elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [We were] scheduled pushback on the half hour. Agents arrived and asked if we had everything; which we did. Door closed ten minutes early at 20 after. We did our before pushback checklist and called for pushback around 22 after the hour. We started to push; and then the tug driver stopped and started to say something. At the same time; I noticed the forward door light come on; and the slides quickly disarm. I looked out and saw an agent; a supervisor of some sort (Flight Attendant I believe) and a passenger on the jetway. The passenger was loaded on; and the door was shut again with no communication to us. I called the Lead Flight Attendant and she was quite startled; suggesting that she had not known what was going on until she heard the tap on the door. Luckily; she did an excellent job and very quickly called for all doors to be disarmed. VERY lucky that the tug driver happened to see the jetway pull up to the airplane as he started his pushback; or we would have had damage to the jet; jetway; and possible injuries. The jetway at this gate only moves a couple of feet; so it is difficult to notice the movement. I'm all for bringing the jetway back to load passengers; particularly since we were so early; but it is imperative that the agents get our attention before moving the jetway toward the airplane so that I can communicate with the pushback crew; flight attendants; and ramp. We VERY narrowly avoided a dangerous and costly error.




Synopsis: An A319's pushback was stopped immediately after it started because an Agent put the jetway up to the aircraft without warning to board another passenger. An alert Flight Attendant luckily disarmed the door.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Aircraft component: Fan Case
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I am an Air Carrier Mechanic working in our Engine Shop (Rolls Royce Trent build line) and have observed numerous violations including: 1) Parts (Forward Fan cases) that have been previously deemed Unserviceable (scrapped) are being brought back into [Engine] build-up and reworked Shop without proper documentation noted on (Engine Shop Return to Service Tag). 2) Seven modules; Forward Fan cases; are being separated and in some instances reinstalled without documentation. Brackets; ice impacted and acoustic panels are being removed and installed without documentation. 3) Fan Cases are being reworked without paperwork (no Logbook or Bill of Work (BOW) instructions; etc.). 4) Co-mingling of Serviceable and Unserviceable parts (no quarantine or seperation). 5) Parts are not being stored properly (capped; plugged; and tagged). 6) Supervisors constantly foster; nurture and encourage behavior contrary to company policies; SOP/OPM procedures and FAR's. Missing documents. Hangar.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports numerous violations that have been occurring in his Air Carrier Engine Shop that include Unserviceable (Scrapped) Forward Fan cases that are reworked and damaged acoustic panels that are reinstalled without proper documentation; co-mingling of Serviceable and Unserviceable parts.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ1; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This aircraft just came out of long term storage. It needed a full thrust takeoff; ETOPS verification for hi-altitude APU start and an Autoland update. Two separate Maintenance write-ups occurred after door close but prior to push back. This resulted in delays and multiple MRD updates. Both pilots reviewed and verified FMC load was normal after each anomaly corrected. On takeoff the FO (Flying Pilot) called for 'Autothrottles.' EPR mode engaged normally but throttles were slow to advance and left throttle lagged approximately 1 knob width. At 'check thrust' call FO commented to check left engine throttle. I had noticed the slow movement and manually moved both throttles to the commanded full thrust EPR setting. When passing 3;000 ft. the aircraft speed bug would not accelerate above CMS (approximately). We set 250 manually and each time we tried to engage VNAV or FLCH the command bug retreated to approximately CMS. We also noticed the command EPR was indicating CON thrust. I tried to engage CLB on TMSP panel but had no effect. At this point I said we'll wait until above 10;000 ft. to troubleshoot further. Above 10;000 ft I noticed that the VNAV CLB page appeared normal; but there was an 'ALL ENG' prompt at 5L which I'd never seen. After selecting the ALL ENG prompt the airplane returned to normal CLB mode. At no point during ground operations did either pilot ever select the CLB EO prompt or the subsequent Execute key. After landing and debriefing with Maintenance and the next leg's Captain; this Pilot stated she had also previously seen a 'split throttles on takeoff result in the aircraft believing it was in a single-engine situation and engaging the EO CLB mode. A Maintenance write up for Autothrottles was written up and Maintenance debriefed. (Autothrottles worked normal for remainder of our flight).




