ir*ir 
ir ir 
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ir ir COMMISSIE VAN DE EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN 
Brussel, 05.07.1995 
C()M(95) 313 del' 
MEDEDELING VAN DE COMMISSIE AAN DE RAAD 
Levering van voedselhulp aan Armenië, Georgië, Azerbajdzjan, 
Kirgizstan en Tadzjikistan 

Mededeling van de Commissie aan de Raad 
Doelstelling : Levering van voedselhulp aan Armenië, Georgië, Azerbajdzjan, 
Kirgizstan en Tadzjikistan 
1. De Commissie kan nu bevestigen dat de voedselsituatie in de landen van de Kaukasus, 
Kirgizstan en Tadzjikistan in de loop van de komende winter waarschijnlijk opnieuw 
zeer kritiek zal zijn. De staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van deze landen hebben de 
Europese Unie verzocht de voedselhulp in 1995/96 voort te zetten. De Lid-Staten 
hebben de Commissie gevraagd de situatie en de vooruitzichten op voedselgebied te 
analyseren. In mei jongstleden heeft een gezamenlijke missie van de EU/VS het land 
bezocht om de voedselbehoefte te analyseren; deze missie heeft de ernst en de omvang 
van het probleem bevestigd (zie bijlage 4 van het aangehechte werkdocument). 
2. De Unie dient zich nu over deze vraag uit te spreken. 
3. De Commissie legt deze situatie voor aan de Raad en meent dat er twee opties zijn : 
Optie 1 : De Unie kan besluiten dat zij niet over de middelen beschikt om positief te 
reageren op het verzoek van de staatshoofden van de begunstigde landen; deze optie 
houdt een ernstig gevaar in op zowel politiek als economisch niveau. Op politiek niveau 
zou deze optie tot een destabilisatie van de sociale situatie leiden, hetgeen in sommige 
staten de maatschappelijke orde in gevaar zou brengen; bovendien zou deze optie zeker 
in al deze staten het democratiseringsproces in gevaar brengen. Op economisch niveau 
zouden door het uitblijven van deze hulp alle inspanningen van de EU en van 
internationale instellingen (met name het IMF) ter bevordering van stabilisatie worden 
ondermijnd. 
In het algemeen zou dit de geloofwaardigheid van de Unie in de regio ondermijnen en 
dus ook de toekomstige strategie die is opgenomen in de mededelingen van de 
Commissie aan de Raad en het gemeenschappelijk standpunt tijdens de discussies 
binnen de Raad. Nieuwe voedselhulp is in feite het essentiële element in het 
gemeenschappelijk standpunt inzake Transkaukasië, aangezien hiermee de enige band 
wordt geschapen tussen communautaire hulp en een eventueel voorwaardenpakket op 
economisch en politiek terrein. 
Optie 2 : De Unie kan besluiten in actie te komen op basis van de ervaring van de 
vorige voedselhulpoperatie. Tijdens voorbereidende gesprekken met de Lid-Staten heeft 
de Commissie de elementen en modaliteiten omschreven waaraan nieuwe hulp moet 
voldoen. De Commissie is van mening dat een nieuwe voedselhulpoperatie, naast de 
gratis levering van landbouwprodukten, gericht moet zijn op structurele aspecten, zodat 
deze landen het in de toekomst zonder grootschalige voedselhulp kunnen stellen. 
Een nieuwe operatie dient het accent te leggen op de ontwikkeling van de plaatselijke 
landbouwproduktie, door het verstrekken van produktiefactoren, technische bijstand, en 
de deskundigheid die nodig is voor het aanwenden van de tegenwaardefondsen die 
verband houden met de voedselvoorziening; de modaliteiten van een dergelijke operatie 
en het structurele element ervan worden in het aangehechte werkdocument behandeld. 
De kosten van een dergelijke operatie worden geschat op 197 miljoen ecu, als volgt 
verdeeld : 
- 100 miljoen ecu gratis levering van landbouwprodukten. 
- 35 miljoen ecu produktiefactoren voor de landbouw en technische bijstand op dit 
gebied. 
- 35 miljoen ecu humanitaire hulp gericht op de zwakste groepen van de samenleving. 
- 17 miljoen ecu technische bijstand op het gebied van de herstructurering van de 
landbouwsector, herstel van de communicatieverbindingen, en het toezicht op de 
operatie. 
