elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202007
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Other via email
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: My crew was informed that there was a confirmed positive case of COVID-19. There was nothing done until the shift ended; just teleconferences and meetings; facility management and the district and whoever else was involved. They had our crew continue to work in the contaminated facility along with the day crew who had been here from XAam to XI:15pm without any cleaning or closing of the facility. So after working our entire shift; the district; facility management and NATCA decided the best plan was to have a cleaning crew come in at night to clean the Tower and facility only not including the TRACON. The person who is believed to have tested positive for COVID-19 works the mid shifts. They enter the TRACON before their shift starts to get the briefing and enter the TRACON after their shift ends to brief the oncoming day shift Supervisor. So with this being said and COVID-19 being able to live on surfaces for hours to days; no one really knows; the TRACON was contaminated. So after all that being said; they are having my crew; the same crew who was here in the facility before the cleaning along with the day shift crew to come back to work tomorrow the very next day and re-contaminate the entire facility. None of us know if we have contracted COVID-19 because they are not quarantining us.Both of the crews working should be mandatory quarantined and the entire facility along with the TRACON should be cleaned. We are on this special COVID-19 schedule for this specific reason. 5 days on and 5 days off. The other crews that are on their 5 days off should be coming in after the facility has been cleaned.




Synopsis: Controller reported that someone in the facility had tested positive for COVID-19. Controller was concerned about the decontamination process.
Date: 201706
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: RSW.Airport, FL
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C RSW
ATC / advisory: Tower RSW
Second aircraft: UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: I was pilot monitoring and was looking for nearby VFR traffic indicated about 800 feet below our flight path while we were on final approach to Runway 06 at RSW. As I was searching for aircraft traffic; I noticed a large drone operating at approximately our altitude; not far from our left wingtip (less than 100 ft away). The Captain did not see the drone and continued the approach normally and we were able to land without any evasive maneuvers. I reported the drone to the RSW tower controller who asked for additional details about the drone after we taxied to the gate. The drone was a large; quad copter-type drone.


Second narrative: I was the flying pilot conducting the ILS Runway 6 in VMC. As we passed the FAF and received landing clearance the First Officer stated she saw a drone off of our left wing tip within 100 feet at our altitude. She reported the incident to the tower. We landed uneventfully in Fort Myers with no evasive maneuvers required. The Tower controllers got information on the drone from the FO upon landing and I notified the Chief Pilot of the event. As pilot flying I did not see the drone.


Synopsis: Air carrier flight crew reported sighting a UAV while conducting the ILS Runway 6 at RSW. The drone was estimated to be within 100 ft of the aircraft; however no evasive action was required.
Date: 201908
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZDC.ARTCC, VA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb; Cruise; Descent
Airspace: Class A ZDC; Class E ZDC
ATC / advisory: Center ZDC
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: On a regular basis I see situations get out of control late at night. On this particular night; I was left working an overloaded sector by myself when TMU (Traffic Management Unit); and all facility management had gone home for the night. I returned from my last break at XA:00 pm [late at night] to find my supervisor gone and another controller working the sector. Almost exactly at that time; the sector was shut off for all EWR and LGA traffic. There was a lot of EWR and LGA traffic still in the air because of all the weather delays from the afternoon. I opened the D-Side (Radar Assist) and we proceeded to hold 14 aircraft and work over flights at the sector. The MAP (Monitor Alert Parameters) value for this sector is 15. At XA:30 PM the controller working the Radar was going to hit 10 hours of duty; so the Midnight shift supervisor instructed me to relieve her at the Radar and work the sector myself. When I took over the sector at XA:34 PM; we had 18 aircraft in the sector. 14 of them were holding. I proceeded to work it out of the hold by myself for the next 50 minutes when it calmed down enough to combine to the midnight scope. I would recommend that TMU and management be more proactive in planning for weather and overload situations that could occur late at night. Also; I would appreciate it if the area supervisor wouldn't leave for the night if the area were still busy.




