elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approximately 10 minutes prior to push I was notified from FFA Forward Flight Attendant) that we may have ammunition on board in a cargo compartment. I was not notified of any HAZMAT on board prior to this and was not provided with a NOPIC (Notice to Captain) form. I called Ops to notify and Station Manager there advised me that according to their Station Manager that declaring ammo was not required. I referred to FOM and there was no statement that I could find that verified and confirmed Manager statement. By this time; door was closed and jetway pulled away. I advised Ops that I wanted a NOPIC form filled for us because it went against what my FOM manual stated; [and] it went against my better judgment. As a flight crew we should have awareness of any HAZMAT that is loaded on board no matter how small. It is considered a Class I material and has explosive properties. I need to know where it is and how much was loaded in the case of cargo smoke or fire. It doesn't matter if it's from a known shipper or loaded in a passenger's bag; it needs to be declared. [Manager] standards are not aligned with standard ICAO-IATA procedures and FOM procedures. If there are any exemptions regarding shipment of ammunition on board that is specifically stated in an IATA/ICAO document then our FOM needs to be updated to state that.




Synopsis: Captain reported missing required hazmat documents prior to departure.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A330
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Immediately after gear retraction on the flight; the FO and I smelled a very strong odor of fumes that I would describe as dirty socks and an oily smell. We donned oxygen masks. A few minutes later; I briefly raised my mask off my face and could no longer detect any unusual odors. On approach into ZZZ1; we smelled the fumes again; and donned oxygen masks. However; this time the fumes were not as strong as on takeoff. In hindsight; it is clear that the better decision than continuing the flight would have been to return to the departure airport. The FO has communicated with me several times since then; advising that he has experienced headaches since this fume event occurred.




Synopsis: A330 Captain reported smelling a strong odor and fumes after takeoff; and then again on descent to a lesser degree.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Departed on a flight following NW bound when entering special flight rule corridor over LAX at 4500 northbound controller advised squawk 1201 and dropped flight following. On the north side of special flight rule area when I contacted the SoCal to continue my flight following I was advised to call SoCal TRACON when landed for possible pilot deviation. The rest of the flight was uneventful [and] when I called SoCal TRACON; I was told that they observed airspace incursion into Burbank Class C airspace. According to the controller; no traffic conflict had occurred.If the SoCal frequency for the northbound exit from VFR corridor was provided at the time that flight following was dropped there may have been less likelihood for this incursion to occur. It may be helpful to look into this [and] see if it's possible to hand over rather than drop the flight following in such a busy area. I don't know if this airspace is frequently violated for this reason or not?




Synopsis: Pilot reports of flight following being terminated due to SFRA and then he is advised later that he violated Class C on the other side of the SFRA.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VIDP.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B777-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Tower VIDP
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Inbound to VIDP the FMS SAM 6F RNAV STAR had been loaded and briefed and was being navigated by the autopilot in the VNAV mode. All indications on the NAV displays were normal for the procedure. As aircraft made the left turn at SAM fix Approach Control assigned us a 090 heading. Additionally they inquired as to which arrival we were assigned and flying. The rest of the arrival was vectors transitioning to ILS Runway 29 which was completed successfully. During taxi in we were instructed to call Approach Control on a land line. After a discussion along the lines of 'all of our company jets were not flying the correct procedural ground track' we concluded the conversation with an agreement to contact Company Sandards to investigate the matter.

Callback: The reporter advised that; during the land line call to Approach Control; limited common language skills made it impossible for him to determine exactly where their flight path deviated from where ATC expected them to go. He stated the moving map display coincided perfectly with the charted arrival which indicated to him that; if their track differed from ATC's expectation; the error was programmed into both.The reporter further addressed his concern about having no raw data means by which to confirm the digitally derived track the FMS slavishly follows coincides with the intended real life track over the ground. He referenced his many years of flying from point to point based on land based NAV fixes that did provide such independent assessment of the aircraft's real location with respect to the earth's surface.



