Relatório da Comissão - Financiamento da União Europeia - Relatório da Comissão sobre o funcionamento do sistema de recursos próprios

INTRODUÇÃO

O artigo 9º da actual decisão relativa aos recursos próprios [1] insta a Comissão a

[1] Decisão (2000/597/CE, Euratom) do Conselho, relativa ao sistema de recursos próprios das Comunidades Europeias, JO L 253 de 7.10.2000, p. 42.

"proceder, antes de 1 de Janeiro de 2006, a uma reapreciação geral do sistema de recursos próprios, acompanhada, se for caso disso, de propostas adequadas, tendo em conta todos os factores pertinentes, incluindo os efeitos do alargamento sobre o financiamento do orçamento, a possibilidade de alterar a estrutura dos recursos próprios mediante a criação de novos recursos próprios autónomos e a correcção dos desequilíbrios orçamentais concedida ao Reino Unido, bem como a concessão à Áustria, à Alemanha, aos Países Baixos e à Suécia da redução referida no nº 1 do artigo 5º".

Em resposta a um pedido do Parlamento Europeu e de acordo com o Conselho, a Comissão comprometeu-se a apresentar a reapreciação supramencionada sobre o funcionamento do sistema de financiamento até ao final de 2004.

Em 10 de Fevereiro de 2004, a Comissão adoptou a sua comunicação [2] relativa às Perspectivas Financeiras 2007-2013. A Comunicação identificou dois elementos principais do actual sistema de recursos próprios que merecem uma maior atenção: em primeiro lugar, a insuficiente transparência do sistema para os cidadãos da EU em conjugação com a limitada autonomia financeira dos tesouros nacionais; em segundo lugar, a necessidade de reformar o actual mecanismo de correcção de desequilíbrios orçamentais negativos.

[2] COM(2004) 101 final de 10 de Fevereiro de 2004.

Em conformidade com essas orientações, o presente relatório apresenta uma panorâmica do actual sistema e das suas principais desvantagens, propõe um mecanismo de correcção generalizado enquanto ajustamento a curto prazo, a fim de abordar a principal questão pendente e sublinha para o mais longo prazo a necessidade de uma estrutura de recursos próprios eficaz, transparente e democrática.

Do documento de trabalho da Comissão em anexo ao presente relatório consta uma apreciação mais circunstanciada destas questões.

1. Actual sistema de recursos próprios

O actual sistema de recursos próprios resulta de sucessivas alterações ao sistema inicial introduzido em 1970. O sistema pode dividir-se nas três categorias seguintes:

(1) Recursos próprios tradicionais (RPT). Trata-se principalmente de direitos aduaneiros cobrados pelos Estados-Membros em nome da EU.

(2) O recurso baseado no imposto sobre o valor acrescentado (IVA). O recurso IVA é aplicado sobre as bases estatísticas "teóricas" do IVA harmonizadas dos Estados-Membros, que é calculado com base nas receitas nacionais do IVA.

(3) Além disso, a base do IVA teórica é "nivelada", se necessário, em 50% do rendimento nacional bruto (RNB) de cada Estado-Membro, a fim de reduzir o efeito do carácter ligeiramente "regressivo" do IVA. Na prática, isto transforma o recurso próprio com base no IVA num recurso com base no RNB para os países em causa na regra de nivelamento.

(4) A taxa de mobilização sobre o IVA não pode exceder 0,5% da base.

(5) O recurso baseado no RNB Trata-se do recurso residual utilizado para equilibrar o orçamento. É cobrado enquanto taxa uniforme em proporção do RNB de cada Estado-Membro. O único limite específico para esta taxa é o limite máximo dos recursos próprios que restringe o montante total de todos os recursos próprios a um máximo de 1,24% do RNB da EU.

Finalmente, um mecanismo específico para correcção do desequilíbrio orçamental do Reino Unido faz igualmente parte do sistema dos recursos próprios (ver secção 3). Foi alterado em diversas ocasiões, tornando o mecanismo cada vez mais complexo e não transparente.

As alterações mais recentes no sistema dos recursos próprios foram decididas pelo Conselho Europeu de Berlim de 1999. Estas alterações reforçam ainda mais a tendência para o declínio dos recursos próprios tradicionais e dos recursos próprios baseados no IVA e o correspondente aumento da parte relativa das contribuições com base no RNB [3]/PNB.

[3] Antes de 2002, o recurso PNB (produto nacional bruto).

Quadro 1 - A composição dos recursos próprios da UE

(em percentagem do total dos recursos próprios; base em numerário)

>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>

1 A partir de 2002, a percentagem dos RPT retida pelos Estados-Membros enquanto compensação pelos custos de cobrança foi aumentada de 10% para 25%. Esta diferença representou cerca de 2,2 mil milhões de euros em 2002 e 2003.

2 Anteprojecto de orçamento rectificativo n.° 8/2004 (UE-25).

3 Anteprojecto de orçamento 2005

2. Apreciação do desempenho do actual sistema de recursos próprios

2.1. Critérios de avaliação

O sistema de recursos próprios e de recursos próprios individuais pode ser avaliado face a critérios específicos. É praticamente impossível que todos os recursos próprios individuais satisfaçam os eventuais critérios de avaliação. Contudo, um sistema baseado numa combinação de recursos de natureza diferente pode satisfazer de forma razoável os principais critérios relevantes.

Para o presente relatório são considerados relevantes os seguintes sete critérios de avaliação:

* Visibilidade e simplicidade;

* Autonomia financeira;

* Contribuição para uma afectação eficiente dos recursos económicos;

* Suficiência;

* Despesas administrativas-eficácia;

* Receitas-Estabilidade;

* Igualdade nas contribuições brutas.

2.2. Avaliação

O actual sistema demonstrou bons resultados no que diz respeito aos critérios de suficiência e estabilidade, mas não consegue claramente satisfazer os critérios de visibilidade e simplicidade e não contribui de forma significativa para uma afectação mais eficiente dos recursos económicos na EU. O sistema financeiro tornou-se cada vez mais complexo ao longo do tempo, dificultando mesmo que o cidadão interessado compreenda o seu funcionamento. Além disso, a autonomia financeira está a tornar-se cada vez mais limitada. Apesar de o financiamento do orçamento estar assegurado por regras que vinculam todos os Estados-Membros, não existe praticamente qualquer ligação directa com os cidadãos ou os contribuintes. Pelo contrário, o financiamento do orçamento assenta em transferências dos tesouros nacionais. Quanto aos restantes critérios, o actual sistema de financiamento revelou várias deficiências, tal como explicado mais pormenorizadamente no documento de trabalho da Comissão em anexo ao presente relatório.

3. Evitar saldos orçamentais negativos excessivos

3.1. A questão dos desequilíbrios orçamentais

A União Europeia é uma comunidade de solidariedade, havendo partes do orçamento comunitário que prosseguem um claro objectivo de solidariedade, enquanto outras financiam a realização de objectivos específicos através de programas comunitários adoptados. Tal dá origem à existência de benefícios líquidos do e contribuições líquidas para o orçamento da UE, embora os benefícios desta política revertam para a União no seu conjunto.

Os saldos orçamentais líquidos, quantificados pela diferença entre contribuições para e receitas do orçamento da EU, não conseguem obviamente corresponder plenamente aos benefícios resultantes da adesão à UE.

No entanto, a dimensão de alguns destes desequilíbrios esteve no centro de debates políticos. Em 1984, o Conselho Europeu de Fontainebleau introduziu o actual mecanismo de correcção no que se refere à contribuição líquida de um Estado-Membro, o Reino Unido. Este mecanismo reembolsa o Reino Unido em 2/3 das suas contribuições líquidas segundo o conceito de despesas repartidas. A introdução baseou-se no seguinte princípio geral:

"... qualquer Estado-Membro que suporte um ónus orçamental excessivo em relação à sua prosperidade relativa pode beneficiar de uma correcção a conceder no momento oportuno".

Apesar de a correcção ter sido decidida apenas para o Reino Unido, o princípio de uma correcção generalizada foi, por conseguinte, já reconhecido em Fontainebleau ("qualquer Estado-Membro"), devendo a correcção basear-se na dimensão do desequilíbrio orçamental ("excessivo") e a riqueza de um Estado-Membro comparada com a EU no seu conjunto ("prosperidade relativa").

Nos últimos 20 anos, a evolução económica, o alargamento e as alterações na estrutura do orçamento da EU modificaram significativamente o contexto de funcionamento do actual mecanismo de correcção britânico.

O quadro que se segue mostra a evolução do rendimento nacional bruto (RNB) per capita, expresso em padrões de poder de compra (PPC [4]), entre 1984 e 2003 relativamente a todos os Estados-Membros que foram contribuintes líquidos para o orçamento comunitário em 2002 [5].

[4] O PPC é uma moeda artificial que reflecte as diferenças nos níveis de preços nacionais que não são tomados em consideração pelas taxas de câmbio. Esta unidade permite comparações significativas em termos de volume de indicadores económicos entre países.

[5] Os saldos líquidos constantes do presente documento, tal como os utilizados para a correcção britânica, são calculados incluindo as despesas administrativas. Por esta razão, a Bélgica e o Luxemburgo não figuram entre os contribuintes líquidos. Como as correcções são pagas no ano seguinte, a correcção de 2007 será paga em 2008.

>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>

Tendo em conta a dramática alteração da posição do Reino Unido em comparação com outros contribuintes líquidos e em aplicação do princípio de Fontainebleau, devia ser reconsiderada a concessão de uma correcção numa base exclusiva ao Reino Unido. Por conseguinte, o mecanismo existente deve ser transformado num mecanismo de correcção generalizado, que respeite os dois objectivos de

- evitar saldos orçamentais negativos excessivos em conjugação com uma redução das diferenças entre os contribuintes líquidos com níveis de prosperidade comparáveis;

- garantir que os custos de financiamento do mecanismo são mantidos a um nível razoável.

3.2. Impacto do mecanismo de correcção existente nos saldos líquidos dos Estados-Membros

No mecanismo existente, o reembolso da contribuição líquida ao Reino Unido é de 66%. O mecanismo é financiado por todos os Estados-Membros consoante as suas partes respectivas no RNB com as seguintes excepções:

- O Reino Unido não participa no financiamento da sua própria redução;

- A parte da Alemanha, Países Baixos, Áustria e Suécia limita-se a 25% das suas partes normais.

