elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: P31.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E P31
ATC / advisory: TRACON P31
Second aircraft: Small Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I and my Developmental were starting a pre-brief to assume the A-AR position for training.  It was moderately busy; but somewhat chaotic due to recently certified controllers on the positions involved.  The A-AR 'Controller' had just begun the position relief briefing when I noticed Aircraft X at 8;000 FT; on a converging course nose to nose; with Aircraft Y; descending out of 9;000 feet.  It was probably too late to avert an OE at this point.  I tried to coordinate verbally with the E-AR Controller to formulate a plan to maintain/re-establish separation between the aircraft; but could not get a response.  At this point it was becoming a critical safety situation; so I basically told the A-AR Controller to 'do something; anything.'  The most frightening part of this incident was that both 'controllers' were frozen; with the E-AR Controller doing nothing to fix the impending problem and not communicating that he was even aware of the problem; and the A-AR Controller was too busy complaining and yelling across the room to take action to avert it.I don't know how you fix this.  The last ATM brought in and overwhelmed the facility with 15 developmentals with no formal training program in place.  We have a million dollar ETG lab that sat unused due to lack of personnel/staffing/expertise.  There was no cadre of professional OJTI's.  Due to the number of developmentals; everyone trained these people.  This is a complex facility; and it requires nuanced training by experienced controllers to make new controllers successful.  Instead; we had freshly minted CPC's training developmentals.  We now have a majority of controllers here with low CPC time; and no other FAA experience.  Yet the Memphis hub believes now is the time to cut staffing at P31 by 20-25%.




Synopsis: P31 Controller describes head on situation where controllers talking to the two aircraft do nothing to stop the operational error or fix the situation.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushing back from [gate] in ZZZ. We were anticipating a taxi to Runway XXL and the FMGC was set up to reflect that. Called for pushback clearance was told to push tail south to the grass and expect Runway XY for departure. Being a ZZZ1 based crew these instructions were a little foreign to us; but were relayed to the ground crew and pushback began. Communication with our ground personnel was a little strained as the tug drive had a little bit of an accent and was hard to make out. The instructions to expect Runway XY required us to revise our pre-departure plan to now include the starting of the second motor due to the short taxi. During the pushback; I was heads down resetting the box and loading the data for our new runway of departure. I was listening in on intercom but wasn't giving it my fully attention; as I was starting the engines. The pushback was complete right around the same time as I verified the need to start the second motor with the Captain. I do not recall ever hearing 'pushback complete; set brake' from the ground crew; but it may have been stated as all other procedure from there seemed to occur normally. The tug driver disconnected and ground personnel released us.The Captain was heads down verifying our new speeds and departure procedure in the FMGC as I finished my after start flow and shutdown the APU. It was about this time that we both looked up as the aircraft was slowly rolling forward and gaining a little speed. The Captain and I both got on the brakes and brought the aircraft to a stop a little abruptly; but not violently. We estimate that we probably rolled about 10-20 ft. forward unaware. We did not come into contact with anything and after verifying that the flight attendants we all ok from our sudden stop; we continued on our way.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported non-standard communication with ground crew during pushback caused the aircraft to roll forward after being disconnected.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; Haze / Smoke
Light: Night
Aircraft: EC135
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Compass (HSI/ETC)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Encountered severe gyro magnetic compass precession while positioned on the roof top helicopter pad at a Hospital. Following the patient drop off leg; I completed the start and before takeoff checklist. Prior to lift off I completed an instrument operational check and noted that the Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) had precessed from 310 degrees to 212 degrees in a matter of 27 minutes while the aircraft was parked on the roof top pad. While this anomaly can be attributed to Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment; in this case the MRI is located many floors beneath the helicopter landing pad. Numerous exhaust turbines; and intake turbines are located on the roof top pad; which may contribute to magnetic anomalies. Normally the precession can be corrected by manually slewing the HSI through the gyro magnetic compass control synchronization switch control panel. Aircraft DOES NOT have this panel installed; and the HSI cannot be manually controlled between Magnetic mode (MAG-the gyro slewed to the flux valve heading) or DG mode; operating the gyro as a free (uncontrolled) gyroscope; essentially rendering the HSI useless. This presents a significant safety issue. Both in not being able to manually control the HSI to make compass corrections; it creates a significant inability to fly accurate navigation heading and routes. There is no capability to fly IFR at this point. Furthermore; if the pilot was to encounter an Inadvertent Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC) the precession of the gyro could induce a loss of situational awareness. This base is an IFR capable base; however with an inability to manually slew the HSI; and input corrections; this capability and the safety of flight is severely compromised Install gyro magnetic compass control synchronization switch control panel. Enabling the pilot to manually slew the gyro magnetic (HSI) compass.




