elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During my layover; I made an attempt to sleep roughly between the hours of XA00 and XE00; however; I was unable to sleep. Upon arrival into ZZZ; fatigue was severe and I believe micro sleeps were beginning to occur. I spoke with the First Officer about this and he advised me that he was able to get sleep during the day and felt good. I thought I would be able to drive home safely; however; micro-sleep began occurring again. Fortunately; I made it home safely and went straight to bed. After three hours of sleep I woke up sore with a headache and neck ache. I was unable to sleep any further than that day. I placed my fatigue call at a time that would allow crew scheduling enough time to cover the flight that evening.As I have stated in many fatigue reports prior to this; I believe avoiding back to back red eye flights and wake times back-and-forth between day and night would reduce these issues.1. I was unable to get sleep at the hotel. The hotel provided a quiet; comfortable; cool environment for sleep; but I still could not day sleep. 2. None of the fatigue mitigation techniques work for me during WOCL (Window of Circadian Low). 3. Crew scheduling compounds the problem in its current structure.As I have stated in many fatigue reports prior to this; I believe avoiding back to back red eye flights and wake times back-and-forth between day and night would reduce these issues.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported being fatigued due to lack of sleep and changing day/night flight schedules.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Took over [a] position and shortly thereafter MDW went below minimums. 2 aircraft entered the hold a 3rd was sent back to [departure airport] and another diverted to ZZZ prior to entering the hold. Also at this time I was having issues with AUS and BNA convective weather and possible diverts as well.SOD (Supervisor on Duty) requested [flight] divert to [ZZZ2 a nearby airport]. Aircraft had 45 minutes of divert fuel on board and ZZZ3 as the alternate. In the process of trying of using the reroute tool swift crashed. This happened at absolutely the worst time. Numerous ACARS messages and calls coming in. Asked my pod mates for help as well.Once [software] was rebooted I attempted to work on a reroute again and [software] crashed for the second time. I had informed [flight] to add ZZZ2 as an alternate; gave him the info and told him to divert to ZZZ2. TAF was showing 400/2 for ZZZ2. In the confusion I didn't realize the METAR at ZZZ2 was showing 300/1; below alternate minimums. I changed [the flights] destination to ZZZ2 and again with the workload and confusion of [software] crashing I neglected to add ZZZ4 as the alternate for ZZZ2. This was by far the busiest I've been and to lose my main tool in the heat of the battle was very stressful.




Synopsis: Dispatcher comments about the issues with their company's flight management system.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PBI.Tower, FL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
ATC / advisory: Tower PBI
Second aircraft: Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Instructor; Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X landed Runway 28R and slowed enough to make [the] turn off on Runway 32. My Trainee instructed pilot to turn right on Runway 32. We observed Aircraft X begin to turn; but then return to centerline and continued down runway. Once trainee saw Aircraft X begin a turn; he quickly cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff before verifying Aircraft X had actually exited the runway. Before I could key up to cancel the takeoff clearance; Aircraft Y rejected the clearance saying he saw the other aircraft still on the runway. I told Aircraft Y to cancel takeoff clearance and hold position. Aircraft X then missed the next turnoff and moved very slowly down the runway. Aircraft X asked us which exit he was supposed to make. As this was happening; [the] Trainee decided the next arrival was too close to get Aircraft Y airborne; [and] he instructed Aircraft X to turn right and exit runway at C12. Aircraft X was instructed to exit at C5 and contact Ground. Aircraft Y was not exiting the runway quickly enough; so Trainee told Aircraft Z to go-around. Trainers and trainees must do a better job of scanning runways and verifying arrivals have exited prior to issuing takeoff clearance to subsequent aircraft.




Synopsis: PBI Tower Controller/Instructor reported a runway incursion involving an arrival not exiting the runway quick enough; a departure cleared for takeoff; and an arrival having to be sent around.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: We were preparing to operate [the] flight.  The Ramp Lead came to the flight deck to give us the Load Sheet; and asked if we had brought the aircraft in from ZZZ.  I told him that we had operated that flight.  He then informed us that the ramp personnel in ZZZ had not unloaded the aft cargo compartment when the aircraft arrived in ZZZ; as there were 13 ZZZ tagged checked bags in the aft cargo compartment that he discovered when we arrived in ORD. This caused us to operate ZZZ-ORD; with 390lbs of undocumented bags in the aft cargo compartment.  Not knowing these bags were onboard then caused us to have inaccurate weight and balance information for this flight; including an inaccurate takeoff trim setting.Suggest having the ramp personnel double check the aft cargo compartment when an aircraft arrives at the gate.




