elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: LBX.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Bell Helicopter 222
Operator: Air Taxi
Operating under: Part 135
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class G LBX
ATC / advisory: CTAF LBX
Second aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear
Reporter organization: Air Taxi
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload
Anomaly: Conflict NMAC
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Contributing factors: Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: During a helicopter training exercise (2 pilots) on a 45 degree to runway short final Runway 17. Landing with a simulated hydraulic system failure. We made a last minute check to make sure no one was landing on the runway. Upon looking to the north saw a light twin on very short final for Runway 17. Both aircraft were closing in on the approach end of the runway at the same height and distance for landing. The twin was to our right and slightly behind our field of vision about 200 FT and closing. Once the other aircraft was spotted we terminated the approach to a high hover and the Twin continued with its landing. There was no further incident. Communications would be the main contributing factor. The airport was very quiet and we had been monitoring Approach Control and the local CTAF frequency as well as making our own traffic calls. We never heard any radio calls from the twin until just before he departed the airfield. I also believe TCAS in either aircraft would have been helpful in preventing this. The fact that Texas Gulf Coast Regional (LBX) and Houston Southwest (AXH) share the same frequency and are very close to each other and the high amount of radio calls at Houston Southwest may have contributed to the confusion.




Synopsis: A helicopter pilot took evasive action from a light twin near LBX Runway 17 while both aircraft were on short final and no prior CTAF communications were heard.
Date: 201705
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: RV-8
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Landing
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Weather
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: After a normal visual approach and touchdown on runway; my aircraft departed the paved runway surface on the right side of the runway. This departure from the runway paved surface was caused by a gust of wind that overpowered the RV-8 (tail dragger) rudder and tailwheel which did not have sufficient steering authority to keep the aircraft moving in a straight line down the runway. I used full rudder and full wheel braking to try to stay on the runway; but it quickly became apparent that I could not maintain directional control and the airplane left the pavement at approximately 20 knots ground speed.I brought the aircraft to a stop and shut down the engine between Runway 3 and Taxiway A; about halfway between the runway approach end and Taxiway A8. There was no damage to the airplane and I sustained no injuries. Airport personnel assisted in moving the aircraft back to my hangar. I telephoned the Tower to inform them that the aircraft was not damaged and that there were no injuries.Immediately after the incident; I thought the cause had to be a tailwheel malfunction. I spoke with the Tower controller on the phone and told him that I thought it was a tailwheel problem. However; after getting the airplane back to my hangar; I carefully inspected the tailwheel and found it to be operating normally.Upon further consideration; I believe that contributing factors in this incident were the wind; and my initial surprise at the gust since no gust factor was reported on ATIS or by tower. Another contributing factor was my inattention and complacence as I assumed that the landing weather conditions would be just like every other time I landed at ZZZ. In hindsight; I might have recognized the dangerous situation earlier on landing rollout and executed a go-around; since there was plenty of runway surface remaining for a go-around.




Synopsis: RV-8 pilot reported a loss of directional control and runway excursion due to a gust of wind.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Other takeoff roll
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: On taxi out; I noticed that there was a bit of a 'dead spot' in the steering near the neutral position. I even stated that it wasn't like this leaving ORD or arriving at IND. This is the second leg with this plane. On takeoff upon handing over controls to the FO (Pilot Flying) we received a 'Steering INOP' message as he advanced the thrust levers.It was then that I looked down and noticed that the cord to my cell phone earbuds were touching the base of the tiller (where movement occurs; not totally at the base) and that was possibly inhibiting the steering. We rejected takeoff immediately; taxied clear of the runway; ran the proper procedures. It was then that I moved the tiller (after moving the cord) and verified that this was the issue. We taxied back and flight occurred without incident. I normally leave my phone and earbud cord in my pocket during flight operations. I'm not sure why I had tossed it up to the compartment forward to the tiller. Double check that all things are clear the tiller no matter how small or innocuous it may seem.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information].


