elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202011
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other Bus Ride
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Environment - Non Weather Related

Narrative: I came from ZZZ airport and boarded the employee bus to the employee parking lot. The bus sat for about 20 minutes before leaving and waited to overfill the bus with employees. There were more employees than seats available on the bus. The driver still continued to wait for more people to board after people were already standing without seats. This not only puts everyone on the bus at increased risk for the spread of COVID; but also increases risk for injury for those standing on the bus. We were just asked to not board a crowded bus and instead wait for the next one; however; if all the buses are being filled in this way than this leaves no choice for everyone; but to either put themselves in an unsafe situation or find other means to get to the employee parking lot.




Synopsis: Air carrier First Officer reported a full bus of people on the employee bus which put everyone at risk of COVID-19 and increased risk for injury on the bus ride.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: LGA.Airport, NY
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class B LGA
ATC / advisory: TRACON N90
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Two events occurred while conducting the RNAV GPS 13 approach to LGA. The initial event was a flap overspeed (not exceeding 5 knots) at flaps 30 for 3-5 seconds due to gusts. Approximate altitude was 1800ft MSL. Approximate airspeed was slightly above 185 (possibly 187ks). The overspeed occurred as we were initiating a step down on the approach from RABBY @ 2000ft to MEATZ @ 1300ft. Pitch and power adjustments were made to resolve the overspeed. Almost immediately following the overspeed; we received a TCAS RA (monitor vertical display) to not descend into the red arc. We stopped our descent and initiated a slight climb which resolved the RA. The RA was resolved with a small altitude adjustment. We were able to quickly regain stabilized approach criteria well before the 1;000 ft. call and opted to continue the approach. Prior to the events; the approach was stable and un-rushed. We were on speed at flap selection; however; I believe the combination of initiating our descent; wind gusts and a slight delay in power reduction led to the flap over speed. In regards to the RA; I believe the conflict was due to VFR traffic traversing the area along the Hudson River. We noted that a commercial jet aircraft (immediately behind us on the same approach also reported an RA).




Synopsis: Pilot reported receiving a TCAS resolution advisory while on initial approach to LGA.
Date: 201305
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.TRACON, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Thunderstorm; Icing
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Ice/Rain Protection System
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: This was our second attempt to fly this trip. On the first attempt in the same aircraft; we had an icing system failure in icing conditions and returned to our departure airport. Maintenance checked it out and 'ops check good' was the result. This second time; similar problem; Wing Anti-Ice Fail message; a quicker decision to return but with an additional issue of needing to descend through a cloud layer in freezing conditions. We worked with ATC and found a break in the cloud deck and descended to 10;000 feet without encountering icing. The flight terminated in an overweight landing (I caught the landing weight on short final but told the First Officeer to continue because of approaching thunderstorms and low-level windsheer advisories) and briefed him on the need to make a smooth; low rate descent landing; and he greased it on.Everything seemed like it worked pretty well. The PF and I kept checking in with each other as we did our tasks to make sure we weren't missing anything. It was stressful and exhausting; with lots of things to do; reports to send; people to notify; frequencies to change; flight plans to fix; FMS data to fix; passengers and Flight Attendant stuff to do. The PF commented to me that he thought my idea/request to descend quickly in the opening in the cloud layers (basically VFR) to get below the freezing level was something he never would have considered before this event. He said he just kept wondering how we were going to safely get down through the clouds. We worked with Approach and did a descending 360 through a hole in the clouds to avoid ice and get below the freezing level.




Synopsis: An EMB-145 flight crew experienced a Bleed Over-Temp and Wing Anti-Ice Fail warning while entering icing conditions; and returned to their departure airport for maintenance inspection. The Anti-Ice system ground checked normal; and the flight again was dispatched. When entering icing conditions for the second time and activating the Anti-Ice system; they again had the same failure and the same Master Caution warnings as before.
Date: 201902
Aircraft: Widebody Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge
Reporter qualification: Flight Attendant Current
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Attendant
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure; Staffing
Primary problem: Staffing