Synopsis: B-757 Captain reported aircraft being returned to service from long term storage suffered an auto throttle malfunction on climb out and subsequently learned that later flights had the same problem.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: U90.TRACON, AZ
Aircraft: PC-12
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Departure; Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: A PC-12 was inbound level at 12;000 [feet]. He came to my frequency and I could hear him loud and clear. I responded several times but the pilot could not hear me. It became apparent the pilot could hear some garbled transmissions from me because of the responses he gave. I passed a message through an airborne aircraft and the pilot could hear them loud and clear. I could not keep relaying through a secondary aircraft as they needed to be on another frequency and I needed my frequency back. The PC-12 decided they would just change to advisory frequency on their own and began descending and violated restricted airspace as well; all without cancelling IFR. I finally established radio contact as they drifted closer. We need a relay antenna at OLS. We have a lot of IFR aircraft in and out as well as many international flights over the boarder. We can not communicate with the  pilots and it is creating too many problems. Controllers should not be left helpless with such an easily fixable situation.


Second narrative: A PC-12 called south of the US/Mexico border inbound to OLS. The pilot called several times; eventually crossing the border; but could not hear me and stated he would start descending for the airport. The aircraft was at 12;000 feet and the reported ceilings were at 6;000 feet. The aircraft entered a restricted area (R2303B) at 12;000 feet and started to descend. About 12 miles northeast of the airport; the pilot could hear me and I gave him an altitude to climb to; since he was now below the MVA; and issued vectors back to the destination airport. We have had numerous communications issues with aircraft inbound from Mexico landing at OLS. We need a radio transceiver at the OLS airport. We have no RADAR coverage below 8;000 feet within 10 miles of the airport; the radio problem makes this very dangerous.


Synopsis: U90 Controller described an airspace incursion event when communications was lost with traffic inbound from Mexico to OLS could; the reporter suggesting improved communications equipment at OLS.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 125
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Parking Brake
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The passengers were onboard and seated. I was in the process of checking ID's and briefing the weather. The cabin door was open when the PIC called to me from outside the aircraft. His words were '[my name;] brakes.' Thinking he wanted me to check that the brakes were set; I stopped the briefing and went forward to check the parking brake handle. The brakes were not set; so I climbed into the left seat to set them. As I did this; I noticed the aircraft moving forward. I applied brakes in positive manner and the aircraft stopped. I explained to the passengers the reason for the action. I don't remember anything they may have said; and I went on with the safety briefing. Set the brakes as early in the preflight stage of the flight as possible. Insure the brakes are set prior to removing the chocks. Insure one pilot is in the cockpit prior to pulling the chocks.




Synopsis: CE560 First Officer; while in the cabin briefing the passengers; hears the Captain yell 'brakes' from outside the aircraft. Moving to the cockpit; the aircraft is noted to be moving and the parking brake is set.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Engine Borescope Plug
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Inspector; Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the evening shift; I was assigned the borescope for an ITT (Indicated Turbine Temperature) exceedance. During the examination; I found that the ports for examining the LPT (Low Pressure Turbine) section 19 and 20 were seized. Knowing that I had to video the LPT in order to be able to complete the borescope; I used the path through the front side of the stage 2 HPT (High Pressure Turbine) blades to access the LPT stage 1 guide vanes and the stage 1 LPT Blades. I did not think that I needed to gain permission from GE to be able to look at the LPT from that angle. I was focused on finishing the borescope and did not think that I needed to DMI (Deferred Maintenance Item) the plugs as well. Perhaps a separate job card for the ITT exceedance [can be] created; which could include the details for examining the LPT as well as what to do if inspection ports 19 and 20 are found to be seized.




