NL Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie C 37/50

STEUNMAATREGELEN VAN DE STATEN — VERENIGD KONINKRIJK

Steunmaatregel SA.15373 (2013/C-18) (ex 2013/NN) — Controle van de bestaande steunregeling „Enterprise Capital Funds” (C 17/04)

Uitnodiging overeenkomstig artikel 108, lid 2, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie om opmerkingen te maken

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2014/C 37/05)

De Commissie heeft Verenigd Koninkrijk bij schrijven van 20 november 2013, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 108, lid 2, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de steunmaatregel ten aanzien waarvan de Commissie de procedure inleidt, kenbaar maken door deze binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking te zenden aan:

Europese Commissie Directoraat-Generaal Concurrentie Griffie Staatssteun 1049 Brussel BELGIË Faxnummer: (32-2) 296 1242

Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van het Verenigd Koninkrijk worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

TEKST VAN DE SAMENVATTING

1. DE PROCEDURE

De Commissie heeft de steunregeling (SA.15373) "Enterprise Capital Funds" (hierna "ECFs" genoemd) op 3 mei 2005 goedgekeurd op grond van artikel 87, lid 3, onder c), van het EG-Verdrag (thans artikel 107, lid 3, onder c), VWEU) en met name op grond van de mededeling van de Commissie betreffende staatssteun en risicokapitaal van 2001 (1) die toen van kracht was, nadat zij de formele onderzoeksprocedure had ingeleid (C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)).

Bij brief van 18 oktober 2006 zegden de Britse autoriteiten toe dienstige maatregelen te zullen nemen met betrekking tot al hun bestaande risicokapitaalregelingen.

In 2011 werd de ESFs-regeling geselecteerd om aan staatssteuncontrole te worden onderworpen (SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)). Hierbij werd vastgesteld dat het VK geen dienstige maatregelen had genomen om de ECFs-regeling in overeenstemming te brengen met de risicokapitaalrichtsnoeren van 2006. Per email van 16 juni 2013 verstrekten de Britse autoriteiten informatie over de uitvoering van de bestaande regeling; op 12 juli 2013 verschaften zij aanvullende gegevens.

2. BESCHRIJVING VAN DE BESTAANDE ECFS-REGELING

De ECFs-regeling werd opgezet om, door samenvoeging van publieke en particuliere investeringen, de toegang van kmo's tot expansiekapitaal in het gehele VK te verbeteren. Het bedrag aan publieke middelen in een ECF mocht maximaal tweemaal zo groot zijn als het door het fonds aangetrokken particuliere kapitaal. De verdeling van winst en verlies tussen openbare en particuliere investeerders in ECFs berustte op het beginsel dat bij slechte resultaten de verliezen gelijkelijk met de particuliere investeerders werden gedeeld, terwijl bij goede resultaten de verdeling van de winst niet op gelijke voet (pari passu) plaatsvond (dat wil zeggen dat de particuliere investeerders het grootste aandeel in de winst zouden hebben boven een bepaalde rentabiliteitsdrempel). Door dit mechanisme werd gewaarborgd dat de ECFs, hoewel zij staatssteun ontvingen, toch commercieel georiënteerd waren.

ECFs mochten met eigenvermogensinstrumenten en quasi-eigenvermogensinstrumenten in subsidiabele kmo's investeren voor een bedrag tussen 250 000 GBP (357 000 EUR) en 2 miljoen GBP (2,9 miljoen EUR). Investeringen met louter vreemd vermogen waren op grond van de regeling uitdrukkelijk verboden. Vervolginvesteringen waren toegestaan zolang het totale risicokapitaal dat de kmo's via ECFs en andere risicokapitaalverschaffers aantrokken, niet meer bedroeg dan 2 miljoen GBP (2,9 miljoen EUR). Indien nodig waren vervolginvesteringen boven deze limiet toegestaan, doch pas na een periode van zes maanden en om verwatering te voorkomen. Er mocht hierbij evenwel niet meer dan tien procent van het vast toegezegde kapitaal van een ECF worden geïnvesteerd. In het kader van de ECFs-regeling werden twaalf fondsen opgericht, waarvan zeven na 18 augustus 2007, dat wil zeggen na de uiterste datum waarop de Britse autoriteiten dienstige maatregelen hadden moeten nemen na de inwerkingtreding van de risicokapitaalrichtsnoeren op 18 augustus 2006. Deze fondsen investeerden in 94 ondernemingen.

