elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 12
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cheetah; Tiger; Traveler AA5 Series
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was practicing a partial panel approach and used my backup steam gauges instead of the primary glass display. It has been awhile since I used my backup instruments. I misread the altimeter by 1;000 ft. and got lower than intended. My safety pilot did not call out the issue until I dropped to around 500 ft. I've only switched to a glass display 2 years ago. The lesson I learned here is that remaining competent on older backup instruments is a skill that needs to be exercised regularly.




Synopsis: AA5 pilot reported misinterpreting his altimeter; resulting in a deviation from his assigned altitude.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Component problem: Design; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Aircraft was in the hangar for maintenance when I walked by the tow bar and noticed that it had standard AN Bolts installed in the head where shear pins should have been installed. I then tagged out this E-190 tow bar. I then called the GSE (Ground Service Equipment) vendor for it to be fixed. They never showed up to fix the bar. I then went to the gate to get a serviceable bar. There I found 2 more tow bars also with AN bolts installed. I tagged these out as well and notified my supervisor and manager. Towards the end of the shift I noticed that all the tow bars that I tagged earlier in the night had the tags removed and were not fixed.  I received a follow up email from management tonight saying that [the GSE vendor] had no supervisor on duty Sundays and that another employee from dayshift was going to check the bars. This is a serious safety issue someone is going to get hurt or Aircraft damage is going to happen.The GSE vendor employees seem to be inadequately trained; understaffed; and do not have the parts to fix the equipment properly. Also; the employees have a very hard time understanding what you are telling them is broken due to language barrier. There needs to be someone in charge on shift at all times at the Vendor GSE shop. The employees need to be retrained on the equipment they are maintaining and have access to parts. Need to communicate to employees that it is not all right to pull out of service tags without properly fixing the equipment. If the Vendor cannot properly maintain our equipment then it should be brought in house to the [company facility] GSE department. Safety needs to be made a priority at [our company].




Synopsis: Maintenance reported that 'unserviceable' tags were removed from several tow bars and; the tow bars were put back into service without being repaired.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: D01.TRACON, CO
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Second aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working all four arrival gates at AR3. I had Aircraft X descending on the LDORA2 RNAV arrival out of about FL190. Aircraft Y is made yellow on my scope and DR4 gets on the landline and says 'Aircraft Y I forced on your scope is direct MTJ at 170; can you force your Aircraft X down?' I responded 'Wilco'. I then told Aircraft X to expedite his descent through 160 to help the controller out. The two aircraft were on converging courses about 14 miles apart. I put a *T line on Aircraft Y to MTJ to find out that direct was not close to my arrival; but directly head on. I had to vector Aircraft X off the arrival to a 090 heading to avoid a loss of separation. I then heard the DR4 controller issue a heading of 260 to Aircraft Y; but had I not taken immediate action they would not have remained separated.The D01 SOP Pre-Arranged Coordination Procedures 'Look and Go' language is way too vague and gives departure controllers too much leeway. I feel this causes problems and events like this far too often. The old language was far more restrictive in that it only allowed 'Look and Go' on Denver departures I believe. This is not adequate either; but I believe a happy medium could and should be reached.




Synopsis: D01 controller describes a situation where an aircraft is displayed on his scope by another controller. Displaying controller asks other controller if he can miss his displayed aircraft. Separation is ensured by the controller turning his traffic 90 degrees away from the displayed traffic.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SNA.Airport, CA
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C SNA
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Second aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure; Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Developmental
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was receiving a position relief brief to take the PACR Sector. I was told that there was an aircraft in the departure list off SNA and that SNA Tower was coordinated with to miss the VFR traffic that was southeast bound along the shoreline at 3;500 FT. I had a slight question in my mind about what the exact coordination was; but I did not ask and took over the control position. The departure aircraft (a B737) came off of SNA climbing southbound; and did not call off the departure end at the normal hand off time. I assumed that SNA Tower was keeping the aircraft to give the 3;500 FT traffic (a C182). The B737 called me climbing out of 2;400 FT for 7;000 FT; and was on a converging course with the VFR traffic. The B737 did not call the traffic in sight or mention anything about the traffic. I immediately issued the traffic call; 'traffic 1 o'clock 1 mile eastbound along the shoreline at 3;500 FT; verify you have traffic in sight; if not in sight advise you stop your climb at 3;000 FT.'  At this time the B737 was out of about 2;600 FT; and although I did not think he would be able to stop the climb; it was the first and best response I had at the time. The B737 said searching for the traffic and then called in sight and requested a turn to the left. I said approved as requested. The C182 also called the traffic in sight. The B737 questioned the situation but did not call an RA or say that it was a problem; just that it is very hard to get VFR traffic along the shoreline in sight during the initial departure phase of flight off of SNA. I don't believe that we currently have a good solution to either stopping departures off SNA or giving the Tower traffic and expecting them to give the initial call to the departure aircraft. I believe that the B737 should have been stopped at 3;000 FT for the traffic and immediately switched to Departure for traffic calls and more controlled separation. I don't know what the answer is; but if situations like this continue to occur it is not an appropriate method for the airline customer.




