elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Oxygen System/Pax
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Maintenance techs were complying with RON package for aircraft. They were completing task card # XXXXXXXX under work order # XXXXXX. Upon removal of panels to access O2 generators they found safety pins that prohibit activation of O2 generators still installed.I was made aware of something this evening that I feel must be passed on to you. We had Aircraft X at the hangar tonight as a RON.  Included in the package was task task card # XXXXXXXX; Verify Lanyard Alignment for O2 Generators.  Aircraft was being worked on by Name 1; Name 2;  and Name 3. When they removed the panel to gain access to the generators they found that several of the generators had the safety pin that prevents the generator from being activated still installed with a red safety flag attached. Two of these generators were located at the emergency exit doors.  Had we not had this job card to perform this would not have been found. This aircraft was just released from Heavy Check today; and this was the very first flight after maintenance. I believe the event occurred due to complacency and failure to follow proper protocols after maintenance.Had this aircraft been carrying passengers and an actual emergency happened where these masks were needed several passengers would not  have been able to receive any O2. I am not exactly sure who should also be notified to check into this or what else can be done so I am sending it to you. I just feel that this should be looked into further as this is a safety of flight issue to me. It makes me wonder what else might be getting missed or overlooked at this or other facilities like this one and how do we protect the company and our passengers from situations like this.




Synopsis: Technician reported discovering 2 passenger O2 generators on a CRJ-900 still had safety pins installed on them that would have kept them from being activated.
Date: 201903
Location: POF.Airport, MO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: On the January 2019 update to the RNAV (GPS) 18 Approach at POF; Poplar Bluff Municipal; Poplar Bluff; Missouri a note was added: 'Straight-in and Circling RWY 18 NA at night.' Apparently the FAA 'flight checked' the approach sometime in October 2018 and found a tree had grown into the safety area for the Runway 18 Approach. No notification was given to airport management and on January 2019 the new note on the approach appeared. First it seems that the FAA might have reached out to airport management to perhaps try to remove the tree before changing the notes on the instrument approach procedure. The note is very ambiguous as to what it means. The way I read the note it means that one can shoot the approach but not land on Runway 18 from a straight-in or circle. I was told by airport management that it means that one could not shoot the Runway 18 Approach at night. I queried Memphis Center as to the restriction and the Controller said that the Center was not aware of any restrictions to the approach. If the note is meant to restrict the approach at night then a more clear note would be something like: 'Procedure NA at night.' If the note means one cannot land from a straight-in or circle to Runway 18 at night then why does the RNAV (GPS) 36 Approach plate not have a note restricting circle to Runway 18? The whole process seems to have been ill coordinated and poorly written. If there is an obstacle that is a hazard to operations on Runway 18 it should be more clearly written as to restrict the whole approach procedure at night or restrict landing from a straight-in or circling to Runway 18 at night.




Synopsis: Instructor pilot reported confusion regarding a new note the FAA has attached to the RNAV approach at POF.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Embraer Legacy 450/500
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: A ferry permit was prepared for a flight with the landing gear to be left extended for the entire flight due to an abnormal gear write up the day prior. Performance numbers were provided by the aircraft manufacturer which indicated to me that the aircraft could climb sufficiently and safely with two engines; however in the event of an engine failure the aircraft could not achieve obstacle clearance or even pattern altitude as the airport was at a high elevation in mountainous terrain. The only explanation given by the Chief Pilot was that 'the landing gear could be retracted in the event of an emergency.' This seemed contradictory to the entire nature of the maintenance discrepancy. No performance data was given at all in the event of a missed approach or balked landing with the landing gear extended at destination either. Pilots are not trained for such ferry flights nor could anybody in management or dispatch positions explain the data. The company is putting aircraft and crews in uncertain flight regimes and pressuring crews based on a ferry permit sign off. I have no idea weather or not the FAA was aware of performance issues associated with the flight when they issued the permit. More info needs to be given to pilots for such flights.




