elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: As First Officer I received the CPDLC and programmed the FMC; the clearance came with a change to 'load new route.' At the bottom of this note; I failed to notice 'Climb via SID; except maintain 4;000 feet.' I too quickly went to the page with the new route and the 'load new route.' This page said 'Fly the CONLE 3 RNAV.' After inspecting the departure; I put 13;000 feet in the altitude window; as the hold-down altitude for the SID; having failed to notice the 'except maintain 4;000 feet' back on page one of the CDPLC. Too often now; we receive a 'load new route' clearance when it is the exact same route as is filed. Then the new route and old cleared route are on two separate pages of the CPDLC. I think this can cause confusion and omissions. I have also found when selecting the 'load new route' selection; it often drops out any loaded SID; and the corresponding legs on the SID. This is often unnecessary because the routes are exactly the same. This unnecessary step can lead to errors in lateral track and altitude deviations if they go unnoticed. I realize the importance of thoroughly reviewing all of the pages of the CPDLC and reviewing the loaded route.Additionally; when checking on with Departure the first time; I said we were climbing on the SID to 13;000 feet; since we were not yet in VNAV; and had not reached ZZZZZ. The Controller at that time did not alert us to the fact that we should remain at 4;000 feet. The next controller was the one that asked us how we were cleared; and that we should have remained at 4;000 feet. He noted that many aircraft are missing this and that it was not a big deal at this time. It seems these clearances are confusing or easily missed.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported the format of the CDPLC clearance was not confirmed by the pilots and failed to maintain 4;000 feet per the clearance.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Descending to 14;000 feet; with Center. Lost F-PLN on FMS. Notified Center of loss of navigation capability and asked for radar vectors. I was unable to restore any navigation capability on the Captain MCDU. Transferred aircraft control to me. First Officer was unable to restore any navigation capability on the First Officer MCDU. Advised Approach Control. Approach provided radar vectors to final for the ILS. Manually tuned and identified the ILS. I flew ILS approach to a normal landing. FMS system failure.




Synopsis: A330 Captain reported experiencing a dual MCDU failure during descent for landing and requested vectors to the ILS from ATC.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ORD
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While boarding and loading baggage; the ramp agent came up to the flight deck with completed load report and Notification to Captain form. The ramp agent stated we had 24 LBS of dry ice in the forward cargo compartment as indicated on the load report as 24 LBS CTC (Counter to Counter). I questioned this statement and asked what the total weight of the cargo was. During this time; gate checked bags were added and the load report had to be amended. The ramp agent appeared to be confused from my question and stated we had a total of 24 LBS of cargo in the forward compartment. The amended cargo report came back to the flight deck with no changes to cargo load and it had 22 checked bags and 4 gate checked bags. At this time I went down to the ramp to get clarification on the loading. The forward compartment door was closed and ready for departure. I asked to see the package with dry ice in it. It was at this time I noticed there were two boxes loaded in the forward compartment. I again questioned their load report and the ramp agents said 'oh you know what you're right. We'll fix it.' The ramp agent came back up to the flight deck with completed load report and no changes were made. For a third time I questioned the load report and the two boxes. The agent explained that the second box was accounted for as checked luggage. I assumed that the box was a passengers and the weight and dimensions of the box were at or under 30 LBS. While in ORD; as I looked into the forward cargo compartment; the cargo net was down and I did not get a good look at the two boxes. When we arrived I decided to walk out and check the cargo load coming off the plane. When I did this I noticed the cargo boxes were marked cargo. I asked ramp agents how many bags they unloaded and they responded with 26. So it is my understanding we had 26 bags on board; 24 LBS of dry ice in a box and another box labeled 85 LBS. The box labeled 85 LBS was apparently not accounted for in the load report. After repeated attempts to discover the correct load of the aircraft; ORD ramp agents were unable to provide me with a correct report.




Synopsis: EMB175 Captain reports receiving an inaccurate load close out from a Ramp Agent; even when the Agent is directly questioned about an extra box in the forward cargo compartment. The box is described as gate checked baggage and not included in the weight and balance. It was actually 85 pounds of cargo.
Date: 201211
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On climb out; left wing body overheat light illuminated. Ran checklist in QRH. Attempted consult with Dispatch and was told to standby; also contacted Local Maintenance airborne. Decided to return to airport for further aircraft evaluation and more fuel. Unable to continue to destination safely at FL250 with fuel on board. Did not require declaring an emergency.