Gezien de budgettaire consequenties zijn voor deze optie enkele principebesluiten 
vereist. De Commissie heeft onderzocht welke begrotingslijnen voor de dekking van 
een dergelijke operatie in aanmerking komen. Gebleken is dat de begrotingsmiddelen 
voor de dekking van de structurele elementen (produktiemiddelen op landbouwgebied 
en technische bijstand) en de humanitaire elemeneten van een dergelijke operatie te 
vinden zijn in rubriek 4 van de begroting. 
De levering van gratis landbouwprodukten van een dergelijke omvang kan echter niet 
uit hoofde van rubriek 4 gefinancierd worden, gezien het tekort aan middelen; hiervoor 
moet dus een beroep worden gedaan op de kredieten van het EOGFL-Garantie voor 
1995. 
4. De Commissie meent dat optie 2 aanbeveling verdient. Wanneer de Raad zich 
uitspreekt voor het principe van aanwending van de kredieten van het EOGFL-
Garantie, is de Commissie bereid een voorstel bij de Raad in te dienen voor een 
verordening die gebruik van EOGFL-Garantie mogelijk maakt. 
Aangezien de EOGFL-begroting op 15 oktober sluit en de EOGFL-begroting voor 1996 
geen mogelijkheden biedt, is het onontbeerlijk dat de Raad in juli een principebesluit 
neemt. De bijbehorende verordening zou vervolgens via een schriftelijke procedure 
kunnen worden vastgesteld. Dit tijdschema maakt het tevens mogelijk de operatie in 
oktober aanstaand te laten aanvangen, aan de vooravond van de winter 1995/96. 
De Commissie verzoekt dan ook dat dit punt in de agenda van de Raad Algemene 
Zaken van 17 juli wordt opgenomen. 
.3 
ANNEX 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER 
FOOD AID REQUIREMENTS IN ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN, 
TAJIKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN 
1. Introduction 
In the three republics of the Caucasus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the problem of food supply is 
two-fold: 
1) a food deficit (particularly of grain) which if not addressed could threaten the countries' fragile 
stability and jeopardise the reform process; 
2) the need to restructure the agricultural sectors and boosting local production so as to reduce the 
dependency on international aid in the future. 
In 1994 the EU delivered over 1 million tonnes of food to cover the region's immediate needs, to 
alleviate extreme hardship and so rninimise the risk of widespread unrest. There were no budgetary 
possibilities at that time to provide more structural assistance. 
On the basis of information gathered by the EU-US food assessment mission, there remains a 
significant lack of foodstuffs in the region. It is therefore strongly recommended that, in order to 
encourage stability- and economic reform, the EU again addresses a part of the urgent food 
requirements. However, any new assistance package should target as a matter of priority the 
development of the local agricultural sectors. 
The Commission's proposal, as outlined in the ensuing document, therefore has a dual objective: 
A, To address the immediate food needs, in order to muiimise the risks of social unrest and create 
an environment conducive to basic economic transformation, as well as to meet basic 
humanitarian needs by specific targetting of beneficiaries; 
B. To promote the development of the agricultural sectors by boosting local production and 
creating stable market conditions. 
2. The 204 MECU Food Aid Operation 
Under the 204 MECU food aid operation, the EU has delivered over 1 million tonnes of basic food 
products. In general, the operation has achieved its objectives: the EU safeguarded the minimum 
food requirements of the recipient populations over the winter months thus ensuring regional 
stability in the Southern Caucasus despite the highly sensitive situation resulting from the conflicts 
in Chechenya and Nagorny Karabakh. 
The wider economic impact of the EU's food aid operation is considered to have been significant, 
in addition to alleviating hardship over the winter, it stimulated the operation and management of 
the handling, transportation, storage and distribution systems, and provided a much needed cash 
H-
flow to governments (in the Caucasus). Moreover, the Counterpart Funds (CPF) represented a 
significant part of the governments' budgetary income. 
In political terms, the EU's profile in the region has been significantly enhanced. 
3. Requests Received 
The EU has received requests from the Heads of State or-Government of all the five countries for 
further food assistance in 1995/6 (copies attached at annex 1). The letters all express the countries' 
appreciation of the EU's support during the previous winter and stress the importance of this 
support to the reform process. As an indication of the commitment of the recipient governments to 
the smooth implementation of the EU's food supply operation, President Shevardnadze, in his 
letter, refers to the unprecedented cooperation between the three Caucasian republics 
(Representatives of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Commission met together on a daily 
basis to ensure effective coordination and prompt distribution of the food supplies to their 
populations). 