Synopsis: SCT Controller described a conflict event between a SNA Air Carrier departure and a VFR overflight; the reporter suggesting some type of improved procedure between the Tower and TRACON.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B LAS
Aircraft component: Leading Edge Slat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Takeoff configuration warning. During takeoff roll approximately 130 kts the takeoff configuration warning activated. Takeoff weight was 161;000 lbs. Full aircraft. 24k power. I was the Captain and the First officer was Pilot Flying. The flaps; LE devices; and speed-brake were all in the correct position. The configuration warning then stopped. At some point I said 'continue'. This all happened in a short period of time. The takeoff configuration warning came back on about 147 kts. The aircraft was accelerating normally and there was not much runway left; 3000 ft. The configuration warning being intermittent it seemed the safest course of action was to continue the takeoff. We made an otherwise normal takeoff and continued to LAS. On the approach to LAS the LE Flaps transit light stayed on. We also got a low airspeed warning due to the amber band/min speed being incorrect. We made a normal 30 flap landing using the HUD AOA as a backup. Later; Maintenance determined that the LE flap up micro switch had malfunctioned. This was written up previously; a few days before. Perhaps more should have been done to understand why it happened the first time.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported a faulty leading edge slat micro switch caused two takeoff configuration warnings during takeoff roll.
Date: 202103
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Cleared for takeoff on Runway XXR at ZZZ. XX passengers. Aircraft GW about 125;000 lbs. Aircraft accelerated normally using auto-throttles. At about 80 knots; the Right Bleed Trip Off light illuminated. I immediately began the rejected take off procedure. The airspeed may have gotten as high as 90 knots before spoilers and brakes began to decelerate.  The aircraft slowed to taxi speed; we turned off at the first taxiway; and returned to the gate. No secondary indications or warning lights. No indication of hot brakes.Recency may have been a minor factor.  I had only flown once in the last 30 days. Maybe I could have begun the rejected take off even sooner if I had flown more recently and more often. Still; I think my reaction was pretty good. I believe my decision to abort was a good one.Recency could have been an issue. As soon as I saw the light; I checked the airspeed at 80 and decided to abort. Maybe if I had been flying more regularly; I could have caught the light and reacted even sooner. At any rate; the aircraft GW was 125;000; the deceleration was controlled; and another aircraft was immediately available.


Second narrative: Cleared for takeoff. Everything normal and as I said the 80 knots call we got an amber light. Captain asked what have we got; I responded with amber bleed trip light. He elected to reject at approximately 85-95 knots. Cleared runway at A taxiway .Technically speaking; we were just above 80 knots and should have continued but the Captain elected to reject the takeoff. We both discussed it at the gate and both agree that a lack of recent consistent flying may have caused 'quick trigger.'We could have done another quick reject/departure brief holding short to emphasize what reject procedures are.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported the Right Bleed Trip Off light illuminated during takeoff roll resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Date: 201903
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cabin Lighting
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: In preparation for water service toward the end of cruise; I grabbed a cold cup sleeve from the AFT galley overhead compartment on Aircraft right. The sleeve of cups was noticeably warm. Using the back of my hand; I felt the bottom of the compartment and recognized the surface directly over the galley light that is mounted under the compartment was extremely warm. Upon further inspection; the surface above all lights in the AFT galley that were mounted to illuminate the counter area were extremely warm. (Note: By this stage in flight; the lights had been on constantly for multiple hours.) I shared this observation with my FA (Flight Attendant) Crew and they said it wasn't uncommon for the surface to be so warm within this gallery configuration. While we didn't determine any imminent danger; the temperatures generated were remarkable and concerning.Determine if the extreme temperatures being produced are a potential hazard (melting plastics; burned fingers; fires; etc); and if so; mitigate and/or eliminate the hazard. Determine (perhaps in conjunction with the lighting manufacturer) what causes the increased temperatures: type of bulb; duration of lights being used; type of material around the bulb; etc. Investigate the lighting on this specific tail number. Investigate the lighting on all the aircraft with this same galley interior. Make a plan. Execute plan. Communicate any new actions or responsibilities FAs.




