elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201306
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZDV.ARTCC, CO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Legacy 450/500
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZDV
ATC / advisory: Center ZDV
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: While on descent into Eagle; I was cleared for the LDA 25 approach after the Kremmling VOR. While on the initial segment of the approach; I was informed that Denver Center was getting a low altitude alert on the aircraft. Upon review of the approach plate; I realized that the altitude on that initial segment was 13;800 feet prior to AQULA Intersection; not 12;900 feet. So; I corrected the altitude and the flight continued to Eagle uneventfully. I realized after the fact that I did not see the 13;800 feet when I first looked at the plate because of the terrain depictions behind it. Regardless; I will more carefully review the published altitudes on all segments of the approaches.




Synopsis: EMB500 pilot reports descending below the MEA after passing RLG on the LDA DME Runway 25 at EGE due to terrain depiction clutter on the chart. ZDV issues a low altitude alert and the altitude is corrected.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: We were assigned the GIBBZ1 RNAV STAR transitioning from MGW to GIBBZ. The Captain was utilizing the VNAV function after the crew confirmed all waypoints and altitudes were properly set in the FMS for descent and approach into IAD. ATC delayed our descent from FL450 and that delay required at least a 4.0 degree descent via the GIBBZ1. Initial descent appeared to be correct based on manually confirming required descent rate. Later; a disparity between FMS 1 and FMS 2 presented a different descent profile. The FMS 1 clock froze and shallowed out our descent multiple times despite the PF's attempts to correct the descent rate. FMS 2 presented a level-off pitch which we knew was incorrect. Since there are multiple altitude restrictions with this STAR and an aggressive descent [was required]; we missed an altitude restriction; at/below FL290; at BRNDN by approximately 1;000 feet. In addition; the FMS Approach mode did not provide proper course and vertical guidance during the ILS approach requiring us to utilize LOC2 guidance for the approach. We wrote up FMS 1 with Maintenance after landing. A common technique prior to flying a complex arrival with multiple descent limits is to begin the descent from cruise altitude early (fuel permitting). Also; don't trust VNAV; stick with using VS in the Citation X and mentally calculating required descent rates (old school method).




Synopsis: When they experienced malfunctions of both FMS systems while flying the GIBBZ RNAV STAR to IAD; a Citation 750 flight crew failed to comply with an altitude crossing restriction at BRNDN.
Date: 201408
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E NCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Second aircraft: Cessna 425/441 Conquest I/Conquest II
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [We were] descending to 10;000 FT approaching TENCO. NORCAL called out climbing traffic to our north--then gave us two vector headings in quick succession. We then got a TA at approximately 10;200 FT followed by a descend RA--followed immediately by a climb RA. I disconnected the autopilot and flew the escape maneuver. At about 10;400 FT we got an 'adjust vertical speed' RA followed quickly at about 10;500 FT by the 'clear of conflict' advisory. I never saw the traffic but believe I saw an altitude difference of -200 FT on the ND.


Second narrative: [We were] filed on the Flunk Three Arrival into SMF; cleared to descend to 10;000 and direct to TENCO....Upon landing I talked with a supervisor at NorCal who told me the traffic was a VFR Cessna Conquest climbing out of Grass Valley who happened to request flight following. I told her my concern that we had so little warning and separation. She said the Conquest was operating within its rights flying through an area where IFR traffic was descending into SMF and it could happen again anytime.


