elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B PHL
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Dash 8-300
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Final Vector position was split between me; North Arrival (NA); and South Arrival (SA). I was working Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y from the North; both on vectors to Runway 27R. SA was working 2 aircraft; both being vectored to Runway 35; the runways intersect. SA and I did not coordinate sequencing to the airport. I mistakenly assumed SA was sequencing a slow piston aircraft to Runway 35 number 1. I cleared Air Carrier X for a close in right downwind and instructed the pilot to make a short approach as they were number 1 for the airport. SA had decided to make a CRJ2 number 1 for Runway 35 and assumed I was going to make Air Carrier X number 2 to the airport. I had already switched Air Carrier X to the tower; and SA realized that our sequence was not going to work and cancelled the approach clearance for his CRJ2 and pulled that aircraft out of the situation. We both realized that situation was happening as Air Carrier X was not making as short an approach as I had assumed. I hadn't noticed that Air Carrier Y had closed up the gap between Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y as I was watching the other situation and was relying on the CRDA to sequence Air Carrier Y behind the Runway 35 arrival and was assuming Air Carrier X would make the short approach and there would have been plenty of space between Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y. I noticed that I was losing separation between Air Carrier Y and Air Carrier X; so I cancelled Air Carrier X's approach clearance; climbed and turned the aircraft to the South; and ended up giving them a 360 and re-sequencing them. I usually don't try to 'jam' an aircraft in on a short approach unless I am sure it is what the pilot wants and will be able to do. This time I made a poor decision; and I lost my focus on the rest of the situation. In our facility; the SOP spells out that NA sets the landing sequence when FV is not opened; but I just assumed that SA and I were on the same page. I recommend that even when the traffic is light; we make the effort to actually 'voice' the sequence to avoid all misunderstandings.




Synopsis: PHL Controller described a loss of separation event between aircraft landing both Runway 27R and Runway 35. The confused coordination and assumptions between the two controllers involved were listed as causal factors.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Altitude deviation due to poor CRM while PIC was flying with auto pilot off. Contributing factor low recent flying due to COVID slow down. Deviation immediately reported to ATC and corrected.




Synopsis: Corporate pilot reported having an altitude deviation while hand-flying the aircraft and attributed it to lack of flying due to the COVID-19 slow down.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After takeoff Departure Control gave us a north northwest left turn heading and clearance to climb to 17;000 FT. While in the climb; I noticed an incoming aircraft at a higher altitude and approximately out of 7;000 FT; we got a TCAS TA. I transmitted on VHF number one that I had the aircraft in sight. After my transmission; we received a descending TCAS RA and Departure Control asked us to stop the climb and level at 8;000 FT. By the time ATC had finished this transmission; we were passing approximately 8;800 FT. We complied with the TCAS RA first until we heard the clear of conflict voice from the TCAS system and then complied with ATC instructions. Later on; I inquired about our previous climbing clearance and she stated that she did not recall giving us a clearance to climb and that there was no problem because there was never a loss of separation between the aircraft. To this I replied to her that we both heard the climbing clearance and replied back with the climbing clearance to 17;000 FT. From the point of view from the cockpit; it appeared that there could have been a lateral loss of separation between the two aircraft had we not called the traffic in sight and complied with TCAS RA.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports being given a heading and cleared to 17;000 FT by Departure Control after takeoff. Passing 7;000 FT a TCAS TA is followed quickly by an RA. ATC indicates that a clearance to 17;000 FT was never issued.
Date: 201808
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Passenger boarded the plane; [and was] assigned a seat in the exit row. A Flight Attendant completed the exit row verification and notified myself and ISM (In-Transit Service Manager) of the man in the exit row appearing to have characteristics of being visually impaired. [The] Flight Attendant again verified with the passenger if he was willing and able; and he again agreed. The My Flight app did not register him as a passenger with disability. Supervisor came on board and told us we cannot identify a customer by his/her own disability; then adamantly told us to comply. We notified [the] Captain and let [the] passenger remain in the exit row. During the flight; I observed his visually impaired characteristics. While handing out customs forms; [the] passenger asked if I could assist him will filling out his form. I physically filled out his form and had to physically show him where to sign. He signed in the middle of the document.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported there was a visually impaired person sitting in an emergency exit row.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Seaplane or Amphibian
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Gear Float
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During landing into a small lake; I encountered semi glassy conditions which prompted me to make an early flare and lost too much airspeed creating a bounce situation. Immediately applied full power to execute an immediate go-around but there wasn't enough airspeed which caused it to impact the water harder which caused the left float on the pilot side wing to dip into the water and break off as intended. No other significant damage was noticed. I perceived there were enough ripples in the water to judge the flaring attitude but apparently there wasn't and the glass water technique should have been applied in this instance.




