elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201708
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: DFW.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Airspace: Class B DFW
ATC / advisory: Tower DFW
Second aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: In the flare after an ILS approach to Runway 35C at DFW I initiated a go-around due to wake turbulence from the preceding arrival. On glide path at about the 50 ft radio altimeter call out the wings started rocking. I attempted to slightly flatten out the descent angle to rise above the turbulence but the oscillation continued for another cycle. At around 20-30 feet and nowhere near stable due to the buffeting I initiated an autopilot-off go-around. We followed ATC instructions and returned to land uneventfully on runway 35R.In my opinion the event occurred due to poor spacing by the DFW approach facility. We had followed this aircraft on the arrival and in fact were kept 1000 ft higher than normal at SILER due to our tight lateral separation. The ATIS had advertised visual approaches with a 1500 ft reported ceiling but were told to expect the ILS by the Controller. As we joined final we were instructed to maintain 170 knots to a five mile final. The next transmission we received informed us that we had a 40 knot overtake on the aircraft in front of us yet there was no amendment to our previous speed assignment by the Controller. Based on that information I put the gear down with landing flaps and asked the FO to query the Controller whether he still wanted that 170 knots given our closure rate. Of course I knew the answer but when the FO finally got the question out the Controller responded by telling us to reduce to final approach speed; which I was already doing. Basically what happened is the Controller treated us like we were a visual instead of an ILS; even though we were IMC until after passing the FAF. We were never informed what type of aircraft we were following. At some point in the radio exchanges subsequent to our go-around the FO was able to glean that the preceding aircraft whose wake we hit was a B757. By the way this was the return leg of an all-nighter; the second consecutive night in a row for me.It would have helped to have known the type aircraft whose heels we were nipping on final approach. The '170 to five mile final' instruction was unrealistic given our separation and the weather. Not exactly how you want to end an all-night duty period.




Synopsis: A321 Captain reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence during their landing flare in trail of a B757 to DFW airport.
Date: 201906
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel
When detected: In-flight
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I received an ACARS message during cruise flight that ZZZ OPS listed a power wheelchair as luggage instead of cargo and they listed 4 slides as COMAT instead of HAZMAT. More emphasis to Operations about the importance and critical safety issues of transporting HAZMAT and correct cargo loads.




Synopsis: B737-700 Captain reported ACARS message during cruise stating Hazmat documentation errors.
Date: 202002
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: I90.TRACON, TX
Aircraft: Small Aircraft
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class B HOU
ATC / advisory: Tower HOU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Automation Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Aircraft X was given a heading of 110 to join the localizer; maintain 2;000 feet until established and cleared for the ILS 13R approach at HOU. The pilot read back 'one one thousand; maintain 2;000 feet till established on the ILS 13 cleared ILS 13.' I remember him saying the one one thousand which of course was wrong; but I was fairly certain he meant 110 heading. He did state the altitude to maintain correctly so I did not make a new transmission to get a different read back. I switched him to HOU Tower when he was at 019. Since he was the last aircraft for a few minutes; I remember taking a drink of my water and standing up to stretch my legs. The LA (Low Altitude) alert sounded and I quickly called HOU Tower for them to issue the MSA alert.  The aircraft had descended to 010 on the localizer 1.5 miles from the FAF.  The crossing altitude for the FAF is 020 and the MVA in the area is 020 and the MVA in the area is 2;000 feet. I did not notice his quick descent since the few seconds had elapsed from when I switched him to the Tower.Maintain a steady scan of all aircraft at all times until they are safely outside the area of my responsibility. Make sure every read back is 100% accurate; 100% of the time.




Synopsis: Houston TRACON Controller reported a partially incorrect readback which lead to an aircraft descending below the MSA in the area.
Date: 201310
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MIA.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class B MIA
ATC / advisory: Tower MIA
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: When cleared for takeoff; we were assigned the HITAG1 departure. We queried the Tower Controller and said we had the WINCO1 RNAV loaded causing him to cancel takeoff clearance. We asked if we should load HITAG1 and he instead issued runway heading to 5;000 FT. For vectors. He said he would contact our company as this change is being missed on PDC. After reviewing the PDC; we confirmed no change bars or route change advisory as listed in FOM guidance; however; in the text at bottom; the HITAG1 was referenced. Communication discrepancy between ATC and crew via PDC. Non-standard format for DP change instructions. ATC should use standard route change format or not send PDC to issue alternate clearance instructions. As a crew; we should have queried the irregular format.


