elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202105
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: DEN.Airport, CO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower DEN
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Starting our taxi in Denver; Ground Control gave us instruction to taxi to Runway 34L via F and WA. While taxiing on Taxiway F; my Captain asked for the Before Takeoff checklist. I was accomplishing the before takeoff checklist when my Captain commented that the aircraft ahead of us may have missed the turn to Taxiway WA. Not thinking anything of it; we continued to taxi on Taxiway F. When my Captain was about to turn to Taxiway WA; I commented and pointed to a direction sign in front of us that indicates that Taxiway WA is still straight ahead (arrow pointing up to WA). My Captain also saw the sign and decided to go forward as indicated by the direction sign. As we continued forward; my Captain and I realized that we actually missed Taxiway WA because of the misleading direction sign. The Ground Controller noticed that we did exactly the same thing as the previous aircraft that missed Taxiway WA. The Ground Controller then gave us another instruction to turn inside the WA deice pad and follow the next aircraft on WA. We then taxied on WA to Runway 34L without further incident.We believe that the direction sign just pass Taxiway WA is misleading. The direction sign should be placed just before the Taxiway WA right turn and the direction arrow should be indicating a right turn instead of a straight ahead arrow.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Pilot reported the taxiway signage is misleading at DEN airport.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: TIST.Airport, VI
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb; Taxi
Airspace: Class C TIST
ATC / advisory: Tower TIST
Aircraft component: FMS/FMC
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight; Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Airport
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Non Pegasus B757; map showed slight displacement at TIST Runway 10 Hold Short; but quick position reference (Q10) was not available in the database. On takeoff in Day VMC with unrestricted visibility; GPWS alerted due to map shift. All terrain was in sight at all times. I increased rate of climb slightly but did not fully accomplish escape maneuver. If memory is available; quick position reference data should be available for all regular destination airports.




Synopsis: B757 First Officer detected a slight FMC position error taking Runway 10 at TIST for departure and elected to continue the takeoff in VMC. A GPWS terrain warning is generated just after rotation; but the departure path is visually clear.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Electronic Flt Bag (EFB)
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Manuals; Company Policy
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: During my 48 years of flying; 36 as an airline pilot; we have all witnessed major improvements in equipment and technology. Most were fully tested and vetted prior to the introduction into the flight decks of our passenger aircraft. The latest such technology is the iPad. My comments need to be prefaced by stating that computers are a revolutionary technology with which I am very comfortable and in the use of which I am extremely well versed. That being said; the rush to put the iPad into full use aboard our fleets; WITHOUT BACKUP PAPER MANUALS ON BOARD; is an extremely poor decision and could lead to unintended; very bad conclusions. There needs to be several more years of testing; training and evaluation prior to their full stand alone implementation. There needs to be several training and checking cycles during which the electronic pad is used as the primary information and reference source. Data should be collected; evaluated and codified to determine the practicality and desirability of full implementation. The collected data needs to be compared against a base line established from training and checking session using the existing paper manuals. This is the only means to determine the feasibility and safety of full implementation. The data collected must be the evaluations of LINE PILOTS ONLY; and must not be allowed to be skewed by the inclusion of data related to line check airmen; pilot instructors or standards Captains. These individuals are highly trained in the use of the iPad and their jobs require daily usage. This is not the case with the average line airman.You are strongly urged to prevent our airline from 'RUSHING TO JUDGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION' of the iPad without far more training and evaluation.The potential for an aircraft accident or incident related to premature implementation is not acceptable.




