elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Enroute from TEB to ZZZZ we were given direct to an intersection and accidentally flew to a different intersection. Our route was TEB ELVAE COL DIXIE PREPI OWENZ LINND AZEZU L453 PAEPR..... Along airway L453 there are 2 fixes with similar sounding names; LEXAD and LEXIM. Before PREPI we were given direct to LEXAD but we heard and saw LEXIM along our route. We both confirmed LEXIM and read back to ATC direct to LEXIM. Neither ATC nor us caught the error. About 10 minutes later we were asked what we were flying to and I responded LEXIM. He asked when we were given that clearance and I mentioned it was given to us earlier. He asked if LEXIM was even along our route and I confirmed that it was. He mentioned that there should not have been 2 fixes along our route with such close spelling and that it was their fault for the error. It was then that he said we should have been going direct to LEXAD. He said to continue to LEXIM and he would try to work out direct to LEXIM. Before freq handoff I apologized and asked if we had a problem. He said nothing to apologize for and thanks for bringing the situation to his attention.




Synopsis: A Fractional Captain reporting being cleared direct to LEXAD intersection. The pilot read back LEXIM another fix on their route. ATC did not notice the read back and the pilot proceeded to the wrong fix.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S27.Airport, MT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZLC
ATC / advisory: Center ZLC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: East and abeam around Kalispell MT we were cruising at FL330 with light chop and occasional moderate. We heard another aircraft on our Center FREQ report better rides at FL320. So we decided to request FL310. We had our request granted and the FO (PF) began a slow descent around 500-600 fpm. I would like to preface this by saying we had already asked the FAs at this time to stow the galley carts and be seated prior to the descent due to the occasional moderate at FL330.  In the descent as we reached FL320 we encountered the beginning of the severe turbulence. The aircraft shook violently with our airspeed going +/- 20-30 kts at times. PLIs were appearing on our attitude indicator and the VSI was going up and down +/- 300-500 fpm.  Once I could actually get my arm stable enough to reach a PTT switch I reported it to ATC all the meanwhile we were still descending towards FL310.  ATC asked if there was any A/C damage or injuries. I told them to standby as we were still in the middle of experiencing all this. Level at 310 the turbulence did not stop. I immediately asked for a climb higher to which we were initially assigned block FL310-FL330 again. We began our climb and I told ATC that we wanted FL350. The severe continued again through FL320 with the same symptoms as mentioned above. Finally climbing through FL320 it was back to just moderate and as we got to FL350 it was just continuous light chop.  I finally had the time to call back and make sure everyone was ok. FAs reported that they were both ok and just had some spilled liquids in the galley but no damage; and that all the PAX were ok as well. I then notified ATC of no damage or injuries. Made a PIREP with ATC as well as notified our Dispatcher via ACARS of the encounter.  Rest of the flight was uneventful. On the ground I contacted Dispatch; as well as Maintenance for the required severe turbulence aircraft inspection write up; and I also was connected with the on-duty chief pilot to report the event as outlined in the FOM.




Synopsis: EMB-175 reported encountering severe turbulence in the vicinity of FCA VOR at FL320.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Aeronca Champion
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Instructor
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Practicing taxi in tail dragger and lost directional control in taxi; and ran off runway 20 ft. into cornfield at slow speed. Lack of adequate rudder control. Maybe 15-20mph. Zero aircraft damage. Continued practice and ground school instruction in advance tail wheel flying.


Second narrative: While practicing taxiing; the aircraft departed the grass runway and came to a stop about 20 ft. off the grass in a corn field.


Synopsis: GA flight crew reported a loss of aircraft control resulting in a runway excursion.
Date: 202002
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: The DEN airport information pages provide a set of procedures for when a flight crew can (and should) change the TCAS from TA/RA to TA only. The airport information pages for SFO also have procedures for changing the TCAS from TA/RA to TA only. The problem is that these two procedures are significantly different. I don't know who is responsible for establishing these procedures (FAA; Company; Local ATC; etc.); but shouldn't these procedures be standardized throughout our system; if not in the entire US? These procedures are established to enhance Safety and are important. They should be standardized throughout our system.




Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported the procedures for changing TCAS settings from TA/RA to TA only are different for DEN and SFO airports; and suggested that they be standardized.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DAL.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were flying the LNDRE 2 Departure from DAL. We had just passed LNDRE and FW Center said proceed direct JJANE. We were confused at first since we did not see JJANE on our route of flight. ATC then queried if we had been cleared direct to a fix and we replied no; we were proceeding on the departure. ATC then informed us we were about three miles south of course and to proceed direct JJANE. At this point we finally realized our departure was missing some points. We reprogrammed the FMC and proceeded on course. We were never informed of any loss of separation.This was our second trip together this month and it was the last leg of this trip. We were both very comfortable with each other. Although we had done all the checklists; in hindsight we made at least five errors in spite of having plenty of ground time and not being rushed. 1. When the FO programmed the FMC; he failed to select the correct transition. In fact I believe no transition was selected so at a quick glance it looked correct since it did show the departure and final point. The routing in the FMC went from LNDRE direct to ZALEA rather than via the transition points.2. When I checked route of flight in the FMC I do not recall verifying the specific transition. Obviously I didn't.3. When I briefed the departure from the FMC; the FO failed to notice that I had not briefed all the points on the transition. Note: I also did not compare the points with the chart either which I usually do. 4. The false expectation my fellow Crew Member wouldn't make a mistake after several quality flights together.5. Fatigue. This was the second day in a row of very early report times. Additionally I had just completed 10 days with grandchildren and started the trip less rested than normal. (I would not have called myself fatigued!)




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported a track deviation when the fatigued crew failed to notice the transition was not loaded for the departure.
Date: 201902
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Flight had one cargo item of Hazmat and one quick pack Hazmat item was added 10 minutes before departure. I called the Ops Agent in ZZZ and told them that a quick pack Hazmat was just added but that they should only load it if they have the 15 bags. I then looked at the bag count and it showed 9 bags total. I repeated to the ops agent to let ramp know not to load both Hazmat items. He stated that they would both be held off and he would talk to them. After that I worked some of my other flights and checked this particular flight after about 10 minutes or so and noticed that the quick pack Hazmat item was loaded. I then immediately informed my shift manager which then told me to file a report.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a communication breakdown with Operations Agent regarding the removal of noncompliance Hazmat.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cooling Fan; any cooling fan
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Takeoff was uneventful as First Officer was pilot flying. Passing 10;000 feet; de-sterilized FA's (Flight Attendants); turned off lights as we continued climb. Switched from [Departure] freq to Center. Upon check in with Center; appx 12-15000 ft; I noticed a medium burning electrical smell; didn't mention anything at first to see if smell would dissipate; it didn't. Appx 3-5 mins later; passing FL180 in climb felt a continuous strong vibration under my floorboard followed by a loud 'Thud' which sounded like a metal door hitting a door frame. It was at this point that the burning smell got worse. I told the FO (First Officer); he has the [aircraft] while I called the #1 FA. I asked him if he heard or smelled anything. He did in fact confirm the strong vibration coming from under first class galley. He did not smell anything but the #4 FA in back of plane said she smelled a light burning odor. It was at this point that I realized something was going on. I told FO we're going to turn back to [the departure airport]. I told [Center]; we need to head back for a mechanical problem. I then called #1 FA back and told him we are returning; no evacuation; planned and will be on the ground in 15 mins; he had no questions and I told him to start getting cabin ready for landing.Upon landing; and talking with our local company maintenance; he concluded quickly that one of our blower fans for extraction valve for avionics cooling had malfunctioned.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing vibrations and a burning smell.
Date: 201405
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Aircraft component: Overhead Bins; Latches
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Two of the new lift up bins popped open during landing.  One was over 2D & 3D with stuff precariously positioned; so I got out of my jumpseat and ran to lift it back into a closed position while we were still traveling at a great rate of speed braking during landing.  (Passengers thanked me for 'saving their lives.')  Bin was EXTREMELY HEAVY - WITH NO ASSIST LEVER - AND HAVING TO LIFT AT SUCH A HIGH RATE OF SPEED DOWN THE RUNWAY IS NEVER A GOOD THING!  Bin in the back was around 25ABC or so - passengers unbuckled - stood - to close. BINS POPPING OPEN ON LANDING - very dangerous - having to get out of my jumpseat to prevent injury to passengers - could easily cause injury to flight attendants AND passengers alike.  This is a lose situation - if you leave it open and remain seated it is very dangerous - if you stand to close - it is very dangerous. DID NOT HAVE THIS ISSUE WITH THE OLD BINS.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reports that the new lift up style bins installed on her aircraft are prone to popping open on landing. In this instance she stood up to close it just after the aircraft touched down. Passengers closed a second bin that had popped open.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Climbing through approximately 11;500 feet the Master Warning illuminated along with the Cabin Altitude warning. I turned ATC over to the First Officer; the PF; who stopped the climb and coordinated a descent back to 10;000 feet while I executed QRH emergency procedures. We declared an emergency for an immediate return to our departure airport. There were no further complications and we landed on Runway 8 approximately 10 minutes after receiving the warning.




