elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Manuals
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Refer to report previously filed for Aircraft X Number 1 slat damage at out station ZZZ. Damage was out of limits once aircraft arrived and reevaluated in ZZZ1 causing Number 1 slat to be changed. Damage was not properly documented on the attached engineering order allowing the aircraft to fly out of ZZZ. Turns out when ZZZ filled out the damage report they did state there was a crease present. See attached documents for details.More often than not when we; ZZZ1 sheet metal; contacts ZZZ2 in regards to damage with a crease we almost always get push back from ZZZ2 maintenance with them always trying to claim it is not a crease by definition. The definition is black and white but yet they insist we reevaluate over and over again even when there are pictures with well define lines/ridges defining underlying structure. This is a known issue with ZZZ1 sheet metal and ZZZ2 maintenance.Maintenance should have never issued an engineering order with a documented crease over underlying structure. I suggest having maintenance contact Boeing to get the definition of a crease revised to their liking and have them stop intimidating technicians when they are contact with damage consisting of a crease.




Synopsis: Lead Technician reported that an aircraft with a damaged Number 1 leading edge slat was allowed to fly in an unairworthy condition.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Crossfeed
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was doing a random line check on the crew. They departed the gate with 1;400 pounds of fuel in the center tank. The Captain had the center fuel tank pumps on; as per SOP. Shortly after takeoff the left center tank fuel low pressure light illuminated. The Captain turned the pump off per the company procedure. The procedure does not mention opening the crossfeed. Fuel was then feeding the left engine from the left fuel tank and the right engine from the right fuel boost pump in the center tank. The crew was given a turn on the RNAV departure and an at or below crossing restriction which was not part of the RNAV departure; i.e.; they were busy. Shortly thereafter the fuel imbalance light came on. I informed the crew of their fuel issue.This is the second time I have seen this happen to a crew. The procedure should be all center pumps on or off or; if one is off; the crossfeed should be opened. Maybe with less than 2;000 pounds in the center tank the center pumps should be off for takeoff.




Synopsis: A B737NG Check Airman witnessed as the flight crew; following the company procedure; turned off the left center fuel tank pump shortly after takeoff when the its low pressure light illuminated but did not concurrently open the crossfeed valve...which is NOT directed by the procedure.  A short time later the fuel imbalance light illuminated and the reporter advised the crew of the cause; the left engine now burning from the left main tank and the right from the center tank via the right center tank boost pump.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Engine surge (repeatedly) followed by loss of power (right engine). Determination was made that engine power was insufficient. Due to low altitude and proximity to airport; decision was made to shut down and secure engine per engine inoperative after takeoff procedures. ATC was notified and a return for landing was accomplished.




Synopsis: C402 pilot reported loss of power in right engine.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: With MIA Center; climbing thru FL360 for FL380. Traffic displayed on TCAS at 1:00 heading directly toward us and descending toward our altitude. Flight crew inquired and ATC Controller advised 'There is no traffic'. Pilot Flying was hand flying and turned slightly north of course to increase spacing from TCAS displayed traffic. TCAS showed traffic passed approximately 3 miles from us on a Southeast course near our altitude. We did get visual on the traffic. Pilot Monitoring inquired again with ATC and was advised that traffic was beyond 5 miles. Our TCAS displayed well within 5 miles; near 3 miles. Our ground speed at the time was 471 KTS which would most likely be somewhere in excess of 900 KTS closure rate. I believe that if Pilot Flying had not turned away impact could have occurred. Suggestions; proficiency analysis on said Controller.


Second narrative: About 40 ESE of SRQ during climb from FL360 to FL380; as assigned by ATC; we received TA traffic. On TCAS traffic showed at our one o'clock; at our altitude; moving right to left. I was set at the 10 mile map mode on my navigation display. I inquired ATC about traffic at our altitude and he responded that we had no traffic ahead of us. We spotted the traffic and it had moved just to the left of our nose. Captain turned gently about 5 to 10 degrees right for a period of less than 20 seconds as aircraft passed. I inquired with ATC about the now sighted traffic again and he responded that traffic had required 5 mile separation. It appeared to the Captain and I that the aircraft was probably closer than 5 miles by sight and TCAS readout. We resumed normal course.