Narrative: On our flight we were staffed with minimum crew of 6 flight attendants. When following the aircraft sign in sheet and abiding by the FAA minimum crew highlighted area it left door 2L without a FA (Flight Attendant) seated there. There was the Purser (myself) seated at door 1L and one FA seated at door 2R. All other flight attendants were seated aft of door 2. Door 2L is our main door we use for boarding and deplaning. Not having someone seated there is a major distraction for the FA assigned to door 2R. They not only have the two doors to arm/disarm but they also have to worry about the jetbridge/specials/gate agent at their secondary responsibility. Also during boarding they were using two doors to board passengers. That left only the aft galley FA to not only check and prep his galley but monitor bags/assist passengers/and remain vigilant of the cabin environment. Those are my concerns and observations regarding safety.Now from a service standpoint: when fulfilling the highlighted FAA minimum crew positions first that leaves us with no one in the position to work A zone galley. That obviously cannot be the case so the FA that was assigned the first class galley on the pairing worked the position even though she had to take a different jumpseat for FAA purposes. Now for in the economy cabin it took the 3 FAs working that cabin 2 hours to complete their service. Between the fact that you have only the galley FA available to sell food and nowhere to cross from aisle to aisle it made for the service extremely time consuming. A flight of that length is going to spur more passengers to buy food and not having at least a 7th flight attendant to support the economy cabin makes for an extremely long and inefficient service flow for passengers (and crew). From a staffing standpoint we had a deadheading reserve FA yet they weren't converted to work when they need was clearly present.




Synopsis: Air carrier Flight Attendant reported concern that minimum FAR staffing was inadequate for proper cabin operations.
Date: 201212
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: IMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B767-300 and 300 ER
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine Air Pneumatic Ducting
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During descent; at FL250 with wing and engine anti-ice on; the RT BLD DUCT warning light illuminated. QRH procedures were followed which extinguished the warning light. We landed with the right engine bleed; bleed crossover; and the wing anti-ice off. We also declared an emergency with Tower as a precaution. Landing was accomplished and emergency was terminated. A maintenance logbook entry was made concerning the event.




Synopsis: During descent; a B767-300 RT BLD DUCT warning alerted then extinguished after the QRH procedure was completed; but as a precaution an emergency declared for landing.
Date: 201412
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SBPA.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Taxi
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airport; Human Factors
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Landed in SBPA runway 11. As Captain I took the aircraft from the First Officer after he slowed the aircraft to a safe taxi speed. I made the left turn off the runway onto taxiway E. Tower then told us to make a 180 at the end of the runway. We informed them that we were already on E. They said that D is not usable for us as our wingspan was to great; and to hold position. (E leads to D). Tower then sent out a follow me truck; and we then were cleared to follow him on E and D to the gate. A review of all of our flight pubs; notams and documentation reveals no information on us being out of limits for that taxiway. Update and/or correct the airport [tailored page] 10-7 and 10-9 pages for SBPA. There is a note on [the company] page that reads 'For landing on Rwy 11; you must taxi to the end and use turnbutton; 180 deg turns on runway are not permitted'. I took that to mean that if you need to make a 180; you must use the turnbutton located at the end of the runway. If it is meant to prohibit use of E it is very poorly worded and lacks the critical part of the directive.




Synopsis: After landing at SBPA the flight crew of a large air carrier aircraft exited Runway 11 at E. ATC advised the taxiway wasn't approved for aircraft of that size. The airport pages for SBPA advise only that 180 degree turns should only be performed on the 'button' expansion of the 148 FT wide runway at the far end. No mention is made of the restriction on use of the parallel taxiway.
Date: 201209
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZHU.ARTCC, TX
Aircraft: A319
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZHU
ATC / advisory: Center ZHU
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Enroute
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Returned from break and was relieving the Ocean East D-Side. ACR X was in hand off mode to Miami Center and deviating over 20 miles south of course. I asked D-Side if he needed a point out to Key West Sector and the R-Side advised she was on line with Miami coordinating. So his replied was handled and left. Miami Controller advised R-Side W174 active and R79 advised that we did not even show it scheduled. Then R79 asked the A319 if able left 10 degrees left turn and pilot responded no. I advised Houston Missions who did not show W174 active. Advised W174 was active and Miami Missions had not advised Houston Missions who had not advised us. I advised that the A319 was unable turn due to weather and we needed airspace capped immediately. I recommend Airspace that [was] originally part of Miami Center at 8600W be returned to Miami Center. It should have never been assigned to Houston Center and is fraught with danger due to Military Airspace and lack of communication between Centers and causes both coordination with airspace and radio and radar communication errors. This is not the first occurrence over Military Airspace activity and numerous times we are not advised of RADAR outages either.


