elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was landing Runway XX at ZZZ.  It was a normal centerline approach to landing.  As I touched down; the nose gear seemed to touch before it should have; as if the nose gear strut was in an extended rather than a normal (compressed) position.  Within moments of touchdown; the aircraft darted quickly to the left of Runway XX;  I lost directional control of the aircraft. The aircraft came to an abrupt stop at the side of the runway. No one was injured in this incident.




Synopsis: Commercial Single Pilot reported loss of directional control during landing.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HEF.Airport, VA
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was piloting an aircraft with two passengers aboard. The passenger in the right seat was an A&P and student pilot with over 40 hours of flight training. The passenger in the back was a multi-thousand hour commercial pilot and flight instructor with a significant amount of IFR experience; especially into and around HEF. Our IFR flight to HEF was coming to an end as we were being stepped down and vectored from the west onto the ILS 16L approach into HEF. We were working with Potomac Approach on 128.525 MHz at the time. Regarding altitude; I was first directed to descend from 4;000 feet MSL to 3;000 feet MSL; after which I read back and initiated the descent. Shortly after I was directed to descend from 3;000 feet MSL to 2;000 feet MSL; which I also read back and initiated. Passing through 2;200 feet I was contacted by the controller who asked what I was doing; and then informed that I was to only descend to 2;600 feet. When replying that I had heard an assigned altitude of 2;000 feet; I was then informed that we were below the sector's minimum vectoring altitude and asked if I was able to maintain visual separation with the terrain. Being in solid IMC I replied in the negative; and immediately initiated a climb back to 2;600 feet. Both of my passengers- each with a unique degree of aviation experience- attested to having also heard an assigned altitude of 2;000 feet. Soon afterwards we were cleared for the approach and the flight concluded uneventfully.




Synopsis: On approach to HEF in IMC; there was a breakdown in communication about an assigned altitude between the pilot and the Controller.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: OMDB.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Fatigue; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Flying the route from OMDB to Asia crosses several Radio/Radar Control sectors. These sectors; Kolkatta; Dhaka; Yangon all have sub standard radio equipment and radar. On a good day it is difficult at best to understand the controllers and comply with instructions. Total and intense concentration is required during a low circadian rhythm time for crew. We were scheduled for XA:38 on this leg with only two crew members; no RFO was on board. Complicated and involved instructions are now in place for crossing Yangon airspace. These instructions require both the pilot flying and pilot monitoring to handle radios at several designated fixes throughout the flight. Transmitting in the blind; monitoring blind frequency; monitoring 121.5 and having to call on VHF and HF frequencies; while occasionally relaying information for other aircraft makes for a very intense ATC environment. Had severe weather been in place the workload would have significantly increased as would the fatigue. This leg requires an RFO; period! Flight time is irrelevant due to the complicated ATC environment. The workload is unacceptable for a crew of 2. The pilot flying must take away from his duties and responsibility to assist with pilot monitoring issues; radio control and navigation.  Better company administration and instruction of complicated procedures needs to take priority and communicated to the flight crews in a timely manner. The instructions for this route are buried deep in the flight planning pages. This procedure is worthy of a company notice and needs to be highlighted to the crews.