Synopsis: Air Carrier; with ZMA climbing to FL380; described a TCAS RA event; turning slightly from the observed traffic; the reporter noting that a certain impact would have occurred had not the turn been initiated.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The ramp gave us a NOTOC [Notification to Captain] showing a package containing 6.8kgs of dry ice was loaded on to the aircraft.this was over the 2.5kg limit and when I told them it was not allowed to go they did not want to unload it and provided excuses as to why it could go. Eventually I convinced them it had to be removed and it was.Ramp Personnel need better training and are not to be pressured by management to disregard rules.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported ramp personnel loaded package of dry ice in excess of max weight allowed. Captain refused hazmat cargo.
Date: 201605
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fan Reverser
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Under MEL ITEM INFO was the following entry 'XXXX - AIRCRAFT NO AUTOLAND'.When the MEL installed on the iPad was consulted it was discovered that there was no 'XXXX' code to be referenced. Dispatch was called. The initial reaction of the dispatcher was that this may be a code in reference to [former company] aircraft which have been purchased; but that since he was not sure he would get [Maintenance Control] on the line.The explanation for the 'XXXX' code from [Maintenance Control] was that there was a 'chronic' problem with the number 1 engine thrust reverser which was still useable but removed the aircraft from AUTOLAND status. I did not have the presence of mind to ask; at that time; exactly what the chronic problem was. During landing I noticed that the First Officer was having difficulty deploying the thrust reversers. The First Officer said that the number 1 thrust reverser was slow to deploy.There are three major problems here. First; the system allowed a non-existent MEL code to be entered on to the flight paperwork to legally release a flight. Second; the presence of this code; with no supplementary written information; lulled the dispatcher into a false sense security with regard to the status of the aircraft as revealed by his ignorance of what the issue actually was. Third; specific information regarding the slow deployment of the number 1 engine thrust reverser was either concealed or withheld from both the dispatcher and the flight crew by the use of this code. Exactly how this allows the dispatcher and crew to safely plan a flight in accordance with the FARs is an open question. It should not be necessary to telephone [Maintenance Control] and engage in a conversation to determine what the status of an aircraft actually is.Incidentally; this is the second time that I have been dispatched with a non-existent MEL code in the paperwork. The first was with a previously mentioned former company aircraft. The existence of the [previous company's code] appears to have created a situation whereby dispatchers have been lulled into accepting aircraft even though they are not actually aware of what the status of the aircraft is.




Synopsis: On a B737 the #1 Reverser was deferred but still useable with a code that was not recognized by the flight crew or dispatch.
Date: 201510
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After departure the right engine vibration gauge indicated in the amber band at 3.2. We ran the checklist for Engine Vibration in the QRH which directed us to turn off the autothrottles. After retarding the throttle the indication stayed within limits. The Captain and I both decided that it would not be smart to land at [destination] which is a shorter runway with mountainous terrain. We landed 2;000 lbs over max landing weight (201.0k) and ran the Overweight Landing checklist. We landed flaps 25 to a soft landing and did not touch the brakes until under 50kts. We taxied to the gate uneventfully.




