elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A CRJ2; filed BAE.EAU8.MSP; climbing to FL330 (my top altitude); requesting FL340. Traffic was two overflight aircraft; both at FL310 and both direct GRR; the second of which was the MD90. I gave the CRJ2 15 degrees left; entered it into the 4th line of the Data Block; and handed him off to HOR (Horicon Super Hi). I coordinated HOR's control leaving FL320 (although not on a recorded line; the sectors are adjacent) and transferred communications. Apparently after checking on with HOR the aircraft requested FL320 as I saw this altitude entered hard in the Data Block. The next time I looked the aircraft were coming together as the CRJ2 appeared to be back on course. I quickly advised the HOR Controller and very shortly thereafter the Conflict Alert went off. I turned the MD90 left to a 060 heading and it appeared that the HOR Controller also went left with the CRJ2; but I believe it was too late to avoid a loss of separation. My only recommendation would be to effect coordination on a recorded line; perhaps this might have helped in this event.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event noting some of the coordination relative to this incident was made without utilizing a recorded land line.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 3R7.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E LCH
ATC / advisory: TRACON LCH
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While flying the RNAV (GPS) Runway 8 at 3R7; we received a GPWS obstacle warning at approximately 600 FT. We executed a go-around and missed approach. Weather was right at minimums; so I was planning to get down to MDA ahead of vertical glidepath. Failed to notice the 720 FT crossing restriction at WEBAC; so if we had continued down to 500 FT; we would only have had a 152 FT clearance near a Tower located 3 miles from the runway. We shot another approach; but the weather prevented a landing. We diverted to our alternate. Autopilot was on; with vertical speed mode engaged when the event happened.To prevent this in the future I will plan a more careful review of the approach plate and will fly close to the generated VGP rather than using the 'dive and drive' technique.


Second narrative: With full automation engaged; we briefed and used Vertical Speed to 'dive and drive' down to the MDA of 465 FT. As we were leveling off at MDA we got an EGPWS 'caution obstacle' warning. The EGPWS didn't 'know' that we were leveling off; so it gave us the alert. We did get below the WEBAK altitude of 720 FT just prior to the fix by about 60-70 FT. A more thorough review of the approach chart [would have been advisable and we shouldn't have used the 'dive and drive' technique to get down to MDA.


Synopsis: When the two Captains of a Falcon failed to note the 720 MSL crossing restriction at WEBAC while conducting the RNAV (GPS) Runway 8 approach to 3R7 they descended too quickly and triggered an EGPWS warning. The performed a MAP and diverted to their alternate airport.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: BUR.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: Tower BUR
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: First Officer advised of possible bird sighting on approach. I searched and saw a black drone 'bobbing' up and down traveling northeast under our nose. Reports made to Tower.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported sighting a drone while on approach to Burbank airport.
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FLO.Airport, SC
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D FLO
ATC / advisory: Tower FLO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: FLO Airport; On approach to RWY 01; last 1/4 mile of approach. Tree tops VERY close to aircraft. Aircraft was exactly on PAPI vertical guidance indication. First time this happened a month ago; I thought it was my overactive imagination. A second approach to this runway a month later confirmed my perceptions that the trees have grown well into the approach path; and there is now little vertical clearance to spare. Airport management needs to investigate whether Part 139 clearance criteria are still are still being maintained for this runway.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain believes that the trees just south of Runway 01 at FLO have grown too tall and are interfering with a normal glide path to the runway.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Second aircraft: Gulfstream II (G1159)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working IADFC combined with IADFE and IADFW. Arrival aircraft CRJ-900 from BARIN in the scratchpad said Runway 19L so I planned for CRJ-900 to be number 1 for 19L. GLF2 was on a right base for Runway 19C. When I cleared CRJ-900 for the visual approach to Runway 19L; the pilot advised me that he was assigned Runway 19C which was conflicting with the scratch pad information. Since he was already on a base turn only about 6 miles out I did not want to change his runway to the runway that was indicated on his scratchpad and that I was vectoring for; so I amended his heading to pass behind GLF2 and turned the aircraft to a 170 degree heading to join the final for Runway 19C. He then saw the airfield and I proceeded to clear him for the approach. CRJ-900 saw GLF2 but I did not say 'maintain visual separation' because I thought I had enough divergence and I was gonna bring him through the localizer and bring CRJ-900 back around to give him plenty of room to follow GLF2. Since I did not say 'maintain visual separation'; I lost separation because I did not quite have 45 degrees opposite course divergence separation. Ensure scratch pad information matches with the runway you assign.  Possibly even restate the runway assignment when the aircraft checks in with the Final Approach Controller.