Synopsis: Seaplane pilot reported flaring too high and too slow on approach to a water landing; resulting in a bounced landing and damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: Tower TEB
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I looked over the departure (RUUDY 4 at TEB) prior to my passenger's arrival. My co-pilot and I briefed the departure prior to taxi out and further discussed it on the taxi. It being a clear day; I said that we'd use NAV and possibly VNAV setting for takeoff. The VNAV was an experiment; since I knew of the 1;500 FT crossing at WENTZ and the 2;000 FT crossing at TASCA and I wanted to see what the system would do. My thoughts were entirely on the crossing altitudes and not on the 'visual' map in my head. I was going to follow the navigation; which was obvious; but I was more concerned about the altitudes. When my co-pilot armed the system before takeoff; I should have realized there was a problem because the v-bars showed level with the horizon. He armed it as we were rolling onto the runway (no time to double-check; right). I knew my altitudes; so I thought it wasn't necessary to double-check the system. It was a normal takeoff; normal rotation; but after leaving the ground; the v-bars showed a left turn - and at 400 FT; I followed them. We were at about 210 degrees and in a left turn when Tower Controller said that we were supposed to be in a right turn and to turn to 260 degrees. He also said we were on an IFR flight plan and should be on that heading. (Yes; I agree.) I immediately corrected. The rest of the departure went normally. My altitudes were of no issue but the navigation was completely wrong just after takeoff. We disengaged the navigation and I flew it like I knew it. No further issues occurred and I heard nothing beyond this. We have no explanation for why the navigation system indicated a left turn; instead of the headings provided on the RUUDY 4. The box showed everything correctly. The v-bars did not. Long story short: I put too much faith in my NAV on my airplane. I know better than that.




Synopsis: A CE560 Captain flew the TEB RUUDY 4 with the VNAV engaged as an experiment and; after following the left turn guidance; was directed right by ATC to return to the departure track.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C VNY
ATC / advisory: Tower VNY
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Captain (pilot flying) was told by ATC that they were too low. Requested expedited climb and to adhere to the SID. Departed Runway 34L.