Uit door de Britse autoriteiten overgelegde bewijsstukken maakt de Commissie op dat drie ECFs in zeven ondernemingen vervolginvesteringen verrichtten om verwatering te voorkomen. Het komt de Commissie voor dat de ECFs dankzij de regeling een "preëmptief mechanisme" konden toepassen waarbij een ECF een recht van eerste weigering kon uitoefenen in geval van de verwerving van nieuwe aandelen die waren uitgegeven door een doelonderneming in de portefeuille van dat ECF, om te voorkomen dat particuliere investeerders in dergelijke ondernemingen zouden investeren en daarmee het aandelenkapitaal van het ECF zouden verwateren. De Britse autoriteiten hebben echter verklaard dat een dergelijk mechanisme nooit in de praktijk is toegepast, en zij hebben toegezegd dit ook in de toekomst niet te zullen doen.

3. BEOORDELING

In haar beoordeling betwijfelde de Commissie of de ECFs-regeling in overeenstemming was met de huidige risicokapitaalrichtsnoeren, met name wat de volgende aspecten betreft:

a) Inaanmerkingkoming van verscheidene doelondernemingen voor investeringen

De risicokapitaalrichtsnoeren beperken de investering van risicokapitaal (punt 4.3.2): 1) voor kleine ondernemingen tot de expansiefase, 2) voor middelgrote ondernemingen tot de aanloopfase, ongeacht de vestigingsplaats van de doelondernemingen (dat wil zeggen ongeacht of zij in een steungebied gevestigd zijn), en 3) voor middelgrote ondernemingen tot de expansiefase, mits zij in een steungebied gevestigd zijn.

De Commissie stelt vast dat zes doelondernemingen kennelijk in hun expansiefase waren omdat zij op het moment van de eerste ECFs-investering al een aanzienlijk aantal jaren commerciële activiteiten uitoefenden. Vier van de zes betrokken doelondernemingen waren kleine ondernemingen ten tijde van de investering; deze investeringen voldeden derhalve aan de beperkende voorwaarden van de richtsnoeren. Twee ondernemingen, Reevoo and Interactive Investors, waren echter op het moment van de ECFs-investering middelgrote ondernemingen (2), omdat zij de drempel met betrekking tot het aantal werknemers overschreden (4). Bovendien waren zij in Londen gevestigd, dat geen steungebied is, zodat zij slechts tot de aanloopfase steun mochten ontvangen.

In deze fase van het onderzoek lijkt de verenigbaarheid van deze twee investeringen met de risicokapitaalrichtsnoeren van 2006 twijfelachtig, omdat er nauwelijks aanwijzingen zijn voor marktfalen. Belanghebbenden worden verzocht opmerkingen te maken over deze late investeringen en over het bestaan van marktfalen, dat volgens de richtsnoeren van 2006 een voorwaarde voor steun is.

b) Gebruik van vervangingsinvesteringen

Uit door de Britse autoriteiten ingediende stukken maakt de Commissie op dat het fonds […] (*) eenmaal in een "buy-in management buy-out" (BIMBO) heeft geïnvesteerd. De doelonderneming, Andante Travels, was op het moment van de investering 28 jaar in bedrijf. Zij had […] (*) personen in dienst en een jaaromzet van […] (*).

De richtsnoeren verbieden buy-outs en vervangingsinvesteringen. Daarom moet worden onderzocht in hoeverre deze transactie het handelsverkeer heeft beïnvloed door belanghebbenden in de gelegenheid te stellen hierover opmerkingen te maken.

Gezien het voorafgaande is de Commissie voorlopig van oordeel dat de bovengenoemde investeringen van ECFs verscheidene doelondernemingen een economisch voordeel hebben verschaft, omdat zij een investering/steun hebben ontvangen die niet strookte met de bepalingen van de richtsnoeren van 2006. De Commissie betwijfelt vooralsnog of dergelijke steun als verenigbaar met de interne markt kan worden beschouwd.

Overeenkomstig artikel 14 van Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 van de Raad kan alle onrechtmatige steun van de begunstigde worden teruggevorderd.

