Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: S46.TRACON, WA
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Few to Broken Clouds; 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Attitude Indicator(Gyro/Horizon/ADI)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Check Pilot; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were preparing to depart to BFI to end the work day. As I was running the After Battery flows/checks; I noticed that our Back-Up Battery was not testing correctly. We knew the battery itself was working but the test light was not illuminating and the light inside of the Stand-by Attitude Gyro was also not illuminating. My captain; and I brought out the MEL to see what we could do about the issue. After reading the MEL and speaking with maintenance about it; we decided we could & were allowed to take off VFR with the Stand-By Attitude Gyro 'Inop'; as long as we stayed under the clouds. I had never flown [this] aircraft VFR and since I have little experience with the airplane; I was hesitant on doing so. After talking with dispatch; we were released. The Captain and I came up with a route and a plan on how we would get back to Seattle safely and legally & so we decided to take off. Now; at this point; even after reviewing the current weather and forecast weather; which indicated that we could make the flight possible with no issues; I had not realized the severity of this decision until further on into the flight. For this leg; I was the pilot flying and the Captain was the pilot monitoring. After our initial climb-out; the Captain had mentioned that he wanted to take control of the airplane once we were going to descend and fly through the pass we had planned for since he had experience flying through this specific area of terrain. The original pass we wanted to fly through was Snoqualmie Pass. Once we were nearing Ellensburg VOR; we initiated a positive exchange of control and had begun our descent. He leveled off and passed the city of Cle Elum at 1;500 Feet AGL. The plan was to pass the 3 lakes ahead; Cle Elum; Kachess; and Keechelus. Once we reached Keechelus Lake; we were to follow it northbound to arrive in the Snoqualmie pass. This is when my doubts of a successful flight began.Upon entering the South side of Keechelus Lake; it was apparent that there was no way we could make it without inadvertently going IMC. The pass and peaks around it were covered with an overcast layer. This was when I made my first attempt at voicing my opinion that I did not feel it was safe to continue. I then asked the Captain to return or at the very least; turn around & get out of the situation we were about to be in. He tried to assure me that there were other routes and passes we had as options. His new plan was to follow the I-90 Highway near Bandera until we made it past the terrain. It was at this point that I again; voiced my concerns about the continuation of this flight. I knew once we passed the ski area; things were only going to get worse. I saw that with each attempt I made to speak up with my concern; it wasn't the Captain I was talking to anymore. I was talking to a pilot who almost; in a way; wanted to prove to himself that he could make this flight happen. Whenever I voiced my concerns; he either ignored it; or replied in a way that made my opinion feel irrelevant and childish. This continued as the airplane continued down the pass. As this was happening; I really felt trapped. I felt that there was nothing else I could do but try and talk some sense into him. Looking back now; I know I should have taken control of the airplane.As we continued down the pass; visibility was only getting worse. Rain began to fall. The Captain had to slow down to around 180 Knots just to keep in control of the situation. At this point; the GPWS had begun to go off and stayed on for the remainder of the time we were in the pass. The Captain had complete disregard for the alarm. As we neared a bend in the I-90; I could feel my absolute limit coming up. There were two specific peaks I remember being on either side of the I-90. One at 5;584 Feet MSL and the other at 5;162 Feet MSL. Looking as far forward as I could; I couldn't even see the tops of these peaks or even some of the other surrounding mountains. It came to the point where Iknew we made the turn around the bend; it would be a death sentence. This is when I began calling the Captain by his first name; trying to snap him out of the mindset he had. I had attempted 4+ times; warning him that we were not going to make it past the bend. Not only did I now have to worry about the bend; but also how we were going to make a full 180 Degree turn in the tightest point of this pass. Finally; after at least 10 more seconds after my last plead to turn the airplane around; the Captain realized that he needed to turn around. He asked for Flaps 15 and to call out the airspeed as it decreased in the turn. Even with a steep turn; it was a close call. Once the airplane had made a full 180 Degree turn; we returned to our original point of entry; Keechelus Lake. After escaping the situation we had been in and exiting the harsh conditions; I voiced one last recommendation. I recommended that we returned to our original departure airport; for the night. Instead; the Captain insisted that we pick up an IFR flight plan in the air and return to Seattle. And so; after experiencing what we just did; I agreed and contacted ATC. We then continued the flight normally without any problems back to BFI. Looking back now; there were a number of times that I; as a First Officer; failed to act on my instincts. I feel like there were a number of things I could have done. I could have declared an emergency to 121.5 or any surrounding ARTCC or even taken control of the airplane. In a way; I feel like I let this incident happen by not taking control of that airplane. While everything was happening; I really felt as if my experience was surpassed by the Captain's. Also; the situation was so delicate that I felt that fighting for control over the airplane would have been a costly decision as well. And it was for that reason I allowed him to keep control of the airplane. I know that was the wrong decision to make; and it was a decision that almost cost me my own life. This experience taught me a life lesson: To never allow a captain or anyone else push or set your own personal limits and to understand that even though I am second in command; sometimes it is necessary to take control of the situation. It is my duty as SIC to make sure the flight is completed in a safe and legal manner. And I should never allow another person to make choices that will put everyone on board and the airplane at risk.


