elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The aircraft was parked at the gate.  When cleared by Ramp Control to push back; the Ramp Crew initiated pushback. After pushing clear of the jet bridge while attempting to turn the aircraft toward taxi line; the Tug Operator over steered the nose wheel beyond limits resulting in the tug becoming lodged under the aircraft. The Ramp Crew alerted the Flight Crew to the problem and contacted Maintenance. Flight Crew then contacted ATC and Station Operations. When a bus arrived; passengers and crew were deplaned on the ramp and passengers bussed to the terminal to await bags.


Second narrative: We pushed back off of the gate. The Fleet Service Clerk driving the pushback tug lost control of the tug and ended up overturning the tug almost a complete 180 degrees striking the bottom of the fuselage of the aircraft and wedged the tug underneath. We coordinated with Operations; Ground Personnel; Maintenance and various other departments to arrange for the passengers to be safely extracted from the aircraft and taken to the terminal via company bus. The Fleet Service Clerk tug driver overturned the tug during pushback resulting in a loss of control of the push and struck the aircraft fuselage and became stuck underneath. It is suggested that tug drivers get additional training on how the push back tug operates. It is my opinion that the Tug Driver could have stopped the push and moved in reverse to correct the issue but it seems that the Tug Driver kept going forward which resulted in the tug continuing to turn past the limits and striking the aircraft.


Synopsis: Flight Crew reported a Tug Operator lost control of the tug and crashed into the airplane.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZJX; Special Use AW006
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was CIC. The controller at R34 told me she had an aircraft that had a delay in AW006 in its flight plan; and asked if I had any information on the flight. I told her no; but would call and find out. I called TMU; and told them we had an aircraft going into AW006; and we had no information on the mission nor did we have a depiction of AW006. I asked if we could get one. I was told missions were busy trying to get military airspace released; but that they would work on it. It took one of my controllers going to TMU before we got a depiction of AW006.We should have a depiction of the orbit and a description of the mission before the aircraft shows up.




Synopsis: CIC reports of not being informed of a mission and the time period it took to receive the information.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: PIE.Tower, FL
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D PIE
ATC / advisory: Tower PIE
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Called for release for an Aircraft X departure; I heard 'released;' cleared aircraft for takeoff; approximately 6 minutes later TPA approach calls asking why I released Aircraft X; I told them because they said released. They said they did not say 'released' but 'hold for release.' Afterwards the developmental that was monitoring said; 'TPA said released.' I have since listened to the tape but as the TPA controller was talking with either 'released' or 'hold for release;' an aircraft was announcing his departure off of TPA so there is no way to tell what the TPA controller actually said; unfortunately. 'Released' and 'Hold for release.' if said fast sounds the same. I recommend another phrase from TPA to say if they cannot release an aircraft like:1) Standby2) I'll call you back3) HoldThe word 'released' should not be included in any portion of an instruction from TPA in which they cannot allow that aircraft to depart.




Synopsis: PIE Tower Controller reported confusion relating to the term 'hold for release' and hearing only 'released;' allowing an aircraft to get airborne which should not have.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Door Warning System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After becoming airborne climbing thru 19000 feet the flight attendants chimed the cockpit and excitedly told us the forward service door handle was in view thru the forward service door inspection window. I went to look and confirmed that the handle was visible in the service door inspection window. We were at 21000 feet and about 5 to 6 psi and had no amber alert to say the door was unsafe. In the interest of safety we elected to return to [departure airport] as we were only 10 minutes out. We landed overweight and not knowing how the door would react to depressurization on landing declared an emergency. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate where maintenance confirmed that the door handle was in the open position.




Synopsis: B737-800 pilot reported they were advised during climb by a Flight Attendant that the forward service door handle was in view through the window even though there was no door warning light.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B EWR
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Aircraft component: AHRS/ND
Component problem: Design; Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Taking off we were subject to the same compass deviations as reported previously in a Company newsletter. The compass spun on the takeoff roll and as a result I had to do the math in my head to figure out what heading a 40 degrees to the right would be with our erroneous compass. As a result we missed the next turn by approximately .5 miles. ATC did not query us. Had this event happened in IMC and caused a distraction; so close to NYC; the outcome could have been very different. Do not use Runway 13 when deviations of the compass are noted; especially in IMC. I strongly urge that we look at this as a Company and its effects on the BE40.