Synopsis: A First Officer describes the extreme workload of a two man flight crew operating nearly 8 flight hours at night between the Middle East and Asia while communicating with controllers in poor English; at times on two frequencies.
Date: 201908
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon departure from ZZZ; the aircraft did not want to rotate. With a reasonably light load; the [Weight and Balance Calculation] gave us flaps 15 with a trim setting of roughly 6.0. I thought it was strange that we were that light and it was commanding a flaps 15 takeoff. The First Officer and I discussed it and thought it was simply due to the [Weight and Balance] system commanding a very reduced thrust. I also thought it was kind of strange that we didn't have a Zone count; but the Operations Agent said it was not required. All bags were loaded in the front cargo and; as it turned out; about 80 of the passengers were in Zone A. We did not know about the passenger loading until climbout; when I queried the Flight Attendant about seating.He confirmed all passengers were in Zone A. I had him redistribute the passengers among the cabin. During the takeoff roll; the First Officer was Pilot Flying; I called V1 and rotate. He pulled back but nothing happened. He pulled further until the yoke was nearly at full travel and the aircraft reluctantly rotated. He proceeded to trim to nearly 10 units of nose up trim in order to relieve some of the required back pressure. During first segment climb; with high AOA; we experienced uncommanded roll and pitch reminiscent of a wake turbulence encounter; but there was no preceding aircraft. The First Officer lowered the nose and the event stopped. The rest of the flight was uneventful and I requested a loading audit while enroute. When something seems strange; there may be a reason why.A loading error of this magnitude could easily be deadly in a short airport like ZZZ. By the time we realized the problem; had we been slightly heavier and tried to reject; we would been a giant fireball in the street.A Zone count should be mandatory for all 737-800 aircraft.There MAY be a glitch in the [Weight and Balance] system with light loads. It needs to be looked at.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain reported weight and balance was out of limits; resulting in aircraft control issue during takeoff.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CAE.Airport, SC
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C CAE
ATC / advisory: TRACON CAE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The M20 was in route at 9;000 FT; west to east. The CRJ200 was a departure off CAE Runway 11. Traffic was slow and I only had 4 planes I think. I established radar contact with the CRJ200 on departure and put him on course to ATL. The CRJ200 was out of about 4;000 FT when I switched him to ZJX. At the time the conflict with the 9;000 FT overflight M20 was about 15 to 20 miles away and I did not see it. I saw the conflict when the aircraft were about 6 to 7 miles apart and opposite direction to each other. I called to the aircraft I was talking to (the M20) and told him to turn right heading 180 immediately; and then gave him the traffic call. I did not wait for the response and keyed the ZJX Center line and said turn the CRJ200 north my guy is going south. Both aircraft were on east/west lines opposite direction to each other. The CRJ200 heading 270; the M20 heading 090. I again called the M20 to turn right heading 180 immediately with no response. I made the call again; no response. Then the M20 called and said are you calling me?  And I realized I had been using the wrong call sign. The call sign had a 'W' and I had been calling 'M'. The aircraft passed thanks to TCAS and a RA alert. I immediately asked the Supervisor for relief. This near midair was completely my fault. I was complacent and focused on the departure. I gave him the same thing we always give them. The slowness of the position and routine of the departure lolled me into a false sense of awareness. I will never again take the routine operation of the departure; or for that matter any operation be it only one plane for granted again. I have 30 years ATC experience and this goes to show you can never let your guard down. I deeply regret my failure and realize that if TCAS had not been on the aircraft the outcome could have been catastrophically horrible. I have learned from this error and will be forever diligent.




Synopsis: CAE Departure Controller describes an airborne conflict that he allowed to develop between a CRJ200 climbing and a M20 at 9;000 FT. An incorrect call sign was used to turn the M20 and ultimately a TCAS RA aboard the CRJ separated the two aircraft.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CPR.Tower, WY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E CPR
ATC / advisory: TRACON CPR
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local; Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Approach
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was on Local Control as Controller in Charge. I noticed that Aircraft X was coming in at an altitude lower than the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) the aircraft was in. I pulled a full route of the flight plan to see if the aircraft was filed on a Victor Airway and Aircraft X was not; the aircraft was filed at 11000 feet. I instructed the Approach Controller to wait until the aircraft cleared the MVA to take the handoff.


Second narrative: While working Approach/Departure Control Aircraft X was inbound from the Southwest direct CPR airport. According to the Full Route the aircraft was direct CPR at 11000 feet. The Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) along the route of flight was 11200 feet. I did not accept the handoff from ZDV Sector 22 until the aircraft was located in a lower MVA 3 miles from our boundary due to the aircraft at 11100 in the 11200 MVA.


Synopsis: CPR Local Controller reported the Approach Controller was being handed off an aircraft from the Center indicating 100 feet below the MVA. He ordered the Approach Controller to not take the handoff until the aircraft was in a lower MVA.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying to 11R from the southeast. The winds were favoring the use of runway 16 and traffic was using 16. To enter a left downwind for 16 I planned to overfly the field; perpendicular to the runway at 2;000 feet and join using a teardrop to enter on the 45 degree angle. I made calls on unicom 10 and 5 miles out. Once about 2.5 miles out; another aircraft called in stating he was approximately 5 miles west and would be entering a right downwind for 16. I made another call stating I was 2.5 miles east of the field; would be overflying the field and performing a teardrop entry to left downwind. He called back to say he too would enter a left downwind. As I was performing my descending teardrop making my final turn to downwind I saw him crossing the departure end of runway 16 at what appeared to be 600 feet AGL. He then called traffic in sight and stated he would fly a tight pattern; which he did although his traffic pattern caused me to alter mine as I didn't want to get close to him. I stayed a little high and flew a wide; extended base to allow him time to land and clear the active.My biggest concern with his flying was crossing the departure end of runway 16 at approximately 600 feet AGL; which could have easily caused a mid air collision had he not seen an airplane departing. My secondary concern was him flying an improper pattern to cut me off to land faster while not stating his actual intentions until after performing his maneuvers.




