elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Night
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Second aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Aircraft X was northwest bound near ZZZZZ intersection at FL260. The sector next to me was Sector XX; in another area. They had coordinated with my previous sector controller that they would just PVD (Display Data Tag) their ZZZ arrivals to my sector and would descend into my sector airspace without a 'phone call'. The controller I relieved informed me of this temporary agreement. As I took the sector; it was fairly busy and complex with significant weather impacts to the sector and ZZZ gate swaps in effect due to weather at the arrival gates. I don't know for how long I had a PVD on the aircraft that would eventually conflict with Aircraft X; but the first time I noticed the ZZZ arrival; the datablock indicated 27;400 feet; descending to 17000 feet (likely given 'descend via' by the sector XX controller). As soon as I noticed that the ZZZ arrival was potentially descending through Aircraft X's altitude; I issued a 020 heading to avoid the ZZZ arrival. Once I was confident this would add separation between the two aircraft I returned to other tasks and aircraft. I can only assume that sector XX did not see this traffic and I don't believe I displayed Aircraft X to sector XX. I should have done that and called to reference the traffic. Again; I'm not sure how long I was aware of the ZZZ arrival.Don't allow other sectors to simply PVD as a means of coordination. Perhaps a D-Side (they may have had one) on sectors would have helped with the coordination.




Synopsis: Controller had a data tag of an aircraft being worked by the adjacent Controller displayed on his radar in his sector airspace. No verbal coordination had been accomplished. Normally verbal coordination in addition to the data tag display is required in this situation. The controllers agreed for this time period that verbal coordination would not be necessary. The reporter did not notice the displayed data tag in his sector in a timely manner and had to turn one of his aircraft away to achieve separation.
Date: 201203
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: PDX.Airport, OR
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class B PDX
ATC / advisory: TRACON P80
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Descending into PDX via the Moxie STAR we were cleared to cross seven miles south of VANTZ Intersection at 10;000 MSL. Because of how unusual this clearance was (VANTZ at 10 or 12 thousand is the norm) I queried ATC asking to confirm the clearance and ATC responded that was correct. The pilot flying mistakenly set 7;000 into the altitude alerter and I mistakenly confirmed 7;000 as a correct altitude. We descended to 9;500 where we re-considered the clearance; briefly talked and decided to stop the descent. At this time ATC asked our altitude. I explained we had become confused or misunderstood the clearance and were descending to 7;000 MSL; 7 miles south of VANTZ. From there ATC cleared us to descend and maintain 9;000. Flight continued normally.Being initially confused by the clearance to cross seven miles south of VANTZ and then seeing 7;000 in the altitude window may have drawn an incorrect correlation resulting in a positive response in my mind because of the relation between the seven mile south restriction and seeing the '7' recur in the altitude window. This is only educated guess to as why seeing 7 thousand set produced a positive response in my mind. Increased scrutiny of altitude set in the altitude alerter. Even though the pilot not flying may initially concur with the pilot flying's altitude selection it doesn't necessarily mean that is the correct altitude. Do not just agree with what digits are set in the window. Make sure to agree that the proper altitude set.




Synopsis: An unusual crossing restriction from Approach while descending on the MOXIE STAR to PDX led the flight crew of an EMB-120 to descend below their cleared altitude.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: Turbulence; Windshear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: None
Mission: Training
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class D ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Engine
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Pilot Flying; Instructor
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: During a training flight to ZZZ; a catastrophic engine failure was experience approximately 3SM southwest of ZZZ1 during level cruise flight at 3;500 ft. MSL. After diagnosing the complete loss of engine power as a catastrophic engine failure; I tuned Tower into the radio and immediately [requested priority handling]. As I made a turn for ZZZ1; I was cleared to land both Runway XXR and Runway XXL. Aircraft in closed traffic at ZZZ1 were given instruction by Tower to extend their downwind legs to ensure no traffic conflicts would be present for my forced landing. Ultimately; a safe landing was accomplished on Runway XXR; and no further assistance was required to remove the aircraft from the runway. A phone call was made to Tower; where my name; phone number; and pilot certificate number were recorded. I was advised the Federal Aviation Administration may be reaching out regarding the [priority handling].The direct cause of the engine failure has not been determined. It appeared; however; that at least one cylinder had a piston which experienced a shearing force; ultimately damaging both the piston and the crankshaft. Shortly after the engine failure; the propeller stopped; refusing to windmill. This is consistent with the proposition that the crankshaft was damaged. After determining the engine could not be restarted; the mixture was positioned to 'idle-cutoff;' the fuel-selection positioned to 'off;' the electric fuel pump positioned to 'off;' and the magnetos positioned to 'off.' On close-in base leg; I opened the door as a preventative measure for quick egress of the aircraft in the event of an engine-bay fire upon landing. Barring no fire; I was able to roll the aircraft off the runway; taxiway; and into a transient spot. The aircraft currently resides in a transient parking stall until the aircraft owner's Mechanic can assess the damage.




