elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 202108
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: B737-700
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground ZZZ
Aircraft component: APU
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Second reporter function: Captain
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Narrative: After landing and taxiing towards our parking spot the we got indications of an APU fire. The APU was running and supplying electrical power to the aircraft. Almost simultaneously with the fire warning ground control called and said [they] could see smoke coming from the tail of the aircraft. The Captain stopped the aircraft set the brakes and called for the APU FIRE QRC. We ran the items and the fire was immediately extinguished. We then called for fire department support and was happy to see them already at the aircraft as the Ground Control called them for us. After confirming the fire was out; we taxied into our spot and shut down the aircraft.   It was great to see how fast the Ground Controller was there to confirm our fire suspicions and to call local fire rescue for us. [Other personnel] were on the scene so fast that if an evacuation would have been necessary; they would have been a great help to us.


Second narrative: On taxi to freight facility after landing got a APU fire warning closely followed by ZZZ Ground informing us that there was smoke coming from the tail area of the aircraft. Stopped the jet; asked ATC to roll the fire equipment and completed the APU FIRE QRC followed by the QRH. We discharged one fire retardant bottle. The fire warning went away and ground personnel indicated there was no further evidence of fire. We taxied to parking spot and shut down.   Did not [request priority] as we were already on the ground and required no priority handling. We did call immediately for fire trucks to come to our location.Simulator training works well and prepared us for the event. Cannot overstate the great help available from the ground controller and fire department.


Synopsis: B737-700 flight crew reported that an APU fire began during taxi and was extinguished after the crew ran the applicable procedure.
Date: 201208
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Aircraft component: Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Routine Inspection
Result: Aircraft Aircraft Damaged
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Manuals
Primary problem: Manuals

Narrative: [Maintenance Technicians] were working off of EMB 175 Maintenance Manual 32-11-05 to install the side stay on the left hand main landing gear. The side stay upper section was already installed; and the lower section was sitting on a table behind the left wing. According to the manual; you place the lower section into position and slide the pin through into the upper section; lower section; and the down lock arm and torque the through bolt. The manual does not state that the orientation of the grease fittings is of any consequence. If it had; this problem would not have occurred. I also referred to images attached to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual; and nowhere is there even an image showing the correct orientation. I would like to see [part orientation information] added to the Maintenance Manuals in the near future to stop this from occurring again.




Synopsis: The Aircraft Maintenance Manual did not provide the part detail sufficient to prevent the incorrect orientation and subsequent damage to landing gear components.
Date: 201508
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: SEA.Airport, WA
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Taxi
ATC / advisory: Ground SEA
Aircraft component: Hydraulic System Pump
Component problem: Improperly Operated
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness; Confusion
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Taxi
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: After a normal landing; the flight control annunciator illuminated during taxi to gate. Looked up and both hydraulic B switches were off and engine heat was on. Turned hydraulic B switches on and engine heat off. I assume this occurred during after landing flow as there were no amber lights on during approach or with a master recall. Approach and landing felt normal.


Second narrative: While taxiing in; the Captain noticed the Feel Diff Press caution light was illuminated and the #2 hydraulic pressure was low. He then noticed that both #2 hydraulic pump switches were off. I believe that on my after-landing flow I reached up to turn off the engine anti-ice switches; but grabbed the hydraulic pump switches by mistake. When we turned on the hydraulic pumps; the caution light extinguished and the system operated normally. In my mind; there is a slight chance the pumps were turned off in flight; but this seems unlikely because I don't remember intending to turn off the anti-ice until after landing.My insufficient attention to detail in confirming the correct switches was the main cause of the problem. I had also forgotten to wait to do the after-landing flow until after crossing all runways with taxi instructions received and understood. I will remember from this event to wait until the appropriate time to perform procedures; and to always visually confirm every switch before moving it.


Synopsis: After a normal landing the flight control annunciator illuminated during taxi to gate. Upon checking the overhead both hydraulic B switches were found off and engine heat was on. The First Officer believes he may have made a mistake on the after landing flow.
Date: 201202
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ATL.Airport, GA
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class B ATL
ATC / advisory: TRACON A80
Second aircraft: Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Detector: Automation Aircraft RA
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Procedure

Narrative: On the RMBLR Departure out of Atlanta; ATC leveled us off at 8;000 FT MSL. While at 8;000 FT MSL; another aircraft was vectored over us at approximately 8;500 FT. ATC did not call out the traffic to us. We received an RA 'Descend Now' Advisory. I complied with the advisory and started a 2;000 FPM descent into the green arc on the VSI. I descended to approximately 7;600 FT and the Resolution Advisory ceased. We informed ATC of the event and then climbed back up to our assigned altitude. We believe the other aircraft's descent rate caused our system to trigger the RA.


