elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201402
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: HOU.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower HOU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Our flight had landed and was approaching the gate with both engines operating. I observed the Ramp Agents approaching their positions to receive the aircraft; so I reduced taxi speed in order that the aircraft could continue to roll; rather than stopping short of the Safety Zone while they got into position. As we approached the lead-in line and began our left turn; a baggage tug with carts behind it approached from our left. Given our position; movement; and the fact that we had commenced our turn toward the Gate; I had every expectation that the driver would stop. He did not; crossing directly in front of our moving aircraft.A moment later; a second tug approached from the left; which also did not stop; but passed even closer in front of our aircraft; necessitating a violent brake application to stop our aircraft in order to avoid a collision. After this vehicle was clear; we taxied into the gate and terminated the aircraft. Two Mechanics who were accepting the aircraft to reposition it witnessed what had happened; and confirmed our impressions that what had just transpired was far outside the bounds of safe practice. One specifically commented that the drivers were closer to our operating engines than Mechanics are allowed to be; with attendant hazard to both personnel and also to the risk of ingesting a bag into an engine if we had been at a high power setting.I also spoke with the Ramp Supervisor who had marshalled us in to our gate; who also concurred that both drivers acted inappropriately in not holding short of the Gate Safety Zone until we had parked. I advised him of my intention to report what had happened; and while he didn't know who the individual drivers were; he said that he would attempt to find out.The intentional; blatant; and reckless disregard for even the most rudimentary safe operating practices demonstrated by the behavior of the two drivers is deeply troubling. What happened in front of our aircraft was not only unsafe; it was gross. Violations like this are how people can get killed.




Synopsis: A B737 Captain reported back to back incidences of baggage cart drivers improperly speeding between his inbound jet and the ground personnel marshalling his arrival at the gate.
Date: 202006
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Other Post Flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were working a return from storage work card on Aircraft X; we were working off paper because the task card was going to be revised and it would have cleared all completed work if worked on iPad. The task card was revised and steps had to be transferred to a new task card. There were several technicians working the job so there were also working task cards for reference.  So there was the original task card - the revised task card and working copies to go through.I was the supervisor and assigned the upgrade [to the] Radios and Electronics Lead; xxxxxx step X electrical/electronics on task card; that step included de-preservation of emergency lights; aircraft battery; EPAS batteries and 'any other batteries' including flight attendant station emergency flash lights.At almost going home time for the technicians which is earlier than normal due COVID work hours nothing was signed off by the Lead; when I asked xxxxxx he stated 'it was all done' and they would sign it off.  When I was auditing the master paperwork step x.9 'any other batteries' was not signed; and all technicians had already left. I signed for the step as Supervisor since I was told it was done; I was going to verify that it was done but then got side tracked with other aircraft issues.The aircraft then position ferried with no flight attendants or passengers to ZZZ for a dead 'A' check where they found the flight attendant station emergency flash lights did not have batteries in them.No suggestion for resolution as I should have not signed it off without verification; I never have signed steps before without verification and will not again; however it could have been worse if it had been a revenue flight so the task card should include a flag; not serviceable tape; or some other way of visually seeing the flashlights did not have a battery in them; these return to service cards are something we have never done; the paperwork is extensive and made worse by the revision. I have used this as a reminder not to get complacent.




Synopsis: Supervising Maintenance Technician reported signing off work without verifying it had been completed.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B N90
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were on a vector to the ILS 22L at EWR and were given a turn to join the localizer over TEB. The controller kept us at 250kts and started to slow us down to 190kts just past TEB; at which point we already had the LOC captured; and then gave instructions to slow down to 170kts before GIMEE. By that time we were already half-way to the set up for our approach. At around 1800'; I press Control Steering button to help capture the GS and a second later; I disconnected the autopilot. When we were at a 1000' we were configured. Just below 1000' the captain reached for the checklist and at around 700' called for a go-around; which we performed with no more issues.