Synopsis: EMB505 Captain questions the advisability of a gear down ferry from a high altitude airport due to performance considerations.
Date: 201412
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The Passenger Agent told passenger to tell Flight Attendant (FA) that he had lithium ion batteries.They told me and I was curious and did a word search for lithium ion batteries in Part 1 and came to the page on Passenger and Cargo.In the Flight Manual Part YYYY: Batteries; Lithium-ion - In Device or As Spare (Excluding Mobility Device Batteries) ''' Spare batteries must be in original store packaging; individually plastic-bagged/ boxed; or covered with tape to protect ''' terminals. Yes -''Up to two spare '' lithium ion batteries with an aggregate lithium content of up to 25 grams; plus '' An unlimited number of batteries of less than 2 grams '' lithium ''' contentNo- I asked the FAs to have the passenger come up with his lithium ion batteries. He did and was very knowledgeable and told me they had to be in a separate plastic bag and he had even taped the terminals. I inspected the batteries and could find no reference to the 25 grams referenced in Part 1. He said he had been flying with these batteries to our destination for the last 3 weeks for work with no problems.I called the cargo folks who had no idea about the grams reference in Part 1. He mentioned something about watt-hours. At the time I did not see anything on the battery that referenced watt-hour; but in my review of the pictures just a few minutes ago...I see a reference in the last line to this battery at 48Wh. So I guess I did get pertinent info from cargo that would have helped. I believe they said something about either a 120 or 160 Wh maximum according to IATA. Maybe Part one needs to match with the info we get from cargo folks...aren't they the experts?I suggest we change the manual to have same verbiage as the info cargo puts out. They had no idea what I was talking about when I quoted from our manual to them.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain described the difficulty he encountered regarding the determination of the acceptability of lithium ion batteries brought aboard and declared by a passenger. A contributing factor was the lack of consistency between their Flight Manual description of qualifying quantities; and that of the cargo/baggage department.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At the bottom of descent; as thrust levers were advanced for level off; the left engine was un-responsive. Shortly thereafter the left generator dropped off-line and the engine shut down. The Captain had me declare an Emergency with Approach and called for the QRH. The Engine Failure or In-Flight Shutdown procedure was accomplished to completion followed by the Single Engine Operation Checklist. The flight attendants were notified by the Captain while I called local Company Operations and verified with ATC that ARFF had been dispatched to our landing runway. Total time from identification of problem to landing was approximately 12 minutes. Once on the ground; the aircraft was stopped on the landing runway and ARFF inspected the failed engine and advised that no abnormal conditions existed. We exited the runway and proceeded to the gate. Once the passengers had deplaned; ARFF chief boarded the aircraft to discuss the event with the cockpit crew and was immediately followed by Company Maintenance. The morning following the event; I filed a report with the company briefly describing the event. While I believed that we had complied with all policies and procedures surrounding this event; I now realize that we should have advised Dispatch 'when conditions permit[ted]'.




Synopsis: An MD-83 flight crew; descending to their destination; suffered the failure of the left engine. They secured the engine; declared an emergency with ATC and landed uneventfully at their planned destination.
Date: 202202
Location: IAH.Tower, TX
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Holding short of Runway 27 IAH Aircraft Y reported 5G interference with flight instruments. We were cleared for takeoff and climbing through 400 ft. the mode control panel altitude window indicated 50;000 ft. on its own and the altitude alerter sounding continuously. I selected level change due to VNAV dropping offline and the absence of the flight director pitch bar. Upon re-selecting the cleared altitude in the altitude window the pitch bar was restored and VNAV was re-selected as the pitch mode. This event was reported to ATC; Dispatch; and an ELB entry was entered.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported during departure from IAH the mode control panel altitude window indicated incorrectly and the altitude alerter sounded continuously.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Our initial takeoff clearance was to turn left to heading 055; and climb to 1;500 feet. After departure; we started our turn and initiated level off at 1;500 feet as we were handed off to Departure Control. Departure assigned a climb to 2;000 feet. We initiated a climb and leveled off at 2;000 feet. We received FMS messages 'GNSS 1/2 NOT NAV' and 'POSITION UNCERTAIN' as we were simultaneously queried by ATC regarding our altitude. The controller stated that she showed us at 2;500 feet; while our primary instruments read level at 2;000 feet. We advised that we would attempt to recycle our transponder; which we did. Immediately following; the controller issued a clearance to climb to 3;000 feet and to turn left heading 270. We initiated a climb and left turn as instructed. The controller then stated that she needed us to start the turn immediately; and we responded that we were already in the turn. After recycling the transponder; all altitude information appeared to be accurate. The aircraft was flown to the Service Center where the FMS messages were written up as a discrepancy to be evaluated for functionality. There were no TCAS alerts activated and the controller did not note any further issues after recycling the transponder. I am unaware if this was reported as a potential pilot deviation. I am aware of the fact that degraded GPS information can lead to erroneous ADS-B readouts; which is why the aircraft was written up at [the service center]. Our instruments did not agree with what the controller was reporting during the 2;000 feet level off.