Synopsis: A B777-200 Captain was advised by VIDP Approach Control that his lateral track did not conform to the SAM 6F RNAV STAR by which they had been cleared. The reporter; however; disagreed-citing their FMS track was precisely following the FMS magenta line which; in turn; exactly matched the route described on their commercially published aero chart.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: AC Generator/Alternator
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During my leg while cruising at FL350 to from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with the autopilot engaged. multiple caution messages popped out; suggesting some electrical issue with the #2 IDG/BUS. there was not a lot of communication in between the pilots but the Captain grabbed the Quick Reference Handbook and began working; So I decided to keep flying and work the radios. I kept monitoring the Captains body actions because I know that moving the wrong electrical switch could lead to further electrical issues. During the troubleshoot I confirmed that he could touch the Integrated Drive Generator 2. when he mentioned he was going to turn on the APU I reacted and say no; he asked me Why I did not want APU; so I advised that we were above the maximum altitude for APU start; so he understood and agreed to wait. advised descending; to which he agreed. I requested 29;000 ft. from ATC; and descended to 29;000 ft. When I suggested we were at an altitude where we could; he asked me to turn on the APU. When attempted to start APU about 4 screens went black momentarily and the autopilot and auto throttles disconnected. I announced I had the flight controls; and the throttles. The Captain re-engaged the autopilot without asking me but voiced it over and I monitored the correct engagement. Given the autopilot was responding correctly I decided to leave it engaged and monitor it. Given the APU caused appeared to cause the distruption for the APU I did not attempt turning it on again. Captain kept working Quick Reference Handbook; and coordinated with Dispatch and flight attendants. Captain decided to do the approach and landing; we briefed and landing at ZZZ1 without incident. No request for priority handling was declared.Multiple electrical failures.While we seemed to reach each other fairly well; I feel like the threat was treated like a no-time threat rather than a time threat. However; the outcome was positive.




Synopsis: First Officer reported multiple electrical failures after the #2 IDG failed in flight.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HNL.Airport, HI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower HNL
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was Pilot Flying and the Captain was Pilot Monitoring. We were cleared to land Runway 04R in HNL. After touching down and rolling out; the HNL Tower cleared us to cross Runway 08L at Kilo and contact Ground when clear of the runway. The Captain asked the Tower a second time; 'confirm cleared to cross Runway 08L?' since this is identified as Hot-Spot 2 at HNL. The Tower again confirmed we were cleared to cross 08L and contact Ground when clear of the runway. At this point we made a positive exchange of the flight controls and the Captain took control of the aircraft. Taxiway Kilo has an element of high-speed entry from Runway 04R and we were slowed from rollout; but still moving at a reasonable taxi speed when we came to the Kilo taxiway hold short line of Runway 08L. As we individually looked to 'clear' the right and left sides of the runway before taxiing onto Runway 08L; the Captain observed an Aircraft Y approximately 200 feet above the approach end of Runway 08L. Once identified we both looked and confirmed that the Aircraft Y was landing on Runway 08L. The Captain attempted to stop the aircraft; but he was unable too; before the nose of the aircraft entered Runway 08L. The Captain then pushed the thrust levers forward to propel us across Runway 08L; and clear of Runway 08L; before the Aircraft Y touched down on Runway 08L. There was no further incident.High workload; positive exchange of flight controls; speed at which we entered Taxiway Kilo; ATC commands; and the angle of our view of Runway 08L were all contributing factors. Ultimately we should have stopped the aircraft before entering Runway 08L; even though the HNL Tower had cleared us to cross the runway. Taxiway Kilo and Runway 08L intersection is already identified as Hot Spot 2 at HNL. We were aware of a threat but what we didn't consider was HNL Tower being 'wrong' to clear us to cross the runway with an aircraft on short final.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported they were cleared to cross 8L at HNL even though another air carrier aircraft was on short final for landing.
Date: 201703
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Snow
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Aircraft component: Escape Slide
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As of the time the aircraft door closed we had not been catered.  I restocked the carts with the supplies we had. The boarding door was closed and all doors had been armed using proper procedures for monitor and challenge.  We were waiting to be deiced. I left my door to retrieve my demo equipment (In the last overhead bin aircraft Left.) I heard a knock at the door and saw the caterer looking through the window.  I crossed my wrists to motion that the door WAS NOT safe to open. The door handle began to rise and I grabbed the handle pushing it to the closed position; hoping to signal him to discontinue opening the door.  He continued to open the door and I was screaming and banging on the door. (The AFA told me she could hear me in the front of the aircraft!) He discontinued opening the door and the inside handle was at a half-way position. I called the flight deck to advise them of the situation and I was told not to touch the door.  They would call maintenance.  The catering truck pulled away from the aircraft.After several minutes; I went to the flight deck to communicate with the Captain the details of this incident. I was at the doorway to the flight deck when the dreaded 'hissing' of the slide could be heard throughout the airplane. I returned to my door to find the catering truck parked at the 2L door and the ripped remains of the slide caught on the ramp of the truck.




