elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: FLL.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C FLL
ATC / advisory: TRACON MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: [We were] given Runway 13 by MIA Approach. I asked for Runway 9L (Runway 13 is 6;930 FT; Runway 9L is 9;000 FT). Runway 9L has always been the primary runway for jet operations. A321 aircraft are not known for great deceleration performance. MIA Approach asked why I wanted Runway 9L. I answered; 'A321; I want longer runway.' Once on FLL Tower; I was asked to call MIA TRACON Supervisor. The Supervisor stated that a new program was starting at FLL to up the hourly count during construction on Runway 9R and for expected future growth. All aircraft would use Runway 9L for departure and Runway 13 for arrival. He said I was hurting their count and operation by using Runway 9L. The Supervisor had a commitment from the air carrier that all aircraft could land Runway 13. I was unable to set a return call from the air carrier safety department to discuss the commitment issue. Why would the air carrier commit to this program? Who at the air carrier would commit to a program of all aircraft using a 6;900 FT runway over a 9;000 FT runway whenever 'legal?' I was told by the Supervisor that one air carrier did refuse to participate. Under the FAA safety philosophy that change should be 'safer or as safe;' this does not fly. A jet aircraft landing on a 6;900 FT runway when a 9;000 FT runway is available is not 'safer or as safe.' It may be legal by charts and numbers; but it is not safe.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reports being assigned Runway 13 for landing at FLL due to construction; which he rejects in favor of Runway 9L. Reporter is informed by ATC that his company had made a commitment that all aircraft arriving FLL could land Runway 13.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HAO.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G HAO
ATC / advisory: UNICOM HAO
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I departed HAO and flew direct to RID on a VFR flight. I thought I was departing just prior to the presidential TFR which I believed to be starting in 15 minutes. My plan was to fly out of the TFR stop in Richmond for 30 minutes and then fly to Port Columbus to pick up a passenger. Unfortunately I was mistaken on the TFR start time either due to a change or an error on my part but the TFR went into effect 2 minutes before I departed. I was asked upon landing at RID to call the FAA which I did. I then took off and flew with VFR flight following to Port Columbus. Unfortunately the AWOS at HAO and LUK that I checked via phone prior to departure did not have any special NOTAMs for the TFR prior to my departure. In addition my Garmin 496 must have been delayed with the data feed because I only saw the TFR pop up on my display as I was leaving the TFR.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot reports discovering airborne via his Garmin 496 that a TFR had gone into effect 15 minutes earlier than expected. NOTAMs were not checked directly just prior to departure; relying instead on local AWOS.
Date: 201503
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SMO.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Other Banner Tow
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Banner Tow
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D SMO
ATC / advisory: Tower SMO
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was towing a banner along the Santa Monica shoreline. While Southbound I noticed the parasail headed directly for me; from offshore towards the beach. To avoid the parasail I turned left and started to climb. I had nowhere to go except over Santa Monica Pier. The parasail boat driver appeared to be driving straight for me. In conclusion; Parasail operators need proper training regarding aircraft avoidance. Especially if the parasail is operating in controlled airspace; and interfering with aircraft. Please regulate Parasailing before they kill more people.




Synopsis: A small aircraft pilot towing a banner had a near miss with a parasail. His evasive actions prevented a collision. He suggests that parasail operators need more training and that parasail operations should be regulated.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When configuring for landing; the trailing edge flaps and leading edge devices did not move when the flap handle was moved. The approach was discontinued; the situation was discussed with ATC; and a long final approach to 25R was arranged. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed. Due to abnormal flap system operation rescue services were requested. The aircraft was light weight with no landing performance issues indicated.Flaps were positioned to 15 using alternate flaps. An uneventful landing was accomplished with a termination of the emergency shortly after clearing the runway. Maintenance was notified; a logbook write up was accomplished; and I received a call from Dispatch. Later that day I contacted Maintenance Control and was told that a faulty sensor had caused the problem. If there are any questions please contact me.Reviewing this event; I would suggest a change in title to the 'Trailing edge flap disagree' QRH checklist to include 'no flap movement with flap lever'.The new QRH has many changes. It is a complex document that needs to be aggressively trained. Self-study can only go so far in ensuring correct operational knowledge and use of the document.