Embora a posição líquida do Reino Unido antes da correcção tenha registado poucas alterações desde a sua introdução (-0,48% do RNB em 1985 e -0,47% durante o período de 1996 a 2002), a sua posição final líquida melhorou significativamente em comparação com outros Estados-Membros com níveis de prosperidade semelhantes ou mesmo inferiores, como NL e DE (-0,47% e -0,44%, respectivamente).

Um factor muito significativo para avaliar o mecanismo de correcção existente é o seu impacto no alargamento. Com a adesão de novos beneficiários líquidos, os saldos líquidos de todos os antigos Estados-Membros registam uma deterioração, uma vez que uma parte crescente das despesas é afectada aos novos Estados-Membros. Todavia, em consequência do actual mecanismo, o volume da correcção aumentará muito significativamente para o Reino Unido. Os custos para os outros Estados-Membros, incluindo todos os novos Estados-Membros, aumentarão. Se o actual mecanismo de correcção se mantiver em vigor, de acordo com as estimativas da Comissão, com base na sua proposta de perspectivas financeiras para 2007-2013, a correcção britânica aumentaria mais de 50%.

3.3. O projectado mecanismo de correcção generalizado

A Comissão propõe uma generalização do mecanismo de correcção, evoluindo da correcção existente, a fim de aproximar o sistema do objectivo inicial de evitar encargos orçamentais excessivos. A introdução de uma espécie de "rede de segurança" para grandes contribuintes líquidos, cuja contribuição líquida ultrapassa um certo nível, pode igualmente facilitar uma abordagem mais construtiva, a fim de garantir que o orçamento dá resposta aos desafios políticos da União alargada.

A futura correcção deve ser calculada com base no saldo orçamental líquido de cada Estado-Membro em relação ao orçamento da UE. O mecanismo devia ser suprimido se as contribuições líquidas ultrapassarem um limiar, expresso em percentagem do RNB de cada Estado-Membro, reflectindo o nível de solidariedade ilimitada mínimo aceite entre Estados-Membros. As posições líquidas que excedam esse limiar serão elegíveis para uma correcção (reembolso parcial), conferindo desta forma segurança contra contribuições líquidas excessivas. Inversamente, o volume total de correcções (volume do reembolso) será limitado a um montante máximo, garantindo assim aos que não beneficiam de uma correcção que não incorrerão em custos excessivos do mecanismo. Se o montante total de todas as correcções exceder o volume total previamente determinado, a taxa de reembolso é reduzida em consequência.

Qualquer mecanismo de correcção implica complicações para o financiamento do orçamento. Por conseguinte, a proposta de base deve ser relativamente simples e suficientemente transparente. Quanto a este aspecto, os parâmetros actuais utilizados para o cálculo da correcção britânica devem ser alterados apenas se necessário e simplificados se exequível.

O novo mecanismo proposto pela Comissão inclui os seguintes elementos:

- estabelecer um nível de limiar em percentagem do RNB;

- nivelar o volume total de correcções;

- simplificar o financiamento das correcções baseando-as nas partes do RNB, através das quais todos os Estados-Membros participam no financiamento do montante global das correcções em proporção da sua prosperidade relativa;

- manter o conceito de despesas repartidas e a taxa de reembolso até ao volume máximo inalterado.

De acordo com esta proposta, o Reino Unido seria de longe o maior beneficiário do mecanismo de correcção generalizado. Segundo a proposta da Comissão na próxima Perspectiva Financeira e a proposta relativa a um mecanismo de correcção generalizado, o Reino Unido receberia em média uma compensação líquida de aproximadamente o dobro da da Dinamarca.

>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>

O quadro supra ilustra a estimativa média dos saldos orçamentais líquidos dos Estados-Membros resultantes do projectado mecanismo de correcção generalizado durante o período até 2013 e compara-os à continuação do actual mecanismo e a uma situação sem qualquer correcção.

O mecanismo de correcção generalizado diminuirá os saldos líquidos negativos, reduzirá a distribuição entre os contribuintes líquidos e, por outro lado, diminuirá a carga financeira dos que não beneficiam do mecanismo [6].

[6] Para mais pormenores, ver o anexo técnico.

A Comissão apresenta separadamente uma proposta específica de alteração da actual decisão relativa aos recursos próprios tendo em vista a introdução do projectado mecanismo de correcção generalizado.

4. A estrutura de recursos próprios

4.1. Encontrar a melhor estrutura de recursos próprios

São seguidamente discutidas três alternativas básicas para o financiamento do orçamento comunitário. Nos três casos seriam mantidos os recursos próprios tradicionais (RPT), uma vez que a cobrança de direitos de importação constitui um instrumento da política comercial da União, cujo benefício reverte "naturalmente" para a União.

(1) Manutenção do actual sistema de financiamento inalterado

(2) O actual sistema de financiamento assegurou um financiamento sem problemas do orçamento comunitário. Contudo, na sua actual forma, o sistema de financiamento não dispõe de uma ligação directa com os cidadãos. Os ajustamentos efectuados anteriormente a fim de tomar em consideração interesses específicos reforçaram a opacidade do sistema. As consequências orçamentais das políticas da União permanecem assim impalpáveis para o público em geral. Com o peso esmagador do recurso RNB, os Estados-Membros, e em especial os contribuintes líquidos, tendem a avaliar as políticas e iniciativas comunitárias exclusivamente em termos da sua afectação nacional, dando pouca atenção à substância das políticas, correndo o risco de atenuar o valor acrescentado das políticas comunitárias.

(3) Devido à ausência de qualquer ligação e visibilidade por parte dos cidadãos da EU e ao crescente incentivo para uma tónica no conceito orçamental restritivo de 'juste retour', o mecanismo existente deve ser reformulado.

(4) Um sistema de financiamento puramente baseado no RNB

(5) No âmbito de um sistema de financiamento exclusivamente baseado no factor RNB, a União dependeria inteiramente das "contribuições" dos Estados-Membros. A vantagem de um sistema deste tipo é que seria simples e fácil de compreender. As "contribuições" corresponderiam estreitamente à prosperidade relativa dos Estados-Membros. No entanto, financiar o orçamento através de contribuições dos Estados-Membros pode ser apropriado para uma organização internacional como a ONU. Não reflecte, contudo, o estatuto da União Europeia. Implicaria uma ideia da União, em que os cidadãos estariam representados apenas indirectamente pelos seus Estados-Membros. O estatuto da UE enquanto uma União de Estados-Membros e de cidadãos, que se reflecte actualmente no Tratado, seria completamente abandonado no aspecto financiamento do orçamento. Isto, por seu lado, implicaria suprimir o conceito de recursos "próprios", que tem sido uma referência das finanças comunitárias desde a primeira decisão relativa aos recursos próprios em 1970. A Comissão rejeita uma tal alternativa.

(6) Um sistema de financiamento baseado em recursos próprios fiscais

(7) Um sistema baseado numa grande medida em recursos próprios com base nos impostos tem o potencial de aumentar a autonomia financeira do orçamento comunitário, criando uma relação financeira mais directa entre o orçamento comunitário e os cidadãos da UE. A mudança para indivíduos e operadores económicos enquanto contribuintes, e a correspondente redução das contribuições dos Estados-Membros para o financiamento do orçamento comunitário implicaria uma maior visibilidade para os cidadãos e, por conseguinte, uma maior responsabilidade política da autoridade orçamental no que diz respeito às suas decisões em matéria de despesas. Contribuiria também para mudar o debate político da tónica restritiva das contribuições nacionais para o mérito das políticas comunitárias e para o interesse europeu em geral. Finalmente, uma maior visibilidade reforçaria a confiança nas finanças comunitárias, cujo volume inferior a 2,5% das despesas públicas totais da UE é frequentemente sobrestimado.

(8) Todavia, também não se afigura apropriado um financiamento do orçamento comunitário completamente baseado nos impostos. Uma vez que o requisito do orçamento equilibrado constante do artigo 268º do Tratado não é nem devia ser posto em causa, um recurso fiscal assumindo o papel actual do RNB enquanto recurso de equilíbrio "residual" implicaria uma taxa de imposto variável consoante os requisitos orçamentais ou exigiria uma maior flexibilidade do lado das despesas do que o actual enquadramento das perspectivas financeiras permite. Contudo, alterações frequentes da taxa do imposto não seriam na prática bem recebidas pelos contribuintes (insegurança jurídica, procedimentos técnica e administrativamente complexos) e podiam colidir com a tributação nacional. Afigura-se preferível uma abordagem progressiva, que consiste na manutenção de um recurso RNB limitado, embora aumentando a parte dos recursos baseados nos impostos.

Uma reforma da estrutura dos recursos próprios devia, por conseguinte, centrar-se na introdução neutra orçamental de um novo recurso próprio baseado nos impostos, correspondente a metade do orçamento.

5. Em direcção a um sistema de financiamento baseado em contribuições dos Estados-Membros e dos cidadãos

5.1. Aumentar a parte dos recursos baseada nos impostos

A reforma do sistema de financiamento devia remediar as desvantagens do actual sistema, isto é, a ausência de uma ligação directa com os cidadãos da UE, a dependência das transferências a partir dos tesouros nacionais e a complexidade injustificada, contribuindo simultaneamente tanto quanto possível para uma afectação eficiente dos recursos. Outros critérios tornam-se menos relevantes para os novos recursos, desde que o sistema global lhes permita cumpri-los numa medida razoável.

Por razões de igualdade entre cidadãos nos diferentes Estados-Membros, a introdução de novos recursos fiscais exige uma harmonização prévia suficiente da matéria colectável. A escolha do recurso baseado nos impostos mais apropriado depende essencialmente do grau efectivo de harmonização da matéria colectável.

A existência de arbitrariedades regionais [7] ou a presença de externalidades transfronteiras constituem argumentos fortes para a harmonização das matérias colectáveis e das taxas, que podiam igualmente justificar a afectação da totalidade ou de parte das correspondentes receitas fiscais ao nível da UE. Isto podia contribuir para reduzir uma afectação ineficiente dos recursos económicos.

