elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: FAI.Airport, AK
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E FAI
ATC / advisory: TRACON FAI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the pilot flying. We had been cleared direct to the FAI airport.  We had light ice visible on the wings so I had briefed solid bug and Ref Speeds ON. We were then cleared for a visual approach to runway 20R. Establishing downwind leg I asked the Captain (CA) to help call base and final turns as I could not see the runway very well in the left hand pattern.  The surface winds were reported light. At our altitude; 2500 ft; they were stronger and from the East.  Captain advised that I was too tight in the pattern so I selected an easterly correction. I called for flaps 5 and then gear down about 190 kias.  CA said I was still too tight; the wind was blowing me toward the runway in the pattern.  I made another correction right.  Instead of extending the downwind; CA suggested that a 90/270 turn would give me better spacing.  I disengaged the autopilot; made a 90 degree right turn.  I then entered the left turn back toward the runway; reduced power to begin descent.  Airspeed was about 170 kias. Aware of the hills and mine I then looked out the window for the airport environment/runway and preparing to call flaps 15 and judge my position. The stick shaker came on.I advanced full power leveled the wings and lowered the nose.  When I had regained airspeed and a level attitude; I reduced power and called for flaps 15.  At this point the trim was way off.  The stick shaker came on a second time.  Again I went to full power; level wings and nose down.  CA called 'my airplane.'




Synopsis: Twin engine turboprop First Officer reported twice receiving a stick shaker when the speed was allowed to drop too low on a visual approach to FAI.
Date: 201603
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Passenger
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Hello; flying on an E170/175; I noticed the safety placard for a water landing could be deadly confusing. Both aircraft variants were shown on the placard; with two different scenarios. One variant showed opening front and rear emergency exits in a water landing; the other only opened the front doors. As a passenger; how would we know which variant we are aboard? I believe it would be safer to not have a combined E170/175 safety placard; but rather variant specific safety placards to eliminate any confusion. We were on a flight which flies over water.




Synopsis: A passenger on an EMB170/175 reported noting that the safety card for a water landing shows one variant opening only the front doors while the other shows opening doors at both ends of the aircraft. He did not know which variant he was flying on.
Date: 202105
Aircraft: Heavy Transport; Low Wing; 4 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approx 30 knots on takeoff roll; Level 2 Gen Drive 1 Fault alert. Rejected takeoff. Returned to maintenance area for repair. Repeat write up.




Synopsis: Captain reported a Rejected Take Off after receiving a #2 generator drive fault light which was a repeat write up.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Syst Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After being advised by a Passenger of the nature of the recent company news-making event; (I knew we had an issue but Flight Operations forwarded no information to me about the nature of the issue or the system involved); I decided that it couldn't hurt to do a Standby Rudder Check. The aircraft failed the check. It appeared that the Standby Rudder Shutoff valve would not open. Four Mechanics ended up working on the problem and; by the time I left after over an hour of discussions; it was obvious that nobody had an understanding of how the system worked or how it was supposed to test. During a phone conversation with an unnamed Chief Pilot; I was told that I was being overzealous and should not have tested the system.We have deleted the Standby Rudder System check from our flows and procedures. (We still use gear pins; test VORs; marker beacons and check sunshades.) I have obviously misunderstood the importance of the Standby Rudder System. My haphazard and blatant disregard for Company policy and procedure led to a delay of over 1:30. I have taken the time to reread the Preflight section of the FOM and will do my best in the future to adhere to our procedures in order to minimize delays and protect the company's Return On Invested Capital (ROIC). Failed Standby Rudder Check.




Synopsis: Pilot reports a B737-700 aircraft in service at a gate had failed a Standby Rudder Check due to the Standby Rudder Shutoff Valve would not open. He noted that an hour and a half later it was obvious that nobody had an understanding of how the system worked or how it was supposed to test. He was told by a Chief Pilot that he was overzealous and should not have tested the system since the Standby Check had already been removed from the pilot's checklist.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: F-35 Lightning II
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Second aircraft: F-35 Lightning II
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X came over requesting IR126. Since his route fixes did not coincide with the IR126 entry or alternate entry I verified he wanted to enter at point AD (the alternate entry). He said negative and that he wanted to start at point J. I advised him that he could not enter at J and that I would clear him in at AD or A. He advised me that they had coordinated the entry with another agency. I again advised him that I would not clear him in at J and could offer him AD which was just south of his route. He had me stand by while he figured out his plan. He then requested a climb to FL260 and to return to ZZZ.At the same time Aircraft Y checked on at FL200 and indicated that they had wanted entry at J and heard that they could not enter at J. He then requested direct to ZZZ at FL200.The military aircraft and who ever plans the flights needs to know that we can only clear the aircraft into the Entry or Alternate Entry Points. Also that they can only exit at an Exit or Alternate Exit Point.




