elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: FL360 is the bottom of [Other Center] Sector 45; FL350 and below is [Other Center] Sector 47. These 2 sectors are often combined. [Reporters Center] has control for descent from [Other Center]; but point out is required to [Other Center] Sector 47 if 45 and 47 are split. [Other Center] Sector 45 and 47 were split. OJT in progress at the D-side. Aircraft X at FL360 westbound in [Other Center] 45 airspace getting a bad ride; lower was better. Aircraft requested lower and R-side descended aircraft to FL340. No point out was made to [Other Center] 47. We were not aware of this event until 4 hours later. I do not recall what was happening at the time other than listening to the replay.I think we could use the draw function to note on the scope when 45 is open.


Second narrative: We have control for descent per the LOA with [Other Center]. I was currently training on the D side. [Other Center] 45 and 47 are usually combined but at this time they were not. [Other Center] Sector 47 is from SFC-350; [Other Center] Sector 45 is from 360-UNL. Aircraft X checked on at FL 360 and requested descent to FL340; due to bad rides. The R side did this without any prior pointout or coordination being done.We could write on the scope when 45 is open; especially when training.


Synopsis: Center Controller reported an airspace violation.
Date: 201201
Location: MMID.ARTCC, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center MMID
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Enroute to MMUN at FL380; I was pilot flying and Captain; pilot not flying. Both heard loud pop and immediately noticed R1 cockpit window had cracked. We put on O2 masks immediately as we assessed the situation. Captain took control of aircraft and I got the QRH out. We accomplished window damage checklist. After contacting Maintenance and Dispatch we were told to divert. Dispatch provided us new weather and fuel burn and was given new clearance to our diversion airport. We had to burn off 11;000 LBS of fuel to land at Max landing weight. We landed uneventfully.




Synopsis: B737-700 R1 windshield shattered at FL380. After complying with QRH procedures and consulting maintenance; the crew diverts to a suitable airport.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was training a Student. We were busy with Runway 13R arrivals. A PA32 called. The Trainee instructed him to depart GREGS heading 120. There was no other traffic in the vicinity and at his speed; we had some time before we would need to get back to him. The next thing we knew; the adjacent position Controller; who wasn't busy; informed us that the PA32 had turned northbound back into the Center's airspace. We called the aircraft and tried to get him turned back around in the direction he was supposed to be going. He advised us that he had instrument problems and I assumed a directional gyro (DG) problem and told the student to issue 'no gyro vectors'. I took the position when the Student was unsure about issuing the no gyro vectors and asked the Supervisor to open another position to take the Runway 13R traffic off our frequency. I also asked the adjacent Controller to call the 2 Center sectors near the PA32 and advise them of the problem. It turned out that the pilot was unable to maintain directional control. I changed my mind from instrument trouble to a pilot with vertigo. At this point I simply advised the pilot that he was still turning and asked him to simply keep the airplane straight and level. This went on for a little while; during which the PA32 also climbed from 040 to 060. Once or twice he seemed to stabilize but then would lose control again. He finally got the aircraft enough under control that we were able to vector him for and ILS approach. He went below his assigned altitude when being cleared for the ILS and reported the airport in sight. At this time; we cleared him for a visual approach switched him to the Tower. He answered but failed to do so with his call sign. However; he was having enough problems and didn't need anything else to confuse him so we didn't berate him over the no call sign. Recurrent training for the pilot on partial panel procedures and following the instruments when disoriented.




Synopsis: Enroute Controller initiated 'no gyro vectors' to an aircraft that was experiencing difficulties complying with assigned headings; the reporter recommending more pilot training to prevent future occurrences.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: APU Pneumatic System & Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During preflight; the APU was started and the packs were turned on. Shortly after APU air was initiated; a foul smell began to emanate from the ECS. The smell was a strong body-odor/burnt onion odor. After some time; my eyes began to burn and I developed a slight headache. The odor did not get better; it only got worse. When it was determined we were experiencing a fume event; the CA immediately stopped boarding; de-planed; and maintenance took the aircraft out of service. All agencies were notified (Ramp; Ops; Mx; Flight Leadership). The entire crew went to the ZZZ clinic to get checked out. I was rescheduled to operate a later flight to ZZZ1 after the event. However; after being seen by the clinic physician and in the interest of flight safety; I chose not to operate the re-scheduled leg.




