elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Exit
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After parking; the Lead Flight Attendant stated to prepare for arrival and cross checked. I proceeded to get up and disarm the slide and remove the red strap across the window. I then turned on the POS to transmit and unlocked the lavatories. I left the galley and stood by the aft lavatories and watched the deplaning process. A few passengers came back to use the restroom. Deplaning was a slow process.When there were only a few passengers left another Flight Attendant suggested we check to make sure the slides were disarmed. I was not expecting anything to be wrong. She then turned and said that my slide was still armed but my red strap was undone. I was in total disbelief! I could not believe that when I bent down to disarm the slide that I did not. I have never removed the red strap prior to disarming the door. I have always been extremely careful in following procedures. I cannot explain why the slide was not disarmed. I can see myself bending down and disarming the door. There were no emergencies or passengers asking for things or anything to disrupt my routine. However; when I proceeded back to disarm the door the second time; I did notice that the hooks that the slide sits in when disarmed were loose. The bar was more or less just sitting in the hooks rather than needing to be pressed down. So now I wonder if I put the bar in the hooks but did not make certain they were in there securely and they slipped out. My error is that I did not double and triple check the disarmed door to make sure the bar stayed in the hooks and would not fall out. Another factor may have been that I was tired and ready to get off the airplane. What I learned in this situation was to just step back and review all of the procedures each and every time I am disarming/arming a door. Maybe it has become such a habit that I need to make sure I am absolutely aware of what I am doing at all times.




Synopsis: A B737-900 Flight Attendant failed to properly disarm her emergency exit. An alert compatriot noted the error and the omission was promptly corrected.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working R12 providing 25 miles in trail for EWR satellites and holding for EWR. Satellites were on alternate routing to accommodate holding aircraft. While coming out of hold; low sector presented a handoff for satellites without proper spacing for restrictions. I put them into a hold since I was too busy coming out of the hold for EWR and the high side had a long stream of satellite aircraft. Once I put the sector in hold; the CIC for that area began to scream across the aisle to get 'the crappy controller' off position and that they didn't need to provide spacing since they were a separate sector. Meanwhile; the controller I put in hold was relieved and his relief continued to call asking how much longer. Overflight traffic via RBV is normally routed via THUMP but Aircraft Y was shortcutted to ENO. I missed this and issued the normal descent clearance to the satellite aircraft. I wasn't alerted to my mistake until a conflict alert was activated. I was distracted by the unprofessional outburst of the CIC and the new controller who was holding the aircraft. TMU initiatives need to be passed back as one; the sectors in the same area; should be required to space accordingly with each other and if this isn't feasible; then hold then aircraft without disruption when told to do so. There's a mentality amongst ZDC controllers that anything happening outside their airspace is not their concern; even if that controller is not adhering to SOP; LOA; 7110.65; and TMU initiatives. There is no safety culture here at ZDC. Everything here is done in reverse order. There are no more app reqs (Approval Request) for anything. If there is an aircraft doing something you don't like; even in violation of SOP; LOA; 7110.65 it is incumbent upon the receiving controller to reach out and fix. Handoffs are presented/retracted; presented/retracted; presented/retracted; and it's up to you to figure out what has changed. Positive control is a lost art. As long as 2 aircraft don't hit; everyone here is happy. This is unacceptable.




