elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DWH.Airport, TX
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 6
Aircraft: PA-46 Malibu Meridian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Local; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was just notified of a possible pilot deviation. The FAA called me on my cell phone and emailed a pilot compliancy questionnaire form. During landing phase; alternator light illuminated to inoperative; front windscreen vent defrost/defog stopped working and popped a circuit during exit of landing runway causing burning smell. Received taxi instructions to turn left and taxi on Foxtrot to Echo and Delta into ramp. Lost position on Foreflight taxi diagram while starting to taxi to ramp; as result of poor visibility inadvertently turned left past Foxtrot. To prevent this from the recurrence I will absolutely ask for progressive taxi instructions with any situation such as: poor visibility; distracted with mechanical issues or loss of geo-referenced plane overlay on airport taxi diagram in Foreflight.




Synopsis: PA46 pilot reported a aircraft equipment problem after landing and then lost situational awareness during taxi.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZLC.ARTCC, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: My Controller in Charge (CIC) issued a clearance to Aircraft X on the ground at HCR. The new procedure at HCR is that pilots are required to fly a Visual Climb Over Airport (VCOA) and remain within an arbitrary 5 mile radius of the airport and call us as soon as they're airborne.  Aircraft X was given all of this information and chose to fly directly south into the SLC arrival flow. He called me initially at 14;000 feet; 10 miles south of HCR airport; in another sectors airspace. Prior to this his transponder was not on. I gave the pilot radar contact; and asked him to confirm his position; to which he stated he was 'south of the airport'. This procedure is unsafe. Other airports have higher terrain than we do and they have SID's off both directions that actually work when it's IFR.There's no reason that we can't have a Runway 22 SID that goes over NONTY. The aircraft could climb to cross NONTY at 15;000 feet which would deconflict from Sector 32's traffic; and the arrival flows into SLC. Other airports have these procedures and their terrain is much more complicated than ours. This procedure was called completely illegal and unsafe a year ago and all that's changed is you deleted a footnote from the 7110.65. We can't keep pretending this is safe; until someone gets hurt. We have a responsibility to the flying public to do better.




Synopsis: A Center Controller reported an IFR aircraft departed a non towered airport; did not comply with a new departure procedure which the reporter states is unsafe and did not turn their transponder on. When the Controller radar identified the aircraft it was in an adjacent sector's airspace.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During takeoff upon rotation; LG AIR/GND FAIL" CAS message. We notified ATC and completed the applicable QRH procedure and all checklists. We also conducted an over weight landing in accordance with applicable QRH procedure. We landed at 4X;XXX lbs with 100 fpm rate of descent. After landing crash fire rescue inspected the aircraft. They found no damage. We continued to the gate and deplaned our passengers.Cause - "LG AIR/GND FAIL" CAS message and the inability to retract gear."


Second narrative: During takeoff upon rotation; LG AIR/GND FAIL" CAS message.  We notified ATC and completed the applicable QRH procedure and all checklists.  We also conducted an over weight landing in accordance with applicable QRH procedure.  We landed at 4X;XXX lbs with 100 FPM rate of decent.  After landing crash fire rescue inspected the aircraft.  They found no damage.  We continued to the gate and deplaned our passengers.  All in all; [everything] went well.  Could improve my briefing to the flight attendant.  First Officer and I worked well together.  ATC support was excellent."


Synopsis: EMB-145 flight crew reported a landing gear problem requiring a return to the departure airport.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SWF.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: Marginal
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D SWF
ATC / advisory: Tower SWF
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were cleared for the visual approach to Rwy 9 in to SWF we had identified the airport visually this matched up with the ADF pointing to the FAF and the Localizer movement I clicked off the AP and started the approach. We were level at 3000 feet and started to slow the aircraft and configure. We started our base to final and I called for flaps 30. We had descended to approximately 2400 feet. When I noticed that the Localizer had not centered. I brought this to the Captains attention also the Airport configuration did not look right and the Rwy looked shorter than published. At this point I called for a go around (GA) we initiated the GA leveled off at 3000 feet and ATC vectored us around for another approach and landed. I feel we followed procedures and this is a great example of why we always use our instruments to back up an approach. A contributing factor was the fact that the ADF coincidentally pointed to the location of the FAF of the wrong Rwy.




