elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Baron 58/58TC
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: UNICOM ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had taken off and turned west as cleared. ATC authorized to change frequency. On establishing a course west I set the Autopilot for heading and Altitude. I then was distracted by a new flight software program I had just loaded on an iPad the day before. I had TIS-b traffic set up on my number 2 radio. I kept looking at traffic and the iPad and was distracted from following the NAV 1 radio set to map or the HSI. I must have tripped off the autopilot without realizing it and at the speed of a Baron I was in the wrong place in just a few minutes. I looked at the number 1 NAV and immediately realized what was happening. I penetrated Class B [airspace] but caught it very quickly and made an immediate turn away from the airport. Human Performance Considerations:It was foolish to attempt to resolve the problem with the flight software program without being well on course which was correctly set in my NAV 1. The qualifying factor was poor decision making and not monitoring the autopilot.




Synopsis: BE58 pilot reported the autopilot disconnected while he was distracted with other tasks resulting in an unintentional entry into Class B airspace.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Reverse all nighter; early morning takeoff on Runway XX ZZZ. As we were advancing takeoff power; the First Officer calls 'Lights; Clocks; Fuel' which I didn't clearly understand. This caused confusion because I didn't completely hear what he said. I thought he was calling out some type of issue in regard to the takeoff; or the aircraft; or a traffic conflict. This is a time when the flight deck should be quiet and not cluttered with random non-SOP call outs. I have previously had another First Officer make this random call on the takeoff of which it almost caused a rejected takeoff because of the timing and once again not clearly hearing this random; sporadic non-SOP call out. In each case I questioned the First Officer where they are coming up with this random non-SOP call; and each one said that they were taught this in the training center or on initial OE (Operating Experience). I cannot find any reference to this random; ill-timed call out in the FM (Flight Manual) Normals. I believe it is some old carry over call out. It's very distracting to have the co-pilot calling out random non-SOP calls at the start of the takeoff and I feel it poses a safety threat.I had to query the co-pilot on what he was saying as the auto throttles were advancing power to takeoff thrust. Definitely not an optimal time to be having to ask; 'What did you just say?' As it turns out; we aborted takeoff in ZZZ on Runway XX for a pop up Predictive Wind shear Warning; and the confusion that the First Officer created with the random NON-SOP call; 'Lights; Clocks; Fuel' and the conversation we had to have as we were accelerating to clarify what he had said definitely set the stage for further confusion when we got the PWS (Predictive Wind shear) warning on takeoff. 'Lights; Clocks; Fuel' is not in the FM Normals and is a disruptive NON-SOP call that is a threat to aircraft safety at a critical point when the flight deck should be totally quiet and void of any NON-SOP call outs. It is being taught as SOP; when in fact it is not SOP and the timing of this random; lowest common denominator type of call out is a threat.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported non-standard call-outs used by First Officer caused a distraction during takeoff roll.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: CRP.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Military
Operator: Military
Operating under: Other Military
Mission: Training
Airspace: Class C CRP; Class E CRP
ATC / advisory: TRACON CRP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Second reporter function: Departure; Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We are a STARS facility that runs the bulk of our approaches to a Navy base. They have our radar feed. They have STARS equipment; but not our STARS feed.  Because of this; we are forced to make manual inbound and handoff calls for every approach.  This takes the radar controller's focus and attention away from the radar scope and forces him or her to make a landline communication that would be completely unnecessary if our STARS equipment talked to the Navy STARS.  This is a huge safety risk.  Our facility is constantly training new controllers and new pilots; which is the Navy's mission; to train new pilots.  Hear-back/Read-back is a huge issue here with the brand new; green; pilots and it is only exponentially compounded with the added landline communications.I have been told over and over that this is just a money issue.  That is an unacceptable answer for the amount of safety that is at risk.  We are talking chump change to get these two systems to talk to each other.  This needs to happen ASAP.  It has been a problem for years and controllers have just had to learn to deal with it.  Get the FAA STARS to talk to the Navy STARS and then we can develop procedures and scratchpad entries to ensure a safe operation.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: CRP Controller reports of the discontinuity of the STARS at his facility and the STARS at NGP. The interface between the two systems does not allow handoffs; which must be made manually.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ANC.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: SVFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D LHD
ATC / advisory: Tower ANC
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Recently there have been major changes to our SVFR procedures in Alaska. Our new local procedures were briefed once several months ago. Clarification has been requested on the new procedures multiple times. I was working LHD Class D segment under SVFR conditions with visibility of 4 miles and overcast at 600 feet. LHD has a red and green light to indicate aircraft on Elmendorf final which enters the north portion of the LHD segment. Red means call for release and green means auto release. The lights have no indication of change from red to green or green to red other than luckily seeing the lights change when it occurs. The Local position at ANC has a beeping sound and a button has to be manually pushed in order to change the light and accept red or green. LHD has no coordination in place even after the new procedures. I unfortunately did not see the change in light from green to red and cleared a SVFR Aircraft X for departure of LHD to the east. Once the aircraft was airborne he asked to depart northbound instead. At this time I saw Aircraft Y on final at EDF at 1;700 feet. Aircraft X was at 200 feet which was no loss of separation but I instructed Aircraft X to make a right 360. I then coordinated with the TRACON North hand off position that the aircraft was making a 360 and requested a release north bound which was approved. Aircraft X then proceeded northbound. If you are scanning out the window or coordinating it is very easy to not see the light change. When the field is VFR the green or red light is not a factor other than giving traffic and there are no IFR operations off LHD. So only with these new procedures are we now concerned whether it is green or red referencing departures. Coordination needs to be in place to advise when releases are canceled in SVFR conditions.




