elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Ten minutes prior to departure the tug slammed the aircraft violently backward to the point I thought we had been in a severe car accident!! After recovering from the trauma I went down to see if any one was hurt in the tug. I was told it was a runaway tug. We inspected aircraft for damage. A company Maintenance Supervisor told me it was no big deal. I told him I begged to differ as I felt whiplash from the violent slamming. I also took video with my cell phone to give to my attorney to show how far off the mark we were pushed [by the impact]. I also contacted the Duty Manager as I was concerned about possible injuries to passengers; none have been reported to me at this time. We got an inspection done by Maintenance and continued on to destination.It amazes me the way our management is so cavalier in their approach to other employees' safety. This was a violent crash and to be told by a 'supervisor' who was not even on board that it was no big deal reminds me of the fact that safety at [our reorganized company] takes a back seat!




Synopsis: While the reporter/Captain was in the cockpit preparing the A319 for departure; the aircraft was struck violently by a 'runaway tug.' A Maintenance Manager declared the event to have been 'no big deal' although he was not present when it occured. The reporter disagreed and had a maintenance inspection performed prior to accepting the aircraft for a revenue flight.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Weather elements / visibility: Haze / Smoke; 4
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C BUR
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT; Tower VNY
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In preparation for a brief flight from VNY; I requested an IFR Tower Enroute clearance. Conditions at VNY were VFR; but SMO was IFR with a 1000 foot ceiling and limited visibility due to fog and haze. Thus the need for the IFR clearance.According to my notes; I was given the following clearance by VNY clearance delivery:'Cleared to the Santa Monica airport via the ADAMM ONE departure; VNY 095 radial; DARTS; Direct. Climb and maintain 4000; expect 5000 in ten minutes. Comply with the Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP); except for the altitude restrictions.'After repeating the clearance; I referenced my charts. The relevant portion of the ODP states the following: 'climbing left turn on heading 050 and VNY-095 to DARTS.'  However; the ADAMM ONE procedure states: 'climbing left turn heading 110; then expect radar vectors to VNY-095.'Because the ground controller emphasized that I should follow the ODP; I made the assumption that ATC expected me to follow the directional guidance provided by the ODP; and thus after departure began my left turn; passed through a heading of 110; intending to stop my left turn at 050. Unfortunately; this was apparently not what was expected of me; and as a result; I began to head for the BUR final approach course; which was in use by an air carrier. The Burbank sector controller immediately directed me to turn right to a heading of 180 to avoid a separation error; and I immediately complied.In retrospect; while on the ground at VNY; I should have clarified any confusion I might have had with the conflict between the SID and ODP with the clearance controller. I was about to enter very busy airspace on a day in which flight conditions had repeatedly changed between VFR and IFR. I was stressed; and I could tell that the controllers involved in this incident were stressed as well due to the workload; traffic; and conditions. In this case I should have swallowed my pride and; rather than trying to appear 'professional'; admitted my confusion and asked for clarification on the ground.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of confusion after receiving his clearance from VNY ATCT. He is given a SID and also told to comply with the Obstacle Departure Procedure. Pilot departs and controller directs his flight to another direction away from the Burbank final.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On the ILS in IMC with flaps 3 and gear down at 160 knots assigned; I encountered significant speed fluctuations and sheets of rain. The Pilot Monitoring and I got very focused on airspeed; course and path; particularly speed. We called the final approach fix; checked the altimeters and set the missed approach altitude; but I failed to call for flaps 5 or the Before Landing Checklist. We saw the runway at around 1300 feet. I did not note the failure of the pilot monitoring to call 'thousand; stabilized; cleared to land.' We continued below 500 feet with flaps set at 3. Starting at around 150 feet; we got several terrain warnings; an altitude warning and a finally a flap warning. I visually confirmed that we were not below glidepath and that there was no terrain conflict. During the warnings; the Captain took the controls. As we were touching down; the flap warning registered with me; I realized that we were misconfigured and I selected flaps 5. The central cause for me was channelized attention and tunnel vision. In the conditions; I focused insufficiently on calling for flaps 5; and the Before Landing Checklist and failed to notice the absence of a 1000 foot call. When the terrain and altitude warnings sounded I focused initially on terrain and glidepath and did not think to check the flap configuration until after the flap warning sounded. Because I misinterpreted the early warnings; I did not discover the flap problem until it was too late for me to timely call for a rejected landing. Never focus so completely on one element of the flight that other elements are ignored for extended periods of time. Redouble an emphasis on standard procedure so that no flow items or checklists are missed.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported receiving a GPWS warning on short final then realized it was due to incorrect flap configuration.