TEKST VAN DE BRIEF

„The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter "TFEU"). 1. PROCEDURE (1) The Enterprise Capital Funds ("ECFs") scheme (SA.15373) was approved by the Commission on 3 May 2005 under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty (now Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) and in particular on the basis of the Risk Capital Guidelines of 2001 ("RCGs of 2001") (5), in force at the time, after opening a formal investigation procedure (C 17/2004 (ex N 566/03)). (2) In September 2006, following a meeting with the UK authorities, the services of the Commission informed the UK authorities that the ECFs scheme was not in line with the Risk Capital Guidelines adopted in August 2006 (hereafter "RCGs of 2006") and invited them to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with them. (3) By letter of 18 October 2006, the UK authorities committed to take appropriate measures concerning all their existing risk capital schemes. (4) In 2011, the ECFs scheme was selected for the State aid monitoring exercise (SA.15373 (ex 2011/MX)). It was found that the UK had failed to take appropriate measures to bring the ECFs scheme in line with the RCGs of 2006. (5) A meeting took place on 21 May 2013 between the Commission services and the UK authorities where the former proposed that the monitoring case and several changes to the scheme, which were subsequently notified on 21 August 2013 (SA.36428) by the UK authorities, be treated separately in two cases but parallel in time. (6) By e-mail of 16 June 2013, the Commission services received information on the implementation of the existing scheme. The information was updated by e-mail of 12 July 2013. (7) Two teleconferences took place on 1 and 2 July 2013 to discuss several elements of the case, and a meeting took place on 6 August 2013 where the UK authorities clarified several aspects of the operations that took place under the existing scheme. 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXISTING ECFS SCHEME (DECISION OF 2005) (8) Combining public and private investment, the ECFs scheme aimed at improving access to expansion capital for SMEs throughout the UK. Public investment was limited to two times the private capital raised by the fund, i.e. minimum one third of an ECF fund was to be provided by private investors. (9) The distribution of the profits and losses between public and private investors in the ECFs was based on the logic that, on the downside, the losses were distributed on equal terms with the private investors being fully exposed, while on the upside the distribution of the profits was non pari passu, i.e. private investors received most of the profits notably above a certain profitability rate. (6) This mechanism ensured that ECFs were commercially oriented while entailing state aid. (10) According to the rules of the scheme (7), an ECF may invest expansion capital in any company: — that meets the EU definition of an SME; — where the purpose of the relevant investment, or the application of the proceeds of such investment by the relevant company or undertaking, is predominantly related to or for the benefit of the economy of the UK; — whose equity or other securities are not, at the time of investment, listed on a recognised stock exchange (such as the London Stock Exchange) or otherwise quoted on a non-recognised exchange, i.e. AIM, Ofex or any other market on which prices are quoted publicly; — where the trade of such company is a qualifying trade as defined in Paragraph 4, Schedule 28B of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, or where the company is undertaking research and development with a view to carrying on a qualifying trade (8). (11) ECF funds invested in eligible SMEs by means of equity and quasi-equity instruments between £250,000 (€357,000) and £2m (€2.9m). Pure debt investments were explicitly forbidden under the scheme (9). (12) Follow-on investments were permitted so long as the total equity funding raised by the SMEs from ECFs and other equity investors was no more than the £2m (€2.9m) limit. (13) Follow-on investments in excess of the above limit, i.e. £2m (€2.9m), were permitted, where necessary, only after a period of at least 6 months and to prevent dilution, subject to an upper limit of 10% of each ECF’s committed capital. (14) From the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that three ECFs, made follow-on anti-dilution investments in 7 companies. The Commission understands that the scheme allowed the ECFs to use a "pre-emption mechanism" whereby the ECFs could exercise a right of first refusal to acquire new shares issued by any investee in the ECF's portfolio, in order to prevent private investors from investing in such companies and thereby dilute the ECF's shareholding. However, the UK authorities have indicated that such a mechanism has never been applied in practice and that they committed not to make use of it in the future. (15) The ECFs scheme was initially approved for a period of 10 years, until 2 May 2015, and was intended to be self-financing over the medium term. For the first year of its operation, the UK allocated €65m to cover the cash-flow cost of the initial public participation. (16) 12 funds were created under the ECFs scheme, out of which 7 were created after 18 August 2007 that is, the date after which the scheme should have been aligned with the RGCs of 2006. The pre-2007 funds invested in 67 companies, while the post 2007 funds invested in 94 companies. Therefore, a total of 161 undertakings have benefited from the scheme. 