach and landing were completed.  Upon exiting the runway; we both realized we had just landed without contacting ZZZ Tower for a clearance. As we switched to Tower after clearing the runway; they gave us a taxi clearance and had us call Ground. I always use the taxi light switch as 'cleared to land' reminder.  The lack of traffic at ZZZ right now sort of lulled me into thinking we had been cleared to land.  I realized as we cleared the runway that the taxi light switch was still in the 'OFF'position.  I will make sure I verify with the other Pilot that we're cleared to land (which I usually do). The somewhat 'off' tempo of flying; schedules; and airport activity during COVID has made me realize I need to be extra vigilant.  I simply missed the clearance this time.  I won't do that again.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported landing without a clearance.