elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While in cruise; at FL380; flight attendants in the rear of the aircraft called to report a burning smell; haze; and eye and throat irritation. Flight attendants thoroughly searched the area but were unable to determine the source. No indications of smoke or fire appeared on cockpit displays. The flight attendants shut off the In Flight Entertainment [IFE] system and we selected the utility busses off; but these actions had no effect on the smell or haze.Due to the uncertainty of the situation we elected to divert to a land at a nearby airport. We declared an emergency and landed uneventfully. The aircraft was not overweight. ARFF looked the aircraft over with thermal imaging after landing and continued to investigate after parking at the gate. No evidence of fire or source of smoke were found. The passengers were deplaned via jetbridge through the 1L door and cargo doors were opened after deplaning.




Synopsis: When the aft flight attendants reported haze and smoke and a source could not be determined the Captain of a B767-300ER elected to divert to a nearby suitable airport. No source or evidence of fire was immediately determined.
Date: 201902
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: TRACON L30
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were on the SITEE3 arrival into LAS. The ATIS was advertising ILS 26L and RNAV Visual 19R approaches. Because of our direction of arrival we had set up for and briefed the ILS 26R. Just prior to WYYNN; Approach advised us we would be doing the RNAV visual 19R. This required changing runways very quickly as the arrival also changes shortly after WYYNN. We were able to do this; but Approach Control then refused to clear us for the approach until we called the airport in sight. We had been very busy setting up for the new approach and had not had time to visually acquire the airport. This caused a delay in beginning our descent. Compounding this; LAS is only visible at night as a dark spot near lights and while it is possible to see the airport; Runway 19R does not come into view until short final.We were able to successfully fly the approach and make a safe landing; but this practice is far from safe.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported receiving a late runway/arrival change and increased workload associated with making the necessary FMS changes resulting in a late descent.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: UT25.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Called airport upon departure from ZZZ. Winds were said to be calm. Flight was direct to UT25. On final approach it was very bumpy and as I flared and touched down the wind changed from the right and picked up that wing. I lowered the right wing and aligned to the center line and touched down again. As I set down I was pushed left again and the left wheel hit a tumbleweed in the sand and right wheel touched down in the soft sand. I applied right rudder to get back on the runway and then the soft sand grabbed the wheel and pulled me hard left. At that point all I could do is keep straight as possible and brake to a stop in the sand and tumbleweeds.




Synopsis: Solo pilot reported encountering windshear during landing flare which caused the aircraft to departed the runway surface.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: Tower PDX
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Safety Concern: FAA/NGA A/FD guidance for PDX states that 'Rwy 21 clsd to Height Group IV acraft with cockpit to wheel height greater than 22'.' According to the PDX Airfield Manager's Office representative who is knowledgeable of the restriction; this is due to the VGSI settings not compliant with Height Group 4 setting parameters. According to the representative; this restriction has been in place for at least 20 years. This is a safety related restriction. In addition; it is enforceable on pilots. This restriction is not communicated to aircrews through any current commercial chart products and Height Group IV aircraft databases both contain the LOC21 approach procedure; which could lead crews to think the approach and runway are legal to use. Recommendations: 1. Include a note to this effect in flight paperwork for any Height Group IV aircraft flights into PDX and the surrounding airports (in case of alternate/diversion) 2. Request commercial chart provider AND FAA/NGA to publish this restriction on the LOC21 procedure itself; in the Notes section. The IAP is the best place to publish this because it is usually the first and then the last document a crew will study and utilize when preparing for arrival and executing an approach/landing. 3. Coordinate with commercial chart provider to annotate this restriction. 4. Remove the LOC21 procedure from all applicable aircraft types' GPS database.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported aircraft in Height Group IV (B757 and larger) with a cockpit to nose wheel height 22' or greater are prohibited from landing on PDX Runway 21 because the VGSI angle and runway end location are not compliant with FAA Flight Standards guidelines for aircraft in Group IV.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Gate Agent / CSR
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Object
Detector: Person Gate Agent / CSR
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Contributing factors: Airport; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: I was assigned International Gate from XA:30-XH:00. After I finished the flight departure; and checked the computer; I had a new assignment. I acknowledged my assignment knowing that I was not being provided much time to travel between the gate breakroom and the scheduled arriving gate. I made my way to the gate and was positioned on the jetbridge as the aircraft arrived.  After aircraft was blocked in and Ramp Servicemen (RSM) gave me the Nose to door signal to approach aircraft.I drove B jetbridge to try to meet L1 door; but Jetbridge limit alarm sounded; and ramp agent asked me to stop. I went down onto the envelope to look at what the RSM was stopping me for.  I saw that the B and A bridge were close to each other but still enough apart for a person to walk in between approx. 3 ft apart.  I could not see where any contact had been made between the two bridges. RSM guided me back to the stow box; prior to moving the bridge again I contacted Zone 5 and verified what the correct aircraft was to be met for this 767 aircraft. After 2 or 3 minutes I was told 2L. I then approached the 2L door and completed meeting and deplaning the passengers. Supervisor came to me and said something was damaged.