Synopsis: B737-800 Flight Attendant reported galley lighting configuration may cause overheat condition near light fixtures.
Date: 201807
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: It's not a particular event but a series of events. Basically I refused to fly for this company based at ZZZ; because the owner refuses to comply with 135 regulations and expected me to fly against the law. It was not easy to fly the little bit I did for them; but to my knowledge; the flights I did were legal. They were legal because I would get into an argument till he either got another pilot or did things right. The truth is that he is never there to exercise operational control because he is a pilot for [an airline]; so he is gone most of the time. The company operates under a Letter of Authorization; so there is no Director of Operations; no Chief Pilot; no Director of Maintenance; and only he can exercise operational control; but in reality it's his secretary who knows nothing about aviation; who calls the shots in this company while he is unavailable. It was a constant argument about time off and duty. He considered a day that I didn't fly as time off; and he also expected us to be on call that day. [The owner] occasionally flies the Lear while nobody is looking. He also expects me to plan and execute flights beyond the airplane capability; in this case its fuel limits; he says to disregard the 'Predicted' fuel amount shown by the FMS; and to just pull the power back and I will arrive at destination with plenty of fuel....he said he had done it many times. It seems stupid to continue a flight to an airport when the FMS is telling you that you are landing with less than safe amount of fuel. This man shouldn't be allowed to operate any aircraft; let alone manage a [135] and try to force pilots to fly in an unsafe manner. I have been doing this for 35 years and operate within the law; which this guy was not expecting when he hired me last September 2017. I put in my two weeks notice. I don't work for crooks.




Synopsis: Air taxi Captain reported the owner 'refused to comply with 135 regulations and expected me to fly against the law.'
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Phenom 100
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Miss interpretation of RUUDY 4 departure procedure. The altitude at WENTZ was supposed to be a hard altitude of 1;500 FT MSL and I misread it as 'at or above 1;500 FT.' I overshot the altitude by 200 FT. There was no conflict.




Synopsis: EMB100 Captain reports exceeding the WENTZ crossing restriction during the RUUDY4 departure from TEB. The departure procedure was misread as at or above 1;500 FT at WENTZ.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Flight phase: Other Non-Flight
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We were scheduled to operate a flight with a show time [before 5 am]. As we were walking out the door; I received a phone call from scheduling. They stated our show time had been pushed back [6 hours]. They still have us scheduled to complete our trip; which has us scheduled for a 14:27 hour duty day. FAR 117 has us a maximum duty day of 12 hours plus the two hour extension if we agree to it. They are circumnavigating this rule by converting us to short call; which is not reflected on our schedule allowing them to add four hours to the RAP; which brings us to 16 hours of duty. As line holders; this should not be allowed. We were not notified until we were leaving the hotel; which resulted in us being ready to go; and unable to go back to sleep. They knew about this last night and did not contact us. They should not be allowed to do this; the FAR 117 rules exist for a reason. Converting us from line holders to a RAP of 16 hours when we are awake for the entire portion is not okay.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer pilot reported that after resting and getting ready for an early morning flight; scheduling called and pushed back the show time past the maximum duty day.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Military Transport
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Refueling
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Second aircraft: Military Bomber
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was refueling eastbound with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z.  Aircraft X's data block reflected FL270B300 and RVSM capable.  The Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z aircraft flight plans were non-RVSM capable thus making the Aircraft X's flight during the refueling status non-RVSM as well.  Aircraft X's remarks stated FL270B290 so I don't know why it was changed to 4000 feet block unless it was someone's misguided attempt to protect for the non-RVSM status.  We corrected the equipment modifier for the Aircraft X flight to reflect it's non-RVSM status and informed the next controller that Aircraft X was RVSM capable and only the refueling aircraft were not.  We also informed Aircraft X to let the controller know when they split up that he was RVSM capable.Correctly reflect in the flight plan the status of all aircraft flying in a block formation of its RVSM status.




Synopsis: ZME Controller describes a refueling flight that is non-RVSM capable due to the two aircraft that are refueling are not capable.