Synopsis: EMB-145XR flight crew reported abnormal nose wheel steering and a STEERING INOP EICAS message on takeoff roll. A rejected takeoff was performed; and the Captain found the nose wheel tiller was being affected by iPhone ear buds that had been placed there.
Date: 201604
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZZ.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B787-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During pre-flight; the FMC uplinked takeoff data for runway 01. After receiving TPS (Takeoff Performance System); runway 19 was selected and uploaded. When checking the uplinked FMC data for runway 19 against the TPS; the FMC thrust setting showed TO at a 38 degree derate vs the TPS which showed TO 1 with no derate. Furthermore; the thrust reduction altitude input of 1500 ft had changed to 1000 ft. Everything else matched the TPS.The crew discussed this odd occurrence; manual inputs to correct FMC to match the TPS and noise abatement data were made; and crew planned a coordinated check of uplinked takeoff data after receiving load closeout data. After receiving the post closeout uplink the same data appeared on the thrust page (TO with 38 degree derate) and takeoff thrust reduction (changed to 1000 ft). Thinking perhaps something had changed since the original TPS was printed; we requested a new TPS via ACARS using the current ATIS information. The new TPS matched the original; so manual changes were made once again to the FMC to match the TPS and to correct thrust reduction altitude. No further discrepancies occurred. Both the FB and FC have seen this anomaly before on both 787 and 777.




Synopsis: B787 Captain reported that the auto load function for engine thrust settings was acting improperly and required a manual override.
Date: 201707
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: EAT.Airport, WA
Light: Night
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Parked
ATC / advisory: Center ZSE
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Seattle ARTCC often fails to correctly issue our IFR clearance for flights from EAT. On this occasion; as is often the case; they did not state the name of the departure procedure; the ZARLO2; when they cleared us 'as filed'. Since; according to the AIM in section 5-2-5; the specific Departure (DP) must be named prior to the phrase 'as filed' if it is to be flown; I attempted to clarify our clearance with Center by requesting the ZARLO2. After several verbal exchanges; things weren't much clearer. The controller kept repeating that we were already cleared 'as filed' while never once stating the name 'ZARLO2'; or any other DP; despite my request. At one point; he did state that we could 'do whatever you need to do; and I'll clear you direct GLASR when I have you in radar contact'. After hearing this; in the interest of safety and clarity; I informed him that we intended to fly the ZARLO2. Once we were aloft and again in radio contact with this controller; he queried us about our concern; and when I informed him that being cleared 'as filed' does NOT include the DP; and that those had to be named specifically; he stated 'that's the dumbest thing I'd ever heard'.I recommend additional training for Seattle Center's controllers. Every other ATC facility in our system (except LWS; which is another problem) issues clearances properly; according to the protocol outlined in the AIM section 5-2-5. I believe it's dangerous to deviate from this common practice. Catastrophic consequences could result if the pilot and controller allow sloppy and lazily delivered clearances to lead to a misunderstanding over which DP is being flown.




Synopsis: Air Carrier Captain reported ZSE Center did not correctly issue IFR clearances from EAT by not including the departure procedure.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Cessna 150
Operator: FBO
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: CTAF ZZZ
Aircraft component: Rudder
Component problem: Malfunctioning; Failed
Reporter organization: FBO
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: When taxing after making an aerial survey fuel stop; I experienced complete loss of rudder control. I glanced down at the rudder pedals and it appears that one has broken and is jammed. I texted a picture of the rudder pedal & mechanical failure to my boss who is an A&P (Airframe and Powerplant) with IA (Inspection Authorization). He insisted that I must remove the rudder pedal/cotter pins to help him determine what is mechanically wrong. He insisted that this is legal since he's 'supervising' me and told me I can simply remove the rudder and fly the aircraft from the right seat back to my home airport. I told him I don't want to fly the aircraft and would prefer if he sent another aerial survey pilot or taxi to pick me up. He then insisted that I should try to remove the cotter pins while I wait for a taxi; and I proceeded with removing one. I took a break and consulted with other pilots who informed me that he physically has to be present for it to be legal for me to work on the aircraft; and that it is obviously not airworthy. I fortunately met another pilot at the airport who told me they would fly me back to my home airport where my car was and I gratefully accepted their invitation. After further research; I determined that this incident is required by the operator to be reported to the NTSB immediately since loss of flight controls was involved. I'm certain that my boss never reported this incident. In addition; I came to the conclusion that I could have unintentionally violated FARs by removing one of the rudders cotter pins.




