elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When I arrived on the flight deck at XB:20Z to operate flight xxx ZZZ-ZZZ1 I found the [Maintenance Release] waiting on the printer for me. I began to review the [Maintenance Release] and noticed valid the time of the [Maintenance Release] was XA:16Z. The inbound flight had written up the PA volume as being weak. My [Maintenance Release] stated that the IFE (Inflight Entertainment System) was re-booted and the technician signed off the PA as 'good to go'? I immediately contacted ZZZ hub maintenance and asked if my XA:16Z [Maintenance Release] was still valid. They checked and informed me that indeed it was the current and valid [Maintenance Release]. I then queried them as to how it was possible that a technician came onboard and rebooted the IFE and found it in good operable condition 50 minutes before the aircraft arrived on the gate?? Flight blocked in at XB:06Z and my [Maintenance Release] with an open inbound write up was supposedly resolved at XA:16Z. Obviously; the technician that signed off the write up never touched the airplane and the mechanic who signed off my airworthiness release never followed up with the vendor that signed it off or didn't notice that the inbound write up had been 'resolved' prior to the aircrafts' actual arrival on the gate.I place great trust in our maintenance chain of action and I was very disturbed by the fact that there was such a lack of follow through and lack of checks and double checks to ensure that my aircraft was legal to fly! This time thankfully it was a simple PA write up and not something more serious but; the fact remains that my aircraft was 'pencil whipped' and signed off to be legal without proper verification of the status of the aircraft as being airworthy by those who were responsible to do so.




Synopsis: B777 flight crew noted that the Maintenance Release was illegally signed off prior to aircraft arrival.
Date: 201910
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The flight attendants initially called and told the cockpit that all four flight attendants were getting dizzy and nauseous and one reported a tightness in her chest. We found out later that it was actually only three of them. I advised them to stop the service and; if they felt it would help; to go breathe oxygen in the back galley with the curtain closed. We were at FL350 and our cabin altitude was 7;000 ft. We descended to FL310 to lower the cabin to 5;000 ft. The descent made no difference. While we were doing this we contacted Dispatch and Med Link for assistance. The First Officer; off line jump seater and myself also all briefly donned our oxygen masks as a precaution but then just kept them ready in case we started to feel any symptoms as well. None of us did at all. We asked the flight attendants to discretely ask if the deadheading crew in the back noticed any symptoms. They did not. No passengers reported any symptoms either. Med Link offered for them to take either one Benedryl or one Ondansetron and to continue breathing oxygen. The flight attendants didn't want to take the medication. After breathing oxygen for a few minutes they felt they could finish the service and did so. I told them that they did not need to finish the service and that I was more concerned about them. I also offered to divert immediately if the flight attendants needed me to and they all denied the offer saying that it wouldn't be necessary. We landed uneventfully where we had paramedics; mechanics and inflight supervisors meet the airplane. The three flight attendants had their vitals checked and were all normal upon landing. We reported the airplane as completely normal from our perspective to maintenance and wrote up three oxygen bottles in the Maintenance Release. I stayed with the crew until all flight attendants were checked and then went to my next flight.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported that three of the four flight attendants inexplicably became ill during the flight.
Date: 201503
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This time of year; it is necessary to put covers of some sort over the potential points of entry into the tail rotor gearbox fairing in order to prevent birds from building nests in the tail rotor gearbox fairing or tail rotor drive shaft tunnel. After washing the aircraft; I placed a rag in the little hole on top of the tail rotor gearbox fairing and another on the right side where the drive shaft and linkage come out of the tail rotor gearbox. We received a dispatch from communications for a hospital transfer flight. During my walkaround; I failed to notice the rags in the tail rotor gearbox fairing.  I started the aircraft and while at idle; realized I had not removed the rags. I immediately shut down the aircraft.  After the rotors stopped; I proceeded to the tail rotor area and saw that the rags were still where they had been placed. I then removed them and inspected for damage. There was none; so I proceeded with the mission without further incident.I highly recommend that the company purchase safety orange tail rotor gearbox covers with a 'Remove before flight' streamer attached for  all rotary wing aircraft. Birds attempting to nest in the tail rotor gearbox is a constant problem during the spring through mid summer. To not cover the tail rotor gearbox makes nesting birds a certainty. They make remarkable progress in a very short period of time; necessitating having the mechanic remove the tail rotor gearbox cover to remove FOD producing material. This causes that could be avoided if we were equipped with proper covers.




