elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operating under: Part 91
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Fuel Booster Pump
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Approaching assigned altitude of FL270; both FUEL XFR LEVEL LO annunciators began to cycle erratically. Verified switches were in correct position (AUTO); and fuselage tank was almost empty. At this point both lights stayed on. Since operating these pumps without fuel present creates a rapid; high-heat situation; we did a control transfer; declared an emergency and diverted. We executed the appropriate abnormal checklist; which successfully secured the transfer pumps via pulled CB's; and landed uneventfully. Appropriate transfer pump checklist item was successfully completed during preflight. Fuel transfer pumps failed to shut off after fuselage tank empty.




Synopsis: BE400 Captain reports failure of fuel pumps in the fuselage to shut off when the tank is empty. The abnormal checklist is consulted and the pumps are secured via pulled circuit breakers. The flight diverts to a suitable airport.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MDW.Airport, IL
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C MDW
ATC / advisory: Tower MDW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Aircraft X was on the RNAV Z approach for Runway 22L. The aircraft had been cleared to land. The approach naturally brings aircraft in on a slight angle to the runway. Aircraft X appeared to be coming in at an angle on short final; but aligned with the runway prior to crossing the threshold. However; an ASDE alert triggered with Taxiway Y; which is parallel to Runway 22L. I instructed the aircraft to go-around. The aircraft went around and later landed without incident.This approach is likely to be problematic in the future because the angle it brings in aircraft on lines up with Taxiway Y until the last minute. It might be best this approach not be used if it can be avoided.




Synopsis: MDW Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation when an aircraft lined up with a taxiway instead of the runway.  Controller reported this approach is likely to be problematic because the angle it brings in aircraft on; lines up with Taxiway Y; until the last minute.
Date: 201901
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were scheduled to take a CRJ 700 on a passenger revenue trip however; due to multiple cancellations and maintenance issues; we wound up taking an empty jet instead. Nevertheless; we requested cargo load report (CLR) from ramp crew and prepared the manifest. Upon running the number -- w/ negative bags -- ACARS returned a solution indicating a need for ballast (in the forward cargo area). The Captain relayed the information to Ramp Personnel -- face to face -- and the Ramp Personnel relayed the information to their Operations office to process and authorize the request. Shortly thereafter; Ramp Personnel returned to the flight deck and advised they'd place 400 pounds of ballast onboard the aircraft -- in the forward cargo area -- and handed us a new CLR which indicated the same. We continued our checklists and tasks and proceeded without incident. Upon our arrival and after shutdown; the Captain advised Ramp Personnel we we'd arrived with 400 pounds of ballast and they were welcome to it. During my prefight walk around; the ramp crew advised there was absolutely NO ballast aboard the aircraft. I returned to flight deck and informed the Captain. A moment later; as we prepared for the return flight; Ramp Personnel came up to the flight deck and reconfirmed what they'd told me earlier -- there was NO ballast aboard when we arrived. The ramp crew [from origin airport] said they'd put it on and never did.The requirement for [company] ramp crews to seek permission and authorization from [company] operations when the need for ballast arises removes ramp crew autonomy and adds an extra layer of oversight to a process that may not need it. Remove [company] operations personnel from the equation...allow ramp crew chief to execute the loading of ballast upon request from the flight crew.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reported they were notified at arrival station that their requested ballast was not loaded.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Aircraft: Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower PHL
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A Dash 8 taxiing to depart Runway 35 at K. Aircraft cleared for take off while still on Taxiway E. Procedures do not allow aircraft to line up and wait for an intersection departure after sunset. A CRJ2 landed Runway 26 and was exiting runway. The CRJ2 was given exiting instructions and cleared to taxi D and G and to cross Runway 35. The Dash 8 was not on runway yet and was overlooked. I was distracted by conversation in the tower.




