elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: TRACON S46
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: On climbout the aircraft hit what must have been wake turbulence as there was no weather in the area or rough rides reported. The aircraft was rolled 45 degrees left and pitched nose up as we approached our 7;000 FT climb clearance. The pilot flying disengaged the autopilot to regain control and we subsequently climbed to approximately 7;400 FT during recovery. The turbulence was reported to ATC but no mention of altitude was made.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported wake vortex encounter on climb out from SEA that rolled the aircraft 45 deg and pitched the nose up.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Spoiler System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When we were about 120 or so miles from our destination we got an EICAS Spoiler Fail message. We ran the QRH which stated that we were to land at the nearest suitable airport. We talked it over with Dispatch and Maintenance and came to the conclusion that it was more than likely a switch error; but decided to divert per QRH. We landed without further issues.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 flight crew diverted in accorance with the QRH after receiving an EICAS Spoiler Fail message.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fuel Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other Paperwork Review
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Crew notified me at local time; flight ZZZ to ZZZ1 while off the gate and reported that they had a Number 2 Engine Control Light illuminated. Crew informed me that they probably had to return to the gate and could not go. I reported that they did not; under MEL 73-11-1(C); and to place both Electronic Engine Controls (EEC) in the ALTN Mode. I was under the thought that they were talking about the EEC NORMAL (ON) MODE. I asked if all was 'OK' in the ALTN Mode and they reported 'Yes'. When I was going to order my parts; I read the discrepancy again and I realized that I may have misunderstood them and spoke with my Manager and the Dispatcher and explained the situation. We contacted them on Commercial Radio and asked if the light was still illuminated after the deferral and prior to takeoff. They reported that it was and extinguished just prior to lift-off which is normally the way this system works. I then knew that I was indeed wrong and misunderstood the crew. I then made arrangements for the B737-700 aircraft to be brought to (ZZZ2) for repairs.I can only say that I wish the crew was more assertive and adamant in their thinking that they had to return; according to the NOTE in the MEL; and maybe things would have come together and I would have realized my misunderstanding at that point and just dispatched Maintenance; as is proper procedure. I know that the aircraft cannot go with those lights illuminated; as I dealt with these types of discrepancies for almost 12 years and I am quite familiar with these aircraft systems. This was just one time I thought different and no one contested me. I am not placing blame but no one else caught it either except for me; after reviewing my work which is also a policy of my own each day throughout the day.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Controller reports how miscommunication and misunderstanding between himself and a B737-700 flight crew led to a takeoff departure with both Engine Electronic Controls (EEC) in the Alternate Mode. Number 2 Engine Control Light had illuminated after pushback.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DAY.Airport, OH
Flight conditions: Marginal
Weather elements / visibility: Rain; 8
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bonanza 35
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class C DAY
ATC / advisory: TRACON CMH
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I was heading to Pennsylvania from Colorado and the weather was getting bad and cloud cover was getting bad so I stopped in Muncie; IN to look at the radar to see if it was better south. Up until then I was on Flight Following but since the weather was getting bad I decided to head south then east if the weather was looking better. I wasn't on Flight Following since I wasn't sure I could continue and I was using my GPS for the airspaces. The GPS wasn't looking right however; but I didn't think much about it until I was looking at a runway on my left and right. I was split between Dayton and Wright-Patterson and my GPS wasn't showing I was in their airspace; so I knew I was committed at that point and the GPS was not functioning properly. I quickly got the frequency for Columbus Approach and called them and they told me that there may have been a problem and they gave me a phone number to call when I landed. I stayed with Flight Following the remainder of the flight and the GPS started to work when I got to West Virginia and has been working correctly ever since. I called the number I was given and talked to the Controller but he said someone else may call back but that did not occur. The Controller thought that perhaps everything was ok; but I wanted to submit this report.




