elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports huggingface dataset:
Date: 201410
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Weather elements / visibility: 9999
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Globemaster (C-17)
Operator: Military
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Cargo / Freight / Delivery
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class A ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Reporter organization: Military
Reporter function: Instructor; Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance
Contributing factors: Human Factors
Primary problem: Human Factors

Narrative: [While] at FL350 we changed frequency to Center 100 miles north of...our intended arrival location.  We checked in at FL350 as call sign.  We then were instructed to descend to FL240; we read back clearance 'Aircraft X descend to FL240.'  At this time we descended to FL240; around FL310 we were asked if we were in the descent and responded yes and at that time was issued another descent clearance.  We landed at [our destination] uneventful.  I was notified today (four weeks later); that we checked on at FL350 and the intended descent was for a [an aircraft with a similar sounding call sign] to which we read back the clearance and descended.  ATC did not inform us it was for [another aircraft] nor did they stop us from descending or communicating to us that we had mistakenly thought it was a call to us.  We were not given a number to call upon landing.  Our crew made the mistake of responding to what we heard was [our call sign] and not confirming it was actually [for other aircraft] who we were unaware was even on frequency.  Up until today we had no idea a mishap had even taken place; it was an unfortunate place to be; considering two very similar call signs.  Both ATC and our crew is responsible and I think better communication and situational awareness can prevent other similar incidents.




Synopsis: A Boeing C17 flight crew inadvertently responded and complied with clearances intended for another aircraft with a similar call sign.  The flight was not advised at the time and the reporter only learned of the incident approximately a month after it occurred.
Date: 202108
Location: PTKK.Airport, FO
Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Other Preflight planning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Human factors: Human-Machine Interface; Distraction
Anomaly: ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Airport
Primary problem: Airport

Narrative: Once again the PAPIs at PTKK are inoperative.  There should be a Company response to lack of electronic/ visual glidepath for night operations.




Synopsis: Air carrier Captain reported the PAPI lights at PTKK are inoperative.
Date: 201303
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Final Approach
Airspace: Class C ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Nose Gear
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Flying
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Procedure
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: On approach at 180 knots; gear selected down. No in-transition for nose gear; mains down and locked. Gear Disagree warning. Discontinued approach and complied with QRH; cycled gear 3 times. Previous write up with failure into previous airport; gear cycled 8 times. Chose not to cycle more as failure corresponds to previous write up. QRH gear extension procedure complied with; nose gear deployed down; green and locked. Could not stow landing gear handle; left in up position per QRH notes. Performed fly by over runway at 1;000 feet AGL; gear appeared down by examination by ATC with binoculars. Normal traffic pattern flown; normal landing; nosewheel steering failure steering failure per QRH. Taxied to gate with no further incident. Flight Attendant briefed as to potential situation and passengers briefed throughout situation as to indication issue and crew needed time to determine indicator status. Flight Attendant finally re-briefed as to status and if nose gear collapses; to follow Captain instructions and initial evacuation out serviceable exit. Maintenance was done at the previous airport that is a threat in itself. There were two prior write ups for the issue.


Second narrative: [Report contains no additional information.]


Synopsis: A CRJ-200 nose gear did not extend when the landing gear was selected down so the crew declared an emergency; complied with the checklist; and landed safely after the nose gear extended. This was a repeat problem.
Date: 201605
Local time of day: 1201-1800
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Flight conditions: VMC
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: HS 125 Series
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Ferry / Re-Positioning
Flight phase: Cruise
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Cowling/Nacelle Fasteners; Latches
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion; Troubleshooting
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; First Officer
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted
Contributing factors: Aircraft; Human Factors
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: Aircraft experienced gradual; uncommanded left roll/yaw at 16;000 ft and 300 KIAS; level flight; while vectored direct for the Arrival. Continuous light vibration felt throughout airframe. Slip/skid (ball) indicator displaced completely to the left of center (unusual for a left yaw situation). No unusual engine or flight control malfunctions or abnormalities indicated on the MFD/PFD/MWS.Slowed to 250 KIAS; disengaged Auto Pilot (AP)/ Yaw Damper (YD); and centered the ball by displacing rudder trim 2 indications to the left. Coordinated diversion with ATC. Aircraft remained stable with rudder trim 2 indications to the left; rudder pedals difficult to move as if Yaw Damp still engaged; and vibrations still noticeable. Flew stable visual approach. ATC arranged for emergency vehicles to be on standby. Landed with no complications.On post flight; discovered a fastener on the leading edge of an accessory panel; on the underside of the left engine pylon; became loose and allowed for the leading edge of the panel to be forced aft. Although it was understandable that the panel could cause the aircraft to yaw left; it was confusing as to why the slip/skid (ball) indication was indicating to step on the left pedal and add left trim. Notified ACP; maintenance and steward on duty.


Second narrative: [Report narrative contained no additional information.]


