Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Approach Control vectored us in too close and too high to get properly established on the ILS to Runway 27. I was PM; and said to my F/O; 'this isn't going to work by 1000 ft' (we were at 3000 ft MSL and the PF was urgently configuring the flaps to 30 degrees). I told Approach Control; 'we're going around.'  The PF added power; but allowed the nose to pitch up too high; giving us an 'airspeed' vocal warning. I know the PF corrected somewhat; with the pitch; by lowering the nose; but again; the nose pitched up and we got a second airspeed vocal warning. I was moving the flap lever to 15 degrees (I think?) when we got the first airspeed alert. After the second warning; the PF pushed aggressively down on the yoke to get airspeed back. I said 'level off;' with his more aggressive maneuver; which he did (and airspeed was accelerating; now). We got vectors back around for another approach and landed without incident.Mishandling on the PF's part of a go-around maneuver; and my own mishandling; as a Captain; not to take controls and be ready to help 'coach thru' a dramatic maneuver as a go-around; which is rarely done and unexpected.


Second narrative: We decided a go-around was more appropriate. I commenced the go-around and asked for flaps 15. I asked for flaps 15 a second time. At this point we got an 'airspeed too low' warning. I corrected the airspeed and once again asked for flaps 15; and once again got a second 'airspeed too low' warning; and corrected the airspeed. At this point I maintained level flight; and the Pilot Monitoring; and I configured the aircraft for clean and level flight. We were vectored around for another approach and landed.The approach should not have been continued. I should have commenced the go-around once it was apparent the glideslope was too low. There was a clear disconnect between the Crew. Only one was flying the aircraft and the other was talking to ATC. The go-around maneuver was not completed together; in a timely manner; resulting in the error. The Pilot Monitoring and Pilot Flying coordination was lost. We seldom perform go-around maneuvers; and can be caught off guard. We briefed the go-around procedures on the Jepps; but we should mentally or verbally go over the maneuver.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported letting the airspeed get low on a go-around maneuver from an unstabilized approach.