Synopsis: P28A Instructor Pilot reported emergency diversion leading to an uneventful emergency landing due to engine failure during cruise.
Date: 202101
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: IND.Airport, IN
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C IND; Class E ZID
ATC / advisory: TRACON IND; Tower IND
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Workload
Anomaly: Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Better monitor FO actions. Increase awareness of calculating descent points using distance from the runway to approximate a 3 degree descent path to the runway in order to avoid unnecessary and lengthy low level segments.  Flying at 3;000 feet about 15 miles WSW of IND direct to BIGRD on the RNAV Y 5R. Approach asked if we had the field in sight; we responded that we did; and then we were given a left turn pretty much direct to HUUPS; which is the final approach fix on the RNAV Y 5R; and cleared for the visual approach. Tower then handed us off to Tower. During this time while I was switching to Tower I became task saturated with my PM flying duties from the frequency change; getting a landing clearance; and the FO requesting flap configuration changes. After we were cleared to land I noticed we were just about to level off at 2;100 feet. Well below a 3 degree descent path given our current position to the runway. I had not noticed the FO had set 2;100 feet; which is the altitude at HUUPS; and started a descent as soon as we were cleared for the approach. We leveled off at 2;100 feet and continued for some time before reaching HUUPS and continuing the descent for the runway. We were level at approximately 1;300' feet AGL for a while before descending for landing. I don't think this was technically illegal or in violation of an FAR; as we were cleared for the visual and in the process of making a descent for landing; but I do feel it's not a good technique to simply set the FAF altitude; dive and drive to that altitude; level off for several miles; then continue descent once over the FAF. We were not on a published portion of an approach; and well below a 3 degree descent path to the runway. This wasn't an issue for this particular approach; but it could become an issue at night in mountainous terrain or if there are obstacles in the area.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported getting too low while on a visual approach to IND airport.
Date: 201903
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: LVK.Airport, CA
Aircraft: Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Tower LVK
Second aircraft: Pitts Undifferentiated or Other Model
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Supervisor / CIC
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: I was working the log while Local Control 1 was issuing a 'low approach only' instruction to Aircraft Y on short final. Aircraft X called from RWY 25R north side run-up area requesting right closed traffic; however; because the pilot over-keyed the Local Control Controller; the beginning of the transmission (call sign and position) was clipped. Local Control 1; realizing that his transmission may have been blocked; restated his instructions to Aircraft Y. Aircraft X then stated 'Right closed traffic RWY25R; Aircraft X'. I saw Aircraft X move forward; however; I did not recognize that he was passing the hold short lines. I did watch to make sure the aircraft came to a complete stop; which it did; still clear of the runway; just before Aircraft Y crossed the threshold. While there was no time to have sent Aircraft Y around; I should have recognized that Aircraft X was passing the hold short lines as I watched it move forward. It wasn't until Aircraft X asked for verification that he was cleared for [Runway] 25R and other controllers stated that he had crossed the lines that I realized this was the case.Because of the low height of our Tower; it's difficult for us to see our hold short lines. The lines are also closer to the runway on the north side than they are on the south side. I've been at this facility for several years now however; so I'm used to this being an issue and have caught mistakes like this before. Traffic volume was very heavy and there was some complexity due to the fact that we were split; training on Local Control 2 and a relief briefing had just occurred on Ground Control. I may have been trying to multi-task too much; dividing my attention between Local Control 1; Local Control 2 and Ground Control; rather than giving each of them all my attention at different times. I will be more careful in the future to give all my attention to one position at a time.




Synopsis: Livermore Tower Controller reported a runway incursion.
Date: 201311
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: SEQM.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
ATC / advisory: Center SEGU
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification
Anomaly: No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: Possible altitude deviation. There is a lot of confusion on one specific crossing altitude on the SEQM ILS Z Runway 36 approach. The approach starts at QIT VOR. The approach plate and the tailored company page both say 18;000 feet; however the transition level is FL180. So....do we cross at 18;000 feet or FL180? My copilot and I discussed this question at length. The copilot found on Part One page 17.4-2 (International Section): When flying at or above the transition level; QNE altimeter setting (29.92' Hg/1013 hPa) is to be used and the height of the aircraft is to be expressed in terms of flight levels. As a result of this paragraph; we crossed QIT VOR and the next point (also to cross at 18;000) at FL180 with altimeters set to 29.92. Quito approach never asked us about this; however we are submitting a safety report because there is a doubt.




