elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201306
Location: HOG.Airport, HI
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E HCF
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF; Tower OGG
Second aircraft: Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was westbound at 3;500 FT over the town of Makawao 10 miles east of Kahului Airport speaking with HCF Approach. I requested a direct transition to Waikapu Valley from my current position; and was granted the transition.  HCF advised of two aircraft inbound for landing to Kahului over Maalaea shoreline.  I responded that I had both targets and maintaining visual.  Over the town of Waikapu; just south of the Tropical Plantation at 2;500 FT; 80 KTS; HCF advised there was a Stationair doing aerial survey five miles off my three o'clock and turning. (HCF did not say which direction they were turning.)  I acknowledged and was cleared to switch radio frequencies to common.  At this point I was just west and outside the 5 mile ring of Kahului's airspace.  Approximately 10 seconds later I looked right and saw the Stationair off my right door 50 feet below me and 50 feet to the right of me closing southbound.  I immediately climbed 100 FT to avoid any collision.  I switched back to HCF to see if the Stationair had me in sight and they replied that the Stationair was talking to Kahului Tower.  I asked Kahului Tower if the Stationair had me in sight and the pilot of the Stationair replied; 'No I didn't and that was close!'  There was no response from Kahului Tower.  I switched back to common and continued my flight. I later found out that the Tower had transmission problems telling the Stationair of my location; so he was unaware of my proximity.  The pilot of the Stationair advised the Tower that their transmissions were garbled.The Tower should have tried harder to contact the Stationair and advise him to climb or descend and advise him of conflicting traffic.  HCF should have held on to me until I had traffic in sight and advised me he was one mile away versus five miles away.  Both the Stationair pilot and myself should have been more diligent in seeing and avoiding.




Synopsis: General aviation pilot describes the circumstances leading up to a NMAC five miles west of PHOG at 2;500 feet.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MSLP.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class A MHTG
ATC / advisory: TRACON MHTG
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing El Salvador on the JIBOA 3. ATC cleared us to maintain 8;000 by 10 DME. This restriction is not on the departure. With the language barrier I understood that he wanted us to maintain 8;000 until 10 DME. Expect FL380. After 10 DME. This was my first time into El Salvador. Neither the Check Airman nor I caught the ATC assigned restriction. I was informed of this error today; [many days later;] by the check airman. This was after his third trip in three days with three different pilots both First Officers and Captains.This clearly needs to be put on the F4 messages or somewhere on the 10-7 pages alerting pilots that ATC will assign a restriction that is not part of the published SID.




Synopsis: The crew misunderstood an ATC clearance on the MSLP JIBOA 3 departure which resulted in an altitude crossing restriction not being met.
Date: 201905
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When signing into the aircraft; [we] noticed a faint odor on the aircraft. None of us thought much of it. As the flight progressed; I felt I smelled the odor still. None of the crew thought it was anything but galley smells. I was feeling a little off; but felt it was from coffee on an empty stomach. Talked to the crew and one Flight Attendant said she felt the same but also drank a lot of coffee on an all-night duty period. On arrival into ZZZ; the smell became very strong. The flight attendants also chimed us reporting the odor with passengers commenting on it. We donned our O2 masks and ran the QRC. We were basically on top of the airport; so decided to just continue and not complicate our workload with priority handling unless it looked like we weren't getting in immediately. We were already turning base; so workload was already high. On the ground; we asked for expedited handling and an immediate gate assignment. None of the passengers complained of symptoms and they departed the aircraft. None of the crew noted symptoms on the ground. Called Medical as a precaution and was cleared to go home. Procedures need to be developed to prevent these odor/fumes events.