Synopsis: An A320 Captain expressed concern about the proposed implementation of iPads as the sole flight deck source of information and data currently provided through paper documents and publications. The reporter believes an extended period of vetting; with the paper documents retained as backups; should be required to insure reliability and provide flight crew with adequate opportunity to gain facility and confidence in their use.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Windshear
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LAS
ATC / advisory: Tower LAS
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather; Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On final; ATC advised windshear alert -30 knots at 200 feet; Company in front of us reported windshear and advised 'going around'. We received a windshear alert and commenced a go-around. Several aircraft were forced to go-around leading to frequency congestion and concerns about fuel and diversion airports. Forecast weather did not require alternate fuel. Initially ATC sent us to hold with the expectation of getting right back into KLAS. As we entered holding; ATC said getting back into KLAS would be delayed with windshear and microbursts overhead. We attempted to ACARS Dispatch with diversion plan; received 'NO COMM' message. Requested ATC clearance to ZZZ; we were given a heading and began setup and briefing for descent into ZZZ. We expected to land with 4;700 pounds of fuel. ATC later advised us that landing ZZZ was not an option as we were number seven in line due to other diverts. Controller suggested ZZZ1. We advised ATC Minimum Fuel and asked for and received vectors to ZZZ1. Field was VFR and we landed on Runway X with 4300 pounds of fuel. Based on our fuel and available information; landing at ZZZ1 was the safest course of action. Once on the ground we worked with Dispatch; the Chief Pilot in the Operations Center and local FBO to obtain paperwork and authorizations for return trip to KLAS.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported inability to communicate with Dispatch during a diversion.
Date: 201712
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Elevator Trim System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Captain; Single Pilot; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Time Pressure; Distraction
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: No conflicts with other aircraft that I know of; I did a very careful pre-flight and run-up following every letter on these checklists. The aircraft just came out of paint. All surfaces were removed by the paint shop and I found out later that settings to the pitch system were compromised prior to re-installation. On takeoff when the aircraft lifted in the air; full nose down command was required; I was hitting the stops on down elevator. I reduced the power and landed straight ahead on the remaining runway.  I taxied clear of the runway and went back to the paint shop. The next day fixtures were brought out to the paint shop and it was found the trim jackscrew and the rod end for the trim tab were way out of adjustment.




Synopsis: Piper Cherokee pilot reported difficulty with aircraft pitch control immediately after takeoff due to an improper rigging of the pitch trim system. Pilot reduced power and and landed safely on the remaining runway surface.
Date: 202001
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Caravan 208B
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 135
Mission: Passenger
Aircraft component: Checklists
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Observer
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: During an operational line check by [Instructor]. It was brought my attention that while covering all items on the checklist ; I did not physically have the checklist in hand to review. And this is true. We are of the mindset of on-time. And in a busy environment like [Airport]; our attention is definitely on our surroundings and traffic if weather is VFR. The [aircraft type] Checklists are simple; and memorization occurs quickly with repeated flights along the same routes.This was an observation; not a detection.[Instructor] agreed that its almost too simple. Except that FAR Part 135 requires that the checklist be 'used' at all times during operations. While most pilots have learned that a checklist is a verification procedure; and not a work list; in 121 and 135 it is indeed a work list. And the Regulations dictate that we use them for all phases of operations. [Instructor] would like to let the committee know that he considered conversation with the pilot as counsel; and that no further action is necessary in that regard for the pilot.I spoke at length with [Instructor] on this issue; and the conclusion for me is 'complacency'. We fly the same plane; route; profile; speed; frequencies; all of it over and over. It can become as if we were the autopilots. The danger here is that irregular use of the normal checklists can lead to other areas where we let our guard down. Listening for our call sign; automatically dialing in the next frequency; Using Beta and Braking unreasonably hard to make the first turn off are all potential places where things can and will go wrong when we become complacent.My personal recommendation is to place Card Stock (Not laminated) Normal Operations Checklists in the aircraft. If they get bent and beat up or get lost it means they are being used. Cheap to replace. Very Cheap. Using an Ipad for checklist is cumbersome at best. If you wear glasses; its an annoyance. and you have to either go back and forth from approach plate to checklist (go forbid you tap the wrong thing); or use multiple devices thus increasing rather than lessening the pilot workload.




