elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Flight was scheduled to depart on time but ended up being late. As stated in previous write-ups; the aircraft's APU was placarded inoperative due to random non-commanded shutdowns. The parts for repair were ordered. I lost count but either four or five air start carts were brought to the airplane for engine start. Some could not be started and others ran for short periods of time then ceased operating. What I was told was all available air start carts at the airport were now inoperative because of fuel freezing. Unless something else was done the flight probably would have cancelled.I thought I would ask maintenance if a mechanic would come to the airplane for a supervised start of the APU long enough to get an engine running. The mechanic who placarded the APU on the overnight thought it would be okay. He ran the APU for about two hours during overnight maintenance before it shut itself down. He came to the airplane to supervise the start. Thanks to maintenance the engine was started and we went on our way. What I learned later through the flight department and through legal advice from the pilots union that what we did was wrong. We operated the APU while on placard. Both departments highly suggested that a report be filed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew elected to start a placarded component; the APU; in order to start engines. All available ground carts were inoperative due to extreme cold weather.
Date: 201401
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [We] received erroneous takeoff configuration warning when thrust levers advanced for takeoff. Immediately discontinued takeoff at approximately 30 KIAS and taxied clear of runway. Configuration appeared correct - flaps set at 1; LED's set for takeoff; stab trim set at 6.06; speed brake lever down; parking brake off. [We] recycled flap lever; speed brake lever; and trim. Visually inspected spoiler position to confirm spoilers stowed. Momentarily advanced thrust levers to ensure takeoff configuration horn and lights indicating proper configuration. Received no further warnings and all indications were normal during second takeoff attempt.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reports a low speed reject for a takeoff warning horn. All inputs to the takeoff warning system are checked and cycled and no anomalies are noted. The second takeoff attempt is successful.
Date: 201511
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: BDL.TRACON, CT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E BDL
ATC / advisory: TRACON BDL
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cruising at 10;000 feet 12 NM north northeast of the Putnam (PUT) VOR my FO was exposed twice to a laser illumination on the starboard side of the aircraft and cockpit. The two successions happened at a 30 second interval. He had the intuition to not look directly at the beam; however he had mild spotting in both eyes that went away within 5-10 minutes of exposure. There were no injuries on board. Reported incident to Bradley TRACON.




Synopsis: The flight crew of a corporate aircraft were exposed to laser illumination several times during cruise flight. One crew member experienced minor side effects that dissipated within 10 minutes. Event was reported to ATC.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was assigned to work the Local Control positions combined. We had been briefed earlier with regards to new nationally imposed midnight shift procedures. We were not in midnight shift procedures. Ground Control and Clearance Delivery/Flight Data positions were combined with CIC. After approximately an hour; it was determined by projected traffic count that we were in a period of significantly reduced traffic and the decision was made to combine most positions to avoid frequency changes and improve service. As I recall; I was mainly working arrivals and there was no need to change frequencies in order to provide a safe and efficient service. Ground Control 4 position remained open the entire time. The midnight shift controllers arrived at the appropriate time and the positions were transferred in accordance with the new imposed procedures. I was informed that a meeting was scheduled in order to discuss the non-adherence to new nationally imposed procedures for midnight shift procedures. This meeting was cancelled; however I was informed that I would not be allowed to work anymore midnight shifts or be assigned CIC. I recommend that if the FAA requires strict compliance to a national directive that they need to be more clear on their requirements and that the briefings be more comprehensive and concise. I also think that if the agencies intention is to maintain two controllers in the operation at all times; they need to authorize increased staffing at all facilities and assign more controllers on the midnight shifts.




Synopsis: Denver Tower Controller reported the facility has not been in compliance with the new nationally imposed midnight shift procedures.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: I flew with a First Officer who could not use the cellular service on his iPad to download the flight plan; weather; and etc.; before his flight. WiFi was not available in the terminal. I tried to upload my information to him via Bluetooth but that did not work either. His iPad was not recognized by my iPad. The following day; he called the iPad help desk. They told him that he had gone over his monthly allotment of cellular megabits and that his iPad was locked out. His request to unlock it was denied. He was instructed to get a loaner iPad for his next sequence and was informed that he would have to wait until the new cycle starts before his iPad would be unlocked again for cellular service. He was able to download everything on one of our legs because the terminal had a WiFi service; but on other legs I was the only one to download flight information.I don't agree with the company's decision to just lock up an iPad. This is an important tool for our flight planning. Somebody artificially decided what our monthly cellular allotment is. We often don't have a choice and have to use cellular service to download everything. I personally am close to exceeding my own allotment because in the last two weeks I have flown four trips. I suggest that the company increases our cellular allotment or gives us some extra megabits when approaching a limit. Just taking away the only device we have in the middle of a trip is unsafe. The company is not giving us enough cellular allocation. Many airports don't have WiFi available. [I suggest] increasing the cellular allocation.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported the Company iPads are at times unable to obtain flight plans and weather information because the allocated data plan had been exceeded.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B LAX
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was the Captain (Pilot Monitoring) during an arrival to SNA. We were flying the OHSEA2 arrival. We had descended to 5;000 feet to meet a crossing restriction. We were at 250 knots and I thought it was a good time to slow; since we had a level portion of the arrival. At this time; ATC radioed the instruction; 'Slow to 200 knots; you are below the Class Bravo.' We complied immediately; but it seems we should have already been at 200 knots. There is no depiction of the Class B on the arrival chart; nor is there a speed restriction depicted; as there were further up on the chart. We were over open water and on an IFR arrival designed for Turbojet aircraft. My personal solution going forward was to mark my chart with the 200 knot restriction and make sure I program it in the FMS that way as well as to pay more attention to other arrivals when operating at airports in the vicinity of [the] larger; Class B airport. While it looks like the waypoint LAXBB may be named to indicate that airspace; it is not noted as such on the chart. Furthermore; there is no published speed restriction at LAXBB; and I believe this would be a good charted solution to alleviate the threat for all pilots.