[7] As arbitrariedades regionais referem-se a uma situação em que é difícil determinar a proporção exacta de uma matéria colectável a afectar a cada Estado-Membro ou em que existe uma elevada (potencial) discrepância entre o país que cobra o imposto e o país de residência dos agentes económicos que suportam o encargo do imposto.

O aumento da parte dos recursos próprios baseados nos impostos para o orçamento comunitário não exige quaisquer novos impostos. Implica, contudo, uma decisão sobre a partilha de receitas ou taxas do imposto entre o nível nacional e o nível comunitário. A parte da UE podia ser aplicada enquanto parte da taxa nacional paga pelos contribuintes. O orçamento comunitário total, de qualquer modo limitado pelo limite máximo dos recursos próprios a um máximo de 1,24% do RNB-UE, não aumentaria, uma vez que as receitas do recurso baseado nos impostos seriam compensadas por uma redução correspondente do actual recurso baseado no RNB.

As secções que se seguem ilustram três opções principais a fim de melhorar o funcionamento do sistema de financiamento comunitário. As três mantêm o actual recurso baseado no RNB enquanto recurso de equilíbrio residual, bem como os recursos próprios tradicionais, mas assumem que até metade o orçamento é financiado por um novo recurso fiscal que substituiria também o actual IVA estatístico.

5.2. Opção 1 - Um sistema de recursos próprios com recursos fiscais relativos

ao consumo de energia

Nos termos do disposto na nova Directiva relativa à tributação da energia [8], a maior parte dos produtos energéticos estão sujeitos a tributação comunitária. Apesar de a directiva relativa à tributação da energia adoptada não estar preparada para o objectivo da introdução de novos recursos próprios, cria no entanto condições adequadas para o efeito, harmonizando matérias colectáveis e estabelecendo taxas mínimas.

[8] Directiva 2003/96/CE do Conselho, de 27.10.2003, que reestrutura o quadro comunitário de tributação dos produtos energéticos e da electricidade (JO L 283 de 31.10.2003).

Um recurso fiscal sobre os produtos energéticos não necessitaria, contudo, de se basear em todos os produtos abrangidos pela directiva. Um imposto comunitário podia limitar-se à matéria colectável relativa ao combustível utilizado para o transporte rodoviário (gasolina com chumbo e gasolina sem chumbo, gasóleo, GPL e gás natural para transportes). Isto seria relativamente simples de um ponto de vista administrativo, uma vez que a matéria colectável está já harmonizada a nível da UE e que a maior parte das possibilidades de diferenciação fiscal autorizada pela directiva são aplicáveis a outros produtos energéticos. As taxas comunitárias inferiores a metade das taxas mínimas na directiva relativa à tributação da energia seriam suficientes para financiar metade do orçamento comunitário. As principais decisões apoiar-se-iam nas taxas a aplicar e em eventuais variações consoante o produto e a utilização.

Um imposto comunitário sobre o combustível para aviões ou sobre as respectivas emissões podia constituir um complemento útil para um imposto sobre o combustível para o transporte rodoviário. O sistema europeu de transporte aéreo está plenamente integrado e as emissões dos aviões ultrapassam as fronteiras nacionais. Existem, por conseguinte, argumentos válidos para tributar essas emissões a nível da UE, como forma de internalizar os custos socioeconómicos externos da mudança do clima e outros efeitos ambientais causados pela aviação nos preços das viagens aéreas. Todavia, o combustível para a aviação (querosene) está actualmente isenta de tributação no que diz respeito aos voos transfronteiras.

De um ponto de vista técnico, seria possível a introdução de um recurso fiscal baseado no combustível para o transporte rodoviário num espaço de tempo relativamente curto (cerca de 3 a 6 anos).

5.3. Opção 2 - Um sistema de recursos próprios com um recurso fiscal IVA

Devido à sua ligação directa com o consumo diário, e contrariamente ao actual recurso "IVA" estatístico, a aplicação de uma taxa comunitária às matérias colectáveis do IVA criaria uma clara ligação directa entre o financiamento do orçamento comunitário e o cidadão e aumentaria a consciencialização dos custos da União.

Um recurso IVA genuinamente fiscal seria aplicado através de uma taxa comunitária como parte da taxa do IVA nacional paga pelos contribuintes. A taxa seria cobrada juntamente com a taxa nacional na mesma matéria colectável. Os cidadãos não teriam de suportar um imposto adicional, uma vez que a taxa comunitária seria compensada por uma redução equivalente da taxa do IVA nacional. Por exemplo, se a taxa do IVA nacional fosse de 21% e uma taxa comunitária de 1%, a taxa nacional diminuiria para 20%. A taxa do IVA total cobrada continuaria a ser de 21%.

Para efeitos de visibilidade, o IVA comunitário e o IVA nacional apareceriam como impostos distintos na factura ou recibo que o sujeito passivo fornece ao seu cliente.

Uma taxa comunitária de 1% seria suficiente para cobrir cerca de metade das necessidades financeiras do orçamento comunitário.

As potenciais dificuldades com que a presente proposta se pode confrontar dizem respeito à harmonização incompleta dos sistemas do IVA dos Estados-Membros principalmente associados aos bens à taxa zero. Uma outra dificuldade potencial pode decorrer de uma parte diferente da base do IVA no rendimento nacional nos Estados-Membros (a denominada regressividade do IVA), que desde 1998 levou os Estados-Membros a reduzirem a sua parte nos recursos próprios. Por outro lado, do ponto de vista do consumidor, a taxa comunitária teria o mesmo impacto em consumidores comparáveis em toda a União [9].

[9] Partindo do princípio que os efeitos das taxas zero são neutralizados (ver igualmente o anexo do presente relatório).

De um ponto de vista técnico, seria possível a introdução de uma taxa do IVA comunitária num espaço de tempo relativamente curto (até 6 anos).

5.4. Opção 3 - Um sistema de recursos próprios com um recurso fiscal baseado

no rendimento das pessoas colectivas

Quanto às duas outras opções, um recurso comunitário fiscal baseado no rendimento das pessoas colectivas também exigiria uma definição prévia de uma matéria colectável comum (consolidada), que seria aplicada às empresas. Essa harmonização contribuiria para o funcionamento adequado do mercado interno e para uma afectação mais eficiente dos recursos económicos, que são actualmente falseados por externalidades transfronteiras. Hoje em dia, a existência de 25 sistemas fiscais nacionais distintos e a multiplicidade de legislação fiscal, convenções e práticas representa por si só um obstáculo às actividades económicas transfronteiras. Impõe custos de aplicação substanciais às empresas que operam para além das fronteiras na UE e conduz a inúmeras deficiências no sistema fiscal.

Os trabalhos em curso no que diz respeito a uma reforma abrangente da tributação das empresas centram-se no conceito de uma matéria colectável comum (consolidada), com toda a probabilidade para um grupo de Estados-Membros interessados, no sentido de suprimir obstáculos fiscais ao mercado interno. Estes trabalhos não prevêem quaisquer medidas sobre taxas do imposto, nem são concebidos como método de mobilizar receitas para o orçamento comunitário.

A opção de um imposto sobre o rendimento das pessoas colectivas implicaria a fixação de uma taxa mínima do imposto sobre a matéria colectável harmonizada.

As receitas provenientes de impostos sobre o rendimento das pessoas colectivas são significativas, representando actualmente na UE a totalidade destas receitas em termos médios 2,6% do RNB comunitário. Assim, para as necessidades do orçamento comunitário, seria preciso afectar à UE menos de um quarto dessas receitas.

Dada a situação actual, esta alternativa levaria mais tempo a aplicar, tanto do ponto de vista político como administrativo.

6. Síntese e conclusões

A introdução de um novo recurso próprio baseado nos impostos, que substituiria o actual recurso baseado no IVA para fins estatísticos e financiaria uma parte significativa do orçamento comunitário, possibilitaria ultrapassar as principais desvantagens do actual sistema, isto é, a ausência de uma ligação directa com os cidadãos da UE, uma esmagadora dependência das transferências a partir dos tesouros nacionais e uma complexidade injustificada. Podia igualmente contribuir para uma afectação mais adequada dos recursos económicos na UE. Embora representando uma parte mais reduzida dos recursos próprios totais do que no sistema actual, o recurso baseado no RNB devia continuar a desempenhar um papel importante e garantir que o sistema cumpre razoavelmente todos os critérios relevantes.

A Comissão propõe três hipóteses principais como eventuais futuros recursos próprios fiscais: um recurso baseado 1. no consumo de energia; 2. nas bases do IVA nacionais e 3. no rendimento das pessoas colectivas.

Um recurso baseado no consumo de energia e concebido enquanto imposto comunitário sobre o combustível para o transporte rodoviário constituiria uma fonte de financiamento suficiente e estável para o orçamento comunitário e criaria uma ligação directa com os cidadãos. A matéria colectável está já harmonizada a nível comunitário. Podia ser complementado por um imposto comunitário sobre o combustível para aviões ou sobre as respectivas emissões, pondo assim termo à actual isenção do imposto sobre o combustível para jactos e fixando um preço para os custos ambientais da aviação.

A harmonização da matéria colectável no domínio do IVA está bastante avançada e constitui uma fonte de receitas suficiente e estável. Um recurso IVA fiscal tornaria o financiamento da UE bastante visível para os cidadãos da UE. Seria também evolutivo, uma vez que daria origem a uma reforma das disposições em vigor em vez da introdução de um recurso completamente novo. De um ponto de vista administrativo, a sua introdução não apresentaria quaisquer dificuldades inultrapassáveis.

Devido à sua ligação com uma política comum comunitária e à presença de externalidades transfronteiras, as receitas provenientes de uma matéria colectável do imposto sobre as sociedades harmonizada seria também uma fonte de financiamento adequada para o orçamento comunitário.

A União Europeia é uma União de Estados-Membros e de cidadãos. Qualquer das três hipóteses de recursos próprios fiscais anteriormente analisadas transporia este conceito para o domínio do financiamento do orçamento comunitário. O reforço da ligação directa dos cidadãos ao orçamento ajudaria igualmente a centrar os debates sobre as despesas na substância e não em "posições líquidas" do orçamento puramente "nacionais".