Synopsis: Corporate jet pilot reported receiving a low-altitude alert from ATC after takeoff from VNY airport.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The BOBZY2 has a note requiring 280 KIAS after 10000 MSL. We accelerated instead in managed speed to approximately 300 KIAS. Atlanta Center asked our speed as we were following another aircraft on the same transition; and they told us to maintain 280 per the departure. We complied immediately by using Selected Speed.Both of us were unfamiliar with CLT operations; and we very carefully reviewed and briefed possible ramp routings; the multiple frequency changes; and then the very short remaining taxi to 18C. We also briefed all the normal briefing items for the departure; but we both missed the text block on the BOBZY2 which states 280 KIAS after accelerating at 10;000 MSL. This SID requires scrolling all over the place to try to read all the various notes - and even though I highlighted parts and thought I had carefully reviewed it I missed that block.The iPad is a great resource in the cockpit; but there are times that I find myself wishing for paper; and very densely printed SIDs and STARs are perfect examples. In order to read the text you have to expand the view; but then it's easy to miss other parts of the page. I do hope that as Jeppesen has continually made improvements in the information on the charts they will also seriously look at the formatting of multi-page airport diagrams; multi-runway SIDs and STARs; and find ways to make them more legible on an iPad. That's not an excuse for my missing the note; but since my very thorough FO also missed it that tells me that we are probably not the only ones to make this mistake.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported ATC alerted him to a speed restriction departing CLT that they had missed. The complex departure charts and the iPad interface contributed.
Date: 202002
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Issue was brought to my attention today by management....While working as the Lead RSE (Ramp Service Employee) on Aircraft X; the [Load Plan] was showing 96 bags; 124 pieces of Mail; 4 pieces of [small parcel]; 1 piece of [small parcel] Dangerous Goods. I loaded the freight and mail and [small parcel] and then the Dangerous Goods [small parcel] and surrounded it with bags. I then proceeded to load the rest of the aircraft accordingly. 45 minutes later I reviewed the load on my scanner and the scanner was showing 15 bags scanned to the pit with the Dangerous Goods. The reality is; there are only 14 bags surrounding the Dangerous Goods because the 15th bag was actually the Dangerous Goods. [Small parcel] is scanned as baggage and counts as baggage on the scanner. After pushing out the aircraft; I have 5 minutes to close the flight after push and was realizing that the scanner was not allowing me to close the flight out. After calling the Load Planner; they informed me that the Dangerous Goods did not have 15 bags scanned into the pit. The argument I had with Load Planning was that the scanner shows 15 bags in the pit. Their argument was there was 14 bags and the 15th bag was the Dangerous Goods that scanned as [small parcel]. The plane returned to gate where 1 bag was moved into the pit with Dangerous Goods to make it 15 bags surrounding the Dangerous Goods.




Synopsis: Airline Ramp Personnel reported that a communication breakdown between Ramp Loader and Load Planner regarding Hazmat load configuration resulted in a gate return.
Date: 201411
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During approach to 36R at CLT we were instructed to slow to final approach speed because 'Heavy' traffic would be departing prior to our arrival.  We estimate we were at approximately 500-700 feet AGL when the tower cleared the Heavy to takeoff.  The aircraft was at the hold short line at that time.  The aircraft did not move very quickly at all and we started to question the spacing.  We prepared ourselves for a go around and we expected ATC would likely instruct us to go around because of the spacing.  The aircraft started its takeoff roll when we were at approximately 300-400 feet AGL. As we descended to 200 feet AGL we did not believe the aircraft was airborne and ATC had not instructed us to go around.  It was difficult for us to determine when the aircraft had lifted off because it was night. Between 100 and 200 feet AGL we started to encounter strong wake turbulence (likely from the thrust of the heavy) and decided to execute a go around.  The go around was executed and we were vectored for another approach and landing without incident. I asked the approach controller what type aircraft was ahead of us since we did not know what kind of heavy it was at that time.  They told us that it was a [type deleted] and there was 'no loss of separation'.  I spoke with the tower supervisor on the phone after landing to clarify the incident.  I did not feel that there was any possible way we could land without touching down before the heavy aircraft lifted off.  The supervisor clarified the ATC definition of required separation on the runway and stated that it would have definitely been close to the limit.Overall; I would say the cause of this event was the slow taxi onto the runway and slow takeoff roll of the heavy aircraft which caused inadequate spacing for them to get airborne before we could touch down.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of a go-around due to not being able to see if the departing heavy aircraft was actually airborne.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: N85.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G N85
ATC / advisory: CTAF N85
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While departing Runway 26 during daylight VFR at N85 there was parachute jumping taking place. Although the jump landing location is 600 ft from the center of the runway; one of the chutes came close enough to the runway that I turned away from it shortly after rotation. I turned about 20 degrees or so to maintain a safe distance from the landing chute which was about 300 ft AGL.The lesson here is that you never know what the chutes are going to do; so wait until they land. In this instance I had already back taxied to the end of runway 26 and another aircraft had just turned base on their approach to runway 26. In hindsight I should have waited before beginning my takeoff roll. The landing aircraft would have had to do a go around but if I'm ever in that position again I'm not departing until the chutes are on the ground.




Synopsis: Cessna pilot describes a conflict with skydivers landing as he is departing.