elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: AUS.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) [for our arrival] in IMC light rain. The runway was wet and the overcast was roughly 500-700 ft. We had a normal descent; arrival; approach and landing. Upon landing the Captain stowed the speed brakes and used very little if any brakes. When we approached [the] taxiway we made a turn off which seemed to go at a reasonable speed. The taxiway which was angled which gave the appearance of a high speed turn off. Upon getting farther in the turn it was obvious it was not a high speed and required a hard right turn. This was my first time learning that the nose wheel can skid easily in the A320. We skidded around 45 degrees with a clear indication we would exit the taxiway and recovered only to be going 45 degrees to the grass on the right side of the taxiway. The Captain recovered on the taxiway and the Tower asked if there was standing water or if there was a problem in that area. I responded that there did not appear to be standing water but it was rather slick. It should be noted that in my limited experience in the A320 the taxi speed did not appear to be too fast. I was shocked to see the lack of maneuverability of the nose wheel with wet conditions in a turn.We both felt this did not require any maintenance action. We debriefed the situation and gave an explanation to the passengers at this gate.




Synopsis: A320 First Officer momentarily lost control exiting the runway on a wet surface when the nose wheel skidded in the turn.
Date: 201601
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAS.Airport, NV
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Second aircraft: MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Ground told us to 'hustle up' in order to make our flow time in one minute; void in 4. We expedited our taxi and called ready at 1R hold short and were given immediate 'cleared for takeoff' (1 minute prior to void time). We rogered the call; cleared final that traffic at approximately 3 mi was heading for the left (1L); and crossed the hold short line. As we crossed the hold short; there was an '[company]' call; which was cut short as we turned to align with 1R. I looked up to see an aircraft at approximately 500 feet and lined up for our runway. Tower called for an immediate 'Go Around' and around 10 seconds later; we saw the MD-80 on the Go. Tower cancelled our takeoff clearance; told us to 'line up and wait'. Approximately 4-5 minutes later; we were cleared for takeoff. Meeting a flow time seemed to be a causal factor in this event. We did not feel rushed at all; but did expedite our taxi speed when asked to 'hustle up'.  When Tower cleared us as we called 'ready for Takeoff'; nothing seemed to be out of the ordinary. I normally fly to Hawaii where there are seldom 'flow issues'; and it seems that controllers domestically are under a lot of pressure; which can lead to mistakes.Another factor was the landing traffic. As we were paralleling the runway while taxiing to the approach end of 1R; I noticed 2-3 contacts on the TCAS display in the cockpit and they all seemed to be lined up for 1L (where we had landed 1 hour before). Visually ascertaining which runway an aircraft is lined up for is not an exact science. Winds aloft; coupled vs hand flown approaches; nose to tail distance are just a few factors that can influence one's perception as to which runway is being lined up on. In normal ops; we normally have time to follow on tower frequency who's checking in; and what runway they are cleared for. Again; pressing to get a flight out to shave a minute for flow can compress the safety margins to where a tragedy could occur. Kudos to the person in the Tower that recognized the situation and took corrective action.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported his takeoff clearance was cancelled by ATC because of conflicting traffic.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: OKC.Airport, OK
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class C OKC
ATC / advisory: Tower OKC
Second aircraft: Helicopter
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On approach to OKC; Tower asked us to switch to Runway 17R for helicopter traffic over the interstate. We complied and were established by 1;000 feet. We saw one helicopter we avoided. Then we got an RA to descend at around 700 feet AGL. We complied. I flew the RA guidance after a momentary hesitation to descend below GS. We never saw the aircraft. The Captain saw the traffic on our TCAS [and] it showed 0 feet separation on top of us. The event was in Tower's airspace. They did not point out the traffic to us. We also did not hear them give any advisories to the helicopters. The level of safety they provided was unacceptable.Tower should have kept the helicopters away from our final approach course and advised us more exactly of their location.




