elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZOA.ARTCC, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Climb from FL390 to FL410 possible altitude deviation.I was on lavatory break returning to the cockpit thus not on the flight deck as the aircraft left FL390 for FL410. When I initially called for re-entry to the cockpit while awaiting the flight attendant to set up the cart for 'blocking' via interphone. My First Officer asked if I wanted to climb to the FMC recommended FL410; it was my leg. I said yes it was smooth. It took a minute or two to set up the door 'block'. As I entered at approximately 38;900 feet ATC asked 'who cleared you to 410?' He then cleared us to FL 410 in the same transmission there was no traffic conflict that we were aware of I noted the time as approximately XA:27.I inquired with ATC if we needed to contact anybody about 'this' since I was clear the 41;000 feet was in the 'ALT' window and did not think my First Officer would have put it there without a 'clearance' to do so. Controller stated that they were researching the tapes and querying the Controller about a possible Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) clearance being issued they might not be aware of. It was curious that the Controller knew and stated we were going to 41;000 verses 'why are you in a climb' or 'say altitude'. My thought at the time is he may not be sure if he or did or didn't already clear us. I realize the Automatic Detective Surveillance (ADS) lets him see the 'ALT' window.




Synopsis: A B787 Captain left the flight station for short break and upon return noted the aircraft climbing to FL410 from FL390. Uncertain about the clearance; he inquired and was then cleared to FL410.
Date: 201201
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Light Sport Aircraft
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Exterior Pax/Crew Door
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After a thorough preflight and takeoff run-up; pilot departed in clear conditions with no indication of problems. At nearly 900 FT; Tower assigned pilot heading of 210 and transferred to Departure frequency. Before contacting Departure; while turning; the front latch of the passenger door unlatched and bent rearward. At this point; pilot returned to Tower frequency and requested landing. Approximately 30 seconds after; the rear latch also became unlatched causing door to open upward to fully open position. Pilot was cleared to land and proceeded to land and taxi back to the FBO ramp without further complications. Upon further inspection; pilot noticed missing Plexiglas from passenger window and door frame damage; but is unsure of exact phase of flight in which damage occurred. It is important to note that we have experienced similar situations where the door has opened during takeoff roll or shortly after takeoff in this type aircraft.

Callback: The reporter stated that the aircraft manufacturer shipped modified door latches and the existing ones were replace in a matter of days. The door latch weakness is a known issue and is the object of a service bulletin.



Synopsis: Both passenger door latches of a C162 failed after takeoff; allowing the door to fully open upward. At some point the Plexiglas window separated from the door. The aircraft returned to the airport.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Other Flight School
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Instructor; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Instructor landing with a student pilot after a short cross country. Approach speed and path were good. Touchdown was a little hard. Told the student to turn left on Taxiway G. He still had too much speed but began the turn after a slight delay. We began to skid as we turned sharply and I took flight controls. When I did; I noticed there was some power still in. I reduced power; brought the yoke back; and aimed between the taxiway lights. Once straightened out; I applied brakes and stopped in the grass to the right of Taxiway G before the hold short. I contacted Tower and they told me to wait for emergency vehicles. There was no damage to the aircraft nor injuries. After an inspection by the fire department; [the FBO] towed us back out onto the runway. We started up again; contacted Tower; went to Taxiway F; contacted ground; and taxied back to [the FBO].




Synopsis: C172 flight instructor reported a runway excursion after landing.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation Excel (C560XL)
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Elevator
Reporter function: Technician
Reporter qualification: Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Manuals; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: In the Cessna CE-560XL Maintenance Manual 27-90-30-720; Step (D); Monel rivets are said to be identified 'by dimple heads'. Industry uses 'Double Dimple' as the head marking for Monel MS20615M rivets. Rivets with one dimple would be standard aluminum alloy rivets and would be unsuited for the elevator location described in the above reference. Suggest the Maintenance Manual reference needs revising to have the Mechanic inspecting for 'Double Dimple' heads; not 'Dimple heads'.