Synopsis: CRJ200 First Officer reports lining up with the wrong runway while attempting a visual approach to Runway 9 at SWF. The NDB at the FAF and the Runway 9 localizer were being used as aids and the localizer does not indicate correct alignment. A go-around is initiated.
Date: 201904
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: REI.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class E REI
ATC / advisory: UNICOM REI
Second aircraft: Sail Plane
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying with a student doing pattern work at Redlands airport. On the downwind leg we spotted a para-glider ahead of us around pattern altitude. I took controls and initiated a dive to avoid the para-glider. I am not sure about the exact miss distance.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: GA pilot reported a NMAC with a para-glider while on downwind at Redlands [REI] airport.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CID.Airport, IA
Aircraft: PA-23-250 Aztec
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON CID
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X departed CID after completing practice IFR approach; while working departure radar ID-ed them and asked intentions. Aircraft X wanted to depart CID and fly back to ALO IFR; I asked requested altitude and they requested 3;000 feet. I put Aircraft X on course to ALO and 3;000 feet. Workload increased exponentially due to Oshkosh overflights and standard IFR arrivals/ departures. At time of this event easily 10+ on a single scope at a time all requesting different things due to low ceilings and traffic. Aircraft X was enroute to ALO which has an MVA of 3;400 feet in his flight path. I noticed his exact flight path led him east of the MVA at 3;400 feet; and by the time he reached about 3 miles from the MVA; I issued a climb to 4;000 feet to keep him at a safe altitude. He went slightly inside the 3 mile mark under MVA altitude but above obstruction altitude; and made the climb past 3;400 feet by the time he was 90 degrees away from the obstruction and flying away from it. No accidents or further developments occurred; higher workload than standard due to Oshkosh event traffic funneling in. Nothing to recommend; higher than average workload with several abnormal request led to not seeing the issue before it happened.




Synopsis: CID Controller reported a PA27 entering a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201705
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; Thunderstorm
Aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other After pushback
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was serving as a member of a push team in the international terminal. This particular evening was my second time serving on a push team. I was given the task to assist in wing walking a Boeing 747. I had yet to assist in the push/walk out of a 747. In my training; although several of my classmates gained experience with the 747; my particular team had not. The other wing walker that also served as final marshaller was asked to do so due to his lack of experience/comfort level on disconnection. Prior to pushback; I had explained that I was unfamiliar with the type of towbar that was used on the 747; and needed to have a crash course. He told me that it was pretty self explanatory and that the procedure would be the same. Walk out the aircraft as usual. Wait for stop. Receive/acknowledge brakes set. Give brake set signal to final marshaller. Disconnect towbar. Pull bypass pin; wait for disconnect communication signal. Disconnect communication cable... and walk away. I just needed to know more about the lever that let the middle wheel down on the tow bar. We pushed back and I wing walked the starboard side. The tow tractor came to a stop and I proceeded to disconnect the tow bar. I gave the signal to pull back a bit so I could make my way to the Nose Landing Gear (NLG). I noticed what appeared to be a bypass pin. It had the same shape; and was located on the left side of the NLG strut. I proceeded to pull this pin; but then noticed it was still attached with a thin wire cable to the strut. It wasn't coming off and honestly; I did not want to force it. I looked back at [lead]. He was pointing at the strut; yet higher. I looked and that is when I noticed the remove before flight tag. I realized this was the pin; and pulled the bypass pin. I then waited for the clear to disconnect communication cable and did so. We all cleared the flight and backed off.Upon returning to the ready room; I told [lead] about that pin and having pulled it. He asked me what I was referring to and I elaborated. That is when he began to panic; informing me that it was the wiring pin. He asked me if I had returned it to its location and I mentioned I had not; because I was unaware that it had to be. I made the assumption that; being a larger aircraft; it may have had two bypass pins instead of just one.