Synopsis: A pilot reported a GPS anomaly.
Date: 201810
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Arriving into Gate; with engine 2 shut down; aircraft was moving toward the gate normally under minimal power on engine 1 when; just a couple feet from the spot; the nose gear rolled down into a depression (felt almost like a hole) and the aircraft immediately stopped. Tried taxiing out of it under increased thrust from #1; but using a safe amount of thrust; we were unable to move. First Officer asked if I wanted to restart #2; which I said yes to (we were already late and I knew this was the quicker option than having the ramp crew connect the tug to tow us in). I gave the ramper the visual signal that we were restarting #2; which he acknowledged. With number 2 restarted; it still took both engines at approx. 40% N1 to move; at which time the nose wheel practically jumped out of the depression. Fortunately; I was prepared for it and was immediately on the brakes after exiting and was able to stop normally on the parking spot. I immediately contacted [airport] Ops and informed them what happened and they did send someone out to look at 'the hole'. After exiting the plane; the jet bridge operator/gate agent told the First Officer that this was a normal occurrence on that gate and many aircraft just have the ramp tow them in.




Synopsis: 737 Captain reported the nose gear rolled into a depression approaching the assigned gate and came to an immediate stop.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I have observed a problem with the IVANE arrival to CLT on several occasions while flying and observing as a Line Check Airman. The problem arises when ATC clears aircraft to cross MAYOS intersection at FL220. Two different situations have occurred that would have resulted in altitude deviations without pilot intervention. The first is when the pilot is given MAYOS at FL220 beyond 200 nm. When he begins the descent; the aircraft automatically re-cruises to FL220. This drops out the next restriction at KIYEN at FL220. The aircraft will display the message 'constraint deleted above cruise altitude.' When given the subsequent clearance to descend via the star the aircraft will start down at 1000 fpm without honoring constraint at KIYEN. The other problem that occurs is when the aircraft has already been given a descent and then told to cross MAYOS at FL220. The aircraft has already planned its descent to cross KIYEN at FL220 and when pilot tries to enter FL220 at MAYOS it will not take it. If the pilot does not intervene the aircraft will cross MAYOS at least 1000' high.ATC always gives the clearance to cross MAYOS at FL220 instead of the window that is depicted on the IVANE arrival. Either have ATC give clearance to descend via the IVANE as depicted or give KIYEN at FL220 instead of MAYOS. This would reduce the chance of pilot error. This would also reduce unnecessary pilot intervention and possible altitude deviation and violation.




Synopsis: A320 Check Airman describes the problems that A320 flight crews have with crossing restriction at MAYOS and KIYEN on the IVANE5 arrival to CLT.  Solutions to the problem are also provided.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: KTN.Airport, AS
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Flight into KTN at night. We were stable on the ILS; on glide slope and speed; inside the final approach fix with the runway in sight. We received an oral warning 'obstacle ahead'. Nothing appeared on the display and the Ground Proximity Warning did not command any evasive maneuvers. We continued the approach and landed without incident. Unsure of the oral warning.


Second narrative: An approach; KTN ILS; on the localizer and glide slope receive an amber caution advisory 'OBSTACLE AHEAD'.


Synopsis: An Air Carrier flight crew conducting an ILS Approach reported receiving an Obstacle Ahead warning even though they were on glidepath and stable.