Synopsis: Center Controller reported working a combined overloaded sector with no Assist or Supervisor in their area.
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class E ZZZ2
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Second aircraft: Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Airspace Structure

Narrative: Aircraft X was 12 miles Northwest of ZZZ on a base heading 220 at 3;000 feet being vectored to the ILS Runway XXR at ZZZ airport. I observed an unidentified VFR target depart ZZZ1 airport climbing out of 1;700 feet southbound. At first the the target was flying away from Aircraft X but then I observed the target start a a turn to the east. I then assigned Aircraft X heading 250 anticipating the VFR target would make a turn to the north east to avoid the immediate incursion into the ZZZ Class C airspace. This caused Aircraft X to go through the final for Runway XXR and I climbed Aircraft X to 3;100 feet because the new projected flight path would be into a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude. I then anticipated the VFR target would turn east bound once it got north of the Class C. So I took Aircraft Y off the arrival who was 10 miles north west of the airport on the downwind. I stopped his descent at 5;000 feet when I would normally descend aircraft at this phase of flight to 3;000 feet. It then became apparent the altitude adjustment wasn't going to be enough so I turned Aircraft Y to a 220 heading. The VFR target did make a turn to the east once north of the Class C climbing opposite direction into our arrival corridor at ZZZ. The VFR target did eventually contact another controller for an IFR pickup in my airspace.This event only had a positive outcome because this happens so frequently I have become overly cautious and I guessed correctly what the non participating aircraft was going to do every step of the way. I could have easily guessed wrong and could have had a dangerous situation develop into a crash. I recommend an airspace change that would extend controlled airspace over ZZZ1.




Synopsis: A TRACON Controller reported they vectored two aircraft off the final approach course to avoid an unidentified VFR aircraft which departed an airport underneath the final approach course. The reporter states this conflict occurs frequently and recommends extending controlled airspace to prevent further occurrences.
Date: 201206
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Trailing Edge Flap
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft; MEL; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During the climb out a FLAP FAIL Master Caution Message illuminated on the EICAS. Our flaps were already at zero degrees. At that point; I was pilot flying and the Captain completed the proper QRH procedure. We declared an emergency and continued the flight to our filed destination. I became the pilot not flying as briefed when we were below 18;000 FT. We coordinated with ATC to use Runway 28; as it is the longest runway. We flew the approach and landed without incident. We had an MEL for FLAP LOW SPEED that we were complying with for the previous five legs we flew. Also; it was noted by the Captain at the beginning of our first leg today that FLAP LOW SPEED had been MEL'ed multiple times on this particular aircraft. The Captain even made his point to Maintenance personnel in person at our destination when this issue was getting MEL'ed today. Maintenance decided to MEL the FLAP LOW SPEED yet again. I believe the underlying threat and eventual cause of FLAP FAIL was the fact that the core problem was never fixed. By just continuing to MEL a potentially dangerous problem a real problem occurred. I believe that MEL's that are persistent and keep recurring on the same aircraft are an absolute safety hazard.




Synopsis: An EMB145 EICAS alerted FLAP FAIL during climb after the aircraft had flown multiple flights with a FLAP LOW SPEED EICAS alert. An emergency was declared and the flight continued to its filed destination.
Date: 201711
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing; Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Work Refused
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Takeoff wingtip strike in the Max threat is not addressed. [Company] ops specs call for rotation on takeoff towards 10 degrees of pitch. Operations Manual states in a note 'In some instances (gusty crosswinds; windshear) it may be necessary to hesitate at 10 degrees until liftoff occurs'. As the pitch increases; the wingtip clearance decreases since the 737 is a highly swept wing aircraft and the wing tips are aft of the center of rotation for pitch. In other words as the nose rises while the plane is on the runway; the wingtips go down. There are crosswind landing wingtip strike concerns when landing the [B737] Max with the cross control technique. This wingtip strike is of concern at a body angle of approximately 5 degrees at max crosswind (33 knots) during a cross control landing.In [the operating manual concerning] Takeoff in Gusty Wind or Strong Crosswind Conditions it states regarding liftoff; under sub paragraph Rotation and Takeoff; 'The aircraft is in a side slip WITH CROSSED CONTROLS at this point. A slow; smooth recovery from this side slip is accomplished after liftoff by slowly neutralizing the control wheel and rudder pedals'. Translation and concern is this - by the [operating manual] definition of crosswind takeoff techniques; the aircraft will be; during a strong crosswind takeoff; up to an approximately 5 degree higher pitch attitude (10 degrees; mentioned above) than during landing with the aircraft in a fully cross controlled state until well after liftoff. This guarantees; by the [operating manual] and sim pilot [B737] Max landing instruction training; a severe wingtip runway strike!At max crosswind there will be insufficient wing tip clearance during a textbook crosswind takeoff in gusty wind conditions. No mention is made of any [B737] Max takeoff guidance in any documents I can find; even though by current takeoff technique guidance and wing tip strike charts; an incident is guaranteed by my observation; at crosswinds well below max demonstrated crosswind limits. If I am correct; this must be addressed prior to line flying the [B737] Max. I cannot in good conscience fly the [B737] Max with crosswinds until this threat is addressed.




