elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: IAI1124/1124A Westwind
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was SIC on an IFR flight departing from ZZZ. The PIC asked me to pick up our clearance prior to our departure. I received our clearance from ZZZ Clearance Delivery frequency. Our clearance route was 'Via radar vectors then as filed.' The PIC determined that we would have to fly the published ODP (Obstacle Departure Procedure) for runway XXL at ZZZ. He insisted that since we were not given a departure procedure; the ODP was mandatory.Immediately prior to receiving our take off clearance; Tower gave us a new departure frequency as well as departure instructions. I read the instructions back to Tower and accepted our take off clearance. Our instructions were 'On departure turn right heading 270 climb and maintain 3;000 cleared for takeoff runway XXL.' Shortly after rotation and during our initial climb out; the PIC began a left turn to heading 150 to follow the ODP. I challenged the PIC by saying 'I believe it's a right turn to heading 270'. The PIC responded to me with 'We're following the ODP.' Approximately 2 seconds later; tower instructed us 'I need you to make a right turn; that's a right turn to 270 immediately.' The PIC assumed radio communications from me at that time and responded to tower with 'We're following the ODP.' The PIC continued the left turn to heading 150 after being instructed by tower to turn right heading 270. Tower then instructed another aircraft to make a left turn heading 090 immediately. The PIC finally listened to tower's instructions and began the right turn to heading 270 after several seconds of defiance. Tower was professional at all times and politely asserted that clarification of clearance needs to be made for future reference.




Synopsis: Air Taxi First Officer reported Captain flew Obstacle Departure Procedure instead of assigned departure resulting in an airborne conflict.
Date: 201812
Aircraft: B777-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I should have called in fatigued. I flew Flight X the day the 3 days prior. I had one day left on reserve before 2 [days off]. Scheduling called me about 5 hours after landing from Flight X that they were assigning me Flight Y and were rolling my days off. I informed them that I might be fatigued. They said I had 30 hours off and it was legal. Just because it's legal does not mean it's safe. Well if I had to do it again I would have called in fatigued. I was not given a short flight or short duty day. I was assigned one of our longest flights. I was the flying pilot and I could not keep my eyes open for the last 3 hours on the flight deck. And I was making tons of mistakes. I was in no shape to be flying an all-nighter to the other side of the world. And the bunks are far from perfect. The 777-300 bunks are so hard that sleeping is not easy for me. It's like trying to sleep on hard wood. And trying to sleep in turbulence isn't exactly easy either. Overall my performance as a crew member was sub-standard and I was making a lot of mistakes and also just barely able to stay awake. Because I went from a 3 day [international] trip which you have fatigue from even after a night of sleep because you miss 2 nights of sleep; to a 4 day trip. We are not machines and [Company] must not schedule us like we are machines.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer reported being assigned to international trips in close succession resulted in flying fatigued.
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZJX.ARTCC, FL
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center ZJX
Aircraft component: Altimeter
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Cleared to FL240; we were climbing through 15;000 feet and realized that there was some convective weather in front of us. Requested deviation to the left or direct to SZW that would keep us out of the weather. ATC said that they could give us direct SZW if we expedited the climb through FL230; which we agreed to. F/O increased vertical speed and I set the heading towards SZW for an initial turn; then adjusted power in FMS to MCT limits to provide more thrust. I then entered direct to SZW in the FMS. Passing FL210; I realized that we had not reset the altimeters to 29.92. We immediately corrected this and resumed the climb. No deviations occurred.Recently the checklist was revised to remove the 'below the line' item of altimeters; ostensibly due to the need to standardize with the 777. While the previous procedure for setting altimeters when cleared above/below transition was rescinded due to more altitude errors (more likely due to lack of training the procedure than a problem with the procedure itself; as the procedure has been that way for international for many years without issue); the removal of the checklist item removes the ability of the checklist to capture the error. A recent [company bulletin] discussed the need to pay more attention to detail; and then listed a number of items that appear to be things that would be categorized as 'errors.' I believe the policies and procedures are failing us. While there may be a technological fix to the altimeter problem; right now we have a problem with our policies and procedures that are leading to these types of errors and setting up the scenario where an error is highly probable. Eliminating an error control--such as a checklist item--does not help. In the past; I would have had the checklist on my lap (which is my habit) until it was complete. I believe [such a procedure as policy] may have increased the probability of capturing the altimeter change. Perhaps better policies or procedures can be developed to better mitigate these issues; but removing it from the checklist does not appear to be a solution.