Synopsis: B737-800 First Officer reported a fume event during boarding resulting in flight cancellation and entire flight crew received medical evaluation due to physiological symptoms.
Date: 202111
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: F11.TRACON, FL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B MCO
ATC / advisory: TRACON F11
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: MCO was north and Aircraft X was climbing via the EPCOT SID except maintaining 16 thousand; Aircraft X failed to comply with the BLOSM crossing at or below 7;000 and continued a climb up to approximately 085 feet prior to reaching BLOSM. Aircraft X was turned left to 240 heading to avoid conflict with Aircraft Y.  Had Aircraft Y been further along the STAR lateral track only TCAS would have prevented a NMAC.We have had several of these events since we started using Climb Via procedures while on a North operation.  I believe this has something to do with the top altitude published on the SID's; 'as assigned by ATC.'  The tower sends clearances with a top altitude of 7 thousand via PDC.  Then when the aircraft departs; approach uses either 'except maintain 16 thousand' to comply with crossing restrictions or 'climb and maintain 16 thousand' if no restrictions are needed while climbing on the SID.It is my belief that when pilots are climbing via the SID; they have a higher probability of making an error by erroneously deleting the BLOSM crossing of 7 thousand when they hear; 'except maintain 16 thousand.'As a result; I suggest several things to continue climb via with safety in mind: First; we need to publish SID's on a North Operation with a Top Altitude of 16 thousand.  Second; while we are waiting for the SID's to be re-published; MCO ATCT will need to begin communicating 16 thousand as the top altitude when departing north.  The tower can accomplish this via PDC or while the aircraft is taxiing to the runway with Ground Control.  We want the pilots to input this information when they're in a position of less task saturation.If we're unable to do the above steps or a variation of; then we need to discontinue climb via procedures for safety of the NAS.




Synopsis: F11 TRACON Controller reported a problem with a departure from MCO and an arrival aircraft that led to an airborne conflict.
Date: 201909
Aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Flight Dynamics Navigation and Safety
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: As we progress into domestic CPDLC capability and use; have we examined the necessity for encrypted CPDLC communications? We had a technical glitch a few years ago on the NATs (North Atlantic Tracks) where one of our planes got an unsolicited climb instruction from ATC. They contacted ATC via voice and confirmed it was erroneous; so a potentially deadly conflict was avoided. If we have CPDLC in airspace that is much more congested than the NATs and someone wanted to disrupt ATC operations; sow confusion and potentially cause midair collisions; how hard will it be for them to hack into this system and send CPDLC messages to either ATC or aircraft? If 10 aircraft; all within 20 nm of each other; got hacked ATC instructions and only half acted on those messages; the potential for catastrophic results are very high. Encrypting CPDLC communications is essential to the integrity and reliability of our ATC system.




Synopsis: B767 Captain reported unsolicited ATC instructions and suggested CPDLC encryption.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-83
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Tires
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: With the air pressure gauges taken off the MD-80 tires; there is no way [for flight crew] to check the tire pressure. Referred to the logbook; but was unable to tell when the last Tire Pressure Check was completed; so Maintenance was summoned before sunrise; local time. Upon Contract Maintenance's arrival and pressure check; it was found that all six tires were 10-15 psi below the minimum levels. Maintenance filled the tires and the flight departed one hour late without further incident. Tire pressure gauges are needed for the flight crews; or [have] regularly scheduled and logged; tire pressure checks [accomplished] by Maintenance.