Second narrative: There is a consistent problem when widebodies come into this international gate. There are 2 jet bridges in order to use both L1 and L2 doors to deplane and board passengers. The jet bridge for L1 is a fixed bridge; therefore no steering is available.If the aircraft is stopped and parked where the front wheel sits on towards the front part of the yellow paint touching the front black stripe; it is actually a mispark. It is a mispark because it is more than 1 ft too far and the jet bridge for the L1 door will not fit properly; therefore L1 cannot be opened. The jet bridge for L2 is a regular apron or drivable bridge; therefore; any sight modification can be done with steering that bridge. Since steering is not an option for the front jet bridge; no modifications can be done if the captain does not stop on time or if the ramp guide does not indicate to the captain to stop on the correct spot. So since the L1 door cannot be used to deplane; it also cannot be used to board an aircraft. By only boarding through 1 door on a full widebody; we take a delay with boarding.


Synopsis: A Gate Agent and a Marshaller described problems with a fixed jet bridge at one of their international gates. At the forward edge of the painted marking for the nose gear; the bridge will not mate properly with the L1 door and only the steerable jet bridge can be used and connected to the L2 door.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: AUS.Tower, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Lost visual contact with runway and; at same time; got a GPWS Warning. Did a go-around and landing uneventfully on the other runway.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reported they received a GPWS warning on approach to ELP.
Date: 202107
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Other Post departure
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Airways bill]- This appears to have initially been captured and processed properly and witnessed by two Managers; but at some point the DG information disappeared from [loading software]. This led to this shipment not being on the workbench and was not manifested out on flight XXX/XXJUL21. The manifesting agent placed the shipment in the [Airline] outbound area where a ramp runner came and picked it up and was loaded on to the flight. This shipment was never properly manifested out and the information was not sent to the flight deck. [Report] was opened for this issue.




Synopsis: Air Carrier cargo personnel reported undocumented transport of Hazmat cargo.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: FDR Maintenance
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other After Departure
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Manuals; Aircraft
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) 31-41-00-815; Figure 103 (Sheet 5 and 6); FIM Blocks -9 and -11. Blocks -9 and -11 both reference Block-10; which does not exist on the applicable FIM. FIM is for post Service Bulletin (SB) 767-31-0098 aircraft. FIM is missing a Block number-10; or the blocks are misnumbered. ETOPS Pre-departure Check; re-reviewing FIM after departure. [Recommend] contacting Boeing to determine what is wrong with the FIM Block numbering or if a Block is missing.




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports their Boeing Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) Chapter 31-41-00-815; Figure 103; have Block item numbers -9 and -11 that reference a Block -10 that does not exists on the applicable FIM. The current FIM is for post Service Bulletin (SB) 767-32-0098.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: TRACON M98
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While being handed off from MSP Center to MSP Approach; both the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and I were fully planned; briefed and ready to shoot the ILS to 30L. We checked-in to Approach; where it's my understanding (Pilot Flying) that we were instructed to fly a vector and descend to 4;000 feet and expect the 30L approach. Upon checking onto the frequency I noticed that the frequency was completely saturated with traffic and the Controller sounded behind. After reaching 4;000 feet we were then instructed to fly another vector to intercept the 30R Localizer. At that moment we were only a few miles from the 30L Localizer in which changing runway assignment at that critical phase is challenging in itself with just a second or two to adjust;  but the PM accepted the clearance and changed the ILS frequency in both NAV radios.I thought this was not a good course of action in which I would have rejected the clearance to give us more time to change NAV frequencies and set the FMC up to properly fly the approach. As I started to fly the new vector I noticed that I couldn't arm the LOC on the MCP panel and tried to just fly by heading mode to get on the 30R Localizer. I instructed the PM to set up the FMC so I could arm the LOC.  At this point we flew through the LOC for 30R in which the Controller gave us a new heading and took us off the approach corridor completely for new sequencing. There was an error of communication between us; the Flight Crew; and ATC; with the proper runway assignment; and more critically; poor communication between the PM and Pilot Flying.