Synopsis: ANC Controller describes a release system with red and green lights that doesn't indicate with some type of aural alarm as to what color the light has changed to. By having the alarm the controller would know of the change.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ORD
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Initial approach to ORD; [we were] inbound on BENKY 1. Receiving vectors from 'NEWRK' (ORD landing East) Runways 4R/10/9R in use. Received direct to DEVON and proceeded. Geometry looked wrong; so ATC queried. [We were] vectored to intercept Runway 4R localizer. Landing [was] uneventful. Post flight mission analysis (including ATC radio review via 'Live ATC' website) revealed Controller gave instruction to 'Direct to DEGAN.' Due to volume of radio traffic; crew heard/understood/read back 'DEVON.' 'DEGAN' is a fix on ILS Runway 4R. 'DEVON is a fix on ILS Runway 9R. [They are] too similar.


Second narrative: Radio was very busy with multiple 'blockages' plus a Controller in training.


Synopsis: While on a vector to ORD Runway 4R; a flight was cleared to DEGAN Intersection; but the crew heard DEVON which is on the ORD 9R ILS. In a busy atmosphere; confusion resulted.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PWK.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B PWK
ATC / advisory: Tower PWK
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I had departed PWK for a short flight to ZZZ. I departed runway 30 at PWK and was instructed; about one minute after departure; to continue on a 270 heading for one more mile before proceeding on course direct ZZZ. I maintained 2000 feet to remain well clear of the 2500 feet Class B shelf west of PWK. I turned north towards ZZZ about one minute later. At that time I began to climb to 2500 feet to keep a 500 feet buffer to the 3000 feet Class B shelf and increase my altitude above ground for the short flight. Once I was 2 miles outside the PWK Class D I decided to switch frequencies and pick up ATIS at ZZZ to prepare for my approach; as this was the first time I was making a solo VFR flight to ZZZ and wanted to stay well ahead of the airplane. I received ATIS and wrote down the information. When I first tuned the ATIS frequency it was half way through a transmission so I had to listen to it 1.5 times; which I would estimate equated to one to one and a half minutes. When I was done listening I did a scan for traffic and saw the executive jet in a climb about 400 feet in front of me and 200 feet above me. I think the causes of the loss of separation were: - I was level at 2000 feet for about a minute and a half; so even if approach control had given the traffic advisory to the executive jet; they probably assumed I would stay at 2000 feet and not climb to 2500 feet; therefore not recommending any deviation to the executive jet. When I switched back to PWK to report the incident to the tower; the executive jet sounded like it was in the middle of handoff from approach to tower; which added to the lack of communication. Approach; if they had given the advisory; probably said the traffic would pass 500 feet below them when I was in fact climbing. It should be noted that the executive jet was not on final approach to 16 yet and I was not in the final approach path for 16. - I decided to pick up ATIS at ZZZ too early and in a busy terminal environment; when I should have stayed with PWK tower in the interest of receiving traffic advisories. - I was focused on other traffic to my right as I was picking up ATIS and was not as focused on scanning for traffic to my left; which may have allowed me to spot the jet earlier; although the velocity at which it was traveling would make it difficult to spot.