Synopsis: After a lapse in resetting the altimeter passing the transition altitude the Captain opined that a change in company SOP regarding checklists was a contributing factor.
Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Embraer Legacy 450/500
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Tire
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Noticed checklist indicated Main Landing Gear (MLG) psi was 160 on each tire and thought that was pretty low. Looked through logbook and could not find tire where the tire pressure had been re-inflated; recorded in logbook and checked after 24 hours to see if the pressure loss is more than 5%. I called Maintenance and spoke to [technician]. I asked him the tire pressure parameters for normal inflation of MLG and he looked it up and stated it was 174-184 PSI. I then asked what you do when it is down as low as 160 PSI. [Technician] replied; 'between 90-95% you inflate to normal pressure'. I then read the rest of Table-301 of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) that I had a copy of stating: 'Do a check of the tire/wheel assembly for the cause of pressure loss. Inflate again and record this in the logbook. Remove the tire/wheel assembly if the pressure loss is more than 5% and occurs again in 24 hours.' So; I told [technician] I was concerned there was no documented recheck. I asked him to fax me the form he had that omitted this vital step and I would be satisfied. I never got the different version of the AMM and I am assuming [technician] omitted the part about the re-check. I received a noticed looking for the write-up [later] in the evening.I am always leery of these inspections because I always feel they are done by contractors not familiar with our fleets. I believe our own employees would be more familiar with our aircraft. As to the information omitted to me over the phone; I have no comment.




Synopsis: Captain questions the lack of maintenance documentation in their Embraer EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft logbook for the re-inflation of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) tires that were noted to be below minimum tire pressures. Pilot noted a Maintenance individual was not forthcoming in addressing and recording the tire pressure information and requirement to check tire pressures again in 24-hours.
Date: 202201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During the takeoff roll in the low-speed region; we received am ECAM F/CTRL GRND SPLR fault 3+4. We assumed this was an ECAM associated with our current deferral F/CTL AIL SERVO fault and decided to continue rather than abort. When at a safe altitude; we reviewed the ECAM in detail and concluded that this was a separate issue and we should have aborted.


Second narrative: On takeoff from ZZZ [Runway] XX; we received an ECAM at about 60 kt. for Ground Spoiler 3+4; which we thought was associated with the Aileron Servo Fault deferral. I elected to continue the takeoff and once airborne we were able to tell that it was indeed a separate issue. We should have rejected the takeoff. Unfortunately; the Aileron Servo Fault deferral generated multiple transient ECAMs during start and power changes and we became accustomed to them. They went away in a second or two. On the takeoff roll; we thought it was yet another transient and associated ECAM. I had talked to the inbound Captain who gave us the jet initially in ZZZ1 and he mentioned that there were a lot of stray ECAMs associated with the deferral and it probably added to my thinking that this was another one of those. Airborne; we ran the QRH checklist and determined our landing distances for ZZZ1; made the write-up; and landed normally.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported receiving a Spoiler System ECAM alert on takeoff and elected to continue the takeoff. At altitude and reviewing the ECAM alert; flight crew discovered takeoff should have been rejected and wrote up the alert for maintenance.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On approach into Chicago; I was briefing my First Officer on the approach to Runway 28 at ORD. ATC notified us of traffic about 2:00 from our position. We were at 14;000 FT at the time. The other aircraft was also at 14;000 FT and climbing slowly. We received a RA on the TCAS to descend. I did notice that the other aircraft was only 200 FT above. We were so close that we actually saw parachutist bailing out of the aircraft. We ended up leveling at 12;300 FT. Reported it to ATC and asked if they want us back at 14;000 FT or descend to 12;000 FT. We ended up descending down to 10;000 FT. After landing; Dispatch had me call the ATC duty manager about the RA. They pretty much said that it was their fault. He also wanted to make sure that nobody was injured in the descent; nobody was. I don't remember what frequency we were on but it was on one of the Approach frequencies into Chicago. The ATC Manager told me that the Controller working that frequency was new. He was also doing a report to help teach his new controllers from doing this again.