Synopsis: C208B Pilot reported not physically having the checklist in hand to review during operations; and recommends the use of a physical checklist in addition to an iPad.
Date: 202007
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Transport
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: Tower LAX
Aircraft component: Navigational Equipment and Processing
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Corporate
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On departure we were executing the LADYJ FOUR (RNAV) departure. Climbing through 10;000 our FMS began to accelerate beyond 250 knots around OROSZ Intersection as programmed in the FMS. The LADYJ departure indicates that 250 knots shall be maintained until advised by ATC. We briefed this and were aware of it; however; the way the information is presented is not on the pictorial of the chart and I believe it leaves a significant gap for error; because the flight crew must either assume that the Controller will issue normal speed; or the flight crew must constantly ask for normal speed with subsequent controllers. Also; all aircraft are programmed to accelerate to climb speed above 10;000 feet which requires a non-standard method of selecting manual speed versus having the MCDU command speed appropriate to the airspace and configuration of the aircraft. Selecting manual speed could result in a low speed event in the subsequent climb. Just passing OROSZ the Controller issued normal speed; and I believe this was a non-event. On further research this departure is mentioned as a poorly designed departure and I would hazard to guess there are numerous safety reports on it.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported the FMS began to accelerate beyond 250 knots above 10;000 feet while on the LADYJ FOUR (RNAV) even though the programmed SID requires 250 knots until advised by ATC.
Date: 201711
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class G ZZZ
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Airport
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: At [hospital helicopter pad] following the completion of a [medical] transport; the crew and I completed our walk around and started the aircraft...with all required lights on. I completed the takeoff checklist and after making the required calls (stating our location; direction of departure; and destination); I increased collective and established the aircraft in a stable hover in order to perform hover checks. As I was preparing to slide left with the left side crewmember (our paramedic) clearing my slide; he advised me to hold my position immediately because another [helicopter] was about to land on top of us.Eventually the other aircraft saw us and he/she slid to their left and established their helicopter in a steady hover at approximately 30 feet up; 40 feet to our 9 o'clock. They remained in that hover for approximately 30-40 seconds and then waved off to the south. I attempted to contact that aircraft on the common frequency but they did not answer.When they were clear and out of their turn and heading back to the north; I departed to the south and made a turn out to the west; enroute...for fuel. I contacted flight communication and cleared to the west without them saying anything to us or advising us of another aircraft in the area. If it weren't for the paramedic seeing the searchlight of the other helicopter and his timely call; I am fairly we certain that we would have been hit by the other aircraft. The other aircraft should have been up on the helicopter common frequency. Also; the pad is not big enough for two aircraft to be turning in such close proximity without having direct communications with each other.




Synopsis: Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter attempting to land on the same hospital helipad from which he was lifting off.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Night
Aircraft: PA-31T Cheyenne I
Operator: Air Taxi
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Pressurization Control System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Lost cabin pressurization at 15;000 FT. Announced my intentions to ATC to descend to 10;000 FT. Received no immediate response. I initiated my descent and reported again; 'emergency descent. Descending to 10;000 FT.' At 14;700 FT; ATC acknowledged my transmission and cleared my aircraft to 10;000 FT.




Synopsis: A PA-31 lost pressurization at 15;000 FT; so the pilot declared an emergency and began a descent to 10;000 FT before ATC acknowledged because they were slow responding.
Date: 201702
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ORD.Airport, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class E C90
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Aircraft component: Aero Charts
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: When climbing out on the ORD2 departure after reaching 10000 ft the 250 knot speed restriction was accidentally exceeded. The restriction was lifted while we were approaching 13000; but we were already not complying with the 250 knot restriction.


Second narrative: Pre-departure briefing included the speed restriction of 250 kts until cleared to accelerate on the ORD2 departure. Nonetheless; the airspeed bug drove the flight directors pitch down to accelerate as we climbed above 10;000 ft. All 3 of us missed that I followed the flight director and accelerated to ECON climb speed of roughly 300 kts without clearance to accelerate. It only occurred to us that we had inadvertently violated the speed limit when ATC said 'resume normal speed'. The rest of the flight was unremarkable.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported exceeding the speed restriction that limits aircraft to 250 knots until 13;000 feet on the ORD2 SID.