4. EU-US Food Aid Assessment Mission 
In order to respond to the abovementioned requests, a joint EU-US food assessment mission visited 
the region in April/May. The team, consisting of independent consultants, attempted to evaluate the 
food situation over the coming winter taking into account expected local production, import 
capacity, and other international assistance. An Executive Summary of the team's findings is 
attached at annex 2. 
In short, the mission recommended a multi-facetted aid package targetting primarily the urgent 
food needs, but also focusing on support to the local agricultural sectors through the provision of 
agricultural inputs (eg. fertilisers and seeds) and technical assistance, and also supporting the most 
vulnerable sections of the population through the provision of carefully targetted humanitarian 
assistance. 
5. Other Donors1 Activity . 
Through the 204 MECU food aid operation and other humanitarian food aid previously supplied by 
ECHO, the EU has become the main donor of food assistance to both regions. The second donor is 
the US. Preliminary information on future US assistance is provided in the tables in annex 3. 
The amounts earmarked by the US for 1996 are provisional only. Congress is currently pushing for 
significant budgetary reductions which, if adopted, would reduce by 50% the quantities foreseen 
for 1996. It should also be noted that Turkish assistance to Azerbaijan is likely to decrease sharply 
in the light of Azerbaijan's inability to repay its existing debt. It therefore seems likely that the EU 
will again be called upon to provide the greater share of the international assistance to the region. 
6. Proposal 
The operation's dual objective as outlined in the introduction could be met in the following way: 
A. To address immediate food needs through the provision of bulk food to the official distribution 
system and specifically targetted humanitarian food aid; 
B. To promote development of the agricultural sectors by: 
i) boosting local production through the provision of seeds and fertilisers; 
ii) creating a stable market through use of the counterpart hinds; 
iii) supporting restructuring through the provision of technical assistance. 
S 
Objective A: Food and Humanitarian Assistance 
i) Food Aid 
The table in annex 4 indicates the extent of the expected wheat deficits in each country on the basis 
of data provided by the assessment mission. The total wheat deficit is estimated at over 1.6 million 
tonnes. __ 
To alleviate a part of the deficit, it is proposed that the EU covers 40% of the open wheat needs 
(ie. those not covered by local production, commercial imports or other donors). This would 
amount to 656,000 t for the five countries. By covering only 40% of the deficit (in contrast to 50% 
last year) we would give a clear signal to recipient countries that they need to reduce their 
dependency on international aid. 
So as more accurately to target the assistance according to objective needs, it is recommended that 
the food be allocated in two tranches: 60% of the total amount could be allocated immediately, 
with the remainder distributed among recipients at a later date. This would have the advantage of 
allowing adjustments of the total quantities to take into account changing circumstances. Later in 
the year more accurate data on local production, import capacity, etc, will be available. In 
addition, this mechanism would serve as an incentive to recipient governments to ensure the 
smooth implementation of the programme in their countries. 
The above scheme gives the following breakdown: 
Republic 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Azerbaijan 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Total Open needs 
(wheat) 
350,000 
480,000 
340,000 
360,000 
110,000 
1,640,000 EU contribution 
to cover 40% of 
open needs 
(contribution 
under 1994 
programme*) 
140,000 
(189,000) 
192,000 
(270,000) 
136,000 
(290,000) 
144,000 
(62,000) 
44,000 
(49,000) 
656,000 
(860,000) 1st tranche 
(60% of EU 
contribution) 
84,000 
115,200 
81,600 
86,400 
26,400 
393,600 2nd tranche 
(40% of EU 
contribution) 
To 
be 
determined 
262,400 
* It should be noted that quantities of rye, butter, olive oil and meat were also supplied according to the requests of the 
recipient countries. 
For all countries, it is suggested that deliveries of tht first tranche begin in early October. This 
would allow EU supplies to take over from local production which is expected to cover the 
August/September period. 