Obviamente, qualquer nova afectação de um recurso ao orçamento comunitário tem não só de ser decidido por unanimidade pelo Conselho, mas também tem de ser ratificado pelos Parlamentos de todos os Estados-Membros.

A aplicação de um recurso baseado na energia e no IVA seria exequível a médio prazo, enquanto um recurso fiscal baseado no rendimento das pessoas colectivas deve ser considerado uma opção a muito mais longo prazo. O que é necessário agora é uma orientação política para preparar as condições para a reforma da estrutura dos recursos próprios existentes. Quanto a este aspecto, a Comissão insta o Conselho a:

- debater as opções propostas no presente relatório;

- tomar nota da intenção da Comissão de preparar um plano para substituir, com base numa proposta da Comissão, o actual recurso IVA por um recurso próprio verdadeiramente baseado nos impostos até 2014.

A fim de apresentar uma solução de curto prazo para a questão dos desequilíbrios orçamentais excessivos, que esteja operacional a partir do início das próximas Perspectivas Financeiras, a Comissão propõe:

- a introdução de um mecanismo de correcção generalizado a fim de corrigir desequilíbrios orçamentais excessivos de acordo com a projectada decisão do Conselho relativa ao sistema de recursos próprios e com as medidas de execução propostas que a acompanham.

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Financing the European Union Commission

report on the operation of the own resources system

INTRODUCTION

Article 9 of the current own resources decision [1] calls on the Commission to

[1] Council decision (2000/597, EC, Euratom) on the system of the European Communities' own resources, OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42.

'undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources system, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of all relevant factors, including the effects of enlargement on the financing of the budget, the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources by creating new autonomous own resources and the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United Kingdom as well as the granting to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction pursuant to Article 5(1)'.

In response to a request from the European Parliament and in agreement with the Council, the Commission committed itself to present the abovementioned review on the functioning of the financing system before the end of 2004.

On 10 February 2004, the Commission adopted its communication [2] on 'Building our common future - Policy challenges and budgetary means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013'. The communication identified two main elements of the current own resources system deserving closer attention: first, the insufficient transparency of the system for EU citizens combined with limited financial autonomy from national treasuries; secondly, the need to reform the existing mechanism for correction of negative budgetary imbalances.

[2] COM(2004) 101 final of 10 February 2004.

This report reviews those issues in more detail. For this purpose it is divided in four parts.

Part I of the report presents the main features of the current system, the relevant assessment criteria and provides an assessment of the functioning of the current financing system.

Part II examines the existing mechanism to correct budgetary imbalances and proposes to replace it with a generalised mechanism for correcting excessive negative budgetary balances in order to ensure an equitable treatment of net contributors at comparable levels of prosperity and financing costs that are kept at a reasonable level.

Part III reviews alternative scenarios for the system of financing the EU budget and outlines possible own resources systems that in the longer term might allow certain drawbacks of the current own resources system to be overcome. It is important to stress that future modifications of the own resources system in line with what is proposed in Part III would probably require a review of the generalised correction mechanism proposed in Part II.

Thus, whereas part II is to be seen as the short term adjustment of the current system in order to address the main outstanding issue, part III offers for the longer term the outline of a system that would be more effective, transparent and democratic.

Finally, Part IV of the report presents the final comments.

PART I - THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CURRENT OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM

This part provides an overview of the current system of own resources, presents the criteria used for assessing the performance of own resources individually and together as a system, and then provides an overall assessment.

1. The current own resources system

The current own resources system is the result of successive modifications of the original system introduced in 1970. The latest modifications were decided by the European Council in Berlin in 1999 and implemented through the own resources decision of 29 September 2000 [3] (see below).

[3] See footnote 1.

The current own resources may be divided into three categories that are used to finance the budget in a sequential way, i.e. recourse is made to the following category only when the previous one is exhausted. In practice this means that the third category, the one related to the gross national income (GNI) of Member States, is the residual one used to balance the budget. It is also the only resource to be affected by modifications of budgeted expenditure during the implementation of the budget, i.e. stemming from amendments to the budget. The three categories of own resources are the following:

(1) So-called traditional own resources (TOR). These are mainly [4] customs duties and are collected by Member States on behalf of the EU. Member States retain a fixed percentage of the amounts collected as a compensation for their costs of collecting them. The percentage was increased from 10 % to 25 % as from 2001.

[4] Traditional own resources also include agricultural duties, i.e. import duties collected on agricultural products, and sugar levies. Together, these two categories are estimated to account for around 10 % of total TOR and 1.2 % of total own resources in 2004).

(2) The resource based on value added tax (VAT). This resource is levied on the notional harmonised VAT bases of Member States. The statistical 'notional' VAT bases are calculated in order to compensate for differences in national VAT regimes due to incomplete harmonisation of VAT at EU level. The notional VAT base is calculated, for each Member State, by dividing total national VAT receipts by the so-called weighted average rate of VAT. The weighted average rate is derived from macro-economic statistics (mainly national accounts). In order to take account of the specific national procedures and arrive at a harmonised base for all Member States, changes are made, either to the net revenue collected (known as 'corrections'), or to the VAT base (known as 'financial compensations'). This implies, once again, that statistical elements are used in the calculation of the VAT base rather than fiscal data.

Furthermore, the notional VAT base is 'capped', where applicable [5], at 50 % of each Member States' GNI to reduce the effect of the 'regressive' character [6] of VAT. In practice, this turns the VAT-based own resource into a GNI-based resource for the countries concerned by the capping rule. Any increase in VAT receipts in a Member State whose VAT base is capped will have no effect on the EU VAT resource.

[5] Forecasts for 2005 indicate that for 13 out of 25 Member States their VAT base will exceed 50 % of their GNI.

[6] The share of consumption in national income tends to be higher in relatively less prosperous countries. As a result, VAT revenue tends to be proportionally higher than in more prosperous countries.

A uniform percentage rate is levied on the capped and harmonised VAT bases of all Member States. This call rate cannot exceed 0.5 % of the base but is furthermore reduced to take into account the theoretical impact of the amount of the UK correction (see below).

(3) The GNI-based resource. This resource is levied as a uniform rate in proportion to the GNI of each Member State. There is no particular limit on this rate, other than the own resources ceiling that limits the total amount of all own resources to a maximum of 1.24 % of the EU's GNI.

Finally, a specific mechanism for correcting the budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom is also part of the own resources system. The basic principle of the correction mechanism is to reimburse the UK by 66 % of its budgetary imbalance. The mechanism reduces the own resources payments of the UK and increases the payments of all other Member States, including the 10 new Member States joining in 2004. The correction mechanism has been modified on several occasions since its introduction in 1985 in order to neutralise the impact on the UK budgetary balance of each subsequent modification of the own resources system. Several additional layers have therefore been added to the original calculation, rendering the mechanism increasingly complex and non-transparent.

According to the rules of the own resources system the amount of the UK correction also has an impact on the rate of call of VAT, which is reduced by a percentage theoretically needed to finance the correction ('the frozen rate'). This is a relic from the time the correction was financed on the basis of Member States' shares in the EU VAT base, whereas since 1988 the financing is in reality calculated on the basis of GNI.

The cost of the correction is borne by the other Member States in proportion to their GNI. However, in order to alleviate the budgetary imbalances of four other Member States (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden) these countries pay only 25 % of their normal share. The financing of this reduction is added to the payments of the remaining 20 Member States.

The latest changes to the own resources system were implemented through the current own resources decision of 29 September 2000 and notably concerned the following elements:

- An increase in the percentage of traditional own resources retained by Member States from 10 % to 25 %.

- A reduction of the maximum rate of call of the VAT resource from 1 % to 0.75 % in 2002 and 0.5 % in 2004.

- Some changes to the method of calculating the UK correction in order to compensate for effects related to enlargement and the increase in the percentage of traditional own resources retained by Member States.

- A reduction of the share of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden in the financing of the UK correction to one fourth of its normal value. Previously only Germany had a reduction, by one third, of its financing share.

- The European system of accounts 1995 (ESA 95) replaced the previous version, ESA 79, also in the budgetary and own resources area. As a consequence gross national income (GNI) replaced the concept of gross national product (GNP) in the area of the EU budget.

This package further reinforced the declining trend of traditional and VAT-based own resources and the corresponding increase in the relative share of the GNP/GNI- based contributions.

Table 1 - The composition of EU own resources

(in per cent of total own resources; cash basis)

>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>

1 As from 2002 the % of TOR retained by Member States as a compensation for their collection costs

was raised from 10 % to 25 %. This difference represented about EUR 2.2 billion in 2002 as well as in 2003.

2 Preliminary draft amending budget 8/2004 (EU-25).

3 Preliminary draft budget 2005.

2. Assessment criteria

The own resources system and individual own resources can be assessed against specific criteria. It is virtually impossible for individual own resources to satisfy all criteria. However, a system based on a combination of resources of different natures may reasonably meet the different criteria. The 'systemic' assessment is discussed in more detail in part III of the report.

The following seven assessment criteria are relevant to this report:

- Visibility and simplicity; i.e. the financing of the EU budget should be visible to and understood by EU citizens.

- Financial autonomy; i.e. the financing of the EU budget should provide a sufficient degree of autonomy from national treasuries to reduce the tendency towards a narrow focus on national interest. Autonomy is enhanced if the financing relies to a significant degree on a direct link with citizens/taxpayers.

- Efficient allocation; i.e. the financing of the EU should contribute to an efficient allocation of economic resources, for example by contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market or by setting a price tag on negative externalities, such as pollution.

- Sufficiency; i.e. the resources used for financing the EU must be sufficient to cover the expenditure of the EU in the long run. As for individual own resources, their yield should be significant in relation to the size of the EU budget.

- Cost-effectiveness; the administration costs should be low relative to the yield.

- Stability; the resources should be reasonably stable over time.

- Equity in gross contributions; i.e. the burden should be fairly shared among Member States as well as citizens.

A more extensive presentation of these criteria can be found in annex I to this report.