Second narrative: Prior to our departure from ATL; Tower changed our altitude clearance from 10;000 FT to 8;000 FT without explanation. Departure Control also verified that our clearance was 8;000 FT. As we leveled at 8;000 FT; we received first a caution; then a descend command from our TCAS to which the First Officer; as the pilot flying; responded. I called our TCAS directed descent to Departure and they responded with a traffic callout of VFR traffic at 8;500 FT. When the TCAS reported 'Clear of Conflict;' we returned to 8;000 FT.I have never seen 500 FT of separation in level flight not cause a TCAS RA. 500 FT of separation satisfies everything except the TCAS. Controllers should be made aware of this issue; and the TCAS logic that requires an RA in this situation should be re-examined. In the interim; pilots should continue to respond to the RA as we have been trained.


Synopsis: B737 flight crew leveling at 8;000 FT experiences a TCAS RA due to VFR traffic at 8;500 FT and descends.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZME.ARTCC, TN
Aircraft: B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class A ZME
ATC / advisory: Center ZME
Second aircraft: Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Enroute
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Contributing factors: Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: Leveled a B737 at FL220 and stopped a Citation V at FL230. They were separated. Handed the Citation V off to Sector 60 and they descended the Citation V down to eleven thousand right on top of my B737 without control. In response; I climbed my B737 to FL270 in order to avoid a mid air collision. Possibly evaluate and establish some procedures that may include a 'Look and Go' option that could enhance the current operation with minimum coordination. All too often; Sectors in close proximity rely on verbal confirmation to a request; but do not have anything concrete or an established procedure in an SOP.




Synopsis: ZME Controller described a loss of separation event when an aircraft handed off to an adjacent sector was descended without coordination; the reporter suggesting some type of 'Look and Go' coordination procedure be established.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: MYGF.Airport, FO
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
ATC / advisory: Tower MYGF
Reporter function: Dispatcher
Reporter qualification: Dispatch Dispatcher
Human factors: Communication Breakdown
Second reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Narrative: Prior to push I was notified by the crew about the GS on Runway 6 being NOTAM'd OTS at FPO/MYGF. I asked the CA if he wanted me to send him the NOTAMs packet via acars I would do so; but the only thing that I saw regarding the Glideslope at the destination was that it would be OTS only during the hours of construction which this would not be affected by. We both agreed that the flight could be completed safely and proceeded on with the flight. At this point; since I was not asked to send the packet of NOTAMs I was under the assumption that the CA was simply asking verification on the situation. Once on the ground I received a call from the CA who told me that Nassau Center instructed them to intercept the the GS while on the ILS and was cleared for approach; and it was at this point that they realized the GS was OTS. When they brought this up to someone on the ground they were told that it was in fact not operational. I'm not sure if the information given by [our software] is inaccurate or if the NOTAM simply hasn't been generated.Going off of the information available to us; I don't necessarily feel that myself or the crew did anything wrong in this situation. From the NOTAMs available to me; I didn't see any potential issues; and the crew was instructed to intercept the GS from Nassau Center while on approach.


Second narrative: After being cleared for the ILS 06 approach we captured the glideslope and started descending earlier than we should have. We realized we were too low on the approach around 900 feet and started to climb back to around 1300 feet to intercept a normal glide path. We notified Tower the GS was not working. They said they know. We verified with the paperwork and dispatch that the GS was not NOTAMed out today. We were also cleared for the ILS 06 Z approach.


Synopsis: Air carrier Captain and Dispatcher reported that after commencing the MYGF Runway 06 ILS the Captain discovered the glideslope was out of service and ATC confirmed. The flight crew and Dispatcher referenced the NOTAM before departure which stated the glideslope would not be OTS at the time of their arrival.
Date: 201512
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: CLT.Airport, NC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Parked
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: Aircraft In Service At Gate
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: CLT ramp personnel dropped Cargo Load Report (CLR) off in cockpit and the CLR stated: 57 standard check; 0 heavy checked and 11 gate checked bags in the forward cargo hold. 0 bags loaded in the aft cargo hold. The number seemed reasonable to me so it didn't raise any red flags in my head. After landing; I went down on the ramp to find out why the gate checked bags were not off loaded. I noticed ramp offloading 23 bags from the aft cargo hold that were a mix of gate and checked bags. I went back on aircraft to verify what was on the CLR. The CLR was filled out incorrectly.The person filling out the CLR [should] physically verify bags [are] or [are] not in each cargo hold.  [Then] the crew [should] physically check cargo holds if they think the CLR might be in error.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: ERJ-170 flight crew reported they discovered after arrival that the load manifest they departed with was not accurate.
Date: 201808
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: AVP.TRACON, PA
Aircraft: Commander 114/A/B/TC
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E AVP
ATC / advisory: TRACON AVP
Reporter organization: Government
Reporter function: Approach
Reporter qualification: Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Human factors: Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Procedure; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Aircraft
Primary problem: Equipment / Tooling