Second narrative: Aircraft was deviating east for weather. I was informed after off the sector by another Controller that W174 was active and the aircraft was in it. I relieved the Controller before me and he didn't advise of the airspace being hot. We show this airspace as active in real time; however we sometimes get calls from Miami that it's hot. We need to proceduralize the call when the airspace goes hot and/or cold.


Synopsis: ZHU Controller described a restricted area incursion when intra and inter facility coordination was incomplete.
Date: 201307
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IAH.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower IAH
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Taxiways RA; RB; and RC are inadequately marked. It is difficult in VMC conditions to be sure which taxi lane you are turning on to. In low visibility conditions it would be very easy to inadvertently taxi on to the wrong taxi lane. Simply painting the taxiway designation onto each lane would be helpful.




Synopsis: A Captain reported that during day VMC conditions determining which Taxiway RA; RB or RC is being entered is difficult and during night IMC the task would be very difficult.
Date: 201210
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-400
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Landing
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: Upon landing; on roll out; got 'SPEED TRIM FAIL' light. Upon turning off runway; got left 'PACK' light followed by right 'PACK' light. ACARS had no 'on' time.  I asked [the First Officer] to check if we were depressurized- we were not. We went to manual pressurization and opened the outflow valve. It seemed pretty obvious that we had an air/ground sensor type problem as the ACARS scratchpad also indicated 'buffet alert.' I wrote all this up and I saw the Mechanic and told him about it. The next day; I called Maintenance Control to find out what happened to that plane. He told me they dried out some harnesses and could not duplicate [the problem] and signed it off. He then said that on takeoff roll; the [next flight crew] experienced similar problems; got airborne; declared an emergency and landed at [a diversion airport].  I am not pointing fingers at anyone; I just believe that with this type of problem; with obvious; specific write ups/descriptions of problems; that this is NOT what being a leader in safety and compliance is all about.




Synopsis: During troubleshooting of an apparent air-ground disagree problem; Maintenance personnel were unable to duplicate the problem. They signed off the discrepancy and released the aircraft for service. The anomaly appeared again on the next flight; which resulted in a diversion.
Date: 202202
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Workload; Time Pressure
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: In my opinion Desk X on the AM shift for Date is flight release/task saturated. With the addition of 5G on top of an already hefty workload; I feel this desk Dispatcher could very easily lose operational control; if any Irregular Operations situations arise. This desk has ZZZ Functional Check Flight flights as well. So not only do I think the flights on my desk are at the boiling over pt.; throw in 5G; and ZZZ Functional Check Flight flights. This desk workload needs to be addressed. I do not feel I have or will lose operational control today; however I see this desk as setup for failure and could quickly slide down that slippery slope if anything were to arise. I did send a help alert for the potential of my desk needing help due to the sheer volume of work and daily work tasks. Factors that lead to my conclusion about my desk include daily weather/5G NOTAMs and material related/the shear amount of flights. The only solution I see as benefiting this situation is task reduction. More desk would equal less flights/tasks per desk.




Synopsis: Dispatcher reported they were task saturated and their desk has a heavy workload. Dispatcher expressed concern that 5G-related NOTAMs and additional flights increase the workload.
Date: 201506
Location: PNE.Airport, PA
Flight conditions: Mixed
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Helicopter
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class D PNE
ATC / advisory: Tower PNE
Aircraft component: GPS & Other Satellite Navigation
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Local; Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting; Workload
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown
Detector: Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Police / Security Involved
Contributing factors: Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Last month I was contacted by a chief pilot; stating they were losing GPS satellite coverage on the RNAV (GPS) RWY 33 approach within the last mile of the approach. This would happen intermittently with different aircraft; and different avionics.  RNAV (GPS) RWY 33 approach also uses Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) which is a network of ground-based reference stations to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS).After many inquiries to different divisions within the FAA; I discussed the issue with a Senior Engineer from DOT/FAA Spectrum Engineering Services; who put me in contact with the Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau. I spoke with an agent in Philadelphia. Agent located a GPS jamming unit in a truck located within one mile from the approach end of Runway 33. The truck was in a parking lot; henceforth the intermittent interference; when the truck left the area; the GPS approach was normal. Agent confiscated the jamming unit and destroyed it with a sledge hammer. The driver had no idea he was using a device that was illegal. He was using the jammer to disable a tracking device that was placed in his vehicle by a vendor; to hide his location.




Synopsis: A truck driver near PNE installed a jamming device to block his GPS derived position; but when nearby the airport the device also interfered with the GPS signal on the RNAV (GPS) Runway 33 final approach.