elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZFW.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: Chancellor 414A / C414
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZFW
ATC / advisory: Center ZFW
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: A C414 was inbound to SPH from the east northeast. The pilot was told to expect a visual approach and was asked if they had the weather and NOTAMS. The pilot replied he had weather and NOTAMS. SPH is located on the boundary with MLU low and SHV Approach; so I pointed the aircraft out to SHV as landing SPH and expecting a visual approach and the point out was approved. The pilot cancelled his flight plan about 15 miles from SPH. About 10 minutes later; the pilot checked back on VFR and said that the NOTAMS he had did not indicate that the airport was closed but that SPH was in fact closed. He informed me that he was on the Unicom frequency and they were trying to open the airport for him. I first called SHV and asked if they were showing SPH closed to which they replied that they were not and would check in to it. I looked at the NOTAMS and the first 2 NOTAMS were for a taxiway being closed and the second was for the PAPI lighting being out of service. The third NOTAM was Airworthiness Directive (AD) closed. The forth and fifth NOTAMS were for Tower lights out of service about 6 and 9 miles from SPH. By having the AD closed as the third item; there was confusion on my part and the pilot's part that the airport was in fact closed. If the airport is closed; the other items on the NOTAMS become irrelevant as they are part of the aerodrome. Either the other outage NOTAMS need to be replaced by AD closed and reinstated after the AD is reopened or at the very least the AD closed should be the first NOTAM. Also I question whether the pilot was confused (as I was initially) by what AD meant. As many abbreviations as there are for items around the airport and now the added ICAO abbreviations can lead to uncertainty of what is actually out or closed. The second item that could have prevented this would have been the Status Information Area for both MLU low and SHV correctly indicating that the Aerodrome was closed.




Synopsis: ZFW Controller described an event where traffic inbound to SPH confirmed receipt of all NOTAMS; was released to Unicom frequency only to discover the airport was NOTAMED closed.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Control Column
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Control column seemed a little stiffer than normal on rotation during takeoff; but not unsafe.  During landing; control column seemed to stop at a point during flare while arresting the descent prior to touchdown. I had to add significant additional back pressure; and the column freed and the flare was completed. Touchdown was normal. Writeup was made in the maintenance log.




Synopsis: A B757 Captain reported the control column stiff on takeoff; but binding during land which required significant force to overcome in the flare.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Landing Gear Indicating System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Upon takeoff after gear up was commanded we got two master cautions; LDG INOP; and WT ON WHEELS. We also had a Master Warning for Fuselage Door. We verified the indication on the ED and saw red indications on L2 and R2 doors. We checked cabin pressure and asked Flight Attendants (FA) to visually inspect the doors. The FA's said the doors looked normal. Next I began the QRH for WT ON WHEELS which required no crew action and a note that the gear may not retract.  LDG INOP procedure was going to lead us to Alternate gear extension. We began planning for a return to [the airport] or a diversion. We used ZZZ radio to communicate with Maintenance and dispatch. Maintenance had no solution for our situation. Dispatch and I discussed a plan for another airport; weather in the area at that current time was 1/2sm SN FZFG VV006. Initially we decided to head for ZZZ [airport] because the weather looked the best but after reevaluating plate notes and services we felt that ZZZ1 would be a better choice. Enroute we determined that the main gear were still extended; we checked the alternate verification and saw two green lights for mains no green for nose gear. We discussed configuring early to see if we would be able to get normal green lights by use of normal gear extension. At about 30 miles we attempted to extend the gear normally. We selected gear down felt no transition and saw no lights on the normal landing gear indicator. Next we conducted the alternate landing gear extension procedure; we were only able to use floorboard lights to determine that the gear was extended. I would say that the anti-skid test was inconclusive because one of the lights would go out in 3 seconds while the other took closer to 6. About 5 minutes out I asked the FA's to prep the cabin for a brace and possible evacuation. We landed uneventful; stopped on the runway and pinned the gear and were towed back to the terminal.


Second narrative: The APU wasn't working as the WT ON WHEELS was still telling the plane we were in the air.