Synopsis: PHL Controller reported a possible runway separation error between a landing aircraft cleared to cross Runway 35 at Taxiway G and a departure cleared for take of from Runway 35 while still on Taxiway E.
Date: 202001
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Company Policy; Aircraft
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On Aircraft X arrival walk around found signs of delamination to right wing outboard trailing edge aft flap lower skin at inboard corner. A line technician and a lead line technician performed a tap test and agreed that flap shows signs of delamination. This was confirmed by a line sheet metal technician with a tap test and found out of limits per [manual] and updated the log page with details. But after all this; a Maintenance Supervisor signs off this log just by saying flap appears to be previously repaired; and provided no evidence and/or documentation of previous repair. Not only that but the Maintenance Supervisor also failed to mention in the sign off which trailing edge flap was inspected; left wing or right wing; inboard or outboard?This [report] is filed to report an FAA violation. The review of the log shows a trailing edge flap and also a bearing placed on AOG (Aircraft on Ground) since they were not in stock. A review of Maintenance log history was also performed and showed no record of repair done to this right wing outboard trailing edge aft flap. So let's get this straight: a line technician; a line lead technician and a line sheet metal technician agreed that this flap is delaminated with [manual] reference; but a Maintenance Supervisor can just say; appears to be; and sign it off! Really? Is this how we do maintenance? The union steward was informed of this and is investigating.




Synopsis: Technician reported that a supervisor signed off a log book entry and allowed an unairworthy aircraft to return to service.
Date: 201810
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During start of the Number 2 engine; after the fuel lever was placed in the on position; we observed the mechanic at our 10 o'clock position giving us the hand signal to shut down the Number 2 engine. We shut down the Number 2 engine and the mechanic immediately plugged into the intercom. He directed us to motor the Number 2 engine for 2 minutes. After approximately 1 minute; he directed us to pull the Number 2 fire handle and discharge the Number 1 fire bottle. We asked if we were on fire because we had no fire indications in the cockpit. The mechanic said we were on fire and to discharge the remaining fire bottle into the Number 2 engine. The mechanic told us they were bringing a lift truck to door L1 and we were to evacuate through that door. We executed the Evacuation Checklist per the QRH and egressed as directed through door L1.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: During engine start; mechanic monitoring saw tailpipe fire on MD11 Number 2 engine. Crew discharged two fire bottles into the Number 2 engine and evacuated the aircraft.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A B737-800 LUAW Runway 1R waiting for traffic to land Runway 28 L/R. A B777 exiting the South ramp on Mike for taxi to Runway 28 L/R for departure. I advised the B777 to cross Runway 1L; hold short Runway 1R; departing traffic; read back was correct. Next; I cleared the B737-800 for takeoff. At this time; the B777 had not yet crossed the Runway 1L to hold short and the B737-800 was rolling through Mike; so I advised the B777 to cross Runway 1R; hold short Runway 28L; read back was correct. A very short time later; the B737-800 said they were departing Runway 1R; and aborting. I advised them cancel takeoff clearance; turn right Taxiway F1; turn right onto Lima; and advise when ready to go again. They made a displeasing remark about the intelligence of my instruction? I immediately went back to the B777 and advised them to turn left onto Runway 1R; turn right Taxiway F1 to join Foxtrot; and hold short Runway 28L; read back was correct. The B757 was on final Runway 28R; and was not sent around; as I was able to get the read back of exiting instructions in a timely manner. There was no way to predict that the B737-800 would hear this and conclude that an aircraft would be crossing down field; as not a single aircraft was in their field of vision except the arrival that had rolled through before they were cleared for take off. This may have been the issue; however; as normally; an aircraft with the B777's taxi instructions would have been closer to Runway 1R (maybe even holding short); therefore placing them in the field of vision; possibly identifying them as the B777; alleviating any question when the instruction was issued and read back. Additionally; with the fairly recent events; and this being an outbound leg for a red eye flight; it is very likely that the flight crew was on a higher sense of personal well being and self protective mechanisms quickly sought after with a seemingly unusual clearance. This is a taxi clearance that is estimated to be issued thirteen to fifteen times a day in all light conditions.