Synopsis: An ECD-EC135 helicopter compass precessed nearly ninety degrees while parked on a hospital roof for 27 minutes but because this particular aircraft had no compass slew installed to correct the heading error; the aircraft was rendered non-IFR capable.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: From a brief conversation with the MX personnel he ran test and noted that all systems check good. He mentioned to us that the message could have come up as a result of a faulty indicator but was not sure.At Cruise altitude about 30 minutes from landing we were preparing for approach to landing. Preparing landing data and briefing the approach when we received a R BLEED DUCT warning message. We conducted the immediate action checklist. As we finished the checklist from memory; both valves closed within about 10 seconds. At this time we verified our work since it happened so fast to ensure we did the procedure from memory correctly and we had. As this was happening; the cabin was already loosing pressure at a rate of about 4700 FPM. We initiated a descent to 10;000 feet and declared an emergency. As this is happening we simultaneously conducted the immediate action checklist for loss of cabin pressure. Once that checklist was completed and we are making our emergency descent we proceeded to do the QRH for R Bleed Duct. When descending through approximately 20;000 feet the passenger oxygen mask deployed. At the same time we determined that the nearest suitable airport was the departure airport and decided to divert. On the ground we entered the discrepancy for R Bleed Duct warning and for oxygen mask deployed.We conducted the memory items from the immediate action checklist but we do believe that the 30 seconds mentioned in the QRH for the bleed to close was closer to about 5-7 seconds. We were left with no time to react to the situation on hand and made the decision to do an emergency descent based on the loss of cabin pressure.




Synopsis: A CRJ-700 EICAS alerted R BLEED DUCT at cruise altitude. The crew completed the immediate action checklist which closed both bleed valves and depressurized the cabin. The cabin oxygen masks deployed during descent to 10;000 feet and diversion to a nearby airport.
Date: 201603
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Number two engine did not accelerate past 53 percent on takeoff roll. First Officer called for an abort. I aborted at slow speed and cleared the runway. After further evaluation and discussion with Maintenance; we returned to the gate.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: A B737 Captain reported aborting takeoff when number 2 engine did not accelerate past 53 percent. The crew returned to the gate.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Selector
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Workload; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During cruise flight; the fuel selector handle on my Beech Bonanza V35B was moved from the RH tank position where it had been since takeoff to the LH position. This aircraft has four positions; as it has tip tanks. In order; they are Left Tip; LH Main; RH Main; and Right Tip. Each position has a detent. In reconstructing what happened; I believe that the fuel selector didn't quite make it into the detent position when I switched to LH. If it is not in the detent; it is effectively OFF. About two minutes after the switch; we had a complete engine failure. I contacted Approach and as we were nearly over an airport; said I intended to land there. After quickly switching tanks back to the original tank; the engine came back to life and we made a normal landing with emergency equipment standing by.On this day; I deviated from my normal procedure of always starting on the Left Main; and then switching to the Right Main after 30 minutes. I started on the Right Main and therefore was turning the lever in the opposite direction than that which I'm accustomed to. I believe this contributed to the incident as it was not my normal motion. I would add that it is very difficult in this model Bonanza to visually verify the selector position while the seat is pulled forward to the position occupied in flight.Lesson learned is that always do it the same way; and visually verify the position even if it means sliding the seat back for a moment or two.