Synopsis: A B737-700 flaps and slats did not move with flap selections. The QRH was completed; flaps 15 alternate flaps followed by an uneventful landing. A faulty sensor was discovered. The new QRH procedure is complex.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Normal Brake System
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach in after putting gear and flaps down at about 1;500 feet AGL ECAM on status page normal brakes INOP and ALT Brakes INOP. We decided to go around and look at ECAM. After go around ECAM changed to brakes AUTO BRK FAULT. Went in for normal landing. Called Ops and Maintenance on ground; wrote up problem in logbook.




Synopsis: A320 Captain experiences an ECAM Status message during approach indicating both normal and alternate brakes are inoperative. A go around is initiated. After go around the ECAM message has changed to AUTO BRK FAULT and a normal landing ensues.
Date: 202106
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: SQL.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D SQL
ATC / advisory: Tower SQL
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was flying Aircraft X. I was incoming to SQL from the north for [a] full stop landing; exiting the SFO Bravo; heading south towards the airport. SQL Tower initially asked me to enter a left downwind for Runway 30; keeping 101 freeway to my left; and they would call my left base for Runway 30. A couple of minutes later they asked me to turn left; overfly the runway and enter a right base for Runway 30. I crossed the runway at 1200 feet and began to descend to pattern altitude. SQL Tower told me to follow Aircraft Y that was on an extended right base for 30. As I was searching for Aircraft Y; I began to turn right downwind for 30 right as I noticed Aircraft Z cross in front of me....both of us executing an evasive maneuver. I told Tower that I had a near miss with Aircraft Z....and Tower responded that this aircraft was not on frequency. I was able to land safely.   Upon reviewing ADS-B data and ATC recording of the event; it appears that Aircraft Z took off from Runway 30 and was asked to follow Aircraft A; Aircraft A was told to proceed to KNBR [radio station] antenna and then proceed on course; which they did. Aircraft Z however did not follow Aircraft A and turned too early into downwind. The tower also gave Aircraft Z a very early frequency change so they were not on frequency at the time of [the] near miss. It seems to me that the failure of the Tower to verify that Aircraft Z had Aircraft A in sight was a factor in this near miss; as well as the Tower's early frequency change for Aircraft Z.




Synopsis: Pilot of a single engine aircraft reported an NMAC occurred during traffic pattern entry; resulting in evasive action.
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Takeoff Roll
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On takeoff roll; set standard power and after power set at approximately 50 knots; we heard 3 loud bangs; aircraft yawed sharply to the left. Performed reject at 50 kts. Fire rescue inspected tires and found no tire damage. Taxi back to gate. Engine compressor stall suspected.




Synopsis: Flight Crew encountered engine malfunction during takeoff roll.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Gulfstream G200 (IAI 1126 Galaxy)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Antiskid System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Normal approach and landing. After the touchdown on normal landing roll; the airplane made a little yaw to the right; I did the correction smoothly to the left to keep the aircraft at the center of the runway; and the aircraft started to go left with no control. I did everything to keep control. Applying right rudder pedal and differential brakes; but the aircraft did not respond and started to skid until stopped on the runway close to Taxiway Delta. Four tires exploded; [it] looks like an antiskid malfunction.