The food provided would be sold on the open market and the sales revenue, used to constitute 
counterpart funds which could finance restructuring initiatives (see point 6Aii below). 
ii) Humanitarian Aid 
In all republics the consequences of regional conflicts and economic refoms are placing a heavy 
burden on the local populations. With social safety nets as yet inadequately established, vulnerable 
groups are increasingly at risk. It is recommended that the overall assistance package includes a 
component which would target those most at risk, eg. socially vulnerable groups such as displaced 
3 
6 
people, the elderly, refugees, mothers and young children. Over the last three years these needs 
have been addressed as far as possible by ECHO. All such aid is distributed free of charge through 
chosen NGOs and international organisations and, therefore, does not generate any counterpart 
funds. The humanitarian needs are similar to those of last year. 
Objective B: Agricultural Development 
The developmental component includes the provision of agricultural inputs, the use of counterpart 
funds for restructuring, and the provision of technical assistance. 
i) Agricultural Inputs 
All countries in question have urgent needs for agricultural inputs. In order to stimulate the local 
agricultural sectors, it is proposed that the assistance package includes the provision of seeds, 
fertilisers and other essential agricultural inputs. In order to ensure compatability with existing 
agricultural techniques and to maximise the EU's purchasing power, the majority of inputs could 
be acquired on traditional local markets, eg. Russia, Ukraine and Kazakstan. 
The assessment mission recommends that, where appropriate, the distribution of agricultural inputs 
should target individual producers to ensure their domestic use. In countries where reform is more 
advanced, inputs could be sold by auction, in quantities accessible to 'individual producers. Where 
reform is less advanced, inputs could be distributed through existing marketing channels. The 
counterpart funds resulting from the sale of the inputs could be devoted to restructuring activities 
(see point 6Aii below). 
ii) Use of the Counterpart Funds 
Counterpart funds (CPFs) resulting from the sale both of the food products and the agricultural 
inputs represent an important element in the overall strategy of encouraging the development of the 
local agricultural sectors. The experience in Georgia under the 204 MECU opération has clearly 
illustrated the potential of the CPFs. In Georgia, the CPF constituted some 20% of budgetary 
expenditure which, if added to the income from transit transport of goods through Georgian Black 
Sea ports and on railways, amounted to over 50% of all government expenditure. This result has 
received the unequivocal support of the IMF. 
In the event of a new operation, the CPFs should be used primarily to boost the availability of 
locally produced wheat within the countries. To date, there has been little progress in establishing 
mechanisms for the purchase of local production at commercial rates. This has had the effect of 
discouraging local producers and creating a tendency towards self-sufficiency. The CPFs could be 
used to address this problem in two ways: 
a) by establishing a structured private market through the financing of credit guarantees 
which would enable traders to purchase grain on the local or world markets; 
b) by stabilising the market by enabling governments to purchase local production at a 
guaranteed minimum price. 
Such a strategy would guarantee to local producers the sale of their produce at profitable rates and, 
at the same time, would establish a regulated grain-trading mechanism. Moreover, it would allow 
the governments to build up strategic stocks and so protect against market fluctuations. 
It is estimated that the above measures would increase the availability of locally produced wheat to 
800,000 t (as opposed to 400,000 t this year) thus making further large-scale food aid operatioas 
unnecessary. A detailed proposal for use of the CPF is given in annex 5. 
iii) Technical Assistance 
This component would provide essential support to ensure the fulfillment of the operation's 
objectives and the smooth implementation of the operation. The following elements are proposed: 
- Technical assistance to focus on issues of agricultural restructuring ( and particular to 
rehabilitate the local trade of agricultural production) raised by the food aid operation, 
including recommended use of the agricultural inputs, and support to initiatives financed 
by the counterpart funds. 
- National and regional transport is playing a key role in the success of the agricultural 
rehabilitation as it constitute a prerequisite^© local and regional trade of local 
production. The track between the ports of Poti and Batumi and Tbilissi (the crossing 
point between Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaïdjan) constitute the backbone of the 
transport network in the Caucuses. In view of reactivating local and regional trade it 
will be essential that this track operates under the best possible conditions. However the 
intense use of the Georgian railway under the 204 MECU operation has led to the 
exhaustion of rolling stock and rail tracks. (Nearly 800,000 t of food supplies were 
delivered between December and May, representing 92% of the goods carried by the 
railways over this period). In order to get this railway working properly again some 
urgent support need to be given to the Georgian railways as there is an essential need to 
restore 200 km of rail track and to repair/maintain a large part of the rolling stock. The 
well functioning of this track will also be indispensable for the proper implementation of 
a new food aid operation. 
