elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202005
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I came back from break and off the corner of my eye I see this chord dangling out from the Overhead Escape latch cover?I immediately asked my flying FO if she knew what it was; as she just came back from break? She did not know.I ran through the possible things it could be; loose wire; an explosive wire to a detonator?I opened the Panel; I had no idea what it was and immediately called the two IRO's (International Relief Officers) to ask if they knew? One IRO admitted he placed that there; and said it was a GPS (Global Positioning System) device; he had been shown by another Captain; to be used with iPad. I told him this was PROHIBITED and Advised him not to do this. I was also very clear in the Pre-Departure Briefing on the use of Electronics in the cockpit.FOM addresses FAR 121.542; But that does NOT address any jury rigging; removing panels; attaching electronics to Overhead Emergency Exit Door.He; as others; interpret FOM as allowing them to use the GPS.If this is Permitted; then it should be Clearly noted in the FOM. If it is not then the FOM needs to have UPDATED language to CLEARLY spell out it is PROHIBITED to remove Overhead Emergency Exit Panel to attach a GPS to ceiling by Door; have Wiring Throughout cockpit; router use in cockpit; and any other creative Electronic modification or use that is not Authorized or Approved and often without Captain Approval.Crews need to be made aware that Personal Electronics Used for Flight:- May not be technical standard order approved- Have not been Approved into company specs- The Battery can pose a risk; especially placed in a tight area; concealed.Certainly pulling the Overhead Panel will also wear the Panels tight fit and become loose. Are routers; GPS and whatever other Electronic Devices in violation of what is approved and could there be Interference with the myriad Airplane Systems on the X aircraft type; an Electronic Airplane?




Synopsis: Captain discovered unauthorized device in cockpit inflight.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Global Express (BD700)
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower CLT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Night visual landing backed up by ILS at CLT. Peak operating night time at airport. ATC was trying to move planes in/out as quickly as possible. Crew briefed the approach and vacating point on active runway; while on short final; ATC put an aircraft onto the active runway for takeoff; the aircraft taking off was slow to start rolling thus making the distance shorter between our aircraft and the departing aircraft. Right before touchdown our aircraft flew through the wake turbulence of the departing aircraft causing our aircraft to float down the runway. Upon touchdown ATC taxied an aircraft into 'position and hold'; ATC gave us a taxiway to exit. This happened too late in the landing roll; we exited on a taxiway that led to a closed taxiway; thus causing ATC to send an aircraft around because of the occupied taxiway and runway. [After parking]; I observed another aircraft going around; thus confirming my thought that ATC was pushing too hard in moving aircraft in/out of the airport. We were asked to call the tower; I gave my version of the occurrence. I was told by the ATC controller that there should not be an issue but I am filling out the NASA report anyway. I briefed the First Officer about what would I knew would happen with ATC during this peak operating time. We were both situationally aware of the scenario at hand with the traffic flow in/out of the airport.




Synopsis: BBD700 Captain reported a go-around was initiated by the following aircraft at CLT when he was unable to clear the runway in time.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EDDF.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower EDDF
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were performing the BIBTI3G RNAV departure from EDDF. The FO was flying the aircraft and the Captain was monitoring. We had programmed the VNAV climb to maintain V2+20 (approximately 180 KTS) to 1;500 FT AGL. A normal reduced power takeoff was performed and at 400 FT AGL RNAV was selected and at 500 FT AGL the right autopilot was engaged. At that time the airspeed was a few knots above V2. The autopilot pulled the nose up to maintain V2 and shortly afterwards VNAV was engaged which selected climb power. At that point I observed the airspeed bleeding down and I told the FO to watch the airspeed and he immediately pushed the yoke forward overriding the autopilot and the airspeed began increasing. The rest of the departure went normally. I think the airspeed went down to approximately 160 KTS. We did not get down to stick shaker speed. I am writing this narrative to alert other 767/757 pilots to this situation. I have learned that this is not something new to the 767/757 fleet. Be careful and alert when engaging the autopilot near the time of selecting climb power.