Synopsis: B737 Captain experienced a 'left wing body overheat' light during climb. After complying with QRH procedures it was decided to return to the departure airport.
Date: 201907
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft; found IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) oil level not even on the site glass; I serviced IDG to full. This is a trip going on a flight to ZZZ. If this IDG failed the flight crew would have to run the APU; if APU failed; the last thing is the other engine to support the electric.




Synopsis: Maintenance Technician reported that Integrated Drive Generator oil level was very low.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 12
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Aircraft component: Air/Ground Communication
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Wind calm/variable at 04 knots according to ASOS. I approached ZZZ from 10 miles to the north. Started making radio calls on UNICOM [CTAF] that I would use Runway 14. No other calls heard. I entered downwind for 14 on a 45. Made call. Turned base. Made call. Final. Made call.Saw no other aircraft. Landed 14. Upon landing; saw other aircraft coming towards me on the runway. Other aircraft just landed opposite direction 32. I called 'Do you see me?' on [CTAF]. No response.Other aircraft made 1st turnoff; so did I; without incident. After both aircraft stopped; other operator approached me and said he had heard no calls at all on his 'old radio.' Said he had heard ASOS but not anyone in pattern. Apologized to me as he assumes his radio was at fault.




Synopsis: C182 pilot reported an opposite direction ground conflict on landing at a non-towered airport.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: After engine start; we noticed a mechanical problem that necessitated a return to the blocks. After coordinating with Ramp; we taxied back to the blocks. Immediately upon setting the parking brake; maintenance personnel approached the aircraft with stairs to board before either engine has been shut down. We shut down the engines; and before we could complete our checklists; the mechanics were already in the cockpit asking questions about the mechanical issue. Even at idle thrust these engines are dangerous and there was no need for ground crew to be approaching an aircraft before the flight crew has had an opportunity to shut down the engines. Two of them were wearing hats which could have easily been sucked into the operating engine; but their proximity to the engine could have had a much more devastating result.When we spoke to the crew and asked why they felt so hurried to approach the airplane; they told us that they weren't sure if we were going to shut down the engines and that they remained outside the yellow lines. If an aircraft returns to the blocks; there is no need to have Maintenance approach to board before engines have been shut down. While I understand that a mechanical delay can elicit a hurried response to get the aircraft in the air; there is no need to rush. Hasty reactions are very dangerous. Furthermore; it takes just a few minutes to shut down the engines and [to] allow the flight crew to finish their shutdown checklists. These 2 or 3 minutes are minimal to the often hour or so delay caused by a block turn back. As such; nothing can be gained by adding such unnecessary risk to the aircraft; or worse; to ground personnel. In such cases I believe it is imperative that before approaching any aircraft with the intent to board; and getting near an engine; that ground crew allows the flight crew time to perform their shutdown procedure and any necessary checklist(s).




Synopsis: B767 First Officer reported Maintenance dangerously approaching the aircraft before the engines were shutdown.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Contract Maintenance was in cockpit [neither] unsupervised nor observed by any crew member. We were both in operations flight planning return leg. Disregarding normal safety practices; Contract Maintenance did not ensure flight controls were safe to move prior to actuating. Consequently; aircraft was seriously damaged and refueling personnel nearly injured when contract maintenance moved flap lever with fuel truck connected.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer reports flap damage caused by Contract Maintenance when the flaps are extended at the gate with a fuel truck parked under the wing.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SJC.Tower, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: Tower SJC
Second aircraft: Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Four departures were waiting and one arrival. I departed a PC12 IFR from Runway 30R; departed a Bonanza from Runway 30L; then crossed a King Air waiting for IFR release to hold between the runways to get a Cirrus VFR departure airborne. I told the Citation on final one VFR departure prior to their arrival and cleared [the citation] to land. I cleared [the Cirrus] for departure 'no delay' traffic on 1.5 mile final. [The Cirrus] responded with we have the traffic in sight and cleared for takeoff. I advised [the Cirrus] to expect an offset as soon as airborne. When I turned to radar identify [the bonanza] on the upwind it had a wrong squawk code. As I verified the squawk code [the citation] said there's an aircraft on the runway. I gave instructions to start a climb go around or change to Runway 30R. The Cirrus took his time for departure roll.I should be more cautious with unfamiliar call signs and the moment the aircraft sounded unsure with the read back it was best to cancel take off clearance.