- A monitoring structure similar to that set up under the 204 MECU operation would be 
required to provide quality and quantity control, and to monitor delivery and 
distribution of supplies and utilisation of the counterpart funds. 
7. Financing Requirements 
In order to provide the above package the following financial resources would be required: 
Objective A: Food and Humanitarian Assistance 
i) Food Aid Component 
If the EU is to meet 40% of the wheat deficits in the recipient countries, it would need to provide 
656,000 t of wheat. On the world market this is valued at 132 MECU (including transport). The 
equivalent FEOGA price is estimated at 110 MECU (see table below). It should be noted that the 
proposed food aid component is significantly less than last year's (165 MECU) and that the overall 
emphasis has shifted towards short to medium term structural assistance. 
Republic 
Armenia 
Georgia 
Azerbaijan 
Tajikistan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Total Proposed EU 
contribution 
140,000 
192,000 
136,000 
144,000 
44,000 
656,000 Estimated cost (incl.transport) 
world market 
24 
36 
24 
36 
12 
132 FEOGA cost 
20 
30 
20 
30 
10 
110 
8-
ii) Humanitarian Aid Component 
Under the 204 MECU food aid operation, 35 MECU was provided for humanitarian assistance 
targetted at vulnerable groups and distributed through non-governmental organisations. According 
to the findings of the recent assessment mission, the needs this year are at least of a similar scale. 
The ECHO component, therefore, should ideally be of the same magnitude, ie.35 MECU. 
Objective B: Agricultural Development 
i) Agricultural Inputs 
Demands within the recipient countries for agricultural inputs are enormous. However, given 
budgetary restrictions (see point 8Bi below) and the limited absorption capacities of the NIS 
countries in question, it is estimated that not more than 35 MECU could be mobilised for the 
package. This amount should be devoted to the provision of seeds and fertilisers, and technical 
assistance to suppport the distribution and utilisation of these inputs. 
ii) Counterpart Funds 
The CPFs are generated by the sale of the food and agricultural inputs and do not require any 
bugdetary provision. It is estimated that, under a new operation, the CPFs for the five countries 
will amount to 50 MECU (in local currency). 
iii) Technical Assistance 
It is estimated that the technical assistance component in support of agricultural and food 
distribution restructuring would amount to 17 MECU: 
- Technical assistance for agricultural and food distribution restructuring - 8 MECU (to be divided 
between the five countries); 
- Support to the Georgian railways in order to support food distribution improvement measures: 
repair of 200 km of railtrack - 2.5 MECU, and repair/maintenance of rolling stock - 2.5 MECU; 
- Monitoring structure - 4 MECU. 
8. Availability of budgetary resources 
In order to provide the required financial package, the EU would need to mobilise ail available 
budget lines. A summary of the available budgetary resources is provided in annex 6. 
Objective A: Food and Humanli&rtan Assistance 
i) Food Aid Component -110 MECU 
In order to finance the provision of 656,000 t of wheat, the Commission has explored ail relevant 
budget lines. In all cases the amounts available are insufficient to cover such a quantity of food. 
The use of FEOGA thus seems unavoidable. 
ii) Humanitarian Aid Component - 35 MECU 
ECHO supports the overall conclusions of the assessment mission. However, it has already 
allocated 20 MECU to the five countries in 1995 for humanitarian food aid operations in favour of 
the most vulnerable groups and its budgetary resources are exhausted. Further allocations would 
require the support of the emergency reserve fund (budget line B7/910). 
Objective B: Agricultural Development 
i) Agricultural Inputs - 35 MECU 
Structural food assistance is traditionally provided through budget line B7/200. This budget of 590 
MECU currently covers some 70 traditional developmg countries, excluding the NIS. The 
modification of Regulation n° 3972/86, including inter alia its extension to the NIS, is currently 
a 6 
under discussion and a final decision is expected only towards the end of the year. Given the 
enormous demands from all developing countries on this budget line, not more than 35 MECU 
could be mobilised for the package. 
ii) Counterpart Funds 
No budgetary provision is required. 
iii)Technical Assistance - 17 MECU 
This amount could be financed by the TACIS programme. As it is expected that TACIS funds will 
be fiilly committed for 1995, a part of the required amount could be covered by the additional 
allocation resulting from the accession of new Member States. The remaining amount could be 
financed by the inter-state programme. 
