Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Aircraft component: Intake Ice System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Second reporter function: Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing a morning turn to ZZZ; we experienced an EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) engine probe heat failure on the no. 2 engine. The deferral resulted in split automation with the loss of ATS and also required the engines to operate in N1 mode. The leg to ZZZ was uneventful.  Departing ZZZ on 26R the PDC assigned the Indie1 Departure; runway heading; and climb to 4;000 feet. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) in the left seat. The Pilot Flying (PF) had limited recent flying experience. Our aircraft was very light with 15;000 lbs. of payload.  At the runway after an extended delay for arrivals we were cleared to line up and wait with traffic on a 9 mile final.After sitting in position for an inordinately long period of time under an 800 foot overcast we became increasingly anxious. We sat transfixed on the TCAS looking for arriving traffic behind us. Tower then cleared us for T/O. Fly runway heading maintain 2;000 feet. I repeated the clearance and set 2;000 feet in the MCP and we commenced the T/O. Passing 1;000 feet I called passing 1;000 feet for 2;000 feet. The PF called for climb thrust at the same time Tower handed us off to departure. Rapidly approaching 2;000 feet the PF realized the autopilot couldn't negotiate the L/O so he attempted to intervene with V/S. Passing 2;150 feet I said disengage the autopilot. He complied and stopped the climb at 2;250 feet but then over corrected while trimming. I called for control of the aircraft as he descended through 1;800 feet and stopped the descent at 1;700 feet.


Second narrative: The flight was scheduled to ZZZ. I had operated as the First Officer (FO) on the previous leg as Pilot Monitoring (PM) so that a Check Airman could accomplish a line check on the Captain Pilot Flying (PF). On the incident leg I occupied the jump seat to give a 24 month observation to the (Check Airman) who was now flying from the right seat (PF). The aircraft was operating under MEL 30-XX-XX-X EPR ENG PROBE HEAT P&W ENGINES which forced the crew to operate the engines in N1 mode and deactivated the auto throttles. The crew thoroughly briefed the N1 setting procedure and reviewed the procedure just prior to takeoff. The flight was given a clearance to line up and wait on runway 26R and was advised there was an inbound aircraft for that runway 9 miles out. The delay in position was long and somewhat uncomfortable as the crew was concerned about the proximity of the inbound aircraft. The takeoff clearance was received '[Flight No.] cleared for takeoff; fly runway heading; maintain 2;000 feet' As soon as the words 'Cleared for takeoff' were spoken the PF advanced the throttles to 60% N1 per the MEL procedure. The PM correctly read back the clearance including the cleared altitude of 2;000 feet (PDC clearance altitude was 4;000 feet). The PM set 2;000 feet in the MCP Altitude window and pointed to it but the FO was already advancing the throttles and never acknowledged the new altitude clearance. The takeoff roll was uneventful. The Captain made the 2;000 foot for 3000 foot call and the FO responded (I don't recall his exact words) As the aircraft climbed thru 1500 feet the FO called for Autopilot 2 to command. The Captain selected the autopilot on at 1;700 feet-1;800 feet. The rate of climb was quite high and the aircraft climbed thru 2;000 feet. The captain called out 'level off' to which the FO responded by attempting to select V/S on the MCP panel. At approximately 2200 feet the autopilot was disengaged (I believe by control column forward pressure but I do not know which pilot force caused disconnect). The pitch over was somewhat dramatic and a descent initiated. At this point the Captain responded to a radio call. The FO allowed the aircraft to descend thru 2;000 feet and I called out '2000 feet' The FO responded by reaching up for the MCP panel and appeared confused. I yelled '[Name] you are manually flying'. The FO responded by reducing the rate of descent (It was 1;000-1;200 feet per minute) to near level flight. At this point we were approximately 300-400 feet low. Some conversation occurred between the Captain and the FO; the result being that the Captain assumed control of the aircraft and manually climbed to and leveled off at 2000 feet. (During de-brief the FO claimed the Captain asked if the FO would like to the Captain to fly; from my seat I only heard the FO say 'You have the aircraft') The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Factors contributing to event - Mixed automation (No auto throttles) - Engine Power setting by N1 vice EPR - FO's perceived time pressure to start takeoff roll - Non-compliance with SOP (Alt setting procedure) - Communication- Captain did not ensure FO acknowledgement of cleared altitude - Early level off - Reluctance to turn off automation - Auto-pilot mode confusion - Over reliance on auto-pilot (Attempting to engage the auto pilot in descent below cleared altitude)


Synopsis: An A300 flight crew experienced an altitude deviation while attempting to level off at 2;000 feet. The pilot flying co-pilot did not acknowledge the change in the initial level off altitude from 4;000 feet to 2;000 feet. This combined with a light loaded aircraft and his relative inexperience combined to cause the event. The Captain took control of the aircraft and performed the level off.