elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202003
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: The Y Flight Attendant (FA) informed me that she will not occupy the forward jump seat for takeoff and landing. The jumpseat is in working order.The reason provided by the Y FA is 'social distancing' due to the potential spread of the Coronavirus.I informed her of the policy; but she still refused to occupy the jumpseat placing the passengers onboard in potential danger in the event of an evacuation.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant refused to occupy the appropriate jumpseat due to social distancing concerns.
Date: 201602
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SFO
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During extended taxi in; I called for right engine shut down just after required cooling time. FO acknowledged and announced generator switch. I confirmed I was off brakes and steering; and FO switched electrics but did NOT immediately shut down the engine. This was due to ground controller calling at that precise time with instructions to taxi to a holding pad. There was unusually heavy ground traffic. I failed to cross check the engine instruments to verify that the engine was shut down as requested; and due to many distractions from the subsequent ground instructions and ground traffic; neither of us noticed the error until I parked at the gate. Since I did not have the APU running for parking; I waited for ground power to be plugged in before calling for the left engine to be shut down. It was only then that we both realized the right engine was still running; as well.




Synopsis: A320 Captain discovered at the gate that the right engine had not been shut down by the First Officer during taxi in due to distraction with ATC communications.
Date: 202101
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Other General Ramp
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Show up to gate X to work a flight and a coworker wasn't wearing a mask the whole shift also another coworker was wearing his mask on his neck. While the Supervisor watched 12 feet away. We signal him about the problem and he ignored it.




Synopsis: Ground employee reported co-workers are not complying with face mask policy and supervisors are ignoring the issue.
Date: 202110
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: With shutting down an engine; dumping fuel and returning to the departure airport; we might have landed slightly overweight. With all that was going on; I forgot to record and keep track of our landing weight. I do not think we did land overweight as I believe we would have received an ACARS message stating such but just in case; I am submitting this report as no logbook entry was made to cover an overweight landing.




Synopsis: Captain reported confusion about actual landing weight during an event with an in flight shut down and an air turn back event.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PYM.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cheetah; Tiger; Traveler AA5 Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E PYM
ATC / advisory: UNICOM PYM
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: While approaching and preparing to enter the traffic pattern at PYM and about four or five miles from the field; we encountered numerous (estimated about fifty) helium filled balloons launched from the ground. We were at about 1200 feet MSL; and had little or no time for evasive action. I believe that these balloons were launched from the ground to celebrate the beginning of the [a] bicycle race. Fortunately; no balloons struck the aircraft. We reported the incident on the UNICOM frequency to warn other aircraft. There was no NOTAM for the event that took place in the vicinity of the airport (Lakeville; MA). Suggest these types of events deserve either a NOTAM or should be prohibited at distance close to an airport.




Synopsis: AA5B pilot reported encountering a large number of balloons in flight that had been released in the vicinity of his destination; PYM.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Pushback was completed with both engines running. Ground crew was unable to release the tow bar. Ask if I would release the parking brake to relieve the pressure on the tow bar. I did. They moved the Aircraft then asked to set brakes but the Aircraft was still moving. I told him to stop the push; he continued to say set brakes. Then I figured out he had released the tow bar. I stopped the Aircraft from moving; set brakes. No injury and Aircraft damage. We had a 90 minute delay due to cargo loading. Ground crew not following SOP. The ground crew needs to review SOP; also have a mindset of not having the urgency to rushing.




Synopsis: Air carrier Pilot reported the push back ground crew disconnected the tow bar without advising the flight crew; resulting in the uncontrolled aircraft rolling on the ramp.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pitot/Static Ice System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When given descent [from FL370] noticed airspeed indicators (all three) were giving false readings. SAT at this altitude was -49 degrees. We could hear airspeed increasing as descent began; but airspeed indicators were indicating decreasing speed. The indications decreased at the same rate on all three indicators (CA; FO and Stby). The Stby was the first to clear itself followed by the CA at approx FL290; then finally the FO at approx FL250. When noticed condition used AOM volume 1 and looked up unreliable airspeed charts for EMJ 145 idle descent. Before putting charts to use airspeed indications started to return to normal. Charts were kept handy and used to verify readings during remainder of descent. Declared an emergency with ATC. Continued descent to destination. Weather was VFR for landing. Landed runway 18 uneventfully and notified dispatch and maintenance.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: The flight crew of an EMB-145 suffered the temporary loss of all three airspeed indicators while at FL370.  During the subsequent descent all three returned to normal operation.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Stall Warning System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff climb from ZZZ at 300 FT AGL and 160 KIAS; the Stall Warning Stick Shaker activated for approximately five seconds. I pushed forward on the stick as the PM confirmed that the flaps and airspeed were both set and correct. Pitch attitude was decreased from eight degrees to five degrees; which resulted in the aircraft accelerating to 180 KIAS. Flaps were set at 5 with a green light. The Flap Transient Light did not illuminate. After the stall indication stopped; we continued the takeoff and departure without any further stall issues. While still flying the departure to our destination; we called ZZZ Ops and verified the load sheet numbers were correct. After looking in the QRH and not finding any guidance; I decided to increase our landing weight; for performance computer calculations; to just below max landing weight. By using 109;500 pounds (which was the per-calculated landing weight on the Release) we eliminated the possibility of setting a final approach speed which was too slow. This procedure ensured we did not have a Weight and Balance Issue. After landing; we asked for a bag check audit to confirm our load sheet numbers. Our Zero Fuel Weight numbers were found to be 300 pounds low; which would not cause our indications. A logbook writeup was accomplished and Maintenance was notified.