Synopsis: A G200 anti-skid system apparently malfunctioned on landing causing all four tires to explode but the pilot was able to keep the aircraft on the runway.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SLC
Second aircraft: Embraer Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After exiting Runway 16R SLC; given clearance to taxi via taxiway Echo to Golf to the ramp entry point/ While taxing on Echo approaching Golf slowing to taxi speed of 15 knots or less; noticed an [air carrier] [regional jet] holding short of Hotel on Echo and blocking Golf. Immediately applied brakes and came to a Stop on Echo about 30 feet from regional jet. Night time operation and the aircraft silhouette was poorly lit and blended in with Runway 16 left and taxiway. Told SLC Ground Control you need to give us a heads-up that there was another aircraft blocking taxiway Golf. ATC acknowledged and given taxi instructions to ramp without incident. Night time taxi operations. Aircraft had poor silhouette lighting from rear view. ATC Ground Control gave no report of said aircraft holding on taxiway route cleared. Better situational awareness from ATC and absolute vigilance from flight crew during taxi operations.




Synopsis: A300 Captain reported heavy braking needed to avoid aircraft blocking taxiway.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SDF.Airport, KY
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 5
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower SDF
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the Pilot Flying. During the takeoff roll on runway 17R; as the aircraft accelerated through 80 knots; I didn't hear the 80 knot call from the Pilot Monitoring. I called 90 knots to which I didn't hear a response. I looked at the First Officer's airspeed indicator and observed it indicating significantly less than mine; approximately 70 knots. I announced 'Reject' and rejected the takeoff. Approximately 95 knots was the highest indicated airspeed I observed in my indicator as we executed the Rejected Takeoff maneuver. The First Officer notified the Tower of our reject. We received initial taxi instructions after informing them that we didn't require any additional assistance. During our taxi to the ramp; an airspeed flag briefly appeared in the First Officer's airspeed indicator and then remained out of view. I informed Ramp Control that our brakes were heating and asked to be expedited. After approximately 10 minutes the marshaller began to direct us to our parking spot. Approximately 15 minutes after the RTO; we were chocked and able to release the brakes. The Brake Temp indicator illuminated with one brake temp of 5 as the highest reading. Maintenance informed us that we required one hour of brake cooling to which we agreed referencing the Recommended Brake Cooling Schedule based on our EICAS indication.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: B767-300 flight crew rejected the takeoff at approximately 90 knots in response to conflicting airspeed indications.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Weather
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing through FL250 we received a 'DUCT FAIL' warning message. Complied with QRH; which included leaving icing conditions. While in cruise determined to continue to destination because of the weather conditions in our area; the fuel we had available; and the weather conditions at the possible diversion airports.) We felt that with the fuel we had available we were unable to fly to an airport where we would not encounter any icing at all. We decided the best course of action was to declare an emergency as a precautionary measure and continue to our destination. We flew the approach and landed without further incident.


Second narrative: In speaking with our Dispatcher; we decided that staying high and avoiding icing conditions until descent was best. We landed without incident in the Flaps 20 configuration in accordance with the QRH in case we did accrete ice and needed the speed to keep flying.


Synopsis: When all feasible diversion airports were reporting icing conditions more problematic than their destination; a CRJ-200 flight crew opted to remain out of icing conditions and continue to their destination after complying with the checklist for an ANTI ICE DUCT CAS warning.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Starter
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: We unknowingly flew an un-airworthy from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We had an inoperative APU on our aircraft. We performed the external air pneumatic start checklist. During the start (maybe 45 seconds in) we heard a loud bang. I monitored the engine indications for any sign of damage or an irregular start attempt. The ground crew then stated to let them know when they could disconnect ground air and power; the start was not finished yet so I told them to wait. I had the First Officer look out his window to see if he could see the engine and make sure everything looked okay; it did. We then asked the ground crew what had happened; they said 'The air hose popped out early by itself; it broke'. By this time we had a normal start and I told them they could disconnect ground power and the air. They did so and told us they were ready for push; at no point did they tell us that the air hose had damaged the aircraft when it broke/popped out. We continued the flight to ZZZ1 without further incident and noticed the damage on our post flight walk around. We immediately notified maintenance control and the company of the damage.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: E175 Flight Crew reported the air hose from the air starter unit unexpectedly disconnected from aircraft; causing damage to the aircraft.