Synopsis: HS125 flight crew on a ferry flight reported experiencing flight anomalies created by an unfastened panel on the engine pylon.
Date: 201502
Local time of day: 0001-0600
Location: C90.TRACON, IL
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Initial Approach
ATC / advisory: TRACON C90
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Pilot Not Flying; First Officer
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Situational Awareness
Second reporter function: Pilot Flying; Captain
Anomaly: Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Air Traffic Control
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Contributing factors: Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Primary problem: Ambiguous

Narrative: On arrival with vogler transition to join localizer 27L; crew momentarily overshot localizer course.Better understanding that 'VOGLR' transition to join 27L localizer does not include CENAK waypoint overfly.


Second narrative: We were cleared to fly the WATSN2 RNAV arrival into ORD. After STYLE and before VOGLR; the controller told us to 'Fly the VOGLR Transition'. With very little time; the Captain and First Officer reviewed the arrival again and could find no transition on the arrival. We both agreed that the arrival instructed us to depart CENAK on a heading of 270 or assigned; and expect radar vectors to final approach course. We flew the remainder of the arrival as published; and from CENAK; we turned to 270 degree heading. The Controller then asked us if we had 'missed the turn'; and instructed us to fly heading 250 and intercept the final approach course for Runway 27L. We complied and intercepted the 27L final approach course. VOGLR is listed as an IAF for the ILS 27L approach; and I believe the controller wanted us to depart VOGLR and fly course 281 to NRMAH and intercept the final approach course; even though we were not cleared for the approach when the event occurred. The WATSN2 Arrival instructs crews to fly from VOGLR to CENAK; then turn to heading 270; however; the ILS 27L approach can begin at VOGLR. The crew was confused as to what exactly the controller wanted. The crew should have queried the controller and verified exactly what he expected us to do. Next; the WATSN2 Arrival should have transitions listed if ATC expects crews to fly 'transitions' off of the arrival. In addition; the IAP's should have approach transitions listed if crews are expected to fly 'transitions'. Reference the ILS 35R at KDEN. The WATSN2 and the ILS 27L; do not seem to have a seamless transition. It would have been more clear if we were cleared for the approach prior to VOGLR. The crew should have recognized that this clearance is not commonly given at this airport and immediately asked for clarification from the controller.


Synopsis: ERJ-175 flight crew reported some confusion on what constituted their cleared track on the WATSN2 RNAV arrival to ORD.
Date: 201205
Local time of day: 0601-1200
Location: ZZZ.Airport, US
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: No Aircraft
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Technician
Human factors: Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Anomaly: Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Maintenance
When detected: Other During Maintenance
Result: General Maintenance Action
Contributing factors: Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure
Primary problem: Company Policy

Narrative: A ZZZ Building Maintenance Mechanic is servicing and conducting Annual Checks on all station Fire Extinguishing Bottles in a Hangar Shop. The Shop so assigned to this task is much smaller than the previous work space. There have been complaints that the threat of an accidental bottle discharge is great enough to mandate a less restrictive and congested work environment so personnel can escape from the release of Purple-K Fire Retardant. The current Shop was formally a Warranty Office and has poor ventilation and is not of adequate size. Building Maintenance and Line Maintenance Management have been seeking a suitable location to move this operation but have had multiple roadblocks finding available space. Environmental Facilities.

Callback: Reporter stated his Air Carrier has recently added ventilation equipment and re-designed the Hangar Shop floor space to allow for quicker egress if an emergency should occur. The fire bottles involved are the 400 LB type bottles with wheels; that use Purple-K retardant and are stationed at various locations in their Hangars and at the Terminal gates.



Synopsis: A Line Safety Mechanic reports about a congested and restrictive work environment in their Fire Bottle Shop. He raises concerns about adequate egress to escape from the release of Purple-K Fire Retardant during Servicing and Annual Checks of their 400 LB Fire Bottles.
Date: 201207
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.ARTCC, US
Weather elements / visibility: Thunderstorm
Light: Night
Aircraft: A320
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Descent
Airspace: Class E ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Center ZZZ
Aircraft component: Autothrottle/Speed Control
Component problem: Malfunctioning
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: First Officer; Pilot Not Flying
Human factors: Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Confusion
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Detector: Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: We were on the arrival into our filed destination and had just finished deviating around a few thunderstorms.  All of the sudden we got an ECAM that the autothrottles turned OFF and we got an ECAM that the autothrottles were in thrust lock.  Then the Number 1 engine suddenly rolled back to idle thrust while the Number 2 engine remained at normal thrust.  We declared an emergency letting ATC know we were experiencing and engine failure and we would get back to them.  Within one minute later; we were able to regain normal control of the Number 1 engine; but not the autothrust.  We rescinded the emergency with ATC and continued the flight to ZZZ1 without the autothrust.  The rest of the flight was uneventful.