3. Assessing the performance of the current own resources system

To summarise the conclusions of this section, the current system has performed well as regards the criteria of sufficiency and stability, but clearly fails to fulfil the visibility and simplicity criterion and it does not contribute significantly to a more efficient allocation of economic resources. The financing system has grown increasingly complex over time, making it difficult even for the interested citizen to understand how it works. Financial autonomy is, furthermore, becoming increasingly limited. Although the financing of the budget is ensured by rules that are binding for all Member States, there is virtually no direct link to citizens or tax-payers. Instead the financing of the budget relies on transfers from national treasuries. As for the remaining criteria the current financing system has shown various shortcomings, as explained more in detail below.

3.1. Visibility and simplicity

The current financing system is mainly and increasingly based on national contributions paid directly by the treasuries of Member States to the Commission and lacks a visible direct link to citizens. Most citizens do not know what they pay to the EU budget. This gives much scope for misperceptions of the costs and for a feeling of unfair burden-sharing.

In the current system, traditional own resources (TOR) is the only direct link between the EU budget and the citizens, since they are levied directly on the economic agents paying the import duty. However, since it is a relatively small number of agents that bear the direct burden of the tax and since TOR only represent a very small part of total own resources, they do not contribute much to the visibility of the EU budget.

The lack of a direct and visible link to the EU citizens also results in reduced accountability of the European Parliament, which might make it less sensitive to the cost of financing different policy measures.

Furthermore, the current system has grown increasingly complex over time, making it difficult even for the interested citizen to understand how it works. The VAT resource is levied on a theoretical harmonised base in order to compensate for national derogations from Community VAT legislation and varying tax rates, requiring complicated calculations. Moreover, because of the tendency of the VAT base to be relatively higher in less prosperous Member States (i.e. the so-called regressivity of the VAT base), rules for limiting the base as a percentage of the national income ('capping') have been introduced. The VAT-based contribution from capped countries is therefore in practice based on their gross national income. The main reason for the lack of transparency of the system is, however, the UK correction. Not only is the correction mechanism itself highly complex, the amount of the correction also influences the rate of call of both the VAT and the GNI resource. Finally, in order to alleviate the net budgetary position of other large net contributors, some Member States have been granted a 'rebate on the rebate', i.e. a reduction on the financing of the correction, the cost of which is borne by the remaining Member States.

3.2. Financial autonomy

The rules governing the financing of the budget are laid down in detail in the own resources decision and its different implementing provisions, which are binding for all Member States. The financing of expenditure is therefore guaranteed up to the own resources ceiling. This also means that the financing of the annual budget is completely technical with no room for political discussions. The budgetary authority's room of manoeuvre is extremely restricted, since the level and composition of revenue are largely determined by the own resources decision and by the strict application of the rule of budgetary balance. The financial sufficiency of the EU budget is ensured. As for financial autonomy from the treasuries of the Member States the picture is, however, quite different.

Traditional own resources (TOR) currently represent the only truly fiscal own resources of the EU. They are collected by Member States on behalf of the EU, after deduction of 25 % of the amount collected. The percentage deducted represents an increase compared to the 10 % retained by Member States prior to 2001 (see also next section). As a result, the weight of these fiscal resources in the financing of the EU budget was reduced. TOR do, however, only represent around 10 % of total own resources.

The other own resources are calculated as a percentage of statistical aggregates (GNI or the notional harmonised VAT base) and paid directly by the treasuries of Member States to the Commission. The GNI-resource, initially envisaged as the 'residual' resource to ensure a balanced budget, has in fact become the overwhelming source of revenue for the EU budget.

The increasing dependence of the EU budget on inter-governmental transfers from national treasuries, accounting for almost 90 % of EU total revenue in later years, encourages Member States to seek to maximise ill-defined concepts of national benefit from the EU budget. Such a trend may well impair the future EU budget to adequately reflect the new challenges and needs to meet the legitimate expectations and concerns of all European citizens. In shaping a European Union with more than 25 Member States, narrow national interests will need to be pushed into the background, allowing instead for serious and more focused discussions about common European concerns. Increased autonomy of the EU budget from national treasuries would contribute to a more constructive approach to the benefits of the Union's policies.

Financing the budget by contributions of the members is adequate for an international organisation. It does not necessarily reflect the status of the European Union and is in contradiction with the spirit of the treaty provision, introduced in 1970, whereby the Community budget should be financed by own resources.

3.3. Efficient allocation of economic resources

As the current own resources are mainly levied directly on the treasuries of the Member States, they do not have a direct impact on the relative prices in the economy and the behaviour of the economic agents.

It is only the traditional own resources (TOR) that have a direct impact on relative prices (on imported goods relative to goods produced in the Union) and therefore on the allocation decisions of the economic agents. TOR are, however, the result of common policies such as the customs union and the common agricultural policy and were not primarily introduced for the purpose of financing the EU budget. Due to the mismatch between the country collecting the duties and the country of residence of the economic agents bearing the economic burden of this tax it was then logical to attribute the corresponding revenue to the EU level. The introduction of a Common Customs Tariff has contributed to an efficient allocation of economic resources between Member States by creating a level playing field for import of goods into the Union.

In this context it could also be mentioned that the increase from 10 % to 25 % in the percentage of traditional own resources retained by Member States was introduced irrespective of the actual collection costs. To a large extent it was the result of difficult negotiations about ways to correct excessive negative budgetary balances. The current level could, however, be seen as a useful incentive for Member States to collect TOR. On the other hand, it is not necessarily the Member States bearing the highest costs related to the protection of the external border of the Union that collect the duties and retain the corresponding 25 % of the collected amount. This is because customs operations are undertaken in stages in different Member States. Under the present system, Member States undertaking controls at the external frontier may be in a less favourable position than those Member States actually collecting the duties. In this regard, it is not surprising that some Member States have concluded bilateral agreements, especially in the context of simplified customs procedures, in order to share the 25 % compensation for the costs of collecting import duties in order to better reflect the actual collection and control costs.

Although the present VAT-based resource has today in practice evolved into a national contribution, it earlier served as an impetus for establishing a common VAT system and therefore contributed to the proper functioning of the internal market.

3.4. Sufficiency and stability

The present system has generated sufficient and stable resources to finance expenditure plans. The decline of traditional and VAT-based own resources is automatically compensated by the GNI-based resource, which guarantees financing up to the own resources ceiling of 1.24 % of total EU GNI. The margin available under the own resources ceiling in the current financial perspective is around 0.15 % of EU GNI for the whole 2000-2006 period.

3.5. Cost-effectiveness

The collection of TOR and VAT is the duty of Member States. The collection of traditional own resources is cumbersome and demands significant administrative resources. However, import duties are primarily levied to protect producers in the Union [7] and not to finance the EU budget. The costs of collecting them should therefore only marginally be charged to the financing rules of the EU. Furthermore, if import duties were not to be attributed to the EU level, given the mismatch between the country collecting the duties and the country of residence of the economic agents bearing the economic burden of this tax, complex tax-sharing rules would normally have to be defined, which would entail additional costs.

[7] Furthermore, in shaping its common commercial policy the Union does not act alone but in the multilateral context of the World Trade Organisation.

The VAT-based resource imposes an additional workload on national administrations, since the harmonised VAT resources base is only calculated for the purposes of the EU budget. However, this can be considered as acceptable in relation to its potential yield. The administrative cost of the GNI resource is marginal, since it is incurred for the establishment of national accounts, irrespective of the EU budget.

3.6. Equity

Equity may refer to the situation of individuals or to the fair burden-sharing among Member States. Since the budget is currently financed almost exclusively by contributions from Member States, the assessment here focuses on equity between Member States.

As the ability to contribute to the EU budget can best be measured by a nation's national income, the increasing importance of the GNI [8] resource means that equity between Member States in the financing of the budget has improved over time. As the GNI resource now accounts for ¾ of total own resources in the 2004 budget, Member States' contributions are, generally speaking, becoming closely correlated to income levels across Member States.

[8] Prior to 2002 the GNP (gross national product) resource.

There is, however, one important exception to this rule. Due to the specific correction mechanism in its favour, the UK contributes clearly less than the other Member States in relation to its GNI. Furthermore, the UK correction also distorts equity indirectly since the financing of the correction by the other Member States is not proportional to GNI. The distorting effect of the UK correction is, furthermore expected to increase in the future due to enlargements of the Union.

PART II - PREVENTING EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE BUDGETARY IMBALANCES

1. Introduction

The European Union creates a community of solidarity with parts of the EU budget serving a clear cohesion goal, whereas other parts fund the achievement of specific objectives through EU agreed programmes. As a result, net beneficiaries of, and net contributors to, the EU budget will always exist, although the policy benefits accrue to the Union as a whole.

Budgetary balances (also called net balances), measured by the difference between contributions to and receipts from the EU budget, fail to account fully for the benefits resulting from EU membership. For example, research or border protection expenditure benefits not only the immediate recipients but also gives rise to spill-over effects transcending national borders [9]. It may not be possible to quantify the extent of these spill-overs, but their consideration would modify the assessment of the accounting imbalances.

[9] These spill-over effects include the spending of income generated in the receiving Member State on goods or services produced in another Member State, the purchase of financial asset denominated in various Member States currencies etc.

The definition of budgetary balances is also fraught with significant conceptual and accounting problems. Numerous choices have to be made in computing budgetary balances on the items to be included in the receipts and expenditure flows, and on the reference periods (e.g. cash vs. accrual figures, surpluses from previous years, etc.). The resulting budgetary balances vary significantly depending on the choices made.

Nevertheless, the size of some of these imbalances has been at the centre of discussions. After years of budgetary stalemate and agonizing discussions in 1984 the Fontainebleau European Council introduced the existing UK correction, which was then given effect by the own resources decision of 7 May 1985. The decision was based on the following general principle [10]:

[10] See Fontainebleau European Council, 'Conclusions of the Presidency', Bulletin of the European Communities, 6-1984.

'... any Member State sustaining a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.'

The principle of a generalised correction was therefore already acknowledged by the European Council in 1984 ('any Member State'). The decision for granting a correction should be based on two criteria: the size of the budgetary imbalance ('excessive') and the wealth of a Member State compared to the EU as a whole ('relative prosperity').

