elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SCT.TRACON, CA
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During taxi for takeoff; we were given a new initial departure clearance of fly heading 290 climb; and maintain 12;000 feet (apparently for noise). Takeoff was normal. Upon checking in with SoCal; we were given a heading of 150 'vector to GRIDR'. Two minutes later we were given direct to GRIDR; resume the ZZOOO 1 Departure. As we were proceeding to GRIDR; I noticed that we were approaching 12;000 feet and we hadn't been given a clearance to a higher altitude. I asked SoCal for higher. The Controller once again cleared us direct to GRIDR. I again asked for higher; the Controller responded that the assigned altitude for that departure was FL230. I again asked for higher; the Controller responded that FL230 is the final altitude. I believe I then stated that I needed a clearance or something like that. The Controller told us to climb and maintain FL230. The remainder of the departure was uneventful.My understanding of RNAV departure procedures is that once the altitude on the departure has been modified (12;000 feet); the Controller must either re-clear you to 'climb via' or issue a 'climb and maintain' clearance. Simply stating; 'resume the departure' does not clear you to continue climbing via the departure. The ATC Handbook 7110.65 appears to support my position; but I'm not sure. I tried looking for Company resources in Training and Standards but was unable to find any archived.I previewed the flight packet cover sheet; which highlights issues with improper check-in phraseology and was prepared to make the correct check-in on with SoCal; however; that became moot with the amended clearance. I felt that in that circumstance; in order for me to legally climb to a higher altitude; SoCal either needed to give me a climb via or a climb and maintain clearance. I reviewed the ATC recording online; unfortunately; the recording I listened to only has SoCal; not our transmissions. ['If we were mistaken in this situation; Pilots need further guidance. It seems to me most Pilots would not be comfortable climbing to a higher altitude when given just a resume departure clearance.']




Synopsis: Boeing 737 Captain reported Departure Control climb clearance confusion due to ATC incorrect clearance phraseology.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Aeronca Champion
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A wheel landing was made and the airplane was slowed without braking such that the tailwheel had been set down. At a speed of about 20mph; the left wing gained lift and the aircraft swerved to the right in a ground loop. Left rudder and left aileron inputs were made at the first indication of directional instability. The right main gear left the edge of the pavement and sank into the soft; wet surface; pulling the aircraft further to the right. The aircraft rolled forward into a drainage ditch approximately 6 feet deep containing low standing water; midway down the right side of the runway at an estimated speed of 10-15mph. Neither wing struck the surface; and the prop tips were not struck or damaged. When the aircraft nosed into the ditch; the front cowling was bent and the main landing gear were damaged. There were no injuries and there was no damage to property other than to the aircraft as described above.




Synopsis: Pilot reported a loss of directional control that resulted in a runway excursion and damage to the aircraft.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger
When detected: Pre-flight; In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Before our flight; there was an odor in the cabin. The aircraft was written up and Maintenance could not duplicate the issue that caused the smell. When we were [enroute]; the Flight Attendants called and said that they were smelling the odor again which was described as a locker room type smell; while conferring with Dispatch the Flight Attendants called again and said there were a few Passengers complaining of the smell around the emergency exit row. One of the Flight Attendants reported feeling dizzy; and soon after the other two Flight Attendants from the back of the aircraft reported the same.  We decided to divert the flight to ZZZ.  We did experience some burning of the eyes but there was no odor or fumes in the flight deck.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported they made a diversion after notification of 'locker room odor' in the cabin reported by cabin crew and passengers.
Date: 201406
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Hydraulic Main System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After a 2 hour delay for aircraft to be placed in service after an overnight 'A' check. Maintenance Technician was rebalancing hydraulic A and B fluid levels. It was replenished to 95%. After reaching cruise flight at FL350 I began to monitor Hydraulic System quantity and pressure. I alerted Captain to A level at approximately 74% and started to drop progressively 1-2% in the next several minutes. Captain gave aircraft flying duties to myself and contacted company Maintenance and Dispatch via radio. After 2 separate conversations with company and upon reaching the quantity level of approximately 62% on A Hydraulic system; the Captain felt the safest course of action was an air return to the departure airport. I agreed. It afforded us the longest runway available and premier Crash/Fire Rescue services. We reviewed QRH and briefed flight attendants/passengers/Cockpit Jumpseat Rider. Captain assumed flying duties and I resumed pilot monitoring duties. An emergency was declared and ATC cleared us back direct. Minimal aircraft maneuvering was requested. A flaps 30 autobrakes 3 landing was performed without incident and Crash/Fire Rescue advised no exterior negative mechanical indications were observed. We taxied to gate and deplaned passengers and affected a logbook entry as to the aircraft condition.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reports receiving an aircraft from Maintenance after an 'A' check. At FL350 Hydraulic System A quantity is noted to be solely decreasing and crew elects to return the departure airport.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Hawker 900
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Other Reposition
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Elevator trim would not allow nose down travel. Suggestion: Inspect; identify; and repair problem.