Synopsis: An A320's autothrottle transitioned to THRUST LOCK followed by the number one engine spooling back.  The crew declared an emergency; but the engine returned to normal operation with no autothrottles.
Date: 202005
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: ZZZ.Tower, US
Weather elements / visibility: Partly cloudy to clear; 10
Light: Daylight
Aircraft: Citation I/SP (C501)
Operator: Personal
Operating under: Part 91
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Personal
Flight phase: Final Approach; Landing
Airspace: Class B ZZZ
ATC / advisory: Tower ZZZ
Aircraft component: Main Gear
Component problem: Failed
Reporter organization: Personal
Reporter function: Single Pilot
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument
Human factors: Troubleshooting
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: At approximately 7PM local time; during my final approach to ZZZ; Runway XXR; I lowered my landing gear and received 2 of 3 green lights. The left main landing gear light was dark and the warning horn sounded. I recycled the gear once with the same result. I reported my situation to the Tower and requested that they visually report whether they saw all three gear down and they affirmed to the effect 'all three gear down'. I also recall a [Company] pilot taxiing northwestwardly either on Charlie or Mike toward the main terminal as reporting that he too observed all three gear down. The Tower asked my intentions - whether I would proceed with landing. I inject here that this same left landing gear light indicator in years past had failed to light only to find that it was the indicator light and not the gear. That experience factored into my decision and response to the Tower that I would proceed to land. Upon touching down in the vicinity of where Runway XXR crosses Runway XY and where taxiway Kilo crosses Runway XXR; the left main gear collapsed. I skid down Runway XXR veering leftwardly through the XXR/taxiway Lima intersection onto to the grassy area between XXR and taxiway Mike; coming to a stop in that grassy area. I shut down both engines; exited the aircraft; and disconnected the battery; by which time the Fire Dept. trucks; airport operations and Houston police were on their way; arriving very promptly.




Synopsis: Citation CE 501 pilot reported the left main gear collapsed on landing and the aircraft departed the runway.
Date: 201702
Aircraft: B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operator: Air Carrier
Flight plan: IFR
Flight phase: Cruise
Aircraft component: Other Flight Crew Seat
Component problem: Design
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Fatigue
Anomaly: Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: General None Reported / Taken
Contributing factors: Aircraft
Primary problem: Aircraft

Narrative: I have reported this issue a number of times through logbook entries and/or ASAP reports each time I have flown this aircraft.This aircraft (as well as [another] aircraft) has a chronic noise issue; which violates FAR 117 with regard to providing the pilots a quiet rest facility. When in the Pilot Crew Rest Facility (Bunk) an intermittent; loud knocking noise is heard at varying intensities on irregular schedules. I have recorded this noise and provided it to the company. I recorded it again last night. It sounds as if someone kicks or raps loudly with a knuckle on the bunk wall right near the pilots' heads as they sleep. Last night it sounded like it was coming from below the bunk; through the aft wall. On other aircraft the location can vary. It is impossible to sleep through. First Officer stated to me that he distinctly heard the noise last night and it woke him up at least five times. It was so bad for me that I had to leave the bunk and tried to sleep in the crew rest seat. This was impossible due to coughing passengers and people walking up and down the aisle. I went back into the bunk. My break was almost six hours. Last night; this noise was so bad that I maybe slept an hour and a half. This was totally inadequate. I did not realize how fatigued I was until we after we landed.   We happened to have a representative from Boeing on the flight. I asked him afterward what he thought the knocking could be. He said that it is possible that 'oil-canning' between the E&E compartment and deck floor is what's happening; being caused by the differential in pressure and/or temperatures. The noise created by this problem is obstructive to the intent and application of FAR 117; and negatively impacts the safe conduct of our flights by interfering with the pilots' ability to achieve a restful break.  The insidious degradation of cognitive function which is not necessarily apparent to the pilot; and the fact one might not realize just how fatigued they are; should I encounter this situation again I will give strong consideration to new FAA guidance regarding inflight fatigue accumulation and need to reevaluate continuance of the flight so as to ensure fatigue level does not continue to increase.




Synopsis: B777 Captain reported the crew rest bunk area is subject to random noise intrusions in flight that make it difficult to get quality rest.
Date: 201911
Local time of day: 1801-2400
Location: NCT.TRACON, CA
Flight conditions: VMC
Aircraft: B737-800
Operator: Air Carrier
Operating under: Part 121
Flight plan: IFR
Mission: Passenger
Flight phase: Climb
Airspace: Class C SJC
ATC / advisory: TRACON NCT
Reporter organization: Air Carrier
Reporter function: Captain; Pilot Not Flying
Reporter qualification: Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human factors: Confusion
Anomaly: Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Detector: Person Flight Crew
When detected: In-flight
Result: Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification
Contributing factors: Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals
Primary problem: Chart Or Publication

Narrative: We were filed on the BMRNG SID by Dispatch. However; the active runway changed to Runway 30R; and ATC cleared us via the TEKKY 5 to TEKKY; direct SJC; then BMRNG; flight plan route; maintain 5000 ft. When we were cleared for takeoff; ATC advised us to climb and maintain 4500 ft. Thought this was odd. The TEKKY Sid shows a maximum speed of 230 kts. at the first turn point. However this may be under the SFO Class B airspace. According to the ATC liaison; we cannot exceed 200 kts. We may not fly at our minimum maneuvering speed below the Class B. This needs clarification. The SID is apparently constructed for airspace compliance and track; not for flight below Class B airspace. We need to publish guidance for our pilots on what speed they need to fly and until what point.




Synopsis: An Air Carrier pilot reported a SID speed which is published at 230 kts even though the route is below Class B Airspace causes confusion.