The justifications for granting a correction on an exclusive basis to the UK are today less justified than at the time of the Fontainebleau European Council, since several other Member States can legitimately claim that their current situation is comparable to the UK's. Furthermore, the cost of enlargement should be fairly shared. Consequently, it is argued that, in light of the principle set in the Fontainebleau conclusions, the conditions exist for the introduction of a generalised correction mechanism. The parameters defining such a correction mechanism are examined and a proposal is made with the twin goals of:

- preventing excessive negative budgetary balances combined with a reduction of differences between net contributors at comparable levels of prosperity;

- ensuring that the financing costs of the mechanism are kept at a reasonable level.

After briefly recalling the origin and main effects of the existing UK correction (Section 2), this report provides a brief analysis of the UK's relative prosperity and net budgetary balance in comparison with the other net contributors (Section 3). The subsequent sections of the report contain an analysis of the likely evolution of the UK correction till 2013 (Section 4) and examine proposals for a possible phasing out of that correction in its current form (Section 5). Section 6 defines the key parameters for a generalised correction mechanism and, finally, Section 7 proposes a new generalised mechanism to correct excessive negative budgetary imbalances.

2. The budgetary compensation for the United Kingdom

2.1. Origin of the mechanism

The budgetary imbalance of the United Kingdom was at the centre of the political debate for about a decade (1974-1984), frequently provoking stalemates in the EU decision-making process. The question appeared immediately after the accession of the country to the European Community. The large negative budgetary balance of the UK at that time was essentially due to two factors:

(a) an agricultural sector relatively smaller and structurally different from those of other Member States, which results in lower CAP spending in the United Kingdom;

(b) a proportionally larger contribution to the financing of the EU budget [11].

[11] The United Kingdom had a relatively higher share in the harmonised VAT base than in the total GNP of the EU. At that time the VAT resource was the primary source of EU revenue. The GNI resource was introduced in 1988.

Furthermore, it should be recalled that during the first years after its accession, the United Kingdom was one of the least prosperous Member States with a GDP per capita well below the EU average [12]. This tended to exacerbate the problem of the UK's negative budgetary balance.

[12] In the five years preceding the introduction of the UK correction (1979-1983), only Ireland (and as of 1981 Greece) had a lower GDP per capita than the UK, expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS).

The issue was finally settled at the Fontainebleau European Council of 1984 and the resulting rebate mechanism constitutes an integral part of the own resources decisions (ORD) taken subsequently. Being an integral part of the ORD, the UK rebate continues until modified or abolished by a new ORD. Modifications to the ORD require unanimity in Council and ratification by all national Parliaments. The rebate was reviewed in 1988, 1992 and 1999 and on all occasions the European Council decided to maintain it.

2.2. Description of the mechanism

While technically very complicated to calculate, the underlying principle of the UK correction mechanism is quite simple: to reimburse to the UK 66% of its net contribution to the EU budget. In essence this is calculated in three steps.

- The UK's percentage share in allocated expenditure (i.e. what the UK receives from the EU budget) is subtracted from the UK's percentage share in payments to the EU budget [13].

[13] These payments exclude payments of so-called traditional own resources, which are considered as resources that cannot be allocated to individual Member States.

- This difference is multiplied by the total amount of allocated expenditure [14] to obtain a measure of the UK's net contribution to the EU budget.

[14] Allocated expenditure includes all utilised appropriations for payments, with the exception of external expenditure (namely expenditure headings 4, 6 and 7 of the current financial perspective 2000-2006) and expenditure that cannot be reasonable allocated or identified. However, pre-accession expenditure relating to actual payments in the last year before accession of any acceding country is also deducted from allocated expenditure.

- The result is multiplied by 0.66 (i.e. 66% percent of the whole net contribution is reimbursed).

Most of the additional complications in the calculation arise from the fact that the overall contribution to the EU budget actually paid by the UK (including so-called traditional own resources and the UK correction) has to be equivalent to the overall contribution that the UK would have paid if the rules of the 1985 ORD (i.e. the rules that were applicable as a result of the Fontainebleau European Council) were still in force today. In practice this means that all subsequent modifications to the own resources system, introduced by successive ORD's, have to be neutralised through the calculation of the UK rebate. This includes the effect of the introduction of the GNP/GNI resource, the reduction of the VAT call rate, the capping of the VAT base and the increase of the traditional own resources collection costs [15].

[15] Besides the issues mentioned in this paragraph, the UK rebate also complicates the calculation of the VAT own resource through the mechanism of the so-called 'frozen' rate of call for VAT. While the original logic behind the 'frozen' rate disappeared in 1988 with the introduction of the GNP own resource, the mechanism continues to exist today. It now functions as a complicated and roundabout way to reduce the VAT own resource.

The financing of the correction for a given year 't' is made up by all the Member States in accordance with their respective percentage shares in GNI payments in the year t+1, with the following exceptions:

- the UK does not participate in the financing of its own rebate;

- the share of DE, NL, AT and SE is restricted to 25% of the shares resulting from the calculation above. The difference is made up by the remaining 10 (20 since May 2004) Member States according to their share in GNI payments.

3. Current situation of the UK compared to other net contributors

This section examines the relative prosperity and the size of the net budgetary balances for all net contributors to the EU budget.

3.1. Relative degree of prosperity

The table below gives an overview of the gross national income (GNI) per capita expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS [16]) for the years 2003 and 1984 for all Member States that were net contributor in the year 2002 [17]. (The 2003 figures for all 25 Member States are presented in the annexed Table I.

[16] The PPS is an artificial currency that reflects differences in national price levels that are not taken into account by exchange rates. This unit allows meaningful volume comparisons of economic indicators among countries. Data on PPS are calculated by Eurostat.

[17] Net balances presented in this document, like those used for the UK correction, are calculated including administrative expenditure. For this reason, Belgium and Luxembourg do not appear among the net contributors.

>POSIÇÃO NUMA TABELA>

In 2003, GNI per capita of all net contributors to the EU budget, expressed in PPS, ranges between 97% and 111% of the EU-15 average. At 111.2%, the UK's relative prosperity is at the top of the range. This is in sharp contrast with the situation in 1984, when the UK was the least prosperous of the net contributors and only Greece and Ireland had a lower GNI per capita than the UK.

In view of the considerable shift in the UK's position compared to the other net contributors, it is therefore necessary to reassess whether the UK correction mechanism as it stands is still justified in light of the Fontainebleau principle whereby a Member State's net balance should be viewed in relation to its relative prosperity.

3.2. Net budgetary balances before UK correction

The net budgetary balance of the UK for the year 1985 (the first year for which the correction was calculated) amounted to -0.48% of GNI before correction. (Although accurate data are not available for the other Member States, Germany was the only other major net contributor to the EU budget at that time.) As illustrated in the table below, on average the UK's net balance has remained at a comparable level in recent years. Over the period 1996-2002 the net budgetary balance of EU-15 net contributors - before UK correction and including administrative expenditure - was on average the following:

Table 2

Net budgetary balances before UK correction

for EU-15 selected members (annual averages 1996-2002)

// in % of GNI

United Kingdom // -0.47%

Germany // -0.44%

Netherlands // -0.43%

Sweden // -0.38%

Austria // -0.24%

Italy // -0.06%

France // -0.04%

Average net budgetary balances for the period 2008-2013 [18] will deteriorate for all net contributors across-the-board because of the financing cost of enlargement. According to internal Commission estimates and assuming expenditure levels equal to the financial perspective ceilings as proposed by the Commission in its communication of 10 February 2003 [19], the estimated net balances of the net contributors would be the following. (The figures for all 25 Member States are presented in the annexed Table II).

[18] The net balances for the period 2007-2013 have been estimated on the basis of the expenditure level (payment appropriations) as proposed by the Commission for the EU-27. Where feasible, the allocation across Member States was based on a detailed calculation on the basis of an established methodology (e.g. cohesion expenditure). In other cases, an indicative breakdown was used on the basis of historical data. Expenditure for the 10 new Member States that acceded on 1 May 2004 was calculated according to an identical methodology as for the EU-15, except for the phasing-in of the EAGGF Guarantee direct payments. Expenditure for Bulgaria and Romania is included in a manner which is coherent with the Commission communication Financial package for the accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania, SEC(2004) 160/4 adopted on 10 February 2004.

[19] COM(2004) 101 final.

Table 3

Estimated net budgetary balances before UK correction

for EU-15 selected members (annual averages 2008-2013 [20])

[20] As corrections are reimbursed one year later, averages in this table and the following ones are calculated over a six-year period since the 2007 correction is paid in 2008 and the 2013 correction takes place in 2014.

// in % of GNI

United Kingdom // -0.62%

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.52%

Sweden // -0.47%

Austria // -0.37%

Italy // -0.29%

France // -0.27%

Denmark // -0.20%

Finland // -0.14%

Under the assumption that the level of agricultural expenditure for the EU-25 agreed by the Brussels European Council in October 2002 and the 'cohesion' expenditure proposed by the Commission under the so-called Objective 1 and Cohesion fund remained unchanged, a reduction of the overall level of payment appropriations from the 1.14% of GNI proposed by the Commission to, say, 1.00%, would only have a very limited impact on the size of the estimated net balances. This is because the expenditure for the new Member States would in essence not be touched and the reduction could only be achieved by drastically cutting the other non-agricultural expenditure going to the EU-15 and/or external expenditure that does not enter in the calculation of net balances. As a consequence, the resulting reduction of own resources payments for the net contributors would to a large extent be offset by a corresponding reduction in EU allocated expenditure in these same Member States.

In the absence of any correction mechanism, the UK would have been on average the largest net contributor over the last 7 years, and would probably remain the largest net contributor to the EU budget over the period 2007-2013. However, the net balances of NL, DE and, to a lesser extent, SE have been and are expected to remain of a comparable order of magnitude. As shown in the previous section, all these three Member States are currently relatively less prosperous than the UK.

Whether the size of net budgetary balances is 'excessive' in view of the relative prosperity of the Member States concerned largely depends on the political perception of the acceptable degree of financial solidarity within the Union. If the UK net balance was judged 'excessive', then the application of the Fontainebleau principle would rather point to the extension of a correction mechanism to other Member States, who - at lower levels of prosperity - bear negative net balances of a similar order of magnitude.

In any event, granting a correction on an exclusive basis to only one Member State appears to be unjustified, especially when taking into account the expected evolution of net budgetary balances in the enlarged Union under unchanged conditions, as illustrated in the next section.