Synopsis: Inspector reported not following established procedures while borescoping an engine and failing to enter maintenance items in the electronic logbook.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SBGR.TRACON, FO
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower SBGR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: SID SBGR Sao Paulo Brazil BGC2A requires turn AWAY from the SE Procedure. The Obstacle Clearance Altitude is based on the SE Procedure. The turn into terrain is away from the SE Procedure. The aircraft is still configured; not clean; due to airspeed (210 KIAS) required on overfly of BCO.  The SE procedure in the event of engine failure is not complete until clean.  The SE Procedure terrain clearance altitude is not sufficient to clear terrain on the turn into terrain on the BGC2A.  Crew briefed and used T/O no de-rates; contrary to Fleet Manager Message; to assure adequate terrain clearance and speed per performance section guidance.  CORRECT THE SE PROCEDURE and increase the SE Obstacle Clearance Altitude.  See: 20.12 Performance - FAR Performance; Obstacle Clearance Criteria 'FAR's require ...unless a special engine failure procedure is published; in which case ONLY (emphasis added) the flight path specified in the procedure has been analyzed for obstacles.'  Hence; the obstacle clearance altitude we have been trained to fly to clean-up is too low.  QRH Maneuvers 'Initiate the appropriate Engine Failure Non-normal Checklist followed by the After Takeoff - Climb Checklist WHEN THE FLAPS ARE UP...'  The reliance on the Obstacle Clearance Altitude of 3260 for 9L is misleading since it is based on the SE Procedure.   Since the BGC2A commands a CONFIGURED turn away from the SE Procedure; the Engine Out procedure is flawed.  The altitude is misleading and too low to clear terrain on the BGC2A SID.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain departing SGBR does not believe that the company's engine out procedure allows for the turn to the north on the BGC 2A RNAV Departure; due to the rising terrain in that direction and the SID requirement to maintain 210 knots (takeoff flaps) until the turn is completed at BCO.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B IAH
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying a new aircraft that I purchased 3 days ago. I was out practicing in the NW region of Houston planning to practice stalls; steep turns; and learn the avionics of the new-to-me aircraft. While I was working on the aircraft maneuvers and other scenarios; I started focusing on my auto-pilot as it kept disconnecting. I focused in on the auto-pilot and got completely distracted by it. I was focused on my altitude and heading; but not my airspace situation. I looked up and realized immediately that I was east of Houston Executive Airport (TME). I quickly changed course; turning right to a southwesterly heading in an effort to quickly depart the airspace and while creating minimal diversions for incoming aircraft to IAH. After I was out of the airspace; I contacted Houston approach on 123.80 and self-reported my erroneous flight into Bravo airspace at about 5;000 ft. NW of the Houston IAH airport. The Controller explained that I had a possible pilot deviation and that I needed to copy a phone number; and contacted the folks at that number as soon as possible. I advised I would land the aircraft and call. This is a first time incursion for me; and I feel awful for the potential additional work I put on the Controller as he may have had to move incoming aircraft around me.

Callback: Reporter had no further information to provide.



Synopsis: GA pilot reported they flew into Class B airspace without a clearance.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.TRACON, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on about a 10 mile straight in visual approach to Runway 34R at SLC. We were descending on glide path and configuring for landing when we receive a Traffic Advisory followed by a Resolution Advisory to adjust vertical speed. The other aircraft was located visually at our 9 o'clock and slightly below our altitude on a crossing path. Captain as Pilot Flying disengaged the autopilot and leveled off to comply with the RA. About 5 seconds later; a clear of conflict message annunciated. The other aircraft maneuvered back to final for the other parallel runway. We stabilized the approach; finished configuring for landing and completed the checklist and landed uneventfully.After shutdown; Captain called Tower who provided a phone number for a RAPCON supervisor. The Supervisor was reviewing the event and said it was caused by a late vector from a different controller; who was on a different frequency controlling Runway 34L. The other aircraft was Aircraft Y who had also complied with the RA. The Supervisor mentioned the controller who gave the late vector was experiencing some health issue that prevented him issuing the vector sooner.It appears the controller working Runway 34L momentarily lost the ability to communicate due to a temporary personal physiological event. The last clearance given to Aircraft Y put it on a near collision course with our flight. Fortunately; TCAS did its job.Ensure procedures for vectoring account for the chance of communication breakdown for stuck mics; radio equipment failure or any other possible event; such as a controller being unable to speak for a few moments. Vector should have lateral or vertical clearance built in; just in case.


Second narrative: While on the visual approach we responded to a TCAS RA triggered by another aircraft maneuvering to land on [Runway] 34L. At the gate; we learned through a phone conversation with TRACON there had been a problem with the controller handling operations on the west side of the airport.


Synopsis: B737-800 flight crew reported having an airborne conflict which was the result of the Controller not being able to speak due to personal issues.