Synopsis: EMB-170 Captain reported ramp personnel discovered bags had not been unloaded from the aft cargo pit at the previous airport. This caused the aircraft to operate with 390 lbs of undocumented bags on the flight to ORD.
Date: 201901
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter function: Lead Technician; Technician
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Here is [the] actual times it takes to perform the 600fh (Flight Hour) inspection and 12 month inspection on a CRJ 200. Man-hours attributed to both inspections need to be adjusted as they are not close to the actual time needed to perform these inspections. We are creating a safety issue with such a differential between the allotted time and the actual time of the inspections; causing mechanics to work at extremely quick and rushed speeds on this aircraft and others to be able to get the check as finished as possible in the overnight maintenance period. Again; there is a great need to adjust the hours given for these inspections; please pursue this issue and help make our aircraft as safe and compliant as they need to be.During last night; I recorded the amount of time each person spent on each a 600fh inspection and a 12-month check on a CRJ200. For the 600fh check; planning allows us 13.8 man-hours to perform the inspection. This is an extremely low amount of time because this inspection is very deep in depth and took us 49.25 man-hours to perform last night. On the 12 month inspection; the allotted man hours was 7.0. The actual time it took was 14.5 man-hours and in addition to that we still have to fix the issues that are found during these inspections. The company is so busy trying to obtain more planes and get more work done that they refuse to recognize that we do not have manpower to fix everything.My mechanics for the night felt rushed due to this extremely large amount of work that is being issued to us with the shortest amount of manpower allotted to them. Both of these inspections take at least two times longer to perform than we are allotted to take.We need to re-evaluate our times spent on inspections; especially the non- frequent inspections like the two mentioned above. Anything to keep the leads and mechanics from rushing around (and very possibly not performing their job to the best of their ability) to make our planes safe and compliant.




Synopsis: CRJ-200 Maintenance Technician reported that allotted time is insufficient to allow safe and proper inspections on the aircraft fleet.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Fuel System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: While climbing through 12;000 FT on departure; we received a FUEL LOW LEVEL 1 message warning with the wing tank 2 indications going to zero. We immediately turned back toward the airport for an emergency landing after running the fuel low level QRC. We made an uneventful landing and proceeded to the gate after being inspected for fuel leaks by the ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighters) equipment. We received an erroneous indication of no fuel in the number one wing tank and returned to the departure airport.




Synopsis: The pilots of an Embraer 145 received an erroneous low fuel warning during climb and observed one fuel quantity indicator going to zero. The crew turned towards the departure field; ran the low low level checklist; and made a safe landing.
Date: 202012
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Time Pressure; Other / Unknown
Second reporter function: Lead Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On Date aircraft XXX had fumes/smoke in the cockpit smell noticed by the flight crew.The event occurred due to a razor blade that was left inside CBP1 possibly during a visit to ZZZ for the ADS-B modification in the middle of month of 2019 and I could have possibly left it there during the installation of breaker CBP1-XX during the mod. Due to the length of time between when possibly leaving a razor blade and when it was discovered I cannot recall whether or not I used a razor blade in the area. But; typically; when I do wiring work I don't use razor blades to cut tape or remove wiring insulation. As we usually have the equipment to remove fiberglass tape (a wire spoon and flush cutters or just peeling it off by hand;) and wiring insulation (standard wire strippers and the twisted pair stripping tool). Reflecting on the experience I would hope that even during the crunch time of the push to finish the ADS-B modifications on all our aircraft before the deadline that I would have continued to practice strict FOD control.My suggestion is to not use lose razor blades when doing work on wires unless absolutely necessary; and to practice strict FOD control and to perform detailed FOD inspections before every panel close-up.


Second narrative: On date the crew of Aircraft X reported fumes in the cockpit. An AMT discovered a loose razor blade located behind circuit breaker panel 1. Records indicate that panel had work done inside on date. This event has been brought to my attention due to my participation in ADSB mod which the work was completed. Due to the length of time from when the work was accomplished until now; unfortunately I can not provide details on exact situation. I can say that I was the RII In the process and I understand the seriousness of the situation and would not have allowed a loose razor blade to be left in the circuit breaker panel. I did not see a razor blade in the panel when it was closed. AMT found razor blade after fumes noted in cockpit. The event was caused by a Razor blade left in CBP-1.