Second narrative: On departure; FO selected autopilot at approximately 180 KTS and approximately 10-15 KTS above V2 +20. Seconds later FO selected VNAV at 1;900 FT MSL. Aircraft proceeded to pitch nose up to catch V2+ 20 airspeed set in the FMC as well as having the reduction in power going to climb power. Airspeed bled off to approximately 150 KTS. FO pushed forward on the yoke as the Captain and FO noticed the degradation of the airspeed. All systems worked normally after this and we proceeded on to [destination]. I felt that we were in complete control of the aircraft at all times and took strong corrective action to re-establish climb airspeed. Pilot flying and pilot monitoring should be extremely attentive to all facets of transitioning from hand flying to autopilot and reduction in power going from takeoff power to climb power and not relying solely on automation.


Synopsis: A B767 flight crew had a low airspeed condition during initial climb when VNAV is selected shortly after the autopilot is engaged. The autopilot engagement had caused the aircraft to pitch up to maintain V2 and VNAV had caused a power reduction at the same time. Autopilot was overridden to regain airspeed.
Date: 201606
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When we arrived the seat belt sign was turned off but the PA was not made for me to disarm my doors. The company had changed the rules to wait until the jetway bridge is moving to make the announcement to disarm doors. When I was waiting for about 2-3 minutes the provisioner began to open my armed aft galley door. I banged on the door several times to stop him from opening it. Once he did I disarmed the door before the PA was made; worried for his safety and my own if he attempted to open the door again. The red strap was across the window alerting provisioning that the door was armed during his attempts to open the door. When I spoke to the provisioner he said the jetway was moving so he began to open the door. This is the third time this has happened to myself in just a couple of months. Myself or the provisioner could be killed by the slide and something needs to change to prevent this.If the company wants to keep the policy in place that we must wait for the jetway to move in order to disarm doors; the provisioners need to be trained better to look for the red strap and wait until the door is disarmed. Also a new rule should be in place that no one outside the plane should touch a door until it is cracked open by the flight attendant as a second precaution.




Synopsis: B737-700 flight attendant reported new Company door-disarm procedures are potentially dangerous.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A loss of directional control occurred during the landing roll out phase on Runway 09. Runway 09 is 7;000 FT by 100 FT grooved runway. The wind was from the north at approximately 8 knots. The runway edge lights were not activated. Braking action was good and no standing water was observed on the runway. The light rain obscured the forward windscreen slightly; but forward vision was good. The touchdown was uneventful and a successful crosswind wheel landing was made. This flight was the student's first practice landing in moderate crosswinds. The aircraft touched down 4-5 feet left of center-line. As the airplane slowed; the nose began to veer to the left into the wind due to the lack of appropriate aileron input by the student flying. The aircraft continued to the left despite full opposite rudder input by the instructor. The student had the control stick firmly centered and the instructor's attempt to input left aileron was unsuccessful and delayed. The aircraft left main gear subsequently departed the left side of Runway 09; the right main gear remained on the pavement. The student; with the instructor's assistance; made a successful recovery to runway center-line. No damage to the aircraft or runway edge lights occurred. The light rain was not a factor. The cause is determined to be the student's lack of crosswind correction after touchdown and during the landing roll out and the instructor's subsequent delayed response in aileron input.




