Date: 201506
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Distraction
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Day three of a four day. Up at (time). Three approaches down to [minimums] Two missed approaches. Third approach HUD IMC to [minimums]; land.ZZZ arrival briefed and flown uneventfully until left downwind Runway XY; 250 knots. Assigned; required and 10;000 ft two miles above the runway. Mid-field; downwind; 10;000 ft; Approach Controller commanded '210 knots descend to 7;000 ft'. Speedbrakes extended; 210 knots assigned; descent to 7;000 ft. Not knowing our sequence; abeam the numbers; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; in preparation for possible close-in base vector. Between 10;000 ft and 7;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended; Approach Controller commanded; descend to 3;000 ft. Controller commanded 'left turn 360 degrees; do you have the field?'Before completion of the turn; field in sight; Approach Controller commanded left turn 310; intercept Localizer Runway XY cleared for the visual approach; maintain either 180 knots or 170 knots to the final approach fix. We are required to be 170 by the final approach fix. We were descending to 3;000 ft; landing gear down; speedbrakes extended and slowing to the commanded airspeed; while retracting the speedbrakes and selecting flaps 15; because we cannot select flaps with the speed brakes extended. Knowing; of course; that we have to be configured for landing; in the slot; on speed and stabilized at 1;000 ft; we slowed to 165 just outside the final approach fix; still slightly high but manageable; and selected flaps 30; so as to be stable at 1;000 ft. At this point; the Approach Controller; asked us of our speed; and in the middle of doing everything he commanded; while configuring for a stable approach; and while at the same time complying with his speed command to the final approach fix; we responded '170 knots.'  He then said; 'You must be slower'. Well; we were 165 knots for selection of flaps 30; just atop the final approach fix so as to be both stable at 1;000 ft and 170 at the final approach fix and I key the MIC and said; 'it's difficult when we begin abeam the numbers at 10;000 ft.'He then replies; very excitedly; 'Possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; you will receive phone number upon landing' and forgot to hand us off to Tower. At this point the stress level is increased because we are doing everything he asked of us and he appeared to be mostly concerned about informing us about a possible Pilot violation; telling us to expect a phone number; while we are traveling at 165 knots; configuring flaps 30 for landing and getting stabilized for 1;000 ft. Nevertheless; we were configured for landing; checklist completed and stable at 1;000 ft; never overspeeding the flaps.We switched to Tower; at which point we are cleared to land.We landed in the zone; on speed on Runway XY and turned off [on taxiway.]We cleared the runway; expecting detailed taxi instructions. Instead we were told again; twice; 'possible Pilot violation; possible Pilot violation; contact this phone number XXX-XXX-XXXX'. We were then given taxi instructions.We are normally 10;000 ft 30 miles from the airport. When we are working overtime; as usual; to give Controllers everything they command; the last thing we need is zero respect and threats of certificate action while we are inside the final approach fix configuring for landing and getting stabilized; which does nothing but raise the stress level in the aircraft. It is not safe.


Second narrative: This was the second leg of the day with the Captain and he was the PF. During the brief; the Captain discussed the requirement to maintain 250 knots until assigned a lower speed by ATC. On downwind; ATC slowed us to 210 knots. About midfield; Approach gave us a descent to 6000 ft still 210 knots. The Captain (and I) thought we were high and he extended the speedbrakes and landing gear. I was just about to ask our sequence when Approach gave us a left turn to 360 degrees and a descent to 3000 ft and a speed of 180 knots. The Captain swapped speedbrakes for flaps 15 and continued to descend. We were still high at this point. Approach then told us to fly heading 330 degrees and asked if we had the field in sight. We had the field in sight. I told Approach that we did. Then Approach cleared us for the visual to 28 and to maintain 170 knots to the marker (it may have been 180 knots but I can't remember exactly). We were still high so the Captain continued to slow below 165 knots to get flaps 30 to help the descent. Shortly before the marker; Approach asked; 'Company Flight Number; say airspeed.' I responded with 170 knots because that is our maximum speed at a five NM final. I looked at the ND map and we were about 1.5 miles from [the marker]. I saw the airspeed around 160 knots. Approach responded with; 'I think it is a little less than that.' Shortly after that they said; 'Company Flight Number; possible ATC violation. Call us when on the ground.' Approach never switched us over to Tower. I switched over to Tower shortly after [the marker]. After we landed; the Captain cleared at taxiway and Tower told us to taxi via [taxi instructions] and gave us the phone number to call. I think I could have done better Pilot Monitoring duties in cross checking airspeeds. But we were high (which is typical going into ZZZ) and in order for us to be in the slot at 1000 ft AGL; we had to configure to landing flaps early. In order to do that; we had to slow below 165 knots. I could have coordinated with the Captain to ask for a slower speed to the marker. But; it was a busy time when I was backing up the Captain to not overspeed the flaps and still keep descending to be in the slot. Also; this approach would have been much easier if Company policy was to be in the slot at 500 ft AGL instead of 1000 ft AGL. Also; ATC's statement 'possible ATC violation' on final was a complete distraction and was unnecessary at that point. Approach could have easily relayed the message to Tower or Ground and saved a huge amount of stress to both the Captain and me on short final when we should be focused on landing instead of thoughts of losing our FAA licenses or disciplinary action.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported they were distracted on short final by an ATC admonishment to call regarding a possible violation.