Second narrative: After passing through 10;000 feet and accelerating during a departure from ZZZ to ZZZ1; the aircraft ran out of 'nose down' trim around 280 kts. We became aware of the issue after a trim warning (red) appeared on the PFD. Upon disengaging the autopilot the indicated malfunction was confirmed with the aircraft pitching up without manual input. We (Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring simultaneously) were unable to push the control column forward until the Pilot Flying decreased the power and subsequently the speed decreased below 260 kts. At that point the Pilot Flying moved the trim aft from its forward limit and neutralized the control column forces. Once the Pilot Flying was in control again and after we executed the associated abnormal checklist; the Pilot Flying was able to duplicate the issue by accelerating the aircraft. Once the aircraft was back under control we coordinated a diversion to ZZZ3 with company and ATC. We continued the flight to ZZZ3 without further while maintaining an indicated airspeed at or below 250 kts. No abnormalities were noticed during post-flight exterior inspection of the aircraft.


Synopsis: Hawker 900XP flight crew reported a trim control problem during departure that resulted in a diversion.
Date: 202007
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Passenger
When detected: Other Deplaning
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In A position ZZZ-ZZZ1; several passengers approached me during deplaning to tell me that two passengers in seats XX5 and XX6 were spitting and wiping saliva; phlegm; and blood all over their seats; armrests; tray tables; window; and wall. They explained they were unable to call an FA because they saw this while standing in the aisle several rows behind these people as all passengers waited to deplane. The two passengers were able to exit the aircraft before the other passengers could notify me. I assured them the plane was terminated and would be sanitized for the evening and we agreed that the only thing remaining we could do about it was to notify Operations and request they inform the cleaners of the location to take extra precautions to protect themselves and to sanitize that area thoroughly. The blood [was] intentionally smeared into an X shape on the wall. I presumed the blood came from tearing open a scab or some other small wound. It was a clearly visible amount but didn't indicate heavy bleeding.By the time [deplaning] was complete and I could go to row XX; most of the moisture from the saliva and nasal secretions had dried and was barely visible; only the blood stood out. Without their notification; and even with the easily visible blood; it would have been impossible to realize the extent to which they had contaminated every possible surface. It would have dried completely had we taken the time to tidy the aircraft first. In our PA about passenger compliance we emphasize seat belts and smoking and perhaps that is outdated and detracts from where the emphasis currently should lie. We state federal law prohibits tampering with a lav smoke detector; perhaps we have a law that prohibits passenger misconduct and could be stated in such a way that explains the criminality (if any) to such behavior. I do not believe those passengers believed they could face any consequence for these actions. Regardless of taking place during a pandemic; at any time this behavior poses a risk to other passengers; crew; and employees.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that two passengers were observed spitting; and wiping their saliva and blood over their entire seating area.
Date: 201305
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot-Static System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While cruising at 37;000 feet we observed what looked like windshield condensation on the front windows that turned out to be ice.  The ice detector did not detect ice so we manually selected the anti ice to 'ALL.'  We then received an amber IAS comparator alert.  Checking my instrument with the standby and Captain's; we deemed mine to be inaccurate.  Shortly after; we got an altitude comparator alert with SPS advanced and the AUTOPILOT FAIL. We decided this could be severe icing and requested an immediate descent.  ATC was unable to accommodate us due to traffic so we declared an emergency.  When we began our descent; my airspeed showed slowing while the Captain's accelerating leading me to believe that my pitot tube had been blocked. We were about 100 miles from ZZZ; it was our nearest suitable airport as we had to work hard to get it down in time to do the ILS. Aircraft handling was reported normal by the captain (PF) and as we descended airspeed and altimeter readings appeared to return to normal indications.  We requested ATC to give us frequent airspeed and altitude read outs to back us up in case we were experiencing any failures that we were unaware of.  When we landed all EICAS messages were cleared and all indications in the cockpit were normal. The Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance while I did my post flight inspection so they could have Maintenance check ADC and ice detector issues.  No defects were noted during post flight and the aircraft was found with no ice upon landing.