Synopsis: Air carrier copilot reported he flew through the localizer during a late runway change to an ILS to Runway 30R at MSP and was re-sequenced for the approach.
Date: 201812
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Luscombe Model 8/Luscombe 50
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While flying my Luscombe 8A it suffered minor damage to the gear and wing. I was getting use to flying the Luscombe with skis on snow/ice. While landing there was glare ice I did not account for and there was not enough runway remaining to slow down. There was also not enough runway remaining to safely do a go around. I attempted to make s-turns in an effort to slow the aircraft down before the end of the runway and in the process folded the right gear leg under the fuselage. This could have been avoided with a modification to the gear (ski strut); but the modification is not required and wasn't recommend while installing the skis. I came to a stop 20 feet from the end of the runway with the aircraft resting on the gear and right wing tip. Had I made the decision to go around I know there would not have been enough runway remaining for me to do it successfully. Had I continued straight I would have flipped the aircraft off of the end of the runway [where] there is a 20 foot drop off.




Synopsis: Luscombe pilot reported reactive maneuvering while landing with skis resulted in a damaged landing gear leg and ground strike.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Saab 340 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ; FSS ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was working sectors X/Y/XX at the time. The Saab was cleared for a VOR RWY approach to ZZZ. Soon ZZZ FSS called and said that the flight was on the missed approach and was coming back to my frequency. On contact I stated to the pilot to execute the published missed approach and when able say intentions. Soon after he stated that they wished to climb to 070 and divert direct to ZZZ1. I told the pilot to climb and maintain 040 in the hold; reaching 040 cleared direct ZZZ1 then climb and maintain 070. Pilot stated that he wanted direct at 070 again. I noticed that the pilot was not flying the published missed approach and headed towards higher terrain. I issued a low altitude alert and received no response from the aircraft. He soon turned towards ZZZ1 and planned the visual approach. About half way from ZZZ to ZZZ1 I asked the pilot if he would need any further assistance with me or ZZZ1 Tower. At that time he declared an emergency; stating low hydraulic pressure and was unsure if their braking was going to be able to work. Gear was locked [down with] three in the green. I did manual coordination with ZZZ1 Tower on all emergency information and intentions. Later they landed safely but were unable to taxi off the runway. If the pilot is unable to execute the published missed; they should tell the controller immediately. Then different instructions can be given to the pilot based on aircraft performance; emergency situation.




Synopsis: Assisted by approach control; a SAAB 340 experiencing hydraulic system problems conducted a flawed missed approach procedure at ZZZ and diverted to ZZZ1 where they landed safely but were unable to taxi off the runway.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Observer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I recently was informed about a trim runaway situation involving an ERJ170/175 after take-off from Atlanta. I worked briefly as a consultant to [Company] and manager doing reviews of the TTP [time-triggered protocol] Fly by Wire Flight Control FPGA [field-programmable gate array] and hardware. While there I observed that the Trim Control Unit used a Lattice FPGA which normally does not offer Single Event Upset Resistance unless specifically placed in the FPGA manually by the design engineer using one of the applicable techniques as outlined in the FPGA white papers on SEU [single-event upsets]. The TTP FPGA which [a co-worker] was in charge of used these and I and other consultants who had access to this FPGA code identified the SEU issues with the TTP FPGA; and people who followed me addressed some (or all) of the issues with the TTP ASIC [application-specific integrated circuit]. I did not have access to the Trim Control FPGA code. This trim circuit is common to the A220; ERJ170; ERJ175; ERJ195; C929; and possibly the MRJ-70 and MRJ-100 airliners. While a low probability; it is still possible that SEU toggling a bit in the Lattice Trim Control FPGA could result in a trim runaway situation on any of these airliners depending on if they all use identical trim control FPGA code.




Synopsis: Reporter with experience in flight control engineering and design reported a concern that trim runaway is possible in several aircraft types.