Date: 201705
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B PCT; Special Use DCSFRA
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Just after takeoff from runway 01 in DCA the aircraft entered into prohibited airspace P-56A and P-56B. It was a fairly quick turn in DCA that required the flight crew to start the engines at the gate with the jet bridge still attached for external power. Because this was the Captain's leg to fly he gave the briefing on our departure from DCA. In his brief he gave specific instructions on the complex engine failure procedure that accompanied runway 01. In these instructions it states that DCA 0.4 DME is the decision point for how the flight crew should react to an engine failure just after takeoff. In order to identify the 0.4 DME the Captain decided to takeoff with green needles on his side so that he could identify the turning point; should it be necessary. The first officer stayed in white needles because the flight crew was planning on an RNAV departure procedure. The flight crew also discussed the proximity of the prohibited airspace to the northeast of the field and noted that the main goal of the complex engine failure procedure and the RNAV departure procedure was to avoid this airspace. Just prior to push back the flight crew was advised by ground control that they were to contact clearance for a full reroute; this was the start of a series of events that began to increase the flight crew's work load. The flight crew decided that they should proceed with the engine start process at the gate so that the ground crew could disconnect the jet bridge while they talked with clearance. A new routing was given and it included a new RNAV departure procedure; the Captain loaded the new route and briefed on the differences. The push began then normal procedures and checklists were accomplished. Taxiing out to runway 01 was fairly simple; upon reaching the runway we were number 1 for departure after what turned out to be two arrivals. Takeoff clearance was received with some hesitation due to the tower giving the wrong call sign. Just after takeoff the Captain calls for gear up; speed mode; NAV mode which was briefed. Just after the first officer executed these commands tower gave the switch to contact Potomac departure. During this time the first officer first noticed that something was wrong with the flight director's instructions and noticed that it was not making the turn that the SID required. After checking in with departure the first officer noticed that the Captain was off course and tried to bring his attention to how close they were getting to the prohibited airspace by questioning 'what is the FMS doing?' hoping that that this would make him realize he was not on the right heading. Then tried to further warn and remind the Captain that they cannot go any further to the right. The first officer pointed to the left but incorrectly said 'we need to go to the right'. The Captain acknowledged and corrected by saying 'left'. The departure controller called inquiring about the flight crews efforts to get back on course and the first officer replied 'we are turning now'. The Captain was just starting to realize why he was off course and started asking for heading mode in order to get flight director guidance back to the SID. Once in heading mode the plane began to fly on the correct direction but due to the multiple turns in the SID the plane went across course while the crew was working to get the FMS programmed appropriately and to get back to NAV mode on the FCP. Finally once NAV mode was selected and the FMS1 was armed and captured the plane was turning back on the routing of the SID then the Captain called for autopilot on and the first officer got back to finishing the after takeoff procedure/checklist. Then the crew was notified via ATC on the deviation from course.


Second narrative: During the preflight setup and briefing; I failed to completely brief the required comments for departing from Runway 1 in DCA via the BOOCK2 RNAV departure. As a consequence; I inadvertently set up the NAV source selector for my side with DCA VOR as the source; to identify 0.4 DME; in case of engine failure. The First Officer (FO); as Pilot Monitoring (PM); was in white needles with FMS as the NAV source. I briefed the FO that we would do the RNAV departure; but did not catch that I had erroneously requested the exact opposite setup that we would need for the Captain (CA) as Pilot Flying (PF) and FO as PM for the Runway 1 departure. Due to the improper setup; I was in green needles without the proper heading selected. On takeoff I called for gear up; speed mode and NAV mode for the departure on schedule. The auto-pilot was not engaged; as it is my normal preference to hand fly departures. Shortly after reaching 400 feet; knowing we should be in a left turn; I initiated a turn to the northwest but realized that we were late for the turn; as we were beyond the middle of the Potomac. It was shortly after this that we both realized that the flight director was not giving us the desired course information. Although we initiated the turn to the northwest; it was not to a heading that would get us back on course in an expedited manner. We entered the clouds between 800 and 1400 feet and I lost visual contact with the ground. We were both attempting to identify the error and make the correction to the NAV setup; but our track was still not on course. I made an additional turn to the left. ATC queried us to determine if we were making corrections to the left to resume the departure. We were doing so; and replied in the affirmative. Shortly thereafter; we identified the error and immediately corrected the NAV source selection; ensured that the FCP was in NAV mode; selected the next fix on the departure; COVTO; and went direct to it. As we were by now nearly south of the departure course; this was the quickest route to resume the departure. We rejoined the departure and continued per normal. A few minutes later; ATC provided a telephone number to us and requested we make a call to TRACON. When my post flight duties were complete; I contacted the TRACON and it was from them that I learned we had penetrated the prohibited areas; both P56A and P56B. This was completely unintentional on our part; and resulted from an oversight on my part during the preflight portion of the flight and the improper setup of the navigation source for the CA as PF. This could have been prevented by exercising more vigilance when briefing procedure pages in the 10-7; thus following SOP; and more vigilance to the NAV source selections. I will take further precautions in the future; to ensure that this NEVER happens again. I will be sure to continue the pursuit of the methodical and thorough adherence to SOP procedures; best practices and techniques that has been my goal from the beginning of my career.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported entering prohibited airspace on departure from DCA due to an improper instrument set up prior to departure. ATC corrected the flight's assigned heading.