Synopsis: An A320 flight crew descending on the FLUNK Arrival to SMF suffered a TA\RA conflict with a VFR Cessna Conquest in the process of requesting flight following from ATC during its climbout.
Date: 202009
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During boarding; Flight Attendant X noticed passenger in XX4 not wearing her mask fully. He kindly informed her that her mask must completely cover her nose and mouth. She said it wasn't comfortable; that it kept slipping off her nose.Flight Attendant X kindly offered her a new; more secure mask. She refused. Flight Attendant asked for a third time to cover her nose and mouth with either covering. She told him that she was fine; and to leave her alone. Flight Attendant X told me about the situation. I told the Captain. He; as most Captains agree: If someone doesn't listen to these rules; they probably won't observe other rules.The gate agent spoke to the passenger twice. Then a Customer Service Supervisor met the aircraft to escort her off the plane. The passenger then proceeded to try to speak to the Captain whilst passing through to the jet bridge. The Captain continued to support us; stating that she disrespected the crew. As she was trying to reason with our Captain; it was past departure time. The Customer Service Supervisor asked her 3 times to leave the plane. He reminded her that he asked her three times to deplane. She finally did; without further incident; but she caused a delay.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed from the flight due to refusing to adhere to face mask policy.
Date: 201905
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: MD-11
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Manuals; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While flight watching; a UAV ran off RWY XXL/XXR; closing this RWY indefinitely. Our flight was taxiing to the RWY when this occurred. There is another RWY at ZZZZ; XXR/XXL; however it is more narrow that the southern RWY. Upon looking in database; to see if we could use the alternate RWY; this note is contained: 'Runway XXL/XXR restricted from use for MD10/MD11 due to narrow width.' Upon running departure performance in aircraft performance software; performance information is given for XXR/XXL. However; none of this information is published for the crew to see in the JEPPs; and there is no custom [company] JEPP page for ZZZZ. Had I not looked; we were considering departing on XXR/XXL; which would have been a violation of the system limitation. Without access to this information; it is possible that a flight would depart XXR/XXL; especially if it is a last moment decision like today. I would like to propose removing XXR/XXL from the aircraft performance software database so no performance will be given for this RWY; or at least the system limitation information must be made available to the crew so they do not use that RWY. I relayed this information to the crew; and they obviously were very surprised that they had no access to this information; and they were clearly very happy I investigated AIR to see this limitation. Or is it possible that the system limitation is not accurate?




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported concern with critical runway specific takeoff data not being available to the flight crew. Dispatcher obtained the data and relayed to the flight crew.
Date: 202006
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PCT.TRACON, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E PCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was returning on an SFRA flight plan; northwest bound through the VFR flyway between BAL and DCA; at an altitude of approximately 1;900 feet. I had not flown this flyway for several years and I was unaware of the recommended altitudes for transitioning VFR traffic (1;500 feet west bound and 2;000 feet eastbound. An aircraft at my 12:00 position flying in the opposite direction about 100 feet above me came into view on my ADS-In display; and Potomac Approach notified me of the potential conflicting traffic. The pilot of the other plane; when notified by Potomac; told Potomac that my plane should be at 1;500 feet. That's when I realized that I was flying higher than I should have been. Potomac could have; but did not give me an indication that I was flying at/near an altitude intended for eastbound traffic; not westbound traffic. I should have been more diligent in checking the flyway chart where these altitudes are noted; as they are not shown on the Terminal Area Chart.




Synopsis: Pilot reported an NMAC with an aircraft in an SFRA due to being at the wrong transitioning altitude.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PHL.Airport, PA
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ramp PHL
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ramp Control has been giving aircraft on Taxiway K (an active movement area parallel to a runway) taxi clearances contrary to what Ground Control (GC) or Local Control (LC) gave them. This has put aircraft in unexpected places at inopportune times. I gave ramp Aircraft X at K short of Q for spot 7. Ramp gave Aircraft X K short of V contact GC. Aircraft Y was landing roll on RWY 27R parallel to Aircraft X and had to be told to exit further down the runway because Aircraft X was in the way; blocking runway exits and opposite direction to the flow of traffic. The aircraft behind Aircraft Y almost had to go around. Later Aircraft Z was told K; N contact Ramp. Ramp told Aircraft Z; K short of Q contact GC; which put them in the way of Aircraft A trying to exit RWY 27R. I also found out today that we are unable to hear tapes of Ramp Control; so we are unable to investigate or look into what happened on their end when we have issues or incidents. We have non FAA Ramp Controllers issuing control instructions on active taxiways with no recording or accountability. Ramp control should not own Taxiway J. J should be a movement area controlled by GC. Ramp should only own the alleyways which should remain non movement. This is what is done at LGA and we had none of these issues.




Synopsis: PHL Controller reported problems with the Ramp Tower issuing different instructions than Ground Control causing problems on the airport.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Special Use ADIZ DC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Enroute to BWI we were cleared for the RAVNN6 arrival via the BKW transition. As we started our descent on the arrival; ATC asked us which part of the regulations we were operating under. I told her we were operating as a part 135 flight; and she said 'ok' then handed us off to the next controller. Before I accepted the hand-off; I asked why she needed to know which part we were operating under. She said it had to do with the airspace around Washington D.C. but that we were fine and there was no issue. I accepted the hand-off and we continued the arrival and landed without incident. After ATC had asked us the question about our operations; however; we took a closer look at the STAR on the iPad. We found a small note at the top saying that part 91; part 135 and several other operation types were not allowed to shoot the RAVNN6 arrival via certain transitions; including BKW; which is the transition we were assigned.  The note for this arrival was in fine print at the top of the STAR diagram. If it was in bold print we probably would have noticed it and requested a different transition on the arrival.




