elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: UAAA.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center UAAA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In Flight Planning noticed a more northerly (almost Polar) random route than normal. Upon crew change enroute as International Relief Officer (IRO); We began planning for radio comms; procedures and analyzing for upcoming route requirements from Russia to Destination [India]. After assessing our route which was more 'easterly' than normal; I realized we were flight planned over high terrain (mid 20's) with NO corresponding Terrain Critical Depressurization Procedures (TCDP) Procedure/Escape Procedure for that routing in the Operating Manual. I expected to be on our normal TCDP routing and pages for Terrain Crit.Notified Dispatch about an hour and a half prior to reaching that point as to my concern and that we did NOT and were not going to fly over high terrain on that particular routing Without TCDP Procedures in the event of an Emergency and requested Reroute over appropriate airways. Dispatch said he would check for TCDP Procedure on that filing and could find NO Escape/TCDP Procedure for what they had filed. We recommended reroute to Dispatch and worked on reroute with Dispatch and ATC over M875 with appropriate TCDP. In conclusion; I was surprised and concerned that [software] would plan a route over high terrain with NO TCDP/Escape Procedure. After we discovered this and called it to Dispatch's attention. Dispatch [re-filed] for both Flight who was on the same routing ahead of us.There should be Software or checks to preclude this type of filing by [computer software]/Dispatch on routing without appropriate TCDP Procedures.




Synopsis: A B777 crew enroute to Western Asia over an easterly routing; realized the high terrain beneath their route offered no emergency high terrain escape procedures. The dispatch software apparently contained no check for flight contingencies over high altitude terrain.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Air Carrier X was on the Portland River Departure which is a RADAR vectored SID. Air Carrier X was filed TIMEE.J15 which is a left turn out to join. DH8's are to be turned out of the departure corridor at 3;000 feet due to jet departure climbing out to 9;000 feet. I issued Air Carrier X a 'left turn to TIMEE to join J15' out of 4;000 feet because that is when the aircraft checked up on departure. I observed Air Carrier X start to make a right turn out into the north departure corridor I reissued the left turn to TIMEE and Air Carrier X seemed kind of confused and was out of around 7;000 feet. This is during our morning departure rush and I told PDX ATCT to 'hold departures' because Air Carrier X was having trouble navigated. The ATCT said that they had two jets to go and then departures would be held. I then told the ATCT to stop all departures at 6;000 feet due to the DH8D being now directly into the departure corridor opposite direction climbing out of 7;000 feet. This was a very unsafe situation for the ATCT to not hold departures when requested by the Departure Controller. There could have been an in flight emergency or another situation that was going on. The Departure controller is the IFR authority here at PDX. Air Carrier X finally went direct TIMEE and I was then able to resume normal departure operations. The ATCT needs to be aware that during certain situations outside their airspace sometimes aircraft need to be held on the ground. This needs to be reminded to them that this should be an immediate action and not when is convenient to them.




Synopsis: P80 Controller voiced concern regarding PDX Tower's failure to hold all departures when directed due to previous departures route/heading confusion.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Arrived at MIA and followed DGS to stop.  Before I could set the brakes and shut down engines; fwd cargo door was opened.  Noise and lights distracted me as I noticed the immediate danger of a cargo door open in front of a running engine.  We shut engines down quickly; and then I noticed jet had rolled fwd a couple feet.  Stopped jet; set brakes then.  This jet has a parking brake that requires an unusually hard pedal press to get the brake latch....some are like that. I called ops and reported to them the ramper's safety violation.  I would've gone down to ramp to talk to ramper; but that is not possible on an international arrival. Very unsafe; very distracting; especially during a critical phase when parking jet near buildings and equipment and workers.


Second narrative: Before the Captain set the parking brake and both engines still running; a ramper opened the cargo door. This distraction; warning lights; engines running; cargo door open diverted our attention for a moment and the aircraft rolled forward a foot or so past DGS stop lights.