Synopsis: EMB170 Captain arriving ORD from the south describes a TCAS RA to descend generated by a skydiving aircraft at 14;000 FT; just as the skydivers exit the aircraft. ATC took responsibility for the close call; citing a new Controller on the position.
Date: 201504
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZMP.ARTCC, MN
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZMP
ATC / advisory: Center ZMP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was issued to 'descend via the KKILR ONE ARRIVAL...' by ZMP (high altitude) Sector 16.  This clearance authorizes the aircraft to descend into low altitude (Sector 06) airspace.  The aircraft was handed off to Sector 06 but a frequency change was not issued until requested by the Sector 06 controller while the aircraft was descending through FL220.This procedure is inherently dangerous and goes against everything we have been accustomed to and trained for.  Descending into another sectors' airspace by procedure?  Why don't we just climb all departures to their requested altitude?  It's the same thing.  The STAR arrivals should be given a PD descent to FL240 and handed off to the low sector.  Let the low altitude sector issue the 'descend via' clearance.  The potential for issues like this; not talking to an aircraft in your sector; are too great.  This procedure has reduced safety by eliminating an important step in the handoff process.




Synopsis: ZMP Controller reports of a procedure where the high altitude controller clears the aircraft to descend into another controller's airspace.  The aircraft is handed off to the underlying sector but transfer of communications is not completed until the underlying sector asks for the aircraft.
Date: 201505
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MSP.Airport, MN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B MSP
ATC / advisory: Tower MSP
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was the Captain/ pilot flying. Air Traffic Control requested us to maintain at least 170 knots to the marker. After setting managed speed the Tower advised us that a Boeing 757 would be departing with minimum separation before our landing and cleared us to land. I advised the First Officer to be ready for a go around in case the 757 did not continue its take off roll. The 757 was airborne by the time we were at 500 feet so we continued the approach. At 50 feet we encountered a sink which caused a firm bounce on the main gear and subsequent second touchdown. There were no further problems with the rollout and turn off to the taxiway. During taxi in an ECAM message was generated and an action report printed out. I called dispatch and maintenence control to confer with them prior to writing the discrepancies in the logbook. Keeping our speed up to the marker and then having to make sure we kept our spacing on the slow moving departing aircraft contributed to encountering that aircraft's jet blast and turbulance during our flare and was a factor in the bounced landing. In the future I will have to ask ahead of time if a certain distance can be extended for a departing 757.


Second narrative: Landing behind a 757 which previously took off on 30L MSP. Had about a 15 knot left crosswind. Crossing the numbers the aircraft pitched over and I immediately stated to 'watch it'. I believe he had already began his input to correct the pitch. The aircraft contacted the runway in what seemed to be a flat configuration. The aircraft made a bounce and landed and the rollout seem as normal as could be for the circumstance. I really can't explain what caused the nose down attitude over the numbers. It just all happened so quickly. I believe that we met all SOP's during this approach. The Captain was still on low time. He was aware of the 757 and showed concerned for the potential jet blast. He had added 3 knots extra to his approach speed for the winds and potential jet blast. From my perspective it all happened too fast for any action that could be taken on my part to mitigate the hard landing.


Synopsis: A320 flight crew reported a hard landing following a B757's takeoff from the same runway. Captain believes jet blast could have been a factor.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Generator Drive
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Dispatched with inoperative APU generator. Shortly after top of climb; RT CSD PRESS LOW light illuminated. Followed QRH procedures and was now on single generator operation; with no system degradation. Returned to the departure airport.




Synopsis: A MD-82 crew with an MEL'ed APU generator disconnected an engine driven generator after the RT CSD PRESS LOW light annunciated and so with a single generator returned to the departure airport.