Synopsis: Dash 8-400 flight crew reported receiving warnings for LDG INOP; WT ON WHEELs; and FUSELAGE DOOR. Flight diverted to a suitable airport; and landed safely.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: DCA.Airport, DC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We taxied into a very tight gate; a tow in. It was night. As we approached the pushback tug; we were blinded by the very bright LED headlights. All night vision was gone; [we were] in a tight area. We stopped and called Ops to have them tell the folks to turn off lights. They said lights do not turn off. We turned on all of our external lights to taxi in. The Assistant Station Manager came up and we talked about it. The Captain who was taking over the aircraft heard us; and also spoke of how it blinds us when the ramp is wet and the glare. We were informed that all Company ground equipment have the lights hard-wired to ON if the equipment is running. As everything is going to be extremely bright LEDs; they need to be OFF. Imagine trying to see the Ground Crew; equipment; Safety lines and all other threats while looking into LED headlights. The ground equipment; at least the pushbacks; should have a way to turn off lights or should be turned OFF at all times as we approach it!




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported being unable to see out cockpit window at night during taxi into gate due to ground equipment headlights shining into cockpit.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Ramp JFK
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: We had another issue with CPDLC clearance out of JFK. Clearance received normally; but said; 'Cleared to SAAME via route clearance. SKORR3.RNGRR. This is a REVISED CLEARANCE..'  We confirmed routing and could not find any difference from filed routing.  Also; the clearance came across as two pages - 2/2 and there was no LOAD option for the revised clearance (We were able to print the clearance this time). After cycling through the two pages several times and several minutes later; we noticed that the clearance showed three pages and there was a LOAD option on the third page. We called Clearance Delivery and requested a full route readback to prevent any chance of a conflict/deviation. ATC stated there was no revised clearance; it was as filed. We asked if we were the only ones having a problem; or were other flights having issues and ATC responded; 'The problem is that your company filed you the SKORR3 SID; that SID is only for runways 31 and the computer kicks it out because it doesn't know what runway we are using at the time of processing. Everyone else does not file a SID.'  After confirming the route clearance we departed without problem. At this point I have little confidence in the CPDLC process in JFK due to the issues of late.




Synopsis: The Captain reported that Dispatch filed the SKORR SID out of JFK that was rejected by the ATC computer resulting in confusion for the flight crew when receiving their clearance.
Date: 201509
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Icing; Turbulence
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At FL270; approximately one hour after takeoff; flying in icing conditions with wing and engine anti-ice systems selected 'ON'; the right pneumatic duct overheated and the right pressure regulating shutoff valve closed. Followed QRH procedures and opened the isolation valve per the checklist. Approximately 30 minutes later; the left pressure regulating shutoff valve automatically closed; leaving the aircraft with no pneumatic air supply. Attempted to restore the left side pneumatic air supply per the QRH but was not successful. Immediately [notified] ATC while simultaneously starting the APU and both pilots donning oxygen masks. Requested to descend out of icing conditions and get the cabin altitude below 10;000 feet. No more icing conditions after descending below FL190. After descending below 17;000 feet; the aircraft started re-pressurizing with the APU pneumatic system. Aircraft was being stored for over one year in the high desert in Southern California. Aircraft parts fail at a higher rate when placed in adverse weather conditions after being stored for such a long period of time.Very difficult to prevent this type of event when the aircraft is stored for such a long period of time.




Synopsis: B757-200 Captain reported a pneumatic duct overheat and a pneumatic shutoff valve closed; leaving the aircraft with no pneumatic air. Flight diverted to a nearby suitable airport.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Reporter organization: Contracted Service
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other I discovered it
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: I completed a hydraulic A and B reservoir drain and filter change. AMT #2 was troubleshooting #2 engine fire loop issue and left to retrieve parts to affect a repair. After clearing tools and equipment used for the reservoir task; I proceeded to the cockpit to power the hydraulics and perform a leak check. These tasks were a part of a [routine] check so I deployed the flaps to perform a leak check and the flap inspection required. The initial lack of knowledge that an open thrust cowl interferes with the transition of the flaps; contributed to the incident.