Synopsis: B767 flight crew reported ground crew was active around the aircraft and had opened a cargo door before they set the brakes at the gate. Parking brake failed to set on the first try and the aircraft rolled a few feet past the stop point.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BTR.TRACON, LA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BTR
ATC / advisory: TRACON BTR
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: Approach; Departure; Trainee
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was approved for an opposite direction arrival to runway 22R.  He was cleared for the visual approach and switched to the tower at 12 miles out.  Aircraft Y was an IFR departure off of 4L.  The tower controller forgot to get a release for Aircraft Y and cleared it for takeoff with Aircraft X within 10 miles and called to let me know that they were turning the aircraft out towards his destination to the east.Recommend facility wide review of opposite direction procedures.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Baton Rouge TRACON controllers reported an unsafe operation relating to opposite direction operations.
Date: 201407
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Aircraft component: Cabin Crew Seat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight; Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I am very concerned to have discovered recently on multiple A319 aircraft with new slimline seating; that multiple jumpseats have been improperly installed at door 1L. Most recently on aircraft nose number X I found that both jumpseats [cushions] at 1L inboard and outboard were not fastened or bonded to the seat itself. Mechanics put 2 screws in each jumpseat to fasten the cushion to the seat but this still left extremely sharp edges around all sides of the seat which resulted in a minor cut to my finger but could do much worse if left unfixed. The jumpseats were properly fixed by bonding down all the edges at the next stop. I had 2 fears 1. This could potentially be extremely dangerous in an emergency or turbulence because one of our flight attendant brace positions is holding on to the jumpseat which could result in severe injury due to not being attached and/or sharp edges and 2) the fear that since both jumpseats on aircraft X were improperly installed that this issue could be more widespread than just this one aircraft. My second fear was realized when I showed up the next morning on aircraft nose number Y to find the exact same problem with jumpseat 1L inboard.




Synopsis: A319 Flight Attendant reports that new jumpseats being installed in her company aircraft do not have the cushions attached to the seat; exposing sharp edges that can cut fingers.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TUS.Airport, AZ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C TUS
ATC / advisory: Tower TUS
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arriving in TUS we were initially cleared the RNAV. We were then cleared for the visual approach to Runway 21. As we approached the airport we were notified of traffic at our Ten to Eleven O'clock. We had a visual on one of the aircraft and the tower gave us a no indication the traffic would be an issue as we were established on final. As we approached the tower gave us the go around command. The captain executed an immediate go around without delay. We were unaware that the go around was in reference to that traffic as it was not stated in the initial command. As we climbed on the go around to 7000 ft. The captain saw the aircraft that he a continuous visual on approaching under us and climbing into our path from his vantage point and at the same time we received an RA that commanded us to descend. We ignored this command because it would have descended us right into the path of the oncoming helicopter and maintained a visual separation.Runway construction at current airport and use of runway's conflicting procedures and practices at neighboring military base. Military controllers and pilots should be more aware of the procedures and how they can interfere with airports close proximity.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ-175 flight crew reported receiving a TCAS RA descend command towards traffic during an ATC directed go-around.
Date: 201402
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
Contributing factors: Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Comparing FDC NOTAMs between our Dispatch Monitor and WSI I found instances where NOTAMs were in our system but no longer valid in WSI. I also found instances where NOTAMs were in WSI that were missing in our system. Here are some examples found today. I had to manually delete the following NOTAMs that were no longer in WSI but still in our software: FDC 4/0889 CMH IAP PORT COLUMBUS INTL COLUMBUS OH. ILS OR LOC RWY 28L AMDT 29... ILS OR LOC RWY 28R AMDT 4... ILS OR LOC RWY 10L AMDT 19... ILS OR LOC RWY 10R AMDT 9A... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA APE VORTAC UNMONITORED. 1402210551-1408210551EST FDC 4/1011 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL KANSAS CITY MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 27 AMDT 3... MISSED APPROACH CLIMB TO 1600 THEN CLIMBING RIGHT TURN TO 4000 ON HEADING 330 AND RBA VOR/DME R-137 TO BOWLR INT/RBA 17.62 DME AND HOLD. TOP VORTAC OUT OF SERVICE. 1402211433-1408211433EST FDC 4/1006 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL KANSAS CITY MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 9 AMDT 14... RADAR REQUIRED FOR PROCEDURE ENTRY EXCEPT FOR AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH SUITABLE RNAV SYSTEM WITH GPS TOP VORTAC OUT OF SERVICE. I had to manually add this NOTAM that was in WSI but not in our system: FDC! FDC 4/0535 MCI IAP KANSAS CITY INTL; KANSAS CITY; MO. ILS OR LOC RWY 9; AMDT 14... ALTERNATE MINIMUMS NA; TOP VORTAC UNMONITORED.The automation that adds/deletes NOTAMs in our system does not seem to be working. To provide [relevant coverage] the system could be fixed or at the very least dispatchers could be notified that it is not working and a procedure put in place to make sure that the NOTAMs in our weather packet are complete and valid.