Synopsis: A B737 flight crew experienced a stall warning stick shaker shortly after takeoff. The pilot flying lowered the nose and the stick shaker stopped. The crew verified that the flaps and airspeed were set and correct. They continued to their destination; wrote up the event; and notified Maintenance.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We had an unscheduled aircraft swap and I had not eaten since [early morning] and was starting to feel somewhat weak; and felt the need to acquire nutritious food. So on my way from one gate to the other; I stopped off to get food at an eatery that had NO LINE; and was able to get food quickly. [I] went directly to my gate and after eating some of my sandwich; shortly after I began feeling better. This is a reoccurring issue/problems happening with many co-workers; sometimes on a flight duty day as long as 10 hours. We can be subject to disciplinary action due to delay of flight. Either build time in the pairing schedule or time between flights to get food after 5+ hours without the possibility of disciplinary action being taken; when we have many times NO opportunity to get food during up to a 10 hour duty day.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported difficulty in finding time to acquire and consume food between flights.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Trainee
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion
Second reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Landing
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Practicing landings and flight pattern. As practicing the landing I was told to pull quickly for the flare process of the plane and caused a miscommunication as to pull on the yolk quicker. With the miscommunication caused the airplane to balloon and land on the nose wheel hard and causing internal damage to the nose wheel internals; ripping almost all the screws off the nose wheel screws keeping it attached to the plane. After the incident the instructor took control of the plane and went on a go-around and landed the plane with the nose being as high off ground as possible.


Second narrative: I was instructing my student on landing; focusing on the timing of flaring. He flared too much; which made him balloon. And to correct for it; he pushed down on the control to bring the nose down and landed nose first. The process was too quick for me to intervene. I heard a cracking sound as the nose wheel touched down on the runway. I executed a go around and made a soft field landing; wheelbarrowing the plane all the way down to the taxiway connected to our flight school's entrance. When I exited the plane; I visibly verified that the nose strut was sitting abnormally. I alerted our maintenance tech; who has verified that the nose strut was damaged.


Synopsis: C172 student and instructor pilots reported a hard landing.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb; Initial Climb
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was PM.  On initial climb passing 1;500 feet there was no power reduction as programmed on T/O page X.  I reached up and manually reduced power then checked T/O page X to find it was in fact still programmed properly. Passing 3;000 feet the speed bug did not bug up for flap retraction.  That is when I realized VNAV was not selected. I selected VNAV.  We retracted the flaps on schedule and continued the flight to destination.I have low experience with only 40 hours on the aircraft.  My Relief Pilot also was not yet consolidated and my FO just recently consolidated.  I must have incorrectly responded 'checked' to the 'MCP' challenge on the before Start checklist and missed that VNAV was not selected.Fly more often.  But hard to do under COVID. Be more deliberate in accomplishing checklist especially at the gate before airborne when stress and task demand is low.


Second narrative: Departing ZZZZ at 1;500 feet power did not reduce to climb power. The Captain checked the takeoff pg X for altitudes; they were correct. At 3;000 feet the speed bug did not bug up for cleanup; that's when the Captain realized VNAV was not engaged. He engaged VNAV and I called for flap retraction on schedule.Cause - Recency in right seat. Monitoring. Refrain from staying heads down in the checklist. Confirm selected items.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported not following SOPs during the takeoff and departure phase and forgetting to select VNAV mode resulting in a delayed flap retraction. Captain stated lack of flying contributed to the event.
Date: 201509
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flight departed with 500 lbs less than planned/released. Release FOB was to be 22.7 and pushed with 22.5. Load planning sent a fuel slip for less fuel than what the flight was planned for. This is becoming a issue of safety of aircraft getting less fuel than released by dispatch without a phone call from Central Load Planning (CLP); station or pilot.The flight needs to be fueled to the released FOB per dispatch. If there is a discrepancy a phone call needs to be made. No one is speaking to one another and CLP is constantly shorting us fuel.




Synopsis: Flight Dispatcher reports that Central Load Planning is routinely sending fuel slips to flight crews for less fuel than called for on the dispatch release; and the crews are accepting it without question.
Date: 202110
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: This report is not connected to an event. It is something I have observed and consider a potential threat that I want to highlight. I have observed there are many locations on many airports where multiple stop bars are in close proximity to each other. As far as I know; there is no source document available that lets me know while taxiing which stop bar to use. The threat becomes that any plane could be stopped at the wrong stop bar and not allow sufficient wingtip clearance for a taxiing aircraft on a crossing taxiway. This situation develops when two stop bars are installed near each other for opposite direction traffic. For example; at EWR on Taxiway J there are two stop bars installed between taxiways S and R; one for each direction of travel to hold a taxiing plane short of the upcoming crossing taxiway inbound and outbound. They are so close that there could be an over lap and the possibility of stopping at the wrong one leaving insufficient clearance for a taxiing aircraft on a crossing taxiway. Another situation that poses this threat is a location where multiple taxiways converge. Stop bars are installed to provide clearance for each taxiway. Again it can be difficult to know which is the correct stop bar to use. An example here is again at EWR taxiing northbound on R. As you approach the B1 and L intersection there are as many as 4 stop bars in close proximity. Stopping at the wrong one many leave a risk of insufficient clearance from another aircraft.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier Captain reported stop bars placed in close proximity to each other at EWR causes confusion and stopping at the wrong one could block another aircraft's taxi route.