Synopsis: Citing inadequate training; an air carrier ramp worker reported that in addition to the proper nose gear pin; he pulled another pin that should not have been removed.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Blade
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X had fan blade damage written up against Engine #1 and the damage was researched and signed off as within limits. After further investigation it was noted that the same blades had been written up previously and signed off. As per the Procedures Manual; damage to engine fan blades are to be reworked in accordance with manual or other approved data requirements and must be properly documented by completion of AML or non-routine; but are not to be entered into the Maintenance History. If there is a question as to whether damage to a blade has been dispositioned; it is to be re-evaluated against the manual limits. A lot of time went into investigating the damage and repair limits when the blades had been documented and signed off previously. It is not normal to go into the computer and research work already previously performed. Had this aircraft been at the gate and loading passengers and found by the crew doing preflight walk around the flight most likely would have been delayed or canceled. There needs to be a way to document that the fan blades had been previously written up and investigated for serviceability to prevent future delays and cancelations. Update Procedures Manual to allow documentation into [the] Maintenance History file and a yellow paint dot be placed on blades in question giving the pilot a heads up that the blade damage had already been investigated.




Synopsis: Technician reported damaged fan blades on a routine inspection and determining that the fan blades had already been inspected previously and were within limits for service.
Date: 201604
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Just as I was briefing for the departure; a new update became available for the iPad Flight Deck Pro app. It started to download automatically without my desire for it to do so. It rendered the App unusable for the flight as the download didn't complete prior to departure. I had to use paper charts for the flight.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported he had to use paper charts because his iPad started an update on its own at the gate before departure; failed to finish; and was therefore unusable during the flight.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PRX.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Cruise
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While returning from a patient transfer at 2;000 feet MSL (1;500 AGL) both myself and the nurse identified a crop duster (white in color) at 1 O-Clock less than 1/8 mile. The visibility was 10 plus miles and clear of clouds with light haze. I entered a hard right turn to avoid a collision passing to the right side of the crop duster within 50 yards or less. The crop duster never changed direction or banked he remained on the same course. After recovering from the hard right turn; both crew members acknowledged they did not get the tail number of the plane. I checked my TCAS with no traffic indicated. Continued flight to base with no further issues.




Synopsis: Air ambulance pilot reported a near midair collision with a crop duster near Paris; Texas.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: GFK.Airport, ND
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D GFK
ATC / advisory: Tower GFK
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Was told by ATC to follow the traffic in the downwind; saw traffic off to our right; I checked ADSB and looked for other traffic. Seeing nobody the student and I turned right to follow traffic just off of our right wing. Both the student and I realized that the traffic we were to follow was just above us because we made the turn too early. We dropped altitude immediately by 400 ft and let ATC know what happened. They had the traffic above us extend downwind for spacing.Corrective action would be to pay attention to understand specifically which traffic we were to follow and be sure to have the traffic visually before making a turn towards other traffic.




Synopsis: C172 instructor pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at GFK following a misunderstanding as to their sequence.
Date: 201506
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This pushback was an utter disaster due to the outsourcing of the entire station.  There were multiple trainees all over the ramp with it seemed; only one instructor.  I mistakenly had my interphone button 'out' as I had pressed it twice.  The verbiage coming back to the Captain was absolutely none of what Company X mandates.  No; 'set brakes' or anything similar.  The engine start command from the tug driver was 'cleared to fire up number two!;' and it went downhill from there.  He didn't even know we did not start #2 first. From our vantage point; the station was obviously trying to get way too many people certified at once.  The instructor's span of control was lost during the entire operation.  The all clear symbol with the arms down at 45 degrees was given to us with the tug not even disconnected and numerous people still below the airplane watching the disconnect operation.  It appeared there was NO supervision on the interphone due to the deplorable non SOP commands that were coming to the aircraft.  Our Air Carrier has totally given up SOP mandates it appears with some of these stations and their lack of SOP mandatory compliance.  In this particular instance; there were far too many students for one instructor.  This probably was as close as a crew could be to having an incident as a crew could have without having one on pushback.  It is quite obvious whoever in the Company that is responsible for handing over a station to contractors has dropped the ball in their oversight and SOP compliance for that station.  I would say that office within [our] air carrier needs complete restructuring itself after seeing far too much of this.




Synopsis: First Officer reported that during pushback ground personnel used nonstandard commands and phraseology. The reporter felt this issue was due primarily to the use of outsourced ground staff.