Synopsis: ZDV Center Controller reported two military flights requested entry into a training instrument route at a point other than the published entry points.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Distribution System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: [I] was called by Scheduling to ferry aircraft from ZZZ to ZZZ1 [and] was unaware it was a maintenance ferry until arriving at aircraft. [I] was met by Maintenance and briefed on aircraft status. Aircraft had been written up inbound to ZZZ for center tank continuing to feed wing tanks after wing tanks were full causing fuel to vent overboard. Maintenance was unable to duplicate problem and wanted aircraft ferried to ZZZ1 for further testing. Aircraft was fueled with enough fuel in wing tanks to complete flight without needing to use center tank fuel.Conducted conference call with Dispatch and Maintenance [Manager on Duty - Maintenance Control]. This call confirmed 7;600 lbs. of fuel in center tank was not needed for flight and center tank pumps should be left off. ECAM message would come on when center tanks did not feed and to ignore ECAM message. Was briefed once wing tanks were low enough center tanks could be turned on if fuel was needed since there would not be enough fuel then to overfill wing tanks. Briefed FO (First Officer); completed preflight; left center tank pumps off; flew normal flight and landed with approximately 4;000 lbs in each wing tank; center tank pumps still off.[I] was used to having ballast fuel on previous aircraft for various reasons and did not think much about this; since [I] had enough fuel in wings and believed I could turn on wing tank pumps if needed fuel. After re-reading FOM 22.3.2 'Other than Normal Configuration;' I am not sure I should have operated this flight; if this was considered non-normal procedures. If this type of flying is authorized; FOM should be clarified as to what is NON-normal. Looking back any deviation from normal procedures I would consider NON-normal and IAW (In Accordance With) FOM should not be flown by line crews.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported misgivings when advised to operate a ferry flight with many alternate or abnormal procedures required.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We landed and proceeded to the gate. After parking; we accomplished the parking flows and the parking checklist. With the checklist complete and the in report sent; I left the airplane and proceeded towards the employee parking lot. The Captain stayed on board the airplane. He phoned me a few minutes after I had left the airplane and related that a ground worker had come on to the airplane while the captain was still on the plane to inform him that the number two engine was still running. He shut the engine down and reran the checklist. I was really shocked to hear this because; in my mind; I saw the Captain shut down both engines. Somehow; when running the checklist; we both missed that the number two engine was still running.