Synopsis: ZDC Controller reported of problems with flows into the airspace. High workload and distractions led to a conflict alert.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We did an originator out of ZZZ and had a maintenance delay while going back and forth with MX control; dispatch and gate agent trying to get off the gate in a timely manner. I signed the release and forgot to check my alt/msap fuel. We got airborne and during the climb I grabbed the release to calculate my minimum fuel and that is when I noticed that we had 0 fuel dispatched for alt/msap even though we had an alternate and the weather was overcast at 1200. I sent an ACARS to dispatch about the situation and asked for them to send me the alt/msap fuel to see if I could use my tanker fuel. The number came back at 1500lbs and added with reserve fuel we needed 3800lbs. We were showing landing about 500lbs short. We declared min fuel; climbed an additional 2000 ft; got short cuts and pulled back power but was only able to save 100lbs. After talking with dispatch about our options we [advised ATC] and diverted. Once we were cleared and our new FOB went up we landed then re-dispatched with an alternate and plenty of fuel and continued to the original destination.Dispatch failed to catch the 0 fuel in the alt/msap when an alt was filed; and the captain did not catch it before signing the release and taking off.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: CRJ-900 flight crew reported being dispatched without alternate fuel.
Date: 202008
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I was scheduled to complete the one day training event for the X type aircraft as a result of downgrade due to planned furloughs.  I was previously an X type aircraft Captain. However; between my last flight as an X type aircraft Captain and being assigned this training; I completed the Y and Z type aircraft Qualification Course as I was awarded a bid to Y and Z type aircraft Captain prior to the planned downsizing. I was bumped from that position prior to IOE but after the completion of the course (I was home awaiting an IOE trip). My final position was X type aircraft FO after the bump bids. I asked multiple different sources and all seemed to agree that my situation would dictate at least a multi-day re-qualification course. I was surprised when I was scheduled for the 1 day class; landings event. Yes; I have XXXX hours in the FO seat of the aircraft but my last experience was X years ago. Yes; I was a Captain on it for a year but again; I last flew the aircraft 6 months ago and had an entire course on a different airframe in the interim.  When I asked about this I was told 'If you need more training just ask for it.' Fortunately the simulator broke and we were unable to complete the enhanced items so I will need to go back for another sim period. I'm going to be blunt and tell you there is no way I should have had one period; let alone one period where I get 2 hours to relearn everything and have to share it with another student.  In my particular case I should have had the entire X hour period to myself or been scheduled for a multi-day day re-qualification event. Had I gone on a different aircraft IOE and activated that bid would I have been scheduled differently? If the answer is yes; then brake release on IOE needs to be re-evaluated as the line.  If the answer is no then the entire thought process behind this needs some serious examination. The course would have been fine if I had been coming directly and untainted from the left seat.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported that re-qualification training was inadequate.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We departed Runway 36C in MEM via the GOETZ TWO departure (we believe this to be pronounced 'GOATS' which lead to confusion.) Shortly after contacting Departure; I believe between JAAXX and AYERR; we were cleared 'direct 'GATTS' and resume the departure.' With this clearance we selected GHATS from the legs page and executed. Our [original] Legs page showed GOETZ-BNA-SWAPP-GHATS. Being on Autopilot in FMS mode; the aircraft made a slight left turn and proceeded to GHATS which was just past BNA on J42. In the moments after this occurred something didn't sit well with me. I mentioned to the Captain; 'how can we 'resume the departure' from a fix that is past the last fix on the departure?' I queried the Controller by asking if he had cleared us to 'G.H.A.T.S.' to which he said 'no; it's G.O.E.T.Z' and we pronounce it as 'Gats' here.' We said that we interpreted that as 'Goats'; not 'Gats' but would proceed there now anyway. He didn't seem to mind and then we got the hand off to Memphis Center and the flight continued normally. I believe that GOETZ is sounded out as 'Goats'. The Controller told us to go to 'Gats' (like Bats or Hats only with a G). I am not sure he knew that just past BNA we had an intersection called GHATS; also sounded out as 'Gats.' This seems wrong to us but either way having two intersections close to each other on our flight (GOETZ and GHATS) caused confusion and caused us to proceed to a fix that the controller didn't intend for us to proceed to. We noticed this before ATC said anything and we queried the Controller who seemed to not have noticed what we were doing just yet (The two courses didn't deviate from each other much.)




Synopsis: On initial climb out via the GOETZ RNAV SID from MEM; the flight crew of a CRJ-700 was cleared direct to GOETZ (pronounced 'gats' by the Controller) and to resume the departure. The flight crew (believing GOETZ should be pronounced 'goats') instead selected direct to GHATZ; a downline waypoint on their cleared route. Only the reporter's recollection of the controller's phrase '...resume the departure' alerted them to the error.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Procedure; MEL
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Walking to the aircraft; the inbound crew informed me the cabin was warm during ground operations and while operating at low altitudes but would cool down in cruise. The logbook had a maintenance deferral for the hot air valve which I noted. I was the Pilot Monitoring for this leg; and did my best to keep the cabin cool while taxiing and during initial climb; but the cabin would not cool below 82 degrees F.After examining the Bleed and Pressure systems pages; it was evident the Pack 1 flow control valve was closed despite the pushbutton being in the Auto position. The indication was supported by a cool compressor outlet temperature and a warm pack outlet temperature on the Bleed system page. We wrote up the discrepancy and were met by local Maintenance; who opened a belly panel and found the Pack 1 flow control valve secured in the closed position without a maintenance deferral. Upon further examination of the aircraft logbook; a deferral was cleared the previous night in ZZZ1 for the Pack 1 Inlet Door which requires the flow control valve to be secured closed by maintenance. The mechanic re-activated the valve; but it would not operate normally; so a deferral for the Pack 1 flow control valve and pack were applied.After discussing this event with another Captain; he stated that in his previous discussions with ZZZ1 Maintenance that the station is not qualified to work on the flow control valve; including securing the valve in the closed position or re-activating it. It appears that in this situation; the aircraft should have been grounded until a qualified mechanic could re-activate the flow control valve; but it was instead pushed back into service in unairworthy condition. This causes considerable doubt in the quality of maintenance on our aircraft as well as the question of what trap will be laid for another flight crew to deal with in the future. Less importantly; the process of troubleshooting the flow control valve in caused a three-hour delay.




Synopsis: A319 Captain reported an incorrect MEL action by an unqualified Maintenance Personnel; resulting in a loss of cabin cooling during the flight.