elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202008
Location: BWI.Airport, MD
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 30
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Falcon 20FJF/20C/20D/20E/20F
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B BWI
ATC / advisory: TRACON PCT
Second aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Wake turbulence encounter with resulting 40 degrees bank before correction. Plane ahead was Boeing 737 on same SID.




Synopsis: Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on departure out of BWI in trail of a B737.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport
Operator: FBO
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Skydiving
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X is a parachute operations aircraft. This aircraft operates in the close vicinity of the LGA MILTON FOUR Arrival in the area of BEUTY (FIX). The request of the operator and PIC is to climb to 13500 and operate the jump ops. The LGA arrivals cross BEUTY at 10000. This is a conflict of airspace as the jump ops and the arrivals cannot operate at the same time.ZNY has had countless conversations with the PIC and owner on the need of an agreed to Letter of Agreement (LOA). We have met to make this happen. Soon after the ZNY Facility created a LOA based on our conversations. There has not been an agreement to date. Not because of the need to change information in the LOA but more so the vocal reluctance on [the owner] to sign and agree to a LOA. This event the issue was the PIC did not notify ATC that all the jumpers did not jump when the PIC stated jumpers away. He requested to hold at 12000 for a second. This turned into almost two minutes. At this time the LGA arrivals were stuck high and multiple coordination was needed to be done based on the lack of communication about the jumpers. This area has too much volume to allow a safe operation without clear and precise communication. There are many documented times that this is an unsafe location to have this operation above 9500. Terminate operations above 9500.




Synopsis: ZNY Controller reports of a skydiving operation in close proximity to an arrival route into LGA. Controller states aircraft pilot did not advise when all jumpers where out. The Controller reports that IFR aircraft were stopped at altitudes to keep them away from the jumpers and this made them high on the approach.
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Second aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: The parachute jump area was active VFR/145 at XS90. This area is controlled by AUS app and they notify SAT app and ZHU RND sector 92 when active. The jump plane was climbing in the area southbound and spilled out of the depicted protected airspace. Meanwhile Aircraft X was on the SETZR SID from SAT climbing to FL230. As the targets began to merge I turned Aircraft Y to MERCR intersection on the SID to pull south and issued an initial heading of 15 degrees right to help expedite the vector. This turn kept him an addition 2 miles south of the depicted jump area (the SID takes departures along the southern boundary of jump area). After reevaluating the situation I stopped Aircraft Y at 14000 below the jump plane at 14500. Aircraft X was climbing unusually slow. Majority of the time jets will top this area. As soon as I un-keyed the jump plane began a decent. Aircraft x responded to RA and reported seeing traffic 400 ft above.This has been an ongoing issue for slow climbers or turbo props on this SID with the parachute jump areas active. As stated above the jump are sits just off the SID were the east departures off SAT intercept on a northeast heading then turn east on SID. This jump area is located within SAT app who owns 13000 and below and AUS app who owns 12000 and blow and our 92 sector. I do not have control for turns from SAT until out of 13000 and have active MOA at 8000-12000 south of the SID. For many reasons this is an unsafe place for jump are:1) In a major departure corridor for SAT app.2) Jump planes spill out of depicted area.3) SAT app does not ensure departures top jump planes.4) AUS app does not keep them in areas.1) Don't allow parachute jump operations in or near a major departures or arrival corridors.2) Move SID south.3) Cap jump area altitude to 12000/13000 and SAT app should be required to ensure separation via alt or vector before shipping to 92 sector.4) AUS app needs to monitor their jump planes to prevent spilling out.




Synopsis: ZHU Controller reported a NMAC between an air carrier and a jump plane due to the proximity of the jump area to the SID routing.
Date: 201211
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: EWR.Airport, NJ
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground EWR
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Upon exiting the Terminal C Ramp area on Taxiway B at Intersection K; we were instructed to taxi to Runway 4L via Taxiway B to D; giving way to a B757 exiting at Taxiway S. As we came around the corner on Taxiway B; we mistakenly veered onto Taxiway S which angles off to the right and parallels Taxiway A and B; we thought we were on Taxiway B. About the time we realized it; Ground told us to rejoin B at G. No further mention was made; and the remainder of flight operations remained normal. This intersection is poorly designed and the lighting at Intersection B/S should be designated as a hot spot.