3. OUTCOME OF THE MONITORING (17) The ECFs scheme was monitored by the Commission services in the light of (1) the Commission's decision of 2005 approving the measure and (2) the RCGs of 2006. (18) The assessment led to the conclusion that the scheme was not in line with the RCGs of 2006 as the UK authorities should have taken appropriate measures within 12 months from their entry into force, i.e. as from 18 August 2007, which they failed to do. The issue of appropriate measures arose with respect to ECFs that received public capital after 18 August 2007i.e. after the date by which the UK authorities should have adopted appropriate measures, at the latest, following the entry into force of the RCGs of 2006 on 18 August 2006. In practice, this meant that only the funds created after the end of the transitional period would need to comply with the RCGs of 2006, whilst the already existing risk capital funds could continue to operate under the rules established by the RSGs of 2001. (19) For the reasons explained in section 4 below, the Commission has doubts with respect to the compliance of the ECFs scheme's implementation with the RCGs of 2006, and particularly with respect to: a) Eligibility for investment of several investees; b) Use of capital replacement operations. 4. ASSESSMENT 4.1. Existence of State aid (20) In the decision of 2005 the Commission concluded that State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU is present at the level of the investors and at the level of the beneficiary SMEs. Therefore, through the implementation of the ECF scheme, the companies that are the object of the current monitoring case have received State aid in the sense of the above mentioned article. The UK authorities do not contest this conclusion. 4.2. Eligibility for investment of several investees (21) Since the creation of the scheme, the ECFs invested in 161 companies, of which 94 were investments made after 18 August 2007. Out of the 94 companies, 40 companies had not had sales at the time of the first investment. Of the remaining 54 companies, 6 appear to have been in their expansion stage since, at the moment of ECF's first investment, they had had commercial activities for a significant number of years. (22) The RCGs of 2006 (Point 4.3.2) limit the investment of risk capital to: (1) small enterprises up to the expansion stage and irrespective of their location, i.e. located in assisted or non-assisted areas (2) medium-size enterprises up to the start-up stage, irrespective of their location, and (3) medium-sized enterprises up to the expansion stage located in assisted areas. (23) The Commission notes that four out of the six above mentioned companies fulfil the definition of small enterprises at the moment of the investment. Therefore, although they seem to have been companies in their expansion stage, given their size, the investments were made in accordance with the limits set out in the RCGs of 2006. (24) The two other companies, Interactive Investors and Reevoo (10) exceeded, at the moment of the first investment, the threshold for a small enterprise (12). Therefore, at the moment of the investment, the two companies qualified as medium enterprises. Moreover, given their location in London, which is a non-assisted area, they could have received investment only up to the start-up phase (13). (25) Consequently, the Commission expresses doubts with respect to the compatibility of the aid for the investments into the two companies as they qualified as medium size enterprises, were in their expansion stage and were located in non-assisted areas. (26) The Commission may declare compatible measures providing finance for medium-sized enterprises in their expansion stage located in non-assisted areas, subject to a detailed assessment (balancing) of the individual case under Chapter 5 of the RCGs of 2006, including any evidence of market failure. At this stage of the investigation, the compatibility of the aid for these two investments with the RCGs of 2006 seems doubtful as there is limited evidence with respect to the market failure they faced. Third parties are invited to submit comments notably on the existence of a market failure with respect to such late-stage development companies as well as any other information relevant for making an in-depth assessment of the aid measure at issue under Section 5 of the RCG 2006. 4.3. Use of a capital replacement transaction (27) Based on the evidence provided by the UK authorities, the Commission understands that the fund […] invested in one buy-in management buy-out (14) (BIMBO). The target company, Andante Travels, had 28 years of commercial activities at the moment of the investment. At the moment of the investment, the company employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […]. (28) Under the RCGs of 2006 the venture capital and risk capital measures refer to new/fresh capital being provided to the investees. Since they have limited impact on the cash/balance sheet of an investee, capital replacement operations are not foreseen as compatible measures under the Guidelines. Hence, in its practice the Commission considers them as not covered by the Guidelines (15), irrespective of the location of the investee, i.e. assisted or not-assisted area. In order to further assess the conditions in which the operation took place and to test its impact on competition, the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure with respect to the above BIMBO operation and invites third parties to present comments on it. 5. CONCLUSION (29) Based on the foregoing analysis, the Commission considers that the ECFs may have granted aid outside of the scope of the approved scheme without prior notification. Therefore it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU in relation to funding decisions by the ECFs as to the following elements: a) Eligibility for investment into Reevoo and Interactive Investor; b) Use of one capital replacement transaction, namely the above BIMBO that benefited Andante Travels. (30) The Commission requires the United Kingdom and all interested parties, within one month from the receipt of this letter, to provide all documents, information and data needed for assessing the compatibility of the above-mentioned measures with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU.. (31) The Commission wishes to remind the authorities of the United Kingdom that Article 108(3) TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw their attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. (32) The Commission informs the authorities of the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

(1) PB C 235 van 21.8.2001, blz. 3.