Synopsis: An air carrier Captain; flying the ILS Z RWY 36 approach at SEQM expressed confusion over whether the charted 18;000 feet MEA over QIT and the QIT 177/6.0 DME should be flown as a flight level or an altitude since FL180/18000 are the transition FL/ALTs.
Date: 202001
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: IMC
Weather elements / visibility: Cloudy; Rain; Turbulence
Light: Night
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Pre-flight
Result: General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted
Contributing factors: MEL; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: MEL

Narrative: Refused to operate aircraft with entire overhead panel lights inoperative. Lights would go full bright; dim; and off uncommanded at random intervals. Deemed unacceptable for night flying and totally unsafe for a late night flight to ZZZ with moderate/heavy rain; low clouds and over 20 kts of crosswinds. Refused at aircraft at gate. I believe the MEL that Maintenance was going to use was not meant for the entire panel being dark.




Synopsis: B737-800 Captain refused aircraft due to erratic overhead warning lights affecting the entire overhead panel.
Date: 201409
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SLC.Airport, UT
Aircraft: Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear
Operating under: Other 105
Flight plan: VFR
Mission: Skydiving
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class B SLC
ATC / advisory: Tower SLC
Second aircraft: Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Other / Unknown
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance
Contributing factors: Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: Our support personnel coordinated for Parachute operation into Salt Lake Class Bravo airspace for the State Fair at specific times.  These times coincided with our evening cargo banks; one of our busiest VFR traffic times.  The jump was also scheduled to occur almost directly over the main transition for all VFR aircraft in and out of SLC.  The controllers requested and had the tower supervisor coordinate to hold out all VFR traffic for the tower airspace until the jumpers were down.  We also requested to be given a 5 minute warning and a 1 minute warning so that we could sterilize our airspace from our end as well.  We were given the 5 minute warning but never given the 1 minute and never asked for permission to allow the jumpers to jump.  We still have Aircraft Y in a downwind directly under the jump aircraft when we were told jumpers away.  We were never informed of how many jumpers there would be and how we could tell which one was the last one so we could verify that they were out of the way.  As we are watching parachutes still in the air and fairly high in the sky; TRACON begins bringing aircraft into the airspace; pointed directly at the parachutes.  To make it worse; we were not transferred communication to the Aircraft Y pilots until there were about 3 miles into our airspace already.  When asked to make the Aircraft Y's turn around and/or spin; the TRACON ignored us and instead asked the jump aircraft if the jumpers were down; to which he responded affirmative; even though we were watching the parachutes still descending with our binoculars.  When we finally did get communication with the Aircraft Y pilots we had to take them off their normal flight path to avoid the area the parachutes were in.  When the Aircraft Y's finally passed the parachutes; there were well above the parachutes; but until then we had no way of knowing the altitude of the parachutes.  For parachute operations in that close to the airport; the tower controllers need to be in absolute control of who comes in to the airspace and when; it should not be dictated to us by the TRACON.




Synopsis: SLC Tower Controller describes a situation involving parachutists and IFR aircraft in close proximity. Coordination between Tower and TRACON was not complete.
Date: 201906
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: JFK.Airport, NY
Light: Night
Aircraft: A321
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
Airspace: Class B JFK
ATC / advisory: Ramp JFK
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Returned To Gate
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Did preflight inspection of cockpit. Pushed back and started # 1. After start got ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) with horn about hydraulic and flight controls. Hydraulics were in the normal range but were not feeding the systems. Started getting fumes in the cockpit so shut down engine. Called Maintenance and returned to gate. Maintenance comes on and finds 2 guarded switches on maintenance panel in off position.Maintenance not returning aircraft to airworthiness condition after tests. They were extremely hard to spot from our vantage point.Return switches to normal after system checks. This is setting us up for failure.


Second narrative: After pushback; and after number 1 engine start; we received a hydraulic system warning message. We shut down number one engine and the warning went away; and we returned to the gate. It was discovered that one of the guarded maintenance panel switches was in the not normal configuration.Maintenance performed the checks and did not return the aircraft system to normal configuration. The guarded button was not discovered in preflight as being on.Would change maintenance checklist to read; maintenance panel: keep guard switch cover in 'open' position to highlight button is in the 'not' normal configuration. With the switch cover closed; it is difficult to ascertain button position in all ambient conditions.


Synopsis: A321 flight crew reported receiving an hydraulic anomaly ECAM during taxi out which resulted in a return to the gate.