Synopsis: ERJ-170 First Officer reported an NMAC with a helicopter on final approach to OKC that featured an RA command to descend below the glideslope at 700 feet AGL.
Date: 202102
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZAN.ARTCC, AK
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A PANC
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: We encountered moderate; approaching severe turbulence at 39;000 feet. There was was a SIGMET for the area to our south for turbulence 32;000 feet to 40;000 feet; I requested 30;000 feet and received clearance to 30;000 feet. We began a descent and the turbulence stopped completely at 38;500 feet. I slowed the descent and requested 36;000 feet. We had no response and continued a slow descent. PANZ then queried if we were still descending to 30;000 feet. I asked again for 36;000 feet and we were cleared to 36;000 feet. At 34;500 feet we began a climb to 36;000 feet. About that time ATC contacted us on VHF and clarified why we were descending so slowly. I responded that I made 2 requests for 36;000 feet and also tried on VHF. There is a VHF dead zone of about 180 miles between 2 remote transmitters and we were unable to make contact at the initial descent.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported an VHF radio dead zone.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Fuel Tank
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Other Person
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: I performed a Defueling Task on an EMB-120 aircraft in preparation for C-Check. I used the equipment provided by the company to defuel the aircraft; not knowing that it was not the proper equipment stated in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). After the work was performed; I signed off the right and left wing Defueling Card blocks saying I performed it in accordance to the AMM. It was the FAA that found out about the problem due to a call from some who said we weren't performing the proper procedure and using the proper equipment when defueling aircraft. The reason to why this equipment was used instead of the one required in the AMM Manual; was because that's the way I was trained to do it and everyone who performed the task before me have done it many times and [that] became the 'new way of doing it.' Being the first time performing the task; the [defueling] equipment was set up and ready to go. And the Crew Leader fearing that the next shift was going to be upset for not defueling the aircraft when they got there; asked me to do it. In a way I would say there was pressure on me to complete it as fast as I could. So I jumped on the task right away without wasting time. It is my fault for not following the AMM at the time. If I would have just stopped for a moment and pulled the [Manual] out this incident would have been addressed and fixed properly. An FAA Inspector came to the Base [two months later]; to talk to me about the issue. I was not notified about the violation by anyone; only by the FAA Inspector.  I would suggest for the Leader of the crew; not to rush the mechanics on performing a task and expecting an unrealistic time for it to be done. It seems to me; and it happened before; when I'm about to perform a job and; the leaders want you to start on it right away; and they seem to get upset when your in a computer pulling out references for the job. It happens a lot so; I think it should stop. The required equipment should be in the facility for tasks that are performed often.




Synopsis: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) was informed by an FAA Inspector that he did not use the proper equipment when he had defueled an EMB-120 aircraft. Technician noted that he; and others before him and after him; had been trained to use the same equipment.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Weather elements / visibility: Rain
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Landing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Weather
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Full tanks for flight to LAX. Projected landing 6.6. Due to rides planned cruise altitude not acceptable so we used FL300. Later in flight that was unacceptable and FL280 the only reasonable ride. Planned landing fuel in FMC 5.7 at that time. Not great; but not bad. When fuel in center tanks burned out our FMC planned landing fuel dropped significantly - now 4.9. ATC sends us lower and drops speed to 250 KIAS fuel burn suffers. LAX turns around airport landing to the East now and fuel burn suffers. Long story short we find ourselves on final with 3600 lbs of fuel and not happy about it since FMC guidance led us to be mostly happy with our progress for 5 hours of a 6 hour flight. Real exciting in the last hour! Hugely unsafe? No; but not optimal by any means. Nothing heard from Dispatch about our burn progress throughout entire flight despite Dispatch asking me to call prior to flight about full tanks and lower than optimal fuel for landing. I'd have probably stopped in PHX or LAS if we'd had a discussion about it. That's not a good thing I'm the Captain and I'd not have it any other way; but it's nice to feel like Dispatch has your back and we do NOT feel that way today due to multiple reasons (mostly high Dispatch turnover) as discussed in recent School class sponsored by company. This is the lowest fuel I have ever blocked in with. I don't know what the Review Committee feels about that quantity of fuel on a stormy night in LA with heavy rains and the airport configured to non-standard; but I'd love to hear from someone about it. After all; the only Captain I generally fly with is me.




Synopsis: B737 Captain reports landing in LAX with 3600 pounds of fuel due to a variety of factors; after expecting to land with 6600 pounds.
Date: 201909
Location: SFO.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Parked
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Ground Personnel
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: My partner and I are [company] employees who finished securing Aircraft X on Gate XX. We were about to call for deadhead when my partner noticed that the wing of Aircraft Y; being pushed out by [company] from Gate XY; was coming very close to our aircraft's tail and Number 1 side rear stabilizer. I got out of our Supertug to signal an 'X' with my arms (to stop the aircraft); but the pushback driver did not stop. Only after my partner called Ramp to tell the pilots to stop the pushback process did the mechanics stop the push. The pushback driver stopped the push for a brief period of time before continuing and finishing the push. There were also no wing-walkers utilized during the pushback of Aircraft Y by [company].




