Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Other Person
When detected: Taxi
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Prior to take off from ZZZ we experienced a long delay due to heavy bank of departures. I asked the First Officer (FO) to shut down the right engine to save fuel. We were to follow [another aircraft] to the runway and we were advised by the ground controller that we should stay with him. When we asked about our sequence we were told that we were number 20.As we moved closer to departure runway it appeared to me that we would be taking off soon; but the controller had not switched us to the tower. I asked the First Officer to restart the right engine at this time. Meanwhile; the ground control frequency had been busy the whole time and it was hard to get a word in. We finally asked the ground controller if he needed us to switch to tower. He replied in the affirmative and DID NOT say that he had asked us to do that earlier; as I was concerned we had missed his call.As we switched to tower the [preceding aircraft] that we were following was turning onto the runway. First Officer started to run the before takeoff checklist below the line as the tower was giving us instructions to get on the runway. I was observing EICAS indications relating to the right engine; and I said something like 'that's not right' as I observed no N1 on the right engine. All other indications except N1 appeared normal. I advised the tower that we had an engine issue and that we would not be ready to take off. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on XYR; turn left on Yankee and left on Papa. We acknowledged the clearance and started to taxi. As we taxied; a couple of aircraft started mentioning that the right engine was on fire; however; we had no cockpit fire or overheat indications other than the mentioned abnormal start indications. I continued to taxi and as I turned onto taxiway Papa I stopped the airplane and set the brakes. Other aircraft kept advising us that the fire was still going. Since we had no indications in the cockpit; I was thinking 'Engine Torching' vs. the correct term Tailpipe fire. I was about to call for that checklist when to me; it sounded like someone said over the radio that we should do an evacuation.Since we had several reports of a fire; at this time I advised the tower that we were starting an Evacuation and asked the First Officer to run the Evacuation check list. Again; we had no cockpit indications of a fire. As a caution and because time was of essence I wanted to tell the Flight Attendants to prepare for possible evacuation. Since the last [aircraft] we flew [had] a different flight inter-phone; I was not immediately sure which button was for talking to the back. So; I decided to make a PA announcement to the flight attendants to 'Prepare for Evacuation'. My intent was to have them prepare and assess the situation from their vantage point. By this time; I believed; because the FO was running the Evacuation checklist; that she had actuated the evacuation signal. I then started hearing the sounds of the evacuation going on and made a PA announcement to 'evacuate on the left side only'. As I put my attention back in the cockpit the FO was at the point on checklist where we needed to pull the fire handles. I said something to the effect that we needed to pull them; but she pointed me to a statement that said 'illuminated fire handle'. We both decided that there was no illuminated handle and elected not to pull them. I now realize that was procedurally incorrect. However; in the rush of the moment we thought we did the correct procedure; and by this time the Evacuation was almost complete. We proceeded to do a sweep; and verify that all passengers and Flight Attendants had evacuated the airplane. And then we used the slides to exit the airplane. Thankfully; the evacuation went smoothly except for a few minor injuries. Our inflight crew did an excellent job of herding all passengers away from the aircraft.

Callback: The reporter stated that they didn't realize they had a fire until other aircraft informed them. The reporter stated that they did not have any indications in the cockpit of a fire except that the #2 engine appeared to have a hung start. The reporter stated that he suspects the First Officer may have introduced fuel into the engine a little too early therefore the fuel did not light off as it normally would and fuel was just pouring into the tail pipe. The reporter stated they went through the QRH and started the check list for engine fire. The reporter stated it was very busy in the cockpit due to the fact they were lined up for takeoff with ATC very busy with multiple aircraft in line waiting for takeoff. The reporter stated they may not have pulled the fire handle because it's only called for if the handle is lighted. The reporter also stated that they decided to get off the runway and evacuate the aircraft. The reporter stated that while accomplishing the evacuation procedure and attempting to deal with the fire; the First Officer may have accidentally turned off the APU causing the starter cutout message on EICAS. The reporter stated that by time the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting arrived the fire had gone out; but it was still smoldering. Smoke was coming out the front and back of the engine. The reporter stated that there was black soot all over the pylon area and when they water washed the engine all the black soot came off. The reporter stated that after the water wash they could not find any damage to the engine or the wing.The reporter stated that the company is constantly changing the checklists and it makes it difficult to ensure you are following the proper procedure.

Second narrative: On taxi-out to runway XYR/W we realized there would be a long delay for takeoff. We were told to remain with ground and follow [another aircraft]. I queried as to our sequence and was told number 20 for departure.After reviewing the release; we realized that we were only planned for 20 min of taxi fuel; so the Captain asked me to shut down number 2. We started the APU so there would be no interruptions in the cabin for power. Captain asked me to send a message to the dispatcher alerting them of our on time off the gate; and our subsequent delay. The ground frequency was very congested; but we kept hearing other aircraft transferred to tower 'number nine for departure;' but they never switched us. The captain made an announcement that we were number 20 for departure and talked with the flight attendants and advised them of the delay. As we inch closer to taxiway W he asks me to again query Ground for our sequence because we needed to start the right engine... because of the congestion; I could not; and so he tells me to start number 2. It appeared to be a normal start; with a rollback around 350 (all engine indications similar to the left engine). While I was starting the engine; I was finally able to ask Ground if he wanted us to monitor tower. He said yes; I checked in with tower; and at the same time noticed 'STARTER CUTOUT-R' and no N1 indication on the right engine. Tower cleared us to line up and wait; to which we replied unable. I did the obvious corrective action of ENG START selector to Auto; and the message disappeared. At that point we were unaware of any fire indications. Hindsight; if someone would have told us about the flames; I should have performed the Tailpipe Fire checklist. We had no fire or overheat indications at any time.I had already completed all other checklists to the line. They again cleared us for takeoff; and the captain confirmed we had power to the right engine; but no N1 indications so he came on the radio telling tower we were unable to takeoff due to an engine issue. Tower then gave us instructions to turn right on XYR; left Y; left P. I read back the instructions. As I was pulling out the QRH; that is when other aircraft on frequency advised us that we had flames coming out of the right engine. Multiple aircraft stated our right engine was still on fire and tower asked our intentions. One of the transmissions from another aircraft at that time said something to the effect of 'you guys need to be clear when talking about fire; because if they still have a fire they will be evacuating based on your observations.' I believe I came on frequency and asked if there were still flames since we had no fire indications; bells; or lights; nor did we even have a hot start. Aircraft or tower confirmed our engine was on fire. We asked to have the equipment rolled; and the captain commanded the evacuation checklist. I read it slowly; and performed the first 5 steps. The Captain did the PA to prepare for evacuation and then asked me about pulling the fire handles. I misunderstood him; and thought he wanted me to discharge the bottles. We went through the checklist and both confirmed that step 7 said we did not have any fire warning indications so I didn't want to discharge the bottles.That is when I heard the slides deploy; the EVAC light illuminate; and the flight attendants giving their commands. The captain quickly made a PA to only evacuate on the left side.Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) had not arrived by that point; and with an unknown confirmed fire; I believe our crew performed the safest action based on the information we had; rather than wait for a confirmation of the fire extinguished or worsening.By the time we finished the remaining checklist items; only one flight attendant was on board. We did a final sweep of the aircraft to make sure no other people were on board and then we came down the slide. We talked with ARFF while performing the final walk.


Synopsis: An air carrier flight crew reported being advised of an engine fire while lining up for takeoff; resulting in an evacuation.