elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B747-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Second reporter function: First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: An improperly secured pallet was found in position RS. Loading personnel were made aware of the issue and asked to correct it. Flight was delayed and dispatch was notified. According to the CA (Captain); loading personnel said that the pallet had special instructions for loading and securing but those were not followed. As a suggestion; these 'special' instructions should be part of the paperwork given to the crew; or at least the crew should be made aware of them; otherwise how are supposed to know what we are checking during a Main Deck walk around? Or even more important; what is the point of a Deck walk around if we are unaware of these special loads and the way they are supposed to be secured?


Second narrative: Cargo not properly secured; especially when it's like this at the very aft position (tail). At rotation this can slide back and puncture the skin. That piece of cargo was removed before flight. I believe shipper needs to be educated on how to pack. Load Master needs to examine each pallet carefully.


Synopsis: B747-400 flight crew reported noting an improperly secured pallet that was corrected before departure.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: L35.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZLA; TFR FIREFIGHTING
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In departing from the Big Bear airport; I inadvertently entered the firefighting TFR south of Big Bear airport. For a pre-flight briefing; I had used an EFB program that had not downloaded the graphical TFR boundaries in the morning when I consulted the EFB graphical representation. In the future; I can obtain a briefing directly from the FAA or consult a service known to be online and linked to FAA information.




Synopsis: A pilot reported inadvertently penetrating a Firefighting TFR due to the boundaries not being updated in his EFB software.
Date: 202006
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Passenger sitting in 1X was asked several times by myself and two other flight attendants to please wear his mask. Passenger refused to comply and was given a reminder form from the mask kit which he proceeded to throw into my jumpseat at 1Y.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger refused to wear a mask.
Date: 201301
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZTL.ARTCC, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-88
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZTL
ATC / advisory: Center ZTL
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Missed crossing restriction at the...intersection by 6;000 FT. We were given a clearance to cross...at 14;000 FT. The Captain entered the altitude in the Altitude Window but failed to put the restriction into the FMS.




Synopsis: MD88 Captain failed to set intersection crossing altitude restriction into the FMS and flight crew missed restriction by 6;000 FT.
Date: 201302
Location: DIA.Airport, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: TRACON D01
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: During an RNAV arrival into DIA we received an arrival change just prior to top of descent. This occurs quite often. We reprogrammed the new arrival and began descent. Just prior to the final fix on the RNAV arrival we were cleared for the transition to the runway. Because we hadn't anticipated this clearance we were then quite busy programming the change. This all happened while receiving late descent clearance for a visual to 16L. A high descent rate then caused a TCAS RA and a level off for the parallel aircraft on 16R. This further delayed our descent. The recovery went well. All of this would never have happened in the pre-RNAV approaches. I believe the new RNAV arrivals are very problematic with all the speed and altitude restrictions. The lateral NAV is not a problem. However; the designers need to limit the altitude and speed restrictions to the minimum necessary.




Synopsis: Late and untimely changes to RNAV STAR assignments inbound to DIA contributed to expedited descent rates and a TCAS RA response with conflicting traffic for a B757 flight crew. The reporter commented that; while the demands of lateral nav is acceptable; the multiple airspeed and altitude constraints common to many of the RNAV STARs are distracting and require excessive flight crew attention.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During inspection for a PIREP for a 'grinding noise and feel' in the [Landing] gear handle after a Functional Check Flight (FCF) (previous PIREPs also); I found the landing gear control cables; in the forward cargo [pit] ceiling outboard side at approximately [frame] station 300; to be wrapped around each other. This was causing the stiff [gear] handle and grinding noise. Cables were inspected per Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and rerouted; re-rigged per AMM and all operational checks were normal. It appears that a floor beam repair had been accomplished recently; the cables removed during that process. [Contributing factor] Failure to properly inspect cable installation. [Recommend] proper [clearance] 'clear to close' and inspection of routing of control cables when disconnected.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports finding the landing gear control cables in the forward cargo pit ceiling wrapped around each other at approximately frame station 300 on a B767-300 aircraft. Pilots had made several previous write-ups for a stiff gear handle with a 'grinding noise and feel.' A floor beam repair had recently been accomplished that removed the cables. 'Clearance to Close' panels also an issue.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: A gentleman walked on the aircraft without a mask; I nicely asked him if he had a mask and if not; I would supply one for him. He said he did have a mask; but just needed to find it. He made his way to his seat in X6 and was putting his seatbelt on. I told him since he was in the bulkhead he'd have to stow his bags above him in the overhead bin. He is now moving around; bending down close to the gentleman beside him; who clearly looked uncomfortable. I then handed him a mask and told him he needed to put it on. He said once again; he has one. My B-FA then comes up and I inform him of the situation. B FA says to the gentleman he needs to put his mask on and the man loudly and rudely says; 'Oh would you just shut your mouth!!' Now; I inform our Captain on what is happening in the back and he said; 'He can't talk to you guys like that; get him off.' So I tell the gate agent; she gets her manager and the security coordinator and the man is escorted off.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant in Charge reported a passenger became belligerent about the face mask policy and was removed from the flight.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The event occurred on the visual approach to XXR. We were turned in a bit tight to intercept the final and I was slow in getting a rate of descent established sufficient enough to capture the glide slope. We turned the flight directors off and autopilot off and continued. We were stable by 500 feet but exceeded 1;000 FPM below 1;000 feet AGL. I think I reached 1;300 FPM during the correction to capture the glide slope. The landing and taxi in was uneventful. First leg of a three day trip after being off for a few days may have played a role. I haven't done a whole lot of flying since being off for 2 months.My proficiency is coming back to pre-coronavirus time off slowly but surely.