Synopsis: Flight instructor in a tailwheel aircraft reports a runway excursion during his students first crosswind landing. No damage is reported.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEQM.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower SEQM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: ATIS at Quito showed 1000 scattered and approach to runway 36. The first officer was flying the leg and upon turning base on the ILS 1 runway 36 approach the approach controller told us low visibility procedures in effect followed by the visibility values. We did not understand what he gave for values so I asked him 3 different times for visibility but he never did get them to us. We switched over to tower at about 10;500 feet and were told continue approach and RVR at 600 meters. At about 800 feet I asked cleared to land and was told yes. First Officer picked up the runway environment at about 500 feet and clicked off the autopilot as we were about 1/2 dot above glide slope. He pitched over slightly and received a sink rate call to which he immediately corrected. We continued to the runway and at about 75 feet he received another sink rate and again corrected immediately and landed normally.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported asking for clarification regarding visibility values while landing in SEQM. Flying First Officer was able to pick up the runway environment visually at 500 feet AGL and adjusted for a landing.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 10
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SFO
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight from SFO to ZZZ departing from Runway 01L intersection M. Received and acknowledged position and hold instructions from the tower; taxiing on the runway requested takeoff checklist which was completed and acknowledged; confirmed the correct runway and stated clear for takeoff which was triggered by the landing lights being on. Began and completed the takeoff. During climb out tower indicated the need for us to call them and provided a number. After arriving in ZZZ we placed a call and spoke with someone who asked us to call back and speak with a Quality Control Specialist. We made that call; left a message and he returned our call later and informed us we had departed without takeoff clearance. He confirmed this by allowing us to hear the tapes. He also told us that no conflict with other aircraft had occurred.Fatigue may have had some influence. Rest periods between duty have been ok. The time zones and the early morning get up may have had an effect. As a crew we placed a great focus on using and becoming comfortable with new triggers; flows; checklists and responses that have been recently introduced. I believe trying to comply and respond properly along with an old trigger may also have contributed to our error. The more familiar these new procedures become the less direct focus will be necessary and they will become the tool they were meant to be.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Fractional jet flight crew reported a departure from SFO without a takeoff clearance.
Date: 201511
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cabin Address System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During our preflight; we noticed that the forward PA wasn't working. Maintenance came on board. The PA had been written up before. Maintenance MELed d the PA. The Captain had no objections and neither did we. I would just make announcements from the back of the cabin and the rest of the crew would help out as needed. We also said we would use call lights to get each other's attention.During door closure; I realized this was really affecting our procedure. I was able to use the forward PA to make the 'final paperwork; electronic device/prepare doors' announcement but I was not able to make an all-call. I then wondered if the forward PA could even pick up other chatter. So we tested it and we were unable to hear any communication; pilot to FA or FA to FA. At this point; many different scenarios came to mind. Less serious things such as a pax getting up during taxi (I'd be unable to make any announcement); to more serious things such as an unruly pax (I would be unable to make contact with FA or FD).To sum it up; I felt the PA was MELed for poor reason. We were at a maintenance base where they could have fixed it or swapped out an aircraft. Errors that were made was not realizing the severity of the situation before pushing back and proceeding with flight. This was an error on all parties; the flight attendants; pilots and Maintenance. To avoid reoccurrence; this type of maintenance issue should not be able to be MELed. I understand the aircraft could still fly safely but I feel like the cabin security was not taken into account.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported the PA system being inoperative. The crew elected to continue with the flight only to experience communication; safety; and security issues.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fan Reverser
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About 75-80 KTS during the takeoff the right engine REV came on indicating the right engine reverse had deployed. The takeoff was rejected at or below 80 KTS.


Second narrative: I was pilot not flying. On takeoff a green REV annunciation showed on upper EICAS. Rejected the takeoff below 80 KTS. Taxied clear of runway. Returned to gate. Maintenance took aircraft out of service.


Synopsis: B757 flight crew experiences a green REV indication on the right engine at 80 KTS during takeoff and rejects. Crew returns to the gate and Maintenance takes the aircraft out of service.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Other Preflight planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other unknown
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I [am] concerned about the lack of communication from the company regarding the cause of the closure of ZZZ.  While a message was published that the facility was due to close for X days for deep cleaning; there was no mention of the reason for this closure.  It is now my understanding that there are multiple personnel who have tested positive for COVID-19.  It is concerning to me that the company is not following their established protocol as outlined in X communication where it was stated [they would] also reach out and quickly contact any other employees who may have come into close contact with the person who is suspected of having COVID-19.  It seems to me that anyone who has been in the facility in the past week should be advised whether or not they were in close proximity to one of the affected individuals.  I also find a lack of transparency in the company announcement that communicated the temporary closure of the [site] which made no mention of the trigger for the closure.




Synopsis: Pilot was concerned why a site was temporarily closed for cleaning and what caused the closure.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Cessna 150
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a 1.5 mile final for ILS XX at ZZZ Aircraft Y turned to base right in front of us even though we had just made a radio call and he knew we were on a short final.  This caused the instructor to grab the controls and full throttle to go missed. Had we not done this we would have been within a hundred feet of Aircraft Y.  He knew where we were and disregarded our radio calls and cut us off.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a NMAC on final approach.