Date: 201409
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Military Transport
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Refueling
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Second aircraft: Fighter
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I was the R Controller on Razorback High and Drake Ultra High (22/19). I had only been on position for approx 10 minutes. Aircraft X was handed off to me climbing to FL230 southeast of TUL. Aircraft X was climbed to FL280. Aircraft X reported that they were waiting for Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z; both flights of 4. Aircraft X wanted to delay at FSM VOR. I cleared Aircraft X to FSM; and amended their assigned altitude to FL260. Aircraft X entered the hold at FSM. While flying on their outbound leg; Aircraft Y was handed off to me climbing to FL230. The R1/2 Controller appreq'd Aircraft Y; flight of 8; non-standard formation; 6 miles in trail. I also assigned Aircraft X FL270B280; their requested altitude. During this time; Sector 19 was being split off from Sector 22. I was unable to provide a recorded briefing to the R19 Controller due to the complexity and volume of my traffic. Sector 19 was split and it took approx. 3 minutes to complete sector transfer. There were numerous other aircraft at this time requesting weather deviations; frequency changes; and other traffic had to be moved for the military aircraft. I also was being relieved by another controller; who I elected to instead sit on my D side. I accepted the hand off on Aircraft Y; and climbed them to FL260. Aircraft X; after a position and altitude check; accepted MARSA with Aircraft Y flight. I then assigned Aircraft Y FL270B280; and switched them to tanker frequency. I then cleared Aircraft X to maneuver as necessary to join with Aircraft Y. Aircraft A; a SGF departure was level at FL250; southbound toward FSM. Aircraft Y was slowing their climb rate; and so I descended Aircraft A to FL240 and turned them 30 degrees left. There was no known conflictions between Aircraft A and any other aircraft. I accepted the hand off on Aircraft B; a ZZZ departure; heading toward TUL. Due to the military flight joining; and Aircraft A being turned in their direction; I elected to leave Aircraft B at FL230. The R1 Controller called and asked about a Mode C intruder; on code XXXX and climbing. Code XXX was climbing out of FL240 when I noticed the code. My limited data block filter was set to FL228B352. He was concerned about the proximity of Code XXXX and Aircraft B. Code XXXX was Aircraft Z flight; also departed TUL and joining up with Aircraft X. Code XXXX was approx 12 miles from Aircraft B; and climbing and I do not believe any separation was lost; however; both the R1 controller and my radar team were concerned about the random code. I queried Aircraft X about the code; and he informed me that they were part of the Aircraft Y flight (Originally Aircraft Z; however; they joined into a single flight). At this time; Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z (squawking code 1147) were at least 15 miles apart; 2000 feet or greater apart in altitude. I had no communication with Aircraft Y; and had no radar identification. Aircraft X informed me that they were still joining up; and I advised Aircraft X to tell me when they were fully established in the refueling formation. It took approx. 30 miles for all the aircraft to join with Aircraft X. After the event; I talked with the R1 Controller. He stated that Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y departed TUL to join with Aircraft X. TUL approach called and stated that the two flights joined together into a single flight of 8. Aircraft Z (now the only data block ZME had) continued onto FSM. The R1 Controller handed Aircraft Y flight to me; and I joined Aircraft Y and Aircraft X in a refueling formation. The known tracks; and their coordinated formation standards were separated from all aircraft. However; Aircraft Y and Aircraft X did not join. They were not in the coordinated 6 miles separation and were many 10's of miles apart and many 1000's of feet in altitude apart. This created a serious safety concern; and the Aircraft Z flight (Code XXXX) was in close proximity to Aircraft B. While I do not believe any separation was lost; this type of operation created a very unsafe situation. I was not able to communicate with 1/2 of the aircraft flight; nor did I know exactly where they were located. There was no indication from either the Aircraft Y flight lead or Aircraft X that the formation was in fact split; and joining from different locations; all outside the coordinated 6 miles. It appeared that the Aircraft Z flight (code XXXX) did not fly directly to FSM; nor join with Aircraft Y; but instead flew eastbound until north of FSM; putting them into a possible confliction with Aircraft B. There needs to be better communication with the military aircraft and air traffic control regarding their intentions. Communication between Aircraft Z and Aircraft Y was inadequate as to their intentions; and the communication with ATC was also inadequate. Aircraft Y was essentially flying around in Class A airspace with no separation being provided between them and other aircraft. These two flights should have never joined together prior to refueling with Aircraft X. Radar and communications should have been established with Aircraft Z. There should also have been some indication from the Aircraft Y lead that he only had 1/2 of their formation with him; and the other half was 20 miles away. Regardless of how the aircraft became separated; ATC should have been informed of the other aircraft positions. By the time I was made aware that these aircraft were not established in their formation; there was no longer a possibility of collision. Essentially I had aircraft in my airspace and did not know their altitude or position. This situation was completely unacceptable and created a serious hazard.




Synopsis: ZME Controller reports of a problem with two flights of aircraft attempting to join up with a refueling aircraft.  The flights were never close enough to be a standard flight and caused a conflict with other aircraft because they were so far apart.