Synopsis: Air Carrier Lead Technicians reported being notified that they may have inadvertently contributed to a fume event by leaving FOD on an aircraft they repaired.
Date: 202009
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MEM.TRACON, TN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON MEM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: While flying the VANZE arrival into Memphis; we were vectored off the arrival and allowed to deviate left and right to avoid major thunderstorms in the Memphis area. After clearing a cell; we were told to proceed to SUZEE and resume the arrival. We were level at 10;000 ft.; about 3 miles from SUZEE; we started a slight descent; to adhere to the altitude restrictions of the arrival. Memphis approach was extremely busy vectoring aircraft on/off the arrivals and SIDS. We noted an aircraft 5 miles away and climbing and no factor. We stopped our descent at 9;500 ft. and were told to maintain 10;000 ft. for the traffic. We continued the arrival with no other issues. [There was] congestion on the radio and thunderstorms in the area.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict following ATC clearance.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At cruise altitude of 3;500 FT on a VFR flight; the engine failed. I immediately informed TRACON who turned me over to a nearby Tower and I landed on Runway X. This action was the safest course of action at that moment in time. Aside of the engine failing; there was no damage to property or injury to anyone.




Synopsis: A C172's engine failed while cruising at 3;500 FT so the pilot; in contact with a TRACON; was turned over to a nearby Tower where a safe landing was completed.
Date: 201506
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Cabin Lighting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: The cabin reading lights at row 9 and 10 as well as the first 3 rows of coach would not turn off.  [Maintenance Control] was consulted and several resets by the purser were tried; nothing worked.  I was told again by [Maintenance Control] that it was a known and constant problem; I've written this up before.  In the process of the resets; it caused the pilots bunk reading lights to cycle on and off; disturbing the resting pilots crew rest.  That makes that rest area not a class 1 facility; and a violation of FAR 117 rules.  This must get fixed in a timely fashion or crews might not take aircraft with this known problem.




Synopsis: Captain reported several rows of cabin lighting would not turn off. The reset procedure caused the crew rest area lighting to cycle on/off; impinging FAR 117 rest requirements. This was reported as a chronic occurrence.
Date: 202103
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: None
Mission: Other ground repositioning
Flight phase: Other ground repositioning
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Second aircraft: A320
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Airline supertug 1 was repositioning a B787 from the ZZZ Hardstand (Terminal X) to Ramp Exit XX. As the supertug was backing onto the ramp area; Aircraft X was observed entering the XX Alleyway and taxiing around the aircraft under tow (which was still in motion) to Gate XXB in what seemed to be an unsafe maneuver; for which the supertug Operator had to stop abruptly to avoid contact with Aircraft X. While it is true that the XX Alleyway is uncontrolled; the Aircraft X Flight Crew should have stopped and contacted FAA Ground as the primary overseer of all ground movement.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported a B787 was under tow and an A320 taxied around the towing aircraft.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Speedbrake/Spoiler
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: October 2013; I had B757-200 aircraft Work Package that included troubleshooting (T/S) of the Auto Speed Brake System. I found that the Auto Speed Brake actuator was at fault. I checked the RII list to see if the replacement of the actuator was RII; and per RII list 27-62-02 it does not.  I printed out the Aircraft Maintenance Maintenance Manual (AMM) reference 27-62-02-022 and read the instructions. Because I was tired and had already checked the RII list; I missed the paragraph in the AMM that said the Auto Speed Brake mechanism had to be removed to change the actuator and that requires an RII Inspection. I replaced the actuator with no problems and all tests were good and the aircraft went back into service with no problems. I feel that this mistake was because I was too tired and the AMM included a note that was opposite to what the RII list has. There is no need to remove the mechanism to replace this actuator and that threw me off too; but the mechanism needs an RII.  I know that the AMM takes preference over all other documents and I made the mistake of not reading the AMM carefully enough; that will never happen again.




Synopsis: A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed he missed a required RII Inspection of an Auto Speed Brake mechanism after replacing an Auto Speed Brake actuator on a B757-200 aircraft. Technician noted that fatigue; along with a misunderstanding of a 'Note' in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedures contributed to the missed RII requirement.