Synopsis: AS-350 pilot reported advising his company of the need for covers for tail rotor components that birds often nest in.
Date: 201312
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DVT.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D DVT
ATC / advisory: Tower DVT
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [I] was cleared for GPS 25L approach into DVT. Approach was going smoothly. [I] was not able to get LPV on GPS. At the MDA I thought I saw the airport. I began to descend early. I then saw the correct lights 2 miles ahead. I was VFR at this time and remained so. [I was] still above the lower LPV minimums but below LNAV minimums for the approach. I really thought I was looking at the airport lights when I began to descend. Terrain was visible and well marked so I stayed where I was. I really wish I had a good answer for this. We just do not fly enough in actual IFR. I was much sharper under 121 flying than I am today. Two pilots would have helped although I know unrealistic for 99.9 percent of the flying that we do.




Synopsis: Air Taxi pilot reports flying the RNAV Runway 25L approach to DVT using LNAV minimums due to WAAS being unavailable for unknown reasons. The approach is continued below minimums when the runway is thought to be sighted; although this turns out to be incorrect and a normal landing ensues.
Date: 201304
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Human factors: Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our routing into DEN was filed on the PEEKK RNAV STAR via OURAY transition. Upon switching to ZDV (DEN Center); we were cleared onto the LDORA1 arrival. With some low level convective activity ahead on the arrival; we were expecting to ask for some slight deviations for weather. We switched to the next ZDV sector; and we were given a left turn heading 340 degrees for en route spacing. Several minutes later we were cleared to intercept the TELLR1 arrival. Shortly thereafter ZDV tells us: '...cleared to deviate up to 15 degrees either side of course; and descend via the TELLR1 arrival.' By this time we were both heads down for most of the descent reprogramming and verifying all the new route changes; as well as the new constraints. ZDV handed us off to DEN TRACON at FL250; and we were then issued to proceed direct POWDR direct DVV; and to descend and maintain 17;000. We were then cleared to deviate at our discretion for weather avoidance to DVV. Normal radar vectors and altitudes from the mid-teens to landing were then provided by TRACON. Also; we twice experienced airspeed anomalies during the managed descent. The FMGC and charted speeds were not being followed correctly by the airspeed tape. It was commanding 210 KTS instead of the required 250 and 280 KT speeds. We as the pilots had to manually select the correct speeds; and also use full speed brakes to meet required altitudes. This required the jet to be hand flown several times on the RNAV STAR just to be at the correct altitude and airspeed at several fixes. THIS IS NOT WORKING!




Synopsis: An A320 First Officer reported specific and generalized problems with respect to conducting RNAV STAR operations into DEN. His summation states: 'THIS IS NOT WORKING!'
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Weather elements / visibility: 6
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Other 107
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: UAS Operator
Reporter qualification: Other RPIC
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While flying my UAS along the shore. I experienced a near miss with a low flying aircraft. I was taking pictures of the surf and cliffs for my photography portfolio. I was flying a UAS. I launched from the parking area overlooking the beach; altitude about 71ft MSL. Visibility was reported as greater than 10 NM; winds less than 4 MPH. Although visibility along the beach was unlimited to the South; [it was] about .9 Miles to the North. I had completed filming and had instituted the automated Return-To-Home procedure. In this mode the aircraft climbs to its designated RTH altitude and autonomously flies back and lands at its launch or 'Home' point. Although on autopilot the aircraft still responds to the controls. At this point; I observed and heard an aircraft flying low (a little above the top of the bluff which at that point is 71ft MSL) along the beach that had come from the North around the point. My first reaction was to dive the drone and I started to descend but I realized that it was already above the level of the approaching aircraft so I reversed throttle and continued the climb to evade. The aircraft passed below the drone which was at about 244ft MSL altitude and between the drone and I. The aircraft was a low-wing; single-engine; monoplane; dark in color. The pilot gave no indication that he saw the UAS and continued flying South along the beach. Although the sectional charts list the Minimum Safe Altitude in the area at over 1;000 ft; aircraft sometimes fly along the beach because it is very scenic with the ocean view stretching out to the horizon. This also creates the illusion that other aircraft can be seen well in time to be avoided. But the coast is not a straight line and aircraft skimming the bluffs over the beach are masked by bluffs at points along the coast. In this case the bluff [at the] point only .9 mile away masked the aircraft from my view and vice versa and it was in my flight space with almost no time to react. Pilots should expect to encounter [UAS]. FAA should remind pilots that even if visibility is unlimited; small drones can only be seen at best a mile away and they should avoid tracing the beach contour even if visual flight rules allow it.