Synopsis: Ground Crew reported company mechanics pushing back an aircraft without wing-walkers that came close to touching the reporter's aircraft.
Date: 201606
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: VNY.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class D VNY
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Prior to departure we thoroughly briefed the SID. However; upon departure we leveled for a crossing restriction and failed to initiate the prescribed climb after meeting the crossing. Our lateral navigation was complied with however; which consisted of a vector after the crossing restriction. Conditions were 'clear and a million' so we were able to see the approaching terrain; prompting us to realize our mistake. We began an immediate climb to comply with the SID. Shortly thereafter; ATC advised us to begin a climbing turn away from the terrain; also issuing a terrain alert. At no time was the terrain an imminent threat but even still this event served as a great reminder to diligently brief and follow published procedures; something I always strive for and have a renewed vigor towards.




Synopsis: Hawker 125 First Officer reported ATC issued a terrain alert when they failed to climb as charted on departure from VNY.
Date: 201304
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: HCF.TRACON, HI
Aircraft: Caravan 208A
Operator: Corporate
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: TRACON HCF
Second aircraft: ATR 72
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I have been trying to find out what the correct procedures are at MKK Airport; and if we consider them a NON-RADAR airport; or apply opposite direction procedures that we are all unclear about. I have been persistently hounding the facility to tell me how to handle MKK Airport operations. Finally; one Supervisor said that he; personally; would just 'Hold For Release (HFR); and send one in; one out; to ensure safety. I asked other than personal techniques; what everyone can do by the rules to ensure safety. I could tell the Supervisor really didn't know; and felt bad that the facility put him in that position. Later; I was providing OJT and had an ATR 72 on a VOR-A Approach; this is a circling approach and about 10 percent of the aircraft will circle to the opposite direction runway. I heard the D-Side trainee get a call from MKK and heard him/her say 'After ATR 72 lands; release Caravan 208A.' I then heard further discussion by the instructor; and some back and forth with MKK Tower. Finally; the trainer said; just call the Supervisor. MKK Tower was trying to get us to approve 'Subject Your Discretion (SYD) because the inbound decided to do an opposite direction circling approach and it would mean that the departure may have to wait and extra minute or two. If I had not been talking about this issue to people around me while I'm working; they would have just approved SYD. It's not that I think SYD is not safe; but I do not believe that MKK Tower knows the correct application of SYD and the facility has just found some Notice that no one knows about; that indicates SYD is not to be used there. Apparently MKK Tower and their controllers do not know of this Notice either. The Supervisor was informed and when he tried to call them to discuss it; MKK hung up on him.




Synopsis: HCF Controller voiced concern regarding the facilities 'unclear' method of handling traffic operating at MKK Airport.
Date: 202109
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On nearly every one of my recent flights with Dangerous Goods; the other pilots have gone to throw away the 'Planned Dangerous Goods' paperwork once the 'Final Dangerous Goods Summary' has been received. These two ACARS messages are two parts of one form; however; with all of the information on both the planned and final messages required by 49 CFR 175.33 and ICAO. The final form does not replace the planned form; both forms must be retained by the crew and should be used to provide information to ATC and first responders in the event of an accident or incident.




Synopsis: Air Carrier First Officer reported flight crew members often discard Hazmat documents that are required to be kept until flight completion per CFR.175.33 and ICAO regulations.
Date: 201701
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Physiological - Other; Time Pressure
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Staffing; Weather; Human Factors
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Prior to reaching top of climb; while reviewing my flights in the air; I realized that I had missed an alternate on this flight. The TAF had changed after dispatch; but prior to departure. I advised the crew via ACARS; and ran numbers with the current projected fuel at his next fix (CA stated 6000 lbs; FL290). I was unable to add ZZZ as an alternate until I ran numbers with the actual payload of 9300 lbs (rounded up 200 lbs for any margin of error) I sent ZZZ weather via ACARS and amended the flight prior to top of climb.The reason this was missed by me was that I was becoming increasingly ill with a stomach virus since the late evening hours. I was actually feeling very nauseous and was trying my best to complete my shift. I have heard that we receive a negative attendance hit for leaving early due to 'failure to complete shift;' and I did not want to risk receiving this.




Synopsis: Air carrier Dispatcher reported missing an alternate airport requirement; attributing the error to being ill and not wanting to leave due to a company 'negative attendance' policy.