Second narrative: After we had been cleared 'line up and wait' on Runway 8R; we were then 'Cleared for takeoff; RNAV HITAG.' I inquired that we were assigned the WINCO1. We were told that our takeoff clearance was cancelled. We immediately looked at our PDC and there were actually no change bars from our filed routing; but we both missed that HITAG1; WINCO transition was also listed on the PDC. We said we could load the HITAG if needed; and the Tower Controller said not to worry about it; 'cleared for takeoff; runway heading 090' and he would take it up with the company. Non-standard PDC route change; and for some reason both the Captain and myself missed the HITAG1 even being referenced in the notes. Had we noticed; we would have had to inquire with Clearance Delivery as there were two different SIDs referenced.


Synopsis: A crew preparing to depart MIA had its takeoff clearance canceled after ATC asked them to confirm they were assigned the HITAG1 SID but the WINCO1 RNAV was loaded in the FMS.
Date: 201807
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZBW.ARTCC, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: While descending through 19;200 feet MSL on the ORW7 arrival into BOS; I saw what I thought was a balloon coming towards our aircraft. A few seconds later as we flew directly under it; missing it by about 10-20 feet; we noticed it was a drone. It was directly above my windshield (the FO side) and probably about 2 feet wide. We were approx 24NM west of PVD VOR.  I immediately notified BOS center and they proceeded to vector other aircraft away from that area. BOS center gave us their number to call them on the ground for further information. I called and spoke with BOS center managent and provided the information [they] requested in addition to my contact information.


Second narrative: We were flying the Norwich 7 (ORW7) arrival into BOS and we were approximately 24 miles west of PVD on the arrival near the OUTTT intersection. I was the Pilot Flying but was heads down at the moment while I was giving a PA announcement to the passengers. As we were passing through FL192 in the descent I looked up and saw what appeared to be a black drone directly in front of us at the same altitude. I saw the drone out of the FO's windshield and it quickly passed over the top of us. It appeared to be 18-24 inch in diameter; oval shaped; solid black in color; and I believe it missed our aircraft by about 20-50 feet.The FO was certain it was a drone. She reported to me that she saw what appeared to be a propeller on the top of it and something else hanging below it (possibly a camera). We reported this to BOS ARTCC who immediately began to vector other aircraft away from that area. The FO had a much better and longer visual look at the object and was certain it was a drone. BOS ARTCC asked us to call them on the phone after landing which we did. They said a report would be filed on their end. I also reported this to the Chief Pilot. Possibly a high altitude drone.


Synopsis: ERJ-190 flight crew reported a NMAC with a Drone during the descent phase of flight.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: MMMX.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise; Initial Approach
Airspace: Class A MMMX
ATC / advisory: Center MMMX
Aircraft component: Navigation Database
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Software and Automation
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: Fix CI051 came up when approach ILS 05R Z entered into FMGC.  Fix is not on that approach; nor any approach into MMMX. Fix MX901 which is on the approach was not in the FMGC. This is not noted on NOTAMs. If pilots are not careful and neglect to delete CI051 and add MX901 with an altitude constraint  prior to being cleared the approach they would not comply with a clearance and potentially 'jam' themselves on this approach.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain Line Check Airman reported the aircraft database for the MMMX ILS 05R Z does not match the approach chart.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Beechjet 400
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach; Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I accepted a hand off on a BE40 landing ZZZ. Because he was a Lifeguard; I was trying to give him expeditious service to Runway 6 at ZZZ; as I was not overly busy when I formulated my plan. A few other aircraft came into the picture; including a departure from ILG landing ZZZ1 and requesting practice low approaches at ZZZ1; which we do not do. I got into a conversation with that pilot that may have distracted me from implementing my plan as I had envisioned it. I also misjudged what another sector would do and got myself in a position that I had to try to expedite the descent for the BE40 and vector to avoid traffic that I had not anticipated. I had expected the North satellite controller to leave ZZZ1 arrivals at 50 so I could get the lifeguard underneath at 40 to land straight in to Runway 6. The controller did not do it and ran the traffic more to the SOP at ZZZ1 and I was left scrambling to try for separation. At the same time another aircraft had not descended as quickly as I hoped. It was a plan that would have worked out if I had been able to complete needed coordination; but I didn't. I think I should have worked my traffic closer to the SOP operations here rather than trying to provide expeditious service without complete coordination.