Synopsis: The pilot reported that he widened his pattern at 11R to allow space for another aircraft who flew a tight pattern inside of him.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PC-12
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Second aircraft: Learjet 60
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There was training on the Handoff position and the trainee was a little behind causing data blocks to overlap and handoffs were slow which caused the sector to be more chaotic than normal. I descended Aircraft X from 16;000 feet to 10;000 feet with Aircraft Y at 13;000 feet opposite direction. I turned Aircraft X from a 250 heading to a 310 heading after I realized Aircraft X wasn't descending according to aircraft specifications. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y. When he reported traffic in sight; I told him to maintain visual separation. Aircraft Y replied and advised me he received an RA. I gave traffic to Aircraft X that Aircraft Y had him in sight and is maintaining visual separation.I should have used vertical separation.




Synopsis: A ZNY ARTCC Controller descended an aircraft through the altitude of opposite direction traffic.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Emergency Brake System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: This flight is this inbound flight of an out and back trip. The MEL 29-24-01 was still in effect during this flight and as on the previous leg I could not complete a preflight alternate brake check accumulator check or confirm good pressure with the parking brake set. The same agencies were contacted and consulted with again and the information given to me was that the MX Check done by MX covered for my checks. No reference or procedure for crew in MEL 29-24-01. As before I made sure chocks and tug in place to back up parking brake until an engine was started. Incomplete MEL procedures led the crew to seek info and advice from other sources.


Second narrative: Leg #2 dispatched with Mel 29-24-01 Yellow system electric pump inop. Again; unable to verify brake accumulator pressure during Captains pre-flight check and on before start checklist due to MEL procedure causing brake accumulator pressure to be low/ inadequate. There was no guidance in (o) or (m) procedures for this MEL that addressed this. When the Captain asked the AMT about this; he said that the accumulator was good. More importantly; there are no alternate procedures for pushback to ensure both the normal & alternate brake systems are adequately pressurized. We did not have any problems with pushback or brakes during leg 2. Flight was uneventful.I believe the Mel procedure was inadequate in that it doesn't address maintenance's check being used instead of the Captain's pre-flight requirement to check the alternate brake system as well as; the pressure check on the before start checklist. There are no (o) procedures to tell crew how to properly check alternate brakes system and pressure on before start checklist. Additionally; it doesn't address alternate pushback procedures with this item deferred. There needs to be (m) and (o) alternate pushback procedures.


Synopsis: A300 Flight Crew is dispatched with MEL 29-24-01 for an inoperative Yellow electric pump. The MEL does not allow the Captain to check the Yellow system/accumulator pressure prior to engine start nor does the MEL require maintenance to perform the check. The reporters believe that both the MEL and the push back procedures need to be modified to accommodate this MEL.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: CON.Airport, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: M-20 J (201) / Allegro
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was practicing multiple approaches to the CON airport in night VFR conditions. My second approach was the ILS 35 which I elected to fly at 2;400 ft to remain under the overlying 2;500 ft Class C airspace at MHT to the south. After completing the procedure turn I was descending inbound on the glideslope when another aircraft called me on unicom and said BOS Center would like me to contact them.I called BOS and was asked if I was aware of the MHT class C airspace. I responded that I was and explained I purposely flew the approach at 2;400 ft to remain under the class C. I was told by the Controller the Class C is at 2;000 ft and in the future I must contact them before attempting the ILS to 35 at CON.As I continued to fly the missed approach I was approx 1 mile north of the CON airport when the BOS controller called me again and said that 'after checking the chart' the airspace in question was indeed 2;500 ft but it would be good policy to contact them prior to flying close to the Class C.At no time during the ILS 35 approach did my aircraft climb above 2;400 ft. There was very little wind and I flew the approach as published which clearly kept me out of the MHT Class C airspace; however to avoid any potential confusion in the future I will contact BOS center when operating near the Class C.




Synopsis: Mooney M20 pilot reported being advised by BOS ATC to contact them before operating in close proximity to the overlying Class C airspace.