Date: 201507
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CRP.Airport, TX
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737-300
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C CRP
ATC / advisory: Tower CRP
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue; Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to CRP; and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago; but needless to say we were not familiar with the CRP environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach and requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. In retrospect this was probably not a good decision as we were not very familiar with the airport environment but the good weather conditions had me not worried about the maneuver. We initiated the go-around above 1;000 feet; but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1;000 feet which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 maneuver the FO lost sight of the airport but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway. The FO completed the maneuver but we were again not in a position to make a safe landing as we were not well aligned with the landing runway and initiated another go-around again getting approval to stay with Tower but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1;500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO informed me he had lost sight of the field and wasn't sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind. This is when I realized I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to resequence the FMC course on the RNAV Approach we were using as a backup; and extend the centerline. I completed the base turn; final turn; and landed uneventfully on Runway 18. The simplest solution to this event was to accomplish a straight ahead go-around and let Approach Control vector us back to final. We had plenty of fuel for that option. But the desire to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible led me to make a bad decision; and choose a visual maneuver which we don't practice. This was also the last leg on a day that began very early in domicile and I was sleep definitely feeling the effects of a poor night's and the fact that I have flown seven out of the last eight days on trips in the window of circadian low; and the additive effects of this were building up. I did brief the FO at the beginning of our day that I was tired and that would be an additive condition for me today. While we were backing up the visual approach with the RNAV procedure; the visual maneuver we flew could have been made safer by allowing Tower or Approach Control to call our pattern; even at the cost of additional time and fuel. I do give the FO credit as he was very forward with his inexperience at CRP and communicated with me that he wasn't sure what we were doing in the middle of the second maneuver. The safer option with all the conditions affecting this flight would have been to accept help from ATC in the form of vectors.


Second narrative: The event began during the transition from the arrival to the approach. The visibility at the field was about 10 SM with haze/mist. The approach that we had planned was a visual backed up by the RNAV Runway 18. We were in a -300. Because I've only flown the -300 a handful of times; I had decided to configure early. I began a speed reduction at about 15 miles from the FAF and asked for flaps 1 at 12 miles while slowing from 210 to 170 knots. I had asked for flaps 5 at this point. The Captain hesitated and stated were still 12 miles out. I said ok let's hold off. We continued to about 10 miles; and then ATC gave us a left turn towards the airport and told us advice when we see it. We were both outside looking and in that process I had lost my situational awareness with my altitude and speed. We picked up the field at about eight miles or so and were high. The Captain said we were going to have to do something to get down. I agreed and called for gear down flaps 15 and began to slow. The Captain had recommended S-turns to which I had agreed. I was thinking I might as well try to get down; and if I'm still high at 1;000 feet; I'll just go around. We got to about 1;200 feet or so and I suggested that perhaps we should just go around. He asked the Tower for a 360. He then told me to turn to the left. There was some confusion in my mind and so I verified a left 360? He affirmed and said he'd bring my flaps back up to 15. I agreed and began the turn. I added power to level off but not enough power and lost about 300 feet-400 feet of altitude during the maneuver. He had pointed that out to me; and I added more power and climbed back up to 1;000 feet. As we completed about 270 of turn he asked if I saw the airport which I did not. I informed I couldn't see it but he said ok just keep the turn coming. Once I did pick it up I saw that we were not in a good position to maneuver safely to land. We both decided at that point to go around which we had done. He had asked the Tower for right hand traffic. They had cleared us to make right hand traffic and cleared us to land. We were about two miles North of the runway climbing to 1;500 feet and the Captain had asked me to turn right. I then told him that I was confused. In my mind I was thinking I would climb straight out above the airport and enter a downwind somewhere midfield or beyond and come back around while keeping the runway in sight off my right. He said just turn right and make right traffic. So I had turned and lost visual with the field while on the downwind. We turned on a base heading while looking. Finally he said he saw it and I was still looking. He then said ok I have it to which I had given him the aircraft. We had continued and landed without any further event. Some of the threats were low time in a -300 aircraft; marginal visibility; lack of automation; lack of an ILS. Some of the errors were poor communication by not being more vocal about my Situational Awareness (SA) and what I would prefer to do; as opposed to following directions on where to turn etc. lack of communicating our plans and intentions to one another. Another error was my lack of scanning in and out while turning and looking for the field while climbing and configuring. Poor decision to maneuver at a low altitude as opposed to climbing straight out and re-entering a boxed traffic pattern.I think S-turns are ok on final unless below 1;000 feet; but a 360 or other maneuvers that cause you to lose sight of the field could create an unsafe condition; especially if it hadn't been briefed. Always verbalize how you feel and what you would rather do. As a Pilot Flying; I learned I need to be more assertive with decision making; especially a go-around.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew reports being high and fast for a visual approach to Runway 18 at CRP; with the First Officer flying. The Captain requests a left 360 which results in a misalignment and a go around. The missed approach is turned into a visual right downwind prior to reaching the runway. Turning base to final the First Officer cannot pick up the runway and the Captain makes the landing.