Synopsis: A Maintenance Technician reported the trailing edge flaps were lowered and made contact with the open engine cowling.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Lead Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Contributing factors: Manuals; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: The pre-departure checklists have the following added to the header of the checklist: 'NOTE: This check is to be done at the gate or hangar prior to taking the aircraft to the gate at the discretion of the Lead or Supervisor. The purpose of this form is to guide technicians through the crew's pre-flight checks to improve our on-time departure rate.This form does not require documentation in [Company Documents] or the use of the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual). However; if a discrepancy is found as a result of this check; it must be documented.' This is clearly instructing maintenance personnel to perform maintenance activities without documentation in the aircraft paperwork system and is also stating that it is acceptable for maintenance personnel to perform maintenance activities without manual references. I believe this to be a violation of the federal aviation regulations and feel encouraging our workforce to perform any maintenance activities without documentation or proper manual references would diminish our safety and compliance culture.In order to have an acceptable pre-departure checklist per the [CFRs] (Code of Federal Regulations); an internal document should be added to AMM chapter X stating the checks to be performed and proper manual references; These checks should be properly documented as having been accomplished in our maintenance paperwork system.




Synopsis: Air carrier Maintenance Supervisor described maintenance requirements without a published procedure.
Date: 201204
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Cockpit Window
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Manuals; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: There is always a debate on window serviceability when determining limits on acrylic windows. For example; today A B767-300 aircraft had small cracks in the [cockpit] L3 Window [#3 Left]. Our Air Carrier Engineering Document 56-11-00 for B767 aircraft states no V-chips or cracks are permissible in any glass pane. There are no published limits for acrylic windows in our company Engineering Document. Can one assume that glass limits pertain to acrylic; or do acrylic windows have different limits. If so; when do cracks becomes unserviceable in acrylic windows? Suggest [Engineering] clearly define serviceability of acrylic windows in company Engineering Document 56-11-00 for B767; or remove all references to glass; thereby only having a window pane limit regardless of its construction [material].




Synopsis: A Line Mechanic reports that no published serviceability limits exists for V-chips or crack damages in their Engineering Document 56-11-00; for cockpit acrylic windows on B767 aircraft. Only glass window pane damage limits are published; raising question of when do cracks become un-serviceable in acrylic windows.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: MD-82
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After takeoff [with] First Officer flying; smoke in cockpit followed by report of smoke in cabin. Declared emergency and returned to land overweight at 140;000 LBS. Upon landing; smoke had dissipated and returned to gate. Aircraft out of service and departed later on inbound aircraft. I had a very experienced First Officer along with another MD-80 Captain in the jumpseat that I had flown with as a First Officer. Jumpseater was very helpful to the both of us. The flight attendants were very experienced and did their jobs as required. The First Officer continued to fly while the jumpseater and I ran the checklist. On short final I took control of aircraft and made normal landing.


Second narrative: On climb out; smelled slight pack odor. At approximately 9;000 FT; Flight Attendant called and said they had smoke in the cabin.


Synopsis: A MD-82 cabin filled with smoke after takeoff; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where the aircraft was removed from service.
Date: 201704
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.TRACON, NC
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B CLT
ATC / advisory: TRACON CLT
Aircraft component: Autoflight System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight cleared to descend via CHSLY2 RNAV arrival into CLT. Set bottom altitude to 6000 [feet] msg per procedure; Cockpit workload high due to weather in area. Between WHIZE and CAATT intersection I noted speed error at CAATT intersection. As pilot flying; I intervened and selected speed of 210kias and vertical speed in order to correct error; this left aircraft in an un-managed vertical mode with altitude set at bottom altitude (6000). Descent below 9000 occurred prior to CAATT intersection before First Officer trap error at 8800 feet. Aircraft was returned to minimum altitude of 9000 feet simultaneously with call from ATC; whom trapped the error as well. No loss of separation occurred and flight proceeded normally to landing. High workload environment led to not monitoring altitude constraints properly by pilot flying. In addition; full use of automation was 'dropped' in order to intervene with perceived error in FMGS. Due to high work load; pilot flying was task saturated. Fortunately Pilot Monitoring trapped error early enough as to not lose separation. Keep two pilots in cockpit in future in order to trap future errors.


Second narrative: On the CHSLY2 RNAV arrival to CLT; Captain selected open descent after WHIZE and had his hand on the vertical speed knob. I assumed he would push to level off at 9000 to make the restriction at CAATT. When he did not stop the descent I said; 'It should be 9000 at CAATT.' By the time he reacted we were at 8750. We immediately climbed back to 9000 and were already leveling off when ATC asked about our altitude.


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported becoming distracted during a high workload descent on the CHSLY 2 RNAV into CLT; and descended below the descent profile.