Narrative: Aircraft X was IFR at 8;000 5NM W of TALLI intersection. Aircraft X advised that his ACARD went out and came back then went out again. Aircraft X said that he did not need to declare an emergency he just needed to descend to VFR conditions to see what the problem with his equipment was. I descended Aircraft X to 7;000 and then gave him a turn to 320 and continued his descent to 6;000. Aircraft X had some VFR conditions in the area and wanted to continue descent to avoid the clouds. I gave Aircraft X descent to 4;000 and advise me if he needed any other assistance to remain in the VMC conditions during his descent. He then asked to descend to 3;500 and the MVA in the area that was 3;700; I told him about the MVA and descended him to 3;700. I verified that the MVA was at 3;700 and gave Aircraft X the altimeter due to his altitude showing him descending below 3;700 on the scope. Aircraft X responded that he was climbing back up to 3;700 and wanted vectors towards [a nearby] airport. I gave Aircraft X a heading of 150 and maintain 3;700. Position Relieve briefing was started at this time and I gave the next controller all the information about Aircraft X and his intentions to remain in VMC conditions. Before the end of the position relief briefing I gave Aircraft X a heading of 180 and maintain 3;700; vectoring him towards an area with an MVA of 3;400 if he needed to descend anymore. I stayed in the TRACON to see if the next controller needed any assistance with the position.No recommendations to prevent the re-occurrence of this event due to it being an equipment malfunction.




Synopsis: AVP TRACON Controller reported an IFR aircraft with avionics trouble descending below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.
Date: 201507
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B757-200
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Takeoff / Launch
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Airspeed Indicator
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Time Pressure; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: After working to resolve several avionics problems with the aircraft involving the Thrust Management/Autothrottle system and the Takeoff Speed display; we attempted a normal takeoff. Upon reaching somewhere between 65 and 75 KIAS on my (Captain-pilot flying) side; the First Officer (FO) called '95 Knots.' I immediately performed a Rejected Takeoff and exited the runway. We did note that there was an airspeed discrepancy as we slowed. It appeared that the FO's was incorrect; as it did not seem as if we had enough time to accelerate to 95 KIAS compared to other takeoffs. After exiting the runway; all checklists and procedures were complied with and brake energy charts were cross-referenced. We taxied back to parking.




Synopsis: A B757-200 Captain rejected the takeoff at about 70 KTS when the First Officer called 95kts. Maintenance had worked avionics issues to resolve an autothrottle system and takeoff speed display anomalies.
Date: 202010
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Check Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Contributing factors: Weather; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy
Primary problem: Weather

Narrative: IOE (initial operating) student was attempting a flaps 22 landing. During the approach; gusty winds from outer bands of an approaching hurricane contributed to an unstable approach and generating two glide slope EGPWS annunciations. We initiated a missed approach and were put in sequence to reattempt the approach. The vectors from the second approach brought us in above the glideslope. We engaged the vs (vertical speed) mode initially at 1;200 feet per minute (per GOM) and then 1;000 feet per minute as we closed in on the glide slope and stabilized approach criteria. The student had NAV armed; not APP; which as PM (pilot monitoring) I should have caught. My attention was briefly diverted to reassessing our fuel; which was 200 pounds over final divert at the final approach fix. At 1;000; instruments cross checked; the GS (glideslope) was exact (though not captured). At this point; we had been in visual conditions for several minutes. The runway did not have visual guidance (PAPI nor VASI); I looked out the window to verify the runway was clear; of which I annunciated. At approximately 700 feet AGL; we fell below the glide slope; generating additional glide slope EGPWS annunciations. Due to the winds; fuel nature; incoming weather; and diversion airport expecting similar conditions; I used my command authority to take control of the airplane; reestablish ourselves on the glide path; and land without further incident.




Synopsis: EMB-145 Captain reported an unstabilized approach due to gusty conditions.