Second narrative: Ice detector did not detect ice and we lost valuable minutes until ice was visible to flight crew. Suspected unforecast severe ice encounter.  Perhaps better detection of severe icing if that is possible (we were just completing a long deviation around level 5 thunderstorms). Better maintenance of ADC instruments and/or ice detector.


Synopsis: EMB145 Flight Crew experiences the loss of the First officer's airspeed indication at FL370.  An emergency is declared and the flight continues to destination for a normal laneding.  During descent all pitot static systems return to normal.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E I90
ATC / advisory: TRACON I90
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I can't say exactly what caused this. Everything was entered correctly into the FMS and the proper navigation mode was selected. The FMS and autopilot had worked correctly prior to and after that fix. The DOMNO fix is the last fix before the arrival splits into one of three directions depending on the runway assigned. My thought is that since there are several brand new procedures into IAH that there could possibly be a bug in the database of the FMS or it was an isolated incident. We were on the new DRLLR one arrival into IAH when I noticed approaching DOMNO intersection that the autopilot was not starting a turn towards DOOOM intersection. We hadn't reached the fix yet but we were at the point where the autopilot starts leading the turn. I quickly checked that the arrival was put in correctly; it was; and that the First Officer had the plane in LNAV; he did. We were now on top of the intersection and I spun the heading bug to point us at DOOOM. The plane crossed over the fix and went into lateral mode so I hit heading mode to get the plane back on course. ATC said it looked like we had just flown over the intersection and I told him that we were navigating towards DOOOM. Nothing else was said and we continued the arrival. I would like to address these descend via arrivals that we are now receiving. Some of these arrivals; including this new DRLLR one in IAH; are increasing the cockpit workload to dangerous levels. I was so busy as pilot monitoring and PIC making sure that all of these step downs and airspeeds were complied with that I was very late at calling in range; getting landing performance; briefing the passengers and setting up for the approach. Our attention is so focused on making sure we comply with the arrival that if any other situation arises such as weather; mechanical issues; passenger issues; approach briefing discussions; we run a very high risk of missing a restriction. I understand that this is the new approach that ATC wants to take with arrival procedures and it probably works great for pilots who fly airplanes that are VNAV equipped but it is creating a hazard to those of us who don't have these capabilities.




Synopsis: Another EMB145 crew experiences the failure of the autopilot to make the turn over the DRLLR fix on the DRLLR 1 RNAV arrival to IAH. Manual intervention minimizes the deviation.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: EICAS displayed LE SLAT DISAGREE ; LE SLAT ASYM on Final approach. Go Around-Ran QRH -Landed no problems.EICAS Displayed LE SLAT Disagree; LE SLAT ASYM. Ran QRH and landed on next approach.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported executing a go-around after receiving a LE FLAP DISAGREE EICAS message. Crew ran QRH and subsequent landing was uneventful.
Date: 201705
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach; Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ; Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We picked up [aircraft] to ferry it to ZZZ. This aircraft did have a test flight performed on it earlier with no issues. Due to a late inbound deadhead; we were about 2 hours late. We would arrive at ZZZ after midnight; so fatigue was a concern; despite being rested from before.Our aircraft was ready for us with a valid MRD. After a thorough inspection we departed without any event. Approximately 1 hour prior to landing we received a momentary EICAS message for Unscheduled Stab Trim. The incident appeared to be an anomaly as it cleared before we could get the checklist out and the aircraft flew normally. We reviewed the checklist as a precaution and chose to proceed to ZZZ. At this time; while most likely unrelated; we noticed that the Right HYD QTY dropped from its pre-departure level of 1.0 to .78 where it stabilized for the duration of the flight.We elected to conduct a CATIII approach into ZZZ (VMC) because it was due for the aircraft. On approach after lowering the gear; we received 3 greens but the Gear Door light remained illuminated. As we did not have time to get the checklist out; we elected to go-around and troubleshoot. Due to our concern for the gear possibly not cycling correctly; and the fact that we were still indicating 3-greens; we decided not to retract the gear during the go-around. We configured for F5 180 knots. The gear door light went out during the go-around.ATC vectored us around for the visual. During the second approach I noticed that the flap handle did not 'feel right'. In my opinion; it seemed very loose except for around the 15-20 detents were it appeared to almost bind. I was able to select and receive 30 degrees. Then; we performed a normal landing; however; on roll-out the #2 Thrust Reverser would not deploy. Upon clearing the runway we brought the flaps up; which again; did not feel normal.All of these things were written up and fully debriefed to Maintenance.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer reported that they received a momentary EICAS message for an Unscheduled Stab Trim.