Synopsis: Arrival procedures within the DC area and into BWI are restricted to limited types of operating regulations. ATC cleared flight for the RAVNN6 STAR BKW transition into BWI normally prohibited to part 135 operators.
Date: 201407
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower IND
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We were cleared for the MAREO2 departure and assigned Runway 23L for departure.  The ILS 23L DME was NOTAMed out of service (IFVJ).  For departure off 23L the MAREO2 departure reads; 'Climb on heading 227 to IFVJ 2.3 DME then on assigned heading 210; 227; or 242.'   Without an operable IFVJ DME you can not comply with the departure.  The reason that I point this out is that the DME for 23L and other IND runways is periodically NOTAMed out of service.  Whenever this happens IND Clearance still issues clearances that are predicated on these items being operable.  In these cases I will notify either Ground Control or Clearance Delivery that we are unable the departure.  From those interactions I get the impression that the Local controllers are unaware of the discrepancy at hand or maybe unaware of the exact verbiage on the departure plate.  What further piques my interest in this issue is a secondary interaction I have had numerous times with the IND controllers.  Often; even when all equipment is operable; Tower will repeat an assigned heading during initial climb out; and well before the IFVJ 2.3 DME.  It seems the intent in this case is to depart from the MAREO2 departure language and turn prior to the 2.3 DME.  However; I am unclear on what ATC's expectations are.I would like to know if I am correct in not accepting this departure if the DME is OTS.  I would also like to better understand what should occur in the following situation: Cleared via MAREO2; all equipment operable; Tower clearance of; 'Cleared for takeoff Runway 23L; fly heading 210' (At this point I'm following the clearance to fly runway heading to IFVJ 2.3 then turning to 210).  Once airborne cleared by Tower to (turn left heading 210; contact Departure).  Final suggestion: Share report with ATC for feedback and possible follow up with IND ATC.  I don't believe they should issue the clearance for this departure; or similar ones; if the equipment it is predicated on is inoperative.




Synopsis: Pilot reports of issue where DME that is OTS is still being used for clearances he is receiving out of IND airport.
Date: 201811
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZAB.ARTCC, NM
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZAB
ATC / advisory: Center ZAB
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Per LOA with PHX Approach; aircraft on the Jesse Arrival can be blended/stacked with EAGUL Arrivals. Controller in PHX Approach had already asked me to pull out 1 Jesse arrival if the inbound stream which I complied with. His communication was rude and vague. The aircraft mentioned above were coordinated with the Apache Sector Controller. I coordinated descending to 140 and 250 knots to protect for Aircraft X. The rude controller responded 'What am I gonna do with that?' I told him I had no idea because I don't work in that facility but I was complying with the letter. He told me he wasn't going to accept the handoff and to spin him. I told him I wasn't going to spin him; that I had numerous EAGUL arrivals in the stream behind him and that he needed to take the handoff. He told me no; he wasn't going accept the aircraft and to spin him. I told him I absolutely was not going to spin the aircraft unnecessarily. I hung up [and] waited for him to accept the hand off which he didn't do. I called him back and told him he needed to take the hand off and comply with the letter and he refused. I decided instead of risking safety of flight for all aircraft on the EAGUL behind him due to this controller's lack of ability or understanding of facility agreement letters; I would let the aircraft continue. At no time was safety compromised. I shipped the aircraft to Phoenix Approach Control without a handoff. I would address the issue at the TRACON level. It's been an ongoing issue with P50 and ZAB.




Synopsis: Albuquerque Center Controller reported an airspace deviation due to unprofessional Phoenix TRACON Controller not accepting the aircraft.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: TEB.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-60 600 Aerostar
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class B EWR; Class D TEB
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was not the pilot in command. [We were] departing from TEB on Runway 28 [24] with a Ruudy 4 departure. Departure Control stated that a possible deviation might have occurred. The turn to WENTZ was late. There is no fix for the turn. A 240 degree track is held until intercepting a 260 degree bearing to WENTZ. [It is] difficult to see while fighting strong crosswinds and turbulence at 1;500 FT at night. Recommend a fix to be assigned at the intersection of the 240 degree track and the 260 degree bearing to WENTZ. This would allow the GPS to direct the path required.




Synopsis: PA60 pilot reports a possible late turn toward WENTZ during the RUUDY 4 from TEB.