Synopsis: A Technician reports that in the Cessna CE-560XL Maintenance Manual 27-90-3--720; Step (D); Monel rivets are said to be identified 'by Dimple heads'. Industry standards use 'Double Dimple' as the head marking. Maintenance Manual needs revising to have the Mechanic check that 'Double Dimple head' Monel type rivets are installed in the Elevator area; not 'Dimple heads'.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZZ
Aircraft component: APU Fire/Overheat Warning
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: About 12 minutes prior to departure; approximately one minute after switching from external power to APU power; APU auto shutdown. APU FIRE Light illuminated with EICAS APU FIRE warning; FIRE BELL and FIRE BOTTLE auto discharge. Ground Control was contacted for CFR to respond and passenger deplaned right away via jet bridge. No fire (per CFR). Maintenance performed inspection; MELed APU and we departed. Upon switching to external power [after arrival]; APU FIRE Light illuminated with EICAS APU FIRE warning and FIRE BELL. Ground Control contacted to inform of situation and for CFR to respond. Operations and Maintenance also contacted. No Fire. Maintenance then took aircraft. There is nothing that we could do to change this. Maintenance [at the departure airport] said that a spike in a power card (or something like that) was the cause. We would not assume anything after arrival and it was absolutely required to call CFR. We also had no fire bottle at that time.




Synopsis: Widebody First Officer experiences an APU fire warning with auto shut down and fire bottle discharge during preflight. The passengers are evacuated through the jet bridge; but CFR finds no evidence of fire. The APU is MEL'ed and the flight departs for North America. Upon gate arrival; with the APU off and switching to ground power; the scenario repeats.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: PVU.Airport, UT
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 15
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: DA40 Diamond Star
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E S56
ATC / advisory: Tower PVU
Second aircraft: Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My student and I were returning from our cross country flight. We had radar flight following with Salt Lake City Center. They handed us off to Salt Lake City Approach who then handed us off to PVU Tower. I reported to PVU tower we were 9.0 NM SW of the airport and we were inbound for landing. Our altitude was 6;500 MSL; consistent with local arrival procedures. PVU tower had us proceed to the CREEK and report the CREEK; and issued the following traffic advisory: 'Traffic 1 o'clock and 4 miles; northbound; altitude 6;000; type unknown' and that they weren't talking to this traffic. I told my student to remain at 6;500 to allow that traffic to pass below us. About 3-4 miles later; PVU tower said that traffic was now '12 o'clock less than a mile; altitude 6;300'. The airplane blended in well with the terrain and we never saw it until it was at our same altitude 11 o'clock and about 500 feet away laterally. I reported that traffic in sight. Tower asked us what type of aircraft it was; and I told them it was a Piper; possibly an Arrow or Saratoga; and that they were departing toward FFU. The airplane was close enough that I could almost make out the tail number; but I was unable to due to the fact it was only a hazard for a short moment of time. We informed tower that it got within 500 feet of us. The aircraft never did show up on their screen; and it would have if the airplane contacted Salt Lake City Approach and received a transponder code. My student and I were actively looking for this traffic from the moment of the first traffic advisory from PVU tower.




Synopsis: DA40 instructor pilot reported NMAC with another light aircraft in the vicinity of PVU.
Date: 201302
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SMQ.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 20
Light: Night
Aircraft: Cardinal 177/177RG
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E N90
ATC / advisory: CTAF SMQ; UNICOM SMQ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: When approaching the Somerset Airport (SMQ) under an IFR flight plan; it was VFR conditions and we canceled our IFR flight plan to continue the approach and landing at the airport under visual conditions.  We were cleared to switch over the common traffic advisory frequency and we did.  We attempted to turn on the airport lights by clicking the mic 5 times but nothing happened.  We tried multiple times by clicking fast and slow but could not get the lights to turn on.  We entered a standard pattern at the airport as we COULD see the beacon.  We looked in the airport facility directory but there was nothing published about the lights.  We also checked the approach plates but no further information about the lights.  We finally were able to get a hold of someone at the front desk in the FBO and they turned on the airport lights.  As it turns out; the lights were on a different frequency that was unpublished.  There was no NOTAM in regards to the airport lights.  We further found out after we landed that the airport lights frequency have been switched multiple times in the recent past.  I feel like this is extremely dangerous as we were under an IFR flight plan and flying at night.  Had there been any sort of emergency; we would not have been able to land (most likely).  There should either be a NOTAM about the lights or they need to be published.

Callback: No additional information was provided.