Synopsis: C150 pilot reported a rudder pedal jammed during taxi; resulting in a complete loss of rudder control.
Date: 201809
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: LAX.Airport, CA
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class E SCT
ATC / advisory: TRACON SCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were filed to fly an RNAV STAR and ATC had us switch to a different RNAV STAR; which the week prior; the company told us not accept such a change. Upon loading the arrival; we had several issues getting the arrival to load correctly. Due to the last minute change to our new arrival and issues loading the new arrival; we were unable to make the crossing restrictions. We then informed ATC that we could not make the crossing restrictions. [We should have] worked out approach changes with our company prior to our departure in order for us to have time to review arrival parameters.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported ATC changed the filed RNAV STAR and the flight crew was unable to load it in the FMC.
Date: 201910
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: SQL.Airport, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
Airspace: Class D SQL
ATC / advisory: Tower SQL
Second aircraft: PC-12
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Private
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was informed to hold short of the runway awaiting IFR release. There was a Pilatus PC12 on final. By the time I was up next to the runway; the Pilatus was on short final over a levee that is about 100 ft. before the blast pad at the approach end of the runway. The Tower Controller instructed us to line up and wait when the Pilatus was still at least 300 ft. before the threshold of the runway. This Tower Controller frequently seems fed up with his job and frequently issues unsafe instructions to pilots that seem to be in a lazy manner. As a pilot; I feel unsafe operating at this airport when this Controller is on position. This Tower has no manager and only three air traffic controllers which leads to overworked ATC who sometimes show no regard for aircraft.




Synopsis: C172 pilot reported that the Tower Controller instructed them to line up and wait while an aircraft was on short final.
Date: 201406
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: Dash 8-300
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
ATC / advisory: TRACON ZZZ
Aircraft component: Powerplant Lubrication System
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Shortly after acceleration Height we received a master warning and associated Number 1 engine oil annunciation; we discovered the oil pressure dropping rapidly; we declared an emergency; and proceeded immediately to return to the field. As the oil pressure continued to drop we decided to initiate an in-flight shutdown of the Number 1 engine and proceeded with the engine failure checklist. The situation ended with a normal landing and contacted Dispatch on the ground.




Synopsis: DHC8-300 Captain experiences a loss of engine oil pressure shortly after takeoff and declares an emergency to return to the departure airport. With oil pressure continuing to drop the engine is shut down and the flight returns for a single engine landing.
Date: 201501
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: IND.TRACON, IN
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Widebody; Low Wing; 3 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Initial Climb
Airspace: Class C IND
ATC / advisory: TRACON IND
Second aircraft: Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Departure
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Contributing factors: Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: I just arrived at the position for a morning shift. First transmission of the day; after a relief briefing from the midnight crew. I had two departures; one off Runway 23L and one off 23R Aircraft X off RWY 23L on an assigned heading 210 with a first fix of CVG which is approximately a 140 degree heading; and Aircraft Y off Runway 23R on runway heading; with the MAREO3 departure; a 080 heading; with Aircraft X a couple miles ahead. This is a somewhat common practice on the midnight shift to expedite traffic; with the 23R runway heading departure getting a right turn over the airport to the east. This practice is almost exclusively for [name removed] aircraft only. I turned Aircraft Y left direct MAREO intersection which turned Aircraft Y into Aircraft X's flight path. I had not sat down yet and the preference sets were still from the previous controller; which confused me. We have automatic leader direction changes in our stars equipment here and I made a terrible assumption that Aircraft Y was off Runway 23L; not runway 23R. There had been no previous coordination from the tower or in the briefing of this unusual operation. I sat down; changed to my preference sets and immediately recognized the error. I instructed Aircraft Y to remain on runway heading and turned Aircraft X to a 140 heading. I watched both targets and their tracks to see if Aircraft Y had turned. It appeared to me that they hadn't.    Upon arriving at work today I was informed that Traffic Analysis and Review Program (TARP) had gone off and Aircraft Y had started a left turn; and I had an operational error. I would like to have the stars equipment offset the leaders from all parallel runways to the direction away from the airport from that runway to eliminate confusion. Side by side departures off Runway 23; where the data tags overlap always crisscross; which I have never liked. I would also recommend mandatory coordination for this type of midnight operation.




Synopsis: IND Controller describes a loss of separation due to an aircraft turning later than expected and a midnight shift procedure that runs aircraft close together. Discussion about the direction of leader lines and possible offsets were recommended by the Controller.