Second narrative: Cleared to descend via the OHSEA 2 RNAV STAR landing 20R into SNA. After leveling at 5000 feet in between LAXBB and KLEVR ATC instructed us to 'maintain 200 knots beneath the Bravo'.  Our speed at the time was 250 knots. The Class Bravo is not depicted on the OHSEA 2.  Depicting the Class Bravo or mandating a 200 knot speed limit at LAXBB would be helpful for situational awareness.


Synopsis: EMB-175 flight crew reported exceeding 200 kts below LAX Class B airspace while flying the OHSEA2 RNAV arrival into SNA.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 2
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: PA-60 700P
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ; Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autopilot
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Had a problem with my autopilot; received a warning from ATC and the tower and I ended up significantly below the glide slope on my first approach before I made appropriate corrections. I did a go around and completed the second approach manually without incident.I will be working with an avionics expert to determine the cause. In the future I need to be more diligent monitoring the autopilot activity and monitoring the glideslope and making faster manual corrections as needed.




Synopsis: The pilot of a Piper Aerostar reported an autopilot problem on approach that resulted in a descent below the glideslope before receiving an alert by ATC.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Conducting RNAV visual approaches; a large air carrier aircraft was cleared for the RNAV Visual Runway 26R. That aircraft turned early off the approach on top of company aircraft. I turned the first large aircraft away from the finals; the aircraft came close to other aircraft on the [Runway] 27L final. This incident caused me great stress and emotional trauma when this happened; I did the best I could to resolve the pilot error. I told Supervisor I did not want to do those RNAV visual approaches and he commanded that I shall use them. I asked to be removed from position; and another Controller offered to get me out. I left the facility shortly thereafter; administrative leave. I don't know why this keeps happening; this is a known issue with the larger aircraft; and this was at least my 4th time this similar incident has happened. This I was not able to save the error from happening this time.I fear the continuing of these approaches; will lead to a significant event were possible life will be lost; and I want nothing to do with them. Let the air carrier go perfect them at a slow airport; and bring them here. I hope this never happens to me again; the next time could end my career.




Synopsis: An A80 Controller reported the RNAV 26R Visual is dangerous because flight crews do not fly it properly and he feels great stress and emotional trauma while working the RNAV because of the inflight conflicts which develop.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Check Pilot; Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was conducting an SIC (Second in Command) checkride. We had just executed a missed approach out of ZZZ off the VOR-A. As we were climbing northwesterly on the missed; we got a TA for traffic at about our 2 to 3 o'clock. They were slightly above our altitude and began turning to the north as we leveled off and began heading more westerly. As we were visually searching for that traffic; we got another TA for traffic slightly below us and at 12 o'clock. We began to climb in order to climb above their altitude and continued our turn towards the west/south. I was unsure of their direction of flight and it ended up being southwesterly. We got to within 300 feet of vertical separation at the closest. Between the missed approach and the initial traffic; we were caught off guard by the second traffic alert. My suggestions is once traffic is in sight; ensure one pilot is monitoring that traffic; while the other monitors the instruments (and other traffic displays).




Synopsis: PC-12 pilot conducting a checkride reported a NMAC while executing a published missed approach. They received  a TCAS/TA for an undentified VFR aircraft; leveled off; then had to respond to a TCAS/RA for another unidentified VFR aircraft.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JAC.Airport, WY
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D JAC
ATC / advisory: Tower JAC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Landing at JAC; cleared for VOR RWY 1 approach. Dispatch had us tankering fuel so we were heavier than need be. We looked at the landing data and determined if the runway was dry we could take up to a 5 knot tailwind. If it was wet we could accept no tailwind. Our plan was to fly the approach and depending on the wind either land on RWY 1 or circle to 19. Ceiling was 6;000 overcast. On Tower we twice asked for wind updates and each time were told the winds were calm. We elected to land on RWY 1 which was dry. When we asked if the PAPI was out; we were told they leave it off during day/VMC. The Captain did a nice job; although the VVI was around 1;000 FPM through most of the approach which we attributed to high altitude and heavy weight. We stopped uneventfully. On turning off the runway we saw the 10 knot wind socks were fully straight with at least a steady state 10 knot tailwind.Between tankering fuel; lack of PAPI and the Tower not reporting the actual winds (they stayed pretty steady) we felt like we had several links in a potential accident chain in place against us.Tankering fuel into high altitude; short runways; might not be wise. Tower not reporting accurate winds could have caused a problem.




Synopsis: A large passenger jet flight crew dispatched with tankered fuel to JAC was rightfully concerned about runway length (6;300 feet); field elevation (6;431 feet); ATC's SOP of not operating the PAPI during daylight/VMC; landing gross weight and wind direction.  Following a safe landing they were shocked to see the wind socks indicating at least a 10 knot tailwind although; when winds were requested during the approach; Tower had replied; 'Calm.'