Synopsis: Tower Controller described an aborted takeoff event on an intersecting runway when assumptions were made by the flight crew that runway crossing traffic would be a factor.
Date: 201712
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: Heavy Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: Our cruise altitude was flight level 350. Our speed was .81 mach. We were on an Eastbound track. Flight conditions were IMC; obscured hazy layer; no radar images; and no other reports of turbulence on the track. Severe turbulence was experienced for 2-3 minutes. The autopilot disengaged; speed fluctuated 15-20 knots fast and slow. Our speed went 4-5 knots into red speed tape and we an received aural warning for approximately 3-4 seconds. The stick shaker was intermittently engaging during the event. We had an altitude loss of 250 feet due to the performance of the aircraft. No engine parameters were exceeded. The Captain was pilot flying and I was pilot monitoring. I was calling out airspeeds; altitudes; pitch and roll during the event. After the event contacted [Company] and maintenance. We issued a PIREP on 123.45 common radio and requested climb to FL360 via CPDLC. A logbook entry was entered for severe turbulence. Severe Turbulence was encountered. There were no signs of severe turbulence prior to event. I do not think this event could have been avoided. We did not have any warnings prior to the severe turbulence encounter. After the Captain and I debriefed the event we both had the immediate same thought.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported encountering unexpected severe turbulence in cruise causing an overspeed warning alert.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ACT.TRACON, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ACT
ATC / advisory: TRACON ACT
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I departed for a VFR flight to ILE. Before departing; I checked weather; NOTAMS and TFRs enroute and saw that there were only two active TFRs in the Texas area; Dallas and Corpus Christi. Neither of which was along my flight path. I was in the vicinity of Waco; TX Approach Control and contacted them on 127.65 to let them know I was 15-20 NM northeast of their position at 4;500 FT MSL and wanted to get permission to transition through their airspace to my destination. I was informed by the Approach Controller that I was near an active TFR and that I needed to turn east to avoid penetrating the restricted area. After complying with the order; the Controller vectored me around toward the south and then west to maintain TFR clearance. I was told to contact Waco Approach Control via the telephone upon my arrival to ILE. I called them at my destination and spoke about the problem. Apparently; there was a moving TFR that was being conducted in the Waco vicinity that I was unaware of and it was not listed on the FAA.gov TFR website. Being a Part 135 professional pilot; I was shocked to have been snared into a situation such as this and I can assure you that I make safety paramount in all of my aviation related activities.




Synopsis: General Aviation pilot voiced concern regarding the lack of published information on a moving TFR near Waco; TX; noting no NOTAM information was published regarding this TFR.
Date: 202107
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MYR.Airport, SC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other parked
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: It is impossible to egress the jetway at Gate XX at MYR. The jetway doors lock from the inside; and there is no exit button or push bar that will allow you to exit the jetway into the terminal. These codes are obviously not available to Passengers or even Crew Members. You must enter the security code to exit the terminal door even from the inside. Same thing for the door to the ramp at the bottom of the jetway. These are the only jetways in the system that I am aware of that lock you in at the top of the jetway. In the event an evacuation from the aircraft is necessary for a fire; smoke or some other emergency; people are going to pile up in the jetway with no means of escape into the terminal. Exit buttons that unlock the terminal doors from the inside allowing egress from a jetway that has become dangerous should be installed immediately.




Synopsis: Air Carrier pilot reported the jetway at their gate at MYR airport cannot be opened from the inside which would be a hazard during an emergency evacuation.
Date: 201509
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: There seems to be an increasing problem with the smells of strong fragranced cosmetics in the workplace. According to research posted on several internet sites; approximately 10-12% of the population has a severe sensitivity to these harsh chemicals. Reactions include asthma; allergies; migraine; dizziness; lung and throat irritation; and neurological impairment in as short as 30 mins after exposure.Due to the serious safety concerns when pilot health is degraded; we need to address this issue. I am suggesting a remedy for two particular situations that have presented in the past two days.First; please reinstate the restriction for pilots prohibiting the wearing of any fragranced cosmetics in the cockpit. It is a very confined space with restricted airflow. A sensitive person could have a serious medical issue during flight. This restriction used to be in the FOM but has since been removed. Also; publishing a reminder in a newsletter would be helpful to draw attention to the change.Second; please notify all ground transportation providers of the same restriction. Many vehicles are showing up to transport pilots with multiple extreme air fresheners in vents. The driver may also be wearing fragrance which adds to the toxic load. This was an unbearable situation today which could result in a sick call due to a throbbing headache. This is totally unnecessary and compromises the bottom line profitability of the operation. It also erodes pilot health and well being which also costs money and causes needless suffering.




Synopsis: B777 Captain suggests that the company should institute a policy prohibiting strong scents and fragrances in the work place.