Synopsis: A B757-200 First Officer reported they returned to their departure airport because of high right engine vibration indications.
Date: 201601
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The aircraft had an existing MEL for FLT DECK FUEL QTY R/H IND INOP. Complying with the requirements of the MEL; the fueler and contract MX personnel used the Fuel Measuring Sticks to determine the RH wing fuel quantity. The MX contractor believed that the outboard Fuel Measuring Stick was reading erroneously and deferred it as well (28-16B). The MEL allows it to be deferred if tank fuel quantity can be determined by Fuel Quantity Indicators (also MEL'd for the associated side) or by other acceptable means. Note: An operative dripstick within the same tank may be used.The guidance provided to the pilots within the MEL or Supplemental Procedures are vague as to the exact actions taken to ensure that 'correct fuel loading' has been achieved 'by acceptable means' for the flight crew to verify. The lack of guidance invites a false sense of security when a 'trained' non MX base contract mechanic says 'good to go.'Upon arrival to [the destination] and opening the main entry door; a FAA MX Inspector entered; identified himself and asked the CA a couple questions about the problem with the fuel system of the AC. The visit was short. It was followed by a MX Tech who was very quick to say that the contract MX at the departure airport cut corners and deviated from proper procedure in determining the correct fuel load. He stated that the Aircraft should have been deplaned and the fuel transfer method should have been used. That was not done and although the flight crew was adequately confident that sufficient fuel was on board the aircraft and the MELs were complete and compliant; it is of concern to us that the proper method of determining fuel load was not done properly. There was no known fuel deficiency on the flight and the flight was completed with no other abnormalities.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported MEL fueling procedures at Contract Maintenance location may have countered company policy.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B717 (Formerly MD-95)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Observer; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Declared Emergency; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We experienced a compressor stall at 120 KTS and V1 was 136. We heard a loud bang and the airplane veered hard to left. I initiated an abort and we were informed that there was a large flame that shot out the left engine. We informed ATC of our abort and to roll the crash/fire/rescue. We pulled the aircraft onto taxiway and requested the hot brake area and they said that we were fine where we are. I made a passenger announcement and talked to flight attendants.  Fire trucks checked the aircraft and everything looked alright. After we contacted Operations and Maintenance we had fire trucks follow us to gate. Informed ground crew that the right brakes where overheating and to remain clear. I talked to Maintenance and we proceeded to get a new aircraft and continue with our flight.This is my logbook write up. On dept roll at 120 KTS V1. We heard loud pop and aircraft veered to left. We aborted the takeoff; 'LVL 2 LEFT COMPRESSOR STALL' alert displayed. Aircraft behind us reported flames out left engine. Abort was normal and fire trucks as precaution. Power loss on left engine notable. Right side brakes at time of abort 420/440!




Synopsis: A B717 left engine compressor stalled at about 120 KTS on takeoff so a high speed reject was completed; and the aircraft returned to the gate accompanied by Airport Rescue and Fire.
Date: 201709
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Near midair [with] a small drone flying one block east of the hospital.  Our aircraft was on initial climb out at approximately 65 knots and was climbing from helipad to 2200 MSL.  Elevation [at] time of near miss was probably 100-150 feet above helipad which is approximately 1250 MSL.  The primary departure path from this helipad is standardized due to close noise sensitive areas and must be protected from drone activities and intrusions due to high flight volume around the hospital. We had to look up through the rotors to keep it in sight as it passed directly over the aircraft by about 25-50 feet.  We saw it at the last second and had no time to react.  Ground all private drones. They are going to cause a mishap with a manned aircraft; the regulations for their operation do not provide helicopters with a margin of safety that is acceptable to flight crews who cannot see them because they are too small.  The drones also do not have lights or markings that aid in their visual acquisition.  They also do not register on TCAS or other radar systems. Alternately; 'no drone' fly zones within 1 NM of all hospital helipads.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV shortly after takeoff from a hospital.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OME.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZAN
ATC / advisory: Center ZAN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On a routine IFR flight to OME in [an aircraft] with no auto-pilot I was given a clearance to begin an initial descent from 10;000 to 7000 ft.  Somewhere in the descent I fell asleep and upon waking found our altitude was descending through 5;000.  We were in VMC at the time; but within a few miles of a mountain ridge line obscured in an overcast layer.  That same mountain ridge line caused us to lose radar contact and radio communications with Anchorage Center (normal for that route).  An immediate maximum performance climb was initiated to return to 7;000 ft.  Several minutes later radio communications were re-established and the captain reported level 7;000.  I believe the primary cause was crew fatigue.  The captain had just returned to station late the previous night following a 16 hour commute and was noticeably fatigued prior to the flight. As first officer; I had flown five of the previous seven days right to duty day maximums and was also feeling fatigued.  Our crew rest facilities are located on the airport; and a [Large Transport aircraft] came in next door around XA:00 that morning interrupting sleep for both pilots.




Synopsis: Cargo aircraft First Officer reported descending below cleared altitude in mountainous Alaska terrain; when he fell asleep; following a very fatiguing series of flight assignments.