elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SUX.Airport, IA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D SUX
ATC / advisory: Tower SUX
Aircraft component: Electrical Power
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was moving over to take Radar (TR)/CIC. Aircraft X was on a local IFR flight plan (cleared to KSUX via radar vectors) for practice ILS approaches. As I plugged in; [Controller A] asked Aircraft X how this approach would terminate. No response by the pilot. [Controller A] made several unanswered transmissions and I attempted to reach Aircraft X on the PET2000 portable radio located in the tower cab. No response was received by us. I observed Aircraft X's mode C then drop off their full data block and the target displayed ISR. Aircraft X was then observed making a right turn back inbound to KSUX. I relieved [Controller A] from the TR position; [Controller A] remained on as CIC; and verified with [Controller B] that Aircraft X was cleared to land on Rwy 13 which was approved by [Controller B]. I gave an unanswered broadcast to Aircraft X on TR frequency that tower advised Aircraft X was cleared to land on Rwy 13. [Controller B] on LC (Local) position began preparing to send light gun signals to the aircraft as Aircraft X approached Rwy 13. The pilot of Aircraft X then called the tower via the commercial telephone line; stating they had lost their alternator and their electrical equipment was becoming inoperative. I gave Aircraft X their landing clearance via telephone and asked if the pilot required any assistance. The pilot responded no assistance was needed. I then passed the telephone off to [Controller B] on the LC position and [Controller B] remained on the telephone with the pilot. Aircraft X landed without incident and taxied to the ramp under their own power. No recommendations. Current procedures were adequate for handling the incident.




Synopsis: SUX Controller reported a GA aircraft lost communications during practice IFR approach.
Date: 202011
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Ramp
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Company Y is our business partner in ZZZZ and they handle our operation to include ramp functions.   Upon arrival; in pit 1; dirty used gloves and used paper towels were left in the pit.  With the rise of COVID cases in ZZZZ1; the Company Y ramp employees are concerned these used gloves and trash may be contagious. This is a repeated occurrence. The ZZZZ1 Team is aware and are doing briefings.




Synopsis: Ramp employee reported COVID-19 related concerns regarding used gloves and paper towels repeatedly left in aircraft pits.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TXKF.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower TXKF
Aircraft component: Laptop Computer (performance; planning; etc.)
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At the time the runway showed a Notam shortening the runway by 1296 feet of the west end.  Our Performance data system is supposed to preload the Notam into the system and NOT allow a pilot to manually select the full length runway without putting in the code FULL.  Our system should catch the selection of the runway and not give take off data for this reason.  For example if we selected Runway 12 for departure the Performance data system should not give us numbers for this runway.  The only way to receive numbers for full length with a Notam present is for the pilot to select Runway 12/FULL.  This tells the system that the pilot is consciously making this selection.  Our procedures are for the First Officer to load and obtain the takeoff data for the runway for departure.  Assuming the system was working correctly; I loaded the takeoff data for the runway that came back as valid data for Runway 12.  It was only after departure that I realized that the system was not catching the shortening of the runway.  Our system should not allow the selection of the full length of the runway; but in this case it did.  Takeoff was made uneventfully.




Synopsis: EMB-190 Captain reports using the published runway length for takeoff performance calculations with a NOTAM in effect shortening the runway by approximately 1;300 feet.  This NOTAM should have been in the performance data base and the full runway length selection should not have been allowed.  The takeoff was uneventful and the error was detected airborne.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAU.ARTCC, IL
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZAU
ATC / advisory: Center ZAU
Aircraft component: Throttle/Power Lever
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: As we were starting descent from FL400; with the autopilot and autothrottle on; the left thrust lever moved a little but then got stuck near cruise power setting and the autothrottle motor tried but was unable to move it back immediately causing an asymmetric thrust situation. The right thrust lever moved correctly and the Captain immediately noticed the problem. He attempted to disconnect the autothrottle using the button on the thrust lever and the switch on the MCP then manually tried pulling the left thrust lever; none of which fixed the problem. He asked me to try and it felt like the lever was moving slightly about an inch but would then spring back to the stuck position. Any movement of the thrust lever did affect the engine power however. I pulled harder and the thrust lever slammed to the idle position and had normal freedom of movement the remainder of the flight.The Mechanic found a notepad had fallen into the throttle quadrant and was interfering with the clutch microswitch and the clutch for the autothrottle.




