Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EDFH.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower EDFH
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In the myriad of distractions that accompany preparation for a flight we were afforded an additional one just prior to departure. My roles on this flight were as [a Check Airman conducting a line check] as well as the third required crewmember.About 40 minutes before departure time we got a Right Pack Temp EICAS message. The First Officer reached up and turned the pack off. I instructed him to get out the QRH and run through the correct procedure. He said that only applied in the air. I corrected him and we completed the procedure with no luck bringing the pack back online. We then called for the onboard mechanics that reset the pack in the E&E bay but it tripped again. They spent the next 20 to 30 minutes trouble shooting the problem. Because of the ensuing delay the First Officer advised that he may run into an FAR 117 Rest/Duty Time issue if the delay continued. I called Scheduling to run the numbers on when his duty would expire and found that we had a little less than 90 minutes before we lost him. There were no reserves available. The mechanics wound up resetting the pack again and asked us to leave it off until the departure roll. I reminded them that the pack was an ETOPS Significant System and if we lost it after takeoff we would not be able to enter ETOPS airspace. On concurrence with the Captain I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and we agreed to do an ETOPS Verification Flight on the system. Dispatch worked up a non-ETOPS contingency route that required us to add fuel. With the Captain's concurrence we added 900 LBS of fuel which brought us up to the Max Performance Takeoff Weight on the original flight plan. While all this was going on the First Officer got the ATIS and loaded the info into the performance computer on the ACARS. He then loaded the Weight and Balance information. Unfortunately he loaded the Takeoff Fuel into the Zero Fuel Weight boxes of the performance template. This produced a Max Takeoff Gross Weight significantly lower than what it really was. He then left the cockpit for several minutes. The Captain went to retrieve the performance data and was having difficulty understanding how to do it. She had primarily been flying other routes and said she had only seen the performance template once or twice since IOE. I showed her how to retrieve the data and we reviewed it together. Both of us missed the MTOGW error. We read the 'Cautions' and made the incorrect assumption that if we were less than Planned Gross Weight we were OK...similar to the -200 aircraft. What the Cautions were trying to tell us just didn't click. Even the low V speeds and large stop margin didn't register as a flag. In addition the Captain did not follow the SOP procedure by setting the V2 speed estimate on the MCP. This would have been another flag. She later had me explain how to do it. In our printed flight plan package we did not have the paper copies of the TLR Takeoff data to use as a backup/crosscheck. When we referred to the downloaded copy on my tablet we discovered it only had Takeoff data for Runway 3 even though the forecast winds favored Runway 21. Dispatch should have provided that information also. On departure--since the First Officer did not select Runway 21 at Intersection F takeoff data--the Captain elected to use the full length. On the takeoff roll the First Officer called Vr at 131 KTS; but the Captain delayed the rotation until 146 KTS. She rotated at a normal rate. I didn't see the initial pitch but she lowered the nose immediately and accelerated before pitching up again. I believe this may have been when we scraped the tail skid which we discovered after landing. After positive climb was achieved she accelerated at a shallow climb angle. It was obvious to all of us that something wasn't right. She kept the pitch angle between the buffet margins and accelerated through the flap indications on the EADI speed tape. After the flaps were up she accelerated and climbed normally; opting for a higher climb speed of 260 KTS. There were a few other issues that might have helped flag the error. The Captain failed to record the actual ZFW and MTOGW next to the planned weights on the flight plan per FOM procedures. Also if the 'Load' function worked on the aircraft and had propagated the data directly to the FMS we might have caught the erroneous ZFW and Gross Weight there. To help eliminate the error going forward the following procedures might be considered: Highlight or mark in bold border or print the two critical numbers; ZFW and MTOGW; on the Weight and Balance. Modify software not to accept ZFW data outside a reasonable range of weights. Create a positive crosscheck procedure by both crewmembers of the ZFW and MTOGW data before uploading to the FMS.


Second narrative: During our preflight duties I entered the wrong zero fuel weight into the ACARS performance page. I entered the fuel onboard into the zero fuel weight prompt. The fuel on board is located underneath the ZFW box on the weight and balance sheet; and I transposed the two numbers when entering it into the ACARS computer. This error was not caught by any of the three flight crewmembers. ...This [error] resulted in a V1; Vr; V2 speed too low for the actual weight of the aircraft. As we approached Vr; the aircraft did not rotate as normal. Due to this the pilot flying kept the aircraft on the ground for a longer time in order to obtain flying speed. At no time; as observed on the speed tape; did we get any closer than approximately 20 KTS from the red stall warning snake. As a result of this lower takeoff speed; the tailskid was scraped upon rotation. ...Since there were no indications from the Tower; no abnormal pressurization; no abnormal flight controls; or reports from the cabin indicating that we had in fact dragged the tail during takeoff; we elected to continue the flight....The TLR that was provided did not have Runway 21 data; so we did not have the ability to cross check that data against the ACARS provided data. Due to the compressed time after dealing with the maintenance issue; I stepped out of the cockpit to perform the walk around because the 3rd pilot was busy getting the plotting chart ready. Once I came back to the cockpit; the Captain and Check Airman (3rd pilot) was discussing the performance ACARS printout; so I assumed that the speeds that had been entered were correct. My schedule during the last 3 months had been mostly on the 767MW and the 200Fs; which uses the TLR. On the TLR if you weigh less than planned take off weight; you can always go with the speeds provided. But on the 300ER; where ACARS provides the speed this is not the case. Due to this; the warnings that were provided were erroneously ignored. This was a First Officer line check; but there was a substantial amount of instruction between the Captain and Check Airman in the operation of ACARS. The Captain of the flight mostly flies [one of our cargo contracts] so she was not very familiar with this performance system. So when I returned from the preflight walk around; when they were in the midst of this discussion; I incorrectly assumed that the speeds that had been set were correct....When Check Airmen are conducting line checks or observations; be more of an observer than actively participating/interrupting for teaching moments. Let the crew finish up their flows and procedures. Then interject if there are procedural or technique issues. By having a Check Airman and the Captain involved in teaching moments during the normal flow of things; the remaining First Officer is outside of the loop and it becomes difficult getting back into the normal flow of a normal cockpit crew.


Synopsis: Multiple factors assailed the flight crew of a B767-300ER which resulted in flawed performance data and a tail strike on takeoff due to a planned takeoff gross weight much below the actual.