Second narrative: On approach into ZZZ; a very strong odor of 'dirty socks' normally associated with atomized oil in the bleed air system entered the flight deck and cabin. We received a call from the flight attendants about it and subsequently donned our oxygen masks and accomplished the items on the Quick Action Card. I performed a normal landing and the aircraft was taxied to the gate without further incident. The Captain called Maintenance; made an entry into the AML and filled out report.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported a persistent mild odor during flight which intensified on arrival.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ambulance
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A Medevac aircraft was flying; initially on a direct route; level at 21;000 feet. Because of weather along the route of flight; the Radar controller rerouted Aircraft X direct [to destination]. I called the TRACON at least 15 minutes prior to the aircraft estimated at the TRACON boundary to coordinate this priority routing at 16;000 feet. The controller denied my request without stating a reason or issuing an alternative (such as a higher altitude for possible traffic or a request for control). After a pause; I asked for a suggestion as to how to get the Medevac routing to [their destination]. The controller's response was to take the aircraft north or south over the arrival routing; which we were forced to do.We turned the aircraft to the northeast and issued the STAR. This routing added many miles and several minutes to the aircraft's flight. As Aircraft X approached our boundary with Denver Approach; only one aircraft departed out the west departure gate. Only one aircraft could have been a factor with the inbound medevac.Denying some sort of priority to a medevac flight is inconceivable! Especially in an instance of extremely low traffic flow and complexity. Every single controller at the TRACON should be capable of providing priority services and separation to aircraft requesting it; especially when it could involve someone's health. My recommendation is that the controllers at the TRACON be held accountable for their actions or inactions. Rerouting a Medevac as in this instance (and this is certainly not the first time this has occurred) does not meet our requirement of expeditious handling of aircraft.A possible tool to prevent unnecessary rerouting of Medevac aircraft would be to add/change the Letter Of Agreement with Denver Approach. Medevac flights and other aircraft requesting priority (such as emergencies) should not need TRACON approval; but coordinated in advance. If the receiving controller cannot take an aircraft on requested routing; then an alternate routing or altitude should be suggested/coordinated/assigned that does not take the aircraft on an extreme course change away from their destination airport.




Synopsis: ZDV Controller reported the D01 TRACON Controller would not allow an expedited routing for a Medevac Lifeguard aircraft.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About 3 hours before landing business class Flight Attendants (FA) reported a strong chemical/electrical odor in their cabin. I was Inflight Purser; [and] I walked back on aircraft left and confirmed odor. Cockpit was immediately notified. Extinguishers were made ready; power ports were shut off. Business class lights were turned on to see smoke. No smoke was detected. Pilots turned off recirc fans and this seemed to help reduce the smell. About 20 min later a passenger seated behind business class center bulkhead reported that area around him was very hot. As we searched we found the low center wall of bulkhead very hot to the touch. Magazines were removed from rack and we looked behind business class center seats. We saw no smoke; no immediate odor; however observed a vent system behind the dog houses in front of center bulkhead behind business class; forward of seat. FAs were instructed to turn off the power to the VCC video system. After we did this the area got cooler and we kept both power ports and video system off for remainder off flight. PA informing the passengers was made by me and I assured them that every precaution was being taken to ensure their safety. Cockpit was continually appraised. Approximately 30 min before landing the strong odor returned; this time we could smell it in First class and cockpit as well. The cockpit turned off the gasper fans.We landed without incident. I remained on board and stayed and explained all the events in detail to the mechanics who met the flight. I was informed we had lithium ion batteries in cargo. The cause of strong electrical burning odor was never found; no emergency equipment was used and no one reported any injury to me. I ended up with a strong migraine post trip. Crew did everything to ensure safety and we remained vigilant through flight. Continual checks throughout area was maintained by entire crew.




Synopsis: B777 Flight Attendant reported a strong electrical/chemical odor in the cabin. The cause was never determined; but reporter was advised of the presence of lithium ion batteries in the cargo compartment.
Date: 201704
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I; the Ramp Lead Outage Relief Employee; was working my pm shift. I was assigned to work on Gate XX. I had an arrival flight at XA:05. Upon marshalling in aircraft it was parked on wrong stop mark. E170/75W at the time chocks were placed on stop mark pre-arrival and were over E170 part only /75W was visible on the ground. I marshaled aircraft in and parked it on that stop and chocked it. Continued to proceed with aircraft download. Aircraft was being serviced when I realized there was an alternate dashed stop line on the gate painted with markings 57-2/2W/3/3W. Immediately notified supervisor on duty and halted the download on aircraft; took a belt loader and parked it behind the aircraft so it would divert traffic around aircraft since it was on the wrong stop mark and sticking out over clearance zone into ramp ally. We then removed all equipment and the Move Team came to reposition the aircraft on the correct stop line. As far as I have ever known a dashed lead in line is for wide body aircraft and solid lead in lines are for narrow body aircraft. I was unaware that here in EWR we have a few exception gates where dashed lead in lines are for 757 aircraft only. I did not receive a safety briefing at the start of my shift.