Synopsis: First Officer reported executing a go-around due to an unstable approach which had resulted from high assigned airspeeds by ATC.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Supervisor failed to warn and inform mechanics assigned to aircraft that work was going to be performed. Failing to follow Job Card XXX4003; Step 7; A; (1) WARNING [notice]. The Supervisor was performing Job Card XXX4003; upgrade to CAT-2 scheduled Certification Check and turned on hydraulics without informing the mechanics working the airplane that this was going to happen; or that flight controls were going to move. Failure to notify personnel working the aircraft of potential movement of flight surfaces and other areas. Supervisor proceeded with Job Card and mechanics stayed away from any potential moving parts. [Recommend] following safety precautions outlined in the Maintenance Procedures and Job Card.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports that a Supervisor failed to warn and inform Maintenance personnel when he turned on a B737-400 aircraft's Hydraulic System and moved flight controls. Supervisor did not follow the 'Warning' notice in their Job Card prior to performing a scheduled CAT-2 upgrade Certification Check.
Date: 201901
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Seatbelt
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: This report again raises awareness about the consistent misuse of the seat belt sign by a significant number of flight deck crews (mainly Captains). On the past five flights; Captains have insisted upon leaving the seat belt sign on for the entire flight. Some are so brazen they make an announcement prior to take-off advising the sign will be left on for the entire flight! Keep in mind; flying times range between 6.5 to 9.5 hours. On past flights; I have attempted to employ/educate using CRM strategies with some Captains in order to understand their reasoning behind their actions of keeping the sign on. Most express concerns about liability related to passenger injury due to unexpected severe turbulence. Others state they are doing flight attendants a favor by not cycling the sign off during late night flights - minimizing need for compliance checks. I'm deeply concerned the negative safety culture this type of behavior is creating -- a dangerous risk for passengers and crew. It encourages passengers to disobey the sign while fostering complacency among flight attendants. For example; during my last flight; FAs stopped enforcing the requirement for passengers to be buckled due to the sign being constantly on and lack of turbulence. Their reasoning (understandable); belts were unnecessary due to the smooth ride. At one point; I counted at least 15 passengers in the aisle while the sign was on. This occurred about seven hours into the flight; following the breakfast service. Clearly a violation of 121.311 and portions of 121.571. I witnessed this more often on long range flights.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant expressed concern in regard to the overuse of the seat belt.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Student
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was flying a Cessna 172 on a solo cross country to ZZZ1 via ZZZ; I knew of glider activity in the area and upon arrival to ZZZ made radio contact with a glider pilot whose glider and two trucks were parked in the dirt near the end of runway 20. They requested I land a bit long and I complied without any problems. I made all of the proper radio calls and taxied back to 20 via Alpha taxiway. I stopped at the end of alpha and called letting ZZZ traffic know I was holding short of the active runway. The glider pilot then made a call that I was unfamiliar with and began driving a truck onto the active runway towing a glider for takeoff. I continued to hold short and watched the glider takeoff and depart to the left. I then looked down the runway and saw the truck which looked to have pulled off the end of the runway similar to how it had been parked the dirt on the other end runway only moments earlier. I visually verified that the glider was on the left side of the runway in what looked to be a left traffic pattern for 20. I called and announced my intent to enter the runway and takeoff with a right turn out to the north. After waiting a few seconds for a reply I heard what sounded like two clicks and static. I called asking for the individual to repeat and did not receive anything. I then entered the runway and began takeoff procedures. After lifting off I could then see that the truck had not exited the runway and was sitting on it still in the active runway. At this point I had already begun my climb and could not abort the takeoff safely. About this time the driver of the truck began to yell at me over the radio. I continued a safe climb out while calmly explaining to him that I announced I was entering the runway and even given extra time for a response; after not receiving any sort of response from the three calls I had made while on the taxiway I had concluded both visually and through radio communications that the runway was safe for my use.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported he took off at a non-towered airport on a runway that had a truck parked on it when the truck failed to communicate effectively.
Date: 202110
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PAMR.Airport, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D PAMR
Second aircraft: UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We were on the downwind on our inlet departure from PAMR Runway 25 and my student noticed a drone at our 8-9 o'clock position. We reported it to tower. The drone appeared a red tone and it was at an estimated 1;100 feet MSL and less than a 1/4 away.