Synopsis: A First Officer describes why air pressure gauges should be reinstalled on wheel assemblies for their MD-80 aircraft; after all six tires were found 10-15 psi below minimum levels. Due to lack of available information; he had requested tire pressures be checked during his preflight.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MCO.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E F11
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approximately 30 NM northwest of MCO; I was climbing to avoid turbulence. I am proficient in the use of older; steam gauge; aircraft instrumentation; but brand new to the 'glass cockpit' such as the Garmin 1000 installed in this rental aircraft. I had taken some ground instruction in the use of the system before my checkout in the aircraft and had flown it during the checkout. However; I had cancelled a flight the previous day due to marginal VFR weather; as I was not completely sure of my familiarity with the new system. But when I was flying today; in complete VFR; the flight instruments such as altitude were not in their familiar places and; although I thought I had leveled off; I was still climbing and may have penetrated the floor of the Orlando Class B airspace while I was checking my position relative to that airspace. When I noticed the problem; I descended and moved on a course away from the Class B airspace. I think it is important that pilots new to glass cockpits become aware that the transition to the new instrumentation is confusing at first; and far from the 'almost insignificant' change many pilots think it is. I am now reviewing both the operational manual for the G1000 as well as reviewing the video tutoring lessons available online. In addition I am forcing myself to use the older gauges as confirmation and backup when using the newer instrumentation.




Synopsis: The pilot of a rental DA-40; unfamiliar with the 'glass cockpit' Garmin Avionics Suite failed to note his continued climb beneath the MCO Class B and may have inadvertently entered it.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: [I was] advised a flight attendant experienced fume event.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported being notified a Flight Attendant had experienced a fumes event.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: APU was deferred; so commenced with a bottle start of the right engine. Noticed the pressure seemed low (18-25psi?); engaged starter and introduced fuel at N1 indication.  I was anticipating a failed starter cutout and put my finger on the Starter Cutout switchlight. Spool up was gradual; then IIT quickly went above 900deg. Captain called for engine shutdown and I inadvertently pressed the starter cutout instead of moving the thrust lever to Fuel Shut Off position. By the time I realized what I did and before I could shut down the engine; ITT was below 900deg and the engine indication were moving toward normal indication so we elected to not shutdown. Since the HOT icon didn't appear and we knew the reason for the high ITT (low bottle pressure) we decided it was safe to continue. At [destination] we discussed the situation with Maintenance and told us we need to write it up.I was anticipating a failed starter cutout (almost every bottle start requires the manual selection of starter cutout) and improperly responded to the Captain's call for an engine shut down. There was potential engine damage if the engine didn't return to normal parameters with the delay of the engine shutdown.I need to slow down and not presume what is going to happen. Review engine shut down parameters before a bottle start. A question I have is why there are no guidelines for minimum psi for a bottle start like there is for the Cross Bleed start?  At what psi should you not attempt a start?  I am not sure but at one time didn't we have guidelines for the minimum pressure of a bottle/huffer start?




Synopsis: CRJ-200 First Officer reported responding inappropriately to a hot start and then failing to write up the anomaly.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.ARTCC, FO
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Software and Automation
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: GPS jamming encountered between XA21Z and XA52Z at 33;000 feet.  Jamming resulted in immediate loss of ADS-B and GPS left and right.  Once jamming ceased all system function returned to normal.  Informed ATC immediately of the jamming and then again informed ATC when our actual navigation performance was going to require vectors.  As soon as I notified ATC that we were at the point of navigation degradation beyond acceptable performance;  the jamming ceased immediately.  I believe the parties responsible were monitoring ATC frequencies. [Cause was] Some form of GPS Jamming - extremely long period. It usually happens for much shorter periods that is less than 3 minutes. Identify the parties responsible and remove them from the equation.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain flying over foreign territory reported GPS jamming which ceased as soon as the Captain notified ATC.
Date: 202002
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicat
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: No warning or cautions occurred throughout flight. when engine were shutdown at gate; both ENG 1 & 2 showed EGT limitation exceeded; temp 535 in red. we reported EGT to Maintenance with logbook Maintenance write up. Maintenance said it may have been an engine code warning and they would look into it. Crew did not know when or where exceedance took place.




Synopsis: First Officer reported after shutdown at gate both engines showed EGT exceedances; with no crew recollection of it happening.