Date: 201710
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower JFK
Second aircraft: B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were number two for departure; Runway 31L. We were following a Boeing 767. I instructed my First Officer (FO) to ask for separation behind the 'Heavy departing in front of us'. The Controller seemed to be confused/annoyed over our initial and subsequent requests. I then asked 'what is standard separation behind a Heavy?' The response was 'behind a B767 it's 3.5 miles.' My recollection of [Company] Flight Manual...was five miles. Not wanting to start and argument with the Controller...we accepted takeoff clearance and departed when I; as the Pilot in Command; deemed it safe to do so. After departing and level at cruise altitude; I referenced [Company] flight manual. According to AIM 7-3-9; separation between a Large...and a Heavy is five miles. The following day I called JFK Tower hoping to speak with a Tower Supervisor who was unavailable at the time. I did speak with the Controller who answered the phone and was informed that the Controller we dealt with was; in fact; in compliance with 7110.659 which allows Tower Controllers to reduce wake turbulence separation between certain aircraft. This information is not contained in our operating manual. During our conversation the Controller informed me that 7110.659 was initially implemented at certain airports with the intent of making it effective at all airports which; to his knowledge; had not yet been done.... It raises the question in my mind; is the purpose of 7110.659 to help facilitate traffic flow at the expense of safe wake turbulence separation? Wake turbulence events have been significantly reduced over the years as a result of wake turbulence separation which was initially measured in minutes but reduced to miles (radar separation) and apparently; under this new program; has now been further reduced. Is 7110.659 safe; or just more conducive/accommodating to high traffic airports? Update operating manual to reflect 7110.659.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain questioned the safety of implementing Wake Turbulence Recategorization separation standards at JFK and other major airports.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: RJAA.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: Center RJAA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During climb off 16R (RJAA) on the Cupid departure we were initially assigned 9;000 feet per departure control. We got a clearance direct Cupid intersection and climb to 10;000 feet which was read back. I reported 'out of 9;000 for 10;000' because I noticed traffic on the TCAS opposite direction at 10;000. ATC responded with a clearance to maintain 9;000 feet and turn right immediately to Hdg 180. The First Officer (PF) complied however we reached 9;400 feet before returning to 9;000. We did get a TA but not a RA and with the traffic in sight; there was no near miss as some passengers and flight attendants believed.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Flight crew of a widebody transport cleared to a conflicting altitude during departure from RJAA resulting in a TA alert. Crew complied with a new cleared altitude and thus cleared the conflict.
Date: 201901
Location: BOS.Airport, MA
Flight conditions: IMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part
Primary problem: Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Narrative: The previous week I flew the same [JFUND2] arrival into BOS. The aircraft should cross SEETS intersection at or above FL210. Last week it did not level off as it should have. We had to intervene and manually stop the airplane from descending. We did not have an altitude deviation. Fast forward to today and I am now doing the exact same arrival in a different airplane. This time I am watching intently to see if the aircraft levels as it should. NOPE!!!!! Three miles before SEETS the aircraft was diving below FL210. We were correctly all set up with the airplane in NAV and DES and on glide path. Without aggressively grabbing the airplane and leveling off it would have blown through FL210 by at least 1000 feet; if not more. For the second time; I had to grab the airplane and manually stop it from descending to avoid a major altitude deviation. I believe there is a problem somewhere in the database. It correctly shows on the navigation display and matches with the chart; however the airplane descends as if unaware of an altitude restriction.




Synopsis: A320 Captain reported the aircraft failed to initiate a proper level off  while on the JFUND2 arrival to BOS. Captain stated this is a reoccuring type of event.
Date: 202004
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: HUM.Airport, LA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class D HUM
ATC / advisory: Tower HUM
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Time Pressure
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: VFR multi engine training flight with CFI and one student day VFR. HUM Tower was called on the radio in a descent. Both pilots did not observe yellow/black helicopter Aircraft Y in same general direction to HUM airport. Helo took no evasive action and continued straight and level flight path. CFI took evasive action. Helo called HUM Tower after close call; it may have been that the helo was speaking to New Orleans Approach (this is unknown) at time of incident. Aircraft X had been on Tower frequency the entire flight in the vicinity of Class D airspace around HUM. Tower never reported any traffic prior to incident.