Synopsis: When the left thrust lever of their B757-200 appeared to stick in place at cruise thrust as they started their descent the flight crew applied increasing leverage until it broke loose and functioned normally thereafter.  Maintenance found a notepad had slipped into the pedestal.
Date: 201403
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: This occurred on our second passenger leg. We had 10 passengers and no flight attendant. Our Flight Attendant flew the prior passenger leg with us and offered to extend in order to cover the next passenger leg. Her request was denied by scheduling and she was sent home. This was a FAR 135 trip. I conducted the passenger briefing in accordance with the fleet memo. I also received an email telling me to turn off the galley power prior to the flight. Doing so shuts off all power to the convection oven; hot cup; coffee makers and lavatory faucet; but does NOT disable the microwave. To disable the microwave requires pulling its circuit breaker located in the baggage area. In the interest of safety I elected to pull that breaker even though our company does not have a procedure for doing so without a maintenance write-up. At the end of the flight I discovered that the passenger had served themselves alcohol from the galley; which is illegal under FAR 135. I also have serious safety concerns regarding the use of the crystal glasses and stemware as well as the china. We carry a full set of silverware to include chef's knives that could very easily hurt someone. We were unable to ensure that we had a secured cabin prior to landing on this short and crowded flight. Until there is an approved procedure for disabling the microwave oven and securing the breakable china and crystal as well as the silverware and alcohol; we should no longer conduct passenger flights in this fleet without a flight attendant on board for obvious safety and legal concerns. This puts the pilots in a potentially dangerous situation and also puts our airman certificates at risk; not to mention exposing the company to potential risk. Since these flights are being conducted with increasing frequency I have decided to refuse any future passenger leg without a flight attendant as I have serious concerns for my safety and my airman certificate.




Synopsis: G-IV Captain reports flying ten passengers under FAR 135 without a flight attendant on board. After landing the reporter discovers that the passengers helped themselves to some of the amenities on board and had access to knives in the galley.
Date: 201309
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was pilot not flying on a day VFR flight. Normal flight through FL220 then both Pitch Trim channels failed. This was our second leg with this aircraft and we encountered a similar malfunction during the previous leg. We ran appropriate QRH procedure to reset the Pitch Trim channels. We were unable to recover either channel so after a brief conversation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ACARS we decided to divert. We chose the divert airport because it was 50 miles away as we were in a nose-down pitch setting and uncertain of the condition of our horizontal stabilizer because of some poorly explained stabilizer faults on the CMC by Line Maintenance in the previous station who 'ops checked good' the same malfunction during our previous flight. Declared emergency and set up for a visual to [Runway] 18C. Pilot flying did an excellent job flying the approach and taxied to gate without incident.Loss of pitch trim was our threat which compounded into other threats. No autopilot; no pitch trim; no speedbrakes; very high Vref speeds per QRH; Excessive back pressure required to remain stable as we slowed to approach speed.

Callback: The reporter stated that the Pitch Trim Control Unit was replaced which returned that aircraft to service. There were no previous similar discrepancy in the logbook which he had available.