4. Estimated net balances with unchanged Own Resources Decision

Estimates indicate that over the period 2007-2013 the UK correction will increase by more than 50% compared to the average over the latest 7 years to reach an estimated EUR 7.1 billion from EUR 4.6 billion in the period 1997-2003.

Although the envisaged enlargement to 10 new Member States was unanimously agreed at the Berlin European Council in March 1999, the UK insisted and obtained that enlargement-related expenditure be taken into account [21] when calculating the UK correction, thus shielding it from most of the financial consequences of enlargement. That is the main reason for the expected future increase in the UK correction.

[21] Pre-accession expenditure relating to actual payments in the last year before accession of any acceding country is permanently deducted from the allocated expenditure.

As a consequence, the cost for the Member States that pay a full share in the financing of the UK correction, including all the new Member States, will increase proportionally. The average estimated financing cost over the period 2008-2013 for all 25 Member States is presented in the annexed Table IV.

Should the current own resources decision remain in force, the average net balance for the net contributors over the 2007-2013 period after UK correction is estimated as follows (Table III in annex II provides estimates for all 25 Member States):

Table 4

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.56%

Germany // -0.54%

Sweden // -0.50%

Italy // -0.41%

Austria // -0.38%

Cyprus [22] // -0.37%

[22] Throughout this document estimates are based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

France // -0.37%

Denmark // -0.31%

Finland // -0.25%

United Kingdom // -0.25%

According to these estimates, the UK will become (together with Finland) the smallest net contributor to the EU budget, therefore clearly departing from the Fontainebleau principle mentioned above. The persistence of such a growing anomaly risks undermining the legitimacy of EU policies in general, particularly in new Member States. The current system of a unique correction for the UK therefore cannot continue. Instead, the generalization of the correction mechanism, evolving from the existing correction would allow bringing the system closer to the original objective of avoiding excessive budgetary burdens in relation to the relative prosperity of Member States. By introducing a sort of 'safety net' for large net contributors beyond a certain level, it may also facilitate a more constructive approach to ensure the budgetary means necessary to meet the policy challenges of the enlarged Union.

5. Reduction or phasing-out of the UK correction

5.1. Estimated net balances with a reduction of the refund rate

One simple way to rectify the expected 'overshooting' of the UK correction would be to reduce the reimbursement percentage from 66% to - for instance - 33%.

The results in terms of net budgetary balances, expressed as a percentage of each Member State's GNI are summarised below for the net contributors:

Table 5

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

with refund rate reduced to 33%

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.53%

Sweden // -0.48%

United Kingdom // -0.46%

Austria // -0.38%

Italy // -0.34%

Cyprus [23] // -0.32%

[23] Estimates based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

France // -0.32%

Denmark // -0.25%

Finland // -0.19%

The UK's net contribution would be more in line with that of other net contributors, although it would remain rather low in comparison with some of the other net contributors that have lower levels of relative prosperity. Among these net contributors, F and I would benefit most from a reduction of the rebate since these countries unlike AT, DE, NL and SE do not benefit from a reduction in their financing share of the UK correction.

Conversely, the net position of NL, DE and SE hardly improves. A reduction of the UK rebate would therefore not address the perceived excessive net balances of these Member States. Furthermore, it would perpetuate the situation whereby one Member State continues to receive a correction on an exclusive basis, while others in an almost identical, or relatively worse, situation do not.

5.2. Estimated net balances with the UK correction frozen at its current

level

An alternative to the reduction of the refund rate could be to freeze the amount of the correction at a certain level. For instance, the UK correction could be frozen at the level actually enjoyed by the UK on average over the period 1996-2002, which is around EUR 4.5 billion. However, as the result would be comparable to a reduction of the refund rate, the same disadvantages would persist.

Table 6

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

with UK correction frozen at its current level

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.53%

Sweden // -0.49%

United Kingdom // -0.38%

Austria // -0.38%

Italy // -0.37%

Cyprus [24] // -0.34%

[24] Estimates based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

France // -0.34%

Denmark // -0.27%

Finland // -0.21%

5.3. Estimated net balances with a phasing-out of the UK rebate

Phasing-out the UK rebate over the period covered by the next financial perspective, as advocated by certain Member States, would certainly be the easiest solution to limit the unintended effects of the existing UK correction. In its simplest form, this could be done by leaving the calculation method unchanged, while progressively reducing the result by a given percentage over a certain number of years, say over seven years. Thus, the 2007 rebate (to be paid and financed in 2008) could amount to 6/7th of the amount obtained according to the current calculation method, the 2008 rebate to 5/7th and so on. The 2012 rebate, to be paid and financed in 2013, would amount to 1/7th of the normal calculation. In this example it would also constitute the last correction.

The estimated net balances of the net contributors over the period 2007-2013 resulting from such a phasing-out regime are presented below:

Table 7

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

with a linear phasing-out of the UK correction over 7 years

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.53%

Sweden // -0.49%

United Kingdom // -0.43%

Austria // -0.38%

Italy // -0.35%

Cyprus [25] // -0.32%

[25] Estimates based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

France // -0.32%

Denmark // -0.26%

Finland // -0.19%

However, it should be borne in mind that the figures in the table above represent the average for the phasing-out period. After the period under consideration, the UK would no longer benefit from any correction mechanism. The phasing-out of UK correction would have only a minor impact on the net balances of the other large net contributors, since they are to a large extent protected from the financing cost of the UK rebate. Therefore, this alternative would not solve the problem of the 'excessive' net balances of the other net contributors.

5.4. Estimated net balances with a phasing-out of the frozen UK

correction

Alternatively, as advocated by certain Member States, the UK correction could be frozen at an agreed level (for instance EUR 4.5 billion, equivalent to the average over the period 1996-2002) and then phased-out linearly over a number of years. This is the equivalent of combining the effects discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 above. The disadvantages mentioned in the previous paragraphs would remain unchanged.

Table 8

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

with a linear phasing-out of the frozen UK correction over 7 years

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.53%

United Kingdom // -0.50%

Sweden // -0.48%

Austria // -0.37%

Italy // -0.33%

Cyprus [26] // -0.31%

[26] Estimates based on areas controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.

France // -0.31%

Denmark // -0.23%

Finland // -0.17%

5.5. Estimated net balances with enlargement-related expenditure

excluded from the calculation of the UK correction

The calculation of the UK correction takes into account all the expenditure that is 'internal' to the EU and that can reasonably be allocated to an individual Member State [27]. Expenditure in the new Member States is also taken into account, with the exception of a small correction related to the amount of the pre-accession expenditure in the year before accession. The expenditure in the new Member States is the principal cause of the expected 50% increase in the size of the UK correction. It is therefore appropriate to consider the effect of continuing the current system while fully excluding the expenditure in the new Member States from the calculation.

[27] This issue is discussed under Section 6.2.

This approach would have the advantage of at least assuring fair burden sharing between all Member States of the cost related to the current and the future enlargements of the EU.

If the expenditure going to the 12 new Member States would be excluded, the UK correction is expected to be on average reduced to EUR 4.2 billion over the period 2007-2013. The results in terms of net budgetary balances, expressed as a percentage of each Member State's GNI are summarised below for the net contributors:

Table 9

Estimated net budgetary balances after UK correction

with enlargement-related expenditure excluded

for all expected net contributors

(annual averages 2008-2013)

// in % of GNI

Netherlands // -0.55%

Germany // -0.53%

Sweden // -0.49%

United Kingdom // -0.39%

Austria // -0.38%

Italy // -0.37%

Cyprus // -0.33%

France // -0.33%

Denmark // -0.27%

Finland // -0.21%

The net balances of DE, AT, SE and NL would only be affected in a very marginal way compared to the situation under the unchanged own resources decision, since these countries pay only 25% of their normal financing share of the financing of the UK correction.

Again, such a solution would not solve the problem whereby only 1 Member State would be eligible for a correction, while others at comparable or lower levels of relative prosperity and bearing negative net balances of similar size would continue to be excluded. Furthermore, it would effectively create in a durable way two categories of EU expenditure (within the EU-15 and in the new Member States).

6. Parameters of a generalised correction mechanism

6.1. Introduction

The proposed generalised correction mechanism has to be seen in the context of the Commission overall 'package' for the post-2006 financial framework. The final outcome is thus likely to be affected by decisions to be taken on the expenditure side of the package.

If it is accepted that the net contributions of certain Member States are excessive, then none of the alternatives presented in Sections 3 through 5 namely, unchanged own resources decision, abolishing, reducing or phasing-out the UK correction - seems to generate acceptable results in terms of equitable burden sharing among Member States. That is why the Commission proposes to introduce a generalised corrective mechanism.

The generalised correction mechanism is a tool for correcting 'excessive' net budgetary balances in an own resources system primarily financed through contributions from the Member State's treasuries. Any substantial changes to the own resources system (see Part III of this report), would of course require a re-assessment of the need for a corrective mechanism.

A generalised correction mechanism would be calculated on the basis of the net budgetary balance of each Member State in relation to the budget of the EU. The mechanism should be triggered beyond a threshold, expressed as a percentage of each Member State's GNI, reflecting the minimum accepted level of unlimited financial solidarity between Member States and representing a sort of basic reasonable net contribution. Net positions exceeding such a threshold will be eligible for a correction (partial refund). The amount of the correction is to be based on the part of the net balance exceeding this threshold, multiplied by a refund rate (i.e. the percentage of the amount in excess of the agreed threshold to be compensated). The amount corresponding to the sum of all corrections could be capped at a total predetermined volume.

The net balance would be calculated on the basis of a zero-sum situation, i.e. the sum of the net balances of all Member States should be equal to zero [28]. (This principle is also applied in the calculation of the UK correction.)

[28] For a discussion of the different types of net balances and their calculation methods, see the Commission's 1998 own resources report, Annex 3.

6.2. Categories of expenditure to be taken into account

The current definition of allocated expenditure used in the calculation of the UK rebate as well as the Commission's yearly report on the allocation of expenditure to Member States is based on the principle whereby all expenditure for which it can reasonably be shown that the recipient is a resident of a certain Member State is being allocated to that Member State. Recipients are not limited to public bodies but also include private firms, individuals, etc...The allocation is limited to the first round effect [29]. The Commission recognises that this instrument is an imperfect tool and that certain problems of correct allocation continue to exist [30].