Synopsis: B737-MAX Captain reported an unresolved threat of a wingtip strike during crosswind landing and takeoff operations.
Date: 201510
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LEB.Airport, NH
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Night
Aircraft: Citation X (C750)
Operator: Fractional
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E ZBW
ATC / advisory: Center ZBW
Reporter organization: Fractional
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: The weather was clear with calm wind in Lebanon; NH. While briefing the arrival; I elected to choose LNAV GPS to Runway 7 because of the surrounding mountainous terrain and night time. During the descent; ATC offered the visual which I declined and I continued with flying the full approach.  While inside the final approach fix at AKHOM; the PNF asked me to offset visually from the approach in order to line up with the runway.  I replied that I will remain on the LNAV approach until short final because of the elevated terrain on the north side.I then realized that he was looking at downtown Lebanon which was very bright and had two crossing main boulevards that looked like runways with yellow light. Then the Lebanon airport appeared at 12:30; very faint with red edge light. The bottom line of this incident; if I had listened to the PNF by leaving the approach path and lining up with a city boulevard at night; it could have caused a missed approach or even worse.Two points to remember: 1) never accept a visual approach on a mountainous or unusual airport at night; and 2) request and follow the full approach until minimums; and then positively identify the runway in sight before switching to visual cues.




Synopsis: CE750 First Officer reports being cleared for the RNAV RWY 7 at LEB during night VMC. Inside AKHOM the Captain asks the pilot flying (PF) to offset from the approach to line up with the runway and the PF declines due to terrain. Upon descending further it is determined that what appeared to be the airport is actually the lights of downtown Lebanon.
Date: 201902
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: MKE.Airport, WI
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Night
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C MKE
ATC / advisory: Tower MKE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Airport
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: My FO (First Officer) and I had been flying to MKE all week. The snow in MKE was so deep that the taxiway signs were completely obscured. On the first morning into MKE we shot the ILS 19R approach. Despite being exactly on the glideslope and at the correct FAF crossing height; the PAPI remained 4 white for the entire approach. I realize there is a note on the approach plate stating VGSI and GS not coincident; but I have never seen PAPIs and GS disagree to the extent that 4 white is correct for the GS. At this point I was very grateful for the visual landing training reinforcing what a normal sight picture looks like. We reported the issue with the PAPI to tower and they were subsequently notamed OTS (Out of Service). The subsequent 2 mornings we shot the LOC 25L and despite being exactly on each of the recommended altitudes that set of PAPIs remained 4 red. We reported this to the tower and as we were waiting for the hotel van someone from airport management came to talk to us. It seems that with all of the snow it is not unusual for the PAPIs to be knocked out of alignment due to plowing. He did mention no one else had complained about the PAPIs on 25L. On [another] morning we were again shooting the LOC 25L and were vigilant about comparing our altitude to the recommended altitudes. This time the PAPI appeared to be in agreement with the profile. We were so distracted by this that we neglected to select flaps 35. Of course a couple hundred feet off the ground the GPWS screamed at us. I am embarrassed to admit that my first instinct was to move the flaps to 35 in response to the yelling GPWS; but then my logical brain caught up to the fact we were not stable and I called Go Around. The go around and subsequent approach were executed with no issue.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported unreliable Visual Glide Slope Indicator and going around due to a GPWS warning due to an incorrect flap setting.
Date: 202111
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Parked
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Dispatch
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: At XA:18 Dispatcher sent ACARS stating Inaccessible Dangerous Goods not on paperwork in position XX. 3KG Class 2.2 and 84KG Class 9; 39KG dry ice.  Supervisor notified.  [The cause was due to] Ramp [Personnel] did not list Inaccessible Dangerous Goods on paperwork. Ramp needed to track Inaccessible Dangerous Goods better.


Second narrative: Received an ACARS message from Dispatcher stating they found some Inaccessible Dangerous Goods that wasn't included in DG paperwork in 3L that was class 2.2 & 9. A few minutes later received another ACARS message with the amounts of each class. The last message stated Dispatcher had contacted the Duty Officer and he recommended crew fill out report. [The error was caused by] someone [that] didn't follow procedure. Follow procedures [more carefully].


Synopsis: Air Carrier flight crew reported Dispatch notification of undeclared Hazmat shipment onboard. Missing Inaccessible Dangerous Goods information was sent to flight enroute.