Synopsis: PCT Controller experienced a loss of separation event when failing to note the incorrect runway assignment scratchpad information in the data block.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HTS.TRACON, WV
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C HTS; Special Use MOA
ATC / advisory: TRACON HTS
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working North and South radar combined like always. I was informed by the PIKE sector that the Buckeye and Brush Creek MOAs would be active beginning at XA35Z. I informed the local controller; and adjusted the memory aid to reflect the MOA status. I normally also turn on the MOA map on the radar scope to give myself a more obvious reminder; but I failed to do so on this occasion. At about XA47Z; Aircraft X made an initial call requesting IFR to LEX at 040. I RADAR identified Aircraft X; and told the pilot to maintain VFR. I then pointed the aircraft out to the PIKE sector; who approved direct at 040. I then cleared Aircraft X direct to LEX at 040. I believe I had around 1.5 miles separation from the Brush Creek MOA at the closest point. I realized what I had done about 45 minutes later when PIKE sector called back to advise that the MOAs were going 'cold.'I failed to maintain my normal procedure of turning on the MOA map when they are active. In the future; I need to be more diligent in my own standard procedure to avoid a similar situation from occurring.




Synopsis: HTS TRACON Controller reported of an airspace violation with a VFR aircraft and a MOA. The aircraft came too close to the airspace. The Controller did not turn on the MOA display on the scope which is something he normally did. Controller believes this led to him forgetting the airspace was hot and the possible airspace violation.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Entered mid-field left downwind from the southeast for landing Runway 22.... After establishing left base leg I initiated the landing checklist configuring initial flaps; mixture; props; carb heat; fuel selector and checking master/ignition switches; but paused running the checklist when I noticed the runway lights were not illuminated. Although the runway was visible; it was the beginning of dusk and I turned my attention to activating the pilot controlled runway lights with 3 clicks on (radio frequency). After a couple unsuccessful attempts I turned my attention to finishing the base leg and accomplishing the turn on to final while scanning for traffic. Once on final I focused on scanning the airport environment for ground traffic and deer activity in vicinity of the runway/taxiways. I continued the approach and in the landing flair I sensed it was taking longer to touch down and the airplane was lower than I expected when I remembered not completing the portion of the landing checklist for gear and final flaps; but the airplane settled on to the runway before I could initiate a go-around.Factors contributing to the event:  Not completing the landing checklist once initiated; my normal flow  Being distracted by non-critical concerns.  Not Initiating the landing checklist before/or on the downwind leg; my normal flow; instead waiting until the base leg.  Not checking GUMPS on final; my normal flow.  Out-of-sequence/interruptions of normal flows.