9. Conclusion 
The proposed assistance package seeks to address: 
a. the immediate bulk and humanitarian food needs and, 
b. to encourage structural reform in order to reduce future requirements for international assistance. It 
is estimated that implementation of the package would increase the availability of locally produced 
wheat from 400,000 to 800,000 tonnes per year. This would make further large-scale food aid 
operations unnecessary, although further humanitarian assistance will be required for vulnerable 
groups for the foreseeable future. 
The package envisages the following components: 
• food aid (FEOGA) - 110 MECU; 
• humanitarian aid (ECHO) - 35 MECU (sums already allocated for 1995 should, however, be 
taken into account); 
• agricultural inputs (budget line B/7200) - 35 MECU; 
• technical assistance, including support for agricultural restructuring and use of CPFs, support to 
the Georgian railways, and a monitoring mechanism (TACIS) - 17 MECU. 
The mobilisation of FEOGA funds, and of budget line B7/200 and B7/910 would require ad hoc 
decisions by the Council. In order to allow deliveries of food to begin in early October, and given 
that the FEOGA budget closes on 15 October, it is essential that the Council's decision is taken in 
July. 
lO 
ANNEX 3 
US WHEAT ASSISTANCE - 1995-6 
(Amounts in metric tonnes) 
Republic 
In remainder of 1995 
To June 1996 Armenia 
55,000 
100,000 Georgia 
55,000 
125,000 Azerbaijan 
0 
0 Kyrgyzstan 
40,000 
40,000 Tajikistan 
30,000 
na 
EU AND US FOOD AID DONATIONS - 1994 - 1996 
(Amounts in MECU) 
1994-5 
EU: 
Monetised Aid 
Hum.aid (ECHO) 
Total 
US: 
Monetised Aid 
Hum.aid 
Total 
Other: 
Total 
1995-6 
EU: 
Monetised Aid 
HunvaidOBCHO)1 
Total 
US: 
Monetised Aid3 
Hurrtaid 
Total 
Other: 
Total ARMENIA 
34.0 
10.0 
44.0 
23.0 
11.5 
34.5 
3.6 
82.1 
? 
3.6 
3.6 
20.0 
na 
20.0 
na 
23.6 GEORGIA 
41.0 
9.2 
50.2 
19.2 
7.7 
26.9 
5.4 
82.5 
? 
4.5 
4.5 
22.0 
na 
22.0 
na 
26.5 AZERBAIJAN 
43.0 
10.0 
53.0 
0.0 
7,7 
7.7 
2.9 
63.6 
? 
3.8 
3.8 
0 
na 
0 
na 
3.8 KYRGYZSTAN 
14.0 
5.0 
19.0 
11.5 
3.9 
15.4 
na 
34.4 
0 
3.0 
3.0 
11.5 
na 
11.5 
na 
14.5 TAJIKISTAN 
11.0 
• 9.0 
20.0 
5.4 
3.9 
9.3; 
na 
293 
^—1 i 
? 
5.0 
5.0 
• "• j ' " • 1 
s 4 
5.7 
n.i ! 
"""""roT! 
1 Allocated to June 1995. Further amounts arc to be allocated in the second half of the year. 
2 Amounts are provisional only, as the US Congress is currently pushing for budgetary reductions. 
Amounts could be reduced by upto 50%. 
U 
ANNEX 4 
EXPECTED WHEAT DEFICITS IN 1995/96 
(Amounts in '000 tonnes) 
Food Use 
Feed Use 
Other Use 
Closing Stock 
Total needs 
Opening stocks 
Local production 
Imports 
Exports: unregistered 
Food Aid 
Total Resources 
Balance Armenia 
478 
35 
46 
40 
599 
40 
150 
0.15 
55 
245 
-354 Azerbaijan 
1,073 
41 
229 
36 
1,379 
36 
690 
285 
33 
1,044 
-335 Georgia 
572 
0 
33 
48 
653 
60 
108 
0 
-50 
57 
175 
-478 Kyrgyzstan 
500 
70 
152 
33 
755 
50 
360 
150 
85 
645 
-110 Tajikistan 
570 
30 
105 
20 
725 
3 
182 
150 
30 
365 
-360 
\~L 
UTILISATION DES FONDS DE CONTREPARTIE 
DANS LE CADRE D'UNE NOUVELLE OPERATION D'AJDE ALIMENTAIRE 
INTRODUCTION 
Dans chacun des pays bénéficiaires de 1' aide alimentaire on a observé qu'aucun circuit de 
commercialisation de la production locale n' a été à ce jour mis en place. En effet, il ne 
subsiste que des fragments de structures étatiques hérités de l'ancien régime qui, faute de 
moyens financiers et d'un personnel motivé et compétent, s'acquittent tant bien que mal de 
cette tâche. Ces sociétés sont forcées de pratiquer des prix dissuasifs ou encore 
abandonnent une part de la commercialisation de la production au commerce privé qui 
exploité une situation n'encourageant en aucun cas le paysan à mettre sa production sur le 
marché. 
