Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Handoff / Assist; Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was standing behind the adjacent sector (R68) in my capacity as supervisor. I observed conflict alert initiate on R67.  I investigated and observed a 5 mile hoop around one of the aircraft and observed that less than standard separation was being provided.  It appeared vectors had been issued because both aircraft appeared to be in slight turns.  Aircraft X was descending southbound from FL400 to FL340 to comply with the SOP for traffic landing at his airport.  Aircraft Y was in level flight at FL370.  Aircraft X descended through the altitude of Aircraft Y.  I was not advised of any TCAS RA.The sector was busy with high volume.  The sector was restricted with a lot of Warning airspace released to the military. Additionally; weather in some other sectors had caused traffic to be rerouted into this sector.  It was not unusually busy.  I believe this was the CPC's (Certified Professional Controller) first session of the day. A Radar Associate (D-Side) was assigned. He said he was unaware that a suspected loss had happened.  One reason being; the radar controllers map and target settings were to dim for him to see the scope clearly.A lowering of the Sector MAP [Monitor Alert Parameter] numbers when warning airspace is released.  When a sector is basically cut in half with most of the airspace released to the military; the MAP numbers should reflect that.  This would trigger TMU to initiate procedures that would reduce the traffic volume in an airspace restricted sector.


Second narrative: I was the D-side at Hunter and it was somewhat busy.  Aircraft X came over at a very high altitude around FL430 or something.  We eventually have to get that aircraft to FL340. The radar controller waited a little too long to descend him in my opinion and then Aircraft Y showed up at FL370 going northbound opposite direction of Aircraft X. The radar controller descended Aircraft X to FL340 from FL400.  About 20 seconds later the conflict alert went off.  The R-side turned Aircraft Y 15 degrees right; northbound.  Then a little later turned Aircraft X 15 degrees right; southbound.  I thought that this would be enough divergence to maintain standard separation; but apparently not because they were like 4.2 miles or so.  The R-side uses a very small data block (it could be the smallest setting).  I could not clearly read the data blocks even moving very close to the scope.  Also; it was even more difficult to see the actual target of the aircraft.  The supervisor told me that there was a deal; is how I found out. Somebody could get the R-side to make his data blocks bigger so the D-side can read them more clearly; but maybe the R-side is not comfortable with that for his vision.  The R-side should have stopped Aircraft X at FL380 and then on the other side descend him to FL340 and just point out the aircraft to the next high sector descending.


Synopsis: Front Line Manager reports of a loss of separation due to an aircraft descending through another aircraft's altitude. The D-Side was unaware of the loss of separation; due to the R-Side's dimly lit map and targets. The reporter also suggests the Monitor Alert Parameters MAP be lowered when military airspace is given away.