Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Aircraft: MD-88
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E AUS
ATC / advisory: TRACON AUS
Second aircraft: Rockwell Aero Commander Twin Turboprop Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Second reporter function: Departure; Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I witnessed a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) today due to a Controller not ensuring separation; and also due to a misapplication of Visual Separation. The RADAR East (RE) Controller had a Commander flying north-south circuits taking pictures. A MD88 departed AUS; was turned east; and was issued a climb to 12;000. At some point RE issued traffic to the Commander on the MD88; and then instructed the Commander to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. The aircraft were wired on intersecting courses. The MD88 was beneath the Commander and climbing above the Commander. The Conflict Alert (CA) went off. I started to say something; but heard RE acknowledging the RA from the MD88. When the CA sounded; and I noticed this event; the aircraft were at the same altitude with less than 1/2 mile lateral separation. It appeared that the Commander took evasive action in order to 'maintain visual separation' from the MD88. This event was logged as a 'Q' entry; but I informed management that this was a NMAC that should get a little more scrutiny. This is a common practice at AUS: 1) turn aircraft right at each other; 2) issue the low aircraft an altitude that is above the level aircraft; 3) issue the slow; level; and least maneuverable aircraft traffic and 'maintain visual separation'; and 4) this essentially requires the aircraft to take evasive action to avoid the climbing Air Carrier. I have provided previous examples of this; but I have yet to see any action taken at the local level regarding the misapplication of Visual Separation or the absence of ensured separation 'before and after' the application of Visual Separation. I wonder what the airlines would think about this situation. Or the passengers that were aboard the MD88 this morning? Why are we (the FAA) allowing Controllers to play Russian Roulette with aircraft full of passengers? Recommendation; enforce the proper use and application of Visual Separation. Ensure separation before and after the use of Visual Separation. Quit training new employees the technique that was witnessed this morning.


Second narrative: While working RADAR West; I heard the Conflict Alert sound and looked over at the RADAR East airspace and witnessed two aircraft merge at similar altitudes 5 NM southwest of the Austin Bergstrom Airport. After which; I heard the RADAR East Controller tell the FLM that he just had a TCAS RA with this NMAC event. Recommendation; use of Vectors to ensure separation of all aircraft when altitude is not a viable option would have saved the day here instead of TCAS. All too often I see controllers here at AUS bet on separation instead of insuring separation of aircraft. Yes; we have to use our best judgment; but turning the MD88 into known traffic was inexcusable. Either use altitude or Vectors; but always insure separation.


Synopsis: AUS Controllers provided a witness account of a NMAC noting 'visual separation' procedures used by some controllers at the facility are misapplied; creating a safety situation.