Synopsis: SJC Tower Controller reported being distracted by an incorrect beacon code. The reporter failed to notice an aircraft on the runway with landing traffic on short final.
Date: 202011
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I cannot count how many times recently the pilots are not wearing masks. I was sitting up front for my flight to ZZZ when the flight deck came out of cockpit to find a seat. No one wearing a mask. One was but around his chin.  I moved to a different Zone.  Then additional pilots came on; no masks. It's either our policy or not. I do not feel it is my place as a FA to point this out to pilots.  I know quite a few crews are getting sick. It makes me very uneasy to fly in these conditions.  I have family members I return home to.  This is not limited to pilots even though it's very prevalent.  Some FAs will also take off masks when passengers leave. It is alarming and I feel a very unsafe workplace. We can't have 1/2 the workforce adhering to a serious policy regarding a pandemic and 1/2 not. The precautions such as masks are only effective if there is 100% compliance.  I do not want to wear a mask for hours; sometimes 20+; but I do.  [Cause is a] total disregard for policy and others safety. Safety and security is either important to the company or not. My suggestion would be a no exceptions policy or we will continue to see a rise in sick flight crews.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported concerns over pilots and flight attendants not adhering to company face mask policy.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The seat belt sign remained on for more of the flight; as we were experiencing on and off light chop throughout the flight.  I could feel that we had started our descent.  I had begun normal landing duties (tidying up the galley and general duties).  I did hear the slats come down; however I just thought we were trying to slow down as little.  Next thing I hear is the gear come down.  I had been trying to look out and see how high we were; however I was unable to due to the visibility outside.  As soon as I heard the gear drop I called the flight deck and advised them that the cabin was NO WHERE near secure for landing; as no information was given to the flight attendants.  Also once I called the flight deck; then did the sterile light come on.  I advised them; we had kids standing up; bags out; people out of their seatbelts; and again that the cabin was not secure.  I was asked by the flight deck if we needed to go around; I stated 'YES'.  I was then asked; can you just sit down for landing.  I said UMMMMM yup and hung up the phone!  I made a PA; Flight attendant be seated for landing.  I secured the galley as fast as I could.  And sat in my jump seat; as did the B Flight Attendant.  No final descent announcement was given at all; as there was just not time.  We landed and taxied to the gate with no incident.  After landing; the Captain apologized to me many times.  He stated that they were extremely busy with weather and trying to figure out if we were going to divert to our [alternate].  At the very last minute; the weather improved and they shot the approach and forgot all about us in the back.Flight deck does get busy at times; however they cannot lose sight of what is going on in the back of the aircraft.  We should have gone around and made sure our passengers were safe and secure; even if that meant we had to divert to our [alternate] if the condition had deteriorated.




Synopsis: An ERJ-175 Flight Attendant reported they landed before the cabin was safe and ready because the flight crew rushed due to weather concerns.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While performing the anti-ice duct inspection on the Number 1 engine on Aircraft X; I was told by the Shift Supervisor that; 'It does not look good for the station when you write so many items on the aircraft when the aircraft was just here [at ZZZ] for the past two days.'The event occurred because the Supervisor did not like that I had found so many discrepancies on the Number 1 engine; my only heavy jet experience is on the A320 fleet doing heavy maintenance. The items that I wrote up would have been written up at any MRO (Maintenance; Repair; Overhaul) that did/does 12 day C checks on these aircraft.I do not accept being pressured by supervision to not document discrepancies with an aircraft; whether minor or major. The notion that preserving a station's reputation has priority over aircraft safety represents an egregious safety concern. Please leave the employees on the floor to do their job; with no interruptions; the inspection process requires concentration and attention to detail.




Synopsis: Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported being pressured by his Supervisor not to write-up discrepancies found during aircraft inspection.