[29] This means the Commission does not include possible second-round effects into the allocation. Often cited examples of these effects are for instance the possible repatriation of profits by foreign firms or consortia involved in cohesion projects and salaries of European officials residing in Belgium or Luxembourg that is not necessarily exclusively spent in these countries.

[30] Although the Commission is constantly trying to refine the data to improve the quality of the allocation, a number of problems continue to persist. Agricultural export subsidies for instance are allocated to the country exporting the goods, an allocation method which tends to unduly increase the expenditure allocated to gateway countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. Likewise it is not always easy to identify exactly the final beneficiary of certain payments made to international consortia, for example for research expenditure. Since these consortia often have their administrative base located near the EU institutions, an exaggerated share in this type of expenditure may be allocated to Belgium and Luxembourg.

According to this definition, allocated expenditure includes all categories of expenditure that are 'internal' to the EU. This includes virtually the total amount of expenditure headings 1 (agriculture) and 2 (structural operations) as well as the vast majority of expenditure under headings 3 (internal policies) and 5 (administration), excluding only some minor items of expenditure that cannot be reasonably allocated to any individual Member State [31]. Headings 4 (external policies), 6 (reserves) and 7 (pre-accession expenditure) relate explicitly to 'external' expenditure and are therefore not taken into account when calculating the net budgetary balance of a Member State.

[31] In terms of the newly proposed expenditure headings in the Commission communication of 10 February 2003, this corresponds roughly with the content of the new headings 1a, 1b, 2, 3 and administrative expenditure.

It has on occasion been argued that certain categories of this internal expenditure should be fully or partially excluded from the calculation of the net balances. The arguments advanced to defend this are based on perceived conceptual and practical difficulties related to expenditure allocation. However, it should be noted that, while the European Council has reviewed the calculation method of the UK correction on several occasions, it has each time decided to keep the expenditure categories included in the calculation unchanged. Indeed, excluding any of these expenditure categories would constitute a different approach than the basic principle evoked at the beginning of this section. That is why the Commission proposes to keep the current accepted definition unchanged [32]. Thus, all expenditure that can reasonably be allocated to an individual Member State (i.e. broadly speaking, the headings 1, 2, 3 and 5 under the 2000-2006 financial perspective) would continue to be taken into account for the calculation of the net budgetary balance in the context of the proposed generalised correction mechanism.

[32] The only envisageable amendment concerns the agricultural export refunds which could be excluded on the grounds that there is no clear link between the port of exit and the final beneficiary of these interventions. A similar argument is used to exclude traditional own resources from the revenue to be taken into account (cf. section 6.3).

6.3. Categories of revenue to be taken into account

The calculation of the UK rebate excludes the traditional own resources (TOR) from the categories of revenue to be taken into account. This is justified for 2 reasons. First, TOR are not considered to be a Member State contribution but constitute revenue belonging to the EU by virtue of the customs union. Second, TOR are often levied at the port of entry into the EU in application of the Common Customs Code. Since the final consumer of the imported goods does not necessarily live in the country of the port of entry there is no clear geographical link between the collection of the duties and the economic burden they represent. TOR should therefore continue to be excluded in any future proposal to introduce a generalised correction mechanism.

Consequently, the combined share in VAT and GNI own resources would be used as the proper base to calculate any Member States' share in EU budgetary revenue.

A proposal for a generalised correction mechanism should be as simple and transparent as possible. Therefore all existing complications in the UK rebate calculation which are related to the preservation of the UK's 1984 revenue position (share in uncapped VAT, calculating the 'advantage' as well as the 'TOR windfall gains'), should be abolished.

6.4. The level of the threshold

6.4.1. Fixed threshold

Simulations have been run for different levels of the threshold (using a refund rate of 66%) ranging from zero to 0.50% of GNI. The results are summarised in the annexed Tables V through IX [33]:

[33] A minus (-) sign means an increase of a Member State's total own resources payments compared to the estimated future (2008-2013 average) situation under an unchanged own resources decision. Conversely a plus (+) sign means a reduction in total own resources payments for the Member State concerned.

- Table V: estimates of the level of the gross corrections;

- Table VI: estimates of the financing of the corrections;

- Table VII: estimates of the net level of the corrections (= sum of tables V + VI);

- Table VIII: estimates of the impact of introducing a GCM compared to the situation with unchanged own resources decision;

- Table IX: estimates of the net budgetary balances as a percentage of GNI;

The total sum of the corrections at different threshold levels is estimated as follows (details for individual Member States are presented in Table V):

Table 10

Estimated gross corrections

(average 2008-2013)

Level of the threshold

(as a % of GNI, EU-27) // Sum of all corrections

(in billion of euros)

0.00% // 25.8

0.10% // 19.8

0.20% // 13.8

0.25% // 11.1

0.30% // 8.8

0.40% // 5.2

0.50% // 1.9

A threshold level of around -0.25% would represent a sort of neutral point whereby the estimated future cost of financing the generalised correction mechanism would be equal to the estimated future cost of financing the current UK correction mechanism. This is illustrated in Table V in annex II: the effect of introducing a GCM is zero or close to zero at a threshold of 0.25% for all Member States that are currently financing a full share in the UK correction [34]. A threshold lower than 0.25% would mean that the Member States paying in full the UK rebate (they currently bear more than 90% of the total cost) would have to pay more than the estimated cost of financing the current UK correction mechanism in the future. With thresholds higher than 0.25% the mechanism would become less costly for those Member States, including all net recipients from the EU budget, than financing the estimated future UK correction mechanism.

[34] This is valid for all Member States that do not receive a gross correction and therefore only participate in the financing. However, as can be observed in Table V in the annex, at a threshold of 0.25% a few of the 20 Member States that currently pay a full share in the financing of the UK correction would actually receive a gross correction. Consequently, as illustrated in Table VIII, these Member States would still be better off at 0.25% compared to the future cost of financing the UK correction.

The table above (as well as the annexed Table V) illustrates that the total sum of the corrections with a 0.25% threshold would be substantially higher than the estimated level of the future UK correction with the current own resources decision (ORD) unchanged. Applying a threshold of -0.25% would generate a level of (gross) corrections slightly above EUR 11 billion, which is significantly higher than the approximately EUR 7 billion average (net) UK correction for the same period. This difference is linked to the assumption that the financing of the corrections would be shared by all Member States according to their share in GNI (see section 6.7 below).

Thus, for those Member States who would not benefit from the GCM, an overall volume of up to EUR 11 billion of corrections could be financed before the GCM became more expensive than the continuation of the current ORD.

The impact of introducing a generalised mechanism with a threshold is not linear. The effect on Member States' net balances, compared to the current situation, is influenced by a combination of the following three elements: a) the level of the Member States' budgetary imbalance before correction; b) the level of the threshold; and c) the financing rules under the existing UK correction.

The estimated impact is shown in the annexed Table VIII on the basis of which the following observations can be made:

- Net beneficiaries from the budget do not receive any corrections, regardless of the threshold level. As previously indicated, the cost of financing the correction mechanism becomes more expensive for these countries compared to the future financing cost of the UK correction at threshold levels lower than 0.25%.

- All major net contributors to the EU budget (UK, DE, NL, SE) would benefit from the correction mechanism with thresholds lower than or equal to 0.50% of GNI.

- Smaller net contributors would receive corrections depending on the threshold level. The relative position of each individual net contributor, compared to their estimated future position under the current ORD, is determined by a combination of the following two factors:

- the size of the negative net balance before correction, whereby larger net contributors such as DE, NL, SE tend to benefit more at lower threshold levels (compared to smaller net contributors);

- the current financing regime of the UK correction, whereby Member States currently benefiting from a special arrangement (DE, NL, SE, AT) tend to benefit less at higher threshold levels (compared to smaller net contributors).

- The case of AT merits a specific mention since it illustrates the mechanism at work here. Since this Member State is expected to be a smaller net contributor than NL, DE and SE, it would receive smaller corrections (comparable to the corrections received by FR and IT). However, as it would lose the 75% reduction in the financing of the UK correction (whereas countries such as FR and IT do not enjoy such a reduction at present) it would see its net balance deteriorate at higher threshold levels (compared to the estimated situation with unchanged own resources decision).

- The UK would experience a deterioration of its net balance at any threshold level, even in the situation where there is no threshold at all. In this case the UK would receive a correction of an order of magnitude similar to the current UK correction but it would have to participate in the financing of both its own and the other Member States' corrections. It is worth recalling that the deterioration of the UK net balance illustrated in the tables above is in comparison with the UK's estimated future position, i.e. in comparison with the situation where the UK is expected to become the smallest net contributor to the EU budget.

Any future 'fairer' mechanism should ensure in particular that the resulting financing cost does not lead to a heavier burden than under the current UK correction mechanism for 'cohesion' Member States.

6.4.2. Variable threshold

It is possible to include an element of progressivity into the correction mechanism by introducing a variable threshold related to the relative prosperity of each Member State rather than the fixed threshold illustrated in the previous paragraphs. This would ensure a closer link between levels of relative prosperity and net balances. In other words, relatively more prosperous Member States would be expected to have proportionally larger negative budgetary imbalances than less prosperous Member States.

One possible approach would be to use a multi-layer threshold, based on each Member States' GNI per capita expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS). By way of example, the results of a simulation based on the following differentiation criteria are presented below:

GNI per capita PPS (where EU-15 avg. = 100) // Threshold

(in % of GNI)

110% < PPS // - 0.40%

100% < PPS <110% // - 0.35%

PPS < 100% // - 0.30%

The variable threshold, based on the multi-layer schedule given above, would be the following for the net contributors to the budget:

Member State // Threshold

Denmark // - 0.40%

Germany // -0.30%

France // -0.35%

Italy // -0.30%

Cyprus // -0.30%

Netherlands // -0.35%

Austria // -0.35%

Finland // -0.35%

Sweden // -0.35%

UK // -0.40%

The UK's threshold would be increased to -0.40% while the threshold applied to DE, IT and CY would be reduced to -0.30%. The threshold for