Callback: Reporter had no additional information to share.



Synopsis: General aviation flight crew saw a UAS while in the traffic pattern and reported to ATC.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: FFZ.Tower, AZ
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Other go a round
Airspace: Class D FFZ
ATC / advisory: Tower FFZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had a taxi back on Runway 04L and told him to expedite to the end to exit the runway as Aircraft X was on final behind him. Aircraft Y was transitioning to the base of the tower via the GECKO1 transition. Aircraft X for whatever reason decided to go-around even though spacing was going to exist. He informed me of this decision short final. After completing a scan I noticed that Aircraft Y was 0.5 NM northwest of the field about to cross. Aircraft X was passing the numbers at this time and so I issued a traffic alert to both aircraft. Aircraft Y took evasive action avoiding collision and I would estimate the aircraft passed within 100 feet of each other. Neither pilot informed me they were going to file a NMAC.




Synopsis: FFZ Tower Controller reported a Near Mid Air Collision that happened while working local. An aircraft executed an unexpected go-around with another aircraft transitioning the airspace and got too close at the departure end of the runway.
Date: 202008
Local time of day: ZZZ
Location: P80.TRACON, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While I was working an arrival sector I was controlling Aircraft X descending on the ZZZZZ arrival. I was also controlling Aircraft Y that was dropping jumpers from 14;000 ft. directly east of the ZZZZZ arrival. Once Aircraft Y advised me that he dropped his jumpers I saw a potential conflict between Aircraft Y descending to their airport and Aircraft X descending on the arrival. To resolve this conflict I instructed Aircraft Y to descend east so that the aircraft would descend away from Aircraft X. Aircraft Y did not proceed as I instructed and instead turned west bound and continued to descend on top of Aircraft X. As soon as I saw Aircraft Y ignoring my instruction and descending west I issued traffic to Aircraft X and instructed him to turn northwest bound heading 330.Aircraft X did not hear my initial instruction and I had to repeat with a traffic alert and a further turn northwest bound heading 310. Not only is the pilot of Aircraft Y ignoring my instructions a safety risk but the LOA (Letter of Agreement) that is in place with these skydive operations is not specific enough to keep these operations at a safe distance from our ZZZZZ arrival. As long as I have been working here this has been a safety issue. The pilots of these skydive operations have been allowed to practice unsafe operations without any repercussions. To prevent a reoccurrence of this event I think there should be a dialogue between our facility and the pilots of these skydive operations. If there is one already then I am not aware of this because there appears to be no transparency between the controllers and management. I also think that the LOA we have in place with Company A and Company B are not specific enough to ensure a safe operation between skydiving and aircraft descending on the arrival. The LOA between TRACON; Company A and Company B should be re-written to ensure the safe operation of aircraft within the TRACON airspace.




Synopsis: An Approach Controller reported an airborne conflict between a parachute jump aircraft and an air carrier on arrival.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp DFW
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: While at the gate my cabin crew notified me that the aft left hand door (2L) was not able to shut and was misaligned. I went back and examined the door and found that assessment to be accurate. I was not aware of what had caused this; but the entire door was two inches low. I notified the Gate Agent that the aircraft was not airworthy and instructed her not to board the aircraft. I went to the cockpit and notified Maintenance of the issue as well as Operations and advised them not to board the aircraft. About two minutes later and before the mechanics had arrived the passengers started to come on board with the Gate Agent telling me that Operations had said that they didn't care what the Captain had said board the aircraft. After all the passengers had boarded the mechanics could finally get to the back of the aircraft and inspect the door. They had the immediate and exact same conclusion that I had come to which was that the aircraft was unairworthy and instructed me to remove the passengers as the flight would require a new aircraft. I made the calls to Operations; the Gate Agent and a PA to the very upset passengers and started the deplaning process. Once everyone was off I shut down the aircraft and ran my checklists.This event saw the Captain's authority overridden by Operations and possibly put safety of the passengers at risk as one of the primary exits of the aircraft was inoperative.Captain should have final say of what happens while in command of the aircraft.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported the Captain's authority was overridden by operations.