Devant le manque de perspectives d'une rétribution équitable de son travail le paysan a 
tendance à se limiter à" 1' autosuffisance" ne voyant pas l'intérêt de produire en vue de 
commercialiser. 
Cette situation liée aux autres contraintes telles que le manque de moyens financiers, d' 
intrants, d'équipement et de structure d'encadrement conduit inévitablement à une 
diminution généralisée de la production agricole. 
PROPOSITIONS 
En vue de redynamiser le secteur de la production agricole une politique de 
commercialisation basée sur des prix plus justes et sur la libre concurrence doit être mise 
en place, ceci tout en protégeant le producteur dans un premier temps contre les 
tendances spéculatives du commerce privé. 
Pour ce faire les fonds de contrepartie pourraient servir au financement de deux 
instruments: 
- l'installation d'un commerce privé; 
-d' une structure para-étatique destinée à protéger le paysan et le consommateur 
contre les spéculations du commerce privé . 
a) Organisation du commerce privé 
Trente cinq %(35) des fonds de contrepartie devront servir à garantir le crédit qui sera mis 
à la disposition de la commercialisation privée des céréales; ceci devrait permettre de 
mobiliser au niveau des banques privées une somme trois fois supérieure à ce 
pourcentage. Si l'on escompte que les 35 % des fonds de contrepartie qui seront 
accumulés représenteront environ en monnaie locale l'équivalent de dix sept (17) MECU 
la somme totale mobilisable sous forme de crédit bancaire pourrait représenter pour les 
cinq pays quelques cinquante(50) MECU. Ceci représente l'achat de plus de 500 000 
tonnes au prix du marché mondial. Pour organiser le secteur privé les cinq pays devront 
mettre sur place des services du type "chambre de commerce" regroupant les 
commerçants en céréales capables de s'acquitter de cette tache ( ils devront notamment 
démontrer qu'ils ont un accès au crédit bancaire et qu'ils disposent de moyens suffisants et 
d'équipement pour remplir leurs obligations).L'assistance technique de TACIS sera fournie 
au niveau de la mise en place des "chambres de commerce" et des crédits de campagne . 
Dans le cas où il y a un accord avec le F.M.Î. il sera nécessaire de procéder à une révision 
des taux d'intérêt de crédit qui seront pratiqués au cours de la campagne d'achat 
13. 
b) Structure d'état garantissant le prix au producteur 
.65 % des fonds de contrepartie seront utilisés afin de protéger le producteur contre les 
excès spéculatifs du commerce privé Une structure appropriée sera mise en place qui 
achètera à un prix minimum garanti la quantité équivalente à ce fonds. Ce % représente 
un montant en monnaie locale équivalent à 32 MECU devant permettre l'achat dans les 
cinq pays concernés de plus de 320.000 tonnes à un prix minimum garanti équivalent à 90 
ECU/tonne. 
Ce prix est comparable aux tendances actuelles du marché international et représente 
suivant les cas de figure une augmentation variant entre 30 % et 300 % des prix pratiqués 
à ce jour dans chacun de ces pays. 
Ces achats devront permettre la régulation des prix à la production en offrant aux 
producteurs la possibilité de choisir entre le prix offert par le commerce privé et le prix 
rninimum garanti offert par la structure para-étatique. 
Par ailleurs, les quantités achetées par la structure para-étatique ajoutées aux quantités 
livrées par l'aide alimentaire permetteront par la suite de réguler le prix aux 
consommateurs. En effet, ces stocks pourront si besoin briser les hausses de prix qui 
pourraient résulter d'une rétention de stocks par le commerce privé, rétention ayant pour 
objectifs des hausses artificielles du prix au niveau des consommateurs. 
T.A.C.I.S. fournira l'assistance technique nécessaire en vue de mettre en place la structure 
appropriée. 