Synopsis: An EMB-145 CAS alerted both PITCH TRIM channels failed so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted. The crew had no autopilot; pitch trim or speedbrakes; and excessive back pressure was required to remain stable as they slowed to a very high Vref speed.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: King Air C90 E90
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Tower opened and I called to resume approach frequencies from TRACON. I was monitoring the frequencies and had heard TRACON switch the BE90 to Tower; as soon as I took the frequency. The BE90 calls up 9 NM northwest of [the airport] requesting his IFR clearance to [the main airport] climbing to 100 as final instead of 140 and going direct [the intersection]. I gave him his flight plan; [told him to] Squawk XXXX and proceeded to RADAR identify him at 14 NM northwest; I then gave him a heading of 340 for the MVA's and a climb to 100. Pilot didn't read back; so I did a radio check; and by that time I RADAR identified him the second time he was clear of my 080 MVA and gave him on course cleared to [the main airport] via direct [the intersection] climb and maintain 100. The only reason I gave the pilot direct [the intersection] was because he said he was direct [the intersection] which caused confusion as to if he got that cleared or if that was a request. I handed him off to Center coordinating the new final altitude but did not verbally coordinate the direct [the intersection] routing (I used automation to type in -XX in the scratch pad as well as the 100 as final). My low altitude alarm went off and Center called about the BE90 clearing my MVA's or not. I thought he would be outside of my 158 MVA; but he went about 1/4-1/2 mile inside of the north side of that MVA as [TRACON] called me. If a Controller is dealing with something that doesn't normally occur (aircraft proceeding direct [the intersection] from; so early in the climb) then they should be more aware that something may not be right and be more adamant about coordinating more carefully or clearing up any confusion that could occur such as why the aircraft was headed direct [the intersection] in the first place. Also if your gut is to give a heading then you should stick with it. And pilots shouldn't say they are direct a fix if it wasn't a clearance that was given to them to eliminate confusion a heading would've been better. Or if the aircraft had gotten his IFR clearance on the ground it would save a lot of unnecessary coordination while he is already enroute especially if there was no apparent reason why they waited to get it in the air. Next time something out of the ordinary happens verify if it's a clearance or a request.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller experienced an MVA infraction when confused regarding a pilot's request for a clearance.
Date: 201404
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Motor
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was the jumpseat rider on the flight. Uneventful flight until visual approach; we had a runaway stabilizer full nose down on approximately 10-15 mile final. Captain executed a go-around and flew another approach to a visual landing. Due to excessive forward stick pressures; I assisted by pulling back on the Captain's yolk during the go-around; pattern and approach and landing to allow the Captain to maintain aircraft control. I also assisted with QRH checklist items and with briefing the flight attendants.




Synopsis: On final at 1;800 FT a MD-80 Horizontal Stabilizer motor ran full nose down; so a jumpseat rider assisted the Captain pulling the yoke during the go-around and to another approach and landing. An emergency was declared and the QRH completed.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Manuals
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: Aircraft was leaving from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and aircraft did not pressurize. Crew returned to field. Aircraft was in maintenance overnight with a double windshield change which requires [aircraft] to be pressurized to verify no leaks. Manual switch on the avionics ventilation overboard extract valve was missing labels for on\off position. Add perform a bite check of the avionics extract fan ventilation system; to verify proper operation of closing and opening of the valve.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Technician reported an improper windshield change lead to aircraft's inability to pressurize.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BIS.Airport, ND
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class D BIS
ATC / advisory: Tower BIS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On a straight in visual approach to Runway 31 in BIS; we received a gear horn aural. We were not yet fully configured but did notice we were 4 or 5 miles from the runway. We immediately configured the aircraft to full configuration. I noticed then that the radar altimeter was roughly 880 feet while we were still a few miles from the runway. I was aware of the terrain surrounding the southeast side of the airport and knew it was higher than at the airport and felt we were still in a safe condition and safe altitude above field elevation to land. We continued the approach; kept it stabilized and safely landed the aircraft in the touchdown zone on centerline.The primary cause was a combination of a slight loss of situational awareness as well as the differing terrain in the environment. We had discussed the terrain on the approach briefing; and as always would have the aircraft stabilized to meet the stabilized criteria. One primary factor that caused me to configure late was the failure of the FMS to sequence to the final segment. I believed we were 6 miles (from FMS info) from the airport when we actually about 4. The terrain in the area is slightly higher than that at the field so our radar altimeters sensed we were too low to not be fully configured. Typically hearing the gear horn would cause me to go around but we felt we were at a safe altitude above field elevation and as well as distance from the field. I should have briefed that this was a threat because I had encountered it before. I failed to have a proper mitigation tactic; such as configuring earlier than normal to avoid startling either pilot. I also failed to realize the FMS did not sequence properly and was giving us false information on our distance from the runway. A go-around could have been executed; but as stated earlier; both pilots felt we were still at a safe distance and altitude to become fully configured and safely continue the approach.




Synopsis: CRJ200 Captain reported gear horn warning due to passing higher terrain on visual approach.