Synopsis: C177 pilot reports inability to activate the runway lights at SMQ during a night visual approach.  Communications are eventually established on Unicom and the runway lights are turned on.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked; Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Other / Unknown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [Company] Duty Officer informed CA (Captain) and FO (First Officer) (me) via company email that after block-in of a revenue flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 that ZZZ1 offload crew discovered [Aircraft X] had unmanifested ADG in position 12L. The container at 12L was labeled as IBX (International Box Volume); but actually contained 321 pieces of flammable gas (this info provided via Duty Officer in same company email). It was my understanding based on standardized DG (Dangerous Goods) procedures pre-flight that [Aircraft X] did not have any DG loaded.The cause of Hazmat violation was improper tracking of DG materials. DG unmanifested in non-DG labeled container.I suggest more vigilance and thoroughness when handling; tracking; and loading DG.




Synopsis: First Officer reported undocumented transport of Hazmat cargo due to improper DG tracking.
Date: 202002
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Workload
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We departed without a required NOTOC (Notice to Captain). I got distracted when going through all of the ACARS messages that happen right after load complete and acknowledged the doors closed (which they were) and the NOTOC onboard; but it wasn't. All of the normal load complete messages plus the new 'CPDLC can be used again message' came in a very rapid succession; which may have set us up to feel rushed even though we actually blocked out about 5 minutes early. I plan to include a checkbox on my yoke note pad for the NOTOC to prevent a recurrence; but I believe this was an isolated incident not a systemic issue.


Second narrative: Bottom Line Up Front: We took off without the NOTOC onboard the aircraft. The aircraft completed loading early. Therefore; once the load manifest was requested; a continual series of ACARS aural cues (dings) ensued. The series of aural cues and associated ACARS messages to read and acknowledge were: Electronic load manifest (which did indicate a NOTOC); load complete message; acknowledgment message; performance data; as well as a new message (reminding us we could now use CPDLC in flight). These messages came in rapid succession and even through we were not behind timeline to block out on time; it may have contributed to a false sense of being rushed; as during a typical preflight the load manifest is requested; then the ELM and other associated messages come some time later. I did see/recognize the NOTOC required status. However; I didn't recall seeing the load supervisor provide one to us and I did not confirm with the Captain whether it was onboard. I can't attribute this lapse in procedures to one specific event/distraction. My intent is to put a NOTOC check box on my yoke note to prevent this occurring in the future.


Synopsis: B-757 flight crew reported aircraft departure without required Hazmat NOTOC document due primarily to perceived time pressure and workload.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Dusk
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Flight plan block fuel is 145;000 LBS. On their own accord; and without any authorization; ZZZ fueling over fuels the flight to 148;800 LBS. ZZZ fueling citing issues such as 'the fuel pumps were not turned off in time'; or 'the Fueler was in the cockpit at the time of fueling and by the time they went back to the fueling station outside; the aircraft was over fueled'ZZZ fueling has consistently over fueled flights; to the point where it is routine and most actually laugh at this recurrence. ZZZ fueling must be held accountable and the over fueling has to stop and be put in check. I would like to ask that a one-week period of ZZZ outbound flights be looked at and see how many flights were marked 'over fueled'.Action has to be taken on these ZZZ over fuel events. Accountability and recourse are required if these events are to be halted. The amount of money wasted on these events is staggering.




Synopsis: Cargo air carrier Dispatcher reported the aircraft was over fueled by 3800 pounds without crew or Dispatch authorization.
Date: 201909
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B SEA
ATC / advisory: Ground SEA
Second aircraft: Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; Airport
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: While taxing out on the Blue line to Spot 66; we had switched from ramp to ground and were instructed by ground to taxi to Runway 16C via Taxiway Bravo. An Airbus was on the orange line behind us talking to ramp we think with instructions to join Taxiway Whiskey and park at [gate]. The Airbus was taxiing very fast and came up behind us off our right in the neutral zone past Spot 66 to join Taxiway Whiskey. I also had clearance in to the neutral zone beyond Spot 66. If it wasn't for my First Officer seeing the Airbus at the last second we would have slid right to join the taxi line beyond Spot 66 to continue to Taxiway Bravo and collided with the Airbus going to occupy the same space.The Blue and Orange lines need to continue to join taxi line Bravo or Whiskey. This will give pilots guidance on the ground on where to taxi so that they don't cut the corner and have a conflict with one another.Also there is a dead zone between Ramp and Ground control at the same spot so that both parties control the space but cannot provide conflict resolution when multiple aircraft are on different agencies frequencies.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reported ambiguous ramp and taxiway markings and the use of different frequencies in a hot spot area resulted in a critical ground conflict.