Synopsis: An EWR Ramp Agent became confused by the various gate lead-in and stop taxi parking spots and parked an E170 on an incorrect stop line outside the clearance zone.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZMA.ARTCC, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZMA
ATC / advisory: Center ZMA
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cleared to takeoff VRB; climb maintain 2000; heading 090??. We climbed out as directed. During our climb; ATC allowed us to climb a few miles off shore at a low altitude. To us; this put us beyond our power off gliding distance to the shore. We then tried to contact tower and request a better heading towards the shore and advise him that we were not equipped to be this far out. He ignored our request and in fact gave us a heading of 100??. This heading put us even further off shore. He then notified us that we were in violation and gave us a number to call Miami Center upon landing. After we complied with his new instructions; now even further beyond what I was comfortable with; approach then gave us a heading of 180?? and an altitude of 4;000. I then made one final attempt to request a better heading to bring us closer to shore; which was denied. Upon that request; the controller informed us that we were well within gliding distance to the shore. The problem with this is the shore was a crowded beach. This was not a suitable landing point. So; although he may have believed we were within gliding distance of the land; we were not within gliding distance of a suitable landing point that would guarantee no harm to any civilian on the ground. This often is the departure procedure out of this airport and I always have to request a different vector; which is often denied until I am well out of my range of gliding distance to a suitable landing spot. A Cessna should not be multiple miles off shore without the proper flotation equipment. I was trying to follow one regulation and it led to the violation of another. As the final authority to the safety of the flight; I believed I was doing the right thing. This departure procedure should be tailored to different category of aircraft. Single engine aircraft have no business being vectored multiple miles out over the Atlantic Ocean without the proper equipment.




Synopsis: A C172 Flight Instructor laments being vectored too far off shore by VRB tower without over water equipment. The reporter does not see a crowded public beach as a suitable landing point but ATC does not see it this way.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dash 8-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were given our load sheet by the ramp crew and nothing looked out of the ordinary. They had amended an original count of 22 bags in R1 to 24 in R1 and it was correctly crossed out with a single line and initialed by the ramp agent. Due to VHF NO COM the captain had to call for numbers. The performance solution came back with a valid solution and we departed.While in cruise we got an ACARS message from Dispatch that we had been given a false load report and we had 22 bags in R1 that were not reflected on our load sheet. We asked dispatch to rerun our takeoff numbers with the correct number of bags and it turned out that we had departed out of CG to the rear and would have needed to move 100lbs to F1 to be within CG. We did have a uniformed jumpseater from another carrier who had come up to the flight deck prior to departure. He believed he was going to be up front so we had verified his status and checked his required documents to occupy the jumpseat. The captain asked Dispatch to rerun the numbers with the jumpseater in the flight deck jumpseat instead of the cabin and that put us in CG. As we had verified his status the captain asked him to occupy the jumpseat for landing. We landed without incident.Possible solution: An automated system which links the bags scanned by the ramp with the hand reader to the ACARS system or to Dispatch.


Second narrative: We were 660 pounds off in our calculations. The result was an aft CG out of limits. However moving a jumpseater who was riding in the back of the airplane to the jumpseat up front had resulted in a CG within limits.


Synopsis: While in cruise flight; DHC8-400 flight crew received word from Dispatch that they had departed with an incorrect load report and that the correct load would have put the aircraft out of CG limits for takeoff. However; the revised load report did not reflect an occupied jumpseat which had put the aircraft within CG.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working arrival/final radar.  Aircraft X was turned to the airport and cleared for a visual approach to Runway XX right about 6 miles south of the field and switched to the local controller.  Aircraft Y was turned about 3 miles west of Aircraft X on a base for Runway XX Left.  Aircraft Y advised the field in sight and was turned on a heading to join and cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX Left.  Shortly after I observed Aircraft X going through the Runway XX Right final approach course and encroaching on Aircraft Y.  Local then called and told me that Aircraft X said he was cleared for the visual approach to Runway XX Left.  After reviewing the tapes Aircraft X was cleared for visual approach to Runway XX Right and read it back.  However when Aircraft X originally checked on he was told to expect Runway XX Left.I would probably have to say that expectation both on my part and the pilots part led to the event.  The pilot expected the left runway because that's what he was told when checking in.  I expected him to fly the visual approach for the right runway because that's what he was cleared for and what he read back.  Not sure that I have any recommendations other than to be more aware and expect the aircraft to do what you think they won't do.




Synopsis: An aircraft checked on frequency and was told to expect the left runway. When the aircraft reported the airport in sight the Controller cleared the aircraft for a visual approach to the right runway. The aircraft read back the clearance that he was cleared for the right runway. The aircraft intercepted the left runway final approach course. The aircraft thought they were cleared for an approach to the left runway. There was traffic slightly ahead lined up for Left Runway.