Synopsis: A Dispatcher advised that the commercial service providing flight planning services and/or flight crew tablet generated flight info frequently conflict with one another as to current FDC NOTAMs.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Turbo Commander 690 Series
Operator: Government
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Other Documentation
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While I was en route on an IFR flight plan; I was cleared for the visual approach to my destination from Center. I entered a left downwind for [the] runway and made a normal landing. During my taxi back down the runway; I noticed the taxi way was closed from the runway to the ramp. The barricades were about ten foot from the edge of the runway blocking the taxiway. I pulled up next to the barricades and shut down the aircraft. I was there to pick up a prisoner from the local Sheriff's Office. I pulled up the NOTAMS for the airport on my Ipad and found the airport to be closed. During my flight planning I do not remember looking at the NOTAMS for this airport. However; at no time did ATC ever advise me that the airport was closed and the runway was not properly marked for a closer. There were no X's or barricades at either end of the runway that would notate an airport closer. The runway was properly marked with; center lane markers; and thousand foot touch down area. I was also advised to expect the visual approach to [the] runway from ATC. The only indication that I had that the airport was closed were the barricades on the only taxiway; which I only noticed after landing.ATC did ask if I had the NOTAMS and weather; which I informed them that I did. They told me to report the field in sight and to expect the visual approach. Once I cancelled in the air; I was given my new squawk code for my flight to my next destination.I took off; and picked up my IFR clearance in the air; with the squawk code I was given prior to landing.




Synopsis: A pilot reported discovering after landing that the airport was closed. He acknowledged failing to read the airport NOTAMs and adding that the only visible barriers were from the runway to the taxiways. The runway had no X indicating closed.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The illumination of an amber warning light indicating a fault in the auto speedbrake system. Low speed rejected takeoff at approximately 55 KTS [when] I observed the amber 'speed brake do not arm' warning light illuminate. A low speed abort was initiated at approximately 60 KTS. The First Officer confirmed the warning light illumination. Passengers and crew were notified; relevant QRH checklist was completed; Dispatch and Maintenance were contacted. The 'auto speed brake' and 'speed brake load alleviation' systems were assigned MEL's. We then continued the flight.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reports an amber 'speed brake do not arm' warning light at 55 KTS and rejects the takeoff. Maintenance MEL's the 'auto speed brake' and 'speed brake load alleviation' systems and the flight departs.
Date: 201302
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We diverted due to loss of oil in the number two engine.




Synopsis: A B737 diverted due to loss of oil in the right engine.
Date: 201704
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 129
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Second aircraft: B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During ILS approach at JFK 31R runway with localizer and glideslope armed; landing was authorized by ATC as fourth behind B747 at 5 miles and requested hold 170 kts until ZULAB; immediately Flaps 10 were set and speed was reduced to hold distance [at] 5 [to] 7 miles; [wake] vortex turbulence was considered. Then at 2 miles prior to MALDE position; roll to the left side almost 35 degrees was induced by [wake] vortex turbulence; autopilot was disengaged and bank angle alarm was activated; the airplane had lost 200 ft. Immediately a recovery maneuver was [initiated]; [we were] able to reconfigure the localizer and intercept the glideslope at 2800 feet approximately 2 miles before ZULAB; proceeded to inform tower of what happened; [Tower] informed us to continue. The approach and landing phase was continued within established parameters.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to JFK about 5 miles in trail of a B747.