Synopsis: Instructor reported an NMAC event during descent for landing.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZLA
ATC / advisory: Center ZLA
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Loaded the STAAV6 departure during preflight. Noticed waypoint TRALR did not load. Since this point was on the published SID and listed as a point in the release I added the point. While flying the SID as we passed waypoint STAAV enroute to waypoint TRALR the aircraft started a right turn indicating it was 3.5 miles left of course. I directed the FO to manually fly the AC to TRALR which he did. The FMC did not recognize TRALR as a fly to point even though it was depicted on the NAV display directly in front of us; instead it was navigating to NICLE the next point after TRALR. I questioned LA Center if there has been any problems with aircraft flying over TRALR on the SID and he answered yes but didn't know why.It appears as some kind of FMC recognition problem with waypoint TRALR.Need to look into this waypoint FMC mix up. I really don't know what happened.




Synopsis: B767-300 Captain reported his FMC failed to navigate to TRALR on the STAAV6 departure out of LAX.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: At approximately [time and date] facility management evacuated the adjacent area to mine (Area X) due to a reported positive case of COVID-19. This forced a high number of additional aircraft in to our airspace. Additionally; there was a significant weather system over and east of the ZZZ1 area and southern [state] that southern arrivals into ZZZ2 were being routed in to our airspace and had to be blended with our stream. It was highly chaotic.For approximately an hour; my R-Side and the R-Side at [sector] did a tremendous job of keeping traffic separated; spaced; and rerouted where they needed to be. There were multiple instances of what would have technically been airspace violations where we had aircraft clip the Area X sectors Z;Y;A. These happened for up to fifteen miles or so as we used the corners of their airspace. As they had cleared out this area and airspace; and we could see the airspace clearly; we felt that it was a calculated risk in an extraordinary time that was worth taking. We need an in house contingency plan at ZZZ for if we lose an area(s). There are contingency plans in place already for losing entire facilities; but to my knowledge there are no contingency plans for partial losses in ARTCCs. These contingency plans need to include plans for divestiture of airspace; technological solutions for accessing frequency and land line communications; and training for the work force. The Agency should also conduct a 'table top' simulation or emergency situations with all interested entities; i.e. Tech Ops; Unions; other support staff. These exercises should be completed annually to increase readiness to protect the NAS.




Synopsis: ZZZ Center Controller reported that an adjacent area went ATC Zero; resulting in a complex and difficult traffic situation.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: Marginal
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Doing a hot reserve trip to ZZZ and back to ZZZ1. Was the end of a 13 hour reserve day; and the first time I have ever flown in or out of ZZZ. On the approach phase of flight on the LDA XX. The approach was standard from flaps 8 to 30; and getting on to the final approach course in white needles.I was a little uncomfortable with the whole approach; which took my attention away from the last flap setting. I made multiple calls alerting the Captain that altitude or airspeed was off. He responded with 'correcting;' and made correcting actions. I understand what is like to fight with a crosswinds and gusting. But looking back a go around call would have been the correct choice even if the flaps where at 45. In the future I will make that call.We then switched to green needles and that course was about a half dot off. So Captain switched off the autopilot; and hand flew it in and which caused an increase in work load as he descended to the 1;700 foot level off. It was gusting 26 from the right pushing us toward the prohibited area which took some of my focus. I made the 1;000 foot call out; and Tower cautioned us that we were a little low and gave us a new altimeter setting that was .04 off what we had set from the ATIS.  Then I made the 500 foot call out shortly after. Next thing we know the GPWS says 'TOO LOW FLAPS' immediately executed go-around.Immediately executed a go-around; and then vectored around for the approach again.On IOE I did not get the opportunity to fly out of ZZZ or in to ZZZ. So I was worried about the prohibited area that everyone talks about; and with that right crosswind blowing us left to it; really had my attention right when I should have reminded Captain flaps where not at 45. Then the 1;000 foot call out came; and just like that the flaps were over looked. I am still low time; and I have not flown in 2 weeks; but one time and then 2 weeks before that one time. I felt really good off IOE; but in the last month and a half I have gotten close to no flight time.




Synopsis: CRJ-700 First Officer reported that an unstable approach in combination with a GPWS warning prompted executing a go-around.