Synopsis: An EMB-190 Flight Attendant prevented a caterer from opening the 2R galley door after boarding was complete and slides armed. The caterer departed but proceeded to open 2L activating the slide after the Flight Attendant went forward to call Maintenance.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While enroute the aircraft lost power to the engine. The RPM indicated between 1200-1400; while the manifold [pressure] was between 12 and 13 inches. With no power; [I] was forced to make an emergency landing on [a highway] due to it being the best illuminated.




Synopsis: Pilot reported making a forced landing on a highway after experiencing engine power loss.
Date: 201405
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Airspace: Class A ZJX
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Weather; Staffing; Human Factors; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: I was working R-76.  The AR's were closed due to weather and there was weather in the middle of the state; forcing a majority of the center's traffic through the South area.  Most altitudes had chop causing most pilots to request ride reports and different altitudes.  Sectors 76 and 67 had full ACLs (at one point 67 had over 50 aircraft on their list) and were 'red' straight across the board.  I was working with both a D-side and tracker. The aircraft that were re-routed off the Atlantic Routes were coming over with bad routes (CRG-ILM or CRG-SAV-ILM etc) and required full route clearances to miss the warning areas and comply with LOA/SOP.  I also had to issue clearances to two southbound aircraft (I believe [ACR X] was one of the aircraft) who had OMN direct SJU and OMN direct MKJS.  I assume these slipped through the cracks at 67 because they were just as busy as me.  I have no idea how many other re-routes from Washington they did issue while covered up in traffic like I was doing from Miami.  The Supervisor was notified early in the session that issuing FRC's to the AR aircraft was causing the workload in the sector to become almost unbearable.  He told our TMU at least 2 times over the course of the next two hours that MIA needed to ensure the routes were issued off the ground.  When I finally got off position (after more that 2 hours 15 min); Miami was still sending aircraft northbound with SAV-ILM routing; and it seemed the volume was not reduced at all (the ACL was still full). TMU needed to take a more aggressive role in protecting the integrity of the sector.  Volume needed to be reduced and the re-routes needed to be issued from Miami Center.  The situation went on long enough that I have no doubt aircraft I was re-routing in the air were sitting on the ground when we first asked for routes to be fixed.  I see no reason while those planes could not have been given a good route from Clearance Delivery before they ever left.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller complains about overloaded sector due to weather and having to issue amended clearances while aircraft depart over 2 hours later on incorrect routings.
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Departing ZZZ1 for ZZZ2 I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and the CA (Captain) was the PF (Pilot Flying). We planned a low altitude flight due to the shortness of the leg. Some altitudes in the legs page were edited to allow the lower cruise altitude to be selected. The flaps 10 takeoff went as normal (LNAV/VNAV). The PF called for flaps 1 as near as I can recall. I believe this is the case as most if not all of our previous legs had been flaps 5 takeoffs. I was distracted with a radio call or frequency change and I moved the flaps to 1 and did not catch the error. Shortly after that; the FMC changed to the descent phase and the speed bug moved to the flaps 5 maneuver speed; and the A/T (Auto Throttle) mode went from N1 to FMC speed; which resulted in the flaps 5 maneuver speed being the A/T target. As; or just prior to this happening the PF called for flaps up. I moved the flap lever to the up position; and since we were no longer accelerating got a momentary stick shaker. The PF instinctively lowered the nose reducing the AOA (Angle Of Attack). I increased the speed in the MCP window to get the A/T to command acceleration. The remainder of the flight was normal.Suggest crews be alert for unusual mode reversions when using low altitudes for cruise. I would probably use non VNAV takeoff procedures in the future. The big lesson is not new; vigilance absolutely has to be maintained during the 'red' parts of the flight path. The PM job is challenging and can be intolerant of errors.




Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported a procedure error during flap retraction.