Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: A11.TRACON, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ANC
ATC / advisory: TRACON A11
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Departure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: MRI departed a VFR Aircraft Y on what I can only assume to be a Campbell departure. Aircraft Y seemed to shortcut the corner of the departure and was clearly going to clip the 'Seward Segment' (described in the Alaska Chart Supplement).Aircraft X; a known [type] to climb slowly; departed shortly after Aircraft Y from ANC RWY 7L. Aircraft X was assigned an Anchorage 8 departure; a departure that the aircraft is unable to comply with due to climb gradient restrictions.Both aircraft were on a course and climb gradient to place them in unsafe proximity with one another and mitigating action was required which included both a traffic and low altitude alert.Aircraft Y went to the wrong frequency and was talking to North RADAR (NR) while heading southbound into my airspace; the NR Controller did a fine job figuring out the pilots' intentions and then noticing the conflict. I was working South RADAR (SR) and was talking to Aircraft X. Both the NR Controller and myself grew very concerned about the conflict as soon as we noticed Aircraft X acquire its tag and projected the two aircraft to be in unsafe proximity. We both issued traffic and applied merging target procedures to our respective planes while coordinating with one another for a mitigating action. The NR Controller attempted to turn his VFR aircraft to the east in order to provide more space for my Aircraft X to climb to the south; however; the VFR Aircraft Y was failing to respond and the situation was growing dire.Once Aircraft Y failed to respond to NR controlling prompts; he instructed me to turn my Aircraft X even though we were both fully aware of the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) factor which complicated vectoring of Aircraft X. I issued the traffic alert and an immediate turn to the southwest to Aircraft X. Then I issued a low altitude alert and instructed the aircraft to expedite its climb and gave the appropriate MVA information. Aircraft X effected its turn but seemed to struggle to climb; assumedly due to the rate of turn bleeding climb performance from the already underpowered aircraft. Once Aircraft X committed to the southwest turn; Aircraft Y then came back to the NR Controller and complied with the turn to the east which further mitigated the conflict.Safe separation was achieved due to the turn of an IFR aircraft below the MVA.Closest proximity was 1.22 nm and 500 feet.A) Tower needs to be held accountable for issuing traffic to aircraft that will be in unsafe proximity immediately on departure. Aircraft X advised that traffic was not issued by the Tower despite both aircraft clearly being in direct conflict with one another.B) Aircraft that cannot comply with the SID off RWY 7L need to be assigned the climbing gradient for the 7L DVA (Diverse Vector Area) procedure. Aircraft X was allowed to be at an egregiously low altitude and allowed to remain on a SID that he was not able to climb in compliance with. The SID's ground track would have been extremely unsafe and I was forced to disregard MVA procedures in order to ensure safe separation of aircraft.C) The 'Seward Segment' needs to be addressed. Our facility has raised issue with this particular airspace several times to no avail.


Second narrative: Aircraft Y erroneously checked in on my frequency departing southbound out of MRI on what I assume was the Campbell Departure. I identified him in an effort to help out the SR (South RADAR) Controller and anticipated switching him to SR immediately after. As I was going to switch him; Aircraft X tagged up off of the departure end of 7L at ANC; and checked on with SR. I assume they were assigned the ANC8 departure despite their known inability to comply with climb gradient requirements. The targets were converging and I issued merging target procedures. Aircraft Y did not have Aircraft X in sight. The SR was issuing traffic to his aircraft (Aircraft X) who also didn't have Aircraft Y in sight. I issued a turn to the east to avoid a near collision in a timely manner. Aircraft Y did not respond. I informed SR Controller that my aircraft wasn't listening and he should turn his Aircraft X regardless of the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude); as they were above the known obstacles in the area and were converging laterally and vertically with the unresponsive Aircraft Y. I immediately issued a traffic alert to Aircraft Y and he responded and turned to avoid the Aircraft X.No traffic was issued to Aircraft X by local prior to switching Aircraft X to Approach.Add a requirement for ANC Local [Controller] to coordinate with MRI when they have a 7R/L departure that doesn't meet the climb gradient.Clear up any confusion concerning the ANC8 being issued to aircraft that don't meet the climb gradient; and as a result have non-standard takeoff minimums. I believe there is an alternate departure procedure for aircraft with non-standard minimums.Add a requirement for MRI to tag up departures with aircraft type as well a departure procedure/direction of flight. This may lead to more accurate; more timely traffic calls.Reiterate the importance of ensuring separation prior to communications transfer. This seems to be a recurring theme here. There is absolutely no guarantee that a pilot will check on clearly and in a timely manner. If there had been any delay or mistake by the Aircraft X pilot with his check in; there may not have been time to react.Also; more oversight locally concerning these issues. The last report generated a response that is unbelievable to the controller workforce here. It was suggested that we take it to PSP (Partnership for Safety Plan). A systemic deficiency was identified and we were supposed to talk about it at PSP? Unacceptable.


Synopsis: Anchorage TRACON controllers reported an unsafe operation which led to turning an aircraft while below the MVA away from a VFR aircraft.