Second narrative: We landed went right to the gate. I set the parking brake and checked the brake pressure. I shut down the left engine and reached forward to check the status of the APU to check and see if it was up and running. I neglected to shut down the right engine and neither my First Officer nor I noticed the oversight. Even during the parking checklist I looked at the fuel controls switches and responded 'Cutoff.' I left the cockpit to greet the folks and left my bags in the cockpit. A person from the ramp informed me about the engine running and I went back to the cockpit to shut it down and ran the parking checklist. My First Officer had already left the aircraft.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew reports forgetting to shut down the right engine after arriving at the gate and not noticing the omission during the parking checklist. A ramp person came up to inform the Captain that the engine was still running.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: The weather was VFR with rain directly over the field and and the winds were favoring RW 25. I elected to practice the VNAV RW 25 and requested radar vector for this approach. I planed for this and briefed the RW 25 RNAV approach before the decent started. I was cleared to 2500' and leveled at 2500'. I was configured with flaps 5 and speed was set. I was given a heading of 270 degrees to intercept the final approach course about 6 miles from the (FAF) ZZZZZ and cleared for the RNAV 25. As the autopilot was intercepting the inbound heading of 249 degrees we experienced a 15 knot loss of indicated airspeed and moderate turbulence. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and the auto throttles and simultaneously rolled wings level and increased the throttles. I pitched up when I was confident that the airspeed was recovered to a safe speed. I asked the FO to inform the approach controller that we aborted the approach. We maintained the 260 degree heading and climbed up to 4000'. We flew out for approximately 10 miles. After 10 minutes we received radar vectors for a right base and a visual approach without incident.The wind sheer was much worse than expected and I have never experienced anything like that.I will elect to hold until the strong down drafts of the isolated rain showers dissipate of move out of the area.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported wind shear and loss of air speed on approach.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IAH.Tower, TX
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B IAH
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was working Local West (LW). I got a strip on Flight ABC going north. I don't recall him saying his call sign was anything different. I cleared him for take off; he acquired; and when I had appropriate separation I switched him to North Departure. He read back and emphasized Flight ABG when I switched him even though I had called him Flight ABC as did his strip and his data tag. I called North Departure because the pilot had already switched and asked that he verified the call sign. I then asked CD/FD if they had a Flight ABG. They said no. The Ground Controller and FD/CD controllers also thought it strange that the pilot didn't correct them. In the mean time north departure called back and verified that the pilot was intent that the call sign was Flight ABG and not Flight ABC. I then saw the data tag change. I assume the Departure Controller did it. We have been having a bad time with similar sounding call signs and pilots not knowing that their flight numbers have changed and now evidently we don't know they are changing either. This is getting more and more troubling and perplexing to me and several others here. Company responded to our management for an excuse of why we have so many call signs with letters and similar sounding/looking; but they never addressed why the crews don't know about their call signs changing. They need to communicate better to crews and now it may appear the Agency as well. In our last weekly meeting Management was going to follow up with Company Chief Pilot on why crews don't know; but to date I haven't heard anything back.




Synopsis: IAH Controller experienced confusion with regard to similar sounding call signs noting the problem is becoming more serious with no resolution in sight.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MBS.Airport, MI
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D MBS
ATC / advisory: TRACON MBS
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Got a TCAS RA just prior to glide slope intercept on ILS. [A] single engine small aircraft was crossing above at 500 feet over us. ATC pointed out the traffic. Clearance was to maintain 3;000 feet until established and cleared for [the] ILS Approach. We could have started our descent before capturing the glide slope before the final approach fix.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported they observed an aircraft pass 500 feet overhead and received a TCAS/RA.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We landed on Runway XX and exited off on taxi way Papa and was instructed to hold short of Taxiway Gulf on Papa. After several minutes we were instructed to move up and hold short of Runway XYR on taxi way Echo. An aircraft departed the runway and Tower instructed us to cross Runway XYR on Echo and call Ground on the other side. As we were clearing the runway; Company1 Aircraft Y was taxing on Bravo. Our aircraft and their aircraft immediately had to stop; roughly 60-80 ft. apart. With coordination with Ground the Company1 Aircraft Y was pushed back via a tow and we proceeded to the ramp. No damage to any aircraft.The event occurred really quick because we were instructed to cross the runway and the Company1 flight had their instructions. As soon as we were clearing the runway; Ground instructed us to give way to the Company1 flight; at that point the aircraft was already in front of us and neither aircraft was able to continue. We both confirmed that our left and right point of view were clear before crossing the runway. A split second of attention was deviated towards the ramp area after clearing and trying to contact Ground.


Second narrative: After Landing ZZZ Runway XX was instructed right turn Papa hold short Golf. After a brief moment holding short Golf instructed taxi papa echo hold short Runway XYR. After a Company 2 777 departed Runway XYR was instructed to cross Runway XYR contact Ground. Both myself and FO (First Officer) cleared left and right crossed Runway XYR and by the time we were told to hold for Company1. Company1 Aircraft Y was passing left to right 60 -80 ft. in front of our aircraft. Both airplanes stopped abruptly. No damage to either aircraft. I know that I cleared the area to the left prior to taxing. I did not see Company2 Aircraft until it was In front of us. I followed ATC instructions crossed Runway XYR and begin slowing due to unfamiliarity; and what taxiway to expect; A or B followed by a RD entry. My eyes did go right briefly to follow what I was planning for on the taxi and in less than 3 seconds it was all stop.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported taxi instruction miscommunication led to a ground conflict with another aircraft.