Synopsis: An MD-82 suffered a pressurization problem climbing out of approximately 11;500 MSL. They declared an emergency; conducted appropriate QRH checklists and returned uneventfully to their departure airport.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We had to de-ice due to some residual ice on winglets; leading edge of the wings; leading edge of the tail and horizontal stabilizers. Proceeded as per SOP with de-ice procedure and appropriate checklists. During taxi to the runway I requested a Runway Performance Change Checklist; since the assigned runway was different from the one discussed in the briefing; and the First Officer reading through the checklist positioned flaps on 2 as per takeoff performances. We realized that was not standard procedure for the post de-ice taxi to set the flaps which shall be positioned at the right configuration during the 'before takeoff checklist'. I requested a Before Takeoff Checklist immediately with no other issue.The checklist dedicated to the de-ice procedure requires the crew to verify flaps settings against the takeoff performance data and verify the actual position during the 'runway performance change checklist' when the flaps are supposed to be up.The very confusing De-ice/Anti-ice Checklist could have posed a serious safety issue; affecting the anti-ice fluid; in case of actual freezing precipitation or prolonged taxi on contaminated surfaces. Revise and update the appropriate checklist which is very confusing




Synopsis: ERJ-175 Captain reported a discrepancy between the De-ice Checklist and the Before Takeoff Checklist.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: M98.TRACON, MN
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Second aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was told this was a wake remnant error and then while I was in with the supervisor watching and listening to the error he said it was also an error because I did not ensure the CRJ was on a 270 track; not heading; which I gave. I was advised he was on a 260 something track so I didn't have my 30 degrees. So here is the situation; I had B767 heavy descending on the north downwind going to 30L for a visual approach. CRJ was coming in from the northeast going to 30R for a visual approach. I got the heavy below the CRJ and crossed him in front of the CRJ's path probably 4 or 5 miles in front of him and got him across the localizers where they reported the airport in sight just as they were crossing the right localizer on a base heading. I told him to turn towards the airport and cleared for the visual to 30L. As soon as I did that I came back to the CRJ and turned him to a 270 heading and descended him to 40 and then asked him to advise the airport in sight. The CRJ advised the airport in sight and I cleared him for the visual to 30R and called traffic for him about the heavy that was now at his ten o'clock and 4 miles. He advised him in sight but I felt that I had the appropriate separation or less than a 30 degree intercept on both aircraft and didn't think wake turbulence was a factor so I did not tell him to maintain visual separation. I don't think that wake remnant separation should be something we should be having to worry about. It is confusing and I don't think that with standard wake turbulence that we are putting aircraft in dangerous positions.




Synopsis: M98 Controller was advised of a 'Wake Remnant' separation error; the reporter noting that this separation criteria should not be a controller evaluation criteria.