Callback: The Reporter stated that a compass disagree alert occurred on the first LGA Runway 13 takeoff attempted. The crew acknowledged the Airport's Runway 13 compass alert sign and checked heading before takeoff. After beginning the takeoff roll; the compass fault alerted so they rejected the takeoff and reset the compasses. After the second takeoff; the heading was off 30 to 40 degrees so the crew flew the departure track; which they knew from experience; in VMC conditions. The Company's newsletter had been issued on days prior to this event and so they were well aware that the anomaly might occur. The Reporter stated that the crew would not have departed had IMC conditions existed.



Synopsis: A BE-400XP crew rejected a takeoff on LGA Runway 13 because of a compass anomaly but departed VMC on the second takeoff with a 30 - 40 degree compass error.
Date: 202104
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BHM.Airport, AL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower BHM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During a visual approach into BHM; on downwind for Runway 6. Clear day; we were cleared for the visual at 5000 feet. I descended the aircraft to the final approach altitude of 2;200 feet. The Tower Controller asked if we had towers to the right in sight. We did; towers were at 2;049 feet; and were the highest obstacle listed on the ILS Runway 6; At that same moment the aircraft GPWS [announced] 'terrain terrain pull up.'  I quickly disconnected the autopilot and climbed to 2;600 feet. We had terrain (the towers) in sight the entire time. The flight continued uneventful and we landed normally.I descended below the MSA for the approach. Though I had the obstacle in sight. I should have held altitude longer until passing the towers; being cleared for the visual approach may have prompted me to set up early and descend when I shouldn't have.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a visual approach to BHM.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp BOS
Aircraft component: PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At gate and while performing the Before Push Checklist; we had the performance computer give us a bad recommendation. Utilizing 'Optimum Flap' in our performance computer resulted in an improper recommendation of flaps 15 with a stopping margin of only 316 FT. When manually selecting flaps 25 gave us a stopping margin of 1640 FT. Funny thing is that it even recommended 'bleeds off' or another flap setting! Naturally; we were puzzled at why it didn't RECOMMEND flaps 25 in the first place.Since we don't perform intersection takeoffs unless 2000 FT or better stopping margin is available; it seems academic to assume that we would like something more than 316' for an 'Optimum' setting when more is available with a different setting.  Please don't take the comments; which follow as personal; they are not and only used here for emphasis. So; here goes.Why does the performance computer force us to hunt for an acceptable stopping margin? The use of 'optimum flap' failed to deliver on this event and it knew it as evidenced by the screen flashing with recommendation for a different flap setting. Imagine what the lawyers would do to us if we had accepted 316 FT of stopping margin when 1640 FT was available and something went wrong. Here is the data present/used during our event: A/C type: -800 TOW: 168;400; (Release) TOW: 166;558 (Loading Schedule). BOS Runway 9 Temp: 19C; Altimeter: 30.12 Wind: 100/5.My takeaway here is that something is wrong with how our performance computer chooses a flap setting when 'Optimum Flap' is selected. I found it interesting to note that Dispatch utilized a flap setting of 25 when calculating data for our Release out of BOS; but that inside the cockpit our performance computer was perfectly happy with flaps 15 and a stopping margin of only 316 FT. Please note that 'loading and planning' were highlighted as areas in this event due to the fact that nothing else looked appropriate given the circumstances.




Synopsis: A B737-800 Captain questioned the aircraft performance computer erroneously calculating an optimum flaps 15 runway takeoff stopping margin of only 316 FT when manually selecting flaps 25 increased the distance to 1;640 FT.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MYF.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower MYF
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Ground
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was the ground controller. I gave instructions for Aircraft X to taxi from parking ramp to Runway 28R via Golf; Hotel; Alpha. Aircraft Y landed on Runway 28R; crossed Runway 28L on Runway 23 and called me for further taxi to parking. Recognizing Aircraft Y would be a tie at the intersection of taxiways Hotel and Golf; I issued instructions to Aircraft Y to taxi to parking via Hotel and Juliet and follow Aircraft X northbound on Golf. Pilot of Aircraft Y read back 'Taxi via Hotel Juliet; we will follow Aircraft X.' As the two aircraft approached Hotel and Golf; the pilot of Aircraft X said on frequency; 'Hey Aircraft Y you holding for me?' Aircraft Y did not hold nor did he respond or give any indication that he even saw the other aircraft. The pilot of Aircraft X told me over frequency 'That was close. That could've been an accident.' The pilot of Aircraft X asked for the phone number to MYF tower and I notified the CIC of the event.