Synopsis: UAS Operator reported a NMAC with an unidentified small aircraft in VMC at low altitude over coastal bluffs.
Date: 201702
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I have noticed a trend where a significant percentage of copilots; and for some reason; more lately; will reach up and put their hand; palm open and up against the back of the throttles; following them up on the takeoff roll; then leaving them there as if they're protecting the throttles; as if they're flying a Convair.As you know; this is not a company procedure; and frankly; it doesn't accomplish anything.I have two concerns about this;1) It is a major distraction to the Captain when in that environment; where our attention should be focused entirely on the runway; traffic; aircraft control; etc.; a hand comes up out of nowhere near the engine start levers and throttles when it's not supposed to be there. It distracts me from what I need to be focused on.2) If the captain needs to abort; those throttles are going to come back fast and hard and one of two things will happen; either the First Officer's going to get a broken hand; broken fingers; or severed fingers; or the Captain already being distracted by the hand there is going to moderate the reject and potentially extend a high speed abort distance on the runway by trying to bring the throttles back gently. In my case I have to spend the energy and distraction to tell them to get their hands out of the way. This then distracts them as well.The 777 flight manual is very clear about whose hands should be on or near the throttles on the takeoff roll. An extra set of hands is clearly not our policy or procedure and does nothing but cause distraction and is a possible injury waiting to happen.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported he noticed a trend where copilots are placing their hand against the back of the throttles; when the only hand there should be the Captain's.
Date: 202010
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Gate agents used block seats [on this flight] for passenger. I was unable to sit in my assigned jumpseat due to gate agents selling seats.  We notified company and a Supervisor came down and talked to agents. The Supervisor then asked me; in front of the passengers; if I wanted to have a passenger taken off [the flight]. I was given the choices of Dead Head on the flight or sit in the jumpseat. I felt pressured to take a jumpseat; sharing with another Flight Attendant.A week later; I was notified that a crewmember working that flight had tested positive for COVID-19. I'm very upset that I was put in this position and put myself at risk. I still don't know if the Flight Attendant I sat next to on the jumpseat is the one who tested positive.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported feeling pressured to sit in a cabin jumpseat near passengers assigned to company blocked seats. Flight Attendant was later informed of exposure to COVID-19.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZOA
ATC / advisory: Center ZOA
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: [We were] level at FL330 eastbound on R578 between FAPIS and FOMAS when [we] encountered wake turbulence from a westbound aircraft at FL340. Westbound aircraft appeared to be directly on route while [we were] offset 1 NM right of course as per company policy. Turbulence was of moderate intensity and lasted approximately 30 seconds. Seat belt sign was off prior to the encounter and flight attendants were serving in the aisle. No passengers were injured but [one] flight attendant sustained bruises to her elbow and back.




Synopsis: B757 at FL330 eastbound encountered wake turbulence from westbound aircraft at FL340; resulting in minor injuries to a flight attendant.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: A340
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: TSA advised [airline] about a paint spray can in a checked in bag.




Synopsis: Airline Cargo Agent reported being advised by TSA of paint spray can in checked luggage.
Date: 201902
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: The recent change in the flight attendant assignments on the B767 has created an unsafe condition in the cabin. With the removal of the flight attendant in the B zone galley; there is no longer a crew member in position when the pilots need to utilize the restrooms at doors 2 left and right. In the past it was common practice to have a restroom locked off prior to the pilots walking through business class to use them; so that the pilots would not have to wait in line for a restroom. Now this is no longer possible which exposes the flight crew to possible unhappy passengers as we now need to cut in line in front of them. There is no longer an available cabin crew member being present in the immediate area in the event of a conflict or safety issue between pilot and passenger should one occur.Additionally; there is no longer a flight attendant in position to assist a pilot utilizing the crew rest facility at seat 7d should a safety issue occur. Passengers are now free to loiter in the b zone galley area; just steps away from the rest facility at seat 7d. This creates an unsafe condition in that the flight crew member sitting in seat 7D would have no warning or assistance against any unsavory passengers that are now free to assemble in the mid galley area to plan a hostile attack against them. As an LCA (Line Check Airman); I am constantly utilizing seat 6d for my crew rest due to double augmentation of the cockpit crew. This seat is easy to view from the mid galley area and would be easy to reach in less than a second should a hostile force decide to attack. Additionally; pilots are now completely alone while they use the restroom in that area; in the low light condition of cruise flight. Passengers from the aft cabin are already utilizing these restrooms unchallenged; posing and additional safety risk.Not to mention the reduction in service we now will offer to our Business customers; the people we need to please the most.A flight crew safety issue [has been created] on the B767 by removing a cabin crew member from this area; and this should be corrected immediately.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported company policy change that created an unsafe condition in the cabin and crew rest area.