Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was working Departure position. Aircraft X checked in climbing to 2;000 feet which is an unusual altitude since departures are issued 5;000 feet unless otherwise coordinated. I climbed the aircraft to 7;000 feet to remain within my airspace. Aircraft Y was on a limited data tower (T) tag heading northbound. The Conflict Alert went off and I issued traffic to Aircraft X who was about to merge with Aircraft Y that appeared to be on a southbound heading.I had no knowledge that Aircraft Y was operating within the confines of the departure corridor at 2;600 feet. No coordination was ever done with me about the aircraft or that departures would be climbing to 2;000 feet only. I did not see the aircraft operating in the departure corridor at an altitude that; in my opinion; is unsafe. T (Tower) tags are seen constantly throughout the day because numerous helicopters; state police; Miami police; and emergency aircraft operate within the Tower Area 500 feet or below. Any other unusual situation or aircraft that would be operating at a different altitude is coordinated with appropriate sectors; however; this was not done with me.After the event it was brought to my knowledge that the other Departure Controller coordinated with the Local Controller in the tower for Aircraft Y to be in the area doing survey/photo air work. The Supervisor in the TRACON verbally coordinated with the approach controllers about the aircraft as he ventured into the approach airspace as well. No coordination verbally; or a point-out was ever done with me. Aircraft Y also had 18 TARP (Traffic Analysis and Review Tool) hits on him which shows that he was in an unsafe area to be working.It is unsafe to be issuing departing aircraft 2;000 because they could become a conflict with low level IFR aircraft that operate 10 miles from MIA at 2;000 feet. Aircraft should not be allowed to operate at the altitude in such close proximity to the airport especially at times of arrival or departure banks. Coordination/Communication needs to be done with all sectors prior to allowing an unusual situation to occur. The controller that is initially coordinating and approving air work to be done needs to communicate with all other sectors and controllers that will be impacted. They must 'close the loop' and not leave sectors in the dark or without information that is going to impact their operation.Aircraft doing air work in the departure corridor should be speaking with a Departure Controller or if they are on the Tower frequency then departure aircraft should not be switched to the departure controller until they are not a factor with the other aircraft on the Tower frequency. Traffic should be issued to the Departing aircraft by the Local controller if he has both aircraft on his frequency. We should not jeopardize the safety of the operation and multiple passenger airlines for someone who wants to take pictures during busy times of the day. It is not unusual for controllers to feel pressured by the supervisor in charge to accommodate these photo missions or aircraft doing survey work even at times when the controllers feel it is unsafe to be allowing it. The dynamic needs to be changed. If a controller feels that an aircraft working in a location is going to impact the operation or the safety of the operation they should be supported by the supervisor not pressured to be put in an uncomfortable working environment. The supervisor also needs to be making sure that ALL CONTROLLER AND SECTORS that will be impacted are informed; coordinated with and on board with the unusual situation that will be occurring.


Second narrative: I was the First Officer and PF on Aircraft X. We were instructed to line up and wait. Our clearance was to climb to 5;000 feet via an ATC assigned heading. The previous departure was told to level off at 2;000 feet so we had the discussion to be aware this could also receive a similar change in clearance. We were cleared to take off; assigned heading 270. Once airborne we were instructed to level off at 2;000 feet. We did. As we were cleaning up; we were instructed to climb to 7;000 feet from Departure Control. I initiated a climb; with autopilot on. Climbing through approximately 3;500 feet; we received a 'TRAFFIC TRAFFIC' alert from TCAS. I remained on instruments while the Captain looked for the traffic. As he pointed to the traffic; I looked up at the window to my right and saw a light twin at same altitude in a very sharp to its right; and a shallow climb in extremely close proximity to us and our flight path.We had a pretty good climb rate going at the time but didn't feel that it was sufficient to maintain safe separation from the light twin. As I was in transition back to instruments and about to disconnect the autopilot; I heard the TCAS advise 'MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPPEED'. Simultaneously I elected to go to TOGA (maximum available power) to get a better climb rate going as TCAS commanded 'INCREASE CLIMB'. Again; I had the initial feeling that since we were already at CLIMB POWER and at max climb for that power setting; TOGA was needed to get the initial climb we needed to stay clear of that traffic. Once I heard 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' and the Captain confirmed; I returned to normal climb profile and climb power; reengaged the AP and confirmed that the aircraft was in proper configuration for that phase of flight and the FMC was indicating desired autopilot functions to continue with ATC instructions.The Captain notified ATC of the conflict; RA; and recovery and that we were going to file a report on this event. The Controller replied that they had already notified their supervisor. I don't believe that the light twin was being controlled on our frequency because we didn't hear any transmissions to or from that aircraft.


Synopsis: MIA Departure Controller and flight crew reported a NMAC with a VFR aircraft operating in the departure corridor.