RESULTATS ESCOMPTES 
-Cette stratégie offre au producteur la garantie de commercialiser sa production. 
-Cette approche permettera la mise en place d'un commerce des céréales structuré qui 
évitera dans une certaine mesure de laisser cette activité aux mains de structures mafieuses 
profitant comme dans beaucoup d'autres pays d'une dérégulation sauvage de ce 
commerce. 
-Par les moyens financiers mis à la disposition de cette structure le producteur aura la 
garantie non seulement qu'il sera payé mais également que son labeur sera rémunéré à un 
juste prix. 
-Le producteur aura l'opportunité de choisir entre l'offre du commerce privé et celle des 
organismes d'état et de conclure un accord commercial avec le circuit qui lui convient le 
mieux. 
-La redistribution dans le milieu rural de ces moyens financiers devra permettre au paysan 
de recapitaliser et donc de lui permettre d'investir dans le système de production agricole. 
-L'ensemble de ces mesures devrait encourager à moyen terme une relance de la 
production agricole et in fine un meilleur échange des flux commerciaux entre la ville et la 
campagne. 
-Les pays bénéficiaires disposeront de ressources alimentaires suffisantes qui devront 
permettre d'éviter les spéculations abusives sur les prix aux consommateurs et donc de 
contribuer à la stabilité sociale. 
-L'ensemble de cette approche devra permettre de libérer plus de 800.000 tonnes de 
production locale en céréale ( à comparer avec moins de 400.000 tonnes commercialisées 
à ce jour) et mettre en place une structure qui permettra à l'avenir aux pays bénéficiaires 
de mieux combler leurs besoins alimentaires et donc de se passer d' une aide alimentaire 
massive. 
H 
RESUME PAR PAYS DES DISPONIBILITES FINANCIERES ET DES 
OBJECTIFS D'ACHAT 
Pays 
Arménie 
Azerbaïdjan 
Géorgie 
Kyrgistan 
Tadjikistan 
TOTAL Quantité 
d'aide 
alimentaire à 
livrer 
en 95-96 MT 
140.000 
136.000 
192.000 
44.000 
144.000 
656.000 Fonds de 
contrepart 
ie attendus 
en MECU 
10,5 
10,2 
14,4 
3,3 
10,8 
49,2 Appui au 
commerce 
privé en 
MECU 
(35%) 
3,68 
3,57 
5,04 
1,16 
3,78 
17,23 Achat du 
commerce 
privé MT 
(*) 
110.400 
107 100 
151.200 
34.800 
113.400 
516.900 Appui à la 
sécurisation 
en MECU 
6,82 
6,63 
9,36 
2,14 
7,02 
31,97 Achat à 
prix 
garanti 
en MT 
68.200 
66.300 
93.600 
21.400 
70.200 
319.700 
(*) Ces quantités sont calculées sur le fait que la garantie bancaire offre 3 fois plus de 
crédits et donc trois fois plus de possibilités d'achat 
\b 
ANNEXE 
AVAILABILITY OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES 
N°of 
budget line 
B7/210 
B7/211 
B7/214 
B7/215 
B7/216 
B7/217 
Food aid 
B7/200 
Rub. 4 
Emergency 
Reserve Title 
ECHO general 
Hum. food aid 
Centr.& East. 
Europe 
Hum. aid in 
ex-USSR 
(ex TACIS) 
Hum. actions 
through NGOs 
Refugee 
operations 
Food aid for 
developping 
countries Budget 
MECU 
51.861 
33.6 
102.70 
46.70 
12.102 
26.143 
290 Disbursements 
& 
commitments 
31.60 
26.09 
99.70 
43.20 
23.30 
290 Remarks 
on 
utilisation Earmarked 
MECU 
20.26 
7.51 
3.00 
3.50 
2.84 
, Balance 
MECU 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
including 0.86 MECU transferred from budget line B7/216 and a BRS of 10 MECU. 
2 All transferred to budget lines B7/210 and B7/217. 
including 11.24 MECU transferred from budget line B7/216. 
it» 11 
ISSN 0254-1513 
COM(95) 313 def. 
DOCUMENTEN 
NL 11 
Catalogusnummer : CB-CQ-95-363-NL-C 
ISBN 92-77-91496-3 
Bureau voor officiële pubiikaties der Europese Gemeenschappen 
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