Second narrative: The planned flight was to go IFR to BFI. After loading the aircraft; closing the door and getting ready to start the aircraft; it was it was determined that the Standby Horizon was not working properly. I called dispatch and informed him of the issue and was transferred to Maintenance for a Field Deferral. Maintenance deferred the Standby horizon with MEL restrictions limiting the flight to 'Day VFR Only and No VFR Over the Top.' I was transferred back to dispatch and advised him of the maintenance issue and the new MEL restrictions that were in place. I remembered from the weather brief that I had recently received via DUAT.com that the weather at both departure  and arrival stations was VFR but that there were clouds over the cascades; but when I was looking at the weather the flight was going to operate IFR I didn't focus on the details of the area forecast for the Cascades. I did not print the weather report out and therefore didn't have it readily available in the cockpit when I was talking to dispatch. I asked the dispatcher what the weather was like and he reported that it was VFR at BFI; with no detail about weather over the Cascades. The route of flight was altered to be more direct than our original IFR routing but more importantly to take us over Snoqualmie Pass which has the lowest terrain for crossing the mountains in the area and our best option to complete the flight and comply with the MEL restrictions and a new release was received.The flight took off with the Flight Controls (FO) at the controls under VMC/VFR conditions. As we approached ELN it was apparent that it was going to be challenging to comply with the No VFR Over the Top MEL restriction since there were low clouds obscuring the mountains. I took control of the aircraft for this portion of the flight (though forgot to transfer the autopilot control transfer switch to my side) since I was more familiar with the terrain and the routing over the pass. We followed the Interstate towards the pass and were being pushed lower and lower by lowering cloud bases. The FO was starting to voice some concern as to our ability to continue due to clouds blocking our path and the valley we were flying up getting narrower. As we reached the top of the pass we were at approximately 4;200 Feet MSL which depending on exactly where we were was anywhere from 1;000 Feet to 2;000 Feet AGL and trying to determine if I could make out enough of the valley on the other side of the pass to continue. I found a break in the clouds and recognized the interstate on the other side of the pass so continued over the ridge crossing it at about 1;300 Feet AGL after crossing the pass the clouds and visibility dropped quickly and I called for the FO to bring flaps to 15 degree as I descended to 3;700 Feet MSL; so we could fly slower and have a smaller radius of turn should we need it. The FO further stated that he was uncomfortable with our position. Shortly after crossing the ridgeline at the pass in the vicinity Bandera (4W0) the cloud bases dropped to the valley floor; our GPWS warning started to activate and I executed a steep 180 degree turn to keep from entering IMC; and returned up the valley and back over the pass and down the other side now in good VFR and continued towards ELN. Both the FO and I were frazzled with the predicament I had put us in. When we were able to climb VFR to an altitude we could contact ATC; about 15 miles from ELN; I decided that it would be better to pick up an IFR clearance to BFI than to continue VFR over the top of the clouds; to better facilitate a descent into the Seattle area. We picked up an IFR clearance and continued to BFI under IFR. Now under ATC control I activated the heading and altitude portion of the auto pilot and the FO noticed about 30 seconds later that the aircraft was about 30 degrees off our assigned heading; and that is when I noticed that the autopilot transfer switch was not set to my side and so the autopilot was not following my flight director but the FO's side which didn't have the flight director active. The flight was continued without further incident to BFI. A standard weather brief that was not readily available to the crew in the cockpit to reference the details. A seeming lack of understanding on the dispatcher's part of how the MEL restrictions would affect the flight with regard to enroute weather. And no contingency plan was discussed incase weather was an issue and we were not able to complete the flight under the MEL restrictions. Failure of the crew to take the time to obtain the area forecast details and inform the dispatcher of those details and how it will affect the flight.I was feeling some pressure to get the flight moving quickly since we were already delayed with the mechanical issue. The crew did not transfer the autopilot control transfer switch when the controls were transferred from the FO to the Captain. Also the nonflying pilot did not have his flight director activated and mirroring the flying pilot's flight director.The FO didn't have a clear understanding that we were going to have to be under the clouds and not able to fly over the clouds putting us down below the ridge topes; and upon clearing up this misunderstanding; he mentioned that he did not have much experience with flight in low VFR conditions in his previous 600 hours of flying experience.When the FO first started to voice his concerns we were still in a wide portion of the valley and were substantially (1;500 Feet-2;000 Feet) below the cloud bases and 2;500 Feet-3;000 Feet AGL with unlimited visibility blow the clouds. I attributed his concern more to a lack of experience than to a warranted concern at this point.I didn't fully understand the level of the FO's uncomfortableness with the situation as the flight progressed and I feel that if the FO had used the words 'Captain; you must listen...' as outlined in our CRM training; I may have better understood his level of concern but; I shouldn't have let our situation get that far.Looking back at the event I notice there were some 'hazardous attitudes' that I was displaying. There was a level of excitement for a flight that was more challenging and unusual than our normal every day flight. This excitement I had for a change to the monotony of everyday flights was a factor in my decision making.  I am a senior captain and I know this area/terrain well. I can overcome this challenge and complete the flight to get the job done.I recognize this is a scenario I have read about in other accident investigations; flying up a mountain pass into deteriorating weather; but I am better than that and it won't happen to me.Anti-Authority thoughts: The MEL restriction is silly; you would have to have 5 generators fail before we would be down to the Standby Horizon.This flight should have gone one of two ways.1. The weather over the pass should have been discussed and a decision to not depart made.2. If the decision to depart was made; to have turned around at the first voice of concern from either crew member and to have either terminated the flight short of the destination or return to the departure airport; and have made and coordinated this plan ahead of time and with Dispatch.


Synopsis: Light twin flight crew describes an attempted VFR flight through Snoqualmie Pass in an attempt to remain in VMC to comply with an MEL. After passing through the pass the clouds lower to the surface and a very tight turn is required to maintain VFR and avoid the terrain. Once clear an IFR clearance is picked up to destination.