Second narrative: We were on visual approach to XXR at ZZZ.  PF was late starting down to catch the glide path.  Configured and approximately one dot high and ten knots fast at 1;000 feet; unstable but correcting.  Stable by 500 feet but had inadvertently reached a VVI of about 1;300 FPM for a short period below 1;000 feet in the process.  Landing was uneventful.Cause: A lapse in monitoring the descent rate by both pilots. An earlier recognition of developing circumstances that could lead to instability would have likely mitigated this occurrence.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an unstabilized approach; disconnected the autopilot and stabilized at 500 feet and landed uneventfully.
Date: 202003
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft had odd odor upon walking onto flight deck. Packs were off; and no GSE was exhausting in to the airplane/ pack inlets... we tried each pack independently to isolate; but smell remained; a few pax boarded and immediately complained of smell and got nauseous; deplaned; called Maintenance and Ops; wrote it up as a fume event; local Maintenance took aircraft out of service and we swapped aircraft.




Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported a fumes event during pre-flight resulting in passengers experiencing physiological symptoms.
Date: 201912
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Aircraft had a little residual ice on the outboard leading edge and needed de-icing. The F/O and I agreed on de-ice only as the weather was becoming partly cloudy. When [de-ice crew] came on the frequency I asked for 'de-ice only'; yet [de-ice crew] replied that they understood we wanted only a one step then. I corrected them and repeated my request for 'de-ice only'. After some confusing back and forth; we finally all agreed and got what we wanted. This report seems to become my annual 'no one here has a clue about de-icing.' Case in point: I had to explain to my X-year F/O the difference between de-ice only; one-step and two-step. Even he did not know or understand what one-step is. Even though the verbiage in the FOM and on the laminated cockpit cards has vastly improved; I believe there exists still way too much confusion and lack of knowledge on the three different ways we de-ice here. Being [cold weather] based; one would be surprised what exotic request one hears on the [de-ice crew] frequency; from both sides; even when we spell out what needs to be said verbatim to avoid potentially dangerous misunderstandings and to have everyone involved to have that shared mental model.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported deice terminology confusion.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Other Fatigue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: After arriving from Mexico scheduling advised they wanted me to operate a sequence to two leg sequence departing 3:15 later. To accomplish this sequence I would have been up for approximately 25 hours on arrival at the final destination. The departure for my original pairing had an actual pick-up time two hours prior to departure so; regardless of how the company defines the duty period; we were effectively on duty starting at that pick up time. In addition; the more demanding environment of Mexico to operate out of increased fatigue. I advised Scheduling that the assignment was excessive and of course the response was that it was contractual. I stated that if the assignment were of shorter duration I could make myself available but; as the only link in the safety chain in regards to fatigue; I could not accept the assignment. Our Airline's chronic under-manning of fleets; in particular reserves; and its optimization of schedules without regard to the human element is the root of the problem. Turning/rescheduling a reserve crew member out to unanticipated assignments should only be allowed for deadheading to the next assignment. Only external pressures or accidents will force the company to come to terms with this so it is moot to discuss it. Committees to 'address' the problem seem to have had no impact on safe scheduling and it is only the individual crew member; facing loss of pay or 'Counseling;' that upholds safety in this regard. Irregular sleep patterns generated on reserve result in cumulative fatigue and sometimes inability to sleep on demand. Schedules should also reflect the actual pick-up/duty time if it is greater than 1+30 from departure time.




Synopsis: An air carrier reserve Captain related his reasons for refusing a re-assignment due to excessive duty times and fatigue.
Date: 201308
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Turbine Engine
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Incident occurred during cruise flight at FL370 approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes into a scheduled 4 hour and 12 minute flight. Audible 'bang' noises were heard in the cockpit; emanating from the right side of the aircraft; in the vicinity of the #2 engine. The N1 indication for the motor was then observed to drop to approximately 70%; without a commensurate movement of the #2 thrust lever. The N1 indication then proceeded to increase to the normal cruise operating range; of roughly 90-92%; within approximately 10-15 seconds of the onset of the engine anomaly. After 'stabilizing' for 5-10 seconds; there was a subsequent occurrence - much like the first; after which we assessed that the #2 motor was compressor stalling. The Captain; the Flying Pilot; then directed the initiation of the Engine Failure Checklist in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). The checklist items were accomplished in accordance with the QRH; which included the shutdown of the #2 engine. An emergency divert was then coordinated with Air Traffic Control to the nearest suitable landing facility. Single-engine Approach and Landing checklists were accomplished as directed by the QRH. An uneventful single-engine visual approach and landing was performed in visual conditions to the landing runway.




Synopsis: B737 First Officer reported they experienced several compressor stalls in right engine at FL370. Crew shut down the engine in accordance with procedure and diverted to nearest suitable airport.
Date: 201907
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Light: Dawn
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Working a line aircraft performing maintenance on the #2 engine upon closing of the [Engine] T/R (Thrust Reverser) halves no help was available and unable to close them on my own I used locking pair of vise grips to hold the T/R closed so I could latch them. After latching the T/R and fan cowls I forgot the pliers on the aft section of the T/R. It was within an hour of dispatch time I was under pressure to finish up and get the paperwork in for an on time departure. The aircraft flew to ZZZ where the oncoming crew found the pliers and removed them. More man power; every night we work short-handed with a heavy work load and pressure to get it done. The aircraft comes in late and leaves early which adds more stress and less time.




Synopsis: Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported forgetting to remove tools from engine exhaust prior to departure.