Callback: The Reporter stated that the crew had great difficulty at the intersection of B; S and D determining exactly which taxiway they were on. They had begun their taxi at Terminal Charlie and were cleared to Runway 4 but progressing around the corner they lost situational awareness and could not clearly determine from the chart or taxiway signs where they were to transition to B. The Reporter suggests a hot spot on the airport diagram so that crews will look closely at the chart in that area.



Synopsis: A pilot reported that while taxiing to Runway 4L from Terminal C on Taxiway B at the B; S and D intersection he mistakenly entered Taxiway S because of poor signage and a confusing airport diagram.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZKC.ARTCC, KS
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZKC
ATC / advisory: Center ZKC
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Fatigue
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: We thought we were cleared to descend out of FL430 after responding to and reading back a clearance to descend. As we passed through FL420 ATC cleared us to FL400 with the statement that the previous descent clearance had not been for us. No known loss of separation. We subsequently determined that clearance had been for a similar call sign. My guess is that our readback was either blocked by the other aircraft or ATC did not realize it was us acknowledging the clearance. I believe contributing factors include: We had not been made aware of a similar call sign upon checking in on the frequency. Fatigue we had already completed nearly 9 hours of flying including an ocean crossing in what was a back side of the clock operation for our circadian rhythm. Our failure to adequately monitor the frequency.




Synopsis: A small transport crew acknowledged a descent clearance and began a descent that was intended for another aircraft with a nearly identical 'N' number. No warning of a similar call sign had been given.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MEM.Airport, TN
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B MEM
ATC / advisory: TRACON M03; Tower MEM
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: On the Arrival we encountered a line of weather that was moving west to east and were given deviations to maneuver around the weather while lining up for downwind on Runway 18R. ATIS was calling for +RA on the field with wind shear advisories in effect. The Captain and I reviewed the wind shear procedure and precautions well in advance of arriving into the area. Once we were cleared for the approach to 18R; Tower warned of possible wind shear on a 1 mile final to runway 18R. At the time we were on roughly a 4 mile final and planned to carry an additional 5 knots of airspeed. Winds were reported as 250 at 11 knots. At roughly a 1 mile final (300' AGL) we encountered about a 20 knot loss of airspeed along with a Ground proximity Warning System (GPWS) 'GLIDESLOPE' alert. As the Pilot Flying (PF); I recognized the wind shear and immediately pushed the throttles up to correct the situation while performing the wind shear procedure.Although I think we safely aviated through the problem and recovered safely on the second approach; here's what we both learned from the debrief. While performing the wind shear escape maneuver as the PF I said; 'wind shear' but did not make it 100% clear to the Captain what I was doing. There was some miscommunication between the Captain and I whether or not we were doing a wind shear escape or a go-around. We did not receive a 'Windshear' warning from the GPWS.




Synopsis: Widebody Aircraft First Officer reported performing a successful windshear escape maneuver; but noted a possible lack of communication with the Captain as to whether he was performing a windshear maneuver or a go-around.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty)
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I was working the D position on this turn (ZZZ>ZZZ1>ZZZ). I came onboard with a slight headache; throughout the trip it got worse; due to the bad smell onboard. During boarding; a passenger came onboard and asked right away 'Do you guys smell that sulfur smell?'  I smelt it; but not strong enough to worry about it.  Once we closed the boarding door; the smell became stronger and the air seemed a bit hazy; but still I didn't think much of it.  The A FA had a clogged nose; so she didn't smell anything throughout the trip.  During the flight I walked around the aircraft and every time I would walk up to the front; the smell would catch me off guard and the headache would worsen.  Once we landed in ZZZ1; the FAs in the aft said that upon landing and taxiing; the smell became really bad; almost unbearable.  We informed the Captain and Maintenance came onboard.  They blasted air in the aircraft; which made the smell dissipate. Then they tried recreating the scenario by closing the aircraft doors and testing one engine at a time.  The smell did not come back; so we decided it was again safe for boarding. Upon arrival back to ZZZ; the FAs in the back said that there was slight smell; but not as bad as before.