(2) Op het moment van de eerste ECFs-investering was Reevoo negen jaar commercieel actief, had het bedrijf […] () personen in dienst en had het een jaaromzet van […] (*), terwijl Interactive Investors elf jaar commercieel actief was, […] (*) personen in dienst had en een jaaromzet had van […] (*).

(3) Valt onder het beroepsgeheim.

(4) 2003/361/EG - Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie L 124/39. Volgens artikel 2 van de bijlage bij de Aanbeveling van de Commissie van 6 mei 2003 betreffende de definitie van kleine, middelgrote en micro-ondernemingen, wordt een onderneming als een middelgrote onderneming beschouwd wanneer deze tussen de 50 en 250 personen in dienst heeft en een jaaromzet heeft van ten hoogste 50 miljoen EUR en/of een jaarlijks balanstotaal van ten hoogste 43 miljoen EUR. Verder wordt een onderneming als een kleine onderneming beschouwd wanneer zij minder dan 50 personen in dienst heeft een jaaromzet en/of een jaarlijks balanstotaal heeft van ten hoogste 10 miljoen EUR.

(5) OJ C 235, 21.8.2001, p. 3.

(6) The government receives a prioritised return equivalent to the interest charged on the balance of outstanding loans to the fund (at the time 4.3%). Once the government has received its prioritised return, outstanding loans may then be repaid to the government and the private investors under the terms specified in the ECFs' partnership agreement. All further distributions to investors are to be divided between the government and all other private investors in a fixed profit-sharing ratio.

(7) Enterprise Capital Fund – Guidance for applicants http://www.capitalforenterprise.gov.uk/files/Guidance%20for%20Prospective%20ECF%20Managers%20-%20V2.pdf

(8) A trade will not qualify if one or more excluded activities together make up a 'substantial part' of that trade. The main excluded activities are: (1) dealing in land, financial instruments, or in goods other than in the course of an ordinary trade of retail or wholesale distribution; (2) financial activities, property development, or providing legal or accountancy services; (3) leasing (including letting assets on hire, except in the case of certain ship-chartering activities); (4) receiving royalties or licence fees, except where these arise from an intangible asset such as a patent or know-how, most or all of which has been created by the company (or one of its subsidiaries); (5) farming, market gardening, or forestry; (6) operating or managing hotels, guest houses, hostels, or nursing or residential care homes; and (7) providing services to another company in certain circumstances where the other company's trade consists to a substantial extent in excluded activities. Source: Enterprise Capital Funds – Guidance for applicants

(9) ECF's Partnership agreement, Point 3.6: "[ECF] may not acquire Investments in a Portfolio Company… (d) in loan finance or debt instruments with no associated equity securities."

(10) At the moment of the first investment Reevoo had 9 years of commercial activity; it employed […] () persons and had an annual turnover of […]. Interactive Investors had 11 years of commercial activity; it employed […] persons and had an annual turnover of […];Source: UK authorities

(11) Covered by the obligation of professional secrecy;

(12) See Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (OJ L 124 of 20.5.2003, p. 36), Annex I, Article 2(2) (50 employees).

(13) The Commission also notes that Reevoo had been backed by well-known venture capital firms, i.e. […] and […] (Source: UK authorities) which puts in question whether the company faced any market failure.

(14) Management buy-out is a form of replacement capital through which one or more managers of a company take control of the company's capital by acquiring the majority of shares from the actual owner(s). When the buyer is an outsider of the company who will become manager once the operation is completed, the transaction is called management buy-in. A BIMBO occurs when existing management, along with outside managers, decide to buyout a company. Buy-in management buyout (BIMBO) is a form of a buyout that incorporates characteristics of both a management buy-out and a management buy-in.

(15) See, e.g., Case SA.36489 (2013/N), recital (41)