Synopsis: BE35 pilot reports an airspace incursion flying over DAY due to a GPS malfunction. The runways are detected visually but the airspace is not depicted on the GPS display.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Aircraft component: PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: In the preflight setup; everything was uploading properly: route; winds; ATIS; etc. The First Officer entered the expected Runway (05L) and departure in the FMC. We called for our clearance and were cleared via the runway and departure we anticipated. With all doors closed; ready for pushback; we awaited our 'numbers' [Takeoff Performance DATA.]The hard copy of the data appeared on the printer and we waited for the uplink to the FMC; but it did not appear. The First Officer pressed the 'request' prompt for the performance data for Runway 05L (which was the runway already entered in the FMC). We reviewed the hard copy of the [performance data] and the First Officer asked if it was okay to manually enter the data off the paper while we awaited the uplink. I said it was; and he entered the data manually. Flaps 1; no reduction. We pushed back; taxied to and took off Runway 05L. A few minutes after takeoff; an FMS PERF INIT load prompt appeared; and we received a hard copy of [performance data] for RWY 05L. It was; however; for FLAPS 5 and 'Improved Climb.' Huh? We reviewed our original [hard copy printed data] and realized it was for Runway 05R. We took off with the wrong data in the wrong configuration. We later discussed the potential 'worse case' scenarios - particularly at such a critical; high altitude/mountainous airport.


Second narrative: We also discussed how to effectively review the performance data prior to and after loading the FMC to avoid this type of mistake in the future.


Synopsis: When their FMS automatic performance update for takeoff from MMMX failed to appear in a timely fashion; the flight crew of a B737 manually programmed the FMS based on an ACARs hard copy and took off. After successfully departing they received the automatic update and discovered they had taken off on 5L although their manually loaded performance data was for 5R and had utilized flap and power settings inappropriate for their actual takeoff.
Date: 201603
Aircraft: B737-900
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Main Gear Wheel
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Technician
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After tire was ordered through stores using the correct number by another mechanic; I arrived to assist in the tire change. The tire delivered had green wheel covers which are used on 900ER carbon brake tire and wheel assemblies. We proceeded to replace the tire and wheel assembly. As my fellow mechanic was putting away equipment I proceeded to fill out the tire and wheel assembly change record form and made a log and signed off the log for the #4 tire being bad. During the entire time neither myself or my fellow mechanic looked at the delivered tire part number. We were [later] notified by management that a wrong tire had been found installed and was removed earlier in the month.We need to be more diligent in verifying correct part numbers for tire and wheel assemblies are correct before installation. 737-800 and 900 carbon brake tires will have the same green covers on wheel assemblies.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: Maintenance Technicians reported installing the incorrect wheel assembly on a Boeing 737-900.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VHHH.Airport, FO
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower VHHH
Second aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: Rwy 25L HKG we encountered wake turbulence passing 800 feet on departure behind a B777.  Approximate 30 degree bank left and loss of roughly 5 degrees of required climb pitch attitude with decreasing airspeed.  We disconnected the autopilot; recovered from the upset; re-automated; re-established ourselves on the departure SID; and notified ATC of the wake turbulence upset.  No issues with ATC were noted for being off track and we were still able to make the min 205 speed at Prawn intersection.




Synopsis: B747-400 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing VHHH in trail of a B777.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Aircraft component: Pneumatic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After push back; ATC advised us that it would be about 20 minutes prior to clearance for take off. We began taxi on one engine; and Captain (CA) then commanded shutdown of APU with the comment that we would perform a cross bleed start of #2 engine at the appropriate time. While waiting for the appropriate time to start #2; I forgot that the APU was off. CA called for #2 start; which I then did by the 'normal' steps of selecting engine #2 start/stop to start. I then started the timer. Neither of us remembered the need for a cross bleed start. During #2 start I was dividing my attention between preparing for departure and monitoring the engine start. I recall hearing an engine sound that I don't usually hear during engine start; and I focused my attention more carefully on the EICAS. I noticed the #2 temp rising beyond what I normally expect; with the N2 temp approaching max (red tick). I verbally noted this to the captain. I reached for the #2 start/stop in preparation to shut down the engine and it was then that I realized the problem was a result of not properly executing the cross bleed start procedure. I verbalized this to the captain also. The captain promptly increased power on the #1 engine to assist the cross bleed start; which resulted in an immediate decrease in N2 temp on #2. At this point the #2 start proceeded normally. At no time did #2 temp reach or exceed limitations; and no EICAS messages were annunciated before; during or after the start. Rest of the flight proceeded normally.As a new First Officer (FO); I have done very few and infrequent cross bleed starts. This lack of recency and experience contributed to my forgetting that the APU was off and a cross bleed start was required. Further; allowing myself to be distracted/multi task during the start led to delayed identification of the problem.How I will prevent this from happening in the future:-when I turn off the APU (per CA command) with the expectation of a later cross bleed start; I will bring up the ECS page on my MFD display as a reminder.-I will also note 'cross bleed required' on a piece of paper and put it on the engine start/stop switch; as a reminder.-during any engine start I will not divert my attention away from the EICAS until the start sequence is complete.