Synopsis: PA28 pilot reported an NMAC with a business jet in the vicinity of PWK.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Electrical Distribution Busbar
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Failed
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [Received Priority].Crew was at cruise flight at Flight Level 410 from ZZZ to ZZZ1; both pilots were at controls when EMER BUS FAIL CAS message came up followed by a list of CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages. Autopilot was kicked off and Captain had to hand fly the aircraft. Depressurization of aircraft began; crew put on quick donning masks. Crew [advised ATC] and began running the appropriate QRH called for by Captain; EMER BUS FAIL. FO (First Officer) was able to complete the checklist for EMER BUS FAIL. Following QRH; by pressing the override EMER BUS switch to the right position EMER BUS regained power. All CAS messages went away except for CAS message override ALT EMER BUS. At that time Captain was able to get to a lower altitude to take oxygen masks off. FO continue working communications and Captain flew the aircraft. Crew diverted to the nearest suitable airport with no other incidents.




Synopsis: Corporate Jet First Officer reported during cruise flight the Emergency Electrical Bus failed. The pilot crew reconfigured the electrical system following the QRH procedures and diverted to the nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IPT.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A [small aircraft] was apparently at 6500 feet; and NY Center pointed out the traffic. I visually saw the traffic and the First Officer confirmed. I remarked that the traffic looks the same altitude and we were converging.We received a monitor vertical speed TCAS alert. At that time only -300 feet separation was shown on the TCAS indicator.As the aircraft came within a mile the TCAS indicated only a -200 feet separation and issued a RA to climb which was followed by the crew. We climbed to 7600 feet as per the RA. We notified ATC and returned to assigned altitude when clear of conflict. I expressed concern to ATC that there was only 200 feet of separation and that we were visual but clearly the [aircraft] was not on the same page. During the event the [other aircraft] was NORDO.I would expect ATC to issue vectors to avoid traffic. We were visual with the traffic and were ready to act regardless of the RA but when GA traffic is unresponsive I would expect better services to an air carrier.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported a NMAC in the vicinity of FQM with a GA aircraft which generated a RA that was followed by the crew.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Propeller Autofeather System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft returned to field for #1 engine feathering uncommanded on take-off. The discrepancy occurred at XA:30 and when I came on duty at XJ:00 I called maintenance for an update. They reported that they inspected #1 engine wire harness; PLA (Power Level Angle); CLA (Condition Lever Angle) micro switches and replaced the #2 TSCU (Torque Signal Conditioning Unit) and ops check was satisfactory. I entered the data into our operating system. This same issue reoccurred on a later date.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported that a Dash-8-200's propeller auto-feathered on takeoff. Following maintenance action the problem reoccurred on a later date.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Night
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other on call
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Continuously; we fly all nighters back from West to East. We land at either 0500 or 0700. We are expected to be phone available even in 'crew rest.' It is impossible to sleep in the morning while being expected to keep the telephone on. We are continuously interrupted by outside contacts but are not allowed to turn off our phone. Almost every time on reserve; the pilots are assigned a 0200 or 0300 short call assignment for that same night. It is physically impossible to be interrupted from phone availability requirements; get more than 4 hours of sleep that same night; and be fit to fly when called at 0200. We are fatigued every time in these circumstances. We have been advised to 'accept the assignment' but if we are called and unfit; then to say we are 'fatigued.' In these circumstances; we are questioned by the Flight Office when this is a complete and egregious safety issue we are continuously expected to comply with 'as per the contract.' I was so fatigued upon a 0300 call from the crew desk after flying an all-nighter; I did not hear my phone until 4:27 and four calls later. Now I am punished with 5 hours of pay docked and a missed flight for what is an unsafe practice for back to back and multiple swing shifts in just a 72 hour period.




Synopsis: A reserve First Officer reported that after landing at either 0500 or 0700; reserve pilots are expected to be phone ready for next day assignments during that day; which does not allow for adequate rest. The reporter called in fatigued for an trip and was docked pay.