Synopsis: C-182 Pilot interrupted the Landing checklist to turn on pilot-controlled runway lighting; scanned for ground traffic and deer activity; and touched down without extending the landing gear.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground FLL
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Runway 10R at FLL has unsafe airport lighting. The runway is a bridge.  This bridge has no red hazard lighting on the elevated edges of the bridge. There is nothing to warn you that you are on the edge.  The runway has a hole between the runway and taxiway; and there are no red hazard lights around this hole. Taxiway J9 has a sign that is too far away from the turn off from the runway. The sign is about 500 feet west of the turnoff. This sign leads you to believe that the turnoff is after the sign but this is not true.  The runway wall south of the H concourse is lit with blue taxiway lights. These light should be red to tell you that a hazard exists. The wall's red reflectors are not lights.  By the time your landing lights illuminate the reflectors it is too late.Please have the airport light the hazards on 10R with red lights; move the J9 sign and put red lights on the wall before someone gets hurt on this runway.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier Captain expressed specific concerns about the environment surrounding the new Runway 10R/28L at FLL which is significantly elevated in order to allow it to run over a freeway system at the east end. Of concern were insufficient lighting designating steep drop offs; mis-located turnoff signs; the failure to use red lighting to highlight threat areas; and the use of reflectors rather than red lighting as the reflectors are not illuminated by landing lights in a timely manner.
Date: 201712
Location: BOI.TRACON, ID
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E BOI
ATC / advisory: TRACON BOI
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the arrival phase into BZN at an ATC assigned altitude of 11;000 ft; we received a GPWS 'Pull-up' warning while in IMC conditions. I was the flying pilot; and we were on an ATC assigned vector. We complied with the GPWS recovery procedures of the SOP; climbed to approximately 12;000 ft; and reported the altitude deviation to ATC. The flight then continued to BZN without further incident.


Second narrative: Level at assigned altitude of 11000 ft we received a GPWS Terrain warning. We followed SOP escape maneuver and were quickly clear of the event. We were on RV (Radar Vectors) and level. I recommend ATC raise their MVA.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported a GPWS alert while in IMC conditions on radar vectors.
Date: 201505
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center SKED
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: Briefing student pilot on depressurization routes in South America; they brought an issue to my attention. The South America section of the flight manual still has old depressurization escape route pages. There are two concerns with these charts:1. These pages should be copied into the SKBO (Bogota) Jeppesen pages for quick reference for arrival and departure flights in and out of SKBO.2. There are 3 pages that describe the procedures in a different format that the other traditional escape route map formatted pages with text and map all on one page. Having to flip back and forth between a map and text page is unnecessary and burdensome; especially with an emergency requiring an escape route. These could be combined onto one single page that is formatted like all the other South America and Greenland terrain depressurization escape route pages.Bogota is challenging enough. Making the critical information easier to read and more accessible is essential to a safer operation.




Synopsis: B-767 Captain points out conflicting/out-of-date depressurization escape routes in the South America section of the flight manual.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ADW.Airport, MD
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Mission: Other Vehicle tour
Airspace: Class B DCA
ATC / advisory: Tower ADW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Local Control at Andrews Tower and also training a developmental. We received word from the Front Line Manager (FLM) in charge that there was a tour coming out on the airfield and they would need to get on the runway. When the 'tour' did proceed out onto the airfield that callsign was Airfield2 Plus 1. The plus 1 in the vehicle tour was a Motor coach. Airfield 2 plus the motor coach were instructed to hold short of RWY 19R which was the active runway at the time because of a helicopter inbound for a practice approach. The only other traffic inbound was still approx. 30 miles out. After the helicopter departed we had the Airfield 2 plus 1 proceed onto the active runway. They were on the runway for 6 minutes. Also; RWY 19R is the only runway at Andrews being used for fixed wing operations as the other runway (19L/1R) is restricted because of a sink hole that was discovered below the surface of that runway. The airfield vehicle and motor coach bus also only proceeded onto the active runway and drove down the runway full length; exited the departure end and then returned to their original station. The tour was coordinated only before it happened. I think we were all pretty shocked to see a motor coach as part of this tour and driving down an active runway.I do not feel in any way that Air Force personnel should make a request to put a bus with people on board onto an active runway. Especially; as it is the only runway that we can use. I felt the situation was not safe for public safety and whoever was on that bus nor for pilots using the runway.  I also was concerned about the fact that being as it is the only usable runway at Andrews; it is not worth the risk of something going mechanically wrong with that bus and having it possibly break down on the runway or be stuck out on the runway. I definitely recommend that this type of 'tour' never happen nor be approved again. There are times that I feel the Air Force approves tours and such things without completely thinking about the ramifications of these events. They also do not coordinate some of these events until the last minute.




Synopsis: An ADW Tower Controller reported something they had not seen before. The airport vehicle plus one wanted permission to enter the runway. Permission was granted. The plus one was a motor coach on a tour of the airport.