Synopsis: A Bonanza V35B pilot failed to place his fuel tank selector completely in the right main tank detent which starved the engine of fuel. He diverted to a nearby airport but the engine had restarted before landing with the tank selector fully in the detent.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Oil Line
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Preflight; taxi; and takeoff were uneventful; and followed SOP (Standard Operating Procedures). Approximately 1 hour into cruise; and under radar control with Center; we passed over a waypoint and noted our time and fuel remaining for the FPR [Flight Plan Route]. In addition; we selected the full engine display and immediately noted the left engine oil quantity indicated 10 quarts. The right engine indicated 18 (normal). The Captain and I concurred that 10 was not normal. Within 5 minutes; it indicated 9. The Captain sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher. I suggested a SAT phone call to [Operations Control] which included Tech/Maintenance; which was done. We all concurred that if the left engine oil quantity dropped to 8; we would return to ZZZ. Within minutes; the oil quantity indicated 8. The Captain passed control of the aircraft to me and began coordinating our return; calling our [Relief Pilot] off break; advising our flight attendants; and informing the passengers. I contacted Center; requested and received immediate clearance to ZZZ. With the Captain concurrence; I reduced the left engine to idle; and descended to FL210; selecting 270 knots (avoided the need for max N1 on the right engine). The Captain continued to coordinate with Dispatch (desk 81) requesting ARFF as a precaution; as well as the required information for HAZMAT loaded in the forward cargo. The Captain resumed his role as Pilot Flying for the remainder of the flight. We [requested priority handling] with Approach Control; and made an uneventful (overweight) approach and landing on Runway XXR. Our debrief was simple: It was a textbook R9; with a few lessons learned along the way.Apparent oil leak on a high-pressure oil line (per Maintenance).




Synopsis: Flight Crew encountered engine oil leak and landed uneventfully.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ILG.Airport, DE
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D ILG
ATC / advisory: TRACON PHL
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing Runway 1; given initial heading 330; climb to 2;000. Tower handed off to PHL Approach. Approach cleared me to 9;000. Approach then called Traffic Alert one o'clock turn immediately to 270 degrees. After I did not respond immediately; Approach said 'radio check' turn immediately to 270 degrees. I responded; turned and continued my climb. Traffic (I never saw) passed behind me. Several factors contributed:1. Other aircraft was in ILG Class D airspace apparently not in contact with ILG Tower or Approach.2. ILG Tower Controller may have been 'in training.'3. PHL Approach Controller was incredibly busy; potentially missing the potential conflict until he received a traffic alert. As the country is 'opening up' post COVID; anticipated level of weekend air traffic appeared to be underestimated.4. Controller called the traffic at 1 O'clock; turn left. Natural tendency to want to look for the traffic; which would be blocked by the engine/wing in the turn. This delayed my action. Suggestion: Controller state 'Traffic Alert' make immediate turn to XXX. Do not state the location of the traffic. If it's that urgent; it's too late to start looking.5. My avionics unit was in flight plan mode (anticipating getting a 'cleared direct to' (which I received almost immediately after the incident)); not traffic mode. Even though I was in Class D airspace; overlaid by Class B; on an IFR clearance and given a Radar Vector; it was VMC. Having the avionics unit set to traffic would have potentially provided an additional traffic alert. Difficult to say as this all happened in the first 60-90 seconds after takeoff when workload is at the highest.




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a traffic alert shortly after takeoff requiring immediate evasive action. Pilot noted that the PHL TRACON Controller seemed incredibly busy; thereby potentially missing the conflict.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: ATR 42
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: ILS/VOR
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On VOR-A approach just short of the VOR passage at a 2800; VOR 1 DME became erroneous. This distracted us for a moment and PIC switched his screen to VOR/ILS system 2 to read correct DME. VOR2 DME seemed to be working. Because we were so close to station passage and the next step down altitude was after VOR passage; we descended to the next step down altitude too soon. When we left 2800 ft. the airport was in sight and was VMC. We were then aware that we descended early by a mile or two prior to the VOR and received a cautionary TAWS (Terrain Avoidance and Warning System) once but at that point we arrested the descent and adjusted the flight path and the alert had gone away and by then we had crossed the VOR and were at the altitude we were supposed to be at. The circle approach and landing were normal.10 minutes after landing DME 1 corrected itself and we contacted Maintenance control to let them know about DME 1and they informed us nothing was wrong with the plane.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ATR 42-500 pilot crew reported the #1 DME was malfunctioning and receiving a CFTT alert.