Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At or about 2;000 feet AGL we got 2 EICAS messages and the auto brakes clicked off. The messages were RH brake fault and LH brake fault. I was the pilot flying so I took the radios and the captain checked the QRH. Upon checking the QRH the captain did not believe that a go around was necessary. He stated that the QRH had a ground reset procedure and there was a note that said to expect asymmetrical braking on landing. He also stated that it said if appropriate see the next page. I agreed that in that case a go around was not necessary and we could land normally knowing that we had almost twice the amount of required landing distance even if there was an issue. I had repeatedly considered going around but I was thrown off by fact that the messages were blue in color. That was one of the main reasons that I agreed with the captain's assessment. After landing and relooking at the QRH we realized our error; the QRH says to accomplish the checklists not 'when appropriate'. Upon landing in the rush of talking on two different frequencies and accomplishing the necessary after landing items I delayed looking at the status page to check the brakes. Upon reaching the ramp; we got a brake overheat message. The Captain immediately stopped the aircraft and asked me to call for fire trucks. I did so and then ran the QRH for Brake overheat. I then informed ops of the fact that we needed to be chalked and eventually towed in. The captain let the flight attendants and the passengers know of the situation and to remain seated. I sent a message to dispatch informing them. The fire department arrived and cooled the brakes with fans and we were towed to the gate with no further incident.This could have been prevented by being more conservative with our decision after the fault appeared. It was a rushed process that led to a faulty decision. Colors of indications are very prominently relied on in our training; I will not; focus so much on the color of the message from now on but will simply make the cautious decision to go around and dig deeper if something like this ever happens again.


Second narrative: I gave the radios to the First Officer (FO) while I checked the QRH. The QRH had a ground reset procedure; to expect asymmetrical braking; and directed me to reference page 13-10 when appropriate. In a rush on short final I believed this meant if needed. The FO asked if we were good to land. I decided that since the messages were advisory and they were faults; I assumed that only one channel of the brake control modules were inoperative we would have normal braking and we had nearly twice the amount of runway as our factored distance so I said yes. As I taxied into the ramp area the BRAKE OVERTEMP message illuminated. I stopped; did not set the brake; and had the FO run that checklist and check the brake temps. The outboard brakes were hot the inboard brakes were indicating a little more than the outside temperature. We had the ground crew hook the plane up to the tug so we could release the brakes. We also had the fire crew inspect the plane with their thermal imaging equipment. The fire crew also put fans by the wheels to help cooling.Had I told the FO to just 'go around' I would have handled the situation appropriately. If I did not rush the decision; I would not have made the error of not doing the checklist properly.


Synopsis: An ERJ-175 EICAS alerted BRK LH FAULT and BRK RH FAULT when the landing gear were lowered. The crew incorrectly decided the EICAS was an advisory alert because it was colored blue. After landing; overheated brakes required the aircraft be chocked while Fire Crews cooled the brakes with fans prior to a tow to the gate.