Synopsis: MYF Ground Controller issues instructions to a pilot to follow another aircraft. Pilot does not follow the aircraft and the other pilot advises that was close.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were cleared to cross PONZE at 27000 feet and cleared to descend via the BANKR 2 Arrival landing north. We crossed PONZE at 27000 feet in VNAV path; set 9000 feet in MCP for BLNCE. The descent winds and speeds along with the engine anti-ice was programmed into the FMC. We crossed the next four intersections at correct altitudes in VNAV path. VNAV suddenly commanded a 4;000 foot descent to meet next crossing restriction. We notified ATC we would not be able to meet next crossing altitude. ATC gave us vectors and a phone number to call. I called on the phone number provided and explained the details of our RNAV arrival. He indicated that this is a common occurrence on this arrival and encouraged a report to remedy the problem of aircraft being high and fast on this arrival. The aircraft was unable to maintain correct path with large tail wind with anti-ice on. This arrival needs a flatter vertical profile.




Synopsis: B737 pilot reported the aircraft was unable to meet published crossing restrictions.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Fog; 1
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Robinson R22
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: My student and I departed...under VFR conditions...well after the fog had cleared for that morning. The clouds were high and we could see for miles on end. We flew GPS direct...and [then] the clouds became lower; going from 1;000 FT AGL to 600 FT AGL as well as there being some fog near the ground that was thinning. We decided to proceed north...around protected airspace...and then head west towards [an] airport; which had better weather reported. We were able to maintain VFR separation at 600 FT MSL (300 FT AGL) until we reached the northern tip of the protected airspace; where we hit some low; dense fog. Knowing that there was better weather nearby; my student and I continued onwards; flying a gradual descent to stay clear of the clouds. We reached a point at about 200 FT AGL where we could no longer fly any lower due to the terrain and tall trees and decided to turn around and abandon our cross country. As we began the turn we entered the clouds and inadvertent IMC. Since we couldn't see any obstructions around us we decided to also climb back up to 700 FT MSL (400 FT AGL) to avoid hitting anything in the turn. We then became disoriented and entered into a low-g pushover. Soon afterwards we came out of the clouds with the nose pointed straight down and I recovered from the pushover. We landed in a field nearby to assess any damage to the helicopter and upon finding nothing severely damaged; we picked up and flew the helicopter directly back to our [home field]. In hindsight we should've abandoned the cross country sooner instead of pushing into the clouds. Had we decided to land at the intermediate airport or turn around to go back home we wouldn't have entered the clouds and become disoriented.




Synopsis: An R22 instructor and student pilot; attempting to maintain VFR flight beneath a lowering overcast; entered IMC; became disoriented and descended out of the clouds in a nose down; vertical attitude. Pilots recovered and landed in a field.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: SR22
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was holding short of runway XX on taxiway 1; and there was a light aircraft that was landing and a jet holding short of runway XX on taxiway 2. The jet was cleared for takeoff on runway XX and I radioed tower that I was ready for departure XX. The tower controller started to tell me to hold short runway XX; then gave me clearance to cross runway XX and cleared me for takeoff runway YY. When I took runway YY; I noticed what appeared to be a large vehicle past the departure end of the runway. I believed it to be on a road or parked beyond the runway. Due to the curvature of the runway; I couldn't even see the lower portion of the vehicle. Midway through my takeoff roll; I then noticed the van closer and possibly just off the end of runway YY. After I rotated; I noticed the large yellow vehicle; a utility van; was on the runway! I immediately sidestepped the runway and overflew the yellow utility van. When I looked down at it; I noticed it parked south of the runway ZZ numbers and that there was a person 15 feet south of the van looking up at me flying over. The tower never radioed me about the incident and failed to provide me any information about vehicles and personnel on the runway. The tower may have even been unaware of the situation.




Synopsis: SR22 pilot reported after takeoff noticing a vehicle on the runway and avoiding it by overflying it.