Synopsis: Embraer ERJ-175 First Officer reported attempting to accomplish a crossbleed start with the operating engine at idle thrust.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: 4S9.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E P80
ATC / advisory: CTAF 4S9
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Routine Training flight. We followed proper procedures by announcing our position with the intent of performing a simulated engine failure to a touch and go at Mulino airport. We were on frequency of CTAF and asked if there were any gliders or jumpers at Mulino. No response! A little closer we announced again asking if there was any traffic; jumpers and gliders at Mulino. Again; no response. We climbed to 2700' over Southwest corner of Runway 32 with the intent of performing a simulated engine fail to touch and go.As we were descending; in our second turn we heard the jump plane pilot say there were open canopies EAST of Runway 32. We looked and saw jumpers between 1800-2000' and on our westbound heading flew NW away from the runway and airport. We were west of runway and jumpers were east of runway. We were scolded by the jump pilot to read the sectional chart. The chart is clearly marked with glider and jump symbology.What troubles me is that the jump pilot monitors both Approach and CTAF. We were on frequency and announced and heard no reports or follow up jumper advisories. If we were in perceived conflict the Jump pilot can very easily shout out jumper traffic if he is monitoring the CTAF.The responsibility for see and avoid is on us but advisories for jumpers is additional responsibility for jump school personnel. My suggestion is for the jump pilot to make multiple advisories and have a ground spotter on CTAF who can call out to any aircraft in the pattern who cause a conflict.




Synopsis: GA flight instructor reported being surprised by skydivers while in the pattern at Mulino State Airport after requesting information several times over the CTAF frequency.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 310/T310C
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Tablet
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Experienced a malfunction (frozen/unresponsive) of my EFB (Tablet). In the attempt to get the tablet restarted/responsive; I entered class bravo airspace prior to receiving clearance. The airplane (C-310) was newly purchased; and significantly faster than anything I have been flying recently.




Synopsis: A pilot unaccustomed to the speed of his newly purchased Cessna 310 became distracted while attempting to reboot his frozen Tablet EFB and entered Class B.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter FOD
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Upon arrival the First Officer discovered a tool stuck to the top of the right wing at the wing to fuselage fairing. The tool was there throughout the duration of the flight. The aircraft had come out of maintenance and this tool was not removed prior to flight. The tool was also missed during the preflight inspection.  Despite flight at .77 Mach and a steep descent at 3;500 fpm with speed brakes deployed; the tool remained attached to the wing. Upon discovery; maintenance was notified. The tool was approximately 8 inches long and metallic. It appeared to be a metal pick or pry bar. It could have separated on taxi and damaged another aircraft's tire. Or; it could have been deposited as FOD on the runway with possible dire consequences. The tool could have also been ingested into the number one engine; again with dire consequences. During flight at FL360; the tool could have fallen from the aircraft and killed someone on the ground. Better accountability of tools after maintenance is completed.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain is informed his First Officer after post flight inspection; that a tool is stuck to the top of the right wing at the wing to fuselage fairing.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation
Detector: Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The dangerous goods agent presented an explosives box that was damaged and we had the box removed. The First Officer inspected it first. While inspecting it the DG agent pointed out that the box was crushed and that it did not look good. They informed me and we all agreed to have it removed. It looked like whoever strapped it down had crushed it. The person who strapped down this DG box strapped it down too tight and damaged the box.




Synopsis: B757 Captain reported a damaged Hazmat explosive box refused as cargo.