Synopsis: Flight Attendant reported a 'sulfur' type odor during multiple flight legs. Maintenance action at stop over greatly improved the conditions.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SAN.Tower, CA
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B SAN
ATC / advisory: Tower SAN
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: SCT TRACON East sector flashed Aircraft X to me a CAT 2 inbound arriving from the NE. There was a busy stream of arrivals inbound and I had yet to take the flash on the aircraft because per the LOA SCT shall either sequence the CAT 2 arrival or coordinate something else via an APREQ. The controller at East did not verbally coordinate; and next thing I knew the aircraft was on my data block (I did not take the flash) and talking to me. According to the LOA with SCT Paragraph 5 c (1) (e) TRACON Shall: Complete a radar hand off on Class B Airspace CAT 1 [and] tower approved CAT 2 arrivals inbound from the NW at or descending to 2500 MSL. Also paragraph 5 c (2)(b) Tower Shall: When tower CTRD [Certified Tower Radar Display] is operational sequence and assume control for descent at or South of Mt Soledad all Class B airspace CAT 1 and tower approved CAT 2 arrivals. I sequenced Aircraft X aircraft in behind a B737 arrival at Aircraft X's 9 O'clock; which the pilot had in sight. When I called the East Controller to ask; 'Isn't a [aircraft X type] a twin engine?' the response was 'I don't know'. There was no verbal communication and the hand off was forced onto my tag with an OK function. This is not the proper hand off procedure; I was waiting for the EAST controller to call and coordinate the un-sequenced Aircraft X arrival; which I would have approved had the coordination been done in a timely matter. To prevent a re-occurrence I would suggest the wording in the LOA be changed to specifically say. 'TRACON Shall Sequence all CAT 2 aircraft inbound to land; unless otherwise coordinated.'




Synopsis: SAN Tower Controller describes a situation where the TRACON Controller forces a data block onto their position symbol and switches the aircraft to Tower's frequency without any coordination. SCT East Sector Controller violated the LOA between the two facilities.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Physiological - Other
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Physical Injury / Incapacitation
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I ate my crew meal and 30 min later started vomiting aggressively. I did not make it to the lav and was in the cockpit when the symptoms started. As soon as I could I went to the lav and vomited again. The flight attendant was in the cockpit with the Captain who was on oxygen. I came back to the cockpit and said I was starting to feel better because I thought I got it all out of my system. We continued the flight and landed safely in ZZZ. That night I was nauseous and vomiting all night.




Synopsis: B777 First Officer reported becoming ill after eating a crew meal.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: We were at 13;000 feet; 8 miles from ZZZZZ on the arrival into ZZZ. ATC called traffic and we responded; looking. We saw the traffic on the box showing 400 feet below us and ahead of us. We got an aural traffic alert from the box. Then got RA CLIMB. We complied to climb and got to 13;300 feet. Then heard clear of traffic. Told ATC we got RA and had to climb. When clear; told ATC we were going back down to 13;000 feet.




Synopsis: EMB-135LR First officer reported an NMAC event during arrival.
Date: 201208
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MTPP.Airport, FO
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower MTPP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: During ILS/DME Runway 10 approach; aircraft [was] on autopilot tracking slightly below glidepath until approximately 1;800 AGL when nose pitched up slightly and power came up to correct to glidepath then glideslope dropped below horizon and autopilot chased it down resulting in an unacceptable sink rate. Disconnected autopilot and corrected to visual approach. I believe the ILS at MTPP should be tested for accuracy and proper functioning. I fly this [approach] a lot and observe the glide slope and localizer to be erratic constantly. The problem is; it is insidious and if you don't fly this [approach] a lot it can take someone by surprise. It acts like it is working normal then the glideslope slowly drifts up or down slowly. Suggest using only RNAV approaches.




Synopsis: The MTPP Runway 10 ILS glideslope rose slowly then quickly dropped; causing a B737-800 autopilot to chase it at an unacceptable rate down. The autopilot was disconnected and a visual approach completed.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence
Aircraft: DC-10 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: This is a safety of flight issue that MIA ATC is very nonchalant about. As you can see on the attachment [not provided] two different departures are assigned on the PDC. Unless things have changed I thought a PDC change would be highlighted with asterisk on each side of a new assigned routing. This procedure MIA uses is a violation waiting to happen. Very dangerous procedure. In case the attachment is unreadable; HITAG and WINCO were the two assigned departures.MIA [must be made to] comply with standard PDC procedures like the rest of the country.




Synopsis: A DC-10 Captain took exception to the manner in which PDC clearances are formatted in MIA; citing the 'assignment' of two different SIDs on the PDC for their flight.