Synopsis: TRACON Controller described a conflict event when the planning for the expedited handling of a Lifeguard aircraft was interrupted by several unexpected adjacent controller actions making the aforementioned planning ineffective.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I received my IFR release with a 2 minute void time. Although I had heard the pattern traffic call 'turning base' there were no subsequent calls. I checked final and saw no traffic. I announced my departure and entered Runway XX. As I started to roll; the other pilot radioed 'hold position; hold position.' He further stated that he was on short final and was initiating a go-around. On my climb out he asked if I was on frequency. I replied and he told me that I had essentially cut him off. Although I never saw him; or heard him call 'turning final;' I apologized and we each went our own way.Contributing factors on my part include: about 2 hours experience in the last 90 days due to COVID; the 2 minute release window; my unconfirmed belief that I could depart without impacting the other aircraft.Corrective actions include: Asking ATC for a longer release window; calling for a position report from the other aircraft prior to entering the runway; accepting the release voidance and rescheduling the release.Human performance consideration: I believe that I experienced a form of 'get-there-itis.' It felt urgent to depart before reaching the 2 minute void time and that urgency affected my judgment. In truth; there was no rush and I could have taken one or more of the previously identified corrective actions. I will do so in the future.




Synopsis: Pilot reported calling on radio for traffic and attempting to depart in a 2 minute window; when an aircraft on final requested pilot to hold position; but ultimately had to go-around.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZNY.ARTCC, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: Dash 8-100
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZNY
ATC / advisory: Center ZNY
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: I was working a sector. I was talking to two aircraft at the time. This aircraft was going to ZZZ airport. These aircraft get descended to 11000 feet and handed off to TRACON. Around the middle of my sector; after TRACON took radar handoff; all of my information disappeared. The entire data block; flight plan etc. The aircraft became a Mode C intruder on the previous assigned code. Upon my further investigation I found the exact same call sign; a departure leaving ZZZ1 airport. I asked the pilot about why he thought company would do that to which he told me that his flight was delayed due to maintenance. I would assume that the pilot called this in to company because about 5 minutes later the call sign of the other aircraft; the ZZZ1 departure was changed by the company. At this point it made no difference because my flight plan information was already gone. TRACON still had their information. Further investigation by my supervisor led to the discovery that TRACON; unable to depart the flight plan in the system (obviously because one was active) removed strip with logic override; which led to my information disappearance. Had this happened with the sector busy it could've been disastrous. This happens to us all the time in the summer during SWAP (Severe Weather Avoidance Program). Flights get delayed; same call signs are still inbound to the metro area and the outbound flight gets airborne. We always change the call sign. I really don't understand why the airlines use a certain call sign multiple times per day. There must be enough call sign numbers to have a different number for every flight every day.  In SWAP this adds complexity and an extreme amount of workload to an already busy sector. Being able to remove strips would make it much easier; but someone somewhere would lose all their information. I would recommend that the companies use a call sign for one flight only.




Synopsis: ZNY ARTCC Controller reported a TRACON Controller entered a remove strip message on a flight plan. The Controller had to override the flight plan control to enter the message. An aircraft with the same call sign was active in ARTCC airspace. The data tag on the ARTCC Controllers radar disappeared from the display.
Date: 201812
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Amateur/Home Built/Experimental
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Parked
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Incursion Runway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I had my aircraft parked at the self-service pumps and was about to begin fueling when I caught a landing aircraft in the corner of my eye in the midst of a bad porpoise. The aircraft came down hard on its nosewheel; which separated from the aircraft as it skidded to a stop on its nose a few hundred feet from where I stood. The occupant was not exiting the aircraft and the master switch was still engaged; as evidenced by the rotating beacon.Judging that I was the closest person available to render immediate assistance; I ran towards the aircraft along with my flying partner; who has been certified in wilderness first aid. I was aware that I was entering the movement area and did use extreme caution; carefully supervising my partner as well. We arrived on scene first; almost a minute before the emergency vehicles. As soon as it was clear the occupant was unharmed and there was no risk of fire; we immediately left the scene.Another person who followed us out to the aircraft with a handheld radio was admonished by the controller for entering the area without permission and it was suggested that we may have violated a regulation. I believe that under the circumstances; we acted upon the correct instinct to render immediate assistance. As a pilot I understand the hazards that exist in the movement area and did my best to mitigate any risks as I entered with my partner. We retreated to the non-movement area immediately when it was apparent that we were not needed to help.The decision to enter the safety area was not taken lightly; but I felt it was correct at the time. I am sensitive to the controller's needs to control access to the area; and I do regret adding to his workload